Conflict and Peace in Mindanao (MILF)

A summary of Accord and other publications

General information1
Philippines Area Population Ethnic 2 groups Religions HDI
4

February 6, 2010
Mindanao
95.000 km2 21,5 million 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic indigenous groups (8,3 3 million) : Maranao (2,3), maguindanao (2), tausug (1,5). 18 ethnolinguistic non-Muslim indigenous groups. Catholic Muslim (18-34%) (76% in 1903) Other

ARMM
27. km2 4,1 million Predominanlty Muslim Catholic Muslim (>60%) Other

300.000 km2 90 million Some 12 million Catholic (83%) Muslim (5-10%) Other 102 /179 (2008)

Summary of the conflict and the peace processes Islam arrived to Mindanao before the Spanish Catholic colonizers, and a number of Sultanates were able to resist attempts of external dominance until the US took over as colonial power in 1898. The US and later- the newly independent government in Manila promoted the settlement of Christians from the rest of the Philippines in the fertile lands of Mindanao, displacing local (Muslim and non-Muslim) population. By the 1960s the local population had been minoritized, while deep-rooted prejudices against Muslims remain up to date in the rest of the Philippines. Discrimination, Islamic revivalism, and the massacre of several Muslim soldiers during their military service sparkled armed struggle for an independent state, first against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and subsequently against the democratic State. When the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) accepted the option of autonomy, a Final Peace Agreement was signed (1996). In 1977 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from the MNLF in disagreement with the leadership and their willingness to accept autonomy. Peace negotiations between the government and the MILF have been dragging on since 1997. While MILF has also dropped the demand for independence, the most contentious issues are the territorial extension and the degree of economic and political power of a new devolved entity. Meanwhile, the MNLF and the government are still negotiating the implementation of the 1996 agreement. Armed conflict and peace negotiations in Mindanao have become among the most protracted in the world. At the same time, Mindanao also benefits from one of the most vibrant and creative civil societies. Main agreements (GRP-MILF) 1997 1998 2001 2002 2008 2009 July 18: Agreement of General Cessation of Hostilities. August 27: General Framework of Agreement of Intent. June: Tripoli Agreement on Peace. August: Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement. May 7: Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement. June: The Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up. August 5: MoA on Ancestral Domain (signature aborted by Supreme Court) September 15: Framework Agreement on the International Contact Group. October 27: Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component in the International Monitoring Team December 8: Resumption of peace talks (Kuala Lumpur)

Source: Wikipedia, accessed June 2009. Tausug are from the Sulu archipelago; Maguindanaws are from the Cotabatos; Maranaws are from the Lanao provinces. Misuari is a Tausug; MILF is mainly Maranaw and Maguindanaw. 3 Figures are contested: estimates of the Moro population range from 3-11 million (Tuminez 2008). 4 Still a contentious issue between the oficial census and the Office of Muslim Affairs (Human Development Report, 2005)
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Actors
Conflict Negotia -tions & Implementation Internal Government (GRP) - MILF (MNLF, NPA, Abu Sayyaf) OPAPP (GRP) and MILF Peace Panels and Technical Committees. External (US) Libya (2001), Malaysia (since 2001) International Monitoring Team (Malaysia, Indonesia, Libya, Brunei, Japan) (US, Euopean Union, OIC, have offered facilitating roles) UNDP (2005-2009 Program of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building) World Bank (heads multi-donor trust fund for development in conflict affected areas) ICRC (observance of IHL) International Contact Group (Japan, Turkey, UK + 4 International NGOs) (see below) Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue The Asia Foundation Muhammadiya Conciliation Resources USIP (2003- 2007) Nonviolent Peace Forces (J. Galtung, JP Lederach,...), etc.

CSOs

Bishops-Ulama Forum, Konsult Mindanaw Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society Mindanao Peoples Caucus Mindanao Peace Weavers University Consortium Mindanao Commission of Women Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy, Young Moro Professionals Network etc.

Data on the armed conflict

Duration Incompatibility Factors leading to conflict Government troops Paramilitary Opposition troops Child soldiers Deaths Displacements
5

1984 Territory Moro common identity develops in the late 60s as a reaction to discrimination and influenced by Islamic revivalism. Legal: CAFGU(in support of the Military). CVO (in support of the Police). Illegal (very active in the 70s): Ilaga (Christian). Barracuda (Muslim). Several local politicians have government-tolerated private armies MILF: some 13.000 120.000 (1970-2004) 7 1,178 rebels, 475 members security forces (1986-2004) Massive short-term displacement with each Gvmt military offensive: 2000: almost one million. 2003: 400.000. 2008: 600.000. Thousands of Moros fled to Sabah (Malaysia) in the 70s. Rebels have had external support from Libya, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan at different times. Current main source of finance seems to be zakhat.
6

Refugees Finance

Data on negotiations
Negotiations between armed actors (When? Where? How long? What?)

1996-2000, the Domestic Stage (close to Cotabato, in Mindanao) Exploratory and preparatory talks: Aug-Sep 1997. Formation of technical committees: Cessation of Hostilities and Agenda Setting: Oct.96-Jan.97. Low-level negotiations: January 97-September 99. MILF presents a nine-point non-exclusive 9 agenda . Recurrent hostilities. Forging of the: Agreement of General Cessation of Hostilities (18 July 1997). General Framework of Agreement of Intent (27 August 1998). Joint Acknowledgement (10 Feb 1997 and 6 Oct 1997) of MILF-camps. Formal Peace Talks: October 1999-June 2000: 3 rounds of formal peace talks (Jan., March '00), and Technical Committee meetings (Feb-June '00), with Technical Working Groups on MILF's 9 agenda items. Aide Memoire (27 April '00) of a special meeting of the peace panels which anticipated a GRP proposed political package, presented in subsequent meetings (May-June '00) as a proposal for meaningful autonomy.

www.iiss.org Schiavo-Campo (2005). 7 Human Development Report (2005). 8 This section draws mainly from Santos (2005). 9 Ancestral domain; displaced and landless Bangsamoro; destruction of properties and war victims; HR; social and cultural discrimination; corruption of the mind and the moral fiber; economic inequities and poverty; exploitation of natural resources; agrarian reform.
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 Estrada declares all-out-war against MILF: April-July 2000. Suspension: June 2000-February 2001. MILF withdrawal from talks (June 2000). AFP capture of MILF's main stronghold Camp Abubakar (July 2000). Hashim calls for jihad against GRP (July 2000) and subsequent shift from semiconventional to guerrilla warfare in a spiral of hostilities. 2001-2004, the Diplomatic stage (in Malaysia, except 1 round in Libya) January: Estrada falls, Arroyo declares all-out-peace. March 2001: exploratory talks lead to Agmt on the Gral. Framework for Resumption of Talks. Formal phase (April 2001 February 2002) st June: 1 round formal talks lead to Tripoli Agreement on Peace, the framework for 3 basic components of the peace process: security, rehabilitation, ancestral domain. nd July, August: 2 round leads to Agmt. on Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect. October: 3d round leads to Agmt. on Manual of Instructions for Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs). Backchannel phase (March 2002 - February 2003) March: Arroyo suspends formal talks. May 6: GRP-MILF Joint Communiqu on the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups operating in Mindanao. May 7: Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace. June: MILFs project implementing body, the Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up to lead, manage and determine rehabilitation and development projects in the conflictaffected areas. February 2003: AFPs Bulliok Offensive to capture MILFs new headquarters. Suspension & Exploratory talks (6 rounds: March 2003 December 2004). March 2003: Joint Statement reiterating commitment to resume formal peace negotiations and to honour and implement past agreements. June 20: Hashim rejects terror as a means to resolve differences. June 22: MILF extends its ceasefire indefinitely. July 19: Agmt. Mutual Cessation of Hostilities. October 2004: Deployment of IMT. 2005 2008 Discussions on Ancestral Domain (AD) Sept 05: Panels announce they successfully finished most difficult hurdle in the AD agenda. March 06: Malaysia cancels peace talks because of political situation in Manila. Sept. 06: Peace talks resume. Impasse over territory. June 07: Afable resigns reportedly because of lack of support from the Govt. October 07: Panels announce ending the 13-month impasse. November 07: Parties agree to the scope and boundaries of the AD. Dec.07: Peace talks are stalled due to constitutional issues. May 08: The Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute is established. July 27: Joint communiqu announcing signature of MOA-AD on August 5: 700 villages to hold a referendum (within 12 months of the signing) if they want to join the Muslim homeland. Final peace deal scheduled to be concluded in November 2009. August 4: Supreme Court issues a Temporary Restraining Order for the signing of MOA. MILF attacks civilians; GRP dismantles peace panel; humanitarian crisis (600,000 IDPs). 2009 Reframing (fast-tracking?) July 23: Government suspends military operations (SOMO) July 25: MILF suspends military actions (SOMA) July 29: First meeting after breakdown of talks in 2008 September 15: Framework Agreement on the International Contact Group. October 27: Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component in the IMT. st December 8: Resumption of peace talks (KL). ICG participates for the 1 time. Jan 8-9: Exchange of drafts for a comprehensive compact. Huge differences, crisis. Negotiators Both Peace Panels tend to be composed of five members each. With Pdnt. Arroyo, the GRP panel for the first time was all-Mindanawon. GRP Panels often include retired military. GRP panels have changed frequently. Their latest heads have been Ermita, Afable, Garcia, and Seguis. GRP panel has limited autonomy. Main decisions are taken by the Pdnt & Security Cluster. Murad Ebrahim headed MILF panel until he replaced S. Hashim as MILF chief, and Mohagher Iqbal replaced Ebrahim. Mastura and Buat have also been long-time members of MILF panel. Talks are on-off since they began in 1996, due to repeated skirmishes and to stalemates at the negotiating table. MILF negotiating strategy: incrementality and irreversibility: each agreement represents a small and cumulative step forward. Multiple ceasefire agreements since 1997. Joint Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH); Local Monitoring Teams (LMT) in 13 provinces; Joint CF Monitoring Posts (JCMP) with participation of Bantay Ceasefire (local NGO);
st

Comments

Ceasefires Monitoring

Backchannel / civil society diplomacy Gender Transitional Justice

Joint Monitoring Assistance Center (JMAC); Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). International Monitoring Team (IMT). Withdraws 2008, redeployed Feb. 2010. Backchannels are always open, often including the same negotiators as in the formal stages. At times results-oriented backchannel talks have competed with process-oriented formal talks (as in crafting the agreements in 2001, when backchannel talks did all the job). CBCS brokered MILFs unilateral ceasefire in 2003. No provisions regarding gender in the negotiation process so far. Both panels are currently composed by men, but women have had positions in panels and technical working groups. Women are heading several of the CSO initiatives. No measures so far. There is little discussion on TJ. MILF demanded an international war tribunal as one of the six agenda items in 2000.

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Analysis
Strategic What Main features of conflict and negotiations Factors leading to / enhancing negotiations Moros: right to self-determination Gvmt. Philippines: national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Constitution). On-off peace process, with frequent CF violations from both sides despite multi-layered monitoring provisions. Armed Forces won the 2000 all out war, but did not achieve any peace. Political will of Pdnt. Ramos leads to talks (1996). Conditions for resumption were met: 2001: MILF asked for mediation by OIC member country, neutral foreign venue, honouring all past agreements. 2004: MILF rejected terrorism (2003) and GRP redeployed troops from MILF camp and dropped criminal charges against MILF leaders (2004). 2009: GRP dropped demand of surrender of MILF rogue commanders and DDR as precondition; ICG was established to provide additional international guarantees. HD Centre promotes private meetings of Eminent persons (Koffi Annan, Jonathan Powell, Gerry Kelly, Francesc Vendrell) September 2008 June 2009 with the parties. MILF has dropped the demand for independence. International Contact Group (since Dec09). According to Ferrer (2004): 1. Incoherent Govt policy and absence of peacebuilding leadership (on both sides). 2. Lack of national consensus on the need and the way to solve the conflict. 3. International order (Global War on Terror). 4. Pro-war interests (military, economic, political (Govt). 5. Poor governance, patronage, and underdevelopment. 6. Failure of the ARMM. Election periods. Philippines still needs to find its own identity. Is it a nation of nations? (Galtung 2009) Competing policy positions (Oquist 2005) Consultative process initiated by the National Unification Commission (1992), leading to the Six Paths to Peace Govt peace policy (1993). Creation of the Office of the Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process (1993). MILF heads Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA, 2002), and the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (2008) ahead of the final compact. Peace advocates appointed in GRP panels. (Sylvia Okinlay-Paraguya; Ging Deles). Zones of peace as grass-roots initiatives. Inter-faith dialogue. Civilian monitoring of ceasefires (Bantay Ceasefire). Bakwit Power (IDP mobilizations) Distrust has not been addressed. Feelings of resentment among the majority population. Traditional patronage politics. Reluctance of OIC, ASEAN to play a role. Lopsided distribution of funds to ARMM provinces. Lack of government transparency, intentions, unified voice. Neither GRP or MILF seem to be in fully command of its forces. The 9 MILF demands (1999) to address the Moro problem have not been met. Congress, more than the executive, will emerge as the key institution with the mandate and power to resolve the troubles, for it is the venue where the substantial provisions for autonomy will be debated. Local governments should play a bigger role in ARMM (and the peace process). Efforts needed to get the process back on track: 1. Rethinking military strategies (eventual pull out). Sectors of the military may be part of the solution. 2. Sustained social discourse on the issue of a multi-nation state to accommodate identities earlier excluded in the core of national values. 3. Peace constituency building. The land problem (the greatest potential threat to peace and order, Oquist 2005). Opposing paradigms: liberal democratic system and Moro Islamic system (Santos 2002). Arms proliferation. Culture of violence.

Factors blocking negotiations

Successes / Innovations

Challenges

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OPAPP Accomplishment Report 2006.

Other layers of conflict: o MNLF-GRP: 1996 agmt. has yet to be fully implemented. o MILF-MNLF: despite several efforts, differences and rivalities remain significant. Option of 2 Moro homelands? (Tuminez 2008). o Intra MILF and intra MNLF: both groups face internal dissent. o Family and clan feuds (rido) among Moros and among Lumads (and Chrisitans). o Moros-Lumads: many Lumads feel excluded from the negotiations processes. o Lumads-Lumads: unity is difficult. o Malaysia Philippines: GRP and MNLF still claim the Malaysian province of Sabah. Patterns since Constitution as a stumbling block. Marcos times Pendulum swings between war and peace. (70s): Government efforts to divide and rule by co-opting Moro leaders. Opposition to agreements from (the same families of) local leaders and Congress. Government doesnt speak with one voice. Fragmentation in rebels ranks; rogue leaders. GRP unilateral implementation of agmt with MNLF (1976, 1986). ARMM (and SPCPD) nothing but another bureaucratic layer providing little except position and privilege for self-interested Muslim politicians. Lack of transparency. Lack of grassroots consultations. Lack of popular support to agreements. Little effort to explain the agreement to the population. Neglect of concerns of constituencies other than the ones in dialogue (focus on MNLF in 1996, MILF in 2008). Moro hope to expand ARMM (1996, 2008). Institutional support from churches, business and the media is lukewarm or at times completely absent. GRP sometimes abandons the established framework in the rush to an all-or-nothing resolution. Each time talks are suspended they become more difficult to resume. * Recommendation of a Consultative Meeting January 2002

Role of Civil Society Organizations

CSOs met GMA to present a post-Estrada plan of action (2001). In 2001, GMA ordered consultations with CSOs in Mindanao, especially women and IPs,. Many civic actors viewed the re-escalation of the conflict in 2000 as an illustration of the vulnerability of their efforts and as a setback to nearly 30 years of peacebuilding. Lessons learned in the series of Bishops-Ulama Forum meetings have not trickled down to grassroots level because membership comprises primarily middle to top level religious functionaries. Spaces for peace (former peace zones) improved relationships between Muslim and Christian. Kusog Mindanaw (Jun Mercado) came up with a first 100 days Mindanao agenda for Arroyo. GRP held consultations with CSOs before the first round of negotiations in Tripoli (June 2001), but they were conducted in a rush and lacked broad participation. During the second round, MPC sent a team of four observers, including 2 Lumad, who could interact with negotiators during breaks and meals. Only the limited circle of peace advocates in Mindanao are fully aware of the extent of the groups envolvement in the peace talks. They wider public remains unaware. Local Monitoring Teams are composed of five members: 1 local government, 1 MILF, 1 NGO nominated by GRP, 1 NGO nominated by MILF, and 1 religious leader mutually agreed on by both parties. LMTs activities have so far (2003) been restricted to workshop facilitation, with no serious monitoring. The number of LMTs is limited, and have been severely affected by each episode of violence. MPC therefore developed more active local monitors -Bantay Ceasefire (since 2003)- as an alternative voice. CSOs have been very active, but the powers to decide on war rest in Metro Manila with people who have not, and will not feel the consequences of their decisions. Steven Rood (2005): o Weaknesses of CSOs: Ideological differences (conflicting peace agendas) Muslim underrepresentation. Moving from specific demands to aggregating a broad political agenda. o There is little evidence that interreligious dialogue is having much effect on public opinion. (23) The same for zones of peace and engagement in peace talks. o Main area of impact: monitoring. o CS paradoxically strengthens the state in a number of ways (35) o CS has had an impact in making it politically possible for policy elites to adopt positions other than victory. (2) MILF has conducted mass consultations in several Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assemblies: December 3 -5, 1996, 11 attended by 1,070,697 delegates; June 1-3, 2001, attended by 2,627,345 delegates and May 29-31, 2005.

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www.luwaran.net, accessed August 9, 2009

Sources: Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa, Arguilas, Carolyn. 2003. The Mindanao Peace Process. Accord series update Issue. London: Conciliation Resources. Coronel Ferrer, Miriam. 2002. Philippines National Unification Commission: national consultations

and the 'six paths to peace'. In Owning the process: Public participation in peace processes, ed. Catherine Barnes. Vol. 13. London: Conciliation Resources. . 2004. The Philippines State and Moro resistance: Dynamics of a persistent conflict. Paper
presented at a SEACSN conference. Penang, Malaysia.

Galtung, Johan. 2009. Class, nation and the Philippines, in Pax Christi [database online]. Manila, 2009. Available from http://storage.paxchristi.net/2009-0120-en-ap-HR.pdf.
Jubair, Salah. 1999. Bangsamoro. A nation under endless tyranny, Kuala Lumpur (3d edition): IQ Marin SDN BHD. Lara, J. Champain, P. 2009. Inclusive Peace in Mindanao: Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion. London: International Alert. Martin, E. Tuminez, A. 2008. Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines. A summary and assessment of USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. Special Report 202. Washington DC: USIP.

Oquist, Paul. 2002. Mindanao and beyond. competing policies, protracted conflict, and human security. Manila: UNDP/Philippines. Quevedo, Orlando. 2008. A general roadmap towards lasting peace in Mindanao. Mindanews, 06 September, 2008. Rood, Steven. 2005. Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society. Policy Studies 17. Washington DC: The East-West Center.
Santos, Soliman. 2005. Dynamics and Directions of the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations. Davao City: AFRIM. Stankovitch M.(ed.). 1999. Compromising on Autonomy.Mindanao in Transition. Accord series Issue 6, 1999. London: Conciliation Resources. Tuminez, Astrid. 2008. The Past is Always Present: The Moros of Mindanao and the Quest for Peace. Working Paper Series no. 99. Hong Kong: Southeast Asia Research Center, City University of Hong Kong.

United Nations Development Programme (Philippines), and Human Development Network. 2005. Philippine human development report. Makati, Philippines: United Nations Development Programme.

Chronology
XIVthCentury 1450 XVIth Century 1521 Islam is introduced in Mindanao and Sulu. Sulu sultanate established. Maguindanao sultanate and Buayan sultanate established. Magellan arrives to the Philippines.

1565-1898 Spanish colonial rule 1619 Sultan Qudarat becomes ruler of Maguindanao. Greatest Moro expansion. 1645 Treaties delineate boundaries Maguindanao-Spain and Sulu-Spain. 1751 Spain's encouragement of private expeditions against Moros triggers bloodiest period of Moro-Spanish wars. 1876 Final Jolo campaign. 1898 February: USA declares the war on Spain. 1899-1945 US colonial rule 1899 Kiram-Bates (US-Sulu) Treaty. Never ratified by US Congress. Declared null and void by Pdnt. Roosevelt in 1904. 1906 US troops massacre almost 1000 Moros on Bud Dajo (Sulu). 1912 First formal plan to settle Mindanao with Christians. 1913 Us troops massacre more than 500 Moros on Bud Bagsak (Sulu). 1935 Fist Constitution. US promises independence 10 years later. Dansalan Declaration asks US not to include Mindanao and Sulu in Philippines. 1941-1945 Japanese occupation 1965 1986 Marcos regime 1968 March: Jabidah massacre of Moro army recruits releases anger from years of prejudice, ill treatment and discrimination. 1969 MNLF founded by young secular-minded students and professionals in Manila. 197? Christian paramilitary (Ilaga) kill 65 in a mosque in Manili. 1971 Intense fighting between Barracudas (Muslim paramilitary) and AFP. AFP executes 40 Muslims at a checkpoint. Gvmt. Accused of genocide. 1972 OIC requests GRP to protect the lives and property of Muslims. September 21: President Marcos declares martial law. November: MNLF comes out into the open. 1973 Marcos improves socio-economic conditions in the south while maintaining military operations. He wins over key Muslim leaders outside the MNLF. MNLFs armed wing emerges. 1974 Fighting escalates into large-scale conventional warfare. February: biggest battle of the war, in Jolo. OIC officially recognises the MNLF. 1975 War reaches a stalemate. MNLF accepts autonomy. January: first GRP- MNLF meeting in Jeddah. 1976 Key rebels offered amnesty, money, and pol. positions to surrender with dignity. December 23: Tripoli Agreement. 1977 CFA. Shariah courts established as part of the national system of courts. April: only 10 of the13 provinces vote for autonomy in a plebiscite. Marcos unilaterally divides the 10 provinces into two autonomous regions. Negotiations break down. May: MNLF granted observer status at OIC. Dec: S. Hashim announces an Instrument of Takeover of MNLF leadership. 1978 Negotiations resume but GRP chooses to meet Hashim rather than Misuari. April: OIC recognises Misuari as chairman and spokesman for the MNLF. MNLF massacres 33 soldiers who had been invited to a peace dialogue. 1979 Surrendered MNLF founder member A. Alonto joins the GRP panel. Diplomatic initiatives focus on ensuring the Tripoli Agrmt is being implemented. 1980 March: Malaysia and Indonesia offer to serve as honest brokers. 1981 Misuari fails to receive support for secession.
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1899-1916: 20.000 Moros killed (Jubair, 1999, 81)

1982 1983 1984

Marcos consolidates the Philippines diplomatic position. Efforts to link NPA and MNLF fail, but co-operate on the ground. OIC calls on Moros to unite prior to new negotiations. March: MILF is founded, with a religious as well as nationalist agenda.

1986 today: Democracy 1986 Peoples Power I. Marcos into exile. Corazon Aquino new President. March: MILF ready to discuss peace with Aquino. August: With Muslim mediation MILF and MNLF agree to negotiate jointly. September: Misuari gains recognition from GRP as its negotiating partner. 1987 January: Jeddah Accord GRP-MNLF, but talks break down as GRP unilaterally implements the autonomy mandate in the newly approved Constitution. Both MNLF and MILF denounce GRPs moves. 1989 Republic Act 6734 creates the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, rejected by MNLF. Nov.: plebiscite, boycotted by MNLF, MILF. Only 4 provinces opt for autonomy. 1990 Regional elections in ARMM. 1992 May: Ramos elected President. July: National Unification Commission (NUC) formulates amnesty programme and a negotiation process, based on public consultations. October: exploratory talks with the MNLF begin. 1993 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) created. October: formal talks begin. Interim CFA. MILF poses no objections to the talks. 1994 Ramos organises executive-legislative discussions, to gain support for peace. 1995 April 4: a new Islamic rebel group, Abu Sayyaf, kills 50 people in Ipil. Dec.(?): Interim Agreement containing 81 points of consensus. 1996 GRP rushes to mollify politicians opposing the Interim Agreement. Agrmt. to establish Southern Phil. Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Senate presents 9 amendments to dilute autonomy of the agreement. Exploratory talks with the MILF begin. Sep.2: GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. Misuari runs for governor and wins ARMM elections. 6 MNLF leaders elected to the Regional Legislative Assembly. Dec.: MILF holds a huge assembly and reaffirms commitment to independence. 1997 March: GRP-MILF Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. June: AFP launches its biggest offensive against MILF. July: GRP-MILF cessation of hostilities. 1998 Estrada elected Pdnt. in alliance with politicians opposed to peace agreement. MNLF leaders, save for one, lose their bids for local positions. 1999 On and off MILF-AFP fighting throughout the year. Oct.25: formal GRP-MILF peace talks begin. 2000 MILF-AFP skirmishes throughout the year along peace talks. March 21: Estrada announces an all-out war against the MILF. March 26: MILF calls for a UN-organized independence vote for Muslims. May 31: MILF Camp Bushra is bombed, and Philippine flag raised in a mosque. July 9: GRP declares victory and announces MILFs 46 camps taken over. Sep.2-24: MILF's General Assembly confirms withdrawal from peace talks. 2001 Jan: March: March 24: April: June: Aug.7: Aug.14: Nov.24: Estrada falls, Arroyo declares all-out peace policy. Arroyo names Misuari Special Envoy to the OIC. GRP-MILF General Framework of Agreement of Intent. MNLF Exec. Council ousts Misuari, collectively assumes chairmanship. Tripoli Agreement on Peace (GRP-MILF). MNLF and MILF sign an Agreement on General Framework for Unity. Plebiscite on expanded ARMM. One city and one province vote to join. Misuari arrested in Malaysia, accused of rebellion.

2002 March: April: May: June: 2003 January: Feb.10: March-May: May 5: May 14: May 17:

Arroyo suspends formal peace talks with the MILF after skirmishes. Geneva Call persuades the MILF to sign commitment against landmines. MNLF, MILF agree to send a joint delegation to OIC Conference in Sudan. MILFs Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up to lead, manage and determine rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas.

Chairman S. Hashim writes to G. Bush and urges US to help solve the conflict. GRP presents draft final peace agrmt. with MILF to Congress leaders. Several bombs kill dozens of civilians around Mindanao. Bishops Ulama Conference offers to mediate. OIC recognizes ARMM governor Parouk Hussin as chair of the MNLF. Arroyo declares a war of will and vision and orders selective attacks on embedded terrorist lairs in central and western Mindanao. May 28: MILF announces unilateral 10 day CF, and extends it 10 more days. June 20: Hashim rejects terror as a means to resolve differences. June 22: MILF extends its ceasefire indefinitely and requests a matching gesture from the military. September 5 Agmt to: 1) gradual pull-out of the troops in Buliok; 2) deployment of IMT 3) formation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG); and 4) ancestral domain is set as next agenda for the peace talks. 2004 January 18 December 20 2005 Iqbal announces MILF is considering 4 governance possibilities: federal, commonwealth, association of free states and independence. th April 16 7 round of exploratory talks concludes discussion on concept, territory, and resources. September 17 Silvestre Afable, head of the GRP panel, and Iqbal say the panels successfully finished the most difficult hurdle in the ancestral domain agenda. 2006 February 6 February 24 March 6 August 31 September 3 2007 May 12 June 16 July August 17 October 24 November 15 December 16 Peace negotiators promise to draft an overall framework of the ancestral domain by late March. Arroyo declares state of emergency (lifted one week later). Malaysia cancels the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF because of the political situation in Manila. Japan sends a delegation to Manila to talk about Japans contributions to the peace process. Peace talks resume. Impasse over areas to be placed under the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE). Arroyo instructs the AFP to work closely with the mechanisms of the peace process to keep combatants in place. Afable resigns reportedly because of lack of support from the Govt. 10 Marine officers are beheaded in Basilan after skirmishes with the MILF. Arroyo calls urgent peace talks with the MILF to resolve the Basilan situation. GRP panel chair Rodolfo Garcia and Iqbal announce ending the 13-month impasse between the two parties. The parties agree to the scope and boundaries of the AD and affirm all previous points of consensus on the core items of the territory issue. Peace talks are stalled due to constitutional issues. Deployment of IMT (Sixty peace monitors from Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya). The discussion on ancestral domain, the last of the three major agenda items, is divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and governance.

2008 May (?) July 24

The Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute is established. GRP and MILF start their talks in Kuala Lumpur. In Manila, pro-government legislators in the House of Representatives file a bill to postpone the August 11 elections in ARMM. July 27 Joint communiqu on the Muslim ancestral domain. The MOA provides that about 700 villages in Mindanao will hold a referendum within 12 months (of the MOA signing) if they want to join the Muslim homeland. The signing of the agreement is temporarily set on August 5. Formal peace deal scheduled to be concluded in November 2009. August 2 Local officials from North Cotabato ask the Supreme Court to block the signing of the agreement. August 4 The Supreme Court issues a Temporary Restraining Order for the signing of the ancestral domain in Malaysia on August 5. August 11 Sen. Mar Roxas and former Senator Franklin Drilon file petitions with the SC to stop the Philippine government from concluding the MOA with the MILF. September 3: GRP dissolves its peace panel, announces new paradigm for the peace process based on community consultations and DDR. September: Kofi Annan and Ermita meet in Geneva (HD Centre). October 14: Supreme Court declares MOA-AD unconstitutional. November 6: MILF identifies stumbling blocks: 1) Pdnts lack of will; 2) Oligarchs (business and political) in Mindanao and Manila; 3) lack of support from Catholic Church. Novermber 30: Expiration of IMTs TOR December: GRP names new peace panel. Head: Rafael Seguis (Foreign Affairs Usec.) MILF suggests five points to resume talks: 1) International guarantees 2) MOA-AD as a done deal 3) IMT should investigate all ceasefire violations from July 1 4) AFP suspension of military operations against three rogue commanders 5) Malaysia should remain as facilitator. GRP conveys to Malaysia readiness to respond to MILFs 5 points. 2009 Jan: Jonathan Powell and Gerry Kelly (Northern Ireland) visit bot parties (HD Centre). Seguis drops preconditions (surrender 3 rogue commanders, DDR). Feb: Pdnt Arroyo makes urgent request to PM of Malaysia to schedule resumption of talks. Malaysia assures continued support. Mar.16: PAPP Razon announces new strategy based on 3 Rs: 1) renegotiate (MOA-AD) in accordance with parameters and principles reflected in the decision of the Supreme Court 2) reaffirm the primacy of the peace process and reassert commitments to implement all signed interim agreements 3) Review the facilitating process to allow the involvement of eminent persons. Guidelines for the peace panel: 1. Any consensus or agreement shall always be subject to constitutional processes. 2. Any future agreement must be within the purview of Philippine citizenship and there shall be no talk of independence. 3. The government panel will endeavor to exert utmost efforts and utilize available mechanisms to reflect in the agenda and the agreements the values, sentiments and principles of the Filipino people. 4. DDR shall be the overall framework and context governing our engagement with the MILF in the peace talks. 5. Whether the negotiations succeed and result to a peace agreement or not, cessation of hostilities on the ground must continue. 6. While peace negotiations are ongoing with the MILF, government shall also intensify development efforts in the conflict-affected areas as part of its confidence-building measures. June MILF visits Turkey, Norhtern Ireland. Francesc Vendrell visits both parties (HD Centre).

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July 21 Bakwit Power II (mobilizations of IDPs to call for resumption of talks). July 23 Government declares a Suspension of Military Operations (SOMO). July 25 MILF declares a Suspension of Military Actions (SOMA). July 29 First meeting after breakdown of talks in 2008. Ends with a Joint Declaration. Oct. OPAPP visits Northern Ireland, London Dec. 2010 January 27: Exchange of drafts, KL. February 17 (approx): MILF shares a new document: Declaration of Principles on Interim Governance Arrangements (7 pages). GRP immediately starts analyzing it and developing their own new proposal. The idea of a comprehensive compact is definitely dead, and both sides work hard on some kind of interim agreement. 19: CR produces a summary of MILFs draft. 28: Redeployment of IMT. March 4: Question and Answer session in KL. 8-9 1st round of talks in KL attended by ICG

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