LU ME

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LASSiIE~
BRARY J

SMALL UNIT 14011 CS AN PARTI S1AI FARESS ON N

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FREAVENWOR H KA T

P0 RECIST

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1952

U
HSORIAL DIISO

HADQUARTR

EUROPEAN

CMAN

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ALIN--

MS #?P

060e

S1,1ALL

UNIT TACTICS

PARTISAN

WARFARE

Copy 7-of

/00 Copies

HIS TORICAL DIVISION EUROPEA~N CO~ML ,ND

UNvCLASSIFIEP

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UNCLASIt-I

Comments on Exanpies of Partisan Series Warfare Compiled For the on "Small Unit Tactics"

Partisan

warfare

knows neither

tactical

rules

nor generally

and unscrupulous. in numbers, of simple design and limited His weapons are usually wiliweapons become dangerous because of the In the East these with which they are used, because of the inness and trickery human self-sufficiency because of their system. mobility, who use them and of those and the cruelty since they are independent of a supply in camouflage of exert which they

applicable forms.

The foe is unpredictable

Additional factors. are the proficiency the z;uthless terrorism units end the partisan own country, of their the population against Success in vance of certain methods which,

obserwarfare depends not so much on the partisan application of principles or on the doctrinary worth, instances., have proved their in individual

but on a
specific

systematic determination of all

factors which in

any

case might influence the enemy-Is command, his col muniThe population. with the relations end his mobility his cations, study for the examples available number of practical larger the be the imagination and will the, better. trained factors, of these on to lead the fighting understanding of those who may be called against partisans which, under contemporary conditions commanders. military may become the mission of all It is small unit in of warfare,

examples drawn from the following that this spirit Far more should be read. during World War II tactics policies however, are the real tactics., important than small unit by These are the policies partisans.. fighting for successfully means turn economic. and political meens of which propagandistic, the native population against the partisans and gain its collabora-

tion in

the fight

against them.

This task,

which is

in

the hands
movements flight of

with the first of the supreme command agencies, begins the first and with onto enemy soil of the combat troops bomber aircraft over the enemy country. In out fight dence at the least the of long run, the passive partisans the people. it is partisans therefore can neither essential live to

nor wage war withIn gain order to the confi-

support of

the population.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIE1t

FOREIGN

MILTARY Historical Headquarters Division

STUDIES

European Command

voLUME I

January 1952

NUBER 6

C ON TE NT S

Page Comments on Examples of Partisan Warfare.

. . . .

Introduction., t
Example

................... The First Partisan Clash with Partisans Fighting in

.. ,..

.b

1 .2 --

Subterranean Stone
. .

Quarries
3
-

.
.

Partisan
A Company The Forest

Warfare Without Partisans

Commander.s Camp. Story,.
..

...
.

4
5

---

..

*.

>9

,.......

by the Historical Prepared nonperiodically the purpose of increasComand, for Headquarters, European Division, and monographs prespecial studies of selected ing the availability Division and in coordinaof this pared by or under the supervision tion with other staff ctivisions of this headquarters as appropriate. Foreign Military Studies. The material Department information official reflect does not necessarily herein presented for but is or accepted practices, of the Army doctrine only.. Local reproduction may be authorized upon specinumber of additional Division, EUCOM, APO 403, 2614,

A limited to this headquarters.. fic request copies may be obtained from the Historical Phone Control Officer, Karlsruhe Military

t I
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iri

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UNCLASSIFIEP
Introduction

The following five practical examples are conceived as a contribution to the collection entitled "Smail -Uit T:.ct .cs.tIt The examples deal with -partisan warfare and describe historical events that took place from 1941 to 1943 in the Eastern the ater of war, In the Russian campaign the principal author of this Iwork was a division commander and a corps commander in the fighting against the 'partisans Other officers who fought in the East made minor contributions, The problems of partisan warfare and the mieasures which, on the basis of German experience in the East, were considered appropriate to deal with guerilla-infested areas, are treated at length in the German manual "Combat against Guerillas" (Der Bandenkampf) and in the German translation of the Russian "Manual for Partisans" (Handbuch der Partisanen). Several of the principles contained in these two manuals will be demonstrated below in the form of examples reflecting actual events. No detailed explanatiorn is required to show how the aricient weapon of partisan warfare 'has gained in importance in recent times, and to what degree it determines the 'plans of statesmen and soldiers. A study of the nature of partisan warfare' is absolutely ess'ential in any up-to-date military training, in the furtherance of which the following examples may provide interesting material because they are 'based on actual front-line epxiiier'e. Example .: e-1r)_depicts the first clash between 'German troops and partisans near the East Prussian frontier in what was formerlyj Lithuanian territory. Here the partisan units were compo-sed mainly of isolated Soviet troop units, but also of local :inhabitants , During the first two days of combat a hitherto unexpected characteristic of the Soviet Armr was noticed. Isolated Russian soldier s considered it their self-evidenI military duty: to con-. tinuc the fight as paitisans and: to enlist the civilian population; It was no lornger possible- as in Woild Wav ".I to' leave Russian stragglers or isolated units unobserved behind the :German front, where they were practicallyon their own. In cases where a group which had been cut off had an energetic leader, ''the fighting spirit would be rekindled immediately after the first shock, and trouble spots behind the front became inescapable. *Commanded 5th Jaeger Division, 1940 - 43, and V Corps in late 1943; later commanded Seventeenth Army (May to.September 1944).

11

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UNCLA SIFtED

E7Cr&

The command and the troops were initially inclined to regard the partisans as unimportant and not fully on a par in combat value beThis was a cause they usually were equipped only with, small arms. dangerous fallacy, Most partisans were energetic and ambitious men, and many among them were actually driven by fanaticism. Weaklings stayed away from them from the start. Since t1 Russian civil wars, a sort of legend had grown around the 'guerillas. The will to resist damage on the enemy without regard for and the resolve to inflict international agreements on warf are made up for the lack of military equipment. It would thereCombat against partisans .is cruel and merciless. fore be a mistake to oppose them with s'econd-class or weakforces; On the contrary, in order to save lives and time, the forces employed In particular, the paragainst them should be as strong as possible. tisans rust b; attacked with, such arms as they lack themselves, namely, heavy weapons and artillery. It is equally important in any attempts at encirclement to set up It Was a partisan an air-tight ring around the actual combat area. practice not to continue a hopeless engagement, but to disperse, to exfiltrate from a pocket, and, if necessary, to break through in order to reassemble in previously fixed areas. Even an otherwise successful operation uill prove a. failure if elements of the' partisans manage to slip through a cordon that is too weakly manned. In such a case it would be safe to assume that they would soon appear elsewhere in order to continue their raids, Example 2 e is an example of combat against partisans who, under extraordinary circumstances (in deserted, subterranean stone quarries and caves in the Crimea), ,held: ,Qut for months behind the German lines... It is thus not a typical training example of "normal" partisan fighting methods in forest, jungle, swamps or mountains, but rather the narration of a unique action that may merit interest inasmuch as partisans may conceal themselves anywhere, a fact that was- confirmed by German experience in the Balkans, and is now confirmed by the fighting in southeastern Asia. The operations against t partisans in the- Crimean stone quarries failed, principally because accurate geographic information proved even more important than, the numerically superior forces of the attacker. Underground caves,. corridors and shafts were difficult to locate and their extent could be estimated only roughly. Moreover, any fighting against an enemy who has barricaded himself in a bewildering labyrinth is technically difficult if, one does not wish, or is' unable, to use
poison gas.
Since operations had to be carried on in this subterranean labyrinth

h.

it seems more than doubtful whether a third attack, as suggested in the example, would have led to success. The chances.. of, a. defenider familiar

UNCLASSIFIEP

~5S7iSSIO7LED

with the

terrain

and accustomed to.

darkness,

as compared with an

assailant who lacked these more so since. the. partisans

uneven, the appear too' qualifications, and agresolute had an exceptionally

gressive leader..
even if a wire obstacle had been completed, it Furthermore, since the surrounded partisans probably would have been useless, and through the under the wire obstacle dig a tunnel had begun to aim They were unable to achieve their the open. into stone soft induced by hunger. physical exhaustion because of the it of Crimean stone quarries During a subsequent investigation cave sysat Bagerovo a subterranean existed there was learned that southwest of Kerch than the one in the stone quarry larger tem still

The Bagerovo system was carefully prepared for sectional defense, fuzed explosives and machine gun emplacemainly by means of built-in In addition, everything needed for ments covering the passageways.
defense was available, bay, sick a special such as a command post, emergency assemfbly areas, a dressing station, food and ammunition several head had made

stocks,
signals, al of cattle

a reservoir for collecting drip water and colored direction-

there even kept partisans the Originally one by one (the natives which were slaughtered cattle). timely use of the stone quarries to hide their According to statements by local inhabitants,

the underground

stone quarries near Kerch had previously been used during the Russian After the Bolsheviks occupied the Crimea, the Whites were civil war.
said to have lived Here in them for years. of how a tenacious enemy, who

remains unsolved

the problem

is determined to fight to the end in large subterranean stone quarries .or catacombs, can be overpowered other than by starvation,
poison gas or without In operations parations for in the prospect of heavy friendly as for instance' fortifications casualties. in the preof Gibraltar

the

on a smaller scale, seizure of the rock

that a me ans which offered was believed the summer of 1940, it that even of success was to be found in the fact some prospects rapidly and that the narrow openhard rock can be drilled. through ings thus formed could be emplpyed tQ produce underground explosions.-* could not have been considered subThe measures under consideration

ject

'to

t1F

"Gas Warfare"
but rather

rules,

as the means used would not have

explosive mixture of carbon

been poison gases

a highly

and oxygen.

*The German term used is "Schiagendes Wetter" which refers to dust or gas explosions in, mines.

1V

...

UNUlm LA%5,%j

Example 3 deals with the rear areas of the German Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies. which "were Operating in the northern sectors of the Eastern .front. Owing to the- seesaw. movements of 'the winter battles of 1942, the location of ;the' 'fronts held by these armies. was. not clearly defined and the rear areas, due to the existing tactical confusion and the terrain conditions, offered idealpossibilities for partisan activities on..a la:ge':scale.
The successful tactics ;of constantly avoiding action, brilliantly practiced by the partisans in this :instance,- is impressively reflected in the description of a mopping-up operations with whidh a German regiment had- been entrusted. For the. same reasons as those mentioned in Example 1, the German efforts wIrere doomed to failure because the availabe mopping-up protect an operational, area of the size forces were far too weak conc=erned.

to

'illustrates., as does. Example 5, an episode Example' which occurred in the central sectbr of the Eastern .front, where the typical White Russian scenery is characterized: by forests, swamps and waterways, and where through-traffic 'isnecessarily confined to a few paved. roads and to the railways.. Any attack 'gainst a major. partisan headquarters, such as discussed at length in Example 4, is always a ..doubtfu.lundertaking because such a headquarters possesses far more nurous contacts with, the population and a far more extensive intel3igence service than an ordinary partisan 'group.

it

is

When to

large forces are committed against such a, major headquarters,

be expected that

the enemy will learn about, the

irmpending

attack

and

that he will

avoid action by' a timely:4w~thdrawal.

If the size of the unit which is to carry out the attack is small, its approach may remain unnoticed by the -enemy.. On the other hand, it will, then lack the strength, to safely overcomrie the resistance of guards, cover detachments and finally of the--headquarters itself, and also at the same time to tightly seal off the entire area so as to prevent the escape of the senior staff members Ith Ue leaders of a partisan headquarters succeed in. escaping,, 't~he attack 'may: be consider ed a faCilure even though all the troops. have been captured or killed. The only alternative left is the emiployment of h4ghly mobile units equipped with cross-country motor vehicles for rapid movement over large distances and difficult terrain. Such a unit will have to be organized in accordance with the tasks which an effective attack demands. The unit aust be able -to "rapidly :overcome the advanced and direct security
lines. ed for Guns on self -propelied this purpose. The unit mounts anid 'numerous machinrea guns are needmust have an.. assault, detachment to break

UNCLASSIFRED:

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III_ *-

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U CLAfSSIFtE1
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through the security lines and immediately advance to the headquarters proper and overpower its personnel, In addition the unit must have armored vehicles equipped with superior weapons,
flame throwers, trench mortars, and have the support of low-flying

air craft, Finally, troops to cordon off the partisans are absolutely essential as well as adequate infantry and engineer troops equipped with cross-country vehicles of good quality. In many instances the nature of ment,

the

Russian t errain will prenot only by

vent the use of the most modern combat and transportation equipinasmuch as partisans usually protect the mselves
but also, features, seasons,
-

military covering forces tage of difficult terrain unable to master in all

whenever possible, which present

take advanday vehicles are

Finally, in
the capture of a

Example 5
"forest

there is that, situated in

the description
the

of

camp"

midst of the

huge Bryansk forest, threatened German main supply channels constituted by the railway line and highway between Gomel and Bryansk,
In contrast to Example

4,

the action

took place in

the

middle of

winter.

This example illustrates

equipped for the climate, forests winter warfare, to overcome the turn into

how an aggressive
was able, in Russian terrain spite

unit, trained and

hardships of in snow .

of the difficulties

arn. ice mane easily than it

and fields

could have in
quagmires.

the warm season when roads,

gjuirni'ilnCLSIF

UNCLASSI FIED
~#

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SMALL UNIT TACTICS Example. 1 The

First

Clash with'Partisans

"++

w.'

till '

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KK~ I GTE~

UNCLASSI FIED.'

The First.

C ash with:

Partisans

At 0305, on 22 June "1941, the' day when the campaign against the Soviet Union began, the German V Corps.attackcd from an area east
ond northeast of Suwalki (110 kilometers southwest of the former

Lithuanian capital of

Kaunas),

mission of breaking The spearhead division of V Corps had the from Suwalki to astride the, road leading through the Russian front and, in addition, of, establi phing the Seirijai by way .of Lasdiji same evening a bridgehead across the Njemen in the Krikstoniai area

(forty kilometers air distance ee.st .of the Germ'an jump-off positions).
On the way from the jump-off position to the projected bridge-

head the

following four 1.

obstacles hadto be overcome:

tThe

so-called Soviet border pcosition close to the fronarea, which had been occupied by the Germans after

tier'in the Suwalki

the P6lish 'campaign

These emplacements

consisted of field positions

and oie. antitatnk trench, . A.newly built concrete bunker line near Lasdijai.

3.

A field position in the narrow passage south of Lake Dus,

west bof Seirijai.

4.
The the first

The Njemrren River, division overran. the :Russian 'border position on The attack against the newly-built bunker line
The' the

'spearhead
attempt.

near the small town' of Lasdi jai was executed by two regiments . succeeded in peretrating regim-nt, on the right. (southern) flank

town "at .1000 hours, It then traor sdc '.the . narrowi passage south of Lake Dus and, inthe 'late afternoon, near Krikstoniai, it forced a side. crossing of the Njemon and established a bridgehead on the far Meanwhile, the regiment on the left. (nqrthern)'flank was engaged in 'where the last heavy fighting near the bunkers north of Lasdijai

-.

strong .oncrete emplacements the next day

On the evening of the first

were

not,

destroyed until the evening of

day

of the

attack the division was

recongreatlly spread out, : The searhead regiment, the 'division'sbattalion and the bulk of, the ,,artillery were on the naissance Njemein or within the bridgehead on the! other, s-ide' of the river, kilometers from the,.The regiment in the rear, in an area thirty river, was. fighting' the' enemy in. the bunkers near Lasdijai. The

runn

through the regiment, having been pulled s.:.original reserve division area with its had reached the Seirijai point, penetration Lasdijai .cortact_ with the divisions leading elements, ''There was no. direct of the spearhead diviithe tdght -and left' forward on which had thrust

sion.
Seirijai;

The division on the

the division had encountered

-right
left,

had reached the area southwest of

which was to advance north of the lake. of .northwest

on the

Lake Dus,

heavy resistance

At dusk, calm prevailed in the .sector' qf. the 'spearhead divis ion, It did At about 2200 hours the noise of battle. was suddenly heard
not come from the Njemen bridgehead or the' Ladijai' bunkers further

west,A but unexpectedly from the, Seiijai. 'Before proceeding further,

German side there were

area.

it : should be, ientioned that on the

'who had fought in Russia during

many officers

the battalion comWar I.. The regimental commanders, 'soame , of:"; manders, as well as the older reservre officers who headed the rear 1914 - 18. Russians in had learned, to know the echelons and services, belief that the Russians were Previous experience supported their. f lanks had been overOnce thes;e highly sensitive to flank attacks, fate as prisoners of war with powered, Russian troops accepted their

orld

resignation.

In

German bicyclists three kilometers Russians several Smaller

two or 7'orld War I it .was not considered unusual for or cavalrymen to lead' a column of some 500 from the' battlefield to the prisoner of in charge.. of the: ranking prisoner unknown in and sent

war collection point without either''difficulties or resistance.

columns were put partisans were

back to the collection point even 'ithout German *guards.

speaking, practically

Generally

the E esbern ih tir

,wring World War

I
and memories dating back to World War I were forces, could not

Such experiences consadered to the Red Army.

be still valid wit'h_'regard '.to th'e new Soviet that this. Red Arnm Overlooked was the fact

:)e

'the former Czarist Army, for simply regarded as a continuation .of a long, and cruel civil war .:where the objectives Lt had been born in Several oys of fighting and considerthe means used. aad justified of the ble reserves were needed to 'make us realize that the 'spirit Army was different from .that prevailing in former Czarist forces.

Ied.

The ,first .reports ;about rocturnal combat 'noises, 'supposedly emani.ting from street fighting in Seiri jai, were rot considered very n)ortant. On the contrary, the idea pr'evailed that,' due to the excitelent on the first in day of the'campaig; Germnan 'l.nitsmight be firing on

.ach

other

the darkness,

This opinion was proved wrong by reports arriving'soon afterward Lt the division command post located five'kilometers: south of Seirijai.. :he fluctuating volume, of battle noises weri'e not derived from gunplay elements ii wound'ed motorcycliSt'.eportd .that among our own troops, needed.,to build' a bridge f a bridge column, which had been.urgentlyy.
Lear Krikstoniai, 'had been'ambushed from'. the . -forest west,; .of Seirijai

n.

-v!

trr

3r.& vi4'

J j.

while en route

of advance

ard that

west of. the

forest

the route

was

heavily.,jammed..- The - commander of the reserve' regiment that had been moved up to the Seiri jai area, reported street fighting in the town against armed civilians who had appeard suddenly..
The report initially about the participation Only a of armed civilians short time previously in the this

fighting

was doubted;

area had been;"in Lithuaria "" Under a .German-Soviet agreement) after the Polish campaign. Lithuaina had beent ceded to the USSR -U entirely
against the wi2L of its citizens,:, -it therefore appeared that the civilians been separated incredible doing from their

that the Lithuanians ,should' so suddenly have taken up the Russian

cause, On the. whole it seemed more likely the fithting were Russian soldiers who had unit s ,i

Toward midnight
with security
t t

in

the.' .comnrinhder of the reserve regiment the Seirijai area reported as follcws:

charged

Seirijai is shooting ' in

of which is

firmly .held by us .There is occasional the Seir~ijai forest, the southern fringe
bounded by the divis ion s advance and

supply route, Participation of armied .. ivilians in c 1 the fighting ias been confir rd.
Thereupon forest the regimental at dawn.::. commander was ordered to mop up the

Seirijai-

The widening

fighting for

of.the Niemen bridgehead also began at dawn, while the bunker line flared up again at Las dijai.

On the assuaitiaox that the'enemy in the. forest was made up of civilians-'and stiagglers of 'negigible fighting power, when opposed by regular troops,: the -regime tal commanderr ordered one, battalion to mop up t;he' forest,.
The battalion :commander, 'for the Same reasbn, considered as adequate the employment: of' ort comparhny -reinforced by heavy machine guxns, After- penetrating into th.e forest for a short distance, the company snet heavy resistance which was -sent into and was the -for'est

same happened to the 'scond battle The action

compelled to switch'. to- the defense. coar y,', Nor wasthe third company,.
able to carry forward the

The.,

bogged-dawn

in

the- Seirjai forest proved a failure, It had shown

than

However, this failure had cleared up the situation.

that the enemy in the forest was stronger and 'more effective

assumed,

and that he" had been underestimated by a wide margin,

the :..eneTmy-.hold forest dominated thy.terrain over

Una wide

fortunately,

dis tance No by-pass protectbed' fromenemy, observation. and usable by vehicles was avail ble. :Consequently, :not only were communications
within the divisioh sector;, int'errupted.,but also the flow of supplies

IMF=

moving~ to the leading regiment which was .:'then 7.:widening the bridgehead across the Njemen. This situation being: unbearable, the commander of the reserve forest with battalions regiment received the aid' of the :orders: to .odcupy:immediately entire regiment and one attached the Seirijai artillery

The unknown foe in the Seirijai forest. had thus been more successful than he- probably had expected, :.He tied . ddwjr an entire reinfcrced
of the divisjones fighting :power, ' and prevented its regi nt, one third decisive employment in an attack ibeyond the: N jem en The regimental in echeloned in depth commander committed two ,:battalions on the enemy in the. .frdest, .. :Becaus e of the failure during .by sector, of heavy in-,

an attack

the morning hours they were to attack systematically sector and break resistance with the help of the concentrated fire

fantry weapons and theartillery.,:,Elements of the third battalion

the forest to prevent the enemy escape; other battalion troops remained in Seirijai, which was. urprotejctedC: toward the south and north, In. the.
Gqncentration

Is

sealed

off

the

terrain

outside

of

woods the attacking battalions, met stubborn resistance.

The

of fire
terrain effect.

by infantry
was difficult

uns,

mortars and artillery

and. not c.h .nge ..until

pieces in
by the and

the dense wooded desired

The situation

did'not

always accompanied the artillery

the regimental 37-m antitank guns had been moved up._ close behind the infantry and had begun to fire at point-blank range. This direct fire broke the resistance of the savagely--Fight ing enemy7. These tactics
deal of..time.,

on the part of a tenaciously fighting foe took up a great

it was evening before :resistance.. had -finally collapsed and

'the,regiment had occupied 'the, entire forest,. After the end of the fighting the following information 'became '.available Some. 400 .- 5Q0 Russian soldiers,
farrre.d the nucleus of the Only a few still wore their uni:forms while. most of them had. procured civilian lcth ing in villages and .farss, so that. they couldnot be:.identified as:,soldiers.. The majority, hcwever, actually wer:e. civilians, from thel upper. strata of the Russian populaforces fighting in the Seirijai forest, who had been isolated by the German breakthrough,

tion, who had settled in the area after. the Soviet Union t s occup tion of Lithuania. They had joined. the soldiers either voluntarily or -under duress, The. leader of the unit. operating in forest was the Soviet field grade

:the

officer

who had commanded the attack on.Seirijai,.

It was impossible to

capture him.
He was not the only: one to, escape Aproximately one-fourth of the p unit was able to hide in the wheat fields outside the forest, andi, under the cover of -darkness, to slip:through the:..thin. lines Qf. Gerrmn troops surrounding therm: It.: was.. assumed at. thc tie that at.- least some ..elements, succeeded in reaching the far side of .th j N emen. As the" .--division continued its eastward., advance.., from,the. bridgehead several, oficers and' men disappeared

...

-4.-

without trace in an inexlicable manner in the densely wooded terrain behind the front, In ors instance a fiel.d grade air officer vanished shortly after he had eft the division command post, In spite of systematic investigation, nothing was ever heard about him, his driver or his vehicle. Whether rightly or wrongly, the German troops attributed these incidents to the partisans who had escaped from the Seirijai forest.

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17F

SMALL UNIT TACTICS

Example 2
Partisan Fighting in

Subter-ranean

Stone Quarries

P artisan Fighting in Subterranean Stone __-uarries

On the eastern

tip

of the Crimean Peninsula

lies

Kerch,

a city,

owes its founding by the Greeks as The city of 50,000 inhabitants, a trading outpost, and an eventful history covering more than 2,000
years to its favorable location on the Black and Azov Seas and the. Crimea with Kerch Strait connecting the the Kuban area.

After German troops occupied Kerch in World War II the city played an important role as a transloading point for shipments to the Kuban area, In early October 1943, when the Seventeenth Army evacuated the Kuban bridgehead because of Russian successes in the
Don area and wi thdrew across the became part of' the combat, zone. strait to the Crimea, Kerch again

The Seventeenth ArmyJ was conosod of German and Rumanian divisions, :After retiring from the Kuban bridgehead all German divisions
except two (one, near Kerch, the other at the Isthmus of Perekop, were moved the continent to the north) which connects .the Crimea with Thrown the Sixth Army, then fighting north of the Sea of Azov, up to the ultiwere unable to alter battle, these divisions. pieceneal into The Russians Army. fate of -'the Sixth iaS toward. Khers on, The Crimea was cut off.
thrust

forward past Perekop

Late in
a large

October 1943, under. cover of darkness, the Russians launched to occupy the scale landing operation and crossed the strait
northeast of ..Kerch. Counterattacks. by the German.

mountainous terrain

98th Division, which had to defend sixty kilometers of coast on both The enemy of. ;Russian superiority. sides of Kerch, failed as a result
In the six months of fluctuating fighting against four major it was ,7ossible tp prevent a widening of the bridgeRussian offensives north extending to head beyond the. city of Kerpch and the hills ,to the the Sea of Azov. , The, min burden: of the fighting against the bridgegradually head, moved ten divisionsand. two, armored, units into the bridge-

head troops was borne , by, the 98th. Division and another .German' division by air. u an an: troops protcted the, coast on' wvhich arrived later both sides of the bridgehead againist further landing attempts. Partisans- had always, pperated - .in the Crimea, although usually only the Yaila' and .Yalta Mountains ; .At first, the populaEarly- in: 19.4.4 tion in the, vicinity of Kerch; caused no difficultis.
in the woods, of situation this changed....

city-

A road loads in a southwestorly direction from Kerch to the port It was the, only, paved, road. in the area and. thereof Feodosiyae
which had southwest of

fore the main supply route feeding the defensive battle then flared up anew near Kerch. About five kilometers

the city,.
ally

a number night,

of

attacks Trucks

only at officers

occurred and personnel

suddenly on this road, initicarriers were ambushed and

set afire,
before daylight.

their.drivers and passengers were killed,

and soldiers proceeding After a short time the attacks alone were shot

It

was not long

broad area.

down in occurred over a larger

Ni= r

the advance Bagerovo airfield

(west of Kerch)

Ger~i~an antiair-

craf t soldier was found shot dead. North of the airfield a battalion marching to the front was engaged in a regular fire fight by an enemy who appeared at its front and flanks as suddenly as' he later disappeared,

By

this

time partisans

were a

commnon feature

of

the fighting

in

Russia. In the above instance, however, the Germans were unable to discern the area from which the partisans were launching their attacks. The extensive area between Kerch and Feodosiya, the so-called Kerch

Peninsula, is completely barren, with no woods and still less a real forest. Even in villages a group of trees is a rarity, Denuded hills and mountains, at the summits and crests of which the bleak reck pierces through, alternate with flat steppes, Visibility was therefore excell-

ent.

The localities

were easily kept under control.

1oreovcr,

the

1Kerch area was

occupied by numerous artillery

and supply units.

The riddle of the partisans'

afternoon, again in the area

hideout was soon solved.

a large

On a certain
truck was am,-

southwest of Kerch,

bushed., Under its tarpaulin were not supplies, as the partisans had probably assumed, but Rumanian soldiers, armed with submachine guns. The ambush miscarried, During the pursuit across the open field, the Rumanians
suddenly found their very themselves alone, The fleeing partisans ground. disappeared before eyes as if swallowed up by the

A systematic search of not due to shell explosions;

the terrain revealed numerous holes looking

like large bomb or shell craters. exits of a large subterranean

However,

the stony--sided holes were

dilapidated entrances and

they were

the old,

stone quarry, on a sunny day, be

A visitor to Kerch and the nearby villages will,

struck white. by the glaring whiteness whiteness The dazzling

of the houses. The houses are hot oainted is due to the -stones from which the houses

are built.

The stones are procured from underground quarries.

When

freshly cut they are said to be so soft that they can be sawed (similar in this to the stones in the Cher Valley, south of Orleans); when exposed to the air they harden and become durable, The subterranean stone quarries

have existed for ages.

the vicinity quarries. several It was in of

In

the course of 2,000

almost a dozen

years the inhabitants in

of these underground stone The largest of them have multi-storied galleries extending hundred meters in length plus numerous side-galleries, now absolutely clear stone that the headquarters of the partisans

Kerch worked

was

the subterranean

quarry southwest

of, Kerch.

<Vi~i LKJ&
The commander- of the.Run anian .division, which had the mission
of defending the c oastel any possible head against of the Russian bridgesouth area.. directly, decided to wrmest the landing 'attacks,

stone quarry sout1i est of Kerch from the partisans raids, sible and to put an end to their

as soon as pos-

chose to. fight instead of avoiding action, partisans In case the a savage.,and unusual Light undoubtedly leader, and had an energetic The troops selectdark underground .abyrinth, was impending in the company specicomprised a reinforced penetration ed for the initial submachine to pistols, In addition action, this equipped for ally large they carried searchlights guns,- flame throwers and portable entrances of up all was planned to fill It of grenades, quantities

Through this entrance the company was the stone quarry except one. to penetrate into the gallery and overpower the partisans in cldse.
Two additional fighting. when needed, companies stood ready. as reinforcements

company's forward Even while the the entrance and were still silhouetted from the dark. carme under heavy fire

through elements were passing they d by the . utside light, daring the Rumanians great

Tkth

succeeded in gaining about 100 meters of ground in the main gallery. While they were vainly fighting to break down frontal resinstance they were attacked from the side-galleries behind them, Reinforcements
which' subsequently to fight their arrived were unable to turn the tide of battle in

the underground darkness,

way back,

Suffering heavy losses) the Rumanians had

trained out by specially time carried this A second operation, .. entrances at through sever4 who penetrated troops sureender, which had A demand to once, met with the same failure, sans, preceded, was brusquely rejectoe. by .,the parti

Rumanian assault

The two operations the partisans that underground labyrinth, entrances and exits forcing' the water partisans

seemed to'indicate heavy losses with their their of arms in could not be defeated. by force The Rumanian commander therefore ordered all the hope of in up and guarded by sentries filled food and owing to lack of air, to surrender

Contrary to expectations)
Kerch did

the raids, in

the area southwest' of

not cease, During one of the last nights in January, 1944, from open te'entrance was attacked guarding a filled-in the sentry due to the rapid employment of reinforcefailed The attack rain. a few wounded, who were. capturd. The partisans .left ments.

Their .interrogation established

terranean number men,

the' subthe : fdllowing facts: .in plus a stone quarry: was .about" 120; well-armed. partisans, and wouided.and cooked for the of women who nursed the sick was an engineer} formerly employed by the steel Their leader

boom

plant

located

between

Kerch and Jenikal&.e He set the

group of the

partisans

wished to accept

the Rtmanian' demand for. surrend.er'.,

the futures the partisans

The engineer had

their spokesmen shot,, express such thoughtsin

death penazltyfor anyone who should .The f illi ng-in of the entrances had dug shafts camoufl+aged but adequate,. straight upward. and at night used No acute water in addition,

had not cut off the air

ineffectual, DLuring as exits Moreover, the day the for, raids,

supply, indeed this me:as.ureprqved absolutely

shafts were carefully Food was rationed filled

shortage existed, A shaft' dripping -water was collected.

with. grater.was available;

On the basis .of these statements the Rumanian. commander questioned the. German command as to what he now should do ,. It :was a difficult decision, It would of course have been desirable.; to quickly and vopletely eliminate the partisan nest located' so. close behind3 the front.
After two unsuccessful operations it..appeared mree than doubtful, however, whether a third operation, for which the Rumanians requested German aid, would have scored any worthwhile gains even with very strong

forces,
1944),

Furthermore,
uider

our troops were- at that time

.(the end

of January
it

such- heavy pressure

from ,the Russian bridgehead that

was impossible' to detach German units, On the, contrary, given a con-tinuation of the Russian attacks it was to be expected that even the Rumanian units securing the coest on both sides of the bridgehead against renewed landing attempts would have to be. throw n into the defensive battle near -Kerch, Consequently, .it was, irmpossible to assume
responsibility for a large-scale operation gave the The German command therefore with its: prospective. losses, Ruranian division commander the

followitng order: "To operation in force will- take place, The subterran-

'ean partisan nest southwest of Kerch' will bey completely sealed off from the outside by substaritial iwire :obstacles,.
.After, setting troops will up the wire be withdr awn, obstacles li- their
'

the Rumanian combat place; 'units dr awn

from

'the

rear services

'.(so-called alert
'

units) will

assume guard duty;TI

The order to set up the wire obstacle

was, ne-ver carried: out.

IfThen

the Rumanians began building it the partisans recognized the impending danger, broke through the inadequately-manned cordon during darkness, and moved with all their belongings into the .huge..underground stone q'uarries near Bagerovo,

Located ten kilometers west of KerchBagerovo not onlyh. d

but

an airfield

also -a r ailhead and was thus the most. important transloading point behind the front. The new quarters of the partisans therefore represented a still more 'serious menace than the' ones they' had -abandoned, 'souttwest of

Kerch,

especially since the engineer of the steel

plant was ,undoubtedly a

capable' and very energetic leader,

44 QT

r:

The German command therefore requested the following measures to be taken. Rumanian reserves were to imediat ely and definitely isolate. the underground .stone quarry system. near Bagerovo, an area
extending for almost a square kilometer; and they were to build a

strong,
shifts,

continuous. wire obstacle in uninterrupted day and night

A commander was to be appointed who'.was to be in full charge of all labor and guard personnel., The German command assigned to the Rumanian commander so-called, alert units drawn from the personnel. of ammunition columns,,signal and supply units, orderly rooms, ,kitchens, as well as one searchlight battalion,
Forces such as are hardly ever required namely, two Rumanian infantry battalions, for fighting in the open German and Rumanian

field,

,.alert

units,

given the taste thousand ;en,

one searchlight battalion, two construction battalins of setting up the wire obstacle -all told soi - two were thus pinned down by -a; subterranean.,par tisan unit

numbering

only a little may,

The leaving

over one hundred men., after five days an effective., continuous wire
Nightly breakout attempts were usually and construction batRumanian and German alert units in

Be that as it
obstacle nipped in charge of the bud.

had been completed, the

two Rumanian infantry

talions departed,

guard duty only a few observers were on guard duty. At night,

In daylight

sentries were moved up t o the wire obstacle while patrols kept the
area under surveillance, The alert units themselves, in contact with each other by telephone, were grouped compactly behind the elevations of the terrain, on which the searchlights were located. weeks of the cordoning operation the partisans breakout attempts which failed from the due to the machine gun fire that was synchronized with the searchlights, At the end of February, three weeks after the operation began, the first clandestine deserters appeared at the wire obstacle. They stated that food stocks were nearly exhausted and that contact no longer existed with the outside world, The partisans' leader (still the engineer from the steel plant near Kerch) was preparing for a breakout in order to move to another subterranean stone quarry, made start During several the first nocturnal

Because of

this information,

the alarm units-were reinforced by two

Rumanian companies; If the establishing themselves in which, because of the lack

partisans succeeded in breaking out and one of the nearby underground stone quarries of manpower,could be guarded only' by sen-

tries,

there would be "a bottomless barrel,"

so to speak.

The expected breakout did not take place until late in Mlarch. It was executed with great daring by the starving partisans, MIost of them were killed, the rest taken prisoner 0 The engineer was to be found neither among the prisoners three months he had been the driving nor the dead, however. For power of activities which

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literally were underground, . of activities which had cost both Germans and Rumanians considerable casualties. He had tied dow;n forces of significant size and had caused the loss of much time, .In accordance with intercepted Russian radio messages, the engineer had succeeded in slipping through the German lines that same night and had arrived safely inside the Russian bridgehead.

Only hunger had induced him to make the breakout attempt.

could have the'defenses held out for one more week, he *:ould have been liberated in great

If

he

even w-ithout a breakout

towaard Simferopol, troops -ho, for six .no longer

attempt.

For on 8 April the Russians pierced

and advanced superiority

of the Perekop Isthmus

the Crimean capital. In the night of 9 April our months, had contained attacks from the Russian

bridgehead, were compelled to evacuate thejir positipns. They w ere able tot j oin fordes wiith the one-time t Perekop Group,"as ordered, because Siiforopol had meanwhile fallen. In an adventurous march along the southern Crimean coast by way of Sudak and Yalta,
they fought their wray to the Sevastopol area.

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SMALL UNIT TACTICS Example 3

Partisan Warfare Without Partisans

L~....

%~d'

Pa

tisan

Warfare

Tfithout

Partisans

The shape of the front lines and the coniat' conditions inthe the -German Sixteenth Ar'my, operating in Russia under Army Group North, had, since the spring of 1942, taken on forms which even a .tactical instructor gif ted with a very lively imiaginatiQn The left flank of the Sixteenth Army. could hardly have. imagined. Here close contact dxis ted with the was anchored on Lake Ilhn', right flank of the Eighteenth Army, and this was actually the only feature that could be called normal within the entire zone of the Sixteenth Army.. South of Lake Ilnen the so-called,' t funnel; route" had developed, a funnel-shaped approach to the Demyansk pocket which formed a salient far in front of the lines and in which there were seven to eight divisions, faced on all sides by four times as many enemy troops, zone

.,of

The narrowest point in this pocket, at the Lovat River .bridge .near Ramushevo, was. only 3 500 meters across and was under Russian The only approach route artillery fire from the north and south. :leading through the funnel into the pocket', a route which was called '"Reichsknueppeldaimm'" (Reich corduroy highway), was inadequate to For this reason numerous transport carry supply traffic. alone, planes flew into the pocket daily, just skimming the tree t.ops of the If, then, the Russians informed their air force at swampy forest. the moment when the transport planes,' under mrtachine gun fire, crossed the narrow passage at Ramushevo, almost brushing the roofs of the houses, .Russian -planes were able to arrive just in ti=n& to attack, while they: were being unloaded; the 'planes which had landed on the only strip- in the pocket;' The e'nemy carried ovit unceasing .ma ox. attacks against.: the funnel and pocket in ' order to annihilate .these_: two unusual positions. Heavy casualties .were incurred duiring stubborn fighting.: in swamps and forests' In early. June1942: the average fightGerman compa anie s -committed at focal' points. had. ing strength.of O dwindled to -about twenty -men., Behind the besieged Demyansk pocket, beginning in the Rramushevo area, a second. front had developed running southward to the city of Kholnmi In one :sectar- of this front, in the midst of'. swarms,, the 5th Luftwaffe Field Division ' -vas ' committed, As it had to hold . a. very large area with inadequate for eces, this newly activated division was unable to establish: acontinuous line. Its position, comprised a. series. of various-sized 'strdng-po nts, 200-800 meters apart. Only. at the most important "places did there exist anything resembling a, defense '.in depth. ' Khol itslf, -d nstitutin7 the right flank of the Sixteenth Army, had been surrounded since winter by the Russians and

I _V

was defended by General Scheerer, jacent army on the right . The. large a. sort of no-man s land;

There was no contact with the adswampy area south of Kholm was

A similar no-man's land, although mere densely populated, was situated directly behind the positions of the 5th' Luftvraffe Field
Division. without a

with narrow strips of land between the,.swampy parts. The villages were located on these narrowssips of land.. To the south the area joined the no-man's. land near Kholm, while to the north its extent ffluctuated, In the west ;it reached almqst to the railway junction at Dno, the main transloading point of the Sixteenth Army,
In this large area itself of about 3,000 square kilometers for its garrisoning there was

This was an area approximately fifty single paved road, very swampy, axn

kilometers

square,

not a single German soldier,

area was left to, ing. Its actual

still.

less a German. administrationmanpower partisans., was

The
lack-

because

masters were the

tried
vital.

Several times during the winter of 1941to. penetrate into this area., in order at
Dno area, by an outpost line of some. depth..

42 the Sixteenth Army least to protect the

Since the Sixteenth,.

Arry was always under strength, only, hastily improvised units of' at most battalion strength could. be put into the -field. After initial successes -these units regularly had to contend with superior partisan
forces who inflicted bloody losses, Drio itself was severa .times. were, led in by a

.danger of falling

into partisan hands.-

That- this

did not happen the

Six.teenth Army owed only to the fact the partisans commander of less than average qualifications.

that

When, in the spring of 1942, the snow, melted,, turning the area into a quagmire,, the situation automatically calmed down for a. while because
of the. difficulty of moverre nt k With the progressing improvement 'of the roads, the partisans tactivities resumed. They were now directed less against the Dno railway junction than against the rear of the 5th' Luftwaffe Field. Division. Impossible conditions gradually developed. in this division's sectcr. The extended line of strong points, which lacked depth, time and again was attacked from the rear. The road from Staraya Russa to Khoi '(the division s only.supply road) led close behind the 'line of strong points and was, sometimes cut for days., If the road was cut at the diiision's northern flank,. the center and southern flank would remain' without sup'lies, until the road was again: cleared of enemy- forces.

In the'vast
cruits training night

area under .theii.

cont 'ol the partisans for rally drafted re-

four weeks of training, After completion, of their the conscripts slipped through the Gorr an strong points at and over 'to .the Russian lines in order as expressed by recruits captured'while 'passing through..the German lines -tto " carry out their t military duties . Soviet agents bound. for northern Russia slipped through in the opposite direction.

who :received

-13

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A division would have been required to -clear.:the': entire area of

partisans fighting and to pacify it within the definitely. But the S3i teenth Army had The available

no such reserves,

not even as re inf orceents for

the> continuous"

"funnel"

and the Demyansk pocket. new acts

manpcwer sufficed- only for the commitment

eliminated mitted the.worst damage until elsewhere 4

of smaller units, which

of violence were co-

possible; to detach .conNot until the late summer of 1942 was it tingents from the divisions committed in the "funnel"f These were formed:into a regiment composed of two battalions, one mountain artillery battalion and one engineer company, Equipped ith highly mo-

bile vehicles,,
in the rear

the regiment was ordered to

Luftwaffe Field Division

clear the area.of partisas

and to restore the. entire

of the

area to German control.

The

regiment
asmuach

order contained two main difficulties. On the one hand, the would probably have only a limited time, at its disposal, in"funnel" if collapsed, On the other the Russians there Consequently, the hand, and this was

as it would be needed in the renewed the offenive which had just order had to be executed speedily.

the main.

difficulty,

the partisans had to be forced to fight

the area could not be pacified evaded action and. withdrawn into
4

since
Hitherto the depth

unless they the partisans

were defeated had always

of the area as soon as they faced an opponent of anything noar equal strength. Only when, by drawing on reinforcements, they had obtained
absolute superiority would they go over to the defense and finally

to counterattack, According to- available informtion thIe headquarters n supply depot were in thle center of the area in
,'rich;were

partisa

and the main three villages

tongues

close to each other

located ;on one of the :narrov

of land. surrounded by swamps;

that the, partsans. were to suddenly penetrate the areasupply depot, by the shortest , route, In
of the order

the :c ornmand eTr o, ,the regiment believed could best be :engaged ,in battle if the, regiment

and ;, advance against their

,main

to prevent, the partisans

Dvision.

,ing operation, the reginnt was assembled. a days':

5th, Luftwaffe Field F.or the.

from learning about the impendmrch- to ;the north

purpose of -.maintaining

surprise, the regiment omitted' at.the point of departure, namely, the 5th, Luftwaffe Field Division's. command- post area, any sort of scouting or. reconnoiteringg This actually ,was necessary inasmuch as a few
days before a woded area. close behind the division command post had

been penetrated by a partisan battalion numbering several hundred men. The 'division cormmnder had been able to enploy against the partiss only a weak alert unit consisting 'of clerks, kitchen personnel, and
horse grooms:

14''

The annihilation of these enemy forces.:was the first objective of the regiment,, ' With this' "accomplished, the troops, wre to advance on the main supp-ly depot, For this purpose the regiment marched southward during the night. to the division command post area and' at daybreak launched an attack from the march column through the ranks of the alert unit against the enemy forces, which had undertaken several local attacks during the night. when the regiment'began its attack) hardly a hostile shot was fired Without 'opposition it penetrated into the forest where not a single partisan was seen, 'A laborious combing of the adjoining swa-ps proved fruitless,, Since the partisans were again applying their usual tactics of evasion, the regimental commander decided on an immediate advance on the main supply depot, in the belief that the partisans would -defend their supplies. The, regiment commenced the 'arch in two columns along miserable, half-mired roads, In the first villages, situated on strips of land between swamps, the two columns met only a few, old men and women. Questioned about partisans, they replied that they had seen none. In answer to queries about the whereabouts of the younger and women of the village- and the children, the old people pointed to the west, saying "they fled, from. fear."

men

It _was remarkable that no fleeing inhabitants were encountered. The country was completely deserted, The reconnaissance planes attached to the regiment did not notice any movements except those of cattle herds on roads and in the swampy lowlandsThe majority of the people had also left the next villages, which were reached without firing a shot. But the footprints leading'from -the villages across the wet meadows to the swamps, which were largely covered by brushwood, clearly indicated the route the natives had taken when they escaped to the nearby swamps. Scouts who followed the footprints into'' the dense brushwood occasionally met some women and children and a few heads of. cattle but hardly' ever an able-bodied man, It was. soon realized that the partisans and the 'population were cooperating closely, and that women 'and children were to hide in the nearest- swamps as long as the Germans:ere in the vicinity. All cattle had been declared the property of the-partisans, had been confiscated and had had to be driveni to specified collecting points... All men in any way fit for service were ordered to hide in the, swamps during daytime and to march by night, grouped according to villages,to the, nearest partisan unit. Toward evening the two columns approached the main supply depot without having been attacked and without having sighted a single

..15

armed partisan. The regimental comrmander's aim to frce the partisans finallyto: fight was not. fulfilled. The three villages were not defended. On the other hand, nt5 . single -round of ammunition 'Nor. was there' :any clue to innor a bag. of f.%our was to be found. dicate that large amounts of supplies had ever been; ,stored. in these three poverty-stricken villages. The existence- of a main supply depot had merely been simulated to mislead the German intelligence, Somewhere in the, large area,, however;, thJ: partisans were boud' to have stored their stocks of.weapons, armmunition.and food. To discover the whereabouts of the' depots prisoners were necessary, During the, entire day not a:.sinigle prisoner had been, taken who, ad-mitted being a member of the partisanics ' SinCce larrconnaissance was also unable to detect any. movements by partisans in the open terrain, it was assumed that they were- hidinin in the scamps. The regimental commander therefore decided to comb the nearest, swanps the next day. Even if the enemy should again ,aavoid. battle, the-re was at ieast the likelihood of cspturing prisoners. During the night the regiment witnessed a surprising spectacle. Airplanes approached which undoubtedly-were of Soviet. rigin. As soon as the planes had become clearlyaudible, varicolored. light signals went up on all sides of the all-aaound defense positions taken up by the regiment on the. tone of landdurng. the day) including the sector which the regimnnt. had just cossed. Some clever German observers noticed the unifoim color combination of

the light signals and~. thereupon fi:redi

identical light signals when

new airplanes were heard approaching. To .their; surprise they saw," parachutes float dovn 1n the ::ilumn t&'aiea:,. The parachute packs contained ammunition and, unfo turu t 'lyonly .:n a few cases,,. a sort of choclate and tcbacco.
'

The enemy was evidently in the regiment.

the area and had actually surrounded

However, the end result: of :th nd day of the operation. was' seco again fruitless. In the dense . brushwo'd ,ad' reed wilderness of 'the surrounding swamps the German forces captured; 'women and children from nearby villages; a few heads of cattle which had been .withheld from the partisans; a few unarmed'ien who claimed to: be harmless' family heads4 . Nowhere .. .there any re'sistance. Just as.bon"the, was previous day, air reconnaissance :reporte'd: TN pparti.sans. deteced; ' cattle herds are being driven -outhward," After dusk the same. situation prevailed aa on the, previous night. There was the 'sound of approahing i'S6viet ;supply planes and light signals were sent up onall sides of' the regimen Is perimeter defense position, Af ter midght there was heavy, rain,

7) Ar,_ z

It was 'evident nom that the partisan comn ndhad issued orders to avoid a clash with the regiment., How, under these circumstances, was the regiment'ever going to carry out .its mission to clear the area from partisans?; The regimental . commander reasoned that where the cattle herds converged there must 'also be partisans.. The same The rains c onnight the regimert moved southward in twfo -columns, tinued.
An advance detachient moving forward on. cross-country motor vegot stuck in the low-lying sections of the terrain. In the afternoon, the regiment overtook several. cattle .herds in spite of the muddy roads& Shots were exchanged from, a great distance with the cattle guards when, they tried to drive the animals into the No reports were received from No prisoners were taken. swmps. hides
air reconnaissance because of rain and fog. :No. supplies were found

in

the villages Which the Germans passed, through during the. advance..
had advanced far day, when the regiment of flour from the -new harvest was discover-

Finally, on the fourth stock southti~ard, a large

ed in a village. A group of armed men who, fled from the village into a German ambush.. Documents found on one of the dead showed fell against regular *that definite orders had been-issued not .to fight During' the presence Germane units,- but to .evade and- to observe them,
of German troops the principal mission of the partisans was to store

portions of the supplies in small, inconspicuous depots, to be cared for by the population; to safeguard the c attle by driving them into
the southern part of the area, .and if necessary.into the swamps,
-

in

.order

to maintain a food supply for -the coming winter.

;could finally

Hoping that, through the destruction of their. food supplies, he make the partisans give battle, .t regimntal comnand.he er ordered a systematic search for supplies in the, villages. The Luftwaffe received orders to shoot all livestock, especially the cattle hePds in the swaps

For two weeks the regiment crisscrossed the large area, finding numerous small depots with food and ammunition, but no partisans. In the latter part of the two weeks there were: no more cattle herds as -the. Luftwaffe had destroyed- them all. The final result of the regiment's expedition was at once, surprising and disheartening. One evening,: in the area of the Dio railway junction, the rear 'services had to be alerted because a7 strong
.partisan column, numbering more than :1,00 men, had left the pa-

trolled area and, on its northward marh, :;shad crossed the railway line and was proceeding in the direction of the Luga forest -where it would be more-than-a 'day' .march from the regiment, which s at the time was also advancing north. The .alerted supply'units were unable to engage the far superior partisan ;column, which disappeared In the huge' forest south :of :Luga,. In doing so 'it had,

certainly unconsciously,

crossed an invisible
and Eighteenth

wall, namely,
Armies, The

the
Six-

boundary between the Sixteenth

partisans. of its teenth Army was rid the Eighteenth Arrmy, whose operations
pedled, Three days later a

They now belonged" to seriously irathey later

new Russian attack

was launched

against

A lack of reserves there made it necessary to ship the "funel," No other units were available the regix; :nt back to the "funnel,," The entire area nt. that could have replaced the departing regii to itself, was, as in the past, left In the autumn the partisans were back in the area,

S18

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*SMIi L UNIT TACTICS

Example 14
A Company

Cornmarder's Story

Co

as

CommanrderIsStorV

Since the winter of 1942 - 43: the main effort of the partisans in Central Russia had been~ directed -gainst the major railways which The fate of the front depended on c arried supplies from Germany. the operation of 'the railways. By means of attacks on moving trains and large-scale demolition of rails, bridges and tunnels, the partitraffic on the two imsans succeeded at times in halting almost all
portant feeding routes; the one running from Warsaw to Gomel and

Eryanek; and further to the north, Borisov ard Smolensk.

the' one passing through Minsk,

In.the early summer of 1943 it was possible through agents to discover the location of the headquarters of the partisan staff
directing the attacks against the railways in the Borisov sector,

The headquarters was located in the village of -Daljok., fifteen kilometers south of Lepel. Inconspicuous surve lance exercised in the Daljoki area confirmed the agents' reports.
For the German sector command it was of paramount importance to capture this dangerous and long-sought staff, which was the brains of the partisan organization in the Borisov area,

For immediate commitment the German sector commander had the following units available: In the Borisov area, one bicycle battalion-* that had been withdrawn three weeks ago from the front and had temporarily been made available to combat partisans; one "Landesschuetzen"L
'(regional defense) battalion in Lepel (fifty kilometers north of fighting partisans in the Bere Borisov) which, ho ever, was presently sina Valley (thirty kilometers west of Lepel) and of which only one company was still in Lepel; one .troop was in the Senno area (sixty

kilometers east of Lepel)., Generally speaking,

evolved in partisan

in

the course of time a.certain pattern had

After the whereabouts of a partisan

fighting.

group had been discovered. ina village or somewhere deep in

the woods,

*,A bicycle battalion was 'organized as follows:

and communication platoon; light with mortars; 12 machine fourth guns first, .second and third

a'headquarters
companies, each

mounted on bicycles and equipped with. l2 'light

(Heavy Weapons) and six 37-nm antitank

machine guns,
guns;

and 6

company (motorized),

equipped a motorized train.

Ilr

an attack-.was launched simultaneously from several sides with superior forces and weapons. The attack was usually scheduled to cormnence at dawn. Although this system .of concentric attacks was undoubtedly successful it also undeniably involved a great disadvantage, for the
attack succeeded only if the partisans- did not learn befarehand of concentric approach, In the course of time, however, the partisans had not only grown numerically, stronger, ,especially since Stalingrad, the

but they also had improved their organization and intelligence services. Ever more frequently '.the German units approaching from several in sides time. Under the circumstances the most logical course would have been the German sector commander to order an'attack against Daljoki to Landesschuetzen from the north, and by the troop from the east 9 would find no partisans to kttack., because they had withdrawn

for the

be carried out by the bicycle battalion fron the, south and west, by However, it was not an ordinary partisan group that was stationed in Daljoki, but the highest partisan' staff of a large region, where all communications converged. Moreover, the sector commander desired not
merely to liquidate in order to gain interrogations. knew about the ent places. The sector and planned to the staff but to "capture the staff members alive, information about the partisan organization through It was unlikely that the partisan' staff. would not

learn about an approach march from three sides.

pr eparations which 'had had to

'Peihaps
at

it
three

already
diff er-

be made

commander therefore decided against a joint operation have the bicycle battalion, ithen stationed in area of Borisov; carry out the attack on the partisan staff. In this decision he was supported by a message frqm the 'co and er at Lepel stating that the fight against the partisans' in the Beresina Valley was progressing only slowly, and that this fact would probably necessitate the commit-

ment of the Landesschuetzen company which

was

still

in

Lepel.
comthe the

On 23 June the sector commander visited mander who, on the previous day, had returned forests east of Borisov, and gave him a newi partisan staff in Daljoki. The next :morning, on 24 June, the battalion.

the bicycle battalion from an operation order, namely, to

in attack

commander issued

the fol-

lowing written, battalion order:

11.

The battalion,

without

the 3d Company,

which

for -the

time being remains, in its billets, hours toniorrow, 25 .Juno, and will
kilometers west of Lepel) in

will leave, camp at

reach Beresina (thirty

0700'

tw6 ,days of marching,

the

"Ivssin: To destroy the' partisans in joint action with battalion from Lep'el which 'already is 'fighting in the

Beresina Valley.

I:*

?2,

Irarch route:

Boris ov-Lepel-Beresina

"3. Billets from 25 to 26 June: -,Staff ana signal coimuni_cation p'latoon, in Wily; 1st Company, in Sloboda, 2nd Cormpany, in Gadsivlia; 4th (Heavy Weapons) Company, in Anoshki.
"Quartering details- in charge of Lieutenant X will move forward at 0400, 25 June, After the arrival of the battalion at the prescribed billets at about 1600 hours, the quartering Details will assemble at about 1900 at the battalion command post in Wily whence they all will proceed by way of Lepel to Beresina Here they will report at post headquarters, which will assign. billets.

" 4, At 0700, 26 June, the battalion will leave from the northern exit of Wily and continue its march by way of Lepel to Beresina0
The operation against the partisan headquarters in Daljoki is described by the commander of the 1st Coriany as follows:

"It was very hot on 25 June,, After using the dilapidated Borisov-Lepel..Beresina road, the only so-called paved road in the .entire: area, we reached our assigned billets in the afternoon, Ir coipany was .quartered in Sloboda, The - quartering parties, which drove on to Beresina after our' arrival, had taken great' pains to :select for us the houses which were least' infested with lice . But if one used thepoint of a bayonet to poke in the crevices. between the. tile stove and the wooden: walls it became evident that ther~ewas
.not, a:. single

house free of;lice in

the en;-

tire village, As a, precaution; the company bathed in the Essa, which runs immediately west: .of!Sloboda, .As:elsewhere; the. population here* also was: poor, .inif'ferent, although polite, and, naturally, quite hostile, to the, parttisans.,: .Thank Heaven, not ea single partisan is in. the area, '..they said . But .they had heard that a day Is march from.there, -in the : Beresina Valley, there had unfortunately been some partisans: in..Zecent times' tEarly next day, 26. June,.- the company bathed once more' in the Essa in order to shed thel lice of Sloboda,. realizing however that in exchange. that same evening.,they wouldbe visited by the vermin of, Beresina, As ordered, my company: stood ready gat 0700 at the northern. exit. of Wily. In a. dense cloud., of dust. the con'pany .rode off to Lepel. "The battalion executive officer awaited us at the first small .;wooden house in the little rural conmunity of Lepel,. Here we had a -two-hour break, were. issued rations,. and:the company commanders reported to the battalion "c mmander,

S21,.

-i 17

"Guides directed- the comrpanies. to their resting places in the western part of tepel, along the Beresina road. In a house behind the bridge, at the, exit toward Beresina I found the battalion commander, a major whom I had known for a long time. At the.beginning of the war against Russia he had commanded a company in our battalion and I was then his platoon leader. ' I noticed- immediately that he was not entirely at ease. When all company: commanders were present he said immediately. and somewhat bluntly: 'Just so you know right away, I fooled you. Our battalion never was ordered to fight the partisans in the Beresina Valley in joint action wi-th. the Landessc huetze n. That is. a fabrication on my part so as to camouflage our real mission., .Actually, it is the supreme: partisan staff of the Borisov guerilla area, who has been seen in Daljoki, that we have to attack and capture alive "ne were by no means as surprised as the major expected. It was obvious that he could not have publicly announced the day before in his battalion order that we were on the way to. attack the partisan staff in Daljoki. Considering the excellent partisan intelligence service, the news of our intention would have travelled to. Daljoki far quicker than we could have reached the village. "'Let us look at the map., ' the major continued.. . !When I received orders to proceed' with my battalion to Daljoki. and to capture the partisan staff which had comnitted numerous attacks on railways and which had carried out demolition' operation on both sides of Borisov, I tried to think up some method likely to-catch the partisans by surprise. . In thD present, case I consider it. impractical to follow the standard procedure, which would be to bring up rmy units during the night from a2ll four sides toward Daljoki: and to wait for morning to break simultaneously into the village.. X am convinced that the staff in Daljoki would have. learned., about our approach from Borisov to Daljoki, a distanc'e of roughly forty kilome ters, and even more definitely, of our assembly at night. I believe that we would have found the nest deserted. I would have-! liked best to use a small unit on motor vehicles, one or at most two companies, from Borisov, W~ithout a stop, and driving at full speed, we would, after reaching Sloboda, have turned from the Lepel highway into the dirt road to Daljoki; the leading company, on its motor vehicles:, would have driven right into the center of the village, while the rear coiany would have scaled -off the village in the south and east toward the' swamp area. That would have been a real- surprises But for such an undertaking one needs suitable. cross-country vehicles -- .and I do not have them. The solution, therefore, is to simulate. normal march movement such as frequently takes place on the road from Borisov to Lepel The objective given out. will be'tthe -partisan hotbed in the Beresina Valley, which is known, t o all, In order to strengthen er i pression of a routine march movement which in no way has anything to do with the staff in Daljoki, yesterday I .ordered ,the battalion to: be billeted at a level with Daljoki along the march route, For the same

a~~rt

reason, the quartering details which. were sent in advance have re.whereupon they went on in quisitioned billets in the usual manner,'
work providing for billets, There they are at " a body to Beresina, tonight that they have not find -otit unti as ordered, and they will All these measures :are- for the. sole purpose of' 'worked in vain. preventing the partisan staff from becoming suspicious and to induce it to remain in Daljoki. Besides , .I'-anconvinced that the partisan

staff has already known sinc:

last. night
1

that the battalion is. going

to march into the Beresina' Valley'

"The major thereupon said, 'Accordirg to my watch it is now a few minutes past 0900 hours., Until "1100: hours please continue t.o, Nothing must behave as if we were resting on our way to Beresina. that we have something entirely different in point to the fact place or turn southward before' No vehicle may leave its mind. Beresinal one' objective: -. Until 1100 we have only 1100.. "'At the stroke 'ibf 1100 the battalion will turn around, leaving and. any other elements. not absolutely essential behind the train and drive back over the same road it used a few for the attack, The' following sequence will be hours before on the. way to Lepel. roads lead1st, 2d. and 4th Companies.:" The three dirt maintained:' follows:, the 1st Company: taking the ing to Daljoki will be used- as from.Wily .(by way of Soyaditai) the, 2d Company, the one fr.om The Sloboda; the. 4th (motorized) Company,.:.the road from Gadsivlia. procced with, the-,.4th Company. will battalion staff

:one

For each the way there will be no :halts' or reconnaissance. I believe, resistance, company the objective is. Daljoki;.- :'-The first
trtiOn

be encountered not later than at the f-arm houses at Liski, will Podrussy, Pospach and Ivan, Bar which: front Daljoki in a semi-circle. For I assume that an important. staff.. 'such as the ons in Daljoki will not be satisfied.with protecting pits imniediate vicinity. Any reFor this farms must'. be broken quickly. sistanco offered, at ,these purpose the, 4th Company will detach one platoon of 'two antitank guns I want to both the 1st and 2d Companies. At 1200 hours, gentlemen, clear?' Is that' to see yoti and your' companies break iunto Daljoki. I, as his senior "The major's plan was by. no means. clear to us. company comriander, answered'in : the name:oof the others, arguing as follows: 'To penetrate Daljoki::at noon is' something we can probably manage, provided there are no strong enemy forces in the farm, houses the partisan"' front ing'the village .. On the other hand, what will hears _shots fired at. the farms or at the edge ofdo when it staff

the village?'

"'I definitely believe, t I said, 'that the real partisan staff, quickly run ,either toward -the s'outh or leaders, will its namel, t :am 'fraid that in this manner we east and iriash . in the swanmps. ns in~the.rear guard.' catch a few unimportant pa'ti may perhas

But the very men we are most anxious to get will not fight but -dis' appear as fast as possible.' "'I think so, too,' the major replied, '.That is why the 3d . Company will take up positions at the edge of the swamp at 1100 hours. "iHe placed an aerial photograph, of the Daijoki area on the table. 'The 3d Company,' he added, 'remained in camp when we marched off to Borisov, Yesterday afternoon it was loaded on tarpaulin-covered trucks and in the evening it was billeted' in Gorodok, that is, behind the 4th Company. The 3d Company took along no..bicycles and carried only light weapons such a's pistols; cabire s, submachine guns and rifles :with silencers,:" This mrning before 'dawn the company rode from erodok toward Lepel. Inro kilometers north of Anoshki, at a point.where. the forest touches the road, the six trucks stopped briefly. ' My orders were to stop for only hal a minute. 'The company detruck'ed, whereupon the empty trucks, which had not' their motors shut, off, were driven through Lepel to Beresina. Thee'3d Company- had orders, using the aerial photograph you see here, and"with the aid of .a c ompass, to march straight eastward through the woods and moors, and, after crossing the Essa, to march into the swamp 'south of Daljoki, or rather to wade. In the swamp, which is covered by dense brushwood, the company will hide. in a very small area, I repeat, in the 'middle of the swamp. It will send out-no reconnaissance patrols.. Its only task will consist in remaining unnoticed. At 1100 hours, at the very moment when the battalion here in Lhpel will turn around for the attack on the partisan staff, the '3d Company will cautiously and secretly occupy the fringe of the swamp south of Daljoki ard' alsd the forest directly east of Ivan Door. There the company will remain. It will not even attack when the battalion penetrates Dalljoki. Its mission is to capture 'the real partisan staff when it tries to escape into, the swamps. Everything else is of secondary interest to it.. - told the commander of 3d Company that for half a day his company was. to act like Indians. "'Of course I would have gladly 'spred the 3d Company the unusual march through the wet forest and the moors, the wading in the Essa and the painful stay. in the hot swamps south of Daljoki, where they will be half devoured by myriads of gnats' and other stinging insects, I could. have ordered the company to' advanc e on the dirt road which runs some six to eight kilometers east of the paved road in the direction of Liski and then on to Gadsivlia, However, this dirt road is, in my opinion, one of 'the roads connecting the partisan staff in Dalijoki with the partisan units 'operating in the Borisov woods. I have no doubt that an advance by the 3d Company on this road would *,Russian rifles captured from the partisans "and'equipp'ed with silencers and:us ing special'ammrunition,. The report is hardly audible at a distance of a, hundred paces..'

41Z 1311

be 'rapidly' reported. toB th. partisan staff, a f act which' would make our entire undertak; ng a failure, That is the reason I ordered the 3d Company' to' move, through woods arId swamps. In doing so, I' am

'have

fully

aware that

if

:there is. a

single

minor

and ridiculous

slip

all

our trouble

and laborious preparations will hve been in vain. Some fellawrfrom Daljoki or'Liski need, only see our approaching company and reach' the staff Daljoki unseen by us., .'That would be the end; But there is nothing todprevenit hiat; either we'will be lucky :or we won tt. I feel the 3d Company will have luck and bring to- a successful con-

''in

clusion

our last

operation

against

the

partisans.

'For in

four

days

bn 1 July,'we are returning

to our dj.vision at the Smolensk front,' kitchen was ready to

"TVWhen I returned to my company the field

issue and

food. I used this opportunity to sit down with my platoon group leaders in a corner of. the farm, courtyard and, while we

ate, to inform them of the battalion's new mission. I''f orbade then to Daljoki before we had left Lepel behind us At 1050 the corany assembled on the street outsidd the couintyarrd, facing in the

mention

direction

of Beresina,

managed

to get the inhabitants,

who wit-

nessed the assembly,

quickly off the road when I let them know that they could have the r'est of the food from the 'field kitchen in the courtyard. I was well aware that I was thus giving more than one of the ,partisah spies and collaborators an undeserved lunch.

"'At 1100
their'
had come three

sharp I gave the signal to depart. The company fturred bicycles around. We drove back on the same road on which we
hours earlier. Since we could use the tracks we had

left in the morning on the very por road, we were able to proceed at a good 'rate of speed with our bicycles, In we turned into the dirt road to Seyaditai and Daljoki, Since the dirt 'road' was

Wily

sandy our speed was' somewhat reduced. lWre passed through Seyaditai.

It was just 1130 when the forward platoon with the two attached antitank guns left the vilJage in.: the directibn of Pospach. Through
binoculars I cleairly saw, on a, low rise in the ground, and between

'some bunches of trees the roofs of Pospach looking like a country estate; the distance was about 2,500. meters , I could not see Daijoki, which lay behind the rise in the: ground. ,
"The company followed the forward platoon at a distance of 500 I rode up to the forwaird 'platoon bicycle file had already come so

meters..
leader. on the thinking

In my sidecar motorcycle
The head of buildings that the platoon's

close to Pospach

-that with
the.petisan

the nak.d eye

one could see the details

of 'the estate. perhaps, in spite

I began to'feel uncomifortable, of alL our carefully prepared de-

ceptive maneuvers, .operation and 'fled

"Just as I

staff

mid-it have gotten wind of the

stopped.. near~ the platoon leader it all

of a

sudden

became" lively in Pospach. a burst of machine gun fire

Rifle shots sounded and simultanecusly swept the dirt . road'. The 1st.: Platoon

7 25
'.'I
S-rI I

icri:i .;

~'3~~~ac

_-r I

jumped from. their

bicycles

and took cover. shells To run up against.such

The
*A

two antitank

guns

behind the platoon were unlimbered. enemy machine gun with high-explosive
began. to fire next to in Pospach,

Their crews tried to hit

second nachine fire. appeared

the gun
to

Me neither expedientno

necessary.

I ordered the platoon-leader,

whom I was lying, to use his four -,machine guns and the antitank platoon to overpdwer the enemy. 'Under the cover provided by the trees I led the other two platoons in an eastward lunge against the enemy's rear. "Unfortunately, we did not At the last succeed in encircling enemy forces

moment they withdrew toward Ivan Bor.

But we were able

0

still

to cover them with machine

gun

fire

in

the open field

I had
I

the impression that

only vexy few of the

partisans

had escaped.

sent a reconnaissance patrol after

"The action, which and five wounded, l as-ted

them.
had cost us one head

almost an hour,

"About two kilometers ahead

of

us,

in

a flat,

open field,

was

the
it

Behind it one saw ,the wooded arc constivillage of Daljoki, If all haad gone well, the 3d Comtuting the fringe of the swamp.

pany was bound

was close

to be in -this
1300 hours Liski, --

rswap.
to be

The 2d:Comany
just penetrating from the fromn Daljoki,

appeared
into

to

Podrussy.Q line a few

Loud battle

noises were

audible

coming

area behind a where

from Podrussy to

and perhaps also

houses

burned.
to send back for the bicycles, and in order

tSince ' I' had first

to Save time,

platoon.

-in in very loose and Daijoki, Ivan Bor., in

committed the forward platoon -- it was noiCTthe 2d an attack on. Daljoki on foot. The riflemen advanced
I order east; of the dirt road. Halfway between Pospach the platoon received of its the barren and flat terrain,

savage machine gun fire

The platoon east. elements facing

directly on its
was therefore As the intensity

flank from the direction of

of flanking fire from Ivan

forced to employ some

Bor increased, endangering the advance of the company to Daljoki, I ordered"the 3d Platoon, which at the .momrnt.was waiting for the
bicycles take at ?ospach, together with the 1st Platoon, to attack and Ivan Bor. "Shortly therefre in from Daljoki, tive officer. after the 3d Platoon had assembled, we saw white ground

signals rise in'Daljoki.

our hands.

This meant:

'We are here! V

It was the

Daljoki was
came execu-

Immediately thereafter

a motorcyclist battalion stated: the partisans order which against

speeding toward Pospach. He transmitted a battalion

'Daljoki has been taken by

4th

Company," Podrussy,. by 2nd Company.

of this village. The 1st

Elomnnts of the 3-d Company are still.:'.ghting from Ivan Bor in the 'woods directly east

Company will discontinue

Bor.'

-its

advance toward Daljoki and occupy Ivan

"q

yb,(

>

;..

II)

In order

to

quickly end partisan

resistance

and

to

avoid

casual-

ties,
fire

In spite of committed the entire company against Ivan Bor. from twelve machine guns, six light mortars ancd two antitank I

gu.7ns, the partisans did not surrender. They fought on to the last round. Wen we penetrated Ivan Bor we met a platoon h, of the 3d Copawny coming toward us from the forest east of tho estate. The men

simply looked awful.

sect bites, their

Their f,.ces were' bloody and swollen from incaked with mud. carriage The platoon leader reIn-

uniforms

ported as follows:
Bospach we noticed

'Soon after

the beginning of the action near

coming from Daljoki.

horse-drawn

side the carriage s t, in. addition to the driver, four woren who wore the large shawls customary in the area. The carriatge passed
through Ivan'Bor in which thre was a partisan unit. of Ivan Bor the carriago ran up against the platoon Directly east of the 3d Com-

pany, which,
in the swamp.

since

100,

had been hiding on both sides of the road

The four wom.en immediatelv aimed their weapons and fired. They ,,ere shot dead. Actually they wore men, perhaps the core of the staff. Unfortunately we could not find a single scrap of paper on them. ' ".Ater the reduction of Ivan Bor all resistance within the battalion area seemed to have ended. giftor 1500 not a shot was fired, I had the bicycles brought up and sent my conrcany commander to nearby Daljoki to inform the battalion commander that we. had occupied

Ivan Bor. I rescinded my order to the company comrmander, however, when I saw the battalion c omander t's command car approaching from
Daljoki. The mya jor was accompanied by the commnander of the 3d Co-

pany. that I

The gnats in the swamp had made such a mess of could barely recognize him.
major stated t hat the attack had been successful had not

the latter

"The

insofar been possible

as,
staff

except for

a 'few men

who had managed to escape,

Unfortunately it

the partisan some

and in

had been eliminated. had early the swamp,

to capture the top leaders alive.

twenty men, the edge of

The core of the staff,

from Daljoki, strrender

withdrawn southward

doing so had run right their submachine guns.

into the rifles They were all

of the 3d Corrpany,
they

hidden at
fired

Upon our command to

killed in

hand-to-hand

fighting..
"After the attack
the battalion returned to the caup in Borisov."

...

T.

SMA LL UNIT ThOCTICS

Examiple5 The Forest Camnp

I .1

The

oretCm t

In the huge forests west of Bryanek (Central Russia), wich are to for German forces with swamps, it was never possible interspersed really get the upper hand over the partisans for any length of time.

by the few Ger- "n Casualties inflicted There were too many of theme security units available were readily offset by reinforcements repartisans) rear areas. They (the ceived from the extensive stocks equipped with automatic weapons which came froze large were which

rehad had to leave behind in the woods during its the Soviet Ary treat in the summer of 1941. Under tight and uniform direction from
Moscow, the partisans their own activities in with the Bryansk area had carefully on the battlefield, coordinated and thus, operations

in

time of crisis,

they became

a heavy burden and a cause for daily

worry to our supply services.

A
Ruda,

very active group numbering 300 to 400 mn, the so-called Group mainly attacked the railway line and the highway west of Bryansk;
other partisan by having units in the Bryansk energetic area, Group Ruda was commander time. . His group His orders an especially and audacious

More than distinguished

around whose name a legend. had grown in the course of discipline. was characterized by aggressiveness and harsh to which German reconnaissance or police patrols came

were also willingly obeyed by the civilian _population in remote

villages,

only occasionally.

Over a long period only one case of noncompliance became known, when milk village refused to deliver the last the mayor of a small forest cow of the village and instead offered some sheep9 . A few days later
the mayor appeared with his where headquarters Wife and children 'at he counted out twenty Czarist the nearest gold rubles German on the

table and demanded that

air, and not by the railway, because they feared for -their

he and his faiily be iimmediately evacuated by which was endangered by partisan attacks,
lives. the dangerous into

attempts to destroy In the summer of 1942, several Group Ruda failed because each time the group managed

to escape

remote woods and swamps. In the autumn it was finally possible to discover the actual. hide-out and strong point of the group, a fortiof of land sirrounded by several belts fied camp located on a strip
swamps. The German troops which were sent to attack bogged down with their vehicles in the first 'swamrp belt. The German sector commander broke off the action, feeling that he could not accept responsibility

for the losses which would probably be incurred in

heavy weapons statements, against a fortified camp that, was protected by mines and wire obstacles.

an attack without
prisoner

according to

The beginning of the

partisans alike. a ski battalion

muddy period proved crippling to Germans and

time to organize comander used this " The German sector comprising five cqrmpanies, The 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th companies, but they were three Finnish equipped to fight and six inmedium

Companies were rifle

dependently.

In

addition to numerous

submachine
plywood

guns,

each company
Akjas,

had twelve light machine guns, mortars which, loaded on light

heavy machine

guns,

sledges called

were hauled by the troops.

The 5th (Heavy Wleapons)

Company had four

75.--i~i mountain guns which could be disassembled, as well as six Russian heavy mortars. , The weapons were transported by pack animgals, the am-

munition on indigenous sleds drawn by a ?anje*,% horse,

talion was equipped with radio In November, when the first telephones. big snowfalls came

The entire bat-

and the

swamps be-

gan to freeze over,' partisan attacks were renewed. For training purposes, the Gerrian ski battalion was at first employed as a sort of flying-squad to protect the vital railway line. The advantage of its greater mobility, as compared with the slower movements of the partisans who made their attacks against the railway on foot, soon became apparent~ -On several, occasions our ski troops were able to follow
the tracks made by partisans returning to their woods after raids, and

to overtake them. On the other hand, the partisans soon adapted themselves to the new situation which confronted them due to the appearance
of the ski battalion. Whenever a ski coirpany took up quarters in a

village, the large-scale attacks against moving trains and against guardea tunnels and bridges in the vicinity of thc village would cease.
The partisans would then restrict -their activities erous small demolition teams who attempted to fic. It was therefore obvious that a.well-prepared service between the civilian ioning intelligence to disrupt the work of numthe railway traf-

and rapidly functpopulation and the

ski battalion ordered a thorpartisans existed. The commander of the ough search of the villages near the railway and highway. The search brought to light an amazing number of German radio instruments of the battalion. The instruments undoubtedly came from type used' bythe ski supply trains that had been raided.

However, the recapture of the radio instruments failed to produce even the slightest change in the activities of the partisans, for they
possessed, still other means of transmitting mander therefore decided to avoid all villages. words, sleeping in the open at the height first, this decision was received with scant out, however, that during the defense of the ious winter, he himself had lived for several information. This The ski comin other At meant,

of a

Russian winter.

enthusiasm. Orel salient weeks in the

He pointed in the prevopen, that

is to say, in huts built from snow and' a thick layer of fir~-tree branches, with a shelter-half as a door.

-I:Russian farm horse,

Moreover,
sans were able the the

the battalion commander insisted that if

to

the parti-

en of nights in the open, the spend the winter He took measures to procure could do likewise battalion ski the the best: means against and, especially, necessary clothing

dreaded nighttime freezing cf feet,

namely, the high felt

boots,

normally used throughout Russia, which keep the battalion extreme cold. Every member of the ski white paw'ka a night pair of place felt boots attached of the ski to the were worn in

even in legs warM carried under his belt which at

shoes worn during the day.

had become ski battalion By the end of November the men of the an hour and to biwithin accustomed to building snow huts quite were immediately epparent, The results vouacking in the woods, as was no longer as efficient service intelligence The partisan On 2 December,, a partiin villages., when we had spent the nights thirty a furlough train attacked -not Group Ruda san unit

of a ski co:ipa.ny kilometers west of Bryansk, in the vicinity Th. had taken up quarters in the woodsa a -short timeo 'bef ore.
noises -for pany heard tl! battle hazardous a weapon on this carried and joined -mounted on each train every in

which co m-

ttretch

going on furlough and machine guns were Any partisan the action 0

ran

on the spot was shot down while fleeingu The same day not killed another ski company dealt similarly with a different partisan unit
wheh it attacked a Gerran bridge guard detail. which, in the autumn, had Tt was camp of Group Ruda. the headquarters and backcommander therefor.e ordered

swanmcps covered the time ice By this forest the against prevented an attack group was still that the forest evident The German sector bone of Group Ruda.

the ski

battalion comm rand'er to eliminate

the partisan camp,

had been billeted in several the 'battalion On 7 December, after' and ' purpose of resting "a 'few days for the' near Pocep for villages and continued:. it started to snow steadily supplies, replenishing battalion night In the. morning of 8 December the snowing during the Patrols the adjacent woods, and moved northward to its quarters left - of the battalion in order to see if any'enemy scouts covered the' rear

followed the march

peasants we're actually

Following the snow tracks of the battalion

arrested one by one,

four sleds

although it:could.not'be

proved that they had any .ther

from the woods. As a deceptive forest in maneuver

purpose than haul wood

on

-their

the

battalion

first

marched in

north-

westerly direction.
tcard the

In

the depth o~f the forest. it,

turned eastward
,'It west

camp of Group Ruesa, one' of' the Bryansk settlement large' forest of

about twenty-five kilometers zones, and roughly ten seven kilometers kilo-

away.
meters of the

The loca'tion of the carp was only. approximately known.

north of the former forest railway line, Ruda.

was situated

30 ,,,,

UNCLASSIFED
The camp undoubtedly was well camouflaged sance had been unable to locate it accurately

MyY

since either

air in

reconnaisthe autumn

or after the beginning of winter,

camp evidently and the

Communications

from the forest

mainly directecd southwrard .Bryansk highway. The wooded. zone north

were

to the railway line of the camp was

desolate, very swampy and azlmout without roads, Since the unsuccessful attack against the forelst camp the zone h-ad nct been entered by German troops, The ski battalion- commander assumed that the
partisans direction probably would at least expect a German attack from that

It was the battalion comnmariders intention to advance on 8 December to an area about ten kilometers north of the partisan camp; during the follcwing day the exact location of the camp was to be determined, and on 10 December .th battalion was to carry out the attack with the point of main effort directed from the north. The battalion, without having, made any contact with the enemy, reached an area' about ten kilometers northwest of the partisan camp on the evening of g. December and bivouacked in the forest. At dawn the "1st Company left, with orders to reach the. area southwest of the camp, and from! there to reconnoiter the exact location of the camp. The battalion itself remained in its bivouac,

On. the afternoon of. 9 Decermber the commander of the 1st Company reported as follows: "Have reached an area roughly three kilometers southwest of partisan camp. Closer approach to' camp -is now im.possible because the partisans, who wear white parkas as
we do, are carrying out exercises on self-made skis around the camp, During the night we shall reconnoiter exact. location of camhp.. The swamps are frozerY,.t all the

If the partisans were conductingski exercises in the vicinity of the camp, then, so the battalion commander assuimed, they must be unaware of the presence of the ski' b attalibn. He was therefore somewhat surprised radioed before when the 1st Comr-pany, dawn that it was which soon -after 'def-ensiv e

reported the location of the forest camp according to

engaged .in

rnight grid fighting

had

squares,
against

partisans who were attacking from the direction of the 'camp. The commander of. 1st Company reported further as
At OCOO (Daybreak):

follows:
in

"Attack. by ,par:tisans increases

intensity.
At

0830:

Company position cle right flank

ttNcavy fighting against entir e Group 'Ruda. under' heavy mortar fire.: :Partisans' encirof company,,"

M4CLASSIFI

c
At 0900:
enemy in rear,

UNCLASIFIE
New
I am first reports Comwhich seemed that the 1st

"Front on right flank pressed back.

Position of company uintenable.

withdrawing, westwa.rd while continuing to

The battalion commander who, battalion, actually had to was, It on the basis reach a was self

fight."
of the

ha.d alerted 'the simpler than it

decision cyident

severe struggle, but the question was pany must be supported in its hcw. By the immediate participation of the battalion in the battle Or by means of an attack 'by the battafought by the 1st Company? lion against the forest camp, which would at least draw away part of
the partisan units from the 1st Company?' Or would it be better to divide the battalion in such a manner that sonmc of its elements would support the 1st Company while the rest would attack the camp which at the time was' not fully manned?

By means of excellent radio ~telephone coimnunications the battalion commander was accurately informed about the progress of the battle and the present difficulties of ' ht Company. But the great ques-

tion was,

whether the company commander's report that

he was engaged

by the entire Group Ruda was accurate, So far, 1s-t Company had' not captured any prisoners, and the company commander's report was based on his observation that he. was fighting against fourfold supe rioi-ity

prsonal

If the company commander was right, the forest camp was either not manned at all or only by weak forces, Thus thor o was a unique
opportunity of taking the headquarters and backbone of Group Ruda

speedily and without losses. The capture and destruction of the forest camp was, after all, the battalion's real mission, In case
the camp was empty' or only weakly held, it would n~t even be -necess-

ary to cormit the entire battalion against it. Some' elements would suffice while the rest could rush to the aid of 1st Company,.
What would happen, however, if the comp any commtander's report

proved contrary ' to the facts? The exact strength of Group Ruada was unknown; it might have been more,:than 3Q0 to 400 men. It was inprobable that the efficient and cautious leader. of :Group Ruda should leave his mst important strong point unmanne.d. If, however, a strong force. was defending the camp, which supposedly wbas protected by mines
and wsire

obstaclgs,

division

of forces

might," cause

the failure

of

the attack against the camp. The elements'sent to.the aid of 1st Coma pany, would be too weak to carry out a crushing blow against the enemy
forces engaged there; at best it. would provide some relief.

Consequently to' divide .up the: battalion was, in the' final analysis, "neither to hop nor tojurnp.' ". A decisive change in the. situation could only be expected if 'the battalion was' corrmitted as a body, either to crush the partisans in' front of the 1st 'Co.any:. or to capture the forest camp The battalion conander decided to -attack-the 'forest camp.

UCSI
'4 1

~~

12A

. .fF

'Y"~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
He reasoned that the 1st Company was presently about nine kiloIn view of the deep snow in the meters away from the battalion,

forest, where one had to rely on compass and instinct to bring its it- was hardly possible for the battalion
bear in less than three hours, that is, approxiately

when marching, strength to

at noon, This

would leave about four hours, until

the dusk which fell

at

about

an to inflict possible would be quite time it During this 1600. Company, proof 1st the enemy in front blow against annihilating previous experience one According to all vided he decided to fight, to avoid doctrine It was partisan however. could not count on this,

As soon as they recognized the imagainst superior forces, battle In camp. pending danger they would withdraw, presumably into their
the 1st Company sector nothing more trary, camp it a local success. might possibly be scored- but of camp would' cohtinue t.o remain in possession as the On the conThe situation would not have improved. the partisans.

on the A surprise. attack would have become more serious. since German plans would have then be out of the question, by the battalion of any operations The final result been revealed. against of 1st Company would have to be a systematic attack in support

would

the

camp conducted later, On the other hand, if at present, while a considerable part of

Group' Ruda was fighting the 1st Company, the battalion as a body were be to attack the forest camp, an effect of surprise might still was the camp was unmanned or only weakly defended, it If achieved.
battalion. taken up by the bound to be speedily to, the camp would simultaneously bring relief against An attack the 1st Company, for it

could-hardly be assumed that the partisans would continue to attack strong point was in danger of filling into the. 1st Corpany if their
enemy hands. be able as to assumed that of success. Shortly If, to repii.se camp was so strong in the force however, the present was to be it by the battalion, attack the chance on would have even, less later systematic attack

after

0900 the ski

battalion

.marched from its

billets

by

way of the shortest route toward the forest camp';

At the head marched

75-m. mountain 'guns. four by the the 2d Company, which was reinforced The company had orders to use all 5th (Heavy. Weapons)' Company. of the encountered on the way. smash any resistance to rapidly forces its 5th Company, and the remnants of the Company with Then followed tie '3d marched with the leading staff the 4th Company.. The battalion finally company,

The advance proceeded without enemy interference.

flank 1130, battle noises gradually became

On the right
four kilo-

audible from an area

meters south of the camnp,

where the

st

Cmpany was fighting.

the forest camp, the

Toward
first

when we were probably very gun fire,

close to

shots were fired near the leading elements

submachine which carne from the

of the 2d Company

It

was

brushwood beyond an open- level

swamp which was now snow covered.

The corany commander,

accompanied

aNCLASS1FtEF

-CLASSIF NEP U
by the-battalion commander, sent tro platoons and the mountain guns The attacking force soon into action against the enemy riflemen.
succeeded in taking five wooden bunkers, probably intended as an ad-

vance position, which had just

been evacuated.

It

then advanced
just about to cross comiing from the

strip of brushwood, and was through the adjoining, met heavy fire a second snow-covered swamp when it about 150 meters away. forest opposite,.

The camp we were looking for was bound to be located in northwestern side. forest, presunably on its
The battalion six heavy rmortars cogimhander of the ordered the 2nd company to

this

occupy the to attack the

northwestern part of the camp.

The 3d Col:pany,
received

reinforced by 'the
orders

5th Company,

kept in reserve for use iany ws The 4th Ccm camp from the north, of the right flank. The against soft spots and for the rs'otetion time was fighting abcut four kilometers 1st Company, which at this southwest of the camp, was instructed to change from delaying action to attack in order to pin dow n the enermy in front of it,
At about 1300 the 2d Company penetrated while the 3d Company was stubbornly the forward for fringe of the

forest,

fighting

the northern

camp

bunkers.
zone

A short time later

against partisan the camp.

the reserve company had to

which rushed from the 1st

be shiftCompany's

ed southward combat

units

toward

Approximately at

finally
partisans

in front of 2nd Company 1400 hours the resistance These guns of the mcoantain guns. collapsed due to the fire fire at fifty-meter range on the bunkers in stage which the lived and which they defended, At this the company

had opened direct

penetrated into the camp.

The battalion commander

committed his last

by a 2d Company. These reserves were constituted reserves behind the of the 4th Company. The advance of the 2d Company, which platoon fought its way forward from bunker to bunker, brought relief to the north, The 2d Company moved to the 3d Company attacking from the

center of the came,

contact

deliberately left
and then attacked

only a few assault troops in

the camp from the east.

with the enemy,

By 1500 all resistance had ceased in the camp. the partisans, who now were fleeing southward, still.

The remnants

of

caused some con1st

fusion in

the sector of 4th Company which,

against the forces that

southwest of the camp, was

had fought the

then engaged

previously

Company. Having lost almost a fourth of its strength during the day, 1st Corrany, together with the 4th Company, was unable to encirthe
cle the enemy, who escaped while amazed at suffering the size heavy losses. of the camrnp and the amount

We

were absolutely

of supplies, which comprised tens of ammunition and weapons, in addifor many months, In addition we found a tion to enough food to last
whole arsenal of materiel from raided German supply trains, including

~se~rt.

NCGLBSSS

IItE

UNCLASSI FED
1 _ . -. '

binoculars, ment.

battery commander telescopes

and the latest radio equip-

An interrogation of prisoners brought ':t.,o:light the fact that the camp had been held by a fcr ce numbering 150 men. Appryximately 350 men had attacked the 1st Copany during the 'day. The company commi'nder's report about a fourfold superiority of enemy forces therefore proved accurate,
We learned that the area immediately surrounding the camp, except for a few lanes, had been very heavily. mined. The, ski battalion had been favored by luck, inasmuch as heavf' sncwf - lls during the past few days had covered the mines, making them inffectual. The ccmrnmnd er of Group Ruda had booen kied the. saimo evening in front of the 4th. Company. During the follcwing rocnths, Group Ruda remained inactive.

35

UNCLASSIFIED

as

-~-~p~P"T~ F ~, r~;''~

r'71~-~ )

r t~ 7"f Y

ae~":.i:"

Appendix 1

S ketch for Example 1 "THE FIRST CLASH WITH PARTISANS"

Situation on the Evening of 22 June 1941

Adjacent div on the left

Merkine

Scale: 1: 250,000 Kilometers

AJ1 CI

1-

Appendix 2

N~

w -J 0-

F(I)

Oi)

'I)

'9 f,to

Gods

Scale Approximately 1: 100, 000

'pO

U E-C

Iia

0 0 0

w a:0
UJ

0
0

W~ H

/
/ / / / /y G

'I

kP hIDL

;i:4

r Ur rr

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

No.

of Copies Office, Chief of Military History

Historical Division Seventh Army Headquarters, European Command Intelligence School Berlin Military Post SHAPE COIMNAVF ORGER US AFE Military Posts

'

UNCLASSIFlED

NCss l~s "c[ato

The release of this manuscript to non-U.S. personnel is controlled. Non-U.S.personnel desiring access to this manuscript should forward their requests to their respective Military Attache, Washington D.C., who in turn should transmit requests to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Attn: Chief, Foreign Liaison Office.

UJNCLA SFiE

UNCLASS

IF

.'GL (1) 9-51 105-22807