Gloria A.

Compilation of Constitutional Law II- Maam Jumao-as Constitutional Law II principles Section 1 Due Process and Equal Protection A. Life, Liberty and Property 1. COMELEC vs Cruz- 605 scra 167 Facts Question of the constitutionality of highlighted portion of Section 2 of RA No. 9164 entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, whereby it provides ; No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments: I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively. II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law. III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical. The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164. SC ruling : We find the petition meritorious. * Preliminary Considerations The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended constitutional recognition to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of the territorial and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article X, which provides: SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term of office of barangay officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. *Congress Plenary Power to Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial Power As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987. We consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution. ( Note : Estrada vs Dieserto- the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.- ) The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed relate strictly to compliance with constitutional standards. * The Retroactive Application Issue Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law. The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue. Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials provisions is intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials. To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective officials (other than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term limitation for barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the application of the three-term limit. This reading, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials without exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same kind as the other. Their separate topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC suggested. Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c). Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we painstakingly outlined above. Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide the complete rule for the election of barangay officials, so that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this subsection, no term limitation applies to barangay officials.

NOTE: All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the challenged proviso. - With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso based on retroactivity must fail. *The respondents retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard. Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution. The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. ( Only these rights ) In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises . Respondent said that they have right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. SC rules that there is no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local posts; thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to decide. Note: To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before; and (2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm. *. The Equal Protection Clause Issue The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.( Abakada vs Purisima ) The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. *Violation of the Constitutional One Subject- One Title Rule Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. Farinias vs executive. The challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule. First, the title of RA No. 9164, states the laws general subject matter the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law. Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso. 2. Aquilino Pimentel vs Comelec Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the 12th and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri. Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao were marred by irregularities, and the PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents submitted by the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities. Hence, the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being conducted by the NBC. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentels counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentels counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs. Pimentels counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass, maintaining that the said PCOC did not reflect the true results of the elections because it was based on the manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs, the authenticity and due execution of which had not been duly established. The motion to exclude made by Pimentels counsel was once again denied by the NBC, and she was ordered to sit down or she would be forcibly evicted from the session hall. Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri. I. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to due process of law when the respondent SPBOC and the respondent NBC adopted an unconstitutional procedure which disallowed the petitioner [Pimentel] the opportunity to raise questions on the COCs subject of the canvass. II. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to equal protection of the law when the respondent SPBOC and the respondent NBC unconstitutionally adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of COCs from Maguindanao, different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of COCs from other provinces/areas. III. The respondent NBC acted with manifest grave abuse of discretion when it refused to exercise its broad, plenary powers in fully or accurately ascertaining due execution, authenticity and fitness for the canvass of the MCOCs collected by the Comelec in the exercise of such broad plenary powers. It violated its own rules when it deprived petitioner [Pimentel] of the right to ventilate and prove his objections to the Maguindanao COCs. Pemintel ask for ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent COMELEC en banc sitting as the NBC for Senators for the May 14, 2007 elections from proceeding with any proclamation based on the on-going senatorial canvass which includes the new/second Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Maguindanao, until further orders from this Court, SC rulling: The court ruled to dismiss the petition *Pre-proclamation controversy/case As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members

of the House of Representatives. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Proceedings which may delay the proclamation of the winning candidate beyond the date20 set for the beginning of his term of office must be avoided, considering that the effect of said delay is, in the case of national offices for which there is no hold over, to leave the office without any incumbent. In sum, in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that preproclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. *The Petition at bar : This Court rules for the respondents. The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369. Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four given criteria. There is no ambiguity in the said provision, at least, as to whom it imposes the duty, namely: (1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election for Senators. And, in this case, the exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies. The resolution of the issues raised by Pimentel as to the irregularities and suspicious circumstances surrounding the Maguindanao MCOCs, which appear prima facie regular on their face, compels or necessitates the piercing of the veil of the said MCOCs. These issues, however, are more appropriate in a regular election protest, wherein the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.40 *Due process and equal protection of the law Pimentel alleges that the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao disallowing him from asking certain election officials, such as PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, questions regarding the Maguindanao PCOC and MCOCs, deprived him of his right to due process. ( City of Manila vs Lagiuo - There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. - This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process. Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.

This Court finds Pimentels argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. After going over his allegations, however, and the definition of substantive due process, this Court finds that Pimentel cannot invoke denial of substantive due process because he is not assailing any law, which, arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly deprived him of life, liberty, or property. At most, Pimentel can claim that he was denied procedural due process when he was not allowed by the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao to propound questions to certain election officials. But even on this point, Pimentel fails to convince this Court. Asking election officials questions and confronting them with evidence are not part of the canvass proceedings. There is no statute or regulation expressly providing for such a procedure. Any objection or manifestation concerning a certificate of canvass before the NBC, as well as any contest involving the inclusion or exclusion of an election return or certificate of canvass before a local board of canvassers, must be orally submitted to the Chairperson of the NBC or the local board of canvassers, as the case may be. The afore-described procedure does not provide any party the opportunity to question and confront election officials and other witnesses. It may have been allowed on occasion by the boards of canvassers, but it does not necessarily ripen into a legally demandable right. He may not have received the response or action that he wanted with respect to his observations, manifestations, and objections, but Pimentel cannot deny that these were heard and presented in the canvass proceedings. Pimentel further admitted that he did not submit his written observations, manifestations, and objections as the rules of procedure before the NBC and the local boards of canvassers require. 44He cannot now decry that his observations, manifestations, and objections were not given due course when he himself failed to comply with the procedure governing the same. According to Pimentel, he was deprived of equal protection of the laws when he was not allowed to question the election officials involved in the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao, although he was allowed to do so for other provinces or districts. In support of his claim, Pimentel compared his own experiences in the canvass proceedings for different provinces or districts. This Court, however, finds Pimentels assessment misplaced. What would have been essential for Pimentel to allege and prove was that other senatorial candidates were allowed during the canvass proceedings to question the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, while he was not; and that the other senatorial candidates were given undue favor, while he was the only one unjustly discriminated against. It seems apparent to this Court that the position of the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC not to allow, during the canvass proceedings, the questioning of election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, was consistent for all senatorial candidates. Hence, petitioner was similarly situated with all the other senatorial candidates and they were all treated alike insofar as the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao were concerned. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. B. Substantive Due Process 1. Velasco vs Villegas Facts
A suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: " (1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of

such ordinance. - Municipal Corporation- A city ordinance of Manila prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage service is a valid exercise of police

power. 2. Balacuit vs CFI

This is a petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced ---Ordinance penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET.---Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 which provides --To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.--We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power to exact, unless expressly granted by its charter. Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

SC RULING
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. Perhaps, there is some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes.( pak!!) Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. ( Mentioned by Maam Jumao-as) There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar.- A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. ( Ticket daw is a right of property ) In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed 1. Controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of emergency, 2. Limiting the net profits of public utility as well as 3. Regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. NOTE: A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. WHEREFORE, Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional. 3. Del Rosario vs Bengzon

Facts This is a suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988. (1.) The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. SC Ruling: There is no merit in that argument (1) for it proceeds from a misreading and misinterpretation of the letter and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the Generics Act. ----- while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions ('Purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines') where the sole use of generic terminology has been required, the 'prescription' of drugs is further governed by paragraph (b). And the use of the word 'all' in the latter provision emphasizes the absence of any distinction between government and private physicians. In other words, in prescribing drugs, physicians, whether in government service or in private practice, are both governed by exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized to include the brand name in their respective prescriptions. -----As it may be observed that while paragraph (a) refers to "all government health agencies, and their personnel as well as other government agencies" (, paragraph (b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners." As provided in paragraph (d) of the herein code--- the salesgirl at the drugstore counter is authorized to "substitute the prescribed medicine with another medicine belonging to the same generic group." -- the petitioners argue that "the act of prescribing the correct medicine for the patient becomes the act of the salesgirl at the drugstore counter, no longer the act of the physician, dentist, or veterinarian". The SC RULED that the petitioners have distorted the clear provisions of the law and the implementing administrative order. For it is plain to see that neither paragraph (d) of Section 6 of the Generics Act, nor Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 62, gives the salesgirl and/or druggist the discretion to substitute the doctor's prescription. On the contrary, Section 4, par. 4.1, of Administrative Order No. 62 directs the pharmacist not to fill "violative prescriptions" (where the generic name is not written, or illegibly written, and the prescription of a brand name is accompanied by the doctor's instruction not to substitute it), as well as "impossible prescriptions" . The salesgirl at the drugstore counter, merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name, and their corresponding prices. The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State: "to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counter-parts. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. WHEREFORE, the Generic act is constitutional. 4. GSIS vs Monteclaros SC Ruling: Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the dependent children.13 The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except dependent children.14 The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support. The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros' claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. Retirement Benefits as Property Interest In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. ( Pension plan is a right to property). Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees' pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband's contractual compensation. Denial of Due Process The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employee's death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.28 The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. ( Germane purpose of the law) The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. ( classification: All marriages contracted with 3 years before the retirement or death and those contracted not within the said period( after) ) Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for violative of due process and equal protection.

5. Chavez vs Comelec Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its
Resolution No. 6520 which