Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr.

Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

Immanuel Kant 1724-1804CE

First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative (CI1)

Kant called his formulations of absolute moral law categorical imperatives. Categorical imperatives are commands to act in a certain way independent of personal desire. An imperative is a command of the form: Do this. It is an unconditional duty to obey a command. Categorical imperatives are universal, that is, they apply to everyone and at all times. The following is Kants first formulation of the categorical imperative (CI1).

CI1: An act-token is morally right if, and only if, it is universalizable.

An act-token, x, is universalizable if, and only if, person S can consistently will that everyone act on the maxim that S would act on if S were to perform x. In other words, always act on principles that you can will that all others act upon too. To will that something obtains, say p, is to sincerely wish that p be true. To consistently will is to will that person S operate on the same maxim at all times such that it does not involve a contradiction. A maxim is a principle that specifies the situation a person believes he is in and the act that the person takes himself to be performing. In Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant holds that, We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law; this is the general formula for the moral evaluation of our action (23). Let us consider an example. If I consistently will that when I want a particular flower in a conservatory I may pluck it and take it home while expecting to find beautiful flowers there all the time, this constitutes a contradiction. I am not consistent in what I will. If everyone lived by this maxim eventually the conservatory would be denuded. There would be a conservatory and yet there would not be a conservatory; A and ~A. Everyone would hold a contradictory ethic. This demonstrates that this maxim cannot be held as a universal law without contradiction. One might say this is inconsistent willing. Kant writes,
If we attend to what happens in us when we act against duty, we find that we dont (because we cant) actually will that our maxim should become a universal law. Rather, we are willing that the opposite of the maxim on which we are acting should remain as a law generally, but we take the liberty of catering to our preferences by making an exceptionjust for me, just this once!(23).

Kant holds that, morality must be based on reason and reason dictates we must never make an exception for ourselves. A Categorical imperative asserts a standard of ethical conduct to which all must conform. It is universal

1-18-2012

Page 1 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

and absolute. If we occasionally excuse ourselves from a universal maxim then this constitutes a double standard; one set of categorical imperatives for you and a set of self-serving hypothetical ones for me, this in inconsistent. Additionally, Kant believes that CI1 implies that it is morally wrong to refuse to help others. He gives the following example of a stingy man:
A fourth man, for whom things are going well, sees that others (whom he could help) have to struggle with great hardships, and he thinks to himself: What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I wont take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need (23).

I think if this particular man was indigent and asked for help he would expect to get it. This kind of attitude makes self-serving exceptions for himself and others in his socioeconomic class. His double standard defies universal adherence. In this quote, Jonathan Bennetts added text is enclosed by asterisks and precedes Kants words. It discusses how no one could will to be a universal law the maxim such as the one exemplified by the stingy man.
*Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cant even be thought as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone being willed to be such. Its easy to see that an action of that kind conflicts with stricter or narrower (absolutely obligatory) duty.* With other actions, the maxim-made-universal-law is not in that way internally impossible (self-contradictory), but it is still something that no-one [sic] could possibly will to be a universal law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself (23).

In the following, Kant explains that the stingy mans principle is not universal at all but instead merely a general rule not followed by the stingy man. Again, asterisks enclose Bennetts addition.
So if we weighed everything from a single standpoint, namely that of reason, we would find a contradiction in our own will: willing that a certain principle * be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet * subjectively not hold universally but rather admit of exceptions. However, we dont consider our actions in this unitary way; rather, we regard our action at one time from the point of view of a will wholly conformable to reason and then at another time from the point of view of a will affected by preferences; so there is actually no contradiction, but rather the preferences resisting the command of reason. In this the *universality of the principle is changed into mere * generalitythat is, the move is made from all to ever so many or almost all so that the practical principle of reason meets the maxim half-way (23).

If everyone lived by this maxim then, everyone would expect help but no one would give it. This is not universality, it is subjective, it is just a general rule that some may feel they have license to break. It appears that Kant assumes that eventually everyone would break down at some point in life and ask for help in spite of their hyper-individualist mentality.
For a will that brought that about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will (23).

1-18-2012

Page 2 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

However, I can imagine a case where one may not ever come to such a point. A billionaire, who can pay any amount for any service, would never need to depend on the kindness of others to help him. Such a character as Scrooge, in Charles Dickens A Christmas Carol, comes to mind. Scrooge refused to help others and never needed charity because he was so rich. I have met people who live by such a selfish standard. Nevertheless, I agree with Kant. The sum total of humanity could not live by such a self-centered maxim. Our cognitive abilities combined with our social cooperation gave rise to the civilization we know enjoy. Together we can realize heights of human potential that is not possible if no one worked together for a common goal. I concur with Kant and conclude that it is morally wrong not to help others in need when one has the means to do so without detriment to ones own wellbeing.

Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative (CI2)

Kants second formulation of the categorical imperative (CI2) bases morality on something that has absolute value. CI2 holds that, as rational beings we have absolute value and that we should always treat ourselves and others as an end-in-itself and never merely as a means to an end.
But suppose there were something whose existence in itself had absolute value, something which as an end in itself could support determinate laws, That would be a basisindeed the only basisfor a possible categorical imperative, i.e. of a practical law. There is such a thing! It is a human being! (26).

CI2 is formulated as follows:

An act is morally right if, and only if, in performing it, the agent treats himself and all other persons as ends-in-themselves, and treats no one as a mere means. In other words, do not use people just to get what you want instead, treat them with dignity and respect always mindful that each person, including yourself, has intrinsic absolute value. Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means (Kant 27). Kant considers four examples to elucidate CI2. Let us consider them individually. First, he contemplates suicide in relation to CI2. Could my suicide be reconciled with the idea of humanity as an end in itself? (27). The answer is no. Killing oneself does not respect the absolute value of ones own humanity. This is in direct contradiction of CI2.

1-18-2012

Page 3 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

If he escapes from his burdensome situation by destroying himself, he is using a person [his own person] merely as a means to keeping himself in a tolerable condition up to the end of his life. But a man is not a thing [Sache], so he isnt something to be used merely as a means, and must always be regarded in all his actions as an end in himself. So I cant dispose of a man by maiming, damaging or killing himand that includes the case where the man is myself (Kant 27).

Next, he considers a deceitful promise. For example, if I borrow money and state that I will pay it back but secretly intend nothing of the kind, I have used the lender as a means to my end and dishonored the lenders absolute value and ability to make a fully informed decision. We are rational beings, as rational beings we are choice makers. We must treat others as rational choice makers too. We respect this aspect of other peoples character by fully informing them of all the pertinent information relevant to the decision that the other person must make. Kant says that we must not perform an act that involves another person such that the other person involved would not approve of the outcome. In other words, the outcome I have in mind must harmonize with what the other agent would want. More succinctly, I should tell the whole truth. In the example above, the lender expects that I will repay the money per our agreement; therefore, I should repay the money.
when someone A has it in mind to make someone else B a deceitful promise, he sees immediately that he intends to use B merely as a means, without Bs containing in himself the end of the action. For B cant possibly assent to As acting against him in this way, so he cant contain in himself the end of this action. [in this case it is obvious that A] intends to make use of the person of others merely as means, without considering that as rational beings they should always be valued at the same time as ends, i.e. as beings who can contain in themselves the end of the very same action (Kant 27).

Kants third example involves the idea of a person bettering himself. A persons behavior must not conflict with his own absolute value as a human being. Moreover, his behavior must harmonize with respecting himself as an end-in-himself. He asserts that a slothful sluggard who ignores his natural talents and does not strive to maximize his potential epitomizes a gross disregard for his own value, meritorious duty to himself and natures purpose for humanity. In direct contradiction to CI2, this kind of person uses himself as a means to his own hedonistic indolence.
...with regard to contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it isnt sufficient that the action not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it must also harmonize with it. In human nature there are predispositions to greater perfection that are part of natures purpose for humanity...; to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself but not with the furtherance of that end (Kant 27).

Finally, Kant discusses meritorious duty to others. He believes that we should strive to further the ends of others. In this way, we treat others as ends-in-themselves. He argues that not to contribute or take away from anyones happiness is only a negative way of complying with CI2. We must go further; we must contribute to the

1-18-2012

Page 4 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

happiness of others thereby complying with CI2 in a positive way, we must make our ends the same as other peoples ends. It violates CI2 to forsake philanthropic endeavors.
Fourthly, with regard to meritorious duty to others: Humanity might survive even if no-one contributed to the happiness of others, but also no-one intentionally took anything away from the happiness of others; and this is a likely enough state of affairs, because the end or purpose that all men naturally have is their own happiness. This would put human conduct into harmony with humanity as an end in itself, but only in a negative manner. For a positive harmony with humanity as an end I itself, what is required is that everyone positively tries to further the ends of others as far as he can. For the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far as possible be also my ends, if that thought of him as an end in himself is to have its full effect on me (Kant 28).

The Case of Larry the Lounge Lizard

Now let us consider the case of Larry the lounge lizard in light of CI2. Larry is sunning himself along the side of a pool. Pina Colada in hand, this selfish indolent could easily reach out to save a drowning little girl but he does not want to spill his drink so he opts to ignore her struggle and her gasps for air. Clearly, he is violating CI2. He is not respecting the girl as having absolute value and being an end in herself. If he valued the girl as an end in herself, he would save her. I would guess that if someone threw a giant diamond into the pool Larry would dive in to get it because he knows it has absolute value. Additionally, he is not making the end that the little girl would want, i.e. being saved from drowning, his own. This is a blatant lack of meritorious duty to others. One may argue that he impugns his meritorious duty to himself as his act is ignoble, apathetic and slothful. He does not edify his character by refusing to help the little girl. Larrys failure to help the girl is antithetical to Kants categorical imperative. Kant would roll over in his grave at such an insensitive act.

Friedrich Nietzsche 1844-1900CE

Will to Power (WP)

The Will to Power is Nietzsches psychological theory that attempts to explain why humans behave as they do. It is the idea that every animal strives to attain optimal conditions under which it can find expression for its maximum feeling of power and vent its power completely. He seems to believe this thesis:

1-18-2012

Page 5 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

WP: Person S actually performs an action, x, if, and only if, S believes that performing x will produce conditions that will allow S to attain and/or release the maximum feeling of power.

In the term Will to Power, will means motives and drives not accessible to introspection thus will is unconscious or subliminal. Power means casual efficacy, the ability to cause change. Something has great power when it is able to influence people and the course of worldly events. Feeling of power is some form of emotional or intellectual awareness that one has causal efficacy i.e., awareness that one is in control and makes a difference in the world. Maximal feeling of power is an action that enables a person to achieve their maximal feeling of power if no other action would enable them to achieve a feeling of greater control, influence or causal power on things external to them, over the course of their entire existence. Nietzsche uses this doctrine to explain what he believes to be the priests invention and dissemination of what he calls the slave morality. He begins by explaining the etymology of the word good. In antiquity, the aristocracy invented the term good to describe themselves. In this light, it means the powerful, the noble, the rich, and the commanders of the masses. Anyone not like them, the poor, the weak and infirm, the powerless, the rabble, were bad. The priests lacked many of the qualities of the ruling aristocracy however; they were clever, had good memories and were natural storytellers. The priestly class consumed with ressentiment and not able to attain and/or release the maximum feeling of power to the same degree as the noble class, began to invert the idea of good to mean bad. Now, the ruling class was viewed as bad and the rabble was viewed as good hence, the slave morality. In this way, the priests exacted revenge upon the ruling aristocracy. Ressentiment means a deep-seated resentment, frustration and hostility accompanied by a sense of being powerless to express these feelings directly. Their ressentiment gave these clever priests the motive and impetus to disseminate this idea until the ruling aristocracy began to doubt their efficacy, confidence and legitimacy to power. The ruling aristocracy submitted to the new code of values rendering them less powerful and subordinate to the priestly class. The result was the maximizing of the feeling of power for the priests. Nietzsche, in On the Genealogy of Morality writes:
You will have already guessed how easy it was for the priestly method of valuation to split off from the chivalric-aristocratic method and then to develop further into the opposite of the latter; this receives a special impetus when the priestly caste and warrior caste confront one another in jealousy and cannot agree on the prize of war. The chivalric-aristocratic value judgments are based on a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health that includes the things needed to maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting and everything else that contains strong, free, happy action. The priestly-aristocratic method of valuationas we have seenhas different criteria: woe betide it when it comes to war! As we know, priests make the most evil enemiesbut why? Because they are the most powerless. Out of this powerlessness, their hate swells into something huge and uncanny to a most intellectual and poisonous level. The greatest haters in world history, and the most intelligent, have always been priests: nobody elses intelligence stands a chance against the intelligence of the priestly revenge. It was the Jews who, rejecting

1-18-2012

Page 6 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

the aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed) ventured, with aweinspiring consistency, to bring about a reversal and held it in the teeth of the most unfathomable hatred (the hatred of the powerless) saying, Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones saved, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned! (Ansell-Pearson et al 16-17).

Nietzsche also uses his idea of Will to Power to explain humanitys pleasure of cruelty, the sympathia malevolens (disinterested malice). He asserts that people instinctively delight in being allowed to vent their power freely upon one who is powerless. To illustrate this, consider Medieval Europe. When a debtor could not repay a loan, the lender was allowed to remove flesh from the debtor commensurate with the debt. Nietzsche explains that this gives the lender an avenue to vent his will to power, i.e. it allows the lender to gain a feeling of power over the debtor. This form of compensation allowed the lender a kind of pleasure of being allowed to despise and mistreat someone as beneath him. It was a license and entitlement to perpetrate cruelty and torture. Nietzsche did not necessarily condone such actions but merely offers this as a psychological explanation as to why people seem to enjoy cruelty. Additionally, he considers a guilty conscience as cruelty turned in upon ones self. He claims that Christianity instilled in humans a sense of indebtedness that conduces to a guilty conscience. The advent of the Christian God as the maximal god yet achieved, thus also brought about the appearance of the greatest feeling of indebtedness on earth (Ansell-Pearson et al 62).

The Problem of Socrates

Nietzsche discusses Socrates in Twilight of the Idols (1888)The Problem of Socrates. In it, he tacitly associates Socrates with the slave morality. He identifies Socrates as a Plebian, a second-class citizen i.e. a commoner. The Patricians were the original ruling class of ancient Rome, the Plebeians (plebs) the common person in ancient Rome. Nietzsche avers that through dialectical discourse Socrates accomplished an inversion of values as the priestly class did in the above discussion. In Classical philosophy, a dialectic dialog is an exchange of propositions or statements resulting in a qualitative change in the direction of the dialog with the intent to cast a shadow of doubt on the certainty of an assumed truth. Nietzsche claims that the use of such intellectual tools constitutes self-defense by those with no other weapons or means to realize their own power.
With Socrates, Greek taste changes in favor of dialectics. What really happened there? Above all, a noble taste is thus vanquished; with dialectics the plebs come to the top. Before Socrates, dialectic manners were

1-18-2012

Page 7 of 8

Phil 363, Ethical Theory, Dr. Jason Raibley, CSULB, Spring 2007 Essay Exam #3, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche By James R. Walker

repudiated in good society; they were considered bad manners, they were compromising. It can only be self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons. The Jews were dialecticians for that reason; Reynard the Fox was oneand Socrates too? Is the Irony of Socrates an expression of revolt? Of plebeian ressentiment? Does he, as one oppressed, enjoy his own ferocity in the knife-thrusts of his syllogisms? Does he avenge himself on the noble people whom he fascinates? As a dialectician, one holds a merciless tool in ones hand; one can become a tyrant by means of it; one compromises those one conquers. The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to prove that he is no idiot: he makes one furious and helpless at the same time. The dialectician renders the intellect of his opponent powerless. Indeed? Is dialectic only a form of revenge in Socrates? (1).

However, Nietzsche commits an ad hominem fallacy, attacking the person rather than the argument. He references the then popular pseudoscience of physiognomy to censure Socrates. Physiognomy assumed that one could determine a persons character by overt physical characteristics such as ones countenance or the shape of ones head. Recall Nietzsches aristocratic value equation i.e., good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed. It is well known that Socrates was homely and some authors regarded him ugly. As ugly is equated with the underclass, the powerless, Nietzsche considers Socrates full of ressentiment and one of the usurpers of aristocratic noble value system. In conclusion, Nietzsche may have a good point about societys underclass and their avarice for revenge however; he takes it to an absurd and universal extreme. There are people who do not necessarily have a will to power and truly internalize Christianitys altruism. Are there people who use Christian tenants as a self-serving salve for their ressentiment? Yes, but not all of humanity does this. Furthermore, we know that Nietzsche reviled the Judeo-Christian tradition. Could it not be true that he used his erudition as a weapon against that which he hated? Of course, one may claim this is a fallacy of appeal to motive. Appeal to motive is a pattern of argument that challenges a proposition by calling into question the motives of the author. Nonetheless, some people have no interest in acquiring a feeling of power over others and prefer consensus and cooperation instead.

1-18-2012

Page 8 of 8