Final Report Volume 2 - For Client en

WORLD BANK OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE OPERATIONS
IN LITHUANIA FINAL REPORT VOLUME 2 - ANNEXES
WRc and EKO RIVI, UAB Ref: UC6893 OCTOBER 2005
OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE OPERATIONS IN LITHUANIA
FINAL REPORT - VOLUME 2 - ANNEXES
Report No.: UC6893 October 2005 Authors: WRc, Stone and Webster, Eko Rivi, Jurevicius Balciunas, Bartkus and Ptnrs, Prognosta Contract Manager: David Milnes Contract N : 13592-0
The material in this publication is owned by PPIAF and the World Bank. Dissemination of this work is encouraged and PPIAF and the World Bank will normally grant permission promptly. For questions about this report including permission to reprint portions or information about ordering more copies, please contact PPIAF by email at the address below. PPIAF c/o the World Bank 1818 H. Street Washington, DC 20433 Fax: +1 202-522-7466 www.ppiaf.org Email: info@ppiaf.org
CONTENTS
VOLUME 2 ANNEX 1 Overview ANNEX 2 INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR (DECEMBER 2003) EXAMPLE PSP CONTRACTS INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF AGGREGATION 99 99 109 113 115 116 116 117 117 119 120 121 121 122 123 123 123 125 133 153 163 171 183 189 205
ANNEX 3 INTRODUCTION
Armenia Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Kazakhstan Poland Romania Slovenia Emerging trends The water companies SUMMARISING TABLES ANNEX 4 ANNEX 5 ANNEX 6 ANNEX 7 ANNEX 8 ANNEX 9 ANNEX 10 FINANCIAL ANALYSES - AGGREGATED ACCOUNTS FINANCIAL ANALYSES - CASE STUDIES REGULATORY DATA COLLECTION INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF REGULATION REGULATORY OPTIONS THREE DRAFT REGULATIONS STUDY TOUR AND WORKSHOP
World Bank Options for Reform of and Private Sector Participation in the Water Supply and Sewerage Operations in Lithuania Volume 2
VOLUME 2
WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005
ANNEX 1 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF AGGREGATION
Case Study Examples on Aggregation for Lithuania Water Sector Reform

Introduction The key issue of the water and wastewater reform process in Lithuania is the issue of aggregation. Aggregation is in the main a process that is done for economic reasons, but is also a process fraught with political and cultural complications. Many of the issues surrounding the processes of aggregation were analysed in a study undertaken by the World Bank in 2004 and as part of this study we are able to make the final report available to the Ministry of Environment. This Annex will provide the detail of the reform and aggregation process in Scotland that is of interest to the authorities in Lithuania, but not covered in the World Bank report. The World Bank report covers in detail examples in England &Wales, France, Philippines, Hungary, Brazil, Italy and the Netherlands. Other countries that will be of interest are Slovakia, where aggregation in 7 regional utilities has most recently taken place, and Portugal where aggregation has been driven by the creation of a new regional regulatory and comparative performance system. The Report also refers to other examples such as Estonia, Argentina and Colombia.
Overview
This study investigates issues related to the aggregation of small and medium-sized towns for the provision of public services, with a particular focus on water and sanitation services. Aggregation is defined as the grouping of several municipalities into a single administrative structure for the provision of a particular service or function. Such aggregated structures can vary widely, generally along three dimensions, as shown in Figure 1.1 and described below. The countries identified on the figure refer to the case studies developed for this study. Scale: aggregated structures can group two neighboring municipalities, or several ones in a single region or across a broader territory; Scope: aggregated structures can provide a single service (for example, bulk water supply) or all water services, from raw water abstraction to sewerage treatment. For each of these services, they may carry out certain functions only (such as procurement) or be responsible for all functions, from operations and maintenance to investment and financing; Process: municipalities may form aggregated structures voluntarily based on mutual interests or alternatively, a higher level of government, driven by the overall public interest, may impose the aggregation process.
The main driver for aggregation is usually the potential to realize economies of scale by providing services to a larger customer base, and therefore, to render services more efficiently and at a lower cost. But as the customer base becomes larger, the entity in charge of providing services runs the risk of becoming less accountable to its customers. This may be particularly problematic for water services, which are usually considered to be local services and often carry a significant stake in local politics.
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Hence, even though the case for aggregation is often relatively easy to construct, based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative scales of service provision, aggregation processes do not take place as often as one may think, or when attempted, have a relatively high risk of failure, either because political will is lacking, or the potential benefits are not clearly understood, or the aggregation process is perceived as too complex. Ref: Models of Aggregation for Water and Sanitation Provision, April 2004 , (ERM in association with Stephen Myers & Associates and Hydroconseil)
There are several forces that have historically driven the water and sanitation industry towards decentralised (or, equivalently, disaggregated) service. The water and sanitation industry does not display, in an economic sense, strong network characteristics, (although, of course, operationally the connection of pipes function as a network). The fundamental property of an economic network is that the value of connecting to the network depends on the number of other people connected to it (by extension, the addition of a new user increases the value to existing users). This characteristic is clearly observed in some infrastructure industries for example, transportation and telecommunication but is not an important factor for water and sanitation (or electricity). Strong network effects are an important driver of integration (aggregation) at both the operational and organizational level. These sorts of network effects are best understood as a demand-side economy of scale (the value of service to each customer increases as the network expands). A related (and more familiar) characteristic is the supply-side economy of scale. This refers to a relationship whereby the unit costs of service declines as the size of a system increases. Scale economies are very important in some infrastructure industries for example, electricity. The basic economics of an interconnected electricity system whereby electricity is produced from a diverse portfolio of (mostly large) generating stations and transmitted long distances at high voltage - still dominates small-scale, local systems. In contrast, water supply is often available locally. This often obviates the need for the sorts of very large-scale, inter-regional networks through which (some types of) scale economies are leveraged. In addition to these economic issues, the legal frameworks supporting the provision of water and sanitation service in many countries have often assigned rights and responsibilities to local governments. Some of these sorts of legal systems throughout the world have been in place for a long time; others are relatively new. Several countries that have within the last decade or two transitioned from communist systems put in place very aggressive programs to decentralize authority. This included assignment to local governments of the right and responsibility to provide water and sanitation service. Organizational, cultural and even psychological factors can play a role as well. Water is recognized, more than the product delivered by any other infrastructure industry, as vital. Communities and their local political representatives often express a very strong sense of responsibility for and indeed, entitlement to maintaining active involvement with the provision of the service. Community-based governance structures are far more common in the water and sanitation sector than other infrastructure industries. And the loudest protests are heard when attempts are made to transfer responsibility for water service to either a private (even if locally-based) or regional / national (even if state-owned) provider. For these reasons, small local systems are very common in the water industry. These types of systems are most common (and most effective) in areas where populations are dispersed, local sourcing (often from boreholes) is common, assets are low-cost and local governance structures (sometimes tribal-based) are strong. Some combination of these factors is seen in many developing countries throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia. While less common
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in industrialized countries, local service driven by these factors can be found in the U.S., the U.K. and other areas. It is because there have historically been such strong forces driving the water and sanitation sector towards disaggregated solutions that this study is particularly important. Politicians and policymakers anywhere can easily fall into the trap of following industry trends without careful examination of other possibilities. There of course exist many examples of large-scale aggregated water and sanitation throughout the world. While economies of scale are not as strong in the water and sanitation sector as other infrastructure industries, it is because of the basic cost structure underlying any infrastructure industry (high fixed and low marginal costs) still a an important factor. Indeed, aggregation throughout the sector has been most common where the need for large and complex systems is most pronounced. Examples include areas where major reservoirs serve as primary water sources, surface water sources require a high degree of treatment, sewage must be treated to a high standard, and large quantities of sludge require treatment and disposal. While these conditions are most often found in industrialized regions, there are examples throughout the developing world as well. While scale economies are most often identified in connection with large physical assets, it is important to recognize that very important advantages of scale can often be realized through the aggregation of non-physical assets. This applies most importantly to skilled personnel. Particularly in areas where experienced personnel are in short supply, different types of aggregation provide the opportunity to effectively leverage the important contributions of the highly skilled. When effective mechanisms are established for the sharing of information, knowledge and experience across service areas (either through formal integration / merger or less intensive arrangements) benefits can accrue across a wide variety of functions including procurement, accounting, finance and planning.
Scotland Case Study Example

In Scotland a public National provider entity, Scottish Water, has recently been created. The route was adopted against a backdrop of public and political opinion that rejected the full privatisation (divestiture) option adopted earlier in neighbouring England and Wales. Legal basis Scottish Water is a publicly owned body corporate serving some 5.5 million domestic and nondomestic customers with water supply and sewerage services throughout the country of Scotland. In 2002 it replaced three former regional authorities, which in turn had, in the 1990s, replaced municipal providers. It is enabled to carry out activities within or outside Scotland that it considers 1) are not inconsistent with and/or 2) are necessary in connection with its core functions. It is required to have and make available to any person a Customers Standards Code, approved by the Regulator (the Commissioner) and by parliamentary Ministers. There is scope for confusion in the approval procedure. The Commissioner monitors compliance with the code and the code may be varied if appropriate. Scottish Water is also required to work to a consultation code approved by Ministers, with the purpose of involving customers, rather than only those who would claim to speak for them.
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The Customers Standards Code sets out exactly what standards of service can be expected. They cover a range of areas that are important to customers, including: Arranging and keeping appointments. Planning interruptions to water supply. Dealing with emergency interruptions to water supply. Handling enquiries about bills. Responding to written or telephone enquiries. Flooding from sewers.
Scottish Water may fix, demand and recover charges for its services. Charges arising from third parties using its services may be capped by Ministers. They may, by regulation, provide for Scottish Water charges to be reduced in certain circumstances. Charge schemes to be approved by the Commissioner and Ministers and must publish approved charge schemes. Ownership, oversight and operations Scottish Water owns general water supply and sewerage surface and infrastructure assets and attendant liabilities. These include assets transferred from the former regional authorities and the presumption of right to use relevant assets that may be a catch-all for quite messy historic ownership. For many new capital projects executed under BOT (Build Own Transfer) arrangements, ownership remains with the BOT Group over the lives of very complex contracts, covenants and multi-party agreements. Management oversight cascades down from Ministers to a Board of Members with a majority of non-executives over executives1. The former are Ministerial appointees and the latter are appointed from Scottish Water employees subject to Ministers approval. External oversight is provided by technical, service and economic regulators. With the purpose of issuing challenging efficiency targets, the Commissioner (Regulator) carries out benchmarking against the English and Welsh plcs and other utilities. As illustrated by the following quotations from its enabling legislation, the utility has assumed a mandate to manage its operations as a modern customer-focussed business: ..Scottish Water, when exercising its functions, must have regard to the interests of every person who is a customer or potential customer of Scottish Water.. ..Scottish Water must, in exercising its functions, seek to ensure that its resources are used economically, efficiently and effectively.. As noted under Legal Basis, Scottish Water is both an asset owning and operational organisation. In a traditional way it uses internal staff, outside advisors, consultants and contractors to develop and execute capital works, in addition to exploiting BOT opportunities,
The essential difference between the execs and non-execs is that the former run the business on a day to day basis while the non-execs (should) bring different but solid experience to test the execs on their plans and performance.
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a more recent development. It is also able to out-source functions, such as billing but might well face serious internal and external pressure not to do so. Scottish Water has normal sector powers to set salaries, provide benefits and engage and dismiss staff. It is to recognise staff and labour representation through liaison committees and has a Board Member responsible for staff matters. Autonomy and Accountability Historically, relatively well-run public or statutory providers have been quite effective but not particularly efficient. Very few seem to have developed commercially and they may be trapped in a right to exist belief, seeing the Government as their ultimate employer. It may be no accident that while terms such as user, population, connection, consumer are common sector words in many languages, customer is not. Scottish Water is understood to operate autonomously while interacting with the political dimension. A high degree of interference and influence by Ministers is explicit and implicit in the legal structure. Having said that, it is worth remembering that privatisation does not remove local day-to-day politics but heightens political/customer awareness. Regulation Principles of good regulation are accountability, consistency, focusing, proportionality, receptivity and transparency. It is an open question as to how many National and parastatal organisations subject themselves to such regulatory discipline, although there are some examples of good practice. Scottish Water must report to Ministers, the Commissioner, the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency and the Drinking Water Quality Regulator for Scotland. It is required to keep records of its activities and accounts, making them available for inspection and explaining them to persons appointed by Ministers. Reports must be submitted as soon as practicable and annual reports are submitted to a Convenor of the Water Customer Consultation Panels in addition to other noted bodies. Scottish Water must keep proper accounts and records and prepare statements giving true and fair views. In accordance with timing directed by Ministers, statements must be sent to the Auditor General for Scotland for auditing. The Act is not prescriptive on the use of external professional accountants and certification of technical and business information, but it may be difficult for the organisation to provide a true and fair view without external help2. Ministers and the Commissioner regulate tariffs through the approvals and restrictions mechanisms. Financing Essentially Scottish Water is tasked with financing its activities though appropriate invoicing levels, recovery of sums due, capital borrowings, funding through project specific schemes, contributions by third party customers and grants. Those activities include operations, capital investment and, if ordered by Ministers, a reasonable rate of return on the value of its average net assets. Scottish Water may, if Ministers see fit, be afforded guarantees for financial
Scottish Water prepares Asset Management Plans and business plans along the lines of those prepared and submitted to OFWAT by the English companies.
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obligations. Ministers reserve a right to extract surplus funds and may direct the use of funds that are not needed for immediate use to finance functions. Within the range of financing facilities noted Scottish Water can approach the Market for public money (e.g. European development funds), quasi-public money (e.g. European Investment Bank) and commercial loans as it sees appropriate. Limitations and replicability in Lithuania So why look at the water sector in the context of reform and aggregation policy? There are a number of specific economic and customer service issues that indicate that this a worthy of consideration. These include: Massive funding needs in water and wastewater services in Europe for enhanced public health and environmental improvements. Upward pressure on customer bills to pay for investment and to meet requirements for greater cost recovery and transparency in financial management of services. Increases in customer expectations and demands for high quality and value for money services. Budget constraints faced by public authorities of member states.
The tradition of water and wastewater services as a municipal service is strong across the whole of Europe (excepting the UK) and it seems also the case in Lithuania. The ownership and responsibility of the service provision is in most cases regarded as an essential public service for which local public political representatives must be accountable. It is therefore likely that in the water sector there will be always be a tension between the balance of establishing an optimal economic model and resulting efficiencies for the sector, and the political priorities of those responsible for providing the service. The Scottish Water model is in many ways unique and it is young and hence not really tested. A number of aspects or practices of the model may be replicable. Though, what might be better is to see it as a develops over the next few years and its impacts are able to be assessed - it will not remain static so how it progresses should be tracked and adopted if appropriate. The advantages of the model are that, for those advocates of public sector provision, it created a comprehensive service deliverer able to be financed and subject to scrutiny and policing all within the Government provider envelope. The potential shortcoming is the level of political interference implicit in the involvement of Ministers. They have given themselves conflict of interest problems that might diminish the organisations responsibility for performing.
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Organisation of Scotlands Water Industry
UKlegislation and EC Directives
Scottish Parliam and ent legislation
ScottishExecutive
M inisters
Q uality, environm ental and audit perform ance and reporting Custom consultation er Staff and labour liaison Service and financial perform regulation ance
A uthority andresponsibility direct indirect
ScottishW ater Board

Executive D irectors N on-exec Directors
M anagem and ent em ployees
Functions
Finance
O ut-sourcing, BO etc Ts
Finance sources
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Scotland Water Sector - Stakeholders, roles and responsibilities Stakeholder Customers Role and Responsibility Purchasers of services Payment of bills Indication of services required Government Ministers Set political agenda provide clear guidance Appoint Board Members Approve staffing, codes, tariffs, land disposal Provide guarantees Direct Scottish Water over a wide range of issues including use of surplus funds Auditor General for Scotland Local Authorities Health Boards Scottish Water Audit the accounts of Scottish Water
Liaise with Ministers and Scottish Water in provisions of services. If ordered, collect charges on behalf of Scottish Water Respond on matters of significant health risk Provider of water supply and sewerage services Owner of services assets Employer of staff and outsource partners Delivery of capital works operations, quality product Reporting on performance and keeping of proper records Invoicing for and recovery of charges for services rendered Planning to meet service needs Acquire and dispose of land (except water rights) for core functions Report on its functions to a wide audience
Scottish Water employees
Contribute to success of enterprise and maintain welfare through representatives on liaison committees
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Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland
Monitor compliance with customer standards code and efficient delivery of services by Scottish Water Brief Ministers Approve codes, tariffs Carry out efficiency and comparative performance analysis Respond to Scottish Water, Ministers and others within the timeframe set by the Act. Consider the circumstances surrounding the provision so that it can be delivered and efficiently done Promote customer interests, consult on issues and disseminate information
Drinking Water Quality Regulator for Scotland Water Customer Consultation Panels The Scottish Environmental Agency
Monitor potable water quality, set quality standards, enforce compliance Interpretation of standards, setting test levels, carrying out inspections, reporting on non-compliance Comment on customer matters
Protection of land, air and water environments Maintain flood warning system Carry out health and safety at work functions Operate radioactive incident monitoring network
References for SCOTLAND Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002 available through the Government website, www.hmso.gov.uk. Scottish Water. Extensive information is available through their website www.scottishwater.co.uk The Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland, Ochil House, Springkerse Business Park, Stirling, FK7 7XE, Tel 01786 430200, Fax 01786 462018, E-mail enquiries@watercommissioner.co.uk Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) can be accessed via their website, feedback@sepa.org.uk
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ANNEX 2 INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR (DECEMBER 2003)
The following analysis was carried out as part of the December 2003 report concerning the number of regional utilities to be formed Considerations Concerning The Choice Between Five And Ten Aggregate Utilities, submitted under this project. The current Draft Law does not specify the number of regions which will be defined, and thus this work is still relevant in the PSP context. It is therefore included for completeness. Introduction The opinion of the private sector on the preference for the ten county based utilities, or five river basin utilities, was sought through direct telephone contact and the use of a short questionnaire. Ten companies were contacted, five in the UK, and five from other European countries. Not all companies responded as promised, and a total of six responses were eventually obtained. Four of these were from the UK. Generally the companies were unfamiliar with the water sector in Lithuania, and obliged to rely on data provided by ourselves. This included the population data for all the potential utilities, and sector background information. It must be understood that the potential private sector participants will make their decisions whether or not to participate in Lithuania based on detailed financial and other information which is not available at this point in time. A key issue will be the type of PSP proposed, and the level of private sector investment required. A further key issue will be the financial strength of the individual utilities and their revenue base. Their responses are therefore brief and based on the general assumption that the utilities are fundamentally financially sound, and that required investments are recoverable through the tariffs. Issues of commercial confidentiality also limit their responses. They are therefore unable to make any firm statements or commitments, but are willing to indicate generally the structure of the sector which would prove most attractive to them. The participating companies were offered the opportunity to remain anonymous and one took that option. The other five are; 1. Cascal 2. Thames Water 3. Agbar (Aguas de Barcelona) 4. International Water 5. Severn Trent Water International
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The responses All six respondents clearly expressed a preference for the five river basin utilities, with very few points made in favour of a county based system. Some general comments are quoted below. Text in quotation marks is verbatim from their responses; italicised text provides our explanatory comment. The PSP bidding process for ten utilities would be more cumbersome for both the granting authority and the bidders. It may be expected that implementation time, and legal, technical and other consultant inputs would be substantially increased. The transaction costs involved would make some of the ten utilities unattractive to potential investors. The transaction costs for a 200,000 population concession would not be much less than those for a 500,000 population concession. These costs are high, perhaps US$ 500,000 or more to completion, and thus form a significant sum to be recovered through the contract. Concession bid costs are also substantial, (typically US$ 250,000 to US$ 500,000) and also largely independent of population size, within the range considered here. Thus if the ten utility option is selected, this bid cost is risked against a smaller future cash flow. The larger utilities would permit economies of scale. A discussion of possible economies of scale is provided within this report, section 4. This discussion suggests that the economies expected by this respondent may not be fully realisable, and may not be significant in the choice between five and ten utilities. The likelihood of creating smaller and financially weak utilities would be avoided This comment was made in the absence of financial data. The financial analysis in section 5 of this report examines the financial strength of the utilities. The five utility approach would offer the maximum potential to deliver a quality services at a minimum price. A comment reflecting the assumption of economies of scale see above. Under the ten utility system concessions or partial divestiture would be difficult if not impossible, if the units were privatised individually. The river basin system would be preferred from a technical service provision perspective, while the county based system is more likely to provide the best forum for consultation and decision making. On balance, the respondent preferred the river basin system, but emphasised that efficient and effective management and decision making processes spanning local authority boundaries would need to be in place. The respondents concern was clearly that a river basin based system might result in an inability to manage operations and investment activities where these span more than one local authority. Any viable river basin based system will need to address this issue.
On the specific issue of preferred utility size, the following comments were received from the different respondents; For PSP generally, the minimum practical size is 250,000 to 500,000 population, with a strong weighting towards the higher number. A minimum size of 500,000 population may be applicable for Lithuania. Total utility income and required investment levels were stated to be influencing factors as well.
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Populations of less than 150,000 are unlikely to prove attractive, whereas above 500,000 are more likely to offer the true degree of scope for effective and efficient management. Mixed ownership companies would provide the best solution, and (the respondents company) has established these for ranges of 500,000 to 800,000 population. For concessions and leases the range would be 300,000 500,000 population as a minimum size, although 500,000 1,000,000 population would be more appealing. Concessions and leases; minimum size approximately 300,000 population. Management contracts; minimum size approximately 200,000 population. concessions smaller than 400,000 500,000 people are rarely feasible
One respondent considered that all PSP options (concessions, leases, mixed ownership utilities, management contracts) would be open for all utilities under the option of five river basin utilities, while the adoption of ten utilities would place the smaller utilities on the edge of many PSP options, and would lead to bidders focussing very closely on the bidding rules and timing, to see how they could re-group the ten in order to incorporate the smaller utilities. One respondent suggested that there should be no residual political difficulties with the sector restructuring, and that the choice between five and ten would need to take account of that. A desire for strong and very clear central regulation was also expressed. Conclusions The preference for a five river basin utility system was unanimous, and clearly stated. This preference was based predominantly on size considerations. The cost of bidding for contracts, whether investment related concessions, or management contracts, is largely independent of size, within the size ranges considered in the present debate. Bidders will naturally favour a system which offers a larger prize for a given risk. Additionally, the burden of providing bid resources, i.e. sufficient skilled staff of various disciplines to prepare a bid, is considerable. An international bidder may have a limited number of such staff, and will wish to place them on the bid competitions which are most likely to offer a large contract. Perhaps the most illuminating comments were those specifically related to preferred minimum utility sizes. From these, it seems probable that if the five utility river basin based system is selected, with size ranges from 562,000 to 1041,000 population, all the utilities will attract interest for all forms of PSP. If the ten utility county based system is selected, with size ranges from 140,000 to 891,000 population, those utilities with less than 200,000 population may have difficulty in attracting any PSP at all. There are five of these utilities with less than 200,000 population (and none within the 200,000 to 300,000 range). There are three in the grey area between 300,000 and 500,000, where the response to concession/lease type PSP would be hard to predict, although interest in management contracts would be very probable. Two utilities have populations greater than 500,000, where investor interest would be much more likely.
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Finally, it should be noted that while the above indicates clearly the minimum size preferences, the private sector will evaluate each opportunity on a case by case basis. Adequate utility size is only one concern, and if the business case is adverse, or the risks unacceptable, even utilities of the appropriate size will not attract PSP. The setting in place of arrangements which allow good governance and facilitate sensible operational and investment decision making, and which provide a clear and dependable regulatory environment, will be mandatory.
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ANNEX 3 EXAMPLE PSP CONTRACTS
The purpose of this Annex is to illustrate the range of PSP undertaken, and the type of contracts entered into in the region. The following report describes the PSP status in the region in 2002. It is therefore acknowledged not to be entirely up-to-date, but it fulfils the need, and no more recent summary is known to the consultants. An updated survey of the current PSP status within the region is not within the remit of this project. The report was produced by Stone and Webster, a member of the consultants consortium.
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PSP IN WATER MARKETS, A SURVEY IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE, BALTIC STATES, SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
London, May 2002
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to show the main Private Sector Participation (PSP) developments in water markets across central eastern Europe, the Baltic states, southeastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. After looking at the regions water utilities, it has been found that 10 states (out of 21) have implemented some sort of PSP on their water markets; similarly, six out of the total have restructured their water utilities in at least one of their municipalities. Only six of them remain operating their water facilities without significant institutional changes (see Table 1). It is worth to remark since the outset that this report only provides information about the first category of countries, i.e. those that have (either partially or totally) experienced PSP on their water utilities. The surveys information has been gathered from a rather diverse set of secondary sources. Chief among them were the multinationals web sites (mostly annual reports and press releases), media reports, financial press, specialised publications, academic articles, international development organisations (mostly the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD), and the World Wide Web (WWW) in general. Having said that, usual disclosures apply in terms of the reliability of the information. The survey is organised in four sections. Section 2, by and large the most substantial one, offers detailed information per country, spelling out the particularities of the PSP arrangements, such as the type of contracts, their operational period, and (when publicly available) the distribution of the utilities ownership. Section 3, in turn, briefly tries to point out aspects regarding the multinationals presence in the region. Section 4 consists of three tables, which attempt to present in a concise fashion the whole reports contents.
Table 1. Water utilities reforms by country, May 2002

Country
Kyrgyz Rep.
Czech Rep.
Kazakhstan
Yugoslavia
Macedonia
Lithuania
Romania
Slovenia
Moldova
Slovakia
Hungary
Armenia
Bulgaria Croatia
Georgia
Reform Privatised Restructured No major reforms
Serbia and Montenegro.
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Ukraine
Estonia
Poland
Bosnia
Russia
Latvia
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION BY COUNTRY
Armenia Private participation In 1999 an Italian-led consortium became the exclusive operator of Yerevans (1,250,000 inhabitants) water supplies and sewerage network. Rome-based multi-utility Acea lead the consortium made by Italy's C. Lotti & Associati and Britain's WRc Plc. The group was awarded a 4-year management contract and started operations in March 2000. The consortium also acquired the 55 per cent of the water network assets. Bulgaria Private participation Sofijska Voda AD is the water company of Sofia, created following the privatised concession in 1999. Sofijska Voda AD has been operating since October 2000. The company is a joint venture, partly owned by International Water3 (75 per cent) and partly owned by the municipality of Sofia (25 per cent). The contract allows the concessionaire to operate, maintain and expand the city's water and wastewater system, which serves a population of over 1.2 million. Related issues The concessionaire is facing some problems with workers unions and consumer organisations. In August 2000 the Bulgarian unions reported that there were major problems with International Water because they were refusing to agree to transfer contracts of employment, and wanted to put permanent employees onto fixed-term contracts. Similarly, Public Services International, a France-based workers lobbying organisation, protested to the company on behalf of the Bulgarian trade unions, and demanded urgent observation of international work conventions. Along the same lines, on March 2001, the Bulgarian Federation of Consumers took court action requesting that Sofia city councils decision to increase water tariffs to consumers by 25.5 per cent be revoked. This stopped the concessionaire charging the augmented tariffs to consumers.
International Water it is, in turn, a 50/50 joint venture between Italian-based Edison SpA and the US-based Bechtel.
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Croatia Private participation A consortium made by German-based RWE Aqua and Berliner Wasser Betriebe signed a BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) agreement in December 2000 to construct (and operate for 20 years) a wastewater plant that will serve 1 million people. The plant will treat wastewater from Zagreb, Croatias biggest city and capital. This is the largest wastewater project in Eastern Europe. Related issues Although Croatian law (The Municipal Service Act, 1995) permits the privatisation of the water supply, there are still no cases of privatised companies providing municipal services in the water sector. Czech Republic Private participation The Czech Republic has been at the forefront of water sector reform in Eastern Europe. Mainly English and French multinationals possess stakes in the Czech water sector. Vivendi Water (Vivendi), Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (Suez-Lyonnaise) and Anglian Water (Anglian) control almost the entire market. Vivendi originally entered the Czech market in 1994 and now manages a water services network supplying a total client population of two million. The French multinational owns water and sewerage companies in the cities of Prague and Olomouc as well as in the regions of Central, Northern and Western Bohemia. Vivendi leads the Czech municipal outsourcing market, providing water and wastewater services for 3.4 million people. Suez-Lyonnaise, in turn, controls stakes in the Brno, Ostrava, Karlsbad, Sumperk and Horny Slovak city water companies. The companys subsidiaries supply water services to around 2 million Czechs. Anglian controls water utilities in the cities of Ostrava (through a joint venture with SuezLyonnaise), Beroum and in the region of South Bohemia. The company is the second largest producer and supplier of drinking water in the Czech Republic. Anglian supplies services to 1.2 million Czechs. The following paragraphs outline information about the local utilities in the Czech Republic. Prague In January 2001, Vivendi was awarded a 13-year concession to operate Praszke vodovody a kanalizace (PVK) the Pragues (1.2m inhabitants) water supply, sewerage and wastewater
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utility. Vivendi has also acquired a 66 per cent equity stake in PVK. The remaining shares (34 per cent) were transferred to the city of Prague. 4 Brno Brnenske Vodarny a Kanalizace (BVK) operates and maintains the Brnos (the second-largest city in the Czech Republic) water and sewerage system. BVK is owned by Suez-Lyonnaise (51 per cent), the city of Brno (31 per cent) and private Czech investors (19 per cent). In October 1999, the contract (originally signed in 1993) with Suez-Lyonnaise for the provision of water and wastewater management services was renewed for 25 years. BVK serves 420,000 people. In June 2001, Suez-Lyonnaise won a contract to build a water treatment plant at Brno. Ostrava In 1994 Suez-Lyonnaise bought part (15 per cent) of Ostravke VaK, the citys water operator. Some years later, in 1999, the multinational extended its ownership to 40 per cent of the utilitys shares. Ostravke VaK provides water supply and wastewater services to its 320thousand population. Suez-Lyonnaise share the utility ownership with the municipality (25 per cent) as well as with some other private investors (35 per cent). A joint venture by Anglian and Suez-Lyonnaise (53.4 and 43.7 per cent, respectively) holds 97.1 per cent of Ostravas Severomoravsk vodovody a kanalizace, the local water utility privatised during the voucher privatisation in 1992. The company is the owner and operator of water-management assets used for production and distribution of drinking water and water treatment in the regions of Frdek-Mstek, Opera, Nov Jin a Karvin. The company supplies water to Ostrava city and to border regions in Poland. Southern Bohemia Anglian owns the controlling share (95 per cent) on the joint-stock company Vodovody a kanalizace Jin echy, a.s., which was privatised in 1994. The other 5 per cent remain under the municipalitys control. The company operates water assets and provides water and sewerage services in the following regions of South Bohemia: esk Budjovice, esk Krumlov, Prachatice, Jindichv Hradec, Strakonice, Psek and Tbor. The company supplies water to 340 thousand inhabitants Olumouc In March 2000, CTSE, a 50/50 joint venture between Vivendi and SAUR International (SAUR), was awarded a 20-year water and wastewater concession in Olomouc, the capital of Moravia. The joint operations serve 130,000 people.
Although Anglian is part of the Vivendi-led consortium, it only provides assistance with its technical expertise (Anglian Water Annual Report, 1999).
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Sumperk In June 2001, Suez-Lyonnaise bought 82 per cent of Sumperk water company Sumperska Provozni Vodohospodarska Spolecnost (SPVS). The municipality of Sumperk owns 18 per cent of the operator. SPVS has a concession contract to provide water supply and sanitation in 40 communes in Moravia (120,000 people). Horny Slovak In October 1999, Suez-Lyonnaise won a water supply and sewerage contract in Horny Slovak (9,000 inhabitants). The contract includes the operation and management of the existing network and the construction of a water network extension. Estonia Private participation In January 2001, the city of Tallinn sold the 50.4 per cent majority stake to a consortium made by International Water and United Utilities. Via AS Tallinna Vesi, the local utility, the consortium owns and operates the water and sewerage infrastructures of the city of Tallinn (415,300 inhabitants) and the town of Saue (4,500 inhabitants). The contract was signed under a concession fashion for a period of 15 years. The company is organised into three divisions: water production, wastewater treatment and operation of the water, and wastewater networks. Upon privatisation, the investors received management control of the company, a majority of seats on the Supervisory Board and the right to appoint the members of the Management Board. The city of Tallinn (still owner of the 49.6 per cent), however, retained control over certain matters, the most important of which is a veto on any future sale of shares by the eventual purchaser of the controlling stake in AS Tallinna Vesi. As the owner of a golden share in the company, and as party to the Shareholders Agreement, the city of Tallinn has retained this right. Related issues The water company is to receive a corporate loan of from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), consisting to refinance an existing sovereignguaranteed loan. The privatisation was controversial due to financial manipulations of the water operations by the foreign operator, relating to surcharge for water drainage, price increases, dividends payment and the remuneration of the supervisory council.
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Hungary Private participation Szeged Szeged (180 thousand inhabitants) was the first Hungarian municipality that opened its water services to private participation. In 1993 Vivendi acquired a 49 per cent of Szegedi Vizmus ownership, the local water supplier. The city of Szeged owns the remaining 51 per cent. Vivendi also has a 15-year concession contract as a water supplier. Budapest In Budapest (around 1.9 million people), the countrys largest city, the water supply concession was awarded to a consortium, consisting of Suez-Lyonnaise and RWE Aqua, in 1997. The consortium controls 25 per cent of Budapest Water, the local utility. The city of Budapest, in turn, owns the remaining 75 per cent Through a similar arrangement, Vivendi it is a partner of Germanys Berliner Wasser Betriebe in the Budapests wastewater concession. The French-German partnership controls a 25-year concession contract to operate the citys wastewater system, controlling 25 per cent of Budapest Sewerage, the wastewater utility. The city of Budapest owns the remaining 75 per cent of Budapest Sewerage. Kaposvar and Pecs Suez-Lyonnaise is also the concessionaire to operate the water supply systems in the cities of Kaposvar and Pecs (340 and 160 thousand inhabitants respectively). Accordingly, SuezLyonnaise holds a 35 per cent of Eaux de Kaposvar, the remaining 65 per cent is in the hands of Czech investors; the French multinational also owns a 48 per cent of Pecs Pecsi Vizmu. The municipality owns the remaining 52 per cent. Related issues After a long confrontation over termination of the contract, in February 2001 the Szegeds City Council reached a negotiated agreement with Vivendi. The key issue in Szeged was the extension of the sewerage system which currently serves 65 per cent of the population. The city council wants to extend it to provide 80-85 per cent coverage. This work has already been financed by the city taking out a loan, and obtaining government support. Previously, in 1999, the council had decided to terminate the concession to Vivendis subsidiary, and take back the operation of the water company in-house. This would have been the first time that a water privatisation was reversed in the region.
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Kazakhstan Private participation In 1999 Vivendi signed a concession contract with the municipality of Almaty (1.2 million inhabitants) to manage the citys water supply and sewerage. The contract provides a 30-year concession to operate Gorvodokanal, the local water utility. The multinational owns 52 per cent of the joint venture company. The municipality holds the remaining 48 per cent. Vivendi has also secured a contract to build a new water pipeline to Astana (300,000 inhabitants). Poland Private participation Gdansk In 1992, SAUR became the first company to sign a contract for the management of private water and wastewater utilities in a CEE country. SAUR Neptun Gdandsk (SNG), the created subsidiary of SAUR (51 per cent) and the city of Gdansk (49 per cent), manages the complete water cycle for the Gdansk conurbation (600,000 people). A 30-year management contract was signed between the city of Gdansk and SNG. The city administration retains ownership of the pertinent infrastructure and is responsible for capital investment and for financing, regulation and setting of tariffs. Thus, the city of Gdansk, through its municipal council, controls and regulates the performance of the company both as a shareholder in SNG and through the contract. Bielsko Biala In November 1999 United Utilities, in partnership with International Water, acquired 25 per cent of Aqua SA. However, the multinational has recently announced5 its plans to acquire (from the Polish government) an additional 17 per cent stake in Aqua SA. Aqua SA delivers water supply to around 300,000 customers. Tarnowskie Gory and Miasteczko Slaskie In December 2001 Vivendi won the privatisation and outsourcing services contract with a municipal water company in Poland that serves the towns of Tarnowskie Gory and Miasteczko Slaskie in the Silesian region. This is Vivendi's first outsourcing services contract in Poland. The Tarnowskie Gory and Miasteczko Slaskie water company manages the municipal water and wastewater services for 70,000 people. Vivendi will manage those water and wastewater
CNN Money News, 02/ May/2002.
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services for 25 years. The group's initial 33.8 per cent stake in that company will increase to 63.5 per cent by 2003. Vivendi has been recently awarded a 25-year concession to provide water and pipeline rehabilitation services to the Capital city. Romania Private participation Bucharest In April 2000, in the biggest privatisation of a municipal-owned water company to date in Central and Eastern Europe, Vivendi, via its Romanian subsidiary Apa Nova Bucuresti SA, was awarded a 25-year water concession in Bucharest (2.2 million inhabitants). The concession provides for the treatment and distribution of potable water and sanitation services for the city of Bucharest. Vivendi owns 83.7 per cent of the operating company. The municipality controls the remaining 16.3 per cent. Ploiesti In April 2000, Vivendi was awarded a 25-year water concession in Ploiesti (250,000 inhabitants). More precisely, Vivendi has set up a joint venture with the municipality, which runs the service. Vivendi owns 80 per cent of the operating company Apa Nova SRL and the municipality the remaining 20 per cent. Timisoara In November 2000, Suez-Lyonnaise was awarded a 25-year water and wastewater concession in Timisoara (400,000 inhabitants). Under sponsorship of the EBRD, SuezLyonnaise got the water concession with EBRD funding, restricted competition and access to finance. The EBRD first provided a loan under the condition that Aquatim, the local operator, be privatised to a water multinational. Suez-Lyonnaise owns 51 per cent of the operating company Aquatim and the municipality the remaining 49 per cent. Related issues In May 2001, the mayor of Bucharest accused Vivendis Apa Nova of breaching its obligations towards employees, as provided for by the concession agreement. The mayor was requested to intervene by the trade unions in order to solve the conflict between Apa Novas workers and management regarding plans for a major restructuring.
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Slovenia Private participation On July 1998, a consortium led by Suez-Lyonnaise signed the contract for the wastewater treatment plant in Maribor, Slovenia's second largest city (population 150,000). This is a BOT contract to run a 190,000 population equivalent wastewater treatment plant for 22 years. Once the BOT agreement has expired, legal ownership and operation of the plant will be transferred to the city. Apart from Suez-Lyonnaise (through its subsidiary Degrmont), the consortium includes the Austrian companies of Steweag (electricity utility) and Styrcon (engineering consultant). The contract is the first BOT contract for wastewater treatment in the region. Related issues The project has been benefited from a loan from the EBRD. The loan has been extended to Aquasystems d.o.o., the local operator, to finance, construct and operate the wastewater treatment plant.
REGIONAL TRENDS
Emerging trends The main trend in the region is towards privatisation of the water supply, sewerage and wastewater services (see Figure 1). There are more than 30 utilities working under the (partial or total) control of private hands. Moreover, even among the non-privatised utilities, a steady shift towards decentralisation, i.e. major responsibilities being transferred to the municipalities, has occurred in a significant number of countries (see Table 1). Although the water privatisation wave in the region exhibits a kaleidoscopic nature, there is room for identifying convergence patterns. Most privatised water operations are long-term concession contracts, usually of 20-30 years. As a matter of fact, only four contracts do not fall into the concession category. However, two of these four arrangements are BOTs (being the other two management contracts), which in turn involve concessions lasting similar periods of time. The water companies Vivendi is the most established water multinational the region. It has 11 concession contracts in five countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania and Slovenia), delivering water services to more than 8 million customers. Suez-Lyonnaise, in turn, is the regions second major player in the private market for water. Although it only operates in three countries (Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia), it does
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have a significant presence serving almost 5 million people through its 11 concession contracts. Germanys Berliner Wasser Betriebe is the regions third largest in terms of customers (3 million). In association with Vivendi, the firm operates Budapests wastewater system (1.9 million customers). Berliner Wasser Betriebe also has formed a consortium with RWE Aqua (a Germany-based firm). Their partnership holds a BOT agreement to construct and operate a wastewater plant that will serve 1 million people in Zagreb, Croatias capital. There are many other private corporations operating in the regions water sector. Among them are the consortium formed by International Water and United Utilities, which controls three concession contracts in three countries (Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland), delivering water services to 1.6 million customers; another player is Britains Anglia, which controls concession contracts in three Czechs municipalities, serving around 1.2 million inhabitants; Italys Acea, in turn, has presence in the Armenian city of Yerevan (1.2 million customers), where it holds a management contract to operate the capitals water facilities; RWE Aqua, a Germany-based utility, operates in Croatia and Poland, serving around 1 million customers; and finally, Frances SAUR holds a concession the Czech city of Olomouc and a management contract in Polands Gdansk (130 and 600 thousand inhabitants respectively) (see Table 3).
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SUMMARISING TABLES
Table 2. PSP in water utilities in the region, May 2002 Ownership (per cent) Number of Type of Multina Munici users contract tional pality (1000s)
Starting Period opera(years) tions
Country
Location
Company
Multinational
Service
Other private investors
Armenia
Yerevan
Acea & Company Armenian Utility S.c.a.r.l.
Acea
Water supply and sewerage
1,200
MC
55
45
2000
Bulgaria
Sofia
Sofijska Voda AD International Water/United Utilities Zagrebacke Otpadne Vode doo RWE Aqua / Berliner Wasser Betriebe
Wastewater
1,200
CONC
75
25
2000
25
Croatia
Zagreb
Wastewater
1,000
BOT
100
2000
20
Czech Republic
Prague
Prazske vodovody Vivendi a kanalizace (PVK)
Water supply, sewerage, and wastewater
1,200
CONC
66
34
2001
13
125
Northern Bohemia
Severoceske vodovody a kanalizace (SCVK)
Vivendi
Water and wastewater
1,100
CONC
40
60
1998
n.a.
Western Bohemia Central Bohemia Olomouc
Vodospol Klatovy Vivendi
50
CONC
100
1999
n.a.
AQUA Pbram
Vivendi
75
CONC
100
1999
n.a.
CTSE
Vivendi/SAUR
Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater
130
CONC
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2000
n.a.
Brno
Brno VaK
Suez-Lyonnaise
420
CONC
31
51
19
1999
25
Ostrava
Ostravke VaK
Suez-Lyonnaise
320
CONC
40
25
35
1994
n.a.
Ostrava
Severomoravsk vodovody a kanalizace Vodarny Karlovy Vary
Suez-Lyonnaise/ Anglian Suez-Lyonnaise
860
CONC
97.1
2.9
1992
n.a.
Karlsbad
55
CONC
49.8
47
3.2
n.a.
n.a.
126
Sumperk
Sumperska Suez-Lyonnaise Provozni Vodohospodarska Spolecnost (SPVS) n.a. Suez-Lyonnaise
Water supply and wastewater
120
CONC
82
18
2001
n.a.
Horny Slovak Beroun
Water supply and wastewater Sewerage and wastewater Water supply and sewerage
CONC
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1999
n.a.
VaK Beroun
Anglian
58
CONC
54
46
1994
n.a.
Southern Bohemia
Vodovody a kanalizace Jin echy, a.s. ASTallinna Vesi
Anglian
340
CONC
95
1994
n.a.
Estonia
Tallin and Saue
International Water/United Utilities
Water supply, sewerage, and wastewater Water supply
420
CONC
50.4
49.6
2001
15
Hungary
Kaposvar
Eaux de Kaposvar Suez-Lyonnaise
340
CONC
35
65
n.a.
n.a.
Pecs
Pecsi Vizmu
Suez-Lyonnaise
Water supply
160
CONC
48
52
n.a.
n.a.
Budapest
Budapest Water
Suez-Lyonnaise/ RWE Aqua
1,890
CONC
25
75
1997
n.a.
127
Budapest
Budapest Sewerage
Vivendi/ Berliner Wasser Betriebe
Wastewater
1,890
CONC
25
75
1997
25
Szeged
Szegedi Vizmu
Vivendi
Water supply
180
CONC
49
51
1993
15
Kazakhsta Almaty n Poland Gdansk
Gorvodokanal
Vivendi
1,200
CONC
52
48
1999
30
SAUR Neptun Gdansk Aqua SA
SAUR
Water supply and wastewater Water supply
600
MC
51
49
1992
30
Bielsko Biala
International Water/United Utilities
300
CONC
25
75
1999
n.a.
Tarnowskie Przedsiebiorstwo Vivendi Gory Wodociaogow i Kanalizacji (PwiK) Romania Bucharest Apa Nova Bucuresti SA Apa Nova SRL Vivendi
Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater Water supply and wastewater
70
CONC
33.8
66.2
2001
25
2,200
CONC
83.7
16.3
2000
25
Ploiesti
Vivendi
250
CONC
80
20
2000
25
128
Timisoara
Aquatim
Suez-Lyonnaise
Water supply and wastewater Wastewater
400
CONC
51
49
2000
25
Slovenia
Maribor
Aquasystems d.o.o.
Suez-Lyonnaise/ Steweag/ Styrcon
190
BOT
100
1998
22
Sources: multinationals web sites; media reports; financial press; specialised publications; academic articles; international development
organisations (mostly the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD); and the World Wide Web (WWW) in general.
Note: n.a. stands for non-available; similarly, MC, CONC and BOT stand for management contract, concession and build, operate and transfer respectively.

In partnership with Lotti & Associati and WRc Plc. SMVAK is 53.4 per cent owned by Anglian and 43.7 per cent owned by Suez-Lyonnaise. The group's initial 33.8 per cent stake in that company will increase to 63.5 per cent by 2003.
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Table 3. Multinational presence by country, May 2002

(Approx.) Number of customers in the region by multinational (1000s)
Country
Czech Rep.
Kazakhstan
Romania
Multinational Acea Anglian Water Berliner Wasser Betriebe International Water/United Utilities RWE Aqua SAUR International Suez-Lyonnaise Vivendi Water
Slovenia
Hungary
Armenia
Bulgaria
Estonia
Croatia
Poland
1,200 1,250 2,900 1,620 1,000 730 4,700 8,300
Sources: multinationals web sites; media reports; financial press; specialised publications; academic articles; international development organisations (mostly the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD); and the World Wide Web (WWW) in general.
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Figure 1. Percentage of the countries total population served by privatised water utilities, 1999-2002
Poland Kazakhstan Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Croatia Hungary Estonia Armenia Czech Republic 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1999 2002
Percent
Sources: authors calculations
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ANNEX 4 FINANCIAL ANALYSES - AGGREGATED ACCOUNTS
Kaunas county Table 1

Balance Sheet Operating Cash Excess Marketable Securities Accounts Receivable Inventories Total Current Assets Net Property Plant and Equipment Other Intangible Assets Total Assets Accounts Payable Debt Grant financing Total Common Equity Total Liabs and Equity
Balance sheet, mLTL

Actuals 2003 4.3 7.4 21.0 5.6 38.3 595.3 2.6 636.2 5.8 29.5 93.3 507.6 636.2 2004 3.7 5.8 20.2 6.2 35.9 574.7 2.6 613.2 7.5 4.7 93.3 507.6 613.2 Detailed forecast 2005 3.9 29.0 21.0 6.4 60.2 554.8 2.6 617.6 7.8 4.7 93.3 511.7 617.6 2006 4.0 0.0 21.7 6.6 32.4 616.5 2.6 651.4 8.0 11.2 111.1 521.1 651.4 2007 4.2 0.0 22.4 6.8 33.4 736.6 2.6 772.6 8.3 95.9 138.6 529.8 772.6 2008 4.4 0.0 23.6 7.2 35.1 870.4 2.6 908.1 8.7 195.9 169.5 534.0 908.1 2009 5.0 0.0 27.0 7.4 39.3 1,037.2 2.6 1,079.1 10.0 212.7 306.8 544.3 1,079.1 2010 5.4 0.0 28.9 7.5 41.7 1,182.4 2011 5.4 0.0 29.4 7.7 42.6 1,173.0 2012 5.9 0.0 31.7 8.0 45.5 1,159.0 Key driver forecast 2013 6.0 0.0 32.3 8.0 46.3 1,150.3 2014 6.1 0.0 32.7 8.1 46.9 1,142.2 2015 6.1 0.0 33.1 8.3 47.5 1,126.4 2016 6.2 0.0 33.6 8.4 48.2 1,111.2 2017 6.3 32.5 34.0 8.5 81.3 1,096.6 2018 6.4 114.0 34.4 8.6 163.3 1,082.6
2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 1,226.7 1,218.1 1,207.1 1,199.2 1,191.7 1,176.5 1,162.0 1,180.5 1,248.5 10.7 229.2 426.1 555.0 1,226.7 10.9 200.9 435.3 565.2 1,218.1 11.7 169.5 436.8 582.9 1,207.1 12.0 137.4 439.5 603.9 1,199.2 12.1 103.2 442.3 627.7 1,191.7 12.3 60.7 443.0 654.0 1,176.5 12.4 15.4 443.8 683.7 1,162.0 12.6 0.0 444.6 716.7 1,180.5 12.7 0.0 445.4 751.5 1,248.5
Table 2
Income Statement Revenues Cost of operations Depreciation Expense Reported EBITA
Income statement, mLTL

Actuals 2003 68.3 (48.8) (20.4) (0.9) -1.3% 4.8 0.0 0.0 3.9 (0.0) 3.9 2004 74.7 (52.4) (20.6) 1.7 2.3% 0.0 0.1 (1.8) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 Detailed forecast 2005 77.6 (52.6) (19.9) 5.1 6.5% 0.0 0.1 (0.3) 4.8 (0.7) 4.1 2006 80.4 (52.8) (16.6) 11.0 13.6% 0.0 0.3 (0.3) 11.0 (1.6) 9.3 2007 83.0 (53.6) (18.5) 11.0 13.2% 0.0 0.0 (0.7) 10.3 (1.5) 8.8 2008 87.4 (54.7) (22.1) 10.6 12.1% 0.0 0.0 (5.8) 4.8 (0.7) 4.1 2009 99.9 (56.2) (19.8) 23.9 23.9% 0.0 0.0 (11.8) 12.1 (1.8) 10.3 2010 107.0 (56.8) (24.8) 25.4 23.7% 0.0 0.0 (12.8) 12.6 (1.9) 10.7 2011 109.0 (58.7) (24.5) 25.7 23.6% 0.0 0.0 (13.8) 12.0 (1.8) 10.2 2012 117.3 (60.4) (24.0) 32.9 28.0% 0.0 0.0 (12.1) 20.8 (3.1) 17.7 Key driver forecast 2013 119.6 (61.1) (23.5) 35.0 29.2% 0.0 0.0 (10.2) 24.8 (3.7) 21.1 2014 121.3 (61.9) (23.2) 36.2 29.8% 0.0 0.0 (8.2) 27.9 (4.2) 23.7 2015 122.6 (62.7) (22.7) 37.2 30.3% 0.0 0.0 (6.2) 31.0 (4.6) 26.3 2016 124.4 (63.6) (22.2) 38.6 31.0% 0.0 0.0 (3.6) 35.0 (5.2) 29.7 2017 125.8 (64.5) (21.6) 39.6 31.5% 0.0 0.0 (0.9) 38.7 (5.8) 32.9 2018 127.2 (65.4) (21.1) 40.7 32.0% 0.0 0.3 0.0 41.0 (6.1) 34.8
Reported EBITA / Revenues Non-Oper Income Interest Income Interest Expense Earnings Before Taxes Income Taxes Net Income
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Table 3
Cash flow statement, mLTL

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 1.7 20.6 22.4 2.5 24.9 (0.0) (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (1.8) 0.0 (1.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.2 (17.3) 23.2 5.8 5.8 0.0 2005 5.1 19.9 25.0 (0.9) 24.1 (0.7) (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1 5.8 23.1 29.0 29.0 0.0 2006 11.0 16.6 27.6 (0.9) 26.7 (1.6) (78.3) 0.0 (78.3) 0.3 (0.3) 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 17.7 (35.5) 29.0 (35.5) (6.5) 0.0 (6.5) 2007 11.0 18.5 29.5 (0.8) 28.7 (1.5) (138.6) 0.0 (138.6) 0.0 (0.7) 0.0 (0.7) 27.5 0.0 27.5 (84.6) (6.5) (84.6) (91.1) 0.0 (91.1) 2008 10.6 22.1 32.7 (1.3) 31.4 (0.7) (155.9) 0.0 (155.9) 0.0 (5.8) 0.0 (5.8) 31.0 0.0 31.0 (100.0) (91.1) (100.0) (191.1) 0.0 (191.1) 2009 23.9 19.8 43.7 (2.3) 41.4 (1.8) (186.6) (186.6) 0.0 (11.8) 0.0 (11.8) 137.3 0.0 137.3 (21.5) (191.1) (21.5) (212.7) 0.0 (212.7) 2010 25.4 24.8 50.2 (1.3) 48.9 (1.9) (170.0) (170.0) 0.0 (12.8) 0.0 (12.8) 119.2 0.0 119.2 (16.5) (212.7) (16.5) (229.2) 0.0 (229.2) 2011 25.7 24.5 50.3 (0.6) 49.7 (1.8) (15.1) (15.1) 0.0 (13.8) 0.0 (13.8) 9.2 0.0 9.2 28.2 (229.2) 28.2 (200.9) 0.0 (200.9) 2012 32.9 24.0 56.9 (1.6) 55.2 (3.1) (10.1) (10.1) 0.0 (12.1) 0.0 (12.1) 1.5 0.0 1.5 31.5 (200.9) 31.5 (169.5) 0.0 (169.5) Key driver forecast 2013 35.0 23.5 58.5 (0.5) 58.0 (3.7) (14.8) (14.8) 0.0 (10.2) 0.0 (10.2) 2.7 0.0 2.7 32.0 (169.5) 32.0 (137.4) 0.0 (137.4) 2014 36.2 23.2 59.3 (0.4) 59.0 (4.2) (15.1) (15.1) 0.0 (8.2) 0.0 (8.2) 2.8 0.0 2.8 34.2 (137.4) 34.2 (103.2) 0.0 (103.2) 2015 37.2 22.7 59.9 (0.3) 59.6 (4.6) (6.9) (6.9) 0.0 (6.2) 0.0 (6.2) 0.7 (0.0) 0.7 42.5 (103.2) 42.5 (60.7) 0.0 (60.7) 2016 38.6 22.2 60.8 (0.4) 60.4 (5.2) (7.0) (7.0) 0.0 (3.6) 0.0 (3.6) 0.8 0.0 0.8 45.3 (60.7) 45.3 (15.4) 0.0 (15.4) 2017 39.6 21.6 61.3 (0.4) 60.9 (5.8) (7.1) (7.1) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 (0.9) 0.8 0.0 0.8 47.9 (15.4) 47.9 32.5 32.5 0.0 2018 40.7 21.1 61.8 (0.4) 61.4 (6.1) (7.1) (7.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 49.0 32.5 49.0 81.5 81.5 0.0 2003 (0.9) 20.4 19.5 4.4 23.9 (0.0) 0.0 (27.1) (26.9) 0.0 0.0 (0.9) (0.9) 0.6 8.1 8.8 9.7 (27.0) 9.7 (17.3) 0.0 (17.3)
Traditional Cash flow Reported EBITA Depreciation EBITDA Less investment in working capital Operating cashflow Less tax paid Capital investments Less capex Less other operating assets/liabilities Total capital investments Finance Interest Income Interest Expense Debt raised/repaid Total finance payments Equity Grants received/(returned) Equity raised/repaid Total equity cash payments Net Cashflow Cash/overdraft Opening balance Increase/ (Decrease) Closing balance Excess cash Balancing debt
134
Vilnius county Table 4

Balance sheet, mLTL

Actuals 2003 2.3 1.5 28.1 10.9 42.8 424.7 1.4 469.0 20.2 48.2 23.0 377.5 469.0 2004 5.0 0.9 0.0 10.0 15.9 409.6 1.4 426.9 10.0 10.9 23.0 383.1 426.9 Detailed forecast 2005 5.0 0.0 27.1 10.0 42.2 395.0 1.4 438.6 10.0 14.0 23.0 391.5 438.6 2006 5.1 0.0 27.3 10.1 42.4 470.8 1.4 514.7 10.1 24.4 77.5 402.7 514.7 2007 5.6 0.0 30.1 11.1 46.8 603.2 1.4 651.5 11.1 43.5 170.3 426.6 651.5 2008 6.7 0.0 36.3 13.5 56.5 748.8 1.4 806.7 13.5 56.3 275.2 461.8 806.7 2009 7.8 0.0 42.3 14.5 64.6 863.1 1.4 929.1 15.7 55.9 341.0 504.6 929.1 2010 8.5 0.0 46.0 15.7 70.2 946.6 1.4 1,018.2 17.0 16.6 420.3 551.6 1,018.2 2011 9.3 38.4 50.0 16.7 114.3 1,009.5 1.4 1,125.2 18.5 0.0 486.7 606.6 1,125.2 2012 10.1 38.4 54.4 17.7 120.6 1,123.2 1.4 1,245.2 20.2 15.5 486.7 670.2 1,245.2 Key driver forecast 2013 10.9 38.4 58.9 18.7 127.0 1,219.2 1.4 1,347.6 21.8 46.1 486.7 739.5 1,347.6 2014 11.9 38.4 64.0 19.8 134.2 1,280.8 1.4 1,416.4 23.7 35.2 486.7 816.4 1,416.4 2015 13.2 99.0 71.4 21.0 204.7 1,273.7 1.4 1,479.8 26.5 0.0 486.7 910.8 1,479.8 2016 13.9 266.5 75.0 21.9 377.4 1,267.7 1.4 1,646.5 27.8 0.0 486.7 1,015.0 1,646.5 2017 14.6 548.9 78.9 2018 15.3 955.1 82.6
22.9 23.9 665.3 1,076.9 1,262.9 1.4 1,929.6 29.2 0.0 486.7 1,128.5 1,929.6 1,259.3 1.4 2,337.6 30.6 0.0 486.7 1,251.9 2,337.6
Table 5

Actuals 2003 98.5 (75.2) (15.1) 8.2 8.3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 8.2 2004 99.8 (75.2) (15.2) 9.4 9.4% 0.0 0.0 (2.9) 6.5 (1.0) 5.5 Detailed forecast 2005 100.4 (75.2) (14.6) 10.6 10.5% 0.0 0.0 (0.7) 9.9 (1.5) 8.4 2006 101.0 (75.2) (11.8) 14.0 13.8% 0.0 0.0 (0.8) 13.1 (2.0) 11.2 2007 111.5 (67.8) (14.1) 29.6 26.5% 0.0 0.0 (1.5) 28.1 (4.2) 23.9 2008 134.5 (72.4) (18.1) 44.0 32.7% 0.0 0.0 (2.6) 41.4 (6.2) 35.2 2009 156.6 (77.9) (25.0) 53.7 34.3% 0.0 0.0 (3.4) 50.4 (7.6) 42.8 2010 170.5 (84.3) (27.5) 58.7 34.4% 0.0 0.0 (3.4) 55.3 (8.3) 47.0 2011 185.1 (89.6) (29.7) 65.7 35.5% 0.0 0.0 (1.0) 64.7 (9.7) 55.0 2012 201.6 (95.1) (32.1) 74.4 36.9% 0.0 0.4 0.0 74.8 (11.2) 63.6 Key driver forecast 2013 218.1 (100.7) (35.3) 82.1 37.6% 0.0 0.4 (0.9) 81.5 (12.2) 69.3 2014 237.2 (106.8) (37.7) 92.8 39.1% 0.0 0.4 (2.8) 90.4 (13.6) 76.8 2015 264.5 (113.2) (38.5) 112.9 42.7% 0.0 0.4 (2.1) 111.1 (16.7) 94.5 2016 277.9 (118.1) (38.2) 121.6 43.8% 0.0 1.0 0.0 122.6 (18.4) 104.2 2017 292.1 (123.2) (38.0) 130.8 44.8% 0.0 2.7 0.0 133.5 (20.0) 113.5 2018 306.0 (128.4) (37.9) 139.7 45.7% 0.0 5.5 0.0 145.2 (21.8) 123.4
135
Table 6

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 9.4 15.2 24.6 16.1 40.6 (1.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (2.9) 0.0 (2.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 (35.9) 36.8 0.9 0.9 0.0 2005 10.6 14.6 25.2 (27.1) (1.9) (1.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.7) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 (4.1) 0.9 (4.1) (3.2) 0.0 (3.2) 2006 14.0 11.8 25.8 (0.2) 25.6 (2.0) (87.7) 0.0 (87.7) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.8) 54.6 0.0 54.6 (10.3) (3.2) (10.3) (13.5) 0.0 (13.5) 2007 29.6 14.1 43.7 (3.3) 40.4 (4.2) (146.5) 0.0 (146.5) 0.0 (1.5) 0.0 (1.5) 92.8 0.0 92.8 (19.1) (13.5) (19.1) (32.6) 0.0 (32.6) 2008 44.0 18.1 62.1 (7.4) 54.8 (6.2) (163.7) 0.0 (163.7) 0.0 (2.6) 0.0 (2.6) 105.0 0.0 105.0 (12.8) (32.6) (12.8) (45.4) 0.0 (45.4) 2009 53.7 25.0 78.7 (4.8) 73.9 (7.6) (139.2) (139.2) 0.0 (3.4) 0.0 (3.4) 65.8 0.0 65.8 (10.5) (45.4) (10.5) (55.9) 0.0 (55.9) 2010 58.7 27.5 86.2 (3.5) 82.6 (8.3) (110.9) (110.9) 0.0 (3.4) 0.0 (3.4) 79.3 0.0 79.3 39.3 (55.9) 39.3 (16.6) 0.0 (16.6) 2011 65.7 29.7 95.4 (3.5) 92.0 (9.7) (92.6) (92.6) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 66.4 0.0 66.4 55.0 (16.6) 55.0 38.4 38.4 0.0 2012 74.4 32.1 106.5 (3.8) 102.7 (11.2) (145.9) (145.9) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 (54.0) 38.4 (54.0) (15.5) 0.0 (15.5) Key driver forecast 2013 82.1 35.3 117.4 (3.9) 113.5 (12.2) (131.3) (131.3) 0.4 (0.9) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 (30.6) (15.5) (30.6) (46.1) 0.0 (46.1) 2014 92.8 37.7 130.4 (4.4) 126.1 (13.6) (99.3) (99.3) 0.4 (2.8) 0.0 (2.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9 (46.1) 10.9 (35.2) 0.0 (35.2) 2015 112.9 38.5 151.3 (5.8) 145.5 (16.7) (31.3) (31.3) 0.4 (2.1) 0.0 (1.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.7 (35.2) 95.7 60.5 60.5 0.0 2016 121.6 38.2 159.9 (3.2) 156.7 (18.4) (32.3) (32.3) 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 107.0 60.5 107.0 167.5 167.5 0.0 2017 130.8 38.0 168.9 (3.3) 165.5 (20.0) (33.3) (33.3) 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 114.9 167.5 114.9 282.4 282.4 0.0 2018 139.7 37.9 177.6 (3.3) 174.3 (21.8) (34.3) (34.3) 5.5 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 123.7 282.4 123.7 406.1 406.1 0.0 2003 8.2 15.1 23.3 1.3 24.6 0.0 0.0 (16.4) (17.0) 0.0 0.0 (1.0) (1.0) 4.9 2.8 7.7 14.3 (50.1) 14.3 (35.9) 0.0 (35.9)
136
Klaipda county Table 7

Balance sheet, mLTL

Actuals 2003 6.1 5.9 13.4 4.5 29.9 359.5 1.5 390.9 3.9 18.2 97.7 271.2 390.9 2004 3.6 0.0 13.6 4.6 21.8 351.4 1.5 374.6 4.0 3.8 97.7 269.2 374.6 Detailed forecast 2005 3.7 5.3 13.9 4.6 27.5 343.4 1.5 372.4 4.1 0.7 97.7 270.0 372.4 2006 3.7 11.6 14.1 4.7 34.2 347.9 1.5 383.5 4.1 0.7 106.0 272.7 383.5 2007 4.0 10.0 15.3 5.1 34.4 377.7 1.5 413.6 4.5 0.7 131.6 276.9 413.6 2008 4.4 17.4 16.7 5.6 44.0 403.7 1.5 449.2 4.9 0.7 154.8 288.8 449.2 2009 4.8 42.3 18.2 6.2 71.4 406.3 1.5 479.2 6.6 0.0 154.8 299.4 479.2 2010 5.2 46.4 19.8 6.7 78.1 438.1 1.5 517.7 7.2 0.0 154.8 311.8 517.7 2011 5.6 46.4 21.3 7.0 80.3 486.8 1.5 568.6 7.7 31.8 154.8 326.0 568.6 2012 6.0 46.4 22.8 7.3 82.5 506.4 1.5 590.3 8.3 37.9 154.8 340.6 590.3 Key driver forecast 2013 6.4 46.4 24.2 7.8 84.8 502.1 1.5 588.4 8.8 19.5 154.8 356.2 588.4 2014 6.8 48.6 25.8 8.2 89.3 498.3 1.5 589.1 9.4 0.0 154.8 375.4 589.1 2015 7.2 75.8 27.4 8.6 119.0 494.9 1.5 615.3 10.0 0.0 154.8 398.5 615.3 2016 7.7 130.8 29.1 9.0 176.6 491.9 1.5 670.0 10.6 0.0 154.8 424.9 670.0 2017 8.3 216.3 31.3 9.6 265.4 489.3 1.5 756.3 11.4 0.0 154.8 454.7 756.3 2018 8.9 335.6 33.6 10.3 388.3 487.2 1.5 877.0 12.2 0.0 154.8 488.6 877.0
Table 8

Actuals 2003 48.6 (43.2) (8.3) (2.9) -6.0% 0.4 10.4 (6.0) 1.8 (0.4) 1.5 2004 49.5 (42.3) (8.1) (0.9) -1.8% 0.0 0.1 (1.1) (1.9) 0.0 (1.9) Detailed forecast 2005 50.4 (41.3) (8.0) 1.1 2.3% 0.0 0.0 (0.2) 0.9 (0.1) 0.8 2006 51.4 (40.4) (7.8) 3.2 6.2% 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 3.2 (0.5) 2.7 2007 55.4 (42.7) (7.9) 4.8 8.7% 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 4.9 (0.7) 4.2 2008 60.6 (38.0) (8.6) 14.0 23.1% 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 14.1 (2.1) 11.9 2009 66.0 (42.1) (11.6) 12.3 18.6% 0.0 0.2 (0.0) 12.4 (1.9) 10.5 2010 72.0 (45.6) (12.1) 14.2 19.8% 0.0 0.4 0.0 14.6 (2.2) 12.4 2011 77.3 (47.7) (13.4) 16.2 20.9% 0.0 0.5 0.0 16.6 (2.5) 14.1 2012 82.8 (49.7) (14.4) 18.7 22.5% 0.0 0.5 (1.9) 17.2 (2.6) 14.6 Key driver forecast 2013 88.1 (53.2) (14.6) 20.2 23.0% 0.0 0.5 (2.3) 18.4 (2.8) 15.6 2014 93.6 (55.9) (14.5) 23.3 24.8% 0.0 0.5 (1.2) 22.6 (3.4) 19.2 2015 99.6 (58.5) (14.4) 26.6 26.7% 0.0 0.5 0.0 27.1 (4.1) 23.1 2016 105.8 (61.3) (14.3) 30.3 28.6% 0.0 0.8 0.0 31.0 (4.7) 26.4 2017 113.7 (65.7) (14.2) 33.8 29.7% 0.0 1.3 0.0 35.1 (5.3) 29.9 2018 122.0 (70.1) (14.2) 37.7 30.9% 0.0 2.2 0.0 39.9 (6.0) 33.9
137
Table 9

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (0.9) 8.1 7.2 2.3 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 (1.1) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 (11.6) 8.5 (3.1) 0.0 (3.1) 2005 1.1 8.0 9.1 (0.3) 8.8 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 (3.1) 8.4 5.3 5.3 0.0 2006 3.2 7.8 11.0 (0.3) 10.6 (0.5) (12.2) 0.0 (12.2) 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 8.3 6.3 5.3 6.3 11.6 11.6 0.0 2007 4.8 7.9 12.7 (1.5) 11.3 (0.7) (37.7) 0.0 (37.7) 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.1 25.6 0.0 25.6 (1.6) 11.6 (1.6) 10.0 10.0 0.0 2008 14.0 8.6 22.5 (1.9) 20.7 (2.1) (34.6) 0.0 (34.6) 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.1 23.3 0.0 23.3 7.4 10.0 7.4 17.4 17.4 0.0 2009 12.3 11.6 23.9 (0.4) 23.5 (1.9) (14.2) (14.2) 0.2 (0.0) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 17.4 7.6 25.0 25.0 0.0 2010 14.2 12.1 26.4 (1.6) 24.8 (2.2) (43.9) (43.9) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 (20.9) 25.0 (20.9) 4.1 4.1 0.0 2011 16.2 13.4 29.5 (1.2) 28.3 (2.5) (62.1) (62.1) 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) (35.9) 4.1 (35.9) (31.8) 0.0 (31.8) 2012 18.7 14.4 33.1 (1.3) 31.8 (2.6) (33.9) (33.9) 0.5 (1.9) 0.0 (1.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 (6.2) (31.8) (6.2) (37.9) 0.0 (37.9) Key driver forecast 2013 20.2 14.6 34.9 (1.4) 33.4 (2.8) (10.4) (10.4) 0.5 (2.3) 0.0 (1.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 (37.9) 18.5 (19.5) 0.0 (19.5) 2014 23.3 14.5 37.8 (1.4) 36.4 (3.4) (10.7) (10.7) 0.5 (1.2) 0.0 (0.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.6 (19.5) 21.6 2.2 2.2 0.0 2015 26.6 14.4 41.0 (1.4) 39.6 (4.1) (11.0) (11.0) 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 2.2 25.0 27.2 27.2 0.0 2016 30.3 14.3 44.6 (1.5) 43.1 (4.7) (11.3) (11.3) 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 27.9 27.2 27.9 55.1 55.1 0.0 2017 33.8 14.2 48.0 (2.0) 46.0 (5.3) (11.7) (11.7) 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.4 55.1 30.4 85.4 85.4 0.0 2018 37.7 14.2 51.9 (2.1) 49.8 (6.0) (12.0) (12.0) 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.9 85.4 33.9 119.4 119.4 0.0 2003 (2.9) 8.3 5.4 (4.9) 0.5 (0.4) 0.0 (1.7) (1.1) 10.4 (6.0) (0.5) 3.9 (5.3) 0.5 (4.7) (1.4) (10.2) (1.4) (11.6) 0.0 (11.6)
138
Utena county Table 10

Balance sheet, mLTL

Table 11

Actuals 2003 40.4 (34.1) (5.7) 0.6 1.4% 2.8 0.0 0.0 3.4 (0.5) 2.9 2004 21.9 (15.9) (8.3) (2.3) -10.3% 0.0 0.0 (0.5) (2.7) 0.0 (2.7) Detailed forecast 2005 22.6 (15.9) (7.8) (1.1) -4.9% 0.0 0.2 (0.1) (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 2006 23.4 (16.0) (5.2) 2.2 9.3% 0.0 0.2 (0.1) 2.3 (0.3) 2.0 2007 25.1 (16.1) (5.0) 4.0 15.9% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 3.6 (0.5) 3.1 2008 26.5 (16.5) (6.1) 3.9 14.8% 0.0 0.0 (2.0) 1.9 (0.3) 1.6 2009 27.7 (16.7) (10.6) 0.4 1.3% 0.0 0.0 (3.7) (3.4) 0.0 (3.4) 2010 32.0 (16.7) (10.6) 4.7 14.6% 0.0 0.0 (3.5) 1.2 (0.2) 1.0 2011 33.7 (16.6) (10.5) 6.6 19.5% 0.0 0.0 (3.1) 3.5 (0.5) 3.0 2012 34.1 (16.5) (10.4) 7.2 21.2% 0.0 0.0 (2.5) 4.7 (0.7) 4.0 Key driver forecast 2013 35.9 (16.5) (10.3) 9.1 25.4% 0.0 0.0 (1.9) 7.2 (1.1) 6.1 2014 37.9 (17.2) (10.4) 10.3 27.1% 0.0 0.0 (1.1) 9.1 (1.4) 7.7 2015 39.8 (18.0) (10.4) 11.4 28.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.3) 11.1 (1.7) 9.4 2016 42.1 (18.9) (10.2) 13.0 30.9% 0.0 0.1 0.0 13.1 (2.0) 11.2 2017 44.6 (19.9) (10.1) 14.6 32.8% 0.0 0.4 0.0 15.0 (2.2) 12.7 2018 47.5 (21.1) (10.0) 16.5 34.7% 0.0 0.8 0.0 17.3 (2.6) 14.7
139
Table 12

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (2.3) 8.3 6.0 19.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.5 (3.7) 24.5 20.9 20.9 0.0 2005 (1.1) 7.8 6.7 (6.2) 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 (0.1) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 20.9 0.7 21.6 21.6 0.0 2006 2.2 5.2 7.4 (0.2) 7.2 (0.3) (41.3) 0.0 (41.3) 0.2 (0.1) 0.0 0.1 7.3 0.0 7.3 (27.0) 21.6 (27.0) (5.4) 0.0 (5.4) 2007 4.0 5.0 9.0 (0.6) 8.4 (0.5) (42.6) 0.0 (42.6) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 7.6 0.0 7.6 (27.5) (5.4) (27.5) (32.9) 0.0 (32.9) 2008 3.9 6.1 10.1 (0.4) 9.6 (0.3) (43.4) 0.0 (43.4) 0.0 (2.0) 0.0 (2.0) 7.7 0.0 7.7 (28.4) (32.9) (28.4) (61.4) 0.0 (61.4) 2009 0.4 10.6 11.0 (0.2) 10.7 0.0 (12.7) (12.7) 0.0 (3.7) 0.0 (3.7) 9.2 0.0 9.2 3.5 (61.4) 3.5 (57.8) 0.0 (57.8) 2010 4.7 10.6 15.3 (0.7) 14.5 (0.2) (13.0) (13.0) 0.0 (3.5) 0.0 (3.5) 8.7 0.0 8.7 6.6 (57.8) 6.6 (51.2) 0.0 (51.2) 2011 6.6 10.5 17.1 (0.3) 16.8 (0.5) (8.6) (8.6) 0.0 (3.1) 0.0 (3.1) 4.9 0.0 4.9 9.4 (51.2) 9.4 (41.8) 0.0 (41.8) 2012 7.2 10.4 17.6 (0.1) 17.5 (0.7) (8.9) (8.9) 0.0 (2.5) 0.0 (2.5) 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.4 (41.8) 10.4 (31.3) 0.0 (31.3) Key driver forecast 2013 9.1 10.3 19.4 (0.3) 19.1 (1.1) (15.0) (15.0) 0.0 (1.9) 0.0 (1.9) 11.0 0.0 11.0 12.2 (31.3) 12.2 (19.2) 0.0 (19.2) 2014 10.3 10.4 20.7 (0.5) 20.2 (1.4) (15.4) (15.4) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 (1.1) 11.3 0.0 11.3 13.6 (19.2) 13.6 (5.6) 0.0 (5.6) 2015 11.4 10.4 21.8 (0.5) 21.3 (1.7) (7.2) (7.2) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 3.0 0.0 3.0 15.1 (5.6) 15.1 9.5 9.5 0.0 2016 13.0 10.2 23.2 (0.5) 22.7 (2.0) (7.4) (7.4) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.0 0.0 3.0 16.5 9.5 16.5 26.0 26.0 0.0 2017 14.6 10.1 24.7 (0.6) 24.1 (2.2) (7.6) (7.6) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.1 0.0 3.1 17.7 26.0 17.7 43.7 43.7 0.0 2018 16.5 10.0 26.4 (0.7) 25.8 (2.6) (7.8) (7.8) 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.0 0.0 2.0 18.1 43.7 18.1 61.8 61.8 0.0 2003 0.6 5.7 6.2 (14.4) (8.2) (0.5) 0.0 (52.2) (52.3) 0.0 0.0 (0.2) (0.2) 2.2 59.7 61.9 3.6 (7.2) 3.6 (3.7) 0.0 (3.7)
140
Teliai county Table 13

Balance sheet, mLTL

Table 14

Actuals 2003 12.9 (11.7) (2.4) (1.2) -9.3% 0.5 0.0 0.0 (0.7) 0.0 (0.7) 2004 13.3 (12.4) (2.4) (1.6) -11.9% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) (2.0) 0.0 (2.0) Detailed forecast 2005 13.7 (11.5) (2.3) (0.0) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 2006 15.3 (9.9) (1.9) 3.5 22.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.2) 3.3 (0.5) 2.8 2007 19.5 (11.1) (2.5) 5.9 30.6% 0.0 0.0 (0.3) 5.7 (0.8) 4.8 2008 22.3 (11.6) (3.4) 7.2 32.4% 0.0 0.0 (0.8) 6.4 (1.0) 5.5 2009 29.0 (12.5) (6.5) 10.0 34.5% 0.0 0.0 (1.3) 8.7 (1.3) 7.4 2010 32.9 (14.0) (6.4) 12.5 38.1% 0.0 0.0 (0.6) 12.0 (1.8) 10.2 2011 35.6 (14.9) (6.4) 14.3 40.2% 0.0 0.1 0.0 14.4 (2.2) 12.2 2012 36.6 (15.2) (6.4) 15.0 41.1% 0.0 0.3 0.0 15.3 (2.3) 13.0 Key driver forecast 2013 39.4 (15.8) (6.4) 17.2 43.6% 0.0 0.7 0.0 17.8 (2.7) 15.1 2014 41.9 (16.7) (6.8) 18.4 44.0% 0.0 1.2 0.0 19.6 (2.9) 16.7 2015 53.6 (26.3) (6.8) 20.6 38.4% 0.0 1.9 0.0 22.5 (3.4) 19.1 2016 46.8 (17.7) (7.4) 21.7 46.4% 0.0 2.8 0.0 24.5 (3.7) 20.8 2017 48.4 (17.7) (7.1) 23.6 48.7% 0.0 4.0 0.0 27.6 (4.1) 23.4 2018 50.9 (18.5) (7.5) 24.9 48.9% 0.0 5.5 0.0 30.3 (4.6) 25.8
141
Table 15

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (1.6) 2.4 0.8 1.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 (7.5) 1.6 (5.9) 0.0 (5.9) 2005 (0.0) 2.3 2.3 1.2 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 (5.9) 3.1 (2.8) 0.0 (2.8) 2006 3.5 1.9 5.4 0.7 6.1 (0.5) (25.4) 0.0 (25.4) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 18.0 0.0 18.0 (2.0) (2.8) (2.0) (4.7) 0.0 (4.7) 2007 5.9 2.5 8.4 0.1 8.5 (0.8) (55.5) 0.0 (55.5) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 39.7 0.0 39.7 (8.5) (4.7) (8.5) (13.2) 0.0 (13.2) 2008 7.2 3.4 10.7 0.4 11.0 (1.0) (55.8) 0.0 (55.8) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.8) 37.9 0.0 37.9 (8.6) (13.2) (8.6) (21.9) 0.0 (21.9) 2009 10.0 6.5 16.4 (1.5) 14.9 (1.3) (0.0) (0.0) 0.0 (1.3) 0.0 (1.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 (21.9) 12.3 (9.6) 0.0 (9.6) 2010 12.5 6.4 19.0 (1.0) 18.0 (1.8) (0.0) (0.0) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 (9.6) 15.6 6.1 6.1 0.0 2011 14.3 6.4 20.7 (0.7) 20.1 (2.2) (0.8) (0.8) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 6.1 17.1 23.2 23.2 0.0 2012 15.0 6.4 21.4 (0.2) 21.2 (2.3) (20.2) (20.2) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 14.3 0.0 14.3 13.4 23.2 13.4 36.6 36.6 0.0 Key driver forecast 2013 17.2 6.4 23.5 (0.6) 22.9 (2.7) (29.3) (29.3) 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 21.1 0.0 21.1 12.7 36.6 12.7 49.3 49.3 0.0 2014 18.4 6.8 25.2 (0.6) 24.6 (2.9) (0.9) (0.9) 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.9 49.3 21.9 71.2 71.2 0.0 2015 20.6 6.8 27.4 (3.9) 23.5 (3.4) (8.7) (8.7) 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.9 7.7 0.0 7.7 21.1 71.2 21.1 92.3 92.3 0.0 2016 21.7 7.4 29.1 2.8 32.0 (3.7) (18.9) (18.9) 2.8 0.0 0.0 2.8 15.7 0.0 15.7 27.9 92.3 27.9 120.2 120.2 0.0 2017 23.6 7.1 30.7 (0.3) 30.4 (4.1) (10.4) (10.4) 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.1 0.0 6.1 25.9 120.2 25.9 146.2 146.2 0.0 2018 24.9 7.5 32.4 (0.6) 31.8 (4.6) (8.3) (8.3) 5.5 0.0 0.0 5.5 7.3 0.0 7.3 31.7 146.2 31.7 177.8 177.8 0.0 2003 (1.2) 2.4 1.2 (7.2) (5.9) 0.0 0.0 (2.1) (2.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 (7.4) (0.0) (7.4) (7.5) 0.0 (7.5)
142
Alytus county Table 16

Balance sheet, mLTL

Table 17

Actuals 2003 17.0 (13.7) (3.9) (0.6) -3.2% 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 2004 17.2 (14.1) (3.8) (0.7) -4.2% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) (1.2) 0.0 (1.2) Detailed forecast 2005 17.2 (14.1) (3.7) (0.6) -3.5% 0.0 0.1 (0.1) (0.5) 0.0 (0.5) 2006 17.2 (14.1) (3.1) (0.0) -0.1% 0.0 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 2007 17.5 (14.4) (3.6) (0.5) -2.6% 0.0 0.1 (0.1) (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 2008 23.9 (15.3) (4.9) 3.8 15.8% 0.0 0.1 (0.1) 3.8 (0.6) 3.2 2009 25.5 (15.8) (6.6) 3.2 12.5% 0.0 0.1 (0.1) 3.2 (0.5) 2.7 2010 26.8 (16.3) (8.2) 2.3 8.5% 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.4 (0.4) 2.0 2011 29.1 (16.8) (9.8) 2.5 8.7% 0.0 0.1 (0.2) 2.5 (0.4) 2.1 2012 29.1 (16.7) (9.4) 3.0 10.2% 0.0 0.1 (0.4) 2.7 (0.4) 2.3 Key driver forecast 2013 29.1 (16.6) (9.1) 3.4 11.6% 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.5 (0.5) 3.0 2014 29.2 (16.5) (8.8) 3.9 13.4% 0.0 0.3 0.0 4.2 (0.6) 3.6 2015 29.2 (16.5) (8.5) 4.3 14.5% 0.0 0.6 0.0 4.9 (0.7) 4.1 2016 29.2 (16.5) (8.2) 4.5 15.6% 0.0 1.0 0.0 5.6 (0.8) 4.7 2017 29.2 (16.5) (7.9) 4.8 16.6% 0.0 1.6 0.0 6.4 (1.0) 5.5 2018 29.2 (16.5) (7.6) 5.1 17.5% 0.0 2.3 0.0 7.4 (1.1) 6.3
143
Table 18

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (0.7) 3.8 3.1 16.1 19.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.7 (5.6) 18.7 13.2 13.2 0.0 2005 (0.6) 3.7 3.1 (5.7) (2.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 (2.6) 13.2 (2.6) 10.6 10.6 0.0 2006 (0.0) 3.1 3.1 0.7 3.8 (0.0) (19.0) 0.0 (19.0) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 16.4 0.0 16.4 1.2 10.6 1.2 11.8 11.8 0.0 2007 (0.5) 3.6 3.1 0.3 3.4 0.0 (46.6) 0.0 (46.6) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 0.1 41.4 0.0 41.4 (1.7) 11.8 (1.7) 10.0 10.0 0.0 2008 3.8 4.9 8.6 (1.8) 6.8 (0.6) (60.4) 0.0 (60.4) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 51.4 0.0 51.4 (2.7) 10.0 (2.7) 7.3 7.3 0.0 2009 3.2 6.6 9.7 (0.3) 9.4 (0.5) (72.1) (72.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 57.1 0.0 57.1 (6.1) 7.3 (6.1) 1.3 1.3 0.0 2010 2.3 8.2 10.5 (0.3) 10.2 (0.4) (50.1) (50.1) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 36.4 (0.0) 36.4 (3.8) 1.3 (3.8) (2.5) 0.0 (2.5) 2011 2.5 9.8 12.3 (0.4) 11.9 (0.4) (51.1) (51.1) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) 35.8 0.0 35.8 (3.9) (2.5) (3.9) (6.4) 0.0 (6.4) 2012 3.0 9.4 12.4 0.0 12.4 (0.4) (0.0) (0.0) 0.1 (0.4) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 (6.4) 11.7 5.3 5.3 0.0 Key driver forecast 2013 3.4 9.1 12.5 0.0 12.5 (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 12.1 5.3 12.1 17.4 17.4 0.0 2014 3.9 8.8 12.7 (0.0) 12.7 (0.6) (0.0) (0.0) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 17.4 12.4 29.7 29.7 0.0 2015 4.3 8.5 12.7 0.0 12.7 (0.7) (0.0) (0.0) 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 29.7 12.6 42.3 42.3 0.0 2016 4.5 8.2 12.7 0.0 12.7 (0.8) (0.0) (0.0) 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 12.9 42.3 12.9 55.3 55.3 0.0 2017 4.8 7.9 12.7 0.0 12.7 (1.0) 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 13.3 55.3 13.3 68.6 68.6 0.0 2018 5.1 7.6 12.7 0.0 12.7 (1.1) (0.0) (0.0) 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.9 68.6 13.9 82.5 82.5 0.0 2003 (0.6) 3.9 3.3 (9.3) (6.0) (0.0) 0.0 (1.6) 1.9 0.0 0.0 (0.3) (0.3) 0.1 3.1 3.1 (0.7) (4.9) (0.7) (5.6) 0.0 (5.6)
144
Panevys county Table 19

Balance sheet, mLTL

Actuals 2003 2.9 1.5 6.0 1.3 11.6 128.4 0.3 140.4 2.9 0.2 16.4 120.9 140.4 2004 1.5 14.4 0.0 1.5 17.4 121.4 0.3 139.1 2.9 0.2 16.4 119.6 139.1 Detailed forecast 2005 1.7 13.6 7.7 1.7 24.7 114.8 0.3 139.8 3.3 0.2 16.4 119.9 139.8 2006 1.8 0.0 8.6 1.9 12.3 197.1 0.3 209.8 3.7 4.9 79.2 121.9 209.8 2007 2.0 0.0 9.5 2.1 13.7 235.6 0.3 249.6 4.1 10.5 111.7 123.4 249.6 2008 2.2 0.0 10.2 2.3 14.7 286.6 0.3 301.6 4.4 17.8 153.3 126.1 301.6 2009 2.5 0.0 11.5 2.1 16.2 283.3 0.3 299.7 4.9 5.6 157.0 131.8 299.7 2010 2.8 9.9 12.9 2.3 27.8 281.4 0.3 309.5 5.5 0.0 161.9 141.4 309.5 2011 3.0 36.6 13.8 2.4 55.8 289.5 0.3 345.6 5.9 0.0 175.9 153.1 345.6 2012 3.1 78.4 14.5 2.5 98.5 316.2 0.3 415.1 6.2 0.0 204.9 166.3 415.1 Key driver forecast 2013 3.2 140.9 15.1 2.6 161.8 326.2 0.3 488.3 6.4 0.0 221.6 180.7 488.3 2014 3.3 228.4 15.6 2.7 250.0 325.7 0.3 576.0 6.6 0.0 230.4 196.7 576.0 2015 3.4 339.4 15.9 2.7 361.5 323.8 0.3 685.7 6.8 0.0 234.9 214.1 685.7 2016 3.5 471.1 16.2 2.8 493.6 334.2 0.3 828.1 6.9 0.0 247.7 232.6 828.1 2017 3.5 628.6 16.6 2.9 651.7 341.6 0.3 993.5 7.1 0.0 261.5 252.4 993.5 2018 3.6 816.8 17.0 3.0 840.4 342.4 0.3 1,183.1 7.3 0.0 272.0 273.6 1,183.1
Table 20

Actuals 2003 25.5 (20.9) (6.3) (1.7) -6.7% 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 2004 29.3 (23.5) (7.0) (1.3) -4.4% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (1.3) 0.0 (1.3) Detailed forecast 2005 33.0 (26.1) (6.6) 0.2 0.7% 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 0.4 (0.1) 0.3 2006 36.7 (28.8) (5.7) 2.2 6.1% 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 2.4 (0.4) 2.0 2007 40.7 (30.7) (7.9) 2.1 5.1% 0.0 0.0 (0.3) 1.8 (0.3) 1.5 2008 43.8 (32.9) (7.1) 3.8 8.8% 0.0 0.0 (0.6) 3.2 (0.5) 2.7 2009 49.3 (31.0) (10.6) 7.7 15.6% 0.0 0.0 (1.1) 6.6 (1.0) 5.6 2010 55.2 (32.7) (10.8) 11.7 21.1% 0.0 0.0 (0.3) 11.3 (1.7) 9.6 2011 59.1 (34.7) (10.7) 13.7 23.1% 0.0 0.1 0.0 13.8 (2.1) 11.7 2012 62.0 (36.3) (10.5) 15.1 24.4% 0.0 0.4 0.0 15.5 (2.3) 13.2 Key driver forecast 2013 64.3 (37.7) (10.5) 16.2 25.1% 0.0 0.8 0.0 16.9 (2.5) 14.4 2014 66.5 (38.7) (10.3) 17.5 26.3% 0.0 1.4 0.0 18.9 (2.8) 16.0 2015 68.1 (39.5) (10.3) 18.2 26.7% 0.0 2.3 0.0 20.5 (3.1) 17.4 2016 69.3 (40.7) (10.3) 18.4 26.5% 0.0 3.4 0.0 21.8 (3.3) 18.5 2017 71.0 (41.8) (10.6) 18.5 26.1% 0.0 4.7 0.0 23.2 (3.5) 19.8 2018 72.5 (42.9) (11.0) 18.7 25.8% 0.0 6.3 0.0 25.0 (3.8) 21.3
145
Table 21

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (1.3) 7.0 5.7 7.2 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 1.5 13.0 14.4 14.4 0.0 2005 0.2 6.6 6.9 (7.7) (0.9) (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.8) 14.4 (0.8) 13.6 13.6 0.0 2006 2.2 5.7 8.0 (0.9) 7.1 (0.4) (88.1) 0.0 (88.1) 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.1 62.8 0.0 62.8 (18.4) 13.6 (18.4) (4.8) 0.0 (4.8) 2007 2.1 7.9 9.9 (0.9) 9.0 (0.3) (46.4) 0.0 (46.4) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 32.4 0.0 32.4 (5.6) (4.8) (5.6) (10.3) 0.0 (10.3) 2008 3.8 7.1 10.9 (0.7) 10.2 (0.5) (58.0) 0.0 (58.0) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.6) 41.7 0.0 41.7 (7.3) (10.3) (7.3) (17.6) 0.0 (17.6) 2009 7.7 10.6 18.3 (0.6) 17.7 (1.0) (7.3) (7.3) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 (1.1) 3.7 (0.0) 3.7 12.0 (17.6) 12.0 (5.6) 0.0 (5.6) 2010 11.7 10.8 22.5 (0.9) 21.6 (1.7) (8.9) (8.9) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 4.9 0.0 4.9 15.5 (5.6) 15.5 9.9 9.9 0.0 2011 13.7 10.7 24.4 (0.7) 23.7 (2.1) (18.8) (18.8) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 14.0 0.0 14.0 16.9 9.9 16.9 26.8 26.8 0.0 2012 15.1 10.5 25.7 (0.5) 25.2 (2.3) (37.3) (37.3) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 29.1 0.0 29.1 15.0 26.8 15.0 41.8 41.8 0.0 Key driver forecast 2013 16.2 10.5 26.7 (0.4) 26.2 (2.5) (20.5) (20.5) 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 16.7 0.0 16.7 20.7 41.8 20.7 62.5 62.5 0.0 2014 17.5 10.3 27.8 (0.4) 27.4 (2.8) (9.8) (9.8) 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 8.8 0.0 8.8 25.0 62.5 25.0 87.5 87.5 0.0 2015 18.2 10.3 28.5 (0.3) 28.3 (3.1) (8.5) (8.5) 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.5 0.0 4.5 23.5 87.5 23.5 111.0 111.0 0.0 2016 18.4 10.3 28.6 (0.2) 28.4 (3.3) (20.7) (20.7) 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 12.8 0.0 12.8 20.6 111.0 20.6 131.6 131.6 0.0 2017 18.5 10.6 29.1 (0.3) 28.8 (3.5) (17.9) (17.9) 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 13.8 0.0 13.8 25.9 131.6 25.9 157.5 157.5 0.0 2018 18.7 11.0 29.7 (0.3) 29.4 (3.8) (11.8) (11.8) 6.3 0.0 0.0 6.3 10.6 0.0 10.6 30.7 157.5 30.7 188.2 188.2 0.0 2003 (1.7) 6.3 4.6 (0.4) 4.2 0.0 0.0 (18.9) (18.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 11.5 14.0 1.1 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.5 0.0
146
Taurag county Table 22

Balance sheet, mLTL

Table 23

Actuals 2003 5.7 (5.9) (1.3) (1.5) -27.3% 0.2 0.0 0.0 (1.4) 0.0 (1.4) 2004 5.9 (5.9) (1.9) (1.9) -31.4% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (1.9) 0.0 (1.9) Detailed forecast 2005 6.2 (6.0) (1.8) (1.6) -25.3% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (1.6) 0.0 (1.6) 2006 6.5 (6.1) (1.7) (1.3) -19.8% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (1.3) 0.0 (1.3) 2007 7.5 (6.7) (1.8) (1.0) -13.8% 0.0 0.0 (0.6) (1.7) 0.0 (1.7) 2008 8.7 (6.4) (2.5) (0.1) -1.1% 0.0 0.0 (1.0) (1.1) 0.0 (1.1) 2009 9.6 (7.0) (2.4) 0.2 2.2% 0.0 0.0 (1.2) (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 2010 10.5 (7.8) (2.3) 0.4 4.1% 0.0 0.0 (1.1) (0.7) 0.0 (0.7) 2011 11.5 (8.1) (2.3) 1.1 9.6% 0.0 0.0 (1.0) 0.1 (0.0) 0.1 2012 12.4 (8.4) (2.2) 1.8 14.4% 0.0 0.0 (1.0) 0.8 (0.1) 0.7 Key driver forecast 2013 13.5 (8.7) (2.2) 2.5 18.9% 0.0 0.0 (0.9) 1.7 (0.2) 1.4 2014 14.4 (9.1) (2.1) 3.2 21.9% 0.0 0.0 (0.8) 2.4 (0.4) 2.0 2015 15.4 (9.5) (2.1) 3.8 24.6% 0.0 0.0 (0.6) 3.2 (0.5) 2.7 2016 16.4 (9.9) (2.1) 4.4 27.0% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 4.0 (0.6) 3.4 2017 17.5 (10.3) (2.1) 5.1 29.3% 0.0 0.0 (0.2) 4.9 (0.7) 4.2 2018 18.7 (10.7) (2.0) 5.9 31.5% 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 (0.9) 5.0
147
Table 24

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (1.9) 1.9 0.0 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 (0.0) 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.0 2005 (1.6) 1.8 0.2 (1.4) (1.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (1.1) 1.1 (1.1) (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 2006 (1.3) 1.7 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 0.0 (20.6) 0.0 (20.6) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 9.7 0.0 9.7 (10.6) (0.0) (10.6) (10.6) 0.0 (10.6) 2007 (1.0) 1.8 0.8 (0.3) 0.5 0.0 (23.4) 0.0 (23.4) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.6) 18.4 0.0 18.4 (5.2) (10.6) (5.2) (15.8) 0.0 (15.8) 2008 (0.1) 2.5 2.4 (0.3) 2.1 0.0 (21.4) 0.0 (21.4) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 16.8 0.0 16.8 (3.5) (15.8) (3.5) (19.3) 0.0 (19.3) 2009 0.2 2.4 2.6 (0.2) 2.4 0.0 (0.2) (0.2) 0.0 (1.2) 0.0 (1.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 (19.3) 1.0 (18.2) 0.0 (18.2) 2010 0.4 2.3 2.7 (0.2) 2.5 0.0 (0.2) (0.2) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 (18.2) 1.2 (17.0) 0.0 (17.0) 2011 1.1 2.3 3.3 (0.2) 3.2 (0.0) (1.3) (1.3) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 0.8 (17.0) 0.8 (16.2) 0.0 (16.2) 2012 1.8 2.2 4.0 (0.2) 3.8 (0.1) (1.4) (1.4) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 1.4 (16.2) 1.4 (14.8) 0.0 (14.8) Key driver forecast 2013 2.5 2.2 4.7 (0.2) 4.6 (0.2) (1.4) (1.4) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 (14.8) 2.0 (12.8) 0.0 (12.8) 2014 3.2 2.1 5.3 (0.2) 5.1 (0.4) (1.4) (1.4) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 (12.8) 2.6 (10.2) 0.0 (10.2) 2015 3.8 2.1 5.9 (0.2) 5.7 (0.5) (1.4) (1.4) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 (10.2) 3.2 (7.0) 0.0 (7.0) 2016 4.4 2.1 6.5 (0.2) 6.3 (0.6) (1.5) (1.5) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 (7.0) 3.8 (3.1) 0.0 (3.1) 2017 5.1 2.1 7.2 (0.2) 7.0 (0.7) (1.5) (1.5) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 (3.1) 4.6 1.4 1.4 0.0 2018 5.9 2.0 7.9 (0.2) 7.7 (0.9) (1.5) (1.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 1.4 5.3 6.8 6.8 0.0 2003 (1.5) 1.3 (0.2) 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 (14.4) (14.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 14.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
148
Marijampol county Table 25

Balance sheet, mLTL

Table 26

Actuals 2003 10.5 (13.1) (2.5) (5.1) -48.1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 (5.0) (0.0) (5.0) 2004 11.7 (10.6) (2.0) (0.9) -8.0% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) Detailed forecast 2005 12.8 (10.7) (1.9) 0.2 1.9% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.0) 0.2 2006 14.0 (10.8) (0.9) 2.3 16.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 2.3 (0.3) 2.0 2007 15.7 (11.5) (3.2) 1.1 7.1% 0.0 0.0 (0.9) 0.2 (0.0) 0.2 2008 17.3 (12.4) (3.1) 1.8 10.4% 0.0 0.0 (0.9) 0.9 (0.1) 0.8 2009 18.3 (13.1) (3.5) 1.8 9.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.8) 1.0 (0.1) 0.8 2010 19.3 (13.6) (3.2) 2.4 12.4% 0.0 0.0 (0.6) 1.8 (0.3) 1.5 2011 20.2 (14.2) (3.0) 3.0 14.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.4) 2.5 (0.4) 2.2 2012 21.0 (14.6) (2.9) 3.5 16.7% 0.0 0.0 (0.2) 3.3 (0.5) 2.8 Key driver forecast 2013 21.9 (15.1) (2.8) 4.0 18.5% 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 (0.6) 3.4 2014 22.7 (15.5) (2.6) 4.6 20.1% 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.6 (0.7) 3.9 2015 23.3 (15.9) (2.6) 4.9 20.8% 0.0 0.2 0.0 5.0 (0.8) 4.3 2016 23.9 (16.4) (2.5) 5.0 20.9% 0.0 0.4 0.0 5.4 (0.8) 4.6 2017 24.5 (16.9) (2.4) 5.2 21.2% 0.0 0.6 0.0 5.8 (0.9) 4.9 2018 25.1 (17.3) (2.3) 5.4 21.5% 0.0 0.9 0.0 6.3 (0.9) 5.4
149
Table 27

Actuals Detailed forecast 2004 (0.9) 2.0 1.1 1.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 (0.4) 2.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 2005 0.2 1.9 2.1 (0.5) 1.6 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.2 3.2 0.0 2006 2.3 0.9 3.2 (0.6) 2.6 (0.3) (77.0) 0.0 (77.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 57.3 0.0 57.3 (17.5) 3.2 (17.5) (14.3) 0.0 (14.3) 2007 1.1 3.2 4.3 (0.8) 3.4 (0.0) (2.3) 0.0 (2.3) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 (14.3) 0.2 (14.1) 0.0 (14.1) 2008 1.8 3.1 4.9 (0.9) 4.0 (0.1) (1.8) 0.0 (1.8) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 (14.1) 1.2 (12.9) 0.0 (12.9) 2009 1.8 3.5 5.3 (0.3) 4.9 (0.1) (1.5) (1.5) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 (12.9) 2.5 (10.4) 0.0 (10.4) 2010 2.4 3.2 5.6 (0.2) 5.4 (0.3) (1.3) (1.3) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 (10.4) 3.3 (7.1) 0.0 (7.1) 2011 3.0 3.0 6.0 (0.2) 5.8 (0.4) (1.1) (1.1) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 (7.1) 3.9 (3.2) 0.0 (3.2) 2012 3.5 2.9 6.4 (0.2) 6.2 (0.5) (1.0) (1.0) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 (3.2) 4.5 1.3 1.3 0.0 Key driver forecast 2013 4.0 2.8 6.8 (0.2) 6.6 (0.6) (0.9) (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.3 5.1 6.4 6.4 0.0 2014 4.6 2.6 7.2 (0.2) 7.0 (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 6.4 5.6 12.0 12.0 0.0 2015 4.9 2.6 7.4 (0.1) 7.3 (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 12.0 5.9 17.9 17.9 0.0 2016 5.0 2.5 7.5 (0.1) 7.3 (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 17.9 6.2 24.1 24.1 0.0 2017 5.2 2.4 7.6 (0.1) 7.4 (0.9) (0.7) (0.7) 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 24.1 6.5 30.5 30.5 0.0 2018 5.4 2.3 7.7 (0.1) 7.6 (0.9) (0.7) (0.7) 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 30.5 6.9 37.4 37.4 0.0 2003 (5.1) 2.5 (2.6) (0.1) (2.7) (0.0) 0.0 5.1 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 (0.1) (2.9) (2.9) (0.4) (0.0) (0.4) (0.4) 0.0 (0.4)
150
iauliai county Table 28

Balance sheet, mLTL

Actuals 2003 1.8 2.5 13.2 4.0 21.4 267.7 0.7 289.9 5.0 13.5 49.3 222.0 289.9 2004 1.2 0.0 12.7 3.6 17.6 262.3 0.7 280.7 4.8 8.4 49.3 218.2 280.7 Detailed forecast 2005 1.3 0.0 11.9 3.1 16.4 257.0 0.7 274.2 4.4 5.5 49.3 214.9 274.2 2006 1.4 0.0 10.9 2.9 15.2 313.3 0.7 329.2 3.9 18.0 97.6 209.7 329.2 2007 1.6 0.0 9.8 3.2 14.5 386.9 0.7 402.1 3.3 35.8 160.4 202.6 402.1 2008 1.7 0.0 9.2 3.4 14.3 481.9 0.7 497.0 3.4 59.6 241.1 192.9 497.0 2009 2.0 0.0 10.8 2.3 15.1 497.4 0.7 513.2 4.0 48.9 264.9 191.9 513.2 2010 2.5 0.0 13.2 2.7 18.4 526.4 0.7 545.6 4.9 40.9 299.5 196.3 545.6 2011 2.8 0.0 14.9 3.0 20.7 574.2 0.7 595.6 5.5 33.8 348.4 203.6 595.6 2012 3.1 0.0 16.7 3.3 23.1 646.5 0.7 670.3 6.2 29.9 415.1 214.5 670.3 Key driver forecast 2013 3.5 0.3 18.9 3.5 26.1 639.8 0.7 666.6 7.0 0.0 423.7 231.0 666.6 2014 3.6 32.1 19.3 3.6 58.5 640.2 0.7 699.5 7.1 0.0 437.4 249.6 699.5 2015 3.6 97.3 19.5 3.6 124.1 644.6 0.7 769.5 7.2 0.0 456.2 268.8 769.5 2016 3.7 200.2 19.7 3.7 227.3 636.8 0.7 864.8 7.3 0.0 466.8 288.3 864.8 2017 3.7 341.4 20.0 3.7 368.7 622.3 0.7 991.8 7.4 0.0 470.0 309.0 991.8 2018 3.7 519.0 20.2 3.8 546.7 619.2 0.7 1,166.7 7.5 0.0 481.5 331.1 1,166.7
Table 29

Actuals 2003 22.3 (19.8) (5.4) (3.0) -13.3% 1.5 0.0 0.0 (1.4) 0.0 (1.4) 2004 24.5 (22.1) (5.4) (3.0) -12.3% 0.0 0.0 (0.8) (3.8) 0.0 (3.8) Detailed forecast 2005 26.5 (23.9) (5.3) (2.7) -10.2% 0.0 0.0 (0.5) (3.2) 0.0 (3.2) 2006 28.6 (25.8) (7.7) (4.9) -17.1% 0.0 0.0 (0.3) (5.2) 0.0 (5.2) 2007 31.5 (28.1) (9.4) (6.0) -18.9% 0.0 0.0 (1.1) (7.1) 0.0 (7.1) 2008 34.0 (30.0) (11.6) (7.6) -22.5% 0.0 0.0 (2.1) (9.8) 0.0 (9.8) 2009 39.8 (20.5) (16.7) 2.6 6.6% 0.0 0.0 (3.6) (1.0) 0.0 (1.0) 2010 49.0 (24.2) (16.7) 8.1 16.6% 0.0 0.0 (2.9) 5.2 (0.8) 4.4 2011 55.3 (26.4) (17.8) 11.0 20.0% 0.0 0.0 (2.5) 8.6 (1.3) 7.3 2012 61.9 (29.1) (17.9) 14.9 24.1% 0.0 0.0 (2.0) 12.9 (1.9) 10.9 Key driver forecast 2013 69.8 (30.9) (17.8) 21.1 30.3% 0.0 0.0 (1.8) 19.3 (2.9) 16.4 2014 71.3 (31.6) (17.8) 22.0 30.8% 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 (3.3) 18.7 2015 72.4 (32.0) (18.1) 22.2 30.7% 0.0 0.3 0.0 22.5 (3.4) 19.1 2016 73.0 (32.4) (18.7) 21.9 30.0% 0.0 1.0 0.0 22.9 (3.4) 19.5 2017 74.0 (32.7) (19.0) 22.4 30.2% 0.0 2.0 0.0 24.4 (3.7) 20.7 2018 75.0 (33.3) (19.0) 22.6 30.2% 0.0 3.4 0.0 26.0 (3.9) 22.1
151
Table 30
Reported EBITA Depreciation EBITDA

2003 (3.0) 5.4 2.5 (0.5) 2.0 0.0 0.0 (5.4) (5.5) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 5.6 1.6 7.1 5.5 (13.4) 5.5 (7.9) 0.0 (7.9) 2004 (3.0) 5.4 2.4 1.1 3.6 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 (0.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 (7.9) 2.7 (5.2) 0.0 (5.2) 2005 (2.7) 5.3 2.6 0.8 3.4 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 (5.2) 2.9 (2.3) 0.0 (2.3) 2006 (4.9) 7.7 2.8 0.7 3.5 0.0 (64.0) 0.0 (64.0) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 48.3 0.0 48.3 (12.5) (2.3) (12.5) (14.8) 0.0 (14.8) 2007 (6.0) 9.4 3.4 0.1 3.5 0.0 (83.0) 0.0 (83.0) 0.0 (1.1) 0.0 (1.1) 62.8 0.0 62.8 (17.8) (14.8) (17.8) (32.6) 0.0 (32.6) 2008 (7.6) 11.6 4.0 0.3 4.3 0.0 (106.7) 0.0 (106.7) 0.0 (2.1) 0.0 (2.1) 80.7 0.0 80.7 (23.8) (32.6) (23.8) (56.5) 0.0 (56.5) 2009 2.6 16.7 19.3 0.1 19.4 0.0 (32.1) (32.1) 0.0 (3.6) 0.0 (3.6) 23.9 0.0 23.9 7.5 (56.5) 7.5 (48.9) 0.0 (48.9) 2010 8.1 16.7 24.8 (2.0) 22.9 (0.8) (45.7) (45.7) 0.0 (2.9) 0.0 (2.9) 34.6 0.0 34.6 8.0 (48.9) 8.0 (40.9) 0.0 (40.9) 2011 11.0 17.8 28.9 (1.3) 27.5 (1.3) (65.6) (65.6) 0.0 (2.5) 0.0 (2.5) 48.9 (0.0) 48.9 7.1 (40.9) 7.1 (33.8) 0.0 (33.8) 2012 14.9 17.9 32.8 (1.4) 31.4 (1.9) (90.2) (90.2) 0.0 (2.0) 0.0 (2.0) 66.7 0.0 66.7 3.9 (33.8) 3.9 (29.9) 0.0 (29.9) 2013 21.1 17.8 38.9 (1.6) 37.4 (2.9) (11.1) (11.1) 0.0 (1.8) 0.0 (1.8) 8.6 0.0 8.6 30.2 (29.9) 30.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 2014 22.0 17.8 39.8 (0.3) 39.4 (3.3) (18.2) (18.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 0.0 13.7 31.6 0.3 31.6 31.9 31.9 0.0 2015 22.2 18.1 40.3 (0.2) 40.1 (3.4) (22.6) (22.6) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 18.8 0.0 18.8 33.3 31.9 33.3 65.2 65.2 0.0 2016 21.9 18.7 40.6 (0.2) 40.5 (3.4) (10.9) (10.9) 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 10.7 0.0 10.7 37.8 65.2 37.8 102.9 102.9 0.0 2017 22.4 19.0 41.3 (0.2) 41.1 (3.7) (4.5) (4.5) 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.2 0.0 3.2 38.2 102.9 38.2 141.1 141.1 0.0 2018 22.6 19.0 41.6 (0.2) 41.4 (3.9) (15.9) (15.9) 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 11.5 0.0 11.5 36.5 141.1 36.5 177.6 177.6 0.0
Traditional Cash flow
Less investment in working capital Operating cashflow Less tax paid Capital investments Less capex Less other operating assets/liabilities Total capital investments Finance Interest Income Interest Expense Debt raised/repaid Total finance payments Equity Grants received/(returned) Equity raised/repaid Total equity cash payments Net Cashflow Cash/overdraft Opening balance Increase/ (Decrease) Closing balance Excess cash Balancing debt
152
ANNEX 5 FINANCIAL ANALYSES - CASE STUDIES
KLAIPEDA COUNTY Baseline

REBASING CALCULATIONS
Water Charge Scaling factor
Domestic revenue Non-residential revenue Line not in use Other income Bad debt MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL
EBITDA MNLTL
1.004418301 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 24 20 0 0 -
2003 26 22 0 0 -
2004 27 23 0 0 49 42 0
7 2 18
2005 27 23 0 0 0 50 41 0
9 0 18
2006 28 23 0 0 0 52 40 0
11 019
2007 30 25 0 0 0 56 43 0
13 1 20
2008 33 28 0 0 0 61 38 0
23 2 22
2009 36 30 0 0 0 66 42 0
24 2 24
2010 39 33 0 0 0 72 46 0
27 2 26
2011 42 35 0 0 0 78 48 0
30 2 28
2012 45 38 0 0 0 83 50 0
33 2 30
2013 48 40 0 0 0 88 53 0
35 2 32
2014 51 43 0 0 0 94 56 0
38 2 34
2015 55 45 0 0 0 100 59 0
41 2 36
2016 58 48 0 0 0 106 61 0
45 2 38
Net Operating Income

Cost of Sales Taxation Movement in Working Capital Year end Working capital requirement
0 39
39 -
44 43 0
2 15 15
49 43 0
5 5 20
MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL MNLTL 9 -
Net Operating Cashflow

Capex Financing Costs
-13 -
0 0 0 1 -1 3 6 -
10 10 10 2 8 14 14 -
11 12 -
12 38 (26) 19 19 12 3 9 38 38
21 35 (14) 20 14 21 5 16 54 54 -
22 14 8 14 22 7 15 70 70
25 44 (19) 44 25 8 16 86 86
28 62 (34) 62 28 13 15 100 100 -
31 34 (3) 34 31 21 11 111 111
33 10 23 10 33 24 9 120 120
36 11 25 11 36 24 12 132 132
39 11 28 11 39 24 15 147 147
43 11 31 11 43 24 19 166 166
Cash flow before financing

Cohesion Fund / State Grant financing Debt financing
-13 -
(1) 5 7
Cash flow before debt service

Total debt service
0 1 -1 8
-13 1 -14 -7 3
9 2 7 21 21
11 2 9 30 30
Free cash flow

Accumulated Cash Balance before distribution Cash available to investors Cash balance after distribution Net Asset Value in Terminal Period
REBASED TARIFF
Rebased Water Tariff
Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.50 2.43 2.54 2.59 2.0% 1.020 1.000 1.000 2.0% 2004 3.37 9.55 32.20 926.10 3.48% 2.64 1.9% 1.019 1.000 1.000 1.9% 2005 3.42 10.00 34.19 972.96 3.51% 2.5785 -2.2% 0.978 1.004 1.000 2.3% 2006 3.46 10.47 36.24 1,002.15 3.62% 2.63 1.8% 1.018 1.004 1.000 7.9% 2007 3.46 10.60 36.68 1,032.21 3.55% 2.71 3.1% 1.031 1.004 1.000 9.3% 2008 3.46 10.67 36.94 1,063.18 3.47% 2.78 2.8% 1.028 1.004 1.000 9.0% 2009 3.47 10.75 37.28 1,095.08 3.40% 2.91 4.6% 1.046 1.004 1.000 9.0% 2010 3.48 10.82 37.64 1,127.93 3.34% 3.01 3.2% 1.032 1.004 1.000 7.4% 2011 3.49 10.89 38.00 1,161.77 3.27% 3.12 3.9% 1.039 1.004 1.000 7.1% 2012 3.50 10.97 38.37 1,196.62 3.21% 3.22 3.2% 1.032 1.004 1.000 6.4% 2013 3.51 11.33 39.74 1,232.52 3.22% 3.32 3.1% 1.031 1.004 1.000 6.3% 2014 3.52 11.69 41.14 1,269.49 3.24% 3.43 3.2% 1.032 1.004 1.000 6.4% 2015 3.52 11.83 41.67 1,307.58 3.19% 3.50 2.0% 1.020 1.004 1.000 6.3% 2016 3.52 11.86 41.77 1,346.81 3.10% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -146 145.59 2004 8 2005 7 2006 9 2007 9 2008 16 2009 15 2010 16 2011 15 2012 11 2013 9 2014 12 2015 15 2016 19
1.000 1.000
Domestic Tariff Affordability

Rebased Domestic Tariff Average Monthly Household Consumption Household Cost of Water & Wastewater Household Income Tariff Affordability LTL/m3 m3/month LTL/month LTL/month %
2000
2001
2002
2003 3.35 9.12 30.55 882.00 3.46%
Reporting summary
Average effective tariff Average domestic water & wastewater tariff Tariff Affordability LTL/m3 LTL/m3 %
2003 2.54 3.35 3.46%
2006 2.58 3.46 3.62%
2010 2.91 3.48 3.34%
2015 3.43 3.52 3.19%
153
Aggregation Scenario Opex

EBITDA MNLTL
0.938688098 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 24 20 0 0 -
2003 26 22 0 0 -
2004 27 23 0 0 49 42 0
7 2 18
2005 27 23 0 0 0 50 41 0
9 0 18
2006 26 22 0 0 0 48 39 0
9 117
2007 28 24 0 0 0 52 41 0
11 1 19
2008 31 26 0 0 0 57 35 0
22 2 20
2009 34 28 0 0 0 62 38 0
24 2 22
2010 37 31 0 0 0 68 40 0
27 2 24
2011 40 33 0 0 0 73 42 0
30 2 26
2012 42 35 0 0 0 78 44 0
34 2 28
2013 45 38 0 0 0 83 47 0
36 2 30
2014 48 40 0 0 0 88 49 0
39 2 32
2015 51 42 0 0 0 93 52 0
42 2 34
2016 54 45 0 0 0 99 54 0
45 2 36

0 39
39 -
44 43 0
2 15 15
49 43 0
5 5 20

-13 -
0 0 0 1 -1 3 6 -
10 10 10 2 8 14 14 -
10 12 -
10 38 (28) 19 19 10 3 7 36 36
20 35 (15) 20 14 20 5 15 51 51 -
22 14 8 14 22 7 15 66 66
25 44 (19) 44 25 8 17 83 83
29 62 (33) 62 29 13 15 98 98 -
32 34 (2) 34 32 21 11 109 109
34 10 24 10 34 24 10 119 119
37 11 26 11 37 24 13 132 132
40 11 29 11 40 24 16 147 147
43 11 32 11 43 24 19 167 167

-13 -
(3) 5 7

Total debt service
0 1 -1 8
-13 1 -14 -7 3
9 2 7 21 21
10 2 8 28 28
Free cash flow

REBASED TARIFF
Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.50 2.43 2.54 2.59 2.0% 1.020 1.000 1.000 2.0% 2004 3.37 9.55 32.20 926.10 3.48% 2.64 1.9% 1.019 1.000 1.000 1.9% 2005 3.42 10.00 34.19 972.96 3.51% 2.4098 -8.6% 0.914 0.939 1.000 -4.4% 2006 3.24 10.47 33.87 1,002.15 3.38% 2.45 1.8% 1.018 0.939 1.000 7.9% 2007 3.23 10.60 34.28 1,032.21 3.32% 2.53 3.1% 1.031 0.939 1.000 9.3% 2008 3.23 10.67 34.52 1,063.18 3.25% 2.60 2.8% 1.028 0.939 1.000 9.0% 2009 3.24 10.75 34.84 1,095.08 3.18% 2.72 4.6% 1.046 0.939 1.000 9.0% 2010 3.25 10.82 35.17 1,127.93 3.12% 2.81 3.2% 1.032 0.939 1.000 7.4% 2011 3.26 10.89 35.52 1,161.77 3.06% 2.92 3.9% 1.039 0.939 1.000 7.1% 2012 3.27 10.97 35.86 1,196.62 3.00% 3.01 3.2% 1.032 0.939 1.000 6.4% 2013 3.28 11.33 37.14 1,232.52 3.01% 3.10 3.1% 1.031 0.939 1.000 6.3% 2014 3.29 11.69 38.45 1,269.49 3.03% 3.20 3.2% 1.032 0.939 1.000 6.4% 2015 3.29 11.83 38.94 1,307.58 2.98% 3.27 2.0% 1.020 0.939 1.000 6.3% 2016 3.29 11.86 39.04 1,346.81 2.90% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -146 145.59 2004 8 2005 7 2006 8 2007 7 2008 15 2009 15 2010 17 2011 15 2012 11 2013 10 2014 13 2015 16 2016 19
1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.35 9.12 30.55 882.00 3.46%
Reporting summary
2003 2.54 3.35 3.46%
2006 2.41 3.24 3.38%
2010 2.72 3.25 3.12%
2015 3.20 3.29 2.98%
154
Aggregation Scenario Capex

EBITDA MNLTL
0.993253433 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 24 20 0 0 -
2003 26 22 0 0 -
2004 27 23 0 0 49 42 0
7 2 18
2005 27 23 0 0 0 50 41 0
9 0 18
2006 28 23 0 0 0 51 40 0
11 018
2007 30 25 0 0 0 55 43 0
12 1 20
2008 33 27 0 0 0 60 38 0
22 2 22
2009 36 30 0 0 0 66 42 0
23 2 24
2010 39 33 0 0 0 71 46 0
26 2 26
2011 42 35 0 0 0 77 48 0
29 2 28
2012 45 37 0 0 0 82 50 0
33 2 30
2013 48 40 0 0 0 87 53 0
34 2 31
2014 51 42 0 0 0 93 56 0
37 2 33
2015 54 45 0 0 0 99 59 0
40 2 36
2016 57 48 0 0 0 105 61 0
44 2 38

0 39
39 -
44 43 0
2 15 15
49 43 0
5 5 20

-13 -
0 0 0 1 -1 3 6 -
10 10 10 2 8 14 14 -
10 12 -
11 37 (26) 19 19 12 3 9 38 38
20 34 (13) 20 14 21 5 16 54 54 -
22 14 8 14 22 7 15 70 70
24 42 (18) 44 26 8 18 87 87
27 59 (32) 62 30 13 17 104 104 -
31 32 (2) 34 32 21 11 115 115
32 10 23 10 33 24 9 124 124
35 10 25 11 36 24 11 135 135
38 10 28 11 39 24 15 150 150
42 11 31 11 42 24 18 168 168

-13 -
(2) 5 7

Total debt service
0 1 -1 8
-13 1 -14 -7 3
9 2 7 21 21
10 2 9 29 29
Free cash flow

REBASED TARIFF
Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.50 2.43 2.54 2.59 2.0% 1.020 1.000 1.000 2.0% 2004 3.37 9.55 32.20 926.10 3.48% 2.64 1.9% 1.019 1.000 1.000 1.9% 2005 3.42 10.00 34.19 972.96 3.51% 2.5498 -3.3% 0.967 0.993 1.000 1.2% 2006 3.42 10.47 35.84 1,002.15 3.58% 2.60 1.8% 1.018 0.993 1.000 7.9% 2007 3.42 10.60 36.27 1,032.21 3.51% 2.68 3.1% 1.031 0.993 1.000 9.3% 2008 3.42 10.67 36.52 1,063.18 3.44% 2.75 2.8% 1.028 0.993 1.000 9.0% 2009 3.43 10.75 36.87 1,095.08 3.37% 2.88 4.6% 1.046 0.993 1.000 9.0% 2010 3.44 10.82 37.22 1,127.93 3.30% 2.97 3.2% 1.032 0.993 1.000 7.4% 2011 3.45 10.89 37.58 1,161.77 3.23% 3.09 3.9% 1.039 0.993 1.000 7.1% 2012 3.46 10.97 37.95 1,196.62 3.17% 3.19 3.2% 1.032 0.993 1.000 6.4% 2013 3.47 11.33 39.30 1,232.52 3.19% 3.29 3.1% 1.031 0.993 1.000 6.3% 2014 3.48 11.69 40.68 1,269.49 3.20% 3.39 3.2% 1.032 0.993 1.000 6.4% 2015 3.48 11.83 41.20 1,307.58 3.15% 3.46 2.0% 1.020 0.993 1.000 6.3% 2016 3.48 11.86 41.31 1,346.81 3.07% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -146 145.59 2004 8 2005 7 2006 9 2007 9 2008 16 2009 15 2010 18 2011 17 2012 11 2013 9 2014 11 2015 15 2016 18
1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.35 9.12 30.55 882.00 3.46%
Reporting summary
2003 2.54 3.35 3.46%
2006 2.55 3.42 3.58%
2010 2.88 3.44 3.30%
2015 3.39 3.48 3.15%
155
Aggregation Scenario Combined

EBITDA MNLTL
0.927523231 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 24 20 0 0 -
2003 26 22 0 0 -
2004 27 23 0 0 49 42 0
7 2 18
2005 27 23 0 0 0 50 41 0
9 0 18
2006 26 22 0 0 0 48 39 0
8 117
2007 28 23 0 0 0 51 41 0
11 1 18
2008 31 26 0 0 0 56 35 0
21 2 20
2009 33 28 0 0 0 61 38 0
23 2 22
2010 36 30 0 0 0 67 40 0
27 2 24
2011 39 33 0 0 0 72 42 0
30 2 26
2012 42 35 0 0 0 77 44 0
33 2 28
2013 45 37 0 0 0 82 47 0
35 2 29
2014 47 39 0 0 0 87 49 0
38 2 31
2015 50 42 0 0 0 92 52 0
41 2 33
2016 54 45 0 0 0 98 54 0
44 2 35

0 39
39 -
44 43 0
2 15 15
49 43 0
5 5 20

-13 -
0 0 0 1 -1 3 6 -
10 10 10 2 8 14 14 -
9 12 -
9 37 (28) 19 19 10 3 7 36 36
19 34 (14) 20 14 20 5 15 51 51 -
21 14 8 14 22 7 15 66 66
25 42 (17) 44 27 8 18 84 84
28 59 (31) 62 31 13 17 102 102 -
31 32 (1) 34 33 21 12 114 114
33 10 23 10 34 24 9 123 123
36 10 26 11 36 24 12 135 135
39 10 28 11 39 24 15 150 150
42 11 31 11 43 24 19 169 169

-13 -
(3) 5 7

Total debt service
0 1 -1 8
-13 1 -14 -7 3
9 2 7 21 21
9 2 7 28 28
Free cash flow

REBASED TARIFF
Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.50 2.43 2.54 2.59 2.0% 1.020 1.000 1.000 2.0% 2004 3.37 9.55 32.20 926.10 3.48% 2.64 1.9% 1.019 1.000 1.000 1.9% 2005 3.42 10.00 34.19 972.96 3.51% 2.3811 -9.7% 0.903 0.928 1.000 -5.5% 2006 3.20 10.47 33.47 1,002.15 3.34% 2.42 1.8% 1.018 0.928 1.000 7.9% 2007 3.20 10.60 33.87 1,032.21 3.28% 2.50 3.1% 1.031 0.928 1.000 9.3% 2008 3.20 10.67 34.11 1,063.18 3.21% 2.57 2.8% 1.028 0.928 1.000 9.0% 2009 3.20 10.75 34.43 1,095.08 3.14% 2.69 4.6% 1.046 0.928 1.000 9.0% 2010 3.21 10.82 34.76 1,127.93 3.08% 2.78 3.2% 1.032 0.928 1.000 7.4% 2011 3.22 10.89 35.09 1,161.77 3.02% 2.88 3.9% 1.039 0.928 1.000 7.1% 2012 3.23 10.97 35.43 1,196.62 2.96% 2.98 3.2% 1.032 0.928 1.000 6.4% 2013 3.24 11.33 36.70 1,232.52 2.98% 3.07 3.1% 1.031 0.928 1.000 6.3% 2014 3.25 11.69 37.99 1,269.49 2.99% 3.17 3.2% 1.032 0.928 1.000 6.4% 2015 3.25 11.83 38.48 1,307.58 2.94% 3.23 2.0% 1.020 0.928 1.000 6.3% 2016 3.25 11.86 38.58 1,346.81 2.86% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -146 145.59 2004 8 2005 7 2006 7 2007 7 2008 15 2009 15 2010 18 2011 17 2012 12 2013 9 2014 12 2015 15 2016 19
1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.35 9.12 30.55 882.00 3.46%
Reporting summary
2003 2.54 3.35 3.46%
2006 2.38 3.20 3.34%
2010 2.69 3.21 3.08%
2015 3.17 3.25 2.94%
156
Marijampole Baseline
EBITDA MNLTL
1.005974849 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 9 5 0 0 -
2003 7 4 0 0 -
2004 8 4 0 0 12 11 0
1 1 2
2005 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 1 2
2006 9 5 0 0 0 14 11 0
3 13
2007 10 6 0 0 0 16 11 0
4 1 4
2008 11 6 0 0 0 17 12 0
5 1 5
2009 12 7 0 0 0 18 13 0
5 0 5
2010 12 7 0 0 0 19 14 0
6 0 5
2011 13 7 0 0 0 20 14 0
6 0 5
2012 14 7 0 0 0 21 15 0
7 0 6
2013 14 8 0 0 0 22 15 0
7 0 6
2014 15 8 0 0 0 23 16 0
7 0 6
2015 15 8 0 0 0 23 16 0
8 0 6
2016 16 8 0 0 0 24 16 0
8 0 6

0 0
-
14 16 0
2 3 3
11 13 0
3 0 3

0 0 0 0 9 7
-4 -4 -4 -4 3 3
-3 -3 -3
2 2 2 0
3 77 -
4 2 1 2 4 5 -2 11 11 -
4 2 2 2 4 5 -1 9 9
5 1 4 1 5 5 0 9 9
5 1 4 1 5 5 0 10 10
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 11 11 -
6 1 5 1 6 5 2 12 12
7 1 6 1 7 5 2 14 14
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 17 17
7 1 7 1 7 4 3 20 20
7 1 7 1 7 4 4 24 24

(74) 37 40

Total debt service
2 0 2 8 10 10
3 0 3 12 12
Free cash flow

-3 1 6
REBASED WATER TARIFF

Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.55 1.73 1.92 10.9% 1.109 1.000 1.000 10.9% 2004 3.84 9.47 36.41 1,099.93 3.31% 2.10 9.9% 1.099 1.000 1.000 9.9% 2005 3.99 9.95 39.70 1,154.93 3.44% 1.8091 -14.0% 0.860 1.006 1.000 9.6% 2006 4.15 10.34 42.96 1,212.67 3.54% 1.87 3.3% 1.033 1.006 1.000 12.5% 2007 4.30 10.64 45.75 1,273.31 3.59% 1.93 3.2% 1.032 1.006 1.000 10.2% 2008 4.44 10.88 48.36 1,336.97 3.62% 2.00 3.7% 1.037 1.006 1.000 5.7% 2009 4.59 11.07 50.83 1,403.82 3.62% 2.07 3.5% 1.035 1.006 1.000 5.1% 2010 4.74 11.23 53.19 1,474.01 3.61% 2.14 3.4% 1.034 1.006 1.000 4.7% 2011 4.89 11.35 55.48 1,547.71 3.58% 2.21 3.3% 1.033 1.006 1.000 4.3% 2012 5.04 11.45 57.71 1,625.10 3.55% 2.28 3.2% 1.032 1.006 1.000 4.0% 2013 5.15 11.53 59.33 1,706.35 3.48% 2.36 3.2% 1.032 1.006 1.000 3.8% 2014 5.25 11.59 60.90 1,791.67 3.40% 2.41 2.2% 1.022 1.006 1.000 2.6% 2015 5.36 11.64 62.43 1,881.25 3.32% 2.46 2.1% 1.021 1.006 1.000 2.5% 2016 5.47 11.68 63.93 1,975.31 3.24% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -17 17 2004 2 2005 2 2006 3 2007 -2 2008 -1 2009 -0 2010 0 2011 1 2012 2 2013 2 2014 3 2015 3 2016 4
1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.95 9.23 36.44 1,047.55 3.48%
Reporting summary
2003 1.73 3.95 3.48%
2006 1.81 4.15 3.54%
2010 2.07 4.74 3.61%
2015 2.41 5.36 3.32%
157
Aggregation Scenario opex

EBITDA MNLTL
0.932367052 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 9 5 0 0 -
2003 7 4 0 0 -
2004 8 4 0 0 12 11 0
1 1 2
2005 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 1 2
2006 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
3 03
2007 9 5 0 0 0 15 11 0
4 1 3
2008 10 6 0 0 0 16 12 0
5 1 4
2009 11 6 0 0 0 17 12 0
5 0 5
2010 12 6 0 0 0 18 12 0
6 0 5
2011 12 7 0 0 0 19 12 0
6 0 5
2012 13 7 0 0 0 20 13 0
7 0 5
2013 13 7 0 0 0 20 13 0
7 0 5
2014 14 7 0 0 0 21 14 0
8 0 6
2015 14 8 0 0 0 22 14 0
8 0 6
2016 15 8 0 0 0 22 14 0
8 0 6

0 0
-
14 16 0
2 3 3
11 13 0
3 0 3

0 0 0 0 9 7
-4 -4 -4 -4 3 3
-3 -3 -3
2 2 2 0
2 77 -
3 2 1 2 3 5 -2 10 10 -
4 2 2 2 4 5 -2 8 8
5 1 4 1 5 5 0 8 8
6 1 4 1 6 5 1 8 8
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 10 10 -
6 1 5 1 6 5 2 11 11
7 1 6 1 7 5 2 14 14
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 17 17
8 1 7 1 8 4 3 20 20
8 1 7 1 8 4 4 24 24

(75) 37 40

Total debt service
2 0 2 8 10 10
2 0 2 12 12
Free cash flow

-3 1 6

1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.95 9.23 36.44 1,047.55 3.48%
Reporting summary
2003 1.73 3.95 3.48%
2006 1.68 3.85 3.28%
2010 1.92 4.39 3.34%
2015 2.23 4.97 3.08%
158
Aggregation scenario capex

EBITDA MNLTL
0.983727498 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 9 5 0 0 -
2003 7 4 0 0 -
2004 8 4 0 0 12 11 0
1 1 2
2005 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 1 2
2006 9 5 0 0 0 14 11 0
3 13
2007 10 6 0 0 0 15 11 0
4 1 4
2008 11 6 0 0 0 17 12 0
5 1 5
2009 12 6 0 0 0 18 13 0
5 0 5
2010 12 7 0 0 0 19 14 0
5 0 5
2011 13 7 0 0 0 20 14 0
6 0 5
2012 13 7 0 0 0 21 15 0
6 0 6
2013 14 8 0 0 0 22 15 0
6 0 6
2014 15 8 0 0 0 22 16 0
7 0 6
2015 15 8 0 0 0 23 16 0
7 0 6
2016 15 8 0 0 0 24 16 0
7 0 6

0 0
-
14 16 0
2 3 3
11 13 0
3 0 3

0 0 0 0 9 7
-4 -4 -4 -4 3 3
-3 -3 -3
2 2 2 0
2 73 -
3 2 1 2 3 5 -2 14 14 -
4 2 2 2 4 5 -2 13 13
5 1 3 1 5 5 0 12 12
5 1 4 1 5 5 0 12 12
5 1 4 1 6 5 1 13 13 -
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 14 14
6 1 5 1 6 5 2 16 16
7 1 6 1 7 4 2 18 18
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 21 21
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 24 24

(71) 37 40

Total debt service
2 0 2 8 10 10
6 0 6 16 16
Free cash flow

-3 1 6

1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.95 9.23 36.44 1,047.55 3.48%
Reporting summary
2003 1.73 3.95 3.48%
2006 1.77 4.06 3.46%
2010 2.02 4.63 3.53%
2015 2.35 5.24 3.24%
159
Aggregation scenario combined

EBITDA MNLTL
0.910119701 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 9 5 0 0 -
2003 7 4 0 0 -
2004 8 4 0 0 12 11 0
1 1 2
2005 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 1 2
2006 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 03
2007 9 5 0 0 0 14 11 0
3 1 3
2008 10 6 0 0 0 16 12 0
4 1 4
2009 11 6 0 0 0 17 12 0
5 0 4
2010 11 6 0 0 0 18 12 0
6 0 5
2011 12 6 0 0 0 18 12 0
6 0 5
2012 12 7 0 0 0 19 13 0
6 0 5
2013 13 7 0 0 0 20 13 0
7 0 5
2014 13 7 0 0 0 21 14 0
7 0 6
2015 14 7 0 0 0 21 14 0
7 0 6
2016 14 8 0 0 0 22 14 0
7 0 6

0 0
-
14 16 0
2 3 3
11 13 0
3 0 3

0 0 0 0 9 7
-4 -4 -4 -4 3 3
-3 -3 -3
2 2 2 0
2 73 -
3 2 0 2 3 5 -2 13 13 -
3 2 2 2 4 5 -2 11 11
5 1 3 1 5 5 -1 11 11
5 1 4 1 5 5 0 11 11
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 12 12 -
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 13 13
6 1 6 1 6 5 2 15 15
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 18 18
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 21 21
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 24 24

(71) 37 40

Total debt service
2 0 2 8 10 10
6 0 6 15 15
Free cash flow

-3 1 6

Enterprise cash flows Enterprise Masterplan value Net Present value: mnLTL Target NPV Rebased Average Effective Tariff Annual change in rebased Water Charge Required indexation of Water Charge Cumulative Water Charge Indexation Overwrite Tariff Indexation Growth in Total Revenues (net of bad debt) MNLTL MNLTL 0.00 0.00 LTL/m3 % nr nr nr % 2.55 1.73 1.92 10.9% 1.109 1.000 1.000 10.9% 2004 3.84 9.47 36.41 1,099.93 3.31% 2.10 9.9% 1.099 1.000 1.000 9.9% 2005 3.99 9.95 39.70 1,154.93 3.44% 1.6367 -22.2% 0.778 0.910 1.000 -0.8% 2006 3.76 10.34 38.86 1,212.67 3.20% 1.69 3.3% 1.033 0.910 1.000 12.5% 2007 3.89 10.64 41.39 1,273.31 3.25% 1.75 3.2% 1.032 0.910 1.000 10.2% 2008 4.02 10.88 43.75 1,336.97 3.27% 1.81 3.7% 1.037 0.910 1.000 5.7% 2009 4.15 11.07 45.98 1,403.82 3.28% 1.87 3.5% 1.035 0.910 1.000 5.1% 2010 4.29 11.23 48.12 1,474.01 3.26% 1.94 3.4% 1.034 0.910 1.000 4.7% 2011 4.42 11.35 50.19 1,547.71 3.24% 2.00 3.3% 1.033 0.910 1.000 4.3% 2012 4.56 11.45 52.21 1,625.10 3.21% 2.07 3.2% 1.032 0.910 1.000 4.0% 2013 4.66 11.53 53.68 1,706.35 3.15% 2.13 3.2% 1.032 0.910 1.000 3.8% 2014 4.75 11.59 55.10 1,791.67 3.08% 2.18 2.2% 1.022 0.910 1.000 2.6% 2015 4.85 11.64 56.48 1,881.25 3.00% 2.22 2.1% 1.021 0.910 1.000 2.5% 2016 4.95 11.68 57.84 1,975.31 2.93% 2000 2001 2002 2003 -17 17 2004 2 2005 2 2006 6 2007 -2 2008 -2 2009 -1 2010 0 2011 1 2012 1 2013 2 2014 3 2015 3 2016 3
1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.95 9.23 36.44 1,047.55 3.48%
Reporting summary
2003 1.73 3.95 3.48%
2006 1.64 3.76 3.20%
2010 1.87 4.29 3.26%
2015 2.18 4.85 3.00%
160
Aggregation scenario combined with 1% WACC premium

EBITDA MNLTL
0.921276941 2000 0 0 0 0 0
-
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 9 5 0 0 -
2003 7 4 0 0 -
2004 8 4 0 0 12 11 0
1 1 2
2005 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 1 2
2006 8 5 0 0 0 13 11 0
2 03
2007 9 5 0 0 0 15 11 0
4 1 3
2008 10 6 0 0 0 16 12 0
4 1 4
2009 11 6 0 0 0 17 12 0
5 0 5
2010 11 6 0 0 0 18 12 0
6 0 5
2011 12 7 0 0 0 19 12 0
6 0 5
2012 13 7 0 0 0 19 13 0
6 0 5
2013 13 7 0 0 0 20 13 0
7 0 5
2014 14 7 0 0 0 21 14 0
7 0 6
2015 14 7 0 0 0 21 14 0
7 0 6
2016 14 8 0 0 0 22 14 0
8 0 6

0 0
-
14 16 0
2 3 3
11 13 0
3 0 3

0 0 0 0 9 7
-4 -4 -4 -4 3 3
-3 -3 -3
2 2 2 0
2 73 -
3 2 1 2 3 5 -2 13 13 -
4 2 2 2 4 5 -2 12 12
5 1 3 1 5 5 0 11 11
6 1 4 1 6 5 0 12 12
6 1 5 1 6 5 1 13 13 -
6 1 5 1 6 5 2 14 14
7 1 6 1 7 5 2 17 17
7 1 6 1 7 4 3 19 19
7 1 7 1 7 4 3 23 23
7 1 7 1 7 4 4 26 26

(71) 37 40

Total debt service
2 0 2 8 10 10
6 0 6 15 15
Free cash flow

-3 1 6

1.000 1.000

2000
2001
2002
2003 3.95 9.23 36.44 1,047.55 3.48%
Reporting summary
2003 1.73 3.95 3.48%
2006 1.66 3.80 3.24%
2010 1.90 4.34 3.30%
2015 2.20 4.91 3.04%
161
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ANNEX 6 REGULATORY DATA COLLECTION
The table below is referred to in a discussion on Performance Reporting, in Chapter 9. Table A6.1
Data DATA COLLECTED EVERY FIVE YEARS
Regulatory Data Collection

Purpose To provide a baseline view of the assets utilised, their condition and performance and the companys expenditure projections for providing services over the five-year period. Comments Units
Water and sewerage service Detailed asset inventory The assets are divided between infrastructure (i.e. underground assets), non-infrastructure (i.e. surface assets) and others (surplus land, vehicles, etc.). Typical sub-divisions would then be water mains (or sewers) of different size bands and materials, treatment works of different size band and treatment type, pumping stations, dams and reservoirs, offices, workshops, etc. The number or length of each asset is reported together with the asset value, expressed in terms of modern equivalent asset value (MEAV). Asset condition and performance The condition and performance of each asset group included in the inventory is described in terms of a defined condition or performance grade. The overall performance of the assets can then be described in terms of the percentage in each grade and the upgrading proposed improvements expressed in terms of the changes in these percentages. Number, length, percentage, LITAS Number, length, LITAS
____________________
Modern equivalent asset value (MEAV): This is the cost of a modern asset which would provide the service required. The Regulator needs to assess the level of investment required to maintain services. The cost of an obsolete type of asset would be of limited use in this assessment. By using the modern equivalent, assets of obsolete types or materials can be valued in up-to-date terms. Similarly, because many water assets have very long lives, the initial cost bears little resemblance to current costs (even after correcting for inflation). The MEAV concept using current cost data provides the Regulator with better information on current expenditure requirements than would historic cost data.
5
163
Data Performance gap
Purpose
Comments The difference between current performance (described in the condition and performance report above) and the performance required by regulations or stated in the concession contract. Expressed in terms of lengths of pipeline in unsatisfactory condition, numbers of treatment works with unacceptable performance, leakage levels, numbers of flooding incidents, numbers of properties not yet connected to the water or sewer systems, etc.
Units Number, length, percentage
Unit costs of capital works ("cost base")
Costs of constructing typical items of work, such as a length of pipeline in a specified size, depth and material; the connection of a property to the water/sewer system; the construction of a treatment works of specified size and complexity; etc. The company's investment cost estimates must be consistent with these standard costs. The regulator can then compare costs with published price data and assess changes over time.
Anticipated operational and capital expenditures
The estimated operating costs and the capital cost of closing the performance gap (capital maintenance and capital enhancement).
DATA COLLECTED ANNUALLY
To monitor the performance of the company during the previous year, enabling the Regulator to assess the progress of the 5year investment programme and the levels of service achieved during the year.
Water Service Base data Properties and population served, bills issued To provide details of the customer base (for use in subsequent data analysis). Initial properties and populations are reported together with changes over the year. Data are sub-divided between households (i.e. domestic) and non-households (i.e. commercial and industrial). Summer and Winter population figures may also be required if there are significant variations. High-use customers To provide details of significant industrial demands. Sub-divided between users with consumption less than 50 Ml/year, between 50 and 150, from 50 to 250, and greater than 250 Ml/year. Reported in terms of the numbers of users and the volumes supplied. Number, Ml/d Number
164
Data Source water types
Purpose
Comments The total number of sources and distribution input are divided between the various sources (impounding reservoirs, river abstraction and boreholes).
Units Number, percentage
Treatment types
To provide a measure of the treatment facilities utilised by the company. To provide a measure of the topography of the area supplied, which is a key determinant of operational cost.
The total number of treatment works and distribution input is divided by size and type of works {nine size bands and five treatment types) Reported as the average pumping head for resources/treatment, the average head for the distribution network and the average for the entire area supplied.
Number, percentage
Pumping head
m.
Key outputs Water delivered This is the principal output of the company. Sub-divided between households {i.e. domestic) and non-households (i.e. commercial and industrial). Details may also be provided of the water balance, i.e. the input to the distribution network, estimated distribution losses, estimated customer losses, per capita consumption, etc. Leakage reduction and water saving To assess measures taken to promote the efficient use of water by the company and customers. The extent of water lost due to leakage and measures taken to reduce losses are monitored. Availability of water resources To identify the population at risk of restrictions on water use and the duration of those restrictions. The company should define a reference level for restrictions {expressed in terms of the frequency of drought restrictions, the frequency of use of standpipes and/or rota cuts, the frequency of bans on bulk discharge devices such as sprinklers and hosepipes; etc.) and must report the numbers of customers whose supplies are at risk of falling below the reference level. Sub-divided into drought restrictions, standpipes/rota cuts, sprinkler bans, etc. Percentage of customers Sub-divided into water saving audits undertaken, water saving devices installed, cost of water saving initiatives, savings achieved/anticipated, etc. Number, LITAS Ml/d
Restrictions on use of water
To assess the extent of problems experienced lack or resources or losses. To assess problems of low water pressure experienced by customers. To assess the extent of supply interruptions experienced by customers.
Percentage of customers Number
Properties receiving pressure/flow below reference level
The company should define a reference level for pressure at which water will be supplied at normal demand levels and must report the numbers of customers whose supplies are at risk of failing to meet this standard. Sub-divided into planned and unplanned interruptions and durations of 6, 12 and 24 hours.
Properties affected by supply interruptions
Number
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Data Water quality volumes subject to action to improve water quality Activities Mains activities
Purpose To monitor water quality problems and the action taken to resolve the problems.
Comments Sub-divided between water quality determinand (e.g. nitrates, pesticides, iron and/or manganese at treatment works, total/faecal conforms, etc.).
Units Mi/d
This provides a measure of improvements made to the system during the year. It can be compared with the capital expenditure incurred.
The total length of unlined iron pipeline is subdivided between pipes with no change during the year, new pipes and pipes refined renewed or abandoned. Pipes requiring renewal in the near future may also be reported to provide information on future investment requirements. Data may also be sub-divided by pipe size. Only data for unlined iron pipes are required under this item, as this is the major material likely to require attention.
Km
Mains bursts
This provides a measure of the structural integrity of the distribution network.
Reported in terms of the number of bursts per 1000 km of main.
Number
Sewerage Service Properties and population served, bills issued To provide details of the customer base (for use in subsequent data analysis). Initial properties and populations are reported together with changes over the year. Data are sub-divided between households (i.e. domestic) and non-households (i.e. commercial and industrial). Also properties receiving treatment and those not. Summer and Winter population figures may also be required if there are significant variations. Sewage loads Population and annual loads sub-divided between domestic, trade, septic tank and cesspool wastes. The total load entering the sewer system, sub-divided between the load receiving preliminary treatment only and that receiving primary treatment or better, may also be collected. Loads are expressed in terms of BOD and COD (biological oxygen demand and chemical oxygen demand). Average COD and SS (suspended solids) may be reported to facilitate checks on trade effluent tariffs. Number, tonnes Number
166
Data Length of sewers
Purpose
Comments The total sewer length is sub-divided by size and material. It is also divided between "critical" and "noncritical" sewers, where critical sewers are the most important sewers in the system, identified on the basis of failure risk. The number of CSOs (combined sewer overflows) may also be reported, sub-divided between satisfactory and unsatisfactory overflows.
Units
Treatment types
To provide a measure of the treatment facilities utilised by the company. To provide a measure of the sludge disposal routes utilised by the company.
The total number of treatment works and treatment capacity (BOD) is divided by size and type of works (six size bands and six treatment types). The total sludge produced is sub-divided between disposal route (e.g. farmland, land-fill, incineration, sea, etc.). Proportion of sludge disposed of in an unsatisfactory manner may also be reported to provide information on future investment requirements. Sludge load is reported in terms of total dry solids.
Number, tonnes
Sludge disposal
Tonnes, percentage
Key outputs Sewage collected This is the principal output of the company. Sub-divided between domestic sewage, trade effluent and tankered wastes (e.g. septic tank and cesspool waste). In the absence of measured volumes of sewage, it is common practice to assume a fixed proportion of water supplied (say 95%) is returned to the sewer system. Properties affected by flooding from sewers To assess the extent of flooding from sewers experienced by customers. To assess the number of customers at risk of flooding from sewers. Sub-divided into cellars and ground level flooding (internal and external) and the various reasons for flooding (e.g. overloaded sewers, blockages/collapses, equipment failure, third party causes, etc.). Sub-divided into likely frequency of flooding (e.g. more than twice in ten years, more than once in ten (but not twice); not more than once in ten years). Number Ml/d
Properties at risk of flooding from sewers Activities Sewer activities
Number
This provides a measure of improvements made to the system during the year. It can be compared with the capital expenditure incurred.
The total lengths of critical and non-critical sewers are sub-divided between sewers with no change during the year, new sewers and sewers renovated, replaced or abandoned. The total length of sewer condition surveys undertaken (generally by CCTV or "man-entry" inspection) is also reported. Sewers requiring attention in the near future may also be reported to provide information on future investment requirements.
Km
167
Data Sewer collapses
Purpose This provides a measure of the structural integrity of the sewer system.
Comments Reported in terms of the number of collapses per 1000 km of sewer. Pumping main bursts should also be reported.
Units Number
Customer Service Key outputs Response to Billing contacts To assess the effectiveness of the company's procedures for dealing with billing enquiries from customers. To assess the effectiveness of the company's procedures for dealing with written complaints from customers (or from customers' representative bodies). This covers the proportion of customers who receive bills for metered accounts during the report year based on actual meter readings and the proportion based on estimates. To assess the ease with which customers can make telephone contact with the company. The total number of calls is sub-divided between those answered within fifteen seconds, between fifteen and thirty, more than thirty seconds and those which were abandoned before they were answered. Number, percentage The total number of enquiries is sub-divided between the numbers responded to within two days, between two and five, five and ten, ten and twenty, and more than twenty days. Number, percentage
Response to written complaints
The total number of complaints is sub-divided between the numbers responded to within two days, between two and five, five and ten, ten and twenty, and more than twenty days.
Number, percentage
Bills for metered customers
Telephone contact
Payments to customers for failure to provide adequate service
Financial data Profit and loss account To provide an overview of the year-on-year financial health of the company. To provide an overview of the assets utilised by the company. Standard financial data are reported (e.g. turnover, operating costs, other costs and income, taxation, operating profit, dividend payments, retained profit, etc.). Standard financial data are reported (e.g. fixed assets, working capital, investments, debtors, creditors, share capital, etc.). LITAS
Balance sheet
LITAS
168
Data Breakdown of operating costs
Purpose To provide further details of annual expenditure.
Comments Annual costs of the water and sewerage services are each sub-divided between opex (operational expenditure) and capital maintenance capex (capital expenditure), (the capex required to replace assets as they reach the end of their useful lives). Opex is further divided between items such as employment costs, power, materials and consumables, laboratory services, customer services, etc. Capital maintenance is further divided between items such as underground asset renewals (infrastructure renewals), surface asset depreciation (non-infrastructure depreciation), etc.
Units LITAS
Breakdown of total costs
This includes opex and capital maintenance as described above plus capital enhancement capex (the capex required to create assets to provide higher levels of service). Capital enhancement is sub-divided between the various categories of service enhancement (e.g. water and environmental quality, other levels of service (services to existing customers), supply/demand balance (services to new customers), etc. The water and environmental quality expenditure may be further sub-divided between the various statutory requirements (e.g. nitrate, pesticide and lead removal in water supplies; enhanced protection of inland and coastal waters, etc.).
LITAS
Breakdown of operating income
To provide further details of annual income. To provide financial details of the asset base.
Annual incomes of the water and sewerage services are each sub-divided between water supply/sewerage revenues, trade effluent charges, sale of assets, etc. Initial values of the assets are reported together with changes over the year. The assets are divided between infrastructure {i.e. underground assets), non-infrastructure (i.e. surface assets) and others (surplus land, vehicles, etc.). Details are reported in terms of replacement costs of infrastructure assets and depreciation charges and "net book values" of noninfrastructure assets. Changes in the asset stock are sub-divided between capital maintenance changes (infrastructure renewals and non-infrastructure depreciation) and capital enhancement (new assets to provide enhanced levels of service). New non-infrastructure assets are also subdivided by asset life (e.g. very short (vehicles & computers), short (ICA, telemetry, mobile machinery), medium (mechanical and electrical equipment), long (buildings and civil engineering structures).
LITAS
Breakdown of fixed assets utilised
LITAS
169
Data Other financial information
Purpose
Comments Breakdown of working capital (stocks, creditors, debtors, etc.). Movement on current cost reserves (fixed assets, working capital, grants, etc.). Cash-flow statement (net revenues, investment income, finance servicing costs, new investments & debts, etc.).
Units LITAS
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ANNEX 7 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF REGULATION
The following review was undertaken by the consultants consortium (of which WRc were part) preparing a study for the establishment of a regulator in Bulgaria6. The script has been edited and updated. Argentina (Buenos Aires) In Buenos Aires and surrounding districts, the water and wastewater services have been privatised using a concession contract. A tripartite regulator provides economic regulation of the contract. This tripartite regulator is established under a formal agreement between the City of Buenos Aires, the Municipalities and central government. There was extensive debate as to whether the regulator should be set up under a National Congress Law or whether it could be established by a Government decree. In the event, a document was approved by a decree. This document satisfied the complicated technical, legal, economic and political requirements of the various groups involved in implementing the proposed reforms in the water sector. The government decree actually served two purposes: it established the regulatory instrument and also established the process under which the concession contract would be conducted. The regulator, called Entre Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS), is responsible for regulating the following: price cap (tariffs); investment/expansion; efficiency; public relations; customer code/levels of service; inspection of assets; and quality control.
ETOSS utilises independent consultants to carry out technical audit and certification services, as used by Ofwat in England and Wales. Australia Australia is a federation made up of 8 states and territories. The water systems are state government owned and operated. The regulatory bodies are also divisions within the same state governments. Of the 384 water utilities supplying potable water throughout Australia, only two are currently operated by the private sector. A small number are corporatised, but the majority are either state or local government bodies.
World Bank Regulation in Water and Wastewater 2001; Halcrow Group Limited, in association with WRc, KPMG, Norton Rose and ANISA
171
The water industry has been undergoing reform in recent years. The National Competition Council has announced that: Most jurisdictions have successfully separated utility service provision from regulatory functions and introduced a commercial focus for their utilities. Water corporations have begun returning significant dividends to government owners. All jurisdictions have made progress on the pricing commitments. As a consequence consumers' water and sewerage bills have generally fallen. Water rights are being separated from land rights with a consequential increase in the tradeability of those rights. The trade of allocations assists sustainable resource use by ensuring that the resource goes to the highest economic value use. The problems associated with stressed rivers and associated environmental priorities are being dealt with by establishing environmental flow requirements, strategies for reducing withdrawals from over-allocated systems, support for integrated catchment management approaches and implementation of the National Water Quality Strategy. In all jurisdictions, particularly in NSW and Victoria, community groups are involved in the management of water resources. South Australia In South Australia, SA Water carries out service provision. SA Water is a corporatised entity and the Board of Directors reports directly to the State Minister of Government Enterprises. In 1996, SA Water entered into a 15-year contract to outsource the management of the provision of water and wastewater services for the city of Adelaide. The concessionaire is a private company, United Water. United Water does not have any involvement in the tariff setting process. The contract includes for a fixed and variable fee, which is adjusted every five years to give recognition to any productivity gains made during the period. There are also several BOOT contracts for treatment works with another private company, River Water. The Board of SA Water proposes tariff changes directly to the State Ministry of Government Enterprises, together with any justification for the proposed changes. The Minister may take advice from the Competition Commissioner, before making a recommendation to the State Cabinet who make the final decision. Each state has established an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA is a corporatised entity with a Board operating independently of the state government. The State EPA issues licences for discharges to the environment. The EPA can impose penalties for any breaches of the licence conditions. The EPA relies heavily on SA Water to test samples for monitoring purposes, although it does have a testing facility on its own. However, the Minister responsible for the EPA makes the final decisions on whether prosecutions should proceed. Drinking water quality is self-regulating with SA Water managing its own sampling programme to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements. The Department of Human Services is the competent authority with respect to public health issues. If SA Water allowed water to be supplied that was unfit for human consumption, this department would be responsible for investigation and actioning the incident. The department does not carry out any routine monitoring.
172
New South Wales New South Wales has established an independent regulator called the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). IPART is a multi-utility regulator functioning as a tribunal, holding public meetings and making final decisions taking into account "the protection of consumers from the abuse of monopoly power", "the appropriate rate of return-on assets" and "the need to promote competition"7. IPART is empowered, under the IPART Act, to determine maximum tariffs and to carry out periodic reviews of tariff policies. IPART may involve public participation by advertising public hearings, seeking public comments on terms of reference, providing public access to submissions, inviting public comment on issues and submissions, holding public seminars and workshops, releasing reports and determinations to the public and public reporting of compliance by agencies. When making determinations and recommendations, IPART is required to consider a range of issues, which can be grouped as follows: * Consumer protection: tariffs, tariff policies and standards of service, general inflation of tariffs, social impact of decisions; * Economic efficiency: greater efficiency in the supply of services, impact of exercise of functions by some other body, the next to promote competition; * Financial stability: rate of return on assets, impact of borrowing, capital and dividend requirements; and * Environmental and other standards: protection of environment by appropriate tariff policies, considerations of demand management, standards of quality, reliability and safety. IPART recently rejected a tariff increase proposed by Sydney Water on the basis of ineffective use of its capital funds, which led to a public debate on acceptable commercial rates of return for capital investment. There is no mechanism currently in place for decisions of IPART to be appealed in relation to water, although such mechanisms do exist under the national gas and electricity codes for those sections. Western Australia In 1996 Western Australia had a re-organisation of its water industry. The Water Corporation is the major service provider and was established from the Water Authority of Western Australia. Two regulatory bodies were also established. The Water and Rivers Commission provides management protective regulatory functions, whilst the Office of Water Regulation administers a licensing scheme for both the Water Corporation and other water service providers. The licensing scheme involves a set of service quality standards.
IPART Act 1992, Section 15.1
173
Victoria Victoria established an Office of the Regulator General (ORG) in 1994. It is set up as a single person, multi-utility regulator. The ORG's objectives, as set out in the Office of the Regulator General Act 1994, are: To promote competitive market conduct; To prevent misuse of monopoly or market power; To facilitate entry into the relevant market; To facilitate efficiency in regulated industries; and To ensure that users and consumers benefit from competition and efficiency.
ORG does not set tariffs for the electricity, gas and water sectors. Tariffs are controlled directly by the State Government. A three-person appeal body appointed by the Minister may hear appeals from decisions of ORG. The appeal must be decided within 14 days. Appeals are limited to those based on bias or misinterpretation of facts. Chile The water section in Chile is currently composed of 53 service companies, which are mainly regional and provide both drinking water and waste water services. In 1988/9, laws were passed which: Established the system of concession and operation of the water services, regulated the relations between the concessionaire companies, the state and the consumers, and structured the control of the sector; Authorised the State to develop entrepreneurial activities in relation to drinking water and waste water and the formation of joint stock companies regulated by the rules applying to open companies; Created the Superintendence of Sanitation Services (SISS); Established subsidy for payment of the consumption of drinking water and use of waste water services, to the benefit of consumers on low incomes; and Established the tariff system regulating the sector.
In 1997 state companies represented about 92% of customers in the country and coverage of service in these companies about 99% for drinking water and 91% for sewerage. However, only about 17% of the sewage collected received any treatment. The private sector owned certain companies and also participated in the development of services through service contracts, management contracts (with investment), BOOT contracts, and partial concession contracts in respect to certain aspects of the service or a geographical area.
174
The regulatory framework was further updated in 1998 with new legislation that: Established rules applying to all of the companies in the sector, whether privately or publicly owned, with regard to concessions, tariffs, development plans and quality of service; Provided greater powers for SISS to supervise the fulfilment of the commitments of the service providers (development plans, levels of quality of the water and of the service). Regulations on the quality of service were introduced and the amount of the penalties for failure to comply was significantly increased. Introduced improvements in the tariff fixing process and reduced the fixed component of tariff charges; Established safeguards to avoid a concentration of ownership between water and wastewater companies and the concessions of different monopolistic services; and Determined the percentage of participation of the State in the ownership that could be transferred to the private sectors (a maximum of 65%, more if the State is not involved in increases in capital contributions).
In addition to SISS: The National Health Service and the General Direction of Waters (DGA) manages water resources at a national level and form dates water rights. The DGA reports to the Ministry of Public Works (MOP). The National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) is responsible for applying State policy on environmental issues. CONAMA is responsible for all environmental regulation and operates through Regional Commissions of the Environment. It reports to the Ministry of the General Secretariat of the Presidency; The Ministry of Economics, through the System of Administration of Companies (SAE), regulates and administers those companies that remain primarily under public ownership. The SAE appoints the Boards, controls meetings and sets policies. The Ministry of Finance authorises any external debt in relation to state owned companies. The state budgeting rules also constrain the financing of public companies through controls over divided policy, budget allocations, reinvestment of funds and borrowing. The SISS is a decentralised entity with financial independence. It reports to the President through the MOP. The Superintendent is the head of SISS and is appointed by the President for an indefinite term. Responsibility for setting tariffs rests with the SISS. However, tariffs do not become official until the Ministry of Economics issues a decree. Resolutions of the SISS can be contested before the SISS itself. Further appeals can be heard before the Chilean Courts of Justice.
Subsidies have been established under the law. These subsidies relate to drinking water and wastewater for low-income families. The Municipalities pay the subsidies to the companies concessionaires. The Municipalities receive funds from the State for this purpose. The rules on subsidies state that the percentage of the bill to be subsidised may not be less than 25%,
175
nor higher than 85% of the total of the monthly account of the customer up to a consumption of 20m3. The subsidy must be equal for all beneficiaries of the region who are subject to the same tariff and have a similar economic situation. The subsidies are only payable for a period of three years. England and Wales This section only relates to the situation in England and Wales. In 1989, the UK Government passed the Water Act (WA), which provided the necessary provisions for privatisation of the ten Water Authorities in England and Wales and enabled the Secretary of State (SoS) to issue Instruments of Appointment to the respective undertakers. Undertakers may be water and sewerage companies (the privatised Water Authorities) or water only companies (pre-existing private companies. The relevant SoS is the SoS for the Environment in relation to English companies and the SoS for Wales in relation to the Welsh companies. The Instruments of Appointment (licences) set out the appointees' areas of operation and also include the conditions of appointment that the undertakers much comply with. The WA 1989 also set up the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), under a Director General, as the economic regulator for the ten water and sewerage companies formed under the Act, together with a number of already privately - owned water only companies. The Secretary of State appoints the Director General of Ofwat for a fixed term, which may be renewable. The Director is able to exercise wide discretionary powers in order to undertake his duties. Whilst he is politically independent, recent legislative changes have resulted in the Director being required to take account of ministerial guidance in the performance of his duties. The Director requires companies to submit Business Plans every five years. The Director reviews the Business Plans in order to determine the price limits for the next five-year period. The price limits are set to give the companies incentives to be come more efficient. Increased efficiency results in more profits, which are shared with shareholders and customers. In the event of a relevant change in circumstance or notified item significantly altering the assumptions made at the time of the periodic review, companies may apply for interim determinations to restore the status quo. The companies submit annual reports that enable Ofwat to monitor the performance of each company in relation to various aspects of service delivery. In addition to investment levels and compliance with drinking water and environmental standards, the companies also report on performance against nine levels of service indicates. The data provided by the companies have to be independently audited by technical auditors (called Reporters) to verify the information and to ensure that it has been collected and reported satisfactorily. Ofwat publishes a series of reports annually to distribute the information obtained from the companies. The WA 1989 set up a National Rivers Authority (NRA) to act as the environmental regulator in relation to water. The Water Authorities had been responsible for these functions in addition to service provision. They thus acted as "poacher and gamekeeper". The regulatory departments of the Water Authorities were split off from the operational companies and formed the nucleus of the NRA. The NRA was empowered to issue licences for abstraction of water from surface and ground water sources. It was also made responsible for licensing discharges of wastewater into controlled waters, as defined in the Act. In 1995, the Environment Act was passed and the Environment Agency (EA) was established by the amalgamation of the NRA, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution and local authority waste regulatory authorities. The EA thus has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing
176
environmental standards in all environmental media (air, land and water). The Drinking Water Inspectorate, which is responsible for monitoring the quality of potable water, was not included in the EA. A close working relationship is required between Ofwat, EA and DWI. During the periodic review process, the EA and DWI are required to work with the companies to identify improvements necessary to ensure compliance with EU Directives. The quality regulators are required to approve the list of improvements, which Ofwat then reviews and ensures that adequate funding is made available to complete this work. In monitoring compliance, the EA takes a significant number of statutory samples. The companies take additional samples for operational purposes. Performance is measured based on 95% compliance of the statutory samples with the licensed consent. Failure to comply with the consents can lead to prosecution under Section 85 of the Water Resources Act 1991. The DWI relies mainly on the data submitted by the companies, but carries out extensive audits of the operations and procedures and investigates customer complaints. Where water quality fails to meet the standards, the DWI can order the companies to effect remedial measures. France France is divided into 21 Administrative Regions. There are 96 Departments, each administered by an elected general council. In total there are about 37,000 Local communities, each with an elected municipal council. These municipalities have powers for ensuring public order, security and health. Water and wastewater services are a municipal responsibility. The services may be managed directly, in conjunction with other municipalities or sub-contracted to a private undertaking. Most municipalities have entered into concessions or lease-type (affermage) contracts with private companies. There are three major operators Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, SAUR and Vivendi. There is no national regulation of these operations. The contracts are administered at the municipal level. There is, however, a national audit agency (the Cour des Comptes) responsible for reviewing these contracts to ensure that there are no irregularities in the award. Over the last few years, several cases of corruption have received major publicity. Environmental regulation is the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment. This ministry is also responsible for management of water resources. There are six river basin agencies. The responsibilities of these agencies include: Collection of service charges from local communities for services provided; Re-investment of the revenue on improvements in the service and in protection of water resources; Review of plans and conflicts of interest regarding implementation of the Water Law, using consultative committees set up in each river basin area; and Pollution control.
Under the Control of Pollution Law 1964, the State may determine standards and codes of practice and prohibit the use of certain substances.
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In addition to the Ministry of Environment, there are a number of other government departments having an interest in aspects of water. To enable efficient liaison between these organisations, a National Committee for Water has been established. Germany Water and wastewater services are predominantly publicly run. Water is considered to be a common resource, the management of which is subject to collective and democratic decisionmaking. These decision-making powers are divided between the federal parliament, the 16 federal states and the local municipal authorities. Generally, framework legislation is enacted at the federal level. The key legislation relating to water supply and wastewater disposal is the Federal Water Act 1957, as amended in 1996. Each state then provides the detailed requirements as appropriate to its area. The municipalities are responsible within this structure for the provision of water supply and wastewater services and are responsible for the local environment. Generally the water and wastewater activities are managed separately for each other on a single function basis. There are a large number (over 15,000) of different organisations providing water and/or wastewater services. Economic regulation is vested in the municipalities. The municipalities impose and enforce service standards set in conformity to Federal and State requirements. The municipalities also control tariffs, either directly for companies operating under public law or through management or concession contracts for independent companies. Water suppliers and municipal councillors set the water tariffs. As the councillors act as political representatives of the consumers, both suppliers and users achieve agreement on tariffs. As the municipal councils are usually the major shareholders they control the level of prices. Consequently, state authorities can investigate whether tariff increases are justified under the legislation against monopoly abuse. Environmental legislation is formulated at Federal level and implemented and monitored at state level. The Federal Ministry of the Environment carries out Federal duties and the Federal Environment Agency and State Environment Offices enforce regulations. A system of licences has been set up and monitoring and enforcement is generally effective. There is a well-defined system of penalties for failure to comply with the licence conditions. Water resource management regulation is within the remit of the States and municipalities. The municipalities and the operators monitor water abstractions and effluent discharges and the collection of charges. A Joint Water Commission of the Federal States (LAWA) has been set up to co-ordinate common problems and to handle legislative instruments. Whilst the decisions and recommendations of LAWA are not legally enforceable, the co-operative approach has achieved common reporting procedures and brought about a convergence on water resource protection and management. Italy The Galli Law, enacted in 1994, set up a mechanism whereby the 8,075 municipal administrations could be rationalised into 100-120 water areas. The whole water cycle should be managed as an integrated organisation and the water areas should be loosely based on natural river basins. The law allows a more entrepreneurial approach to the management of
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the water industry. Operating licences can be granted to either public or private companies following a competitive tendering process. Mixed companies are the most popular model (with 51% ownership by the municipality or area authority). Under the 1994 legislation the regulatory bodies responsible for the water industry are: The Ministry of Public Works, through the Supervising Committee for the use of Water Resources. The Area Authority to co-ordinate, control and define tariffs within each Water Area. The regional administrative tribunals, at first instance, and the ordinary Law Courts, at second instance, as the competent appeal bodies for disputes arising from granting of concessions by public bidding. The move to competitive bidding has not yet generally been effected. Consequently licences are granted by councils and province's. For these licences, the competent appeals body at second instance is the State Council.
There has been considerable delay in the implementation of the Galli Law Provisions. All of the Italian Regions had adopted the necessary regional legislation governing the co-operation between the local entities for the establishment and functioning of the Water Areas by the end of 1999. There have, however, been significant problems in drafting the co-operation agreements within the defined Water Areas. There has also been opposition from the incumbent operators who benefit from the existing arrangements. The Galli Law also defined new tariff arrangements, based on price cap criteria. The tariff should reflect the nature of the resources, the quality of the service provided, the investment needed to improve the service, operating costs, a return on capitol invested and productivity gains. The tariff is to be defined at Water Area level. Unfortunately, in view of the delays in implementing these reforms, many areas still use a cost - plus approach, whereby each year the old tariff adjusted for new investment, increased productivity and inflation. The public health authorities regulate drinking water quality. There is no national organisation responsible. Environmental regulation is carried out at regional level. However, Italy does not have a good record in the enforcement of EU environmental regulations. Poland Water and wastewater services in Poland are primarily the responsibility of the municipal service sector. This sector also deals with housing stock management, district heating, solid waste management, green areas, roads and municipal transport. There are approximately 300 water and wastewater utilities serving cities and towns in Poland. A large proportion of these (70%) are organised as Commercial Code Companies, whilst a further 12% are managed as in-house budgetary enterprises. Municipal associations are often formed where a single water and wastewater utility serves multiple ,municipalities. Commercial code companies can recover depreciation and profit in tariffs and can reserve funds for investment.
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There is no central regulatory authority responsible for reviewing tariffs, investment proposals and levels of service. Local governments are largely responsible for such regulation. Decisions on water pricing are commonly based on short-term political criteria rather than the economic costs of investment and service delivery. The Official Protection of Competition and Consumers and the Anti-Monopoly Courts may review tariffs in the event of customer complaints or if the utility is considered to be abusing its monopolistic position to take unfair advantage. The administrative or civil courts may also review disputes between the utilities and either the municipality or customers. The Office of Housing and Urban Development has developed legislation to improve the tariff system and economic regulation. It has effected changes to the Ordinance on water supply and wastewater disposal to allow for greater recovery of investment - related costs and differentiation in tariffs for different classes of customers based on the cost of service provision. It has also covered the Standards Board of Pricing, Service Availability and Economic Regulation of the Water and Wastewater Sector. The Board's composed of representatives of the various ministries and agencies involved in regulating the sector together with representatives from industry and municipal associations. The Standards Board has developed a series of standards relating to economic regulation of the sector. A new law has been drafted with there objective of achieving the provision of an uninterrupted supply of water with suitable quality, reliable discharge and treatment of wastewater, the achievement of more rapid environment conservation requirements, the protection of customers' interests, and improvement of the economic effectiveness of utilities and institutions in the sector. The Ministry of Environment is the competent authority charged with the approximation of EU directions into Polish law. A new Water Law covering administration of water resource management and water and wastewater quality requirements was drafted in 1999, but has not yet been given assent as some aspects are contentious. New Regional Water Boards will probably be set up to administer environmental controls within their regions Scotland The water industry in Scotland remains in public ownership. There is one water authority. The regulation of the authority was initially under the Secretary of State for Scotland. A referendum was carried out in 1997, the result of which was to devolve some power from the UK Parliament to a new Scottish Executive. An election was held in 1998, resulting in the establishment of a new Scottish Parliament from which the Scottish Executive was formed. Powers relating to the regulation of the (then three) water authorities were transferred from the Secretary of State for Scotland to the Scottish Executive. In 1999, the Scottish Executive established an office of the Water Industry Commissioner to promote the interests of the customers. This office is committed to ensuring value for money and sets rigorously analysed, challenging, but realistic targets to be achieved by the water authority. Environmental regulation is carried out by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). This body was established under the Environment Act 1995, at the same time as the Environment Agency was set up in England and Wales. Prior to 1998, SEPA was under the auspices of the Scottish Office Environment Department. It now reports to the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department.
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The United States The US is a federal republic comprising 50 states. Water and wastewater operations are normally under municipal control. There are in total about 55,000 service providers. Most of these are small, municipally owned supply and distribution systems. Investors mostly own the privately owned companies, although there are some mutuals owned by customers or landowners within the service area. These private companies serve about 15% of the total population of the US. All 50 states, together with the District of Columbia, have regulatory commissions. These commissions set tariffs based on a "fair rate of return" that they can earn on their assets. Various approaches have been adopted. The "future test year" approach looks at the costs and revenues estimated for a future year, usually the first year of the application of the increase in tariff, to enable the company to achieve a reasonable rate of return. A variation of this is the "historic test year" approach, where by past costs and revenues are used and adjusted (often arbitrarily) to provide the required rates. This approach often results in wide, unpredictable swings in the company's earnings because actual future net earnings do not correlate well with historic net earnings. Alternative Rate Plans (ARP's) have been implemented in some states. The ARP's are voluntary agreements between regulated utilities and the state regulatory commissions which set out in contract the obligations of the utility over several years and the allowed returns, often in the form of a price cap. The ARP's also set down procedures for dealing with foreseeable changes, give the regulators the ability to revert to "normal" regulatory procedures. Normally, the ARP's include the period between tariff reviews, the types of cost that can be passed through, penalties for failure to meet quality standards, reporting requirements, review procedures and dispute resolution/arbitration. Justification for increased tariffs must be submitted by the utility to the state regulatory commission. The evidence submitted is examined in a public rate-hearing inquiry, often presided by a hearing examiner or administration law judge. There is a right of appeal from a regulatory decision to the State Supreme Court, but these are limited to procedural irregularities. An example of a state regulatory commission is the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, which consists of three commissioners appointed by the State Governor for overlapping terms of 6 years each. Funding of the commission comes from a levy on the utility companies. A Rate Payer Advocate represents the customers in the tariff determination process. This is an independent body affiliated with the commission and funded by a levy on the utilities. Environmental regulation is the responsibility of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Each state has its own Department of Environmental Protection, which is a department of the Federal EPA. The EPA ensures that drinking water meets the federal and state Drinking Water Standards, is responsible for managing water resources (both surface water and ground water) and protects the environment against pollution from wastewater discharges.
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ANNEX 8 REGULATORY OPTIONS
The need for regulation All industries are regulated to different degrees. The water and wastewater industry needs to be highly regulated given the impact its operations can have on public health and the environment. In addition, being a natural monopoly, there is a need to protect the customer's interests. Effective regulation can also create a stable operating environment in which the private sector can operate at lower risk. Key objectives of regulation are to: protect the environment from over-exploitation and in particular to establish fair allocation of water resources between competing users; ensure public access to good quality drinking water to protect public health; establish acceptable levels of service and price; provide incentives for competition.
In the areas of environmental protection and drinking water quality, the regulation of a water utility with private sector involvement can be the same as for a public sector water utility. Although, where private capital is involved in water service provision, special care must be taken to avoid private economic interests achieving dominating influence over decisions. In the areas of customer service and service pricing some additional regulation may be necessary to ensure "fair" rates and an acceptable level of service to customers are provided by the private operator. Customers should expect a level of service from their water and wastewater utilities. This level of service should be clearly stated, and the actual service provided should be monitored. In the past, apart from monitoring drinking water and effluent qualities, there was little attention paid to the service provided to the customer. If a private operator is to provide services to customers it is important, as part of the contract, that the level of service to be provided is established at the outset. Otherwise there is no recourse for poor performance. Pricing of service is a complex issue. However some form of regulation is necessary to assess that the rates to customers are "fair" given the framework of rate setting. The key is balancing the 'cost and quality'. Data will be submitted by the company, but the regulator may collect some himself (e.g. complaints from customers) and some may be supplied by other regulators (e.g. compliance with the water quality and environmental discharge standards). Technical and financial audits should be carried out on the data collected to confirm its accuracy. Depending on the regulator's resources, these audits may be carried out by regulatory staff or by specialist consultants appointed by the regulator. The specification of data requirements and the quality of the audit are critical to effective economic regulation because of informational asymmetry - the company will always have
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more information than the regulator. Therefore the company always has a better understanding of its business and is better able to control negotiations with the regulator. Structures of economic regulators The principal alternatives are considered below. Municipal or national organisations The regulatory body must hold powers at a high enough level to give it authority over a service provider which may have high-level influence, but it must also be small enough to take effective action at the local level. However, if the regulator were constituted at municipal level, the result would be a large number of bodies with identical powers and responsibilities. This would dilute the influence of the regulator and would be wasteful in terms of resources. Single sector or multi-sector regulation See main text Chapter 9 Single regulator or regulatory board A regulatory body may be headed by a single regulator or a board which may consist of several directors. Members of the Board should have broad experience, but this need not be specific to the regulatory function, as these skills can be provided by staff. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. A regulatory body headed by a single regulator has the following advantages over one controlled by a board: A single regulator can take decisions faster than a committee. A single regulator can be held accountable for his actions more easily than a committee. A single regulator requires less support and financial resources. The decisions of a single regulator are likely to be more consistent, and thus more predictable, than those of a committee. This is important when regulated organisations must take investment decisions based on their expectations of the future operating environment.
A regulatory body headed by a committee has a number of advantages over one headed by a single regulator: A regulatory board is less susceptible to regulatory capture than a single regulator (see above) because each member will act as a constraint on the others. A committee is better able to consider an issue from several points of view. A committee structure reduces the risk that an individual's prejudices will produce unsound decisions.
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Continuity of succession is easier to achieve with a committee, whose members' terms of office can be staggered, than with a single regulator.
Small or large organisation A regulatory body can be relatively small, employing external consultants as required, or it can be a larger and more self-sufficient body. Staff numbers may vary from as few as fifteen to several hundred but, as a general principal, it is best to have as small a regulatory body as possible. This reduces the costs of regulation and ensures that the staff are well focused and do not spend time making unnecessary demands on the service providers. The regulator's workload will be cyclical so, rather than expand and contract according to the workload, a small organisation can employ consultants for specific tasks such as the data collection and analysis needed during a tariff review. The regulator's staff can then benefit from the expertise of consultants who will have gained experience by working for regulators in different sectors and, possibly, under different organisational structures. The regulator must retain responsibility for decisions, however, and must ensure that the service providers cannot influence the work of the consultants. If such a structure is adopted, the regulator must be empowered to appoint consultants whenever he considers it necessary and he must be given appropriate financial resources. The regulator could be funded from general taxation, or from an industry levy, based on service providers' revenues (possibly 2-3% of customers' bills). The second option is the more transparent and avoids imposing costs on public finances, so is more likely to be the preferred option. Approximate numbers of staff employed elsewhere by water regulators are shown below: Country Colombia Argentina Chile Peru Venezuela England & Wales Responsible for Price only Price and quality Price and quality Price only Price only Price only Number of staff 15 (plus consultants) 70 100 100 100 200
Structures of other regulators In addition to economic regulation, the water industry is subject to quality regulation (drinking water and discharges to the environment). These aspects must be controlled regardless of the structure for service provision, but the form and powers of the regulators may vary according to the extent of private sector involvement in the industry.
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Setting standards is normally a government responsibility and the departments involved in setting standards may also be responsible for monitoring compliance. The public health standards would thus be enforced by the Ministry of Health; the environmental standards would be enforced by the Ministry of the Environment or state Environment Agencies. These responsibilities could be delegated to lower levels of Government provided that the bodies selected possessed sufficient technical expertise to undertake the task. Quality regulation involves a significant amount of water sampling and analysis. To reduce the regulator's workload, responsibility for this could be transferred to the service provider. The water company would be instructed to take and analyse samples, and report the results to the regulator, who would assess the situation and call for corrective action as necessary. This option transfers a proportion of the costs to the water company and it should be more costeffective, since the company would normally undertake such work for internal quality control purposes. The disadvantage is that it involves the risk that the information supplied may be of questionable accuracy, so the regulator must be capable of ensuring that reliable information is submitted by the service providers. In addition to the quality regulation, there is a need to provide an independent arbitrator to resolve disagreements between the regulators and the organisations regulated. This would normally be the responsibility of the legal authorities (Court of Appeal) or, for disputes concerning prices, a competition and consumer protection body. Interaction between regulatory bodies There are two main areas of interaction between regulators: those between economic and quality regulators and those between environmental regulators responsible for adjacent territories. Problems arise between economic and quality regulators because they have opposing objectives. The economic regulator is charged with controlling prices whilst the quality regulators' duty is to maintain (or improve) standards, which tends to increase prices. A compromise must be reached between the objectives and this can strain relations between the two regulators. Service provider can use this situation to their advantage. To reduce the risk of conflict, it is essential. that the costs of improvements in levels of service are accurately estimated and their effect on tariffs assessed before standards are imposed on the service providers. This can be achieved by ensuring that the two sets of regulators co-operate closely. Problems arise between adjacent environmental regulators because pollution travels across boundaries. Low standards in one territory can cause problems in a downstream area, so it is important to ensure that poor standards and ineffective enforcement by the environmental regulator does not result in increased costs to a neighbouring territory. This problem can be resolved by applying consistent standards to all territories and ensuring that the regulators cooperate closely. Effect of regulation on tariffs There are three principal reasons for regulation to affect tariffs: The first is the cost of regulation itself. If the regulators are funded by levies on the service providers, this cost will be passed directly to customers.
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The second is the downward pressure on tariffs exerted by the economic regulator, without whom the service provider would be in a better position to increase tariffs without being called to account. The economic regulator may also be required to implement government policy in respect of subsidies for disadvantaged customers. This may give rise to lower prices for some customers and higher prices for others. The third is the upward pressure on tariffs due to the cost of levels of service improvements which effective quality regulation should achieve. It should be the economic regulator's objective to ensure that these costs are met by improvements in the service provider's efficiency, but this may not always be possible. Price increases can be minimised by providing low cost regulation and applying realistic levels of service, but the greatest effect on prices can be achieved through efficiency improvements by the service provider. This requires effective regulation to ensure, first, that efficiency benefits are achieved and, second, that they are passed to customers rather than shareholders.
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ANNEX 9 THREE DRAFT REGULATIONS
Under the revised TOR for this project, the consultants were required to write three of the regulations which would be required to be issued under the Draft Law. These are included with in this Annex.
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Draft
THE MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
RESOLUTION
REGARDING THE APPROVAL OF THE PROCEDURE FOR PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE SUBSCRIBERS ON THE SAFETY AND QUALITY OF COLD DRINKING WATER, AND ON COLD DRINKING WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT SERVICES
No. of
, 2005
Vilnius
Following the paragraph 2 of the Article 23 of the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment of the Republic of Lithuania (Parliamentary record, No. , 2005) and
the Article 3 of the Law on Coming into Force and Implementation of the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment of the Republic of Lithuania (Parliamentary record, No. , 2005),
1. A p p r o v e the procedure for information provision to the subscribers on the safety and quality of cold drinking water, and on cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services (enclosed). 2. D e t e r m i n e, that this procedure is obligatory to all cold drinking water suppliers, supplying the cold drinking water and providing the wastewater treatment services to the subscribers according to the procedure established by the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment of the Republic of Lithuania.
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Minister
_______________
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APPROVED
by Resolution No. of the Minister of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania on , 2005
PROCEDURE FOR PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE SUBSCRIBERS ON THE SAFETY AND QUALITY OF COLD DRINKING WATER, AND ON COLD DRINKING WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT SERVICES
1.
This procedure regulates the publication of information about the safety and quality of
the supplied cold drinking water, and about the cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services to the subscribers, who are supplied with cold drinking water and provided with wastewater treatment services. 2. The expressions used in this procedure comply with the expressions used in the Law on
Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment of the Republic of Lithuania (Parliamentary record, No. , 2005) and in the Law on Drinking Water of the Republic of
Lithuania (Parliamentary record, No. 64-2327, 2005). 3. The cold drinking water suppliers must inform the subscribers about these
circumstances: 3.1. cold drinking water quality and its impairment, when: 3.1.1. the microbiological and (or) toxic parameters of cold drinking water become worse; 3.1.2. are clarified the signs of water pollution in the water supply distribution network; 3.1.3. the water quality become worse on other circumstances; 3.2. emergencies of water supply infrastructure and wastewater treatment infrastructure, when: 3.2.1. the cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater treatment services provision become worse due to the accidents of the water supply;
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3.2.2. the cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater disposal services provision are terminated, suspended or limited due to the emergencies and other nonplanned circumstances; 3.3. planned interruptions and changes in cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services, when: 3.3.1. the water supply infrastructure facilities are being used the first time or following an interruption, or a part thereof has been replaced and that may worsen the safety and quality of water; 3.3.2. the water supply infrastructure and wastewater treatment infrastructure facilities are temporarily suspended; 3.3.3. prophylactic operations are carried out; 3.3.4. under other circumstances is planned the termination, suspension or limitation of cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services provision. 3.4. transference of property or the right to use of the water supply infrastructure as well as wastewater treatment infrastructure facilities to another legal or natural person. 4. The water supplier must publicly announce about the circumstances described in the
Article 3 in the places of residence or in the head offices of the subscribers or in the local press. 5. According to the legal acts, under special occasions the cold drinking water supplier
must send written notices to every subscriber on the safety and quality of the supplied cold drinking water, and on the cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services. 6. About the circumstances described in the paragraphs 3.1. and 3.2., the water supplier
must send written notice to the subscribers according to the method described in the Article 4 of this procedure immediately, but not later than [12 hours] after the occurrence of these circumstances. 7. About the circumstances described in the paragraphs 3.3. and 3.4., the water supplier
must send written notice to the subscribers according to the method described in the Article 4 of this procedure immediately, but not later than [15] days before the occurrence of these circumstances. 8. The announcement on the circumstances established in the Article 3 shall include the
described circumstance, which may influence the quality and safety of cold drinking water, and the cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services provision, also include the
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described territory and the subscribers, who will be affected by particular circumstance and the time, when the particular circumstance will emerge (if possible) and when the described circumstance will be eliminated. 9. The subscribers of the water supplier and persons, when their place of residence or the
head office is located in the territory, supplied by the public water supplier, have the right to get acquainted with the additional information about the circumstances, which may influence the safety and quality of cold drinking water, and the cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater treatment services provision. 10. The person, requesting to get additional information about the circumstances, described in the Article 3 of this procedure, submits the written request to the water supplier. When the water supplier receives the request he must present to the referring person all required information on particular circumstances, on their origin and elimination and on their impact on subscribers. The water supplier has no right to take charges from persons for the introduction with information, except the compensation for the incurred losses (printing, copying expenses, etc.). 11. On the request of the subscriber, the water supplier must present to that person the information about the planned interruptions and changes in cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services for the following [6 months] period. For the performance of the established obligations in this procedure is responsible the head of the water supplier. The water suppliers shall be held liable in accordance with the procedure established by legal acts for failure to perform the established duties.
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Draft
THE NATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION FOR PRICES AND ENERGY
RESOLUTION
REGARDING THE APPROVAL OF THE PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATION AND PUBLISHING OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS
......................... 2005, No. Vilnius
Pursuant to Article 24 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment and Article 3 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Coming into Force and Implementation of the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment, the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy has resolved:
To approve the Procedure for preparation and publishing of information about the public water suppliers (enclosed).
Chairman
_______________
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APPROVED
by the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy Resolution No. .... ............................. 2005
THE PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATION AND PUBLISHING OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS
12. The purpose of this procedure is to establish the requirements for the public water suppliers regarding the preparation and presentation of information to the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy and the procedure for publishing of this information. 13. The definitions used in this procedure correspond to the definitions used in the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cold Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment and in the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Drinking Water. 14. [Till 31st of January yearly] the public water suppliers must prepare and present to the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy an Annual report on activities, where shall be described and estimated results of the last year activities, and also presented information, indicated in the Article 4 of this procedure. 15. The annual report on activities of the public water supplier shall include the following information about: 15.1. the shareholders of the public water supplier and the owned blocks of securities; 15.2. the structure of management and supervision bodies; 15.3. the annual financial statements, report on activities and auditors inference ( if audit is obligatory following the laws or establishment documents); 15.4. the investments to the water supply infrastructure and wastewater treatment infrastructure; 15.5. the public water supply territory;
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15.6. the owned and operating facilities of the water supply infrastructure and wastewater treatment infrastructure; 15.7. the number of subscribers and categories; 15.8. the amount of inhabitants residing in the activity territory, who are provided with cold drinking water and wastewater treatment services; 15.9. a quantity and quality of the supplied cold drinking water and the provided wastewater management services; 15.10. the circumstances occured during the accountable period, which influenced the
safety and quality of cold drinking water, the cold water supply and the provision of wastewater treatment services; 15.11. 15.12. other activities of public water supplier; [ ].
16. The public supplier must present to the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy a printed and electronic versions of annual report on activities. A signer of annual report on activities is a head of the public water supplier. 17. The public water supplier must publish a summary of annual report on activities and information indicated in paragraphs 4.2., 4.4., 4.5, 4.7., 4.8, 4.9, 4.11 of this procedure in local press and his web-site. 18. The public water supplier shall inform the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy about the changes of data, indicated in paragraphs [4.1., 4.2., 4.5., 4.11] of this procedure, within [5] workdays. 19. The subscribers of the public water supplier and persons, when their place of residence or the head office is located in the operating territory of the water supplier, have a right to get to know about all annual report on public water supplier activities and documents that include it. 20. A person, who wants to get to know about the annual report on activities, delivers an application in writing to public water supplier. When the public water supplier receives the application, he must present the annual report on activities and documents that include it to interested person, and also give a possibility to survey them. The public water supplier has no right to take a fee from persons for introduction with the annual report on activities, except the compensation for expenses (printing, copying expenses and the like).
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21. A control of the publicity of the public water suppliers and the observation of regulations defined in this procedure shall regulate the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy. If the public water supplier offends against regulations of this procedure, the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy has a right [to warrant, to set a term to correct violations or suspend a validity of licence, if the violations are not retrieved during the set term]. A head of the public water supplier is responsible for the presentation and publication of the annual report on activities and also for information about changes of data. The water suppliers shall be held liable in accordance with the procedure established by legal acts for failure to perform the established duties.
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Draft
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA RESOLUTION
REGARDING THE APPROVAL OF THE STANDARD CONDITIONS OF THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY CONTRACT
................................. 2005, No. Vilnius
Pursuant to part 3 of the paragraph 1 of the Article 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment and part 1 of the paragraph 1 of the Article 2 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Coming into Force and Implementation of the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has resolved: 1. To approve the Standard conditions of the Public water supply contract (enclosed). 2. To establish, that The Standard conditions of the Public water supply contract must be included in the Public water supply contract, not changing their matter (point). 3. To establish that the public water supply contract can include not only the Standard conditions of the Public water supply contract but also other provisions, which are not contrary to the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment and to the provisions of other legal acts. The Parties of the Public water supply contract can not establish the contract conditions, that would prejudice the position of the subscriber comparing with the position established by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and other legal acts.
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4. To establish, that the public water suppliers must give an unique number for every concluded public water supply contract and indicate a place and date of the conclusion of contract in the public water supply contract.
Prime Minister Minister of Environment
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APPROVED
by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution No. .... ............................. 2005
THE STANDARD CONDITIONS OF THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY CONTRACT
CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The definitions used in the Public water supply contract correspond to the definitions in the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment (Official Gazette 2005, No. ). 2. The public water suppliers has no right to change ex-parte the provisions of public water supply contracts, with the exception of cases established by the laws.
CHAPTER II PARTIES OF THE CONTRACT
3. The Parties of the Public water supply contract: 3.1. The water supplier (a name, entity code, address of the head office, a number of licence and its issuance, a name and surname of assignee); 3.2. The subscriber (if natural person: a name, surname, personal number, address of place of residence; if legal person: a name, entity code, address of the head office, a name and surname of assignee).
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III. CONTRACT SUBJECT
4. Following the public water supply contract, the public water supplier commits to supply the cold drinking water and (or) to provide wastewater treatment services uninterruptedly to the subscriber, while the subscriber commits to pay for the supplied water and (or) for the provided wastewater treatment services, and to follow the conditions for cold drinking water use and wastewater discharge established in the contract. 5. The public water supplier must provide the cold drinking water, which comply with the safety and quality requirements, established by Laws and other legal acts. If the safety and quality of cold drinking water become worse, the public water supplier, according to the procedure established by this law and other legal acts, must immediately inform about this the subscribers [and, accordingly, to reduce the cold drinking water price]. 6. The public water supplier must guarantee the uninterrupted cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater treatment services provision. If the cold drinking water supply is terminated for more than [24 hours], the public water supplier must serve the subscribers with cold drinking water in alternative supply means, except there is different agreement. 7. The public water supplier is responsible for the installation and maintenance of water supply infrastructure till the end of water supply-use point, and for the installation and maintenance of wastewater treatment infrastructure till the wastewater transfer station. 8. When the subscriber is the natural person, who buys the cold drinking water and wastewater treatment services for personal, family or household needs (the consumer), the public water supply contract shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and other legal acts, when the provisions describe the supply contracts peculiarities.
IV. SERVICES PRICE
9. According to the public water supply contract, the prices for the supplied cold drinking water and wastewater treatment services shall be established following the procedure established by the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment. 10. The subscribers pay for the supplied cold drinking water and for the provided wastewater treatment services by the public water supplier agreeably to the provided cold
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drinking water amount, which is being established according to the data presented by the water measuring devices, except the exceptions established in the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIER FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATION
11. The public water suppliers shall be responsible under law for any violations of the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment and other Laws and legal acts, regulating the cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment, as well as for violation of the public water supply contracts. 12. The public water suppliers must insure their liability, when sum insured shall be not less than one established by the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy.
V. CONTRACT VALIDITY, AMENDMENTS AND TERMINATION
13. The public water supply contract shall be considered complete of its signing day. If the subscriber is the natural person, who uses water to satisfy household needs, then the public water supply contract shall be considered complete after the subscribers facilities are joint to the cold drinking water supply networks. 14. The public water supply contract shall be considered complete for indefinite period, if the contract does not establish otherwise. 15. If by the expiration of the term of the contract neither of the parties declares that the contract will be terminated or modified, the fixed period public water supply contract shall be deemed extended for the same period and under the same conditions. 16. The subscriber, the natural person, who uses water and wastewater treatment services for household needs, shall be entitled to unilateral rescission of the contract warning the public water supplier before [30] days, if he has paid for the supplied water and treatment services used. 17. The public water supplier has the right to terminate, suspense or limit the cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater treatment services, only after the establishment of the agreement between the parties of public water supply contract, except the cases when are find wastewater
203
such a defects of the subscribers facilities, which might cause the accident or may be harmful to human health and security. The public water supplier must notify the subscriber about the termination, suspension and limitation of cold drinking water supply and (or) wastewater treatment services provision within [15] calendar days, except the cases, when it is necessary in order to prevent or liquidate an accident in the water supply infrastructure. 18. The public water supply contract shall be terminated according to the procedure established by the Law on Cold Drinking Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment.
VII. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE OF THE PARTIES
19. The dispute of the parties on public water supply contract is settled on agreement between the parties; if the dispute on agreement between the parties fails, then according to the procedure established by legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania.
204
ANNEX 10
STUDY TOUR AND WORKSHOP
The proposed study tour is to take place in September/October 2005, after contract conclusion. The MoE were unable to arrange the availability of their delegates before that date. The tour will be to Scotland and will include visits to the Scottish Executive, Scottish Water, and the Water Commissioner (regulator). All preparations for the study tour were made. A workshop to present the Final Report took place in Vilnius on 1 st June 2005, to an audience of some 20 key stakeholders. A further workshop planned for 3rd June 2005 for wider dissemination of the findings was cancelled by the MoE due to the difficulties of arranging accommodation and attendance of the target audience. The consultants have been invited to present to some 50 members of Parliament on 15 th/16th June 2005, and will do so. The 1st June workshop programme follows:-
205
PROGRAMME FOR WORKSHOP ON OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE OPERATIONS IN LITHUANIA. WORLD BANK PPIAF supported study
at
Holiday Vilniaus Hotel, Vilnius
01 June 2005
206
PROGRAMME FOR WORKSHOP ON OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE OPERATIONS IN LITHUANIA. WORLD BANK PPIAF supported study
at Holiday Vilniaus Hotel, Conference Hall Cousteau, Vilnius 01 June 2005
Commence: 1. 2.
10 a.m.
Opening Address by Mr. Aleksandras Spruogis, Under secretary at the Ministry of Environment Session 1; Introduction of the project (5 minutes) David Milnes WRc, Team Leader Session 2; International examples of aggregation in the water sector; successes and failures (30 min) - David Milnes WRc, Team Leader Discussion: 10 min.
3.
Session 3; Public Water Supply Regions ; (technical data for aggregation 15 min) Rimantas Tuskeviius - EKO RIVI, Deputy team leader; Discussion: 5 min.
Coffee Break: 4,
11:10 a.m. 11:30 a.m.
Session 4; Reform Process and Corporate Models; Required reforms to existing laws to allow reform to proceed 30 min) Paulius Docka, Jurevicius, Balciunas & Bartkus Professional Law Partnership, Advocate Discussion: 10 min.
5,
Session 5; Private sector interest; (particular reference to the international private sector 10 min) David Milnes WRc Team Leader Discussion: 5 min.
Lunch: 6.
12:30 p.m. 1:30 p.m. Session 6; Standard conditions of the public water supply contract; Procedure for preparation and publishing of information about the public water suppliers; Procedures for information provision to the subscribers on the safety and quality of cold drinking water, and on cold drinking water supply and wastewater treatment services; (an explanation of the draft regulations to the Law, written by the consultants- 20 min) - Paulius Docka, Jurevicius, Balciunas & Bartkus Professional Law Partnership, Advocate
207
Discussion: 5 min. 7. Session 7; Financial Analyses; (aggregated accounts for the 10 new companies 20 min) Viktorija Trimbel, EKO RIVI , finance expert 8. Session 8; Financial Analysis; (case studies for two new companies 20 min) dr.Scott Reid, TRC economics, Associate Director Discussion: 20 min; Tea; 2:45 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. 9. Session 9; Regulatory Issues; (single/multi sector regulation, reporting etc 20 min) - David Milnes WRc Team Leader; Discussion: 15 min 10. Session 10; The Way Forward; (future consultation and implementation 15 min) Aurelijus Katkeviius, PR Service/Edelman, partner. Discussion: 15 min. 11. Concluding Discussions; (30 min)
End of seminar; 4:35 p.m
208
THE PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT BEING IMPLEMENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD BANK IN THE WORKSHOP
Options for reform of water supply and sewerage operations in Lithuania
Date:
2005-06-01
Time: 10:00 a.m. Place: Holiday Inn Vilnius Hotel, Conference Hall Columbus eimyniki St. 1, LT-09312 Vilnius List of participants No. 1. Name, Surname V. Ablingien Institution name Association of Local Authorities in Lithuania (ALAL) Lithuanian Water Suppliers Association The National Control Commission for Prices and Energy Vilkavikis Region Council Committee on State Administration and Local Authorities (LRS) Rietavas municipality Position Advisor Signature
2. 3.
A. Abromaviius R. Bruzgys
President Deputy to head of Water section Council member Chief Adviser
4. 5.
A. Greimas B. Kleponis
6.
V. Kubilius
Representative
7.
R. Kutan
Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania The National Control Commission for Prices and Energy Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania
Head of the Municipal Economy Regulation Division Commission member
8.
R. Lukoeviius
9.
R. Morknas
Communal service department
209
10. 11.
M. Nocius B. Senkien
World Bank Lithuania office Committee on State Administration and Local Authorities (LRS) Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania The National Control Commission for Prices and Energy Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania JSC iauli vandenys JSC Lietuvos aidas Committee of Environment Protection of Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists
Country Manager Chief Advisor
12.
A. Spruogis
Undersecretary
13.
A. Stapulionis
Head of the water section Director of Municipal Economy Department Chief Executive Officer Deputy Editor-in-Chief Commission member
14.
R. pokas
15. 16. 17.
R. Valskis V. eimantas K. Iljaseviius
18.
19. 20.
210

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WORLD BANK OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE OPERATIONS

IN LITHUANIA FINAL REPORT VOLUME 2 - ANNEXES

WRc and EKO RIVI, UAB Ref: UC6893 OCTOBER 2005

FINAL REPORT - VOLUME 2 - ANNEXES

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

ANNEX 1 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF AGGREGATION

Case Study Examples on Aggregation for Lithuania Water Sector Reform

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Scotland Case Study Example

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Organisation of Scotlands Water Industry

UKlegislation and EC Directives

Scottish Parliam and ent legislation

ScottishW ater Board

M anagem and ent em ployees

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Scottish Water employees

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

ANNEX 2 INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR (DECEMBER 2003)

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

ANNEX 3 EXAMPLE PSP CONTRACTS

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

London, May 2002

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Table 1. Water utilities reforms by country, May 2002

Reform Privatised Restructured No major reforms

Serbia and Montenegro.

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION BY COUNTRY

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

CNN Money News, 02/ May/2002.

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Other private investors

Acea & Company Armenian Utility S.c.a.r.l.

Water supply and sewerage

Prazske vodovody Vivendi a kanalizace (PVK)

Water supply, sewerage, and wastewater

WRc / EKO RIVI Ref: UC6893 Volume 2 / 13592-0 October 2005

Severoceske vodovody a kanalizace (SCVK)

Water and wastewater

Western Bohemia Central Bohemia Olomouc

Vodospol Klatovy Vivendi

Water and wastewater

Water and wastewater