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Gender Myths and the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict

Dahlia Scheindlin
Dahlia Scheindlin is an independent public opinion analyst and political consultant working in Israel and internationally. She is also a doctoral candidate in political science at Tel Aviv University.

A Summary of Differences and Similarities in Israeli Jewish Public Opinion

Introduction
Israeli society has distinct and complex gender roles, and the identities of both men and women are largely derived from militaristic socialization and a wartime mentality. Yet there has not been extensive systematic research comparing the attitudes of men and women toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Women could be a potential resource in the elusive quest to rally public support for peace. Research has revealed extensive activism among women in peace movements (Mayer 1994; Sharoni 1995; Emett 1996; Herman and Kurtz 1995, Golan 1997, and numerous other works by Naomi Chazan and Hanna Herzog). Studies in the West have shown that among the public, women often support more peace-oriented positions. Could the regular public of non-activist women be an untapped resource for rallying support for conflict-resolution? Although the conflict has yielded a rich range of public opinion data,i the few serious studies of gender differences are now outdated (see Tessler 1997, 1999) and in fact have found few differences between men and womens opinions regarding the conflict.ii This article revisits the question of womens attitudes by examining more recent data over the last two tumultuous decades. In that time, Israel has been involved in four wars (the
See for example ongoing survey projects: the Peace Index (Guttman Center/Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University); the Truman Institutes Joint Israel-Palestinian Polls; the National Security Studies, Institute for National Security Studies of Tel Aviv University; and most recently Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikakis Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada, Indiana University, 2010; along with many other related studies. ii The two articles are both based on a single set of data 985 Jewish respondents surveyed in 1989.
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first Gulf War, the second intifada, the second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip), four decades of occupation, and multiple rounds of ultimately unsuccessful negotiations. Has anything changed? The first section briefly reviews some central theories about womens opinions of conflict and findings from Israel. The data section then provides material from the last two decades, focusing on original data from the last few years. In the conclusion, I review the findings and suggest possible directions for further research.

Theories of Gender and Conflict: the West and Israel


Numerous studies in the West have indicated that women support peaceful behavior more than men including lower support for the use of force and higher support for concessions, and reconciliation (Tessler and Warriner 1997; Tessler, Natchway and Grant 1999; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Eichenberg 2007). Various theoretical explanations point to inherent male and female qualities based on either innate characteristics or socialized differences such as the experience of motherhood. Sociological theories propose that women are more dependent on social welfare systems that are strained by war hence they are more supportive of conflict resolution and less supportive of militarism (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). But Tessler and Warrineriii found no significant difference in the Middle East, including Israel, between male and female attitudes toward the conflict. Barzilai and Inbar, tracking data from 1988 to 1994, also observed only a weak relationship between gender and support for military action (Barzilai and Inbar, 1996). The Israeli Democracy Institute (2008) found no distinct gender influence on either voting behavior or national security issues, in data going back to the beginning of the state. Golan did observe a somewhat greater support for compromise and negotiations, compared to men, in her analysis of research from the early 1980s, but these differences were only minimally observed in a study that repeated similar questions in the late 1980s (Golan 1997, 584). Support for peace-oriented approaches or disapproval of violence is correlated in some studies with gender equality in society, or support for gender equality (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Tessler and Warriner, 1997, respectively). Although feminism itself has taken an erratic course in Israel (Herzog 1999, 2004), attitudes toward equality do not necessarily break down by gender, and may not indicate distinct conflict attitudes among men and women. Indeed, Tessler et al (1999) suggested that the immediacy of
iii

Based on Golan and Chazans 1989 study (also observed in Golan 1997)

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the conflict may erase gender differences that were found in the West. The theories raise a number of questions: Do women and men in Israel continue to show similar attitudes toward peace and war as in the past? Can differences be discerned surrounding specific developments such as escalation or negotiation? Do women express different feelings about the conflict from men? Could it be that by contrast to Western countries, both men and women are so deeply socialized by the conflict, that gender differences are minimal?

Public Data: 1990s Second Intifada


Toward the end of the 1980s, during the first years of the first intifada, the Israeli population shifted to the right (Arian et al 1992). Arian found that women shifted slightly less than men, but that more women selfidentified as right-wing prior to the intifada (Arian et al 1992, p. 323). The pattern of slight but inconclusive differences reappears in later years as well. However, the first intifada also led to more nuanced shifts, including increased polarization of the population in general, but specifically more dovish attitudes on long-term policy questions related to the conflict (Arian et al 1992 and Arian 1992). Throughout the 1990s, Arian found little variation by gender on conflict attitudes (Arian 2003). But the outbreak of the second intifada may reveal a divergence. Over the years, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: Signing peace agreements with the Palestinians and the Arab states will signal the end of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. In 1994, after the signing of the Oslo Accords, there was no significant difference: Nearly half of both men and women agreed (49% for men, 46% for women). After five traumatic years, Ehud Baraks election in 1999 seemed to bring new optimism: 64% of men and 70% of women agreed that an accord would bring peace. But when talks failed and the second, more violent intifada broke out in 2000, faith among the whole Jewish population dropped. The percentage of men who affirmed that an agreement would end the conflict fell 24 percentage points (from 64% to 40%). Women seemed particularly crushed: Their agreement with the statement declined from 70% to 31% a 39-point drop. Indeed, the monthly Peace Index study, undertaken since 1994, shows a very slight but consistent gap in support for the Oslo Accords starting around the outbreak of the second Intifada with women slightly less supportive of the accords. Women thus seemed particularly affected by the raised, then dashed, hopes for negotiations toward peace, followed by the outbreak of violence.
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(Source: The Peace Index, Guttman Center, Israel Democracy Institute, and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution, Tel Aviv University: http://www. peaceindex.org/GraphsEng.aspx)

Original Data: 2007-2010


The data presented here was collected for private clients who have released the information for publication. Each project had different research goals, and therefore the surveys were not designed for comparison, nor do they represent a consistent methodology. But as a result, the questions address diverse issues. Three of the surveys were conducted just before and during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, offering insight about attitudes before and during the war.

2007 through Operation Cast Lead


In a study for the Jerusalem-based NGO Ir Amim, women expressed slightly more dovish attitudes with regard to Jerusalem (Scheindlin, 2007a). The survey asked respondents to choose between two positions on Jerusalem: first, that its richness lies in its many cultures and religious faiths; or second, Jerusalem is mainly a Jewish city. Just over 40% of women and 36% of men chose the multi-faith view; 55% of women and 61% of men chose the mainly Jewish view of Jerusalem. When asked whether the Jerusalem municipality should seek to
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strengthen the Jewish population of Jerusalem and decrease the Arab population or serve all residents equally, a greater contrast appeared. Sixtytwo percent of men preferred a policy focus on Jews first, and only 37% said the municipality should address the needs of all citizens (a 25-point difference). Women split almost evenly: 48% preferred a policy focused on Jews, and 45% preferred a policy for all (just a 3-point difference). A 47% plurality of women agreed that the Separation Wall and settlements in Jerusalem would prevent the implementation of a final status accord, and such steps should be avoided (40% said this was not true). A majority of men rejected the statement (43% said it was true, 50% said it was not). The slightly dovish female trend was largely confirmed in a second study for Ir Amim about one year later. Thus, in mid-2008, men were more likely than women to support new Jewish construction in Arab areas of East Jerusalem by a 10-point margin (42% to 32%). Just under half (49%) of women supported new Jewish settlements in Jerusalem in general, compared with 63% of men. But women showed slightly more hawkish trends in a survey for the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) conducted at almost the same time as Ir Amims first study (Scheindlin 2007b). The survey tested various peace-related concepts and asked about hopes, fears and threats. Sixty-eight percent of men and 72% of women reported having more fears about a peace process than hopes. Women consistently expressed higher levels of fear about the dangers of peace-related concessions than men:
% Danger to Israels existence (very +somewhat dangerous) Men Dismantling most settlements in Judea and Samaria, except for large blocs such as Ariel and Maaleh Adumim Division of Jerusalem Phased return of about 100,000 refugees to Israel The establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel 61 Women 68 Difference Total Sample +7 65

76 90 59

81 94 71

+5 +4 +12

78 92 65
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Yet women and men give almost identical self-definitions of political ideology. In the IPCRI data, almost the same percentage of men and women call themselves left or right although fewer women labeled themselves as centrist than men, and a greater portion did not answer the question. The finding is stable through November 2008: 48% each say they are right-wing. (Scheindlin, 2008a) In a Meretz survey in late December 2008, 50% of men were rightwing and 46% of women (but the margin of error for this survey of 600 Jews was +/-4%). Again, there was hardly any difference among those self-identifying as being on the left. In a general statement about whether Israel should restart negotiations based on the Saudi Plan (the Arab Peace Initiative - ed.), in which the basic, by now familiar, terms of an agreement were repeated, the December 2008 survey revealed no difference: Just under 40% of both men and women responded positively to the statement. In sum, these surveys show that women seemed slightly less likely to support policies in Jerusalem that were portrayed as confrontational and unfair, but indicated slightly higher levels of fear regarding broader concessions for peace. In this sense, differences were noticed but the direction was not conclusive. Ideologically, women described themselves in the same terms as men.

Operation Cast Lead


Toward the end of the war that devastated Gaza and wrought international opprobrium, another Meretz survey showed that more women than men described themselves as right-wing (53% of the women and 48% of men, Scheindlin 2009). There was no change among the percentages of the left among either gender. Yet the self-identified terms right and left do not automatically indicate the direction of policy attitudes; they tend to express long-term self-perception and identification with certain groups in society, but specific attitudes may contradict the broad categorization. This process becomes apparent in attitudes toward Operation Cast Lead. Certain positions about the war yielded no significant difference. Precisely 46% of both men and women approved the statement: Despite the war, we cannot give up on social issues that are important to everyone: education, closing the socioeconomic gaps, and preserving the environment despite the notion that social issues such as education may appeal to women more than men. However, the January survey during the war showed slightly more support for non-militarist positions among women. When asked whether
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they felt close to or distant from figures expressing specific attitudes toward the war (the attitudes are represented by the statements in bold, below), differences emerged:
Israel could get bogged down in Gaza, like in LebanonIsrael must exhaust international initiatives to end fighting immediately Close Distant Difference (approve-disapprove) [I oppose] Military force and the killing of innocent people and support immediate unilateral withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza Close Distant Difference Especially in the shadow of war, Israel should work toward a diplomatic solution [with international support] Close Distant Difference Men Women Total

22 58 -36 Men

29 46 -17 Wome

26 52 -26 Total

6 77 -71 Men 23 53 -30

10 74 -64 Wome 30 39 -9

8 75 -67 Total 27 46 -19

From Operation Cast Lead through 2010


Nearly two years after the war, in a survey from late October 2010, 41% of men say they are right-wing, compared to 48% of women a gap that is outside the margin of error and reflects the wartime survey above. There remains very little difference in the percentages of left and center identification (Scheindlin, 2010b), but as noted, attitudes toward specific policies may belie those self-definitions. Still, one year after Operation Cast Lead, at least one question shows women supporting a dovish position again. In February 2010, Israels foreign relations were tense; the government had implemented a partial settlement freeze and was wrangling over Palestinian conditions to restart negotiations. A question for the Jerusalem Report magazine asked whether, in light of international pressure, Israel should restart negotiations. Among men, a
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minority of 40% chose options for reviving negotiations (with or without a freeze), and an absolute majority (55%) rejected renewed talks, some even calling for settlement expansion. Among women, a 49% plurality called for restarting negotiations (including extending the settlement freeze), and just 39% rejected negotiations (Scheindlin 2010a). In September 2010, another round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations started; by October they had stalled. In a survey that month, women showed a slightly more hawkish tilt in response to both positive and negative statements about a peace process. Percentage responding true and very true
Israeli-Palestinian peace process: Worth halting settlement construction for a while Men Women Difference Total Sample 48

50

47

-3

Could help achieve peace with other Arab states (Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon) 60 Could help Israels economy Past attempts prove: peace process is hopeless Could hurt Israels security Could ignite dangerous tensions in Israel between religious and secular, Jews and Arabs 65 56 46

56 54 60 55

-4 -9 +4 +9

58 59 58 51

59

67

+8

63

When asked about the statement: I dont intend to support any final status agreement if the Palestinians dont recognize Israel as a Jewish state, 45% of men sided with this hawkish position against an opposing statement, compared with fully 64% of women (a 19-point gap). And women also responded more strongly to statements expressing fear. When told that [i]f peace talks fail like they did in 2000, there could be a third intifada, 84% of women, compared with 73% of men, said this raised serious or very serious concerns.

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Summary
The data affirms that there is little genuine or consistent difference between the genders. Yet the slight differences that do appear yield some observations. The 2007 Ir Amim survey could indicate that women are less inclined to support provocative or unfair policies. In wartime, women appear somewhat more likely to side with policies to end the violence, including the need for long-term non-military solution to the conflict. At several points, women seem to be more susceptible than men to fear and disappointment: They seemed to suffer greater disappointment by the collapse of hopes following the outbreak of the second intifada; slightly more right-leaning after the Gaza war and the failed September 2010 negotiations than men. Prior evidence offers some support: Arians study of attitudes toward Iraqs SCUD attacks in the first Gulf War notes that women suffered from fear far more than men (Arian 1995, p. 86). Golan and Chazans research from 1989 found that there was practically no difference of attitudes except regarding levels of fear (Golan 1997, p. 584). The danger of affirming gender stereotypes notwithstanding, these questions warrant further research that could help show when women are more or less likely to support conflict resolution in the future.

Bibliography
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Barzilai, Gad and Inbar, Efraim. The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options, Armed Forces & Society 23 (1996). Caprioli, Mary and Boyer, Mark A. Gender, Violence and International Crisis Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001), p.503. Eichenberg, Richard. Gender Differences in Support for the Use of Military Force in Cross-National Perspective: The War System, Modernization, and the Universal Logics of Military Action. Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2007. Emmett, Ayala H. Women, Politics and Israeli-Palestinian Co-existence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). Golan, Galia. Militarization and the Israeli Experience. Womens Studies International Forum 20, 5-6 (September-December 1997), pp.581-586. Hermann, Tamar and Kurtz, Gila. Prospects for democratizing foreign policymaking: The gradual empowerment of Israeli women, Middle East Journal 49, 3 (Summer 1995), pp.447-66. Herzog, Hannah. Women in Israeli Society, in Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns, Uzi Rebhun and Chaim I. Waxman, Eds. (Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2004). Israel Democracy Institute. Is There a Womens Voice in Politics? Israel Democracy Institute Website: http://www.idi.org.il/sites/english/parliament/ Pages/IsThereaWomensVoiceinPolitics.aspx Mayer, Tamar, Ed. Women and the Israeli Occupation: The Politics of Change (London: Routledge, 1994). Scheindlin, Dahlia. Ir Amim Public Opinion Survey: Attitudes Toward Jerusalem. March 2007a (n=600 Jewish adults, error +/- 4%). Fieldwork: Shiluv Millward Brown (unpublished). Scheindlin, Dahlia. IPCRI Public Opinion Survey: Attitudes Toward Peace and Conflict. 29-30 April 2007b, (n=595, Jewish adults, error +/-4%). Fieldwork: New Wave Research (unpublished) Scheindlin, Dahlia. Meretz Public Opinion Survey. November 2008 (n=XX Jewish adults, error?). Fieldwork: New Wave Research (unpublished). 76
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Scheindlin, Dahlia. Meretz Public Opinion Survey. 13-14 January 2009 (n=600 Jews). Fieldwork: New Wave Research (unpublished). Scheindlin, Dahlia. What do we need the world for, anyway? Jerusalem Report. March 1, 2010a (n=500 Jewish adults, error +/- 4.5%) Scheindlin, Dahlia. Peace Survey. 15 October-3 November, 2010b. (n=1008 Jewish adults, error +/-3%). Fieldwork: New Wave Research (unpublished). Sharoni, Simona. Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Womens Resistance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995). Tessler, Warriner. Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East, World Politics 49 (2), January 1997, pp.250-281.. Tessler, Mark, Natchway, Jodi and Grant, Audra. Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999), pp.519531. Tzameret, Hagar. Women and Men in Israel: A Relationship of Tolerance or Mutual Tension. Roby Natanson, Ed. Naamat, Israel. Tel Aviv: Macro Institute, 2000: http://www.macro.org.il/lib/1528013.pdf Yishai, Yael. Between the Flag and the Banner (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).

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