G.R. No.

146611

February 6, 2007

CA denied the motion petitioner filed a Petition for Relief[8] anchored on Section 2,[9] Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution and reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his appellants brief CA held that Petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the Court of Appeals as these petitions are filed with the trial courts CA further held that Under Rule 47, an annulment of judgment or final orders and resolutions may be filed before CA based on the ground of extrinsic fraud which seems to be the premise of the petition, but it is worth looking into by the petitioner if the factual basis of the present petition for relief may qualify as an extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned resolution was likewise denied by the CA petitioner is now before this Court via the instant recourse on his submission that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that a petition for relief is not an available remedy in the court of appeals petitioner prays that the court relax the application of procedural rules, or suspend them altogether, in favor of petitioners substantial rights whether or not petitioner is entitled to relief under Rule 38

TANCREDO REDEA,, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEA, Respondent. special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his brother, respondent Leocadio Redea before the then CFI now RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna the parties common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, a residential lot, a riceland and another parcel of land trial court confined the partition to only the property actually pertaining to the estate of the parties deceased father and coowned by them, namely, the parcel of land as the rest of the properties were owned by the defendant petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal court gave due course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to file his appellants brief. Evidently, the period for filing the brief was even extended by the CA there being no appellants brief filed within the extended period, the CA issued a resolution[5] considering the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same. 8 months after the CA issued the above resolution, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration

ISSUE: HELD: No

 petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. A petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, a party prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given due course This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken precisely because of any of the aforestated reasons which prevented him from appealing his case

petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case tried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the same case, just like the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial Court

petitioner failed to show diligence in pursuing his cause. His condition as a farmer, by itself alone, does not excuse or exempt him from being vigilant on his right. He cannot lay the blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.[18] While, exceptionally, a client may be excused from the failure of his counsel, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not convince the Court to take exception. petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. He was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.[21] The Rules allow a petition for relief only when there is no other available remedy, and not when litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence On a final note, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility

Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction For sure, under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final order or other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the court in the same case from which the petition arose.

VDA. DE VICTORIA vs. CA Mario Victoria, through an appeal by certiorari, seeks to set aside the Resolutions of CA promulgated on May 25 and July 12, 2000, which (1) dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari and (2) denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively. FACTS: October 27, 1993 Sps. Gibe filed a Complaint for "Ejectment and Damages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" against: 1. Isidra Vda. de Victoria (the mother of herein petitioner Mario Victoria) 2. Eusebio Arida 3. Juan and Guillermo Becina with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauan, Laguna. >Sps. Gibe alleged: >1992 they acquired property for the heirs of late Judge Lantin. >Property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153, which was subdivided into 7 parcels in 1989 among Judge Gregorio Lantin and his 4 tenants, Felix Victoria, Juan and Guillermo Becina, and Eusebio Arida. *Felix Victoria is the deceased husband of Isidra Victoria. All defendants in this ejectment case were given home lots, while the lots allotted to Judge Lantin were sold to Sps. Gibe. >Lot 1-B-153-A was being fenced and it was discovered that: 1. The Victoria house was standing on the northwestern portion of the property. 2. Mrs. Victoria was harvesting and picking fruits from the citrus trees planted in that area without the knowledge and permission of the Gibe spouses. 3. Eusebio Arida, Juan Becina and Guillermo Becina were also surreptitiously planting palay on the northwestern portion. > The fencing was discontinued after the children of Mrs. Victoria threatened to shoot at the workers of the Sps. Gibe with an armalite rifle. It left approximately 8,000 sq. m. of the northwestern portion of the Lot open and unfenced. >Mrs. Victoria filed her Answer, with Motion to Dismiss Ejectment Case, denying the fact that she entered the lot of Judge Lantin that was sold to Sps. Gibe. She claimed that her farmhouse was constructed on the very lot awarded to her family by DAR. > Preliminary Conference of the Ejectment Case - parties mutually agreed to a relocation survey of the property to be conducted by a geodetic engineer. >The geodetic engr. submitted the results of the relocation survey. >Mrs. Victoria and her co-defendants in the ejectment case filed Manifestation with Motion requesting the trial court to allow an independent surveyor, to be paid by them, to conduct another survey. >Court granted the motion, however, no survey plan was submitted by them. May 21, 1998 - MTC rendered decision in favor of SPS. Gibe finding them the real owners of the property in question. May 22, 1998 Sps. Gibe filed a motion for Immediate Execution and Demolition praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the judgment. The defendants in the Ejectment Case were not given notice. May 29, 1998 after promulgation and receipt of the MTC decision, the defendants filed a notice of appeal, without filing a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of the decision & depositing monthly rentals.

June 1, 1998 MTC granted the Motion for Immediate Execution & issued a writ of execution. July 13, 1998 - Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) was filed with RTC of Calamb, Laguna. >Petition assailed MTC decision contending that it had no jurisdiction over the case and committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favor of Sps. Gibe and in issuing Writ of Execution pending appeal. >Mrs. Victoria died before MTC promulgated the questioned order and she was substituted by her son, Mario Victoria. >RTC of Calauan, where the petition for certiorari was raffled, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. October 7, 1998 - The appeal field by defendants before the RTC of Calauan,Laguna was dismissed for failure to file the appeal memorandum. August 3, 1999 RTC dismissed petition for certiorari. >Petitioner, Victoria, contends that RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case and t issue the questioned decisions because under PD 27 any dispute involving said lands must be referred to DARAB. > Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.The complaint filed by the private respondents was for Ejectment and Damages With a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Ejectment proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. > Petitioner Victoria did not question the jurisdiction of the Court but prayed for the dismissal of the case below for lack of cause of action. >The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error of jurisdiction but an error of judgment which is not reviewable by certiorari

proceedings. In other words, certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment as its function is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction. >Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue the decision dated May 28, 1998, the respondent judge likewise has jurisdiction to direct the execution of the same pending appeal pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. >CA: May 25, 2000, the CA dismissed the CA Certiorari Petition because: 1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a petition for certiorari is an ordinary appeal. 2. The instant petition is filed out of time. 3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of the filing of the petition is incomplete. >Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA by Resolution of July 12, 2000 for being filed 2 days beyond the reglementary period, he filed the petition at bar after he was granted, on his motion, an extension of thirty days to file the petition, conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion for extension. ISSUE/S: I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GADLEJ BY NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON GROUND OF TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE CASE ON THE MERITS. II. RTC OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, COMMITTED GADLEJ BY RULING THAT THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MTC, AND THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO WAS NOT AN ERROR [OF] JURISDICTION BUT AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE IN CERTIORARI [P]ROCEEDINGS. HELD:

Petition is denied. RATIO: 1ST ISSUE > In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of petitioners motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001. - The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the CA dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for petitioners agent on June 5, 2000. - Petitioner had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or a motion for new trial or reconsideration. > Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed two days after the expiration of the reglementary period on June 22, 2000. >The instant petition for review must likewise be denied for having been filed on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the expiration of the period to appeal on June 20, 2000. >The records indicates that this case should have been terminated as early as January 4, 2000 with the lapse of the period within which petitioner could have appealed from the RTC Decision. >Duremdes vs. Duremdes: Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. 2ND ISSUE >The MTC does not automatically lose its exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases by the mere allegation of a tenancy relationship. As

thoroughly discussed in Rivera v. Santiago ,41 the party alleging tenancy must prove the existence of all the essential requisites of tenancy in order to oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the case. > In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in their Answer with Counterclaim. Under the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary Procedure], the MTC was supposed to conduct a preliminary conference to determine if such relationship was indeed the real issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not automatically lose its jurisdiction simply because respondents raised tenancy as a defense. It continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. > To determine whether the CA was correct in its reversal of the trial court, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential requisites of tenancy which are as follows: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties; (4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties. All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged; to divest the MTC of jurisdiction, they must all be shown to be present. > In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessor-in-interest submitted evidence to substantiate the existence of the essential requisites of tenancy. Thus, there is no basis at all to support petitioners claim that the MTC was without jurisdiction to render the questioned Decision. HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK FACTS:

>March 21, 1961 Sps. Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena a loan payable on March 21, 1962. Loan was cured by a mortgage on 2 lots in Cubao. The interest for 1 year was paid in advance. >3 mos. after loan was obtained, the bank became a distress bank. -June 6, 1961: Acting Gov. of the Central Bank apprised the stockholders of Lucena Bank after having found that the officers, directors and employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound and unsafe banking practices. >The Monetary Board advised the stockholders to reorganize the Lucena bank by electing a new board of directors and directed that bank (a) not to grant new loans or renewals; (b) not to accept deposits from new depositors; (c) to service only the existing deposit accounts and (d) not to issue drafts or make any disbursements without the prior approval of Central Bank examiners. >The Monetary Board gave the warning that, if its directives were not obeyed, the Central Bank. would take over the management of the Lucena bank. June 21, 1961 Instead of bowing to the will of the Monetary Board, the Lucena bank and its board of directors filed with the CFI of Manila a complaint seeking to restrain the implementation of Resolution No. 928. August 22, 1961 Before the expiration of the one-year term of the loan, Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by means of a check for P6,000 dated August 8, 1961 which was drawn against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Fernandez As the bank's executive vice president was not available, the payment was not consummated. >At the time that the check was issued, the San Pablo Colleges, had a deposit in the Lucena bank amounting to P11,890.16 (27 tsn April 25, 1966). Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San Pablo Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount w/ Hernandez. It is not

clear whether in August, 1961 the San Pablo Colleges could make a withdrawal from its deposit in the Lucena bank. August 23, 1961 Hernandez sent to the bank by registered mail a photostat of the check and a letter inquiring whether the bank would honor the check and when he should go personally to the bank for that purpose. That letter was received by the bank on August 29. August 30, 1961 the executive vice-president wrote to Hernandez and informed him that the check could not be honored for the time being because of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations. What the vice-president meant was that by reason of the letter of the Central Bank Governor dated June 16. 1961 the operations of the Lucena bank were suspended. >The vice-president explained that because there was a run the bank its assets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernandez, which check was drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepted. >The vice-president said that when Hernandez presented the check, the Lucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdrawals and that had Hernandez paid cash, his payment would have been accepted. To honor the check would have been tantamount to allowing a depositor (San Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucena bank could not entertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Bank examiners. Payment by check was a disbursement. >The VP did not take the trouble of asking the Central Bank examiners whether the payment by check made by Hernandez could be accepted. Hernandez, who should have known that the bank was in distress, did not bother to take up his problem with the said examiners. October 18, 1961 Hernandez again asked the bank when he could deliver the check. October 24, 1961 EVP told him that the bank could not yet honor the check because it had not resumed its banking operations, that it might

reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not be due until March 21, 1962. February 1, 1962 Hernandez sent another letter enclosed the original check (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank dated March 7, 1962, which was sent by registered mail and special delivery. March 7, 1962 - the check was returned to Hernandez because the bank's manager was allegedly in Manila. April 25, 1962 - Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank on April 25, with the request that his mortgage be cancelled. >In the meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Lucena Bank. February 8, 1962 Governor of the Central Bank in a letter enjoined the Lucena bank from transacting business and advised it to turn over its assets, documents and records to the chief bank examiner. The bank building was sealed. February 12, 1962 the Lucena Bank filed with the Court of First Instance of Lucena City a complaint praying that the Central Bank be enjoined from liquidating the said bank. February 14, 1962 the court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction which it dissolved ten days later. >On the same date, FEBRUARY 14, 1962, the Manila court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 47345, restraining the enforcement of the Monetary Board resolution, which required the Lucena bank to undertake a reorganization and to curtail its operations [THIS IS THE PREVIOUS CASE FILED BY THE LUCENA BANK AGAINST MB]. The Central Bank appealed. >To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation of the Lucena bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its

charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed with the Court of first Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27, 1962 for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank [THIS IS ANOTHER CIVIL CASE]. March 28, 1963 CFI Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative. April 2, 1963 Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 426 designated the Superintendent of Banks or his duly authorized representative to take charge of the assets of the Lucena bank. November 27, 1963 The Board in its resolution ordered the Superintendent of Banks to convert the assets of the Lucena bank to money. The Lucena bank, by means of certiorari sought to annul the liquidation proceeding. This Court denied its petition. October 29, 1963 Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had sent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the chock for P6,000. He again requested that his mortgage be cancelled. December 9, 1963 Associate Superintendent of Banks in his answer returned the check to Hernandez and informed him that, according to the Lucena bank's executive vice-president, the check could not be applied to the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was already closed when he received the check. Moreover, the chock was drawn against the current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank which was in the process of liquidation. Hernandez was advised to settle his account by paying cash or by means of a chock drawn against a bank other than the Lucena bank. December 16, 1963 Hernandez announced to the Associate Superintendent of Banks in his letter of that he was going to deposit the said check in the court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before December 26, 1963.

January 2, 1964 Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. That letter was received in court on January 6, 1964. January 11, 1964 Hernandez wrote a letter informing the Associate Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. Copies of that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges. October 12, 1964 - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000. October 20, 1964 Ventral Bank filed a motion to dismiss contending that the venue was improper because the action involved a real property so it should have been instituted in QC where the lots are situated. Also, Lucena Bank is under liquidation and its properties and assets are in custodial egis and may only be reached by motion in CFI Manila. January 30, 1967 the counsel of Lucena offered to compromise the case by stipulating that the central Bank would apply the check in question to the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check of P6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint and counterclaim would be dismissed. The compromise did not happen because the lawyers of Hernandez and Central Bank did not assent to it. October 31, 1967 RTC rendered an amended decision ordering Lucena or Central Bank to honor the check, cancel the mortgage and pay Hernandez damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE/S: The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred: (1) in not holding that the venue was improperly laid;

(2) in not holding that it had no jurisdiction because the Hernandez spouses should have ventilated their claim in the liquidation proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Instead of filing a separate action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City; (3) in not holding that there was no valid consignation; (4) in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees; and (5) in ordering execution pending appeal in spite of the tact that the assets of the Lucena bank are in custodia legis or in the custody of the liquidation court and the receiver appointed by it. RATIO: RTC judgment is reversed and set aside. The case is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take up with the liquidation court(proper venue to resolve this case) the settlement of their mortgage obligation. HELD: (1)Defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hernandez spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated. >Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies". >The rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure

the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. >Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. >The venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is not the same as an action in personam. We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile. GO vs UCPB Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals, where the respondent judge is directed to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. FACTS: >Go & Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International and a lot more of Noahs Ark Enterprises. Sometime in August 1996, they both applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with UCPB for 900M, which the UCPB approved. >Transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over lands located in Mandaluyong and registered under Looyukos name and another lot registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.

July 21, 1997 the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to them was cancelled by UCPB. As a result, Go demanded from UCPB the return of 2 TCTs covered by the Real Estate Mortgages executed. UCPB refused to return of the TCTs. It proceeded to have the 2 pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized and caused for its registration before the RD of Mandaluyong on September 2, 1997. June 15, 1999 UCPB filed with the Sheriff of Mandaluyong an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by a TCT for non-payment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. The public auction sale of the property was set on 11 April and 3 May 2000. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injuction, against the bank and its officers and the sheriff, with the RTC of Pasig. The amended complaint alleged: >Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT, which will be auctioned, although it was registered only in the name of Looyuko; >UCPB was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign 2 deeds of real estate mortgage covering the said property; >The approved omnibus credit line applied for by Go and Looyuki did not materialize and was cancelled by UCPB on July 21, 1997 and so the pre-signed real estate mortgages were cancelled; >He demanded from UCPB the 2 TCTs to be returned to him but the bank refused; >Despite the cancellation of the credit line, UCPB had the 2 deeds or real estate mortgage notarized and caused the extrajudicial foreclosure; >That the auction sale be enjoined; >TCTs be returned to him and bank be ordered to pay him for damages. June 7, 2000 UCPB filed motion to dismiss stating that: > that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees; > that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;

>an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint states no cause of action; >that the complaint was improperly verified; and >that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false certification of non-forum shopping. June 7, 2000 RTC issued an order enjoining the auction sale and granted the writ for preliminary injunction. August 9, 2000 RTC denied banks motion to dismiss the case. The MR was denied as well on November 8, 2000. January 3, 2001 UCPB questioned said orders before CA via petition for certiorari alleging that the RTC acted w/o or in excess of jurisdiction w/ grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order that denied the motion to dismiss and the MR. July 31, 2002 CA set aside the orders of RTC and ordered for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of improper venue. 14 November 2002 Gos MR was denied. ISSUE/S: Whether petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue? HELD: Petition denied for lack of merit. The assailed decisions denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. RATIO: >In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include

partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies. >Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.22 The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4. >It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said cases are filed. >The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,31 is more particularly instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is the Court of First Instance of Laguna. >In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.35 An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies. Rule 1, Sections 1 6 Rules of Court Paderanga vs. Buissan (September 1993) TO DETERMINE THE PROPER VENUE OF AN ACTION TO FIX THE PERIOD OF A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH PRAYER FOR DAMAGES FACTS:

In 1973,PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA Industries company as represented by its General Manager JOSE ELUMBA entered into an oral contract of lease o For the use of a commercial space in a building owner by PADERANGA o The lease was for an indefinite period, but the rent was agreed as P150/month o The leased area was used as the sales office of Allied Air Freight in Ozamis City 1977 PADERANGA subdivided the leased area into two o He took possession of the other half o Repossession was allowed by the local manager of ELUMBA July 1977, ELUMBA instituted an action for damages and PRAYED FOR THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF LEASE AT 5 years. o They filed the action before the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City PADERANGA then moved for the dismissal of the case because the action was a REAL ACTION which should have been filed before CFI of Misamis Occidental in Ozamis City, because the property was situated there. 1978 Judge BUISSAN denied the Motion to dismiss o Because it was an enforcement of the contract of lease o No question of ownership was raised o The venue was then proper MR of PADERANGA was also denied o Although there was an action for recovery of possession, it was not the main issue raised (remember, Dean said that the main issue/contention is what is alleged in the initiatory pleading, in this case, the recovery of possession was ONLY incidental to the contract of lease, and claim for damages) ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES o PADERANGA

Since it is a real action, venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory where the property lies. o ELUMBA The recovery of possession being incidental, the original action is for breach of the contract of lease, and damages The action is one in personam (between parties) and not in rem (against the whole world) Therefore, the venue may be laid in the place where plaintiff-defendant resides ISSUE: Whether the action filed is a personal action or a real action? HELD: - The case is deemed a real action and must be tried in the province WHERE the property lies (OZAMIS CITY). o The instant action is for damages, and the fixing of the lease period Although there the recovery of possession is incidental, IT IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE Karas train of thought DAMAGES WHY? BREACH OF CONTRACT, a portion of the property leased was repossessed by the lessor IF the damages is granted the repossessed portion will likewise be returned to the lessee THEREFORE, the recovery of possession IS INCIDENTAL the initial action filed. Even though the action did not seek for recovery of possession, it is the ULTIMATE PURPOSE of the action, and as such, it is a real action because you want to recover something. Personal Action Real RTC where the defendant or any of the defendants reside or where plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs reside RTC having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject

Action

property or a portion thereof lies

INCIDENTAL ISSUE: Whether or not the venue for an action to fix the period of a contract of lease should be before the CFI Misamis Occidental OZAMIS CITY(where the property is) or the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte DIPOLOG CITY (where ELUMBA is based)? HELD: The venue should be in Ozamis City. - The court pointed out that ELUMBA is confused with the concept of personal and real actions vis--vis actions in personam and in rem. We will focus on personal and real actions o The action instituted is in personam but this does not mean that the action is PERSONAL. A personal action may not necessarily be an action in personam and a real action may not be an action in rem Action in personam Action in rem An action against a person on the basis of his PERSONAL liability Is an action against the THING itself, instead of the person

PNB vs. CA (1987) *GUYS Im not sure if this is the correct case, I dont have the SCRA copy. So, Im saying sorry if this is the wrong one. PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CA WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES FACTS: - In 1952, Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG mortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani - In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to guarantee the loan of her son VITUG - The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata MONTEMAYOR

VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the loan o Cert of Sale was issued to PNB o PNB later on sold the properties HISTORY (sorry, this is important to understand the case) o Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second wife is MONTEMAYOR o He died intestate (with no will) and his estate was settled and distributed MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (meaning, the court made her the administer the estate of Clodualdo) MONTEMAYOR entered a contract of lease with two of her children o But then the other children filed an action for partition and reconveyance and damages against the administrator of MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montemayor already passed away) o They also included PNB in the action, because PNB sold the mortgaged properties THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels of land, which they claim to be CLODUALDOs and MONTEMAYORS They argue that o The mortgage to PNB as well as o The PUBLIC AUCTION are null and void. They invoke a previous court decision wherein the properties were decided to be of conjugal nature. 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA Reversed lower court decision stating that the public auction of the properties are valid, but only HALF.

SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance and damages? HELD: NO. - Remember that there was a previous decision stating that the parcels of land are of conjugal nature o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto. o PNB was only included because the subject properties were sold. REMEMBER LAND TITLES (and this will apply to your Credit Trans): A mortgaged property should be in the name of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The property is a security for the payment of the loan. PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they even question the validity of the titles? The titles were in the name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore, they dont have to look beyond the title. - Actions for the recovery of real property and for partition ARE REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personam that bind particular individuals who are parties thereto. o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by said decisions PNB was also not aware of the case and the said decision, because of they knew the conjugal nature of the property, they would have required the consent of all the heirs (co-owners). WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay

attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Tesorero vs. Mathay (1990) PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ENERGY FACTS: - 1980 respondent Davao Light (DALIGHT) filed with public respondent BOE an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties worth P339M o The appraisal was made by the Technical and Management Service (TAMSPHIL) - June 1981, the BOE disapproved the TAMSPHIL Appraisal report due to deficiencies and discrepancies - 1982, DALIGHT again filed an application for the approval of its appraisal, this time Asian Appraisal Co conducted the appraisal - 1983, DOE approved P282M as the fair and reasonable value of DALIGHTs properties, and DALIGHT received the same - Jan 1984 (17 days after receiving the decision), the petitioners filed an MR but the same was denied, but the petitioners did not receive the decision - June 1984, petitioners prayed that a hearing be conducted and/or a resolution be issued on their MR - BOE replied that the MR has been denied, and provided copies of the decision ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case? HELD: NO. - The proper remedy is to appeal to the Office of the President 7 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF ITS DECISIONS OR ORDERS. - It must be noted that the decision was received on Dec 19, 1983, but the petitioners ONLY filed their MR on Jan 5, 1984 or 17 days after from receipt of the said decision

They received the copy of the denied MR on Dec 1984 The Court in the broader interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant recourse and considering the dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval It is also well settled that litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits and not technicalities, that this Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the merits. A careful review of the records show that this case will not only affect herein petitioners but also the more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao City and its environs. It appears more appropriate to consider the petition on its merits rather than dismiss it on technicalities.

Manila Hotel vs CA GR No 143574 July 11 2002 MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SAMUEL ALCORDO, respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57760, which dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari assailing the October 29, 1999 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CN. 00-12-09877-98.3 Facts: Private respondent was hired by petitioner on as Food and Beverage Director. On November 30, 1998 his services were terminated on the ground of loss of confidence due to his inability to improve the profitability of the restaurants under his responsibility. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.

On June 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision4 dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner was, however, ordered to pay private respondents one month salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day advance notice of dismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its failure to comply with procedural due process. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner Manila Hotel to pay full backwages, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, and moral and exemplary damages. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied. A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition on the following grounds: o 1) the petition was not accompanied with copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the position paper of the parties; o 2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by Atty. Martin B. Isidro, petitioners counsel and Assistant VicePresident, Personnel Department; and o 3) the petition was not accompanied with a board resolution authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for and in behalf of petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner alleging that the failure to attach said documents to the petition was due to inadvertence or oversight.7 Attached to the motion were copies of the omitted decision of the Labor Arbiter, the position papers, as well as the required board resolution.8 Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration stressing that under Rule 46, Section 3, in relation to Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to append copies of relevant documents is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari praying for a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure. The petition is without merit.

Issue: Whether or not procedural rules can be liberally construed? Held: No Ratio: Pertinent portion of Rule 65, Section 1 and Rule 46, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. . . . . The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied) The Court of Appeals outrightly dismissed petitioners action on the ground that the petition was not accompanied with the required board resolution authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to institute the petition; as well as copies of the Labor Arbiters decision and the position paper of the parties. The issue posed before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the termination of private respondents employment. Hence, the need to append copies of the Labor Arbiters decision and the position papers of the parties. Under the circumstances, there was a necessity for the appellate court to review the facts and the law on which the conclusions were based, considering the conflicting findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.

Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.9 Petitioner contends that the omission of the required documents is due to "oversight" or "inadvertence." In Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,10 however, the Court held that "oversight" and "excusable negligence" have become an all too familiar and ready excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice. In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent reason for the Court to be liberal in the application of the rules.11 Hence, the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds must be sustained. Petition is DENIED. Resolution of Court of Appeals affirmed. Rebollido vs CA GR No 81123 February 28 1989 CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN REBOLLIDO, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents.

The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident are lack of jurisdiction over the defendant and absence of due process. Facts: August 7, 1984, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. 8113 for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1, 1984, involving a Mazda Minibus owned and driven by petitioners Crisostomo Rebollido and Fernando Valencia, respectively and a truck trailer owned at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto Alva. September 21, 1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the defendants (PepsiCola). It was received by one Nanette Sison who claims to be authorized to receive the summons as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages. When the default judgment became final and executory, the petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private respondent PEPSICO, Inc. At that time, the private respondent, a US corporation, was already occupying the place of business of Pepsi Cola at Legaspi Village, Makati to prepare for the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola. The dissolution of Pepsi Cola was approved by the SEC, one day after the accident occurred, March 2, 1984. The Board of Directors and the stockholders of Pepsi Cola adopted its amended articles of incorporation to shorten its corporate term. Immediately after such amendment, Pepsi Cola cause the publication of a notice of dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the private respondent in a newspaper of general circulation.

Realizing that the judgment of the lower court would eventually be executed against it, respondent PEPSICO, Inc., opposed the motion for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of summons to a mere clerk. The lower court denied the motion of the private respondent holding that despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the private respondent, there was proper service of summons upon defendant Pepsi Cola. The lower court said that under Section 122 of the Corporation Code, the defendant continued its corporate existence for three (3) years from the date of dissolution. The private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the respondent court (CA) to annul and set aside the judgment of the lower court and its order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction ruling that there was no valid service of summons. The appellate court stated that any judgment rendered against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the private respondent within the contemplation of the undertaking, but service of summons should be made upon the private respondent itself. It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private respondent be summoned and be given its day in court. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: (1) whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to whom summons should be served in the civil case for damages; and (2) whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette Sison, allegedly the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. If there was valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola, the issue arises as to whether or not such service validly vested jurisdiction on the lower court over the person of the respondent corporation.

Held: (1)Pepsi Cola is the real party in interest . (2) There was valid service of summons Ratio: (1) On the first issue, the petitioner maintain that it is Pepsi Cola which is the real party in the case before the trial court because when the accident happened one day before the date of legal dissolution, Pepsi Cola was still the registered owner of the truck involved. Being solidarily liable with its driver for damages, there appears to be no question that the complaint and summons were correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that: Parties in interest - Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. ... . In the case of Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals real party-in-interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. In the case of Walter Ascona Lee vs. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr, a real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal rights of the former. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another. The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola, A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and

its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made a party to a suit according to the Corporation Code. In American jurisprudence, a similar provision in the Corporate Act of 1896 was construed with respect to the kinds of suits that can be prosecuted against dissolved corporations: xxx xxx xxx ... The words 'defending suits against them mean suits at law or in equity, in contract or tort, or of what nature soever, and whether begun before or after dissolution. The rationale for extending the period of existence of a dissolved corporation is explained in Castle's Administrator v. Acrogen Coal, Co. (145 Ky 591,140 SW 1034 [1911]) as follows: The person who has a valid claim against a corporation, whether it arises in contract or tort should not be deprived of the right to prosecute an action for the enforcement of his demands by the action of the stockholders of the corporation in agreeing to its dissolution. The dissolution of a corporation does not extinguish obligations or liabilities due by or to it. In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitioners against Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of action accrued, i.e. on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong. (2) Although it maybe true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same ..., nevertheless since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance, with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the purpose of said rule as above stated to assure service of summons on the corporation had thereby been attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a technicality.' (at p. 469; Emphasis supplied).

The valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola operated as a sufficient service of summons upon the private respondent. The lower court can enforce judgment against the private respondent. Therefore, we rule that the private respondent is bound to satisfy the judgment by default which has become final and executory. The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the private respondent to vacate judgment. G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989 BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and ROMEO HUGHES, respondents. OVERVIEW The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorization from the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The private respondent was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as a bus driver until the incident in question, when he was relieved of his duties. The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was driving Baliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owing to a jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, the bus was hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine National Railways that dragged it several meters. Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physical injuries. Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision rendered on April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any contributory negligence.

Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNR, he had his driver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement with Baliwag Transit. He repeated his request several times even after the dismissal of the criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistance of Minister Ople, who wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "implored" the private respondent's re- employment. As this request was also ignored, Hughes finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 1980. On May 10, 1980, the petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his driver's license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous to the riding public." CIV PRO FACTS The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to file on July 29, 1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for illegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for his reinstatement with back wages from May 10, 1980. On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by Director Francisco L. Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of prescription, "it appearing that although the private respondent was separated from the service on 10 August 1974 (date of the accident), it was not until 29 July 1980, or a little less than 6 years thereafter, when he filed the complaint." The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister Ople in his order dated May 21, 1981. The question that has to be settled is the date when the cause of action accrued and from which the period shall commence to run.The contention of Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when the collision occurred. Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demand for reinstatement was rejected by the petitioner. SC = Hughes is correct its May 10, 1980.

It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not have accrued from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date. At best, he was deemed suspended from his work. There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and his employer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witness in its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we may assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms when the case was being tried. We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the date when his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitioner denied his demand for reinstatement. Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after such rejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed. G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939

ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees. On June 11 , 1930, defendant Esteban Icaragal, for value received, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in security for its payment, said Esteban Icaragal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pagil, Laguna. Promissor defaulted in the payment. Plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due. Judgment was there rendered for Bachrach. A writ of execution was subsequently issued. The provincial sheriff of Laguna levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff. Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933. The sheriff desisted from the sale of the property, as a consequence, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered Bachrach took the present appeal. Whether or not Bachrach is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security. SC = Yes Bachrach is barred. We rule against splitting a single cause of action. For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Both refer to one and the same obligation. There exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). We hold, therefore, that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. He may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985

GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, petitioner-plaintiff-appellant, vs. LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU, respondents-defendants-appellees. Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject him was filed. A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00 representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. Bacalans answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff against the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual and moral damages in the amount of no less than P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages. In addition, defendant has been compelled to retain the services of undersigned counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolous claim and to protect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himself to pay the further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees." City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of P150.00 as attorney's fees. The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby required in favor of the defendant. 1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay a) P10,000.00 as moral damages; b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and 2. With costs against plaintiff The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of execution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment. Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied. With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning for the following reasons: (a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs) distributed thus: P10,000.00 as moral damages P5,000.00 as exemplary damages P1,000.00 as attorney's fees which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and ruled: This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid cause of action. Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment. Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin? SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy. The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same. G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986 REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents. Facts: Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of

Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). The order appealed from states two causes of action; the first cause of action is against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643, and the second one is against respondent Calion for refusing to pay the amount P10,212. On December 15, 1983, respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00 (RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20,000). It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows: THIS IS THE PRESENT RULE ... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ... Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus: Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are

owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of the FORMER RULE under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows: ... Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ... Issue: W/N Court was correct in dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction Held: Yes. RTC does not have the proper jurisdiction over the case. Ratio: There is no difference between the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint. Each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

[G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005] SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents. Facts: The petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Paranaque, Metro Manila. On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the former sold the property to the latter payable in six installments via postdated checks. It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. On May 17, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint against the respondents with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands therefor.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action. On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Paranaque City, where the property subject matter of the action was located. In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorney's fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages (legal basis: Sec 5(c) Rule 2). On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order granting the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was a real action and should have been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City where the property subject matter of the complaint was located. Hence the present recourse.

Issue: W/N the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan Held: No, petition was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdication. Ratio: The Court ruled that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter's refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the

respondents. The claim for damages are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action. Being a real action, it should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Paraaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.