PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, represented by MAYOR PABLO R.

OLIVARES, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed against the decision of the CA annulling an order of execution of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, in an expropriation case. Brief Statement of Facts Paranaque City filed a civil case for the expropriation of several lots which was owned by herein petitioner. After depositing the required amount in the court, it filed an ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted the motion. Subsequently, PIRC moved for reconsideration of the decision. It contended, among others, that the court has no jurisdiction over the property because the same is in custody of PCGG by virtue of a pending action. It prayed as well that the LGU should vacate the property. Issue in the RTC Whether or not the expropriation case should be denied and the LGU be ordered to vacate Ruling The expropriation case is denied. The LGU is ordered to vacate. Paranaque moved to reconsider but the same was denied. It later filed an appeal but before it is transmitted to the CA, PIRC asked for a writ of execution of the aforesaid decision. The court then granted the latters petition. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 The case was, however, referred by the SC to CA. Issue in the CA Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ Ruling in the CA The court ruled in the Affirmative and thereby annulled the order of the court a quo Appeal to the SC

Petition for Review on certiorari under rule 45 Issue in the SC Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the order granting the writ of execution Ruling of the SC The court ruled in the negative. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal.- On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may in its discretion, order execution to issue before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be included therein. The aforesaid Section 2 prescribes the following requisites for the valid exercise of the discretion: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. Our examination of PIRCs motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate and the appointment of the special sheriff shows that it contained no notice of hearing to PARAAQUE. The notice was a request directed to the Clerk of Court to submit the motion to the court for its consideration and approval immediately upon receipt thereof, A notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court, and not to the parties, is no notice at all. To these must be added the palpable absence of any good reason to justify execution pending appeal. In the subject incident, defendant alleges and explains that the continued possession of the Municipality of defendants property has caused and will continue to cause great damage to defendant. Good reasons that allow or justify execution pending appeal must be superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. The above reasons relied upon by the trial court hardly qualify as good. In the first place, PIRC did not offer any evidence to prove the great damage it alleged in its motion. Public interest was clearly involved, thus prudence and utmost circumspection, instead of undue haste, should have guided the trial court away from capriciousness. BELL CARPETS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MILAGROS CAGUIOA, VICTOR R. STA. ANA and MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC., respondents.

Brief Statement of the Case This is an appeal on certiorari under Rule 45 filed against the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming en toto the decision of RTC Pasig City. Brief Statement of the Facts In the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, 1 Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. sued Carpets International (Phils.), Inc. for the recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of yarn ordered by the latter. The complaint contained an application for preliminary attachment. Carpets International filed an answer admitting certain facts but mostly deny all other allegations. The writ of preliminary attachment prayed for in the complaint issued ex parte 4 and pursuant thereto, the sheriff seized the machinery, equipment, raw materials and finished products ostensibly belonging to Carpets International. Later, an affidavit of third-party claim was presented by herein petitioner. In that affidavit, it laid claim to some of the attached property, i.e., the inventory, finished products and hand tools. In a motion, private respondent moved for leave to implead petitioner as party defendant for the reason that it and Carpets International are one and the same entity. It was granted. Private respondent filed a motion for summary judgment dated 20 August 1985 for the reason that the indebtedness, the amount thereof, and the ownership of the attached properties were all admitted by Carpets International. The honorable Judge then rendered a summary judgment. Subsequently, private respondent moved for execution pending appeal for the reason, among others, that (1) the finished goods that were attached easily deteriorate and go out of fashion insofar as the shades and colors are concerned, thus making them unsaleable, and their continued storage will only make them dirty and further depreciate their value. It was granted. A motion to reconsider was file but it was denied. Appeal to the IAC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion Ruling Negative. The judgment made by the RTC is affirmed.

Appeal to the SC Appeal on certiorari under Rule 45 Issue Whether or not it was error on the part of the IAC in not nullifying the orders of the court a quo Ruling The court ruled in the negative. In the first place, the judgment of the Trial Court sought to be annulled has become final and executory by reason of BCITC's failure to appeal therefrom within the time appointed, i.e., 15 days from notice of the judgment. The summary judgment was unquestionably a final one. No appeal was taken from the summary judgment. 9 Instead a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying for the annulment of the judgment. In any event, the facts, as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court to have been duly established from the pleadings, affidavits and other papers on record, show that the summary judgment was correctly and properly rendered by the Trial Court. The issues raised by Carpets International and BCITC in their answers (to the complaint of MBSMI) are demonstrably sham, fictitious, contrived. SHUHEI YASUDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLUE CROSS INSURANCE, INC., respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31402 on November 11, 1993 and setting aside the writs of execution pending appeal issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59. Brief Statement of the Case Petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to collect from defendants YRL Shipping Co. S.A., Azucar Shipping Corp., Eduardo Lopingco, Enrique Rojas, and Arnold Savella a certain sum of money. It also asked for damages, issuance of an arrest order, preliminary attachment, restraining order and injunction. The amount represents the alleged equity interest and share of petitioner in the income of YRL Shipping Co. derived from its operations here in the Philippines under a Bareboat Charter Agreement with the Azucar Shipping Corp. Such amount was allegedly withheld by the defendants from petitioner.

In an order dated January 16, 1990, the RTC granted petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitionerplaintiff. In addition, it ordered the defendants to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Defendants, except Savella, appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. On February 16, 1993 upon petitioner's motion and over the vigorous opposition of defendants except Savella, the trial court issued an order allowing execution pending appeal of a portion of its decision awarding actual or compensatory damages. The trial court found that there are good reasons to justify the execution of the judgment pending appeal, namely, that the appeal taken by the defendants is dilatory; that herein petitioner is a Japanese national and is sickly; that the vessel M/V "Valiant" has been left to waste and deteriorating at the pier, and is in grave danger of losing its value; and that petitioner posted bond to answer for any damages which the defendants may suffer if the court later finds that petitioner is not entitled thereto. Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution. However, the defendants cannot be located and their properties could not be determined by the sheriff. Hence, they go after private respondent. Private respondent Blue Cross, as surety of the defendants, sought recourse to the CA. Appeal to the CA Special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction Issue Whether or not the petition should be granted Ruling Affirmative. It set aside the writs of execution pending appeal issued by the trial court, insofar as private respondent is concerned. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the writ of execution Ruling The court ruled in the affirmative. The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Par. 3, section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case but to delay. One "good reason" upheld by this Court to justify execution pending appeal is the deterioration of commodities subject of litigation. In the present case, petitioner, in his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, cites as a ground for its allowance, the deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V "Valiant". He claims that the vessel has been left to rot at the pier and without a crew to guard it. It is in grave danger of losing its value. The vessel, practically abandoned, is exposed to the varied elements of nature, such as rains and storms, not to mention human elements such as invasion or robbery. CRISANTO DE BORJA, in his capacity as administrator of the Intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, petitioner, vs. DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, MARCELA, SATUNINA, JUAN, EUFRASIA, JACOBA and OLIMPIA, all surnamed DE BORJA, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of execution of another order, which had been or was to be appealed, directing the herein petitioner, Crisanto de Borja, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, "to deliver the properties assigned in the project of partition to the heirs, Marcela, Saturnina, Juan, Eufrasia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed De Borja, within five days." Brief Statement of the Facts Marcelo de Borja had left upon his death considerable property consisting mostly of lands, and the proceedings for the settlement of his estate were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Rizal about thirty years ago and still pending. As long ago as February, 1940, the probate court approved a project of partition, which is now final. That project of partition allotted to the estate of Quintin de Borja, then already deceased, certain properties as his share in the inheritance with this proviso: that "before delivery of the properties adjudicated to the testate estate of Quintin de Borja, the administrator of his estate (shall) execute the corresponding document of transfer in favor of the intestate estate of

Marcelo de Borja, of all the rights, interests, and participations that said Quintin de Borja has in civil case No. 6190 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entitled 'Quintin de Borja versus Feliciana Mariana'." The Nueva Ecija litigation referred to involved real properties registered in Quintin de Borja's name but claimed to be a part of Marcelo de Borja's estate; and to pave the way for the partition, which Quintin de Borja's children keenly desired, the latter agreed to transfer those properties to Marcelo de Borja's intestate estate. In pursuance of the terms of the partition, Marcela de Borja Vda. de Torres, as special administratrix of the estate of Quintin de Borja, on July 6, 1950 made a deed denominated "Cession of Rights,the pertinent part of which "sets and transfers absolutely and irrevocably unto the estate of Marcelo de Borja (special proceedings No. 2414 Court of First Instance of Rizal). It was on the strength of this cession of rights that the court issued the order whose execution Crisanto de Borja, the petitioner, wanted to stop. Appeal to the SC Petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the RRC Issue Whether or not the execution of the cession rights be restrained Ruling The court ruled in the negative. This intestate proceedings has been pending in this court for almost 29 years now. The Court can not justice continue to withhold from the heirs this estate the possession and enjoyment of the properties assigned to them in the Project of Partition. As a necessary precaution, however, the court required the heirs to post adequate and sufficient bond to respond for any lawful obligation that may be adjudged against them, if any, later on. It will be observed that this court has made similar orders for the delivery of the inheritance assigned to the other heirs of this estate. No appeal has been interposed against any of them. The court therefore understands that the other heirs have already received from the administrator the properties adjudicated to them, or that the same is in process. It is repugnant to all sense of fairness and justice to withhold from one group of heirs the inheritance due them when the others have already received theirs, or are about to do so. Even if all of the heirs are not similarly placed, the fact remains that the administrator or any other party is duly protected and can find relief, if he is entitled to any, against the bonds that the he airs have posted. It is the desire of this court to close this proceedings as promptly as practicable. The court expects co-operation from all the parties, principally the administrator and admonishes them to refrain from taking any step tending to delay the speedy settlement of this estate.

ANA RUBENITO and BABY MACAYA, petitioners, vs. LOLITA LAGATA, ROLANDO BINCANG, HON. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 75, MARIKINA CITY, and SHERIFF EDWIN C. GARCIA, respondents. Brief statement of the Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on December 21, 1999 which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Writ of Execution, the Notice to Vacate and the Order of Demolition of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 75), Marikina City. Brief Statement of Facts Private respondents Lolita Lagata and Rolando Bincang, who are registered owners of a parcel of land located in Interior Balubad Street, Nangka, Marikina City, filed with the Punong Barangay of Nangka, Marikina City a complaint for ejectment against petitioners Ana Rubenito and Baby Macaya. Mediation proceedings were conducted by the Punong Barangay, Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Subsequently, a compromise agreement or amicable settlement denominated as KASUNDUANG PAG-AAYOS was executed by the parties and attested to by the Punong Barangay. The petitioners agreed to vacate on December 11, 1991. However, on the agreed date, the petitioners did not vacate the premises. This prompted private respondents to file a complaint in the Metc for the execution of the compromise made in the Punong Barangay. Issue in the Metc Whether or not the writ should be granted Ruling The MeTC treated the complaint as an ordinary complaint for ejectment. The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that no prior demand to vacate was made upon petitioners. Appeal to the RTC Appeal under rule 40 of the RRC Issue Whether or not the Metc erred in dismissing the complaint Ruling Negative. The RTC treated the KASUNDUANG PAG-AAYOS as a mere contract.

Appeal to the CA Petition for Review under Rule 42 of RRC Issue Whether or not the court a quo erred in affirming the decision of the Metc Ruling Affirmative. Private respondents complaint before the MeTC was not for ejectment, as the lower courts have inadvertently treated it to be, but one for execution or enforcement of an unrepudiated amicable settlement arrived at in a barangay conciliation proceedings which by statute has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court. It added that since the complaint was filed within the proper period, it was the MeTCs ministerial duty to order the execution of the said amicable settlement, under which petitioners bound themselves to vacate the premises not later than December 11, 1991. Thus, the CA set aside the decision of the lower courts and directed the MeTC to order the execution of the disputed amicable settlement by ousting petitioners from the premises. Consequently, the MeTC proceeded as ordered by the CA. The petitioners asked for the lifting of the writ because the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over it. The decision of the CA was not yet received by them. But, the motion was denied. Appeal to the SC Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RRC, though the court treated as certiorari under Rule 65 due to the nature of its averments in the petition Issue Whether or not the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not lifting the writ and ordering demolition Ruling Negative. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

ZACARIAS COMETA and HERCO REALTY & AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE FRANCO, respondents.

Brief Statement of the Case This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challeging the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 25, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48277, entitled Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laggui, et al., and the Resolution dated January 27, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Brief Statement of Facts The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, at Makati rendered a decision in a civil case for Damages, entitled Jose Franco v. Zacarias Cometa, awarding to herein private respondent Jose Franco, the sum of P57,396.85. The judgment became final on March 9, 1978. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff levied on execution three (3) commercial lots of petitioner Zacarias Cometa located at Guadalupe, Makati. On October 17, 1978, two (2) of the lots were sold to respondent Franco at public auction for the amount of P57,396.85. On November 17, 1981, petitioner Herco Realty & Agricultural Development Corporation (Herco) filed Civil Case No. 43846 with the same CFI Rizal, Branch 15, to annul the levy on execution and sale at public auction of the real properties. The complaint alleged that the ownership of the lots had been transferred by Cometa to Herco before the execution sale. It assailed the validity of the levy and sale on the ground that the sheriff, in disregard of the proper procedural practice, immediately proceeded against Cometas real properties without first exhausting his personal properties; that the lots were sold en masse and not by parcel; and that the said properties which are commercial lots situated in Guadalupe, Makati, and are conservatively valued at P500,000.00, were sold only for P57,396.85, the amount of the judgment. Issue in the CFI Whether or not the levy and sale was valid Ruling The court dismissed the case on the ground of lack of interest in the prosecution of the complaint for failure of the representatives of Cometa and Herco to appear. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 16, 1996 and by this Court on January 20, 1997 in G.R. No. 126760. On February 26, 1997, this Courts Resolution which, in effect, upheld the validity of the assailed levy and sale, became final and executory. The heirs wanted to redeem the property but the CA ruled otherwise. It contended that the parties already lost their right due to the lapse of the period prescribed by the rules.

Appeal to the SC Petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 Issues Whether or not the CA erred in not affording them the right to redeem Whether the sale and levy was invalid Ruling Affirmative. While there is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a judicial sale of real property, nevertheless, where the inadequacy of the price is purely shocking to the conscience, such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it, the same will be set aside. Thus, in one case, the judicial sale of land worth P60,000.00 for P867.00 was considered shocking to the conscience. So also, the sale of properties at around 10% of their values, as when a radio worth P1,000.00 was sold for P100.00 and a matrimonial bed costing P500.00 was sold for P50.00, the price was held to be grossly inadequate. How much more the judicial sale of two (2) prime commercial lots located in Guadalupe, Makati, conservatively valued at P500,000.00 in 1987, to satisfy a money judgment of P57,396.85? Another, the questionable manner in which the said lots were levied upon and sold at public auction has, likewise, caught the attention of the Court. The manner of execution of money judgments is governed by Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was then in force, thus: SEC. 15. Execution of money judgments. The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal property of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and the accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. xxx (emphasis and italics supplied) In relation to the foregoing, Section 21, also of Rule 39, provides that SEC. 21. How property sold on execution; Who may direct manner and order of sale. All sales of property under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of nine in the morning and five in the afternoon. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more shall be sold. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots, they must be sold separately; or, when a portion of such real property is

claimed by a third person, he may require it to be sold separately. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual delivery, it must be sold within view of those attending the sale and in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such property shall consist of several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the officer holding the execution nor his deputy can become a purchaser, nor be interested directly or indirectly in any purchase at such sale. (emphasis and italics supplied) In the case at bar, the subject lots were sold en masse, not separately as above provided. The unusually low price for which they were sold to the vendee, not to mention his vehement unwillingness to allow redemption therein, only serves to heighten the dubiousness of the transfer. ST. DOMINIC CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO P. TENSUAN, RTC BRANCH LXXXIII, QUEZON CITY FRANCISCA B. BUSTAMANTE, FLAVIANO BUSTAMANTE, CARLOS ROBES, ADALIA FRANCISCO and AURORA FRANCISCO, respondents. Brief Satement of the Case This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated January 31, 1985 in AC-G. R. SP No. 00513 entitled "Francisca B. Bustamante, et al., v. Hon. Ricardo P. Tensuan, et al.," which set aside the orders of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11895, as well as the resolution dated April 16, 1985 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Brief Statement of the Facts A civil case entitled Ricardo Castulo and Juan V. Ebreo v. Carlos Robes and wife Adalia Francisco and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation" was filed seeking the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83783 in the name of the spouses Carlos Robes and Adaha Francisco. It appears that PHHC awarded the property in question to one Cristobal Santiago, Jr., in whose favor a final deed of sale was executed and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued. Subsequently, the Robes spouses mortgaged the realty to the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company. The mortgage lien was duly annotated on TCT 84387 on February 9, 1965. Thereafter, the aforesaid civil case was filed. Claiming legal interest in the property, the Bustamante spouses were allowed to intervene in the case.

On March 25, 1968, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on TCT 84387 at the instance of the Bustamante spouses. For failure of the Robes' spouses to pay the mortgage obligation, the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company foreclosed the lot and caused the same to be sold at public auction. The property was purchased by Aurora Francisco in whose favor a certificate of sale was issued. Before the sale of the land to St. Dominic, Aurora Francisco applied for a writ of possession and was granted. Later, Aurora Francisco sold the property to petitioner, St. Dominic Corporation. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. Q-11895 proceeded to judgment and favored the Bustamantes. When the judgment became final, the Bustamante spouses applied for a writ of execution. On June 29, 1982, Presiding Judge Tensuan issued an order granting the application for a writ of execution with the qualification, however, that "said writ may not be enforced and/or implemented as against the St. Dominic Corporation." Aggrieved with the amended decision, the Bustamantes sought recourse to the CA. Appeal to the IAC Petition for certiorari and mandamus Issue Whether or not the court a quo erred in amending its decision thereby exempting from execution St. Domic Corporation Ruling Affirmative. The respondent Judge is hereby ordered to cause the issuance of a writ of execution in strict conformity with the dispositive portion of the final and executory decision. Aggrieved by the reversal of the decision, St. Dominic Corporation sought recourse in this court. Appeal to SC Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Issue Whether or not the IAC erred in reversing the decision of the court a quo

Ruling Affirmative. Indeed, a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action (Vda. de Sengbengco v. Arellano, 1 SCRA 711; Hanopol v. Pilapil, 7 SCRA 452; and Hollero v. Court of Appeals, 1 1 SCRA 3 1 0). It is elementary that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court (Bien v. Sunga, 117 SCRA 249) and such judgment is not available as an adjurtication either against or in favor of such other person. A decision of a court will not operate to divest the rights of a person who has not and has never been a party to a litigation, either as plaintiff or defendant (Granados v. Monton, 86 Phil., 42). Verily, execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party in the case, has not yet had his day in court (City of Bacolod, et al., v. Hon. Enriquez, et al., 101 Phil., 644; Tayson v. Angeles v. Icasiano, et al., 83 Phil., 921; Manza v. Hon. Vicente Santiago, etc., 96 Phil., 938; and Angara v. Gorospe, et al., 101 Phil., 79). It is clear from the records that petitioner St. Dominic Corporation had never been impleaded as a party to Civil Case No. Q-11895 filed by Ricardo Castulo and Juan V. Ebreo. The complaint had for its purpose the nullification of the award to Cristobal Santiago, Jr., and the subsequent sale between Santiago and the spouses Adalia Francisco and Carlos Robes. Such proceedings neither involved nor affected St. Dominic Corporation. VIRGILIA CABRESOS, WELDELINO CABRESOS, RUBYLIN CABRESOS, LUZVIMINDA CABRESOS, MARILOU CABRESOS, ROQUELITO CABRESOS and SYLVIA LUNA CABRESOS, petitioners, vs. MEYNARDO A. TIRO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, DAMASO B. DAHINO in his capacity as Provincial Deputy Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, RAMON QUIZ and GENEROSA ENRIQUEZ, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to modify the proceedings in the execution stage of the judgment in Civil Case No. 3150 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in its implementation. Brief statement of Facts Private respondents filed against spouses Galicano and Florentina Cabresos a case for recovery of ownership and possession of a portion of a residentialcommercial parcel of land situated in the Poblacion of Balingoan Misamis Oriental. Issue in the CFI Whether or not the spouses cabresos should vacate Ruling

The court ruled in the affirmative. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the above judgment. Later, an entry of judgment was made. The private respondents filed a motion for execution. Consequently, Judge Teves issued a writ of execution ordering, among others, to deliver to plaintiffs the two buildings constructed by defendants in bad faith on said land in litigation without right to indemnity. The writ triggered the filing of the present petition. The petitioners who are the wife and children of one Rodolfo Cabresos, a son of the spouses Galicano and Florentina Cabresos, refused to vacate the second building referred to in the above writ. The records show that at the time the civil case was filed, there was only one house built on the premises in question. It was only during the pendency of the litigation that the petitioner's building was constructed. Initially, said construction was just a small "camarin" but later on the petitioners made it into a dwelling place. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 of the RRC Issue Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in including them in the execution even though they are not parties to the adjudged civil case Ruling Negative. The petitioners are privies to the case for recovery of ownership and possession filed by the former against the latter's predecessors-in-interest, the latter being the daughter-inlaw and grandchildren of the losing party in Civil Case No. 3150. By the term "privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action. There is no doubt that the assailed decision is binding on the petitioners. The house they constructed while the case was pending started out only as a "camarin" which was converted into a house. With respect to the contention of the petitioners that there exists a variance between the dispositive portion of the questioned decision and the writ of execution subject of this petition, the said contention is untenable. The order to vacate the litigated premises extends to those considered as privies to the action for recovery of ownership and possession. The fact that the petitioners' house is not strictly speaking the same structure referred to in the dispositive portion of the said civil action does not bring them outside the ambit of the order to vacate. What the rule prohibits is for the writ of execution to be different from or to exceed the terms of the judgment. Notwithstanding the inclusion of the second house in the writ of execution issued to enforce it, that judgment remains unaltered or unmodified considering that the alleged owners of said house are the successors-in-interest of the petitioners.

EXEQUIEL LISING and LORETA VIOLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE ANDRES PLAN, MAMERTO LICUANAN, VICENTE GARCIA and ESTRELLA MAGAT, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This is a Petition for mandamus filed by petitioner-spouses Exequiel Lising and Loreta Viola to compel respondent Judge to issue a Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. Br. II-428 and Civil Case No. Br. II-765 of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, against respondent spouses Vicente Garcia and Estrella Magat. Brief Statement of the Facts The LISINGS were the original registered owners of a lot consisting of several hectares located at Santiago, Isabela. The Disputed Property became the subject of four civil suits, all decided by the Court of First Instance of Isabela. In Civil Case No. 65 (Exequiel Lising vs. Gaspar Aquino, or the LISING-AQUINO Case), it was declared that AQUINO is the owner of the southwestern portion of the Disputed Property. The LISINGS, however, sold the entire lot to private respondent Mamerto LICUANAN. Subsequently, the LISINGS offered to repurchase the lot, but LICUANAN refused. In Civil Case No. II-428 (Exequiel and Loreta Lising us. Mamerto Licuanan, or the LISING-LICUANAN Case), the Trial Court rendered a summary judgment declaring the LISINGS entitled to repurchase, and ordering LICUANAN to resell and reconvey to them the Disputed Property, but set to another date the fixing of the repurchase price. Later, Licuanan filed a complaint for quieting of title. In Civil Case No. II-765 (Mamerto Licuanan us. Exequiel Lising and Loreta Viola, or the LICUANAN-LISING Case), the court ruled that Lising has already sold his right to repurchase to Licuanan and therefore, had already lost it. The LISINGs appealed and the decision was reversed Meanwhile, LICUANAN sold the Disputed Property to respondent spouses Vicente GARCIA and Estrella Magat. In Civil Case No. Br. II-891 (Vicente Garcia vs. Gaspar Aquino, or the GARCIA-AQUINO Case), Garcia wanted to recover the portion of the lot ceded to Aquino but the court ruled that he is a purchaser in bad faith, therefore, has no right over the disputed property. Subsequently, the LISINGS filed a Motion for Execution in the LISING- LICUANAN Case, which had adjudged them entitled to repurchase.The LISINGS filed another Motion for the inclusion of the GARCIAS in the Writ of Execution. The GARCIAS opposed the Motion since

they were not parties and alleged that a separate civil action was the appropriate remedy so that all parties could be accorded due process of law. Issue in the RTC Whether or not the writ of execution be granted as against the Garcias Ruling Negative. The Motion for the inclusion of the GARCIAS in the Writ of Execution is denied for the reason that they were not parties in the LISING-LICUANAN and in the LICUANAN-LISING Cases, and that a separate civil action was necessary so that the GARCIAS could ventilate their defenses. Appeal to the SC Petition for mandamus Issue Whether or not, under the environmental circumstances, execution may be enforced even as against the GARCIAS Ruling Affirmative. In the GARCIA-AQUINO Case, wherein the GARCIAS sought recovery of possession of the Aquino Lot premised on their ownership of the entirety of the Disputed Property, the Trial Court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, held that the GARCIAS were purchasers in bad faith and, consequently, were bereft of any right of ownership. That judgment definitively established their non-entitlement to the Disputed Property so that any separate civil action for the determination of their rights is rendered unnecessary. The cancellation of the lis pendens on the LICUANAN title prior to the purchase by the GARCIAS need not alter the foregoing conclusion as it was prematurely done while the appeal in the LICUANAN-LISING Case was still with the Appellate Court. Having been aware of the pendency of the LISING-LICUANAN and the LICUANAN-LISING Cases, the GARCIAS should have intervened in those suits for the protection of their alleged rights. Having failed to do so, they are bound by the results. CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC., respondents. Brief Statement of the Case

Respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this action for certiorari under rule 65 for having set aside the order of execution dated June 10, 1991, and the writ of execution issued by Judge Wilfredo Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Brief Statement of the Facts This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila against private respondent Army and Navy Club for violation of a lease agreement.. A summary judgment in favor of the petitioner was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila 1 and seasonably elevated to the Regional Trial Court. To stay its execution, ANC filed a supersedes bond, which was approved by Judge Reyes. He subsequently affirmed the appealed judgment on June 7, 1991. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground that the judgment had already become final and executory. Judge Reyes granted the motion. Appeal to the CA Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the petition be granted Ruling Affirmative. The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and contends that decisions of the regional trial court in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and are final and executory. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the order of the court a quo Ruling Negative. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court.

Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its appellate capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both laws recognize that such judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the rights of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final and executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary period for appeal. During that period, execution of the judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of right. In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25, 1991, to appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June 10, 1991, before the expiration of the said reglementary period. As the decision had not yet become final and executory on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not have been granted. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the trial court authorized was an execution pending appeal. While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court, this provision must be strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule. The reason allowing this kind of execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion. ANANIAS SOCO and FILEMON SOCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CLEMENTE L. SANTIAGO, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assails as erroneous the Decision promulgated by the respondent Court of Appeals. Brief Stetement of Facts Private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment, before the Municipal Trial Court against petitioners Ananias and Filemon Soco. After hearing, judgment in favor of private respondents was rendered by the MTC. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, the MTC decision was affirmed in toto It be emphasized that the action at hand is for unlawful detainer and the other case for annulment of title pending before another sala of this court will not divest the municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the unlawful detainer case nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the said case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto. This decision of the RTC became final and executory on account of petitioners failure to file their projected petition for review before the Court of Appeals, inspite of the fact that their

motion for extension of time to file petition for review was duly granted. The decision became final and executory. Upon motion filed by respondent Clemente Santiago, the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Branch II issued an order giving herein petitioners seven (7) days to vacate otherwise and the order of demolition will be issued. To forestall enforcement of the writ of execution and the order of demolition, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the respondent RTC. However, the same was dismissed. Petitioners brought their cause to the public respondent, alleging among other things that certain facts and events had transpired which purportedly would render the execution of the MTC decision unjust and inequitable. It is the alleged favorable decision it obtained in another action pertaining to the same property. Appeal to the CA Petition for review Issue Whether or not the court a quo erred in not granting its petition, even considering the fact that the latter obtained a favorable decision in another action, which may warrant the stay of the writ of execution Ruling Negative. Appeal to the SC Petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 of the RRC Issue WHETHER OR NOT, the inferior court (MTC of Malolos, Bulacan) can be prevented from issuing writ of execution and demolition in Civil Case 255, not only because of a serious question of ownership but actually a favorable Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 of the RTC, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan in favor of petitioners. Ruling Negative. The decision in MTC as affirmed in RTC had already become final and executory, due to petitioners failure to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the RTC decision, in spite of having secured an extension of time to do so. In this jurisdiction, the general rule is

when a courts judgment or order becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce this judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances which transpired after judgment become final, render execution of judgment unjust. Petitioners insist that the favorable judgment they obtained in RTC Civil Case No. 562M-90 yielded a new fact or circumstance that would justify non-enforcement of the final and executory judgment of the MTC. This contention had already been resolved by public respondent and we quote with approval its disquisition: The new facts and circumstances that would justify a modification or non-enforcement of a final and executory judgment refer to those matters which developed after the judgment acquired finality and which were not in existence prior to or during the trial. In the case at bar, long before the rendition of judgment, dated January 21, 1991, in Civil Case No. 255 of the MTC of Malolos, Civil Case No. 562-M-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch XVII had already been pending as shown by the amended answer with compulsory counter-claim, dated October 11, 1990. On this basis, coupled with the ruling in Joven vs. Court of Appeals, (212 SCRA 700) which states that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto, We find and so hold that the case at bar is devoid of merit. The respondent Regional Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion. HOLLANDA A. S. EVANGELISTA vs LA PROVEEDORA, INC., Brief Statement of the Case This is a petition for certiorari to annul the writ of execution, and the subsequent proceedings which took place by virtue thereof, in civil case entitled La Proveedora vs Manuel Abad Santos. Brief Statement of the Facts On August 23, 1969, the court rendered a decision in favor of La Proveedora Inc., and against Manuel Abad Santos. On June 2, 1970, Manuel Abad Santos died. Subsequently, or on September 30 1970, the court issued a writ of execution, pursuant to which the Sheriff levied on a parcel of land and a house situated thereon, both owned by Manuel.

In the meantime, an intestate proceeding was filed in the CFI of Pampanga. Hollanda was then appointed as administratrix. Even prior to her appointment, petitioner already informed the sheriff to desist from proceeding with the sale due to the death of Manuel. This was followed by an urgent motion to recall the writ of execution, but the same was denied and the sale was carried out. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the writ of execution and the subsequent proceedings which took place by virtue thereof, be annulled Ruling Affirmative. If the judgement debtor dies after actual levy of execution, the property levied upon may be sold; If before, the money judgement must be presented as a claim against the estate, although of course the same need no longer be proved, the judgment itself being conclusive. Since in this case the death of of Manuel Abad Santos preceded the levy of execution on his properties, the judgment against him should be presented as a claim against his estate. EUFROSINO ROM, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE COBADORA, defendant-appellant. Brief Statement of the Case Appeal from a judgment finding appellant guilty of contempt for disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ of execution or possession of the property in litigation. Brief Statement of Facts Cobadora filed a complaint against appellee Rom for forcible entry before the Justice of the Peace Court. The Justice of the Peace Court upheld appellee's right of possession but on appeal, the Court of First Instance of Leyte, declared the appellant entitled to the possession of the property and ordered appellee to return the same together with the products thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in favor of appellant. Appellee Rom meanwhile filed against appellant Cobadora, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, for quieting of title over the same parcel of land. After trial, the Court this time rendered judgment in favor of appellee, declaring the appellee as owner of the land, ordering the restoration thereof to appellee. This was affirmed both by the CA and SC.

The judgment declaring appellee Rom to be the lawful owner of the land having become final, the Court a quo issued the writ of execution. Appellant Cobadora having refused to comply with the writ by refusing to sign the same and by remaining on a portion thereof, was charged with contempt by appellee. And was found guilty thereof. Appeal to the SC Petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 Issue Whether or not the conviction of contempt against Cobadora was proper Ruling Negative. Rule 39, sections 13 and 14 of the Rules of Court expressly provide the procedure for execution and enforcement of a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property, and for removal of improvements on the property subject of execution, as follows: SEC. 13. How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced. The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution. SEC 14. Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The order of execution issued by the lower Court is addressed solely and exclusively to the sheriff, who under the above-cited rules is called upon to oust the defeated party from the property and make the delivery or restitution by placing the prevailing party in possession of the property, and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated party to relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt. The acts punishable for contempt under Rule 71, section 3 (b) are those of disobedience of or resistance to lawful writs or orders addressed directly to defendant such as a writ of injunction requiring him to do a specific act or restraining him from performing certain acts. 6 Also, if after having been dispossessed or ejected from the property by judgment of the Court, a defendant should enter or attempt or induce another to enter into the property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner to disturb the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto, he would be liable for contempt. But such is not the case here.

ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner, vs. POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case Appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a civil case entitled "Polly Cayetano, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Anita U. Lorenzana, et al., Defendants-Appellees" and from the resolution of the Court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Brief Statement of Facts Petitioner filled in the Municipal Court of Manila ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants occupying different stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate The areas occupied by the two principal protagonists(petitioner and respondent) are adjacent to each other. The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in favor of the petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I. The Court affirmed the decision of the municipal court and ordered the defendants-tenants to vacate the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the premises, the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and a writ of demolition was issued. Thereupon, Petitioner together with her counsel and Deputy Sheriff roceeded and entered the premises of the respondent and in spite of her protests that she was not a party to the ejectment cases in which the demolition order was secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment cases, they destroyed the latter's fence and destroyed improvements on the premises. Consequently, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against the petitioner and Deputy Sheriff for damages with mandatory injunction. The Court dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff for lack of sufficient evidence. Not satisfied with the Decision of the Court, Polly Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision appealed from, and ordered "defendant-appellee Lorenzana to restore to appellant the possession of the property invaded and occupied by her. Appeal to the SC Petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 Issue Whether or not the CA erred in deciding that the writ could not be legally effected against private respondent Whether or not the issuance of the writ of demolition is violative of Rule 39 sec 14

Ruling Anent the first issue, the court ruled in the negative. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which does not bind her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases. The vital legal point here is that respondent did not derive her right or interest from the defendants-tenants nor from the plaintiff-landlord (the herein petitioner) but from the Bureau of Lands from which she had leased the property. She is neither a party nor successor in interest to any of the litigants in the ejectment cases. Anent the second issue, the court ruled in the affirmative. The notice required before demolition of the improvements on the property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment debtor, and not to a stranger or third party to the case like the private respondent herein. JANE CUA, ROBERT C. CUA, NELSON C. CUA, BENY C. CUA AND EDDIE C. CUA, petitioners, vs. CARMEN LECAROS AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. Brief Satement of the Case In this petition, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the private respondent's right to remain on the property and set aside the orders of the trial court which sought to enforce the aforementioned decision through the issuance of an alias writ of demolition. Brief Statement of the Facts Joe Cua bought a property from J. M. Tuason & Co.. At the time he bought the property, a decision was already rendered by the trial court in favor of J. M. Tuason & Co. against Antonio Estabillo, a squatter on the property in question. Meanwhile, Adelfa Estabillo, wife of Antonio, executed a deed of sale in favor of Carmen Lecaros, herein private respondent, over the house which was erected on the area forming part of Cua's property. Later, the trial court issued the writ of execution. Because of the failure of Estabillo to vacate the lot and remove his house, J. M. Tuason, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of

execution and a special order of demolition. The lower court ordered the sheriff to demolish Estabillo's house, if necessary. The private respondent who accordingly substituted herself as party defendant in place of Estabillo, filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of demolition. This was denied. The trial court granted Cua's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. The private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. Cua filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that a writ of execution through an order of demolition is not appealable. The trial judge held in abeyance its resolution on Cua's motion pending the respondent's filing of a Record on Appeal. However, upon the latter's failure to file the Record on Appeal, the trial judge dismissed the appeal. On August 8, 1983, the private respondent filed with the appellate court a special civil action for "certiorari with preliminary injunction" asking for the declaration of nullity of the orders of the trial court granting (1) the motion for execution, (2) the alias writ of demolition and (3) the dismissal of her appeal. Appeal to the CA Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing her appeal Ruling Petition granted. The court orders Joe Cua and all persons acting for him or under his authority to return to the private respondent the possession and control of the disputed premises. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the respondent court erred in not finding that an order granting the issuance of execution or demolition is not appealable Ruling The court ruled in the affirmative. The appellate court obviously disregarded the rule that an order of demolition, as a means to enforce a writ of execution, is generally not appealable and

that before the approval of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the filing of a record on appeal was mandatory in order to perfect an appeal. The court acted on the premise that such procedural rules do not apply to the private respondent as she was outside the trial court's jurisdiction because according to the appellate court, she was not privy to Civil Case No. Q-3296, the source of all these orders. And the basis of such conclusion is the appellate court's finding that it was Ignacia Lecaros, not respondent Carmen Lecaros who bought the land and who derives her claim from Estabillo, theoriginal defendant in the case. The finding of the appellate court totally bewilders us. The records are replete with facts and circumstances indicating that it was Carmen Lecaros who bought the house of Estabillo which was erected on Cua's property. It was also the private respondent who expanded her "domain" over the land by renting around 1,400 square meters of the same property to several other persons, who like her, have no valid claim whatsoever over the land. And lastly, why would she file a notice of appeal from the writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-3296 if she was not privy thereto? ALBETZ INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, and SPOUSES RICARDO CALMA AND VICENTA D. CALMA, and SPOUSES FRANCISCO UMENGAN and MARIA R. UMENGAN, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals , entitled "Spouses Ricardo Calma and Vicenta D. Calma, and Spouses Francisco Umengan and Maria R. Umengan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Albetz Investments, Inc., Defendant-Appellant", affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, whereby Albetz Investments, Inc. was ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Brief Statement of Facts The Calma spouses were the lessees of a lot in Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., the lessor, needing the premises in order to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to it and upon refusal of of the Calma Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an action of unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. Judgment by default was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding rentals. The judgment having become final, Atty. Macario S. Meneses, director and lawyer of Albetz Investments, Inc., filed a motion for execution. The motion was granted and the Municipal Court issued the writ of execution. To forestall the enforcement of the writ of execution, private respondents file several actions, to wit; petition for certiorari and injunction, petition for certiorari and prohibition, and action for specific performance.

Four days after the dismissal of the last action or eighteen months from the date of the issuance of the writ of execution and the consequent writ of demolition, the Sheriff, at the instance of defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., thru its lawyer, Atty. Meneses, demolished the house of' the spouses Calma without any new writ or order for demolition having been issued by the Municipal Court . They commenced the instant action in the Court of First Instance of Manila. They contend among others that defendants and the deputy sheriff demolished the house indiscrimately and the personal properties were carelessly placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the Court of First Instance. Appeal to the SC Appeal by certiorari under rule 45 Issue Whether or not the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of Calma Spouses Ruling Negative. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. No damage worth mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc. if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties, considering that this would not have taken a considerable length of time. JESUS Z. VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. IRENE Z. DE AGUILAR, respondent. Brief Statement of the Case Appeal by certiorari taken by Jesus Z. Valenzuela from a decision of the Court of Appeals. Brief Statement of Facts In Civil Case entitled "Florentina Zafra Vda. de Valenzuela, plaintiff, versus Irene Zafra de Aguilar, defendant", a decision was rendered, requiring the defendant, among other things, to

pay the plaintiff a certain amount of money. The defendant did not pay by this judgment, and a second alias writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which the Provincial Sheriff caused to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of La Union, a notice of public auction sale. Jesus Z. Valenzuela, attorney of plaintiff, being the highest bidder to whom certificate of sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff of La Union. Subsequently, Jesus Z. Valenzuela filed for the registration and confirmation, in his name, under the operation of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), of his title to the above mentioned property. To said application, Irene Z. de Aguilar filed an opposition and an action against Jesus Z. Valenzuela and the Provincial Sheriff of La Union, for annulment of the aforesaid public auction sale, and damages with injunction. Issue in the RTC Whether or not the public auction sale be annulled Ruling Negative Appeal to the CA By Notice of Appeal Issue Whether or not trial court erred in not annulling the public auction sale Ruling Affirmative. A proper levy is essential to a valid sale; that the latter is void if the levy is not valid; and consequently, the sale is null and void, if the notice of levy of real property is not filed with the office of the register of deeds. Appeal to the SC Appeal by Certiorari Issue Whether or not the execution sale of the land of Mrs. Aguilar to Jesus Z. Valenzuela is null and void owing the failure to file with the office of the register of deeds of the notice of levy of said land before the aforementioned sale Ruling

Negative. Considering that one of the main purposes of the requirement that the notice of levy of real property be filed with the office of the register of deeds is to notify third parties who may be affected in their dealings with respect to such property; that there are no such third parties involved in the case at bar; that the non-registration of the notice of levy prior to the auction sale has not impaired the substantial rights of Mrs. Aguilar; and that her inaction for the aforementioned period of time amounts to laches, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the claim of petitioner-appellant and in rendering judgment for herein respondent-appellee. ELISEO GUEVARA, JESUS GUEVARA, ELENA GUEVARA, VERONICA GUEVARA, MARGARITA GUEVARA, PEREGRINO GUEVARA, MARIA GUEVARA, EUGELIA GUEVARA, PETRA EVANGELISTA, for herself and as Guardian Ad Litem of her minor children NENILA, PRISCILLA, ERNESTO, DELIA and CARMEN, all surnamed GUEVARA, and MAXIMA CANLAS, as Guardian Ad Litem of ESTER GUEVARA, petitioners, HON. PLACIDO C. RAMOS, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-Quezon City, then presided over by the HON. JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, BERNABE FLORES, BERNABE CRUZ, ROSITA CRUZ, ABRAHAM CRUZ, ADELAIDA CRUZ, ADORACION CRUZ, LEONORA CRUZ, ROMULO CRUZ, FLORA CRUZ, CONRADO CRUZ and MAXIMO CALALANG, respondents. Brief statement of the Case This is an instant petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction principally to prevent enforcement of a "writ of possession" ordered by the Court of First instance of Rizal. Brief Statement of the Case For the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), the judgment creditors caused the levy on execution of a parcel of land located at Rizal Street, Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to prevent the sale at public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance. On account, however, of an indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors the provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale at which said Bernabe Flores was the successful bidder. Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors' own counsel. The judgment debtors having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe Flores an "Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale" .Thereafter Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of

possession directing the judgment debtors "to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession of the same to Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives and assigns." But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over the same. Consequently, the lower court served notice upon the third-party claimants to vacate the premises in question on pain of being punished for contempt. Appeal to the SC Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction Issue whether or not the right to possession be defeated by the fact that a third party, not privy to the judgment debtor, claims to be the owner of the same property Ruling Negative. It has been held that "where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession" Such a hearing, however, was not necessary in this case for two reasons: (1) The third party-claimants here were not in possession of the disputed land when it was sold at public auction on February 25, 1963, pursuant to the writ of execution. By the judgment-debtors' own admission in their opposition to the motion for a writ of possession, the third-party claimants occupied the said land only after they had commenced Civil Case No. 7720 on June 10, 1963. They were not in possession when they filed their third-party claim February 13, 1963. (2) When the land was levied upon and when it was sold on execution it was declared for taxation in the names of the judgment debtors, who were the ones then in possession. Quite obviously the third-party claimants' belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in accordance with the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership. DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION and NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case

Sought in this Petition are a review and a reversal of the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, in a civil case entitled "Opulencia vs. Hon. de la Cruz, et al.," as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration. Brief Statement of the Case The spouses Manuel and Natalia Carpena Opulencia became indebted to petitioner Delta Motor Corporation. After a suit has been commenced by the latter, the former moved for a compromise agreement. For failure of the spouses to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, the Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution for the full compromise amount. The sheriff then proceeded to the levy and the consequent auction sale. DELTA motors was the highest bidder. The one-year period within which to redeem the mortgaged properties having lapsed without any redemption having been effected, a Final Deed of Sale has been issued. The Trial Court approved the Sheriff s Final Deed of Sale and issued a Writ of Possession. The OPULENCIAS filed an Urgent Petition for Relief from execution of judgment and to set aside the Writ of Possession on the ground of irregularity in the implementation of the Writ of Execution by the Sheriff. The Petition was denied by the Trial Court. Appeal to the CA Petition for certiorari and Prohibition Issue Whether or not the petition be granted Ruling Affirmative. The actuations of the special sheriff from levy on the properties to the issuance of certificates of sale were attended by irregularities serious enough to invalidate all proceedings had pursuant to the writ of execution, without however prejudice to whatever lights which have accrued to Delta from the Compromise Agreement. Appeal to the SC Petition for review under rule 45 Issue Whether or not the levy and sale on execution and of the Writ of Possession which ensued thereafter are valid Ruling

Negative. To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) File with the Register of Deeds a copy of the order, description of the attached property and notice of attachment, and (2) Leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice. These are prerequisites to a valid levy, non-compliance with any of which is fatal. For the weight of authority is to the effect that a special statutory provision respecting the manner of carrying out levy of attachment must be strictly complied with, and departure therefrom, shall invalidate the levy. In this case, notice of levy was filed with the City Assessor's Office on two tax declarations covering the properties in question and not on the title itself as provided for by the Land Registration Act, which requires all transactions respecting property covered by Torrens Titles to be recorded with the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the levy made by the Special Sheriff herein could not bind the land nor create a lien on the property. PHILIPPINE SURETY and INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. BEATRIZ ZABAL, respondent Brief Statement of the Case In this petition for review, petitioner Philippine Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. takes exception from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that notice to the occupant of a real property is a prerequisite to a valid levy of execution upon that property, and reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Brief Statement of the Facts Pursuant to a writ of execution duly issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of herein petitioner surety company to enforce a money judgment against Amado de la Merced and Candido Fajardo, the solidary judgment-debtors, the Sheriff of Manila, levied on all the interests and participation of Candido Fajardo in a parcel of land registered in his name. Notice of the levy was duly registered in the register of deeds of Manila, and annotated in the corresponding title. Subsequently, Beatriz Zabal presented for registration a deed of sale, whereby Candido Fajardo appeared to have conveyed to her the parcel of land. Thereupon, the Registrar of Deeds cancelled the certificate in the name of Fajardo and issued in lieu thereof the name of Beatriz Zabal. But, as the notice of levy in favor of the surety company was carried at the back of the new certificate, Zabal went to the Court of First Instance of Manila praying for the cancellation of the annotation, on the ground that she was already the owner of the land when it was registered, and that the levy on the property was irregular and improper. Issue in the CFI Whether or not the annotation be cancelled

Ruling Negative. Appeal to the CA By Notice of Appeal Issue Whether or not the court a quo erred in not granting its prayer Ruling Affirmative. The rule (that registration of an attachment makes it superior to a prior unregistered sale) presupposes a valid levy and plaintiff challenges the efficacy of the levy. She testified without contradiction that she has been in occupation of the property even prior to the sale on August 28, 1958 and particularly June 17, 1960 when the levy was made, yet she was not served a copy of the notice of levy, order or attachment and description of the property, in violation of the requirements of Section 7(a) of Rule 59. Appeal to the SC Petition for Review under rule 45 Issue Whether or not the levy made by the sheriff was invalid Ruling Affirmative. Since the Court of Appeals, in this case, found that no notice of the levy was given to respondent who was then in occupancy of the land a factual finding which we cannot now review it is obvious that there was no valid levy on the land, and, therefore, its registration in the registry of deeds and annotation in the title were also invalid and ineffective.5 Petitioner's case is not even helped by the allegation that Fajardo, in whose name the land was registered was duly notified of the attachment. Where notice to the occupant is required by law for the validity, of a levy, personal service of the copy of the writ, description of the property and notice to the owner, who is not the occupant, does not constitute compliance with the statute.6 TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and RODRIGO TAN, doing business under the name and style "ASTRO AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY," respondents.

TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and POLARIS MOTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case The two consolidated petitions before us seek to annul the decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R. No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984, respectively. The two decisions both upheld the validity of the levy made on two properties whose ownership is claimed by petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said properties are far in excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but only the vendor's equity of redemption. The petitioner also asks that the resolutions of the appellate court denying its motions for reconsideration be set aside. Brief Statement of the Facts This two consolidated petitions arose from suits made by respondents against Consolidated Mines Inc. These are suits seeking to collect sum of money from the latter as payment of the equipments it purchased from respondents. A preliminary attachment was ordered to CMIs personal and real properties. Subsequently, several Consortium Banks filed third-paty claims and asked for the lifting of the order contending that they were mortgagees of the properties sought to be attached. The aforementioned Banks foreclosed the mortgage. In the foreclosure sale, petitioner was proclaimed to be the highest bidder. Being so, the latter sought to discharge the properties from attachments. Issue in the Trial Court Whether or not the properties be discharged from attachments Ruling Affirmative. The order is lifted. Appeal to the IAC By Notice of Appeal Issue Whether or not the trial court erred in lifting the order

Ruling Affirmative. Appeal to the SC Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 Issue Whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that "because the private respondent through the sheriff could not have levied on the properties but only on the right of redemption or equity of redemption thereon, there could not have been an over-levy sufficient to justify a quashal of the notice of levy on attachment on the properties claimed by the petitioner." Ruling Negative. When herein private respondents prayed for the attachment of the properties to secure their respective claims against Consolidated Mines, Inc., the properties had already been mortgaged to the consortium of twelve banks to secure an obligation of US$62,062,720.66. Thus, like subsequent mortgagees, the respondents' liens on such properties became inferior to that of the banks, which claims in the event of foreclosure proceedings, must first be satisfied. The appellate court, therefore, was correct in holding that in reality, what was attached by the respondents was merely Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption. The appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was no over-levy on the disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption, an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be quantified nor equated with the actual value of the properties upon which it may be exercised. NOVERNIA P. NAGUIT, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSLER U. PADUA and NORBERTO B. MAGSAJO, respondents. Brief Statement of the Case This is a petition for review of the judgment of Court of Appeals denying petitioners third-party complaint. Brief Statement Of Facts The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 133, found Rolando Naguit liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and ordered him to idemnify private respondent Osler U. Padua. A writ of execution and levy was subsequently made unto the properties of Rolando including that of herein petitioner. It was successfully sold to private respondent.

Consequently, Novernia filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati against Padua and Sheriff Magsajo for the annulment of sale and for damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to enjoin the final conveyance of title over the condominium unit to private respondent (Civil Case No. 95-1182). Petitioner claimed that that the condominium unit levied upon and sold to private respondent is her exclusive property, not the judgment obligors; and that consequently, the levy and sale of the condominium unit are void. Issue in the Trial court Whether or not the prayer be granted Ruling Negative. The court has no jurisdiction over the case. It should be filed to the court which granted the writ of execution. Appeal to the CA By Notice Of Appeal Issue Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case Ruling Negative. Since petitioner is the spouse of the judgment debtor she cannot be considered a stranger to the case wherein the writ of execution was issued and thus, she should have presented her third-party claim therein. In the event that her claim is denied, only then should petitioner bring the matter before the appellate court. Appeal to the SC Petition for Review Issue Whether or not Novernia should file the third party claim only on the court that issued the writ of execution Ruling Negative. A third-party claimants right to bring an independent action to assert his claim of ownership over the properties seized is sanctioned by Section 17 of Rule 39 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that

Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to the value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claims to the property by any proper action. [emphasis supplie