Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects

Inter-American Development Bank Washington, D. C. Best Practice Series Sustainable Development Department

Cataloging-in-publication provided by the Inter-American Development Bank Felipe Herrera Library

Guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects. p.cm. (Sustainable Development Department Best practices series; SOC-135) Includes bibliographical references. 1. Violence. 2. Economic development projects. 3. Inter.-American Development Bank. I. Inter-American Development Bank. Sustainable Development Dept. Social Development Div. II. Series.

339.46 G282dc21

This document was prepared by a team composed of: Andrew Morrison (SDS/SOC) Team Leader; Tracy Betts (RE1/SO1), Christina Biebesheimer (SDS/SCS), Loreto Biehl (SDS/SOC), Mayra Buvinic (SDS/SOC), and Ginya Truitt Nakata (RE2/FSS). Consultant reports by Martin Anderson (independent consultant), Katherine Christoffel (Childrens Hospital of Chicago) and Ronald Slaby (Harvard University and the Educational Development Center) provided important background information for the document. Helpful comments and suggestions were received from many Bank staff. These guidelines have been reviewed and approved by the Banks Programming Committee on October 2001 June 2003 This publication (No. SOC-135) can be obtained through: Publications Social Development Division Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20577 Fax: Email: Web Site: 202-623-1576 sds/soc/@iadb.org www.iadb.org/sds/soc

Contents

Introduction 1

Areas for Bank Support 7

Evaluating Violence Reduction Projects 21

Lessons Learned 23

Bibliography 26

Foreword
This document, written in response to requests from both Bank administration and project teams, provides Bank staff guidance on the selection of interventions to reduce violence, whether in the context of stand-alone violence reduction operations or as components in other types of loans. These guidelines are a work in progress, which will be expanded and modified as the Bank gains more experience in violence reduction activities. Actions to prevent violence fall within the Banks mandate to promote development and reduce poverty, given the fact that violence both hinders growth and worsens poverty. In addition, the Plan of Action from the 2001 Summit of the Americas enjoined the multilateral development banks to intensify their support for countries efforts to tackle the problem of violence. IDB-financed violence reduction activities will emphasize preventive measures that have a proven track record of success. Prevention activities will be emphasized for two fundamental reasons: they are generally more cost-effective than control measures, and they are more consistent with the IDBs mission as a development bank. These guidelines detail promising interventions in the following sectors: information systems and research; health; education; justice, media, police, and prisons (rehabilitation of inmates). In addition, promising approaches in situational prevention, social prevention, community-based initiatives and violence reduction legislation are described. In supporting these types of interventions, the Bank will seek to collaborate with other international agencies, as well as foster partnerships between government and civil society. These guidelines also provide recommendations on how to evaluate violence reduction operations, as well as a synthesis of the lessons learned to date in the preparation and execution of violence reduction projects.

Christof Kuechemann Deputy Manager Sustainable Development Department

Introduction
RATIONALE FOR BANK SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROJECTS These guidelines respond to two institutional demands. The first is from the Banks Loan Committee, which charged the Sustainable Development Department with preparing guidelines to assist project teams in justifying the economic benefits of reduced crime and violence and in identifying project components that effectively reduce violence. The second demand comes directly from operational staff with an eminently practical concern: what types of activities have a proven track record of performance in violence reduction? This need is accentuated by the fact that violence reduction is a relatively new area of work for the Bank.1 Precisely because violence reduction operations are relatively new to the Bank, these guidelines are able to incorporate best practices and lessons learned from only a small number of Bank projects. This has two consequences. First, these guidelines have incorporated information from a variety of sources other than Bank projects, including the voluminous literature evaluating the impact of violence prevention programs in developed countries. Second, these guidelines are a work in progress; they must evolve and incorporate more best practices and lessons learned specific to the Bank and the region, as the Bank gains more experience in this area. Recent evidence shows unequivocally that violence slows economic growth and impedes social development. The most obvious cost generated by violence is the value of resources used to attempt to control it or treat its consequences; public and private expenditures on police, security systems and judicial services ranged from 2 to 9 percent of GDP in six countries of the region, and expenditures on health services as a result of violence ranged from 0.3 to 5 percent of GDP (Londoo et al., 2000). If levels of violence were reduced, some of these expenditures could be devoted to more productive ends. Less obvious but perhaps more important is the impact on economic growth that is generated by violences effect on human capital accumulation, incomes, andat the macroeconomic levelon investment and productivity. There is evidence that violence affects schooling performance, leading to a loss in stocks of human capital. Domestic violence is associated with higher rates of grade repetition and dropout rates for children who either witness it or themselves are victims. Incomes are affected by violence as employees decide to work fewer hours or are less willing to work at dangerous times or in dangerous neighborhoods. Domestic violence has been shown to lead to significant reductions in the earnings of abused womenlosses that in two countries of the

The focus of these guidelines is violence reduction, rather than the narrower focus of criminal violence. A violent act may or may not contravene existing legislation and consequently may or may not be labeled as criminal by the criminal justice system. Two examples are certain types of domestic violence and corporal punishment, whichalthough not contravened by legislation in some countries of the regionare both serious in their own right and have been shown to generate further violent behavior.

region were shown to represent between 1.6 and 2 percent of gross domestic product (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). Nor are key macroeconomic variables exempt from the impact of violence. The loss of investment and productivity resulting from urban violence is estimated at 1.8 percent of GDP for the region as a whole (Londoo et al. 2000). Another reasonable shorthand measure of the costs of violence in the region is individuals willingness to pay for the elimination of violence. For six countries of the region, this willingness to pay ranged from 1 to 11.5 percent of GDP, with a mean value of 5.3 percent (Londoo et al., 2000). There is also emerging evidence that violence exacerbates poverty. Domestic violence, as the study cited above notes, impoverishes women. Other research documents that the assets of the poorin particular, their social capitalare more affected by violence than are the assets of other groups (Moser and Holland, 1997). If this is the case, violence also exacerbates inequality. Recent studies have shown that inequality is one of the most important variables that can explain differences in rates of violence among countries. Thus, it may be the case that violence, poverty and inequality are linked in a vicious cycle: inequality spawns violence, which in turn worsens poverty and increases inequality even further.2 Thus, Bank operations which that reduce violence are consistent with the mandates of the Eighth Replenishment to fight poverty and inequality in the region. Finally, current violence impedes future possibilities of social development by generating even higher levels of violence in the future. There is convincing evidence of the self-perpetuating nature of violence: chilAt the same time, studies in the region have not documented that poverty itself generates violence.
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dren who are victims of or even just witnesses to domestic violence are much more likely than their peers to engage in violent behavior, both while still children and later as adults. In addition, violence has been shown to have a contagion effect for society as a whole. In sum, violence begets violence; escalating spirals of violence, in turn, generate significant social and economic costs in terms of foregone economic growth, decreased social capital, worsening poverty and increased inequality. High and growing levels of violence in the region make violence reduction an especially urgent priority. For Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, the homicide rate rose from 19.6 per 100,000 in 1984 to 28.4 per 100,000 in 1994.3 Over the longer period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, seven out of ten countries for which data are available have registered increases in the homicide rate.4 In the mid-1990s, the region had the second-highest homicide rate in the world, exceeded only by Sub-Saharan Africa.5 These rising levels of violence and crime present difficult challenges for democratic governance in the region. The IDBs Corporate Strategy (Renewing the Commitment to Development: Report of the Working Group on the Institutional StrategyGN2077-1) recognizes the threat posed to democratic governance by a generalized lack of citizen security. By supporting efforts to
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Information provided by the Health Situation Analysis Program, Health and Human Development Division, Pan American Health Organization. The estimates are based on data on causes of mortality, which are found in the PAHOs Technical Information System data base. 4 Fajnzylber et al., 1998. Internationally comparable data on other forms of violencearmed robbery, rape, domestic violence, etc.are not available over time. 5 World Health Organization, unpublished data.

reduce crime and violence in ways consistent with democratic governance, the Bank is in fact supporting the consolidation of the regions democracies. Finally, it is important to note that governments of the hemisphere have called for collaboration between the multilateral development banks and national institutions in initiatives to reduce and prevent violence. The Plan of Action from the 2001 Quebec Summit urges multilateral organizations to intensify their support and technical assistance to those countries that so request, in the elaboration of national strategies and actions regarding this topic (violence prevention). COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES OF THE IDB The IDB must be selective in choosing interventions to support violence reduction. Interventions should emphasize prevention and foster partnerships between governments and civil society. It is especially important for the Bank to seek partnerships with other national and international agencies working in the area of violence reduction. Organizations such as the Pan American Health Organization, UNIFEM, and UNESCO have undertaken important initiatives in violence reduction and IDB projects should take advantage of potential synergies with these efforts.6 The Bank is a founding member of the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence, whose members include the World Bank; the Pan American Health Organization; the Organization of American States; the United
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Coalition offers a practical vehicle for increased collaboration among member institutions. IDB violence reduction projects should also build upon the Banks unique comparative advantages.7 With its capacity to work with sectors as disparate as justice, health and education, the Bank is well poised to design violence reduction projects with interventions in multiple sectors. In addition, the Bank can make use of its long-term financing to support those prevention activities that require up-front investments but deliver longer-term payoffs. As a borrowers bank, the IDB is able to work closely with its member countries and tailor projects that respond to local conditions. This is especially important in violence reduction operations, since the types of violence and the factors responsible for violence can vary significantly among countries. The Bank is able to work effectively with countries in novel and experimental areas and in areas where relationships, listening and sensitivity are important. It is able to use its convening capacity to engage stakeholders in discussions of emerging issues such as violence reduction, as well as to promote increased collaboration between governments and civil society in this new area of action. The Bank has growing in-house capacity to conduct research on violence. Using its comparative advantage in economic analysis, it has done research on the social and
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The Social Development Division (SDS/SOC) has compiled an annotated list of international organizations that have undertaken violence reduction activities, along with the programmatic focus of their interventions. This table is available at: http://sdsnet/ divisions/soc/violence/guidelines.cfm. (Appendix Table A to the guidelines document).

Several of these comparative advantages are mentioned in the IDBs corporate strategy document Renewing the Commitment to Development (July 1999).

economic costs of violence. It has also documented the link between social and domestic violence and produced best practices analyses of violence reduction programs. Through its long-standing work in the area of modernization of the state, it has gathered evidence and experience in the reform of the judiciary and criminal justice systems. Finally, the IDB has been a pioneer in standalone violence reduction operations. The Bank has quickly built the institutional capacity to respond to borrowers demands for projects in this area. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen and expand this capacity by offering ongoing training to staff from Headquarters and Country Offices in the design, oversight and evaluation of violence reduction projects. These comparative advantages position the Bank quite favorably to continue its work in this area. BRIEF HISTORY OF IDB PROJECT WORK IN VIOLENCE REDUCTION While stand-alone violence reduction projects date only from 1996, many traditional Bank projects have the potential to reduce violence. Early childhood development programs, for example, have been shown to reduce both youth violence and criminal conduct in adult years. Judicial reform projects that provide greater access to judicial services and/or training in conflict resolution reduce violence associated with vigilante justice or conflicts between neighbors. Violence reduction initiatives are especially appropriate in health, education, judicial reform and municipal/urban development projects. The Banks first stand-alone violence project focused on domestic violence against

women by creating local treatment and prevention networks in six countries. This and subsequent domestic violence projects have been financed to date by technical cooperation funds. In 1998, the Bank approved the first two stand-alone violence reduction loans, one in Colombia (PR-2274; $57 million) and one in Uruguay (PR-2279; $17.5 million). In response to rising demand from member countries, there are currently a number of stand-alone loan operations in the design stage. These stand-alone operations have supported the creation of information systems, as well as interventions in multiple sectors.8 CRITERIA FOR SELECTING VIOLENCE REDUCTION ACTIVITIES Bank funding in any given area must meet three basic tests. The basic purpose and functions test asks if the activity makes a direct contribution to the Banks basic mandate of accelerating the process of economic and social development. The economic considerations test asks if the decision can be justified solely on economic factors. The noninterference in political matters test requires that the activity not have aspects that could be perceived as interfering or potentially interfering in internal political matters.9 Since violence directly inhibits economic and social growth. Actions that reduce vio-

SDS/SOC has compiled an annotated list of Bank operations which address issues of violence, whether through stand-alone violence reduction operations or through specific components in projects with other objectives. This table is available at: http://sdsnet/ divisions/soc/violence/guidelines.cfm. 9 Spelled out in a memorandum from the Legal Department Limits on the Activities Which May Be Funded with IDB Resources in accordance with the Banks Charter (April 9, 1998).

lence meet the basic purpose test.10 Interventions that do so efficiently meet the economic test. The test of noninterference in political matters requires making a judgment that the operation does not further a particular internal political position or agenda. The principle of cost-effectiveness is, therefore, the first litmus test to which prospective violence reduction interventions should be subjected. Bank project teams need to select interventions that are both effective in reducing violence and do so in the least costly manner possible. Unfortunately, evidence on the cost-effectiveness of different interventions is scarce. If available at all, it is typically for interventions undertaken in developed nations, which raises questions of applicability to the developing nations of the region. Nevertheless, it is clear that prevention activities are generally more cost-effective than remedial or control approaches. Thus, Bank projects should emphasize activities that seek to prevent rather than control violence. In addition, Bank violence reduction projects should contain evaluation components that permit both the Bank and the countries of the region to begin to amass data on the types of interventions that are most cost-effective in reducing violence. A second criterion for inclusion in Bank projects should be that interventions do not contravene the injunction in the Banks charter to avoid interference in countries
It is recommended that project teams contract diagnostic studies that identify the most important manifestations of violence in a country and the associated socioeconomic costs. Estimating the socioeconomic costs of violence is important because it establishes the importance of crime and violence as a public policy issue and provides information needed to begin the process of resource allocation. SDS/SOC has prepared a methodological guide on calculating the costs of violence, which is available on the website: www.iadb.org/sds/soc.
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internal political affairs. As outlined in the Banks charter, noninterference refers not only to avoiding direct interference in the political affairs of member countries, but also to ensuring that decisions of the Bank, its officers and employees not be influenced by the political character of member governments. The areas in which conflicts potentially may emergeand consequently in which the Bank should avoid involvement are highlighted in the section on activities with police forces. In addition to these areas, the following questions can help gauge the potential for political interference, as well identify human rights concerns. Are there adequate monitoring mechanisms in place to insure that the products or services resulting from Bank funded projects are not redirected to questionable areas in terms of political interference or human rights concerns? This is an especially relevant consideration when financing interventions in sensitive areas. Corollary to the above, are there mechanisms in place in Bank operations (such as advisory councils, community consultations and other systems of checks and balances) that foster transparency in the allocation of resources and openness in the execution of activities, especially in sensitive areas? Do the activities and the executing agencies comply with human rights standards? Do the project activities include strengthening compliance with human rights standards and/or training in human rights issues?

A third criterion is that interventions must be feasible. Feasibility has several dimensions, including the existence of a local service provider or agency with experience in

the type of intervention being proposed and an overall program design whose complexity does not exceed the capacity of the executing agency. Finally, interventions and the programs of which they are a part should strive to incor-

porate the participation of civil society. This will both increase the likelihood that interventions will achieve their stated objectives and help ensure the sustainability of the project over time.

Areas for Bank Support

In its lending and technical cooperation operations to reduce violence, the Bank should support: information exchange and knowledge dissemination activities and social marketing campaigns; research on magnitudes, risk factors, costs, best practices and evaluations; institutional strengthening (schools, hospitals, police, etc.); components in lending operations in relevant sectors (education, health, justice, modernization of the state, urban and municipal development); and stand-alone peaceful societies and violence reduction operations. and/or more risk factors for violence, have the potential to have a greater impact on overall levels of violence.11 At the same time, such complex programs necessarily will involve more institutions in the execution scheme. In the worst case scenario, complex programs can exceed the institutional capacity of executing agencies, leading to low rates of disbursement, delays in execution and even the cancellation of some program components. Given the heterogeneity among member countries in terms of execution capacity, these guidelines cannot provide guidance on whether, for any given country, a more comprehensive or more focused program is most appropriate. Project teams are simply advised to take into account the management capabilities of executing agencies (including past experience in implementing externally financed projects), as well as the supervisory capacity of the IDB country office, when deciding whether or not to add another component to the project. The subsections that follow provide recommendations to project teams on possible in-

In stand-alone multi-sector operations, the Bank should work with national governments whose commitment to institutional reform and inter-sectoral collaboration is essential to project success. The Bank should also engage municipalities and other local government agencies, which are well positioned to coordinate efforts of different agencies and to respond to specific local needs in violence prevention and control. Finally, the Bank should encourage collaboration between government and civil society, and involve business, religious, and media leaders as well. Before discussing promising interventions, it is important to note the tension that exists between more comprehensive and more focused programs. Programs with more components, addressing more types of violence

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There are multiple risk factors for violence, and some are specific to certain types of violence. A partial list of risk factors includes: gender, age, biological predisposition, employment status, drug or alcohol abuse, and early exposure to aggression (at the individual level); dynamics and norms, a history of violence, and household size and density (at the household level); and income inequality, history of societal violence and/or wars, lack of effectiveness of institutions of social control, easy availability of guns, drug trafficking, media violence and cultural norms (at the community/societal level). Research on risk factors is ongoing, and the empirical evidence for some risk factors is stronger than for others. For more details, see Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999).

terventions to reduce violence, organized by sector. The sectors included are:12 information systems and research; health; education; justice (judicial services and judicial reform); media; police; prisons; and situational prevention, social prevention, community-based initiatives and legislative action. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION The lack of reliable information (on the incidence and prevalence of different types of violent behaviors, the risk factors for different types of violence, information on which programs are effective, and how much they cost) severely hampers efforts to reduce violence. Therefore, the Bank should support the collection of information on violence and its risk factors, policy- and programoriented research, best practice research and evaluations, and dissemination of the results of these efforts. Information Systems. The Bank should support the collection of reliable information on violence and crime at the regional, national and local level, and in different sectors. This involves support of improved case registries in various institutions (health centers, police, etc.), as well as survey instruments, including victimization surveys, to measure the
SDS/SOC has compiled a more detailed, annotated list of possible project interventions. This table is available at: http://sdsnet/divisions/soc/violence/ guidelines.cfm. The Sustainable Development Departments publication Technical Notes on Violence Prevention also provides useful information for project teams. Available at the same address.
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true prevalence of different types of crime and violence and enable epidemiological surveillance. Teams should take special care to ensure that information systems have built-in safeguards to protect the privacy of individuals. Special attention should be paid to ensuring that information systems capture: (1) gender and domestic-based violence, such as partner violence and rape, as well as child and elder abuse; (2) youth violence; (3) the ethnic and racial dimensions of violent behavior, which historically have been invisible in the region; (4) the socioeconomic characteristics of victims and (if possible) aggressors; and (5) the spatial distribution of violence (i.e., the information system should be geo-referenced). Better information will allow more efficient allocation of prevention and control resources, both over types of violence and over geographic areas. Policy- and Program-oriented Research. The Bank should support research on the social and economic costs of violence, as well as on the situation-specific risk factors for violence. Research on socioeconomic costs will both help justify devoting resources to violence reduction and permit the priority allocation of resources to activities that address those types of violence generating the highest social costs. Such research is especially useful as part of project preparation, since it serves both to justify IDB support for the project and mobilize support among national stakeholders. Research on risk factors is helpful in the design of prevention programs that seek to modify these risk factors. Best Practice and Evaluation Research. The Bank should support studies to identify and document best practice programs at local, national and regional levels, as well as careful, scientific evaluations of violence reduc-

tion efforts financed by the Bank and other agencies. Dissemination. The Bank should use its convening capabilities to disseminate the information collected from surveys and analytical research. It should endeavor to engage a broad range of stakeholders (including government, civil society, the business community, the media and the churches) in public dialogues to discuss this information, identify solutions, implement them, and monitor their implementation. HEALTH SECTOR Violence is clearly a public health problem. Measured in terms of disability-adjusted life years lost, homicide and violence worldwide account for more loss of healthy life than lung cancer, breast cancer, leukemia or asthma (World Health Organization, 2000). Violence against womenincluding domestic violence and rapeaccounts for more than five percent of the healthy life years lost by women of reproductive age in developing countries (Heise et al. 1994). In some countries of the region, violence has become the most important killer of young males. The health sector, which has to deal with the consequences of violence, can also play an important role in its prevention. The Bank should finance activities in the health sector dealing with detection, referral and treatment of victims of violence; primary and secondary prevention through the health care system; and training of health care personnel in both prevention and treatment of violence.13

Detection. The first step to offering specialized treatment and services to victims of violence is to identify those users of health services who have been victims of violence. The Bank should support the development of specialized detection protocols for particular types of violence. For these detection protocols to be effective, health personnel ranging from receptionists to nurses and doctorsmust be trained in their use. Thus, the IDB should finance in-service training in hospitals and clinics. In addition, the IDB should support the efforts of medical associations and schools of medicine to offer inservice and pre-service training in violence detection to their members and students. Treatment and Referral. Identification is only the first step. The Bank should also finance the design and provision of services to victims so that they are less likely to be victimized in the future. These services may include training in anger management or peaceful resolution of conflict, as well as gang diversion programs for youth involved in or at high risk of participating in gangs. In the case of domestic violence against women, women should be offered referrals to a variety of services, ranging from counseling and temporary shelter to training courses that permit them to establish economic independence. In some cases, these services will be provided within public hospitals and clinics. In most cases, however, the providers of these services will be based in the community rather than the medical institution per se. Thus, the Bank should encourage public hospitals and clinics to collaborate with and refer clients to NGOs and other private providers of services for victims of violence, and Bank projects should support the formation of service provision networks that include both public and private providers. Network formation will involve creating information and referral sys-

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This section draws upon the consultant report Guidance for the IDB on Violence Prevention as Part of Health Sector Loans, prepared by Dr. Katherine Christoffel of Childrens Memorial Hospital, Evanston, Illinois. A copy of this report is available from SDS/SOC upon request.

tems, as well as training of staff of member institutions. Prevention. The Bank should support a wide range of prevention-based interventions in the health sector, emphasizing work with low income and excluded populations (including indigenous peoples, populations of African descent, and other excluded ethnic and racial groups) and groups at particularly high risk of suffering violence (especially youth and women). EDUCATION Aggressive behavior is largely learned, and this learning often takes place at an early age within the family, in the community and at school. Since violence is learned, it can also be unlearned or, more easily, never learned as an acceptable response to frustration (American Psychological Association, 1993). For many youngsters, the classroom is where they learn and practice aggression, but it just as easily can be made a place to learn and practice nonaggressive responses. In childhood, aggressive and disruptive classroom behavior contributes to poor school achievement and poor peer relations (Eron et al., 1994). Poor achievement, in turn, can lead to repetition of grades and dropping out of school, thus limiting formation of human capital and creating a fertile ground for crime and violent behavior. When the learning environment becomes disruptive, teachers cannot teach and students do not learn as effectively. Since most violence occurs in the presence of others and sometimes because of it, the bystander effect is also important. The Bank should, therefore, support efforts to prevent and combat violent behavior in school settings by supporting general educational interventions to increase school quality and enrolments, as well as specific violence prevention inter-

ventions such as conflict resolution and violence prevention programs, training for teachers, special programs for at-risk children and youth, and informal educational programs. General Educational Interventions. Bank efforts to expand the coverage and improve the quality of early childhood development programs, as well as primary and secondary education, will lead to higher enrolment and lower drop-out rates, and have a secondary or collateral effect in the reduction of violence. Extending the number of hours students are in school also contributes to violence prevention. Another general educational intervention with a potential impact in violence reduction is the development, implementation and evaluation of pilot programs for degree equivalency or accelerated learning programs in countries where they currently do not exist. In addition, vocational and skills training programs, by increasing employment probabilities, may reduce the risk of individuals engaging in violence. Bank programs should also support the review of all existing textbooks, teaching materials and resources to eliminate negative stereotypes (of women, as well as ethnic and racial minorities), which perpetuate intolerance and in doing so, violence. Conflict Resolution and Other Violence Prevention Curricula. The Bank should support the design and implementation of conflict resolution, mediation and other violence prevention curricula that teach students cognitive and social skills and nonviolent responses to conflict and frustration. These programs should be taught at the preschool, primary and secondary levels, either mainstreamed or through separate modules. The Bank should also fund school programs that attempt to change individual behavior indirectly by modifying the school environment

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(e.g., establishing norms and expectations for behavior, improving management and disciplinary practices, and enhancing classroom and instructional management) in such a way as to promote nonviolent behavior. Teacher Training. Interventions to change the behavior of students or modify school environments will not succeed unless teachers and administrators are trained to implement them. Thus, Bank programs should also support pre-service and in-service training in violence prevention for teachers and school administrators. At-risk Children and Youth. The Bank should support after-school and other special programs (including sports, skills training and community service) for children and youth at high risk of resorting to violent behavior. Informal Educational Programs. The Bank should finance informal educational interventions (using techniques as diverse as radio programming, street theater, and others) to reach vulnerable groups such as young mothers and at-risk youth. JUSTICE The criminal justice system, responsible for prosecuting crime and providing public safety, incorporates organizations of the judicial and executive branches of government, including police, prosecutors, forensic laboratories, public defenders, courts, parole and rehabilitation officers, and prisons.14 A well-functioning criminal justice system can aid in the prevention of violence in three important ways. First, it acts as a crime deterrent by making citizens aware that breaking the law will have immediate, negative
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consequences. If crimes are promptly and expertly investigated, suspects are correctly identified, and trials are both timely and fair, then levels of impunity will be reduced and citizens may well perceive that crime does not pay. If due process and the human rights of defendants are protected and corruption is weeded out of the criminal justice system, this will help ensure that only the guilty are punished and encourage citizens to collaborate with authorities. Second, a well-functioning criminal justice system reduces the probability that citizens will take the law into their own hands via vigilante justice. Vigilante justice provides no guarantees of due process or fairness for those suspected of crime and thus presents a high risk of punishing the wrong people. It also perpetuates or strengthens a societys tendency not to cooperate with state authorities to deal with crime and violence. Finally, an efficient criminal justice system dissuades individuals from taking measuressuch as arming themselves or hiring private securityto protect themselves, their families or their businesses. The proliferation of weapons, even when they are owned for purposes of self-protection, is likely to lead to greater incidences of violence, both intentional and accidental. The proliferation of private security services will tend to escalate the degree of violence employed in crimes against people and property that are protected by such firms. The proliferation of private security services may also tend to concentrate crime and violence among populations who cannot afford private protection, thus increasing the vulnerability of the poor to violence. Therefore, to both reduce and prevent violence, the Bank should support strengthening the criminal justice system, including the functions of crime processing, training and

Police and prisons are addressed in separate sections below.

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alternative sentencing. Specific activities include: Evaluating and Strengthening the Weakest Links in the Criminal Justice System. A break in any link along the chain from investigation to imposition of sentence will increase impunity and reduce the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. For the system to act as a deterrent to crime, then, each of its parts must function effectively, and each organization must communicate its specific expertise and information to the others. Thus, Bank projects to strengthen the criminal justice system should begin with an evaluation of how each component is working, and then target the weakest links, and/or target organizations in which there is political support for and institutional openness to change. Strengthening the Functions of Crime Investigation, Fair Trial and Fair Sentencing. The Bank should support projects that increase the ability of the criminal justice system to investigate crime, provide timely and fair trials, and impose and carry out reasonable sentences. Projects can target police, attorneys general, prosecutors, forensic laboratories and forensic medicine centers, public defenders, courts, parole and rehabilitation officers, and prisons. Bank projects can also target the way that each organization coordinates with and reports to other institutions within the sector. The fact that the system must be fair if it is to be effective in deterring crime means that the IDB should emphasize protection of due process and human rights in all criminal justice projects. The Bank should pay particular attention to insuring that ethnic and racial minorities are fairly treated in the criminal process, and Bank projects should seek to guard against racial/ethnic profiling.

Training of Judges and Judicial Staff. In the area of domestic violence, the IDB should upport training for judicial personnel so that they are better able to handle such cases. In particular, judges can be trained in the application of international human rights conventions (which, in many cases, supplant national legislation) and in the use of protective orders. Strengthening Rehabilitation Services and Victim Protection. In theory, the criminal justice system is not merely punitive, but also rehabilitative. It is tasked not only with punishing criminals, but also with transforming criminals, whenever possible, into productive, law-abiding citizens. Bank projects should support the design and implementation of programs for the rehabilitation of criminals, including the use of alternative sentencing and mediation of sentences, especially for juvenile offenders and minor offenses. The Bank should also support programs that provide protection to witnesses of crime, and protection and shelter to victims of crime and violence. MEDIA The media in its various formsTV, radio, newspapers, and moviesinfluences behavior. This influence is a double-edged sword: while media can promote pro-social behaviors and, in particular, peaceful coexistence, it can also promote violent behaviors.15
A large body of research, dating back to the early 1950s, establishes a causal relationship between portrayals of violence in the media (movies and television) and aggressive behavior (Katzman, 2000). The effects of media violence can be classified into four categories: 1) aggression effect, where an increase in mean and violent behavior is observed; 2) victim effect, which carries with it an increase in fear, mistrust, and self-protective behavior; 3) bystander effect, as illustrated by increased callousness, insensitivity, and apathy towards violence; and 4) appetite effect, which produces an increased desire for media.
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Box 1. IDB Experience in Judicial Reform Several IDB judicial reform projects have included important components to address the issue of violence directly. The project in El Salvador (PR-2113) included rehabilitation of young inmates, scholarships for young offenders, and recreational programs for at-risk youth. The project in Panama (PR-2280) included the creation of service centers for victims of violent crime and finances improvements to the investigative capacity of the relevant ministry (Ministerio Pblico) through, in particular, the provision of equipment, training and rehabilitation of physical space for the forensic medicine laboratory. Finally, the judicial reform project in Guatemala (PR-2307) trained judicial personnel to better handle domestic violence cases, strengthened the victim assistance offices and supported development of a strategy for inmate rehabilitation.

Some individuals are particularly susceptible to the harmful effects of violence portrayed by the media. Children, who learn new behaviors by observing role models in the media and who blend fantasy with reality, are particularly vulnerable to repeated exposure to media violence. Because they lack critical viewing skills, children can learn and glorify the use of violence and, as a result, fail to develop socially acceptable problem-solving skills. Bank projects should work with the media to promote peaceful societies. In all work with the media, Bank teams should emphasize respect for individual freedom of expression and for freedom of the press. In the area of media interventions to combat violence, the Bank could fund dialogues and seminars, practical research, advocacy and training and social marketing. Dialogues and Seminars. In order to address the issue of media violence, the Bank should use its convening capacity to support public dialogues and technical seminars. Public dialogues offer the opportunity for the issue

of media violence to be discussed by a broad spectrum of the stakeholders involved: media owners, academicians, researchers, parents, teachers, students, policymakers, editors, producers, and reporters. Technical seminars involve a more narrow audience (usually experts and media representatives) and present best practice experiences that emphasize the compatibility of socially responsible programming or writing and market share. Practical Research. Research documenting the links between media violence and violent behavior is not needed given the already extensive evidence on this score. Instead, the IDB should support practical research that informs project design. Such research may document the viewing, listening and reading patterns of target audiences or pilot-test different types of anti-violence programming, for example. Advocacy and Training. The Bank should support advocacy and institutional strengthening initiatives designed to promote prosocial programming and reduce violent content in the media, including the creation or strengthening of advocacy groups. It should fund training seminars for editors, reporters, and producers about responsible reporting of

violence and participation in violent events (Slaby, forthcoming).

13

violence in the print as well as visual media, and should support media literacy training, particularly for young viewers. Social Marketing. The Bank should support the development and execution of public information and social marketing campaigns with anti-violence messages that have clearly defined target audiences and messages. All the steps involved in crafting an effective communication program (analysis of audiences and resources; strategic design of message; development, pre-testing, revision and production; management, implementation and monitoring; impact evaluation; and planning for continuity and selfsufficiency) should be followed (see Tilson Piotrow et al., 1997; if not, the communication programs are unlikely to be successful in changing violent attitudes and behaviors. POLICE16 Bank support for the police meets the basic purpose and functions test mentioned above, since effective policing will lead to lower levels of impunity, thus reducing crime and violence and contributing to the Banks basic mandate of accelerating social and economic development. This supportas long as it is used to finance high-impact interventionscan also meet the economic considerations test, but questions could be raised regarding the noninterference in political matters test. Given past history of police involvement in political affairs during nondemocratic periods, the concern is that Bank activities with police forces have the potential to indirectly interfere in political affairsshould a police force that has re-

ceived Bank resources take part in political activities at some future date. Another concern frequently expressed is that, by undertaking projects with police forces, the Bank may be financing activities that inherently present some risk of human rights abuses. Bank project teams should avoid financing activities in which human rights abuses are a clear and present danger. Some of these areas are identified in box 4 on proscribed areas for IDB support, but teams must exercise care in identifying other potentially dangerous areas. Accountability is Key. An effective way to protect the Bank against indirectly supporting police involvement in political affairs or financing activities associated with human rights abuses is to condition IDB support for police forces upon the existence of accountability mechanisms or the strong commitment to implement such mechanisms. (See box 2 on the dimensions of accountability.) If accountability mechanisms do not exist or there is no strong commitment to developing them, IDB project teams should not finance activities with the police force in question. Financing Preventive Policing. In all their work with police forces, IDB teams should emphasize the strengthening of the preventive functions of the civilian police force. Teams should prioritize activities in three broad categories to increase accountability; promote professional behavior and strengthen professional skills; and improve police-community relations. Activities that can be financed under each of these rubrics include: Increased Accountability: This refers to both internal accountability (within the police force) and external accountability (to political leaders and communities). Internal Accountability concerns the es-

16

An initial, extended version of this section was presented in a consultative meeting held at the IDB. Participants included representatives of important human rights organizations, experts in police reform (both academics and practitioners), and Bank staff.

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Box 2 Dimensions of Accountability Accountability has two dimensions: audiences to whom the police are accountable and areas of accountability. A police force should be accountable to multiple constituencies, including internal control (within the police department), state control (external to the department but internal to the government) and societal control. Police should be accountable in the areas of public safety (reducing crime, violence, disorder and fear) and regulating their own behavior (reducing corruption, brutality and other misconduct) (Stone and Ward, 1998). The following questions can be used in determining whether police forces are accountable to the citizenry and to civilian authorities:

Is there an internal affairs division charged with investigating and sanctioning cases of police misconduct? How well does the internal affairs division function? Are the police held fully accountable to civilian political authorities, for example via budgetary and performance reviews? Are there specific mechanisms available that promote the accountability of police to the citizenry, such as civilian review boards and community consultative committees? How well do these mechanisms function? Are there mechanisms in place to detect and punish corruption and violations of citizens human rights? How well do they function? Do human rights organizations participate in the training of police officers?

The answers to these questions are especially important in cases where there is a documented history of police repression and systematic violation of human rights.

tablishment or strengthening of internal affairs divisions and the development of an early warning system to detect corrupt police officers. External Accountability entails training political leaders in the review and supervision of police forces and the establishment or strengthening of civilian review boards. It also involves the establishment of mechanisms that allow citizens to shape police priorities for crime prevention and control (e.g., community consultative committees) and the creation of an information system to monitor trends in crime, which will allow citizens to evaluate police performance in preventing and controlling crime. Promote professional behavior and development of technical and professional skills: This refers to activities such as the revision of police training curricula;

training for police in human rights, domestic violence and/or community relations (including community policing); reform of police recruitment procedures; and provision of educational opportunities to police officers. Improve Police-community Relations: This involves pilot testing of community policing programs,17 and improving the quality of services to vulnerable populations (e.g., domestic violence services, family services, and youth services).

The Bank has not yet financed the comprehensive reform of national, state, or city police forces, but such a request from a regional government is quite likely in the fu17

The Plan of Action from the 2001 Quebec Summit urges greater use of community policing in order to increase dialogue and interaction among police, civil society and local communities.

15

ture. Questions that project teams should ask before embarking on comprehensive reform projects include: Does the reform effort have the support not only of civilian leaders, but also of the police leadership? Have the statuary and legal changes integral to the reform (if they are contemplated) already been approved by the relevant political authority? Are the police leaders willing to prioritize reforms and activities that are designed to promote police accountability, both internal and external to the force? Are the police leaders willing to tackle the issues of corruption and abuses of human rights?

and activities designed to improve coordination with other government agencies.18 A second phaseconditional upon successful completion of the firstcan include a wider range of activities. This wider range of activities includes training; increased efficiency in organization, structure and staffing; and more efficient support processes.19 Training has two components. It entails training in problem-oriented policing, including allocation of police resources based on patterns and trends in crime and the creation of beat designs based on crime statistics and neighborhood characteristics. Increased efficiency in organization, structure and staffing has six components. It refers to the rationalization of organizational responsibilities; the definition / delineation / increased efficiency of human resources and administrative functions and the privatization of organizational functions (subcontracting to civilians). It also entails configuration; that is, the type and purpose of units, the elimination of overlapping missions, and the civilianization of tasks to maximize beat coverage. Finally, increased efficiency also includes technical assistance in planning and budgeting and performance evaluations and incentive systems for good performance. More efficient support processes refers to the reorganization of support services, training in information technology (IT); systems design and application; and technical training in procurement procedures.

Negative answers to these questions indicate that the reform effort has little chance of succeeding and should not be financed by the Bank. Within comprehensive reform packages, activities to increase accountability, promote professional behavior and the development of technical/professional skills, and improve police-community relations should be given priority. Project teams should consider designing phased operations in which the first phase consists of actions described above, as well as the preparation of a strategic plan for reform with clear performance benchmarks

18

These activities can be designed to improve the transfer of people, property and information among agencies and across jurisdictional boundaries or reconfigure districts to create integrated policy jurisdictions. 19 This wider range of activities should also be available to police forces with high levels of accountability.

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Box 3. IDB-Financed Activities with Police Forces Since 1996 IDB financing to police forces has come either via stand-alone violence reduction loans, via judicial reform projects or via nonreimbursable technical cooperation agreements. All have been focused on civil police and not military police. Activities included in IDB operations have included:*

Police training in at least five loan operations (Colombia, Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama, Brazil, Argentina) and three technical cooperations (Suriname and two regional TCs). Training has included review and modification of police training curriculum and training in specific areas such as human rights, community policing, police investigations, and dealing with at-risk populations such as women and youth. Pilot testing of community policing in specific neighborhoods in Uruguay. Improved information systems: purchase of hardware, software, and installation of integrated information systems in at least four loan operations (Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala). Institutional strengthening of planning capacity in two loan operations (Uruguay, Guatemala). Improved coordination with other agencies of the criminal justice system in at least three loan operations (Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay) and one regional TC. The projects presented in this box are: PR-2274 (Colombia), PR-2279 (Uruguay), PR-2307 (Guatemala), PR-2280 (Panama), PR-2221 (Brazil), PR-2536 (Argentina), and TC 9710270 (Suriname).

Using Existing Bank Experience. The Bank has experience supporting police forces through loans and technical cooperation agreements. Box 3 summarizes Bank activities to date with police forces; these activities have focused on encouraging the emergence of prevention-oriented police forces through improved training, community policing, and the development of better information systems. In addition, several technical cooperation agreements have trained police forces to better handle domestic violence cases. Unforeseen Requests and Problematic Areas. This section on police activities has attempted to be comprehensive; nonetheless, it is perhaps inevitable that project teams will be presented with requests, which are not

explicitly addressed here. In order to protect the IDB from financing activities that are associated with human rights abuses or that have political aspects, this subsection identifies activities with police forces, which should not be included in IDB projects. Box 4 outlines these activities, along with the reason or reasons for concerns. This list does not purport to be comprehensive. For each potential activity with police forces, project teams should pose three questions: (1) will the intervention substantially reduce crime and violence? (2) Does support for the intervention risk involving the IDB in the political affairs of the country? (3) Might project funds be employed to finance activities associated with human rights abuses?

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Box 4. Proscribed Areas for IDB Support

Activity Support for military police forces Activities designed to preserve state security or investigate crimes committed with political motivations (support for counter-intelligence or state security) Undercover operations Acquisition of lethal or potentially lethal equipment (e.g., weapons, ammunition, tear gas, patrol carsexcept for specially-designed vehicles used in conjunction with community policing) Support for specialized units such as SWAT teams, bomb disposal units, drug eradication brigades, canine units, anti-kidnapping units, crowd control units, etc. Training in weapons use Notes: E = little effect on crime of violence. P = potential for involvement in political affairs. H = potential for activities to be associated with human rights abuses.

Reason for concern* P E,P,H P,H E,H

E,P,H

E,H

PRISONS The issue of potential IDB support for prison construction is not covered in this document, since this topic is currently being addressed by an inter-departmental task force charged with providing guidelines for justice projects. Within existing prisons, the principal strategy for reducing crime and violence is to support inmate rehabilitation programs so that inmates released from prison are less likely to relapse into criminal behavior upon release. Rehabilitation programs that have been evaluated and found to be successful in reducing recidivism include drug treatment and skills development programs. Vocational training and more basic literacy programs are also promising, as is job place

ment for newly released inmates. Since rehabilitation is more likely to be effective the earlier it is undertaken, the Bank should target rehabilitation efforts at young and firsttime offenders. For this same reason, project teams are also encouraged to consider alternative sentencing and mediation for juvenile offenders and minor offenses. These alternatives to incarceration have the collateral benefit of not contributing to prison overcrowding. To date, the Bank has financed rehabilitation programs directed at young offenders (in El Salvador and Uruguay) and has supported the development and/or improvement of information systems that track prison populations (in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama).20

20

The project numbers for these operations are: PR2113 (El Salvador), PR-2279 (Uruguay), PR-2002 (Costa Rica), PR-2307 (Guatemala) and PR-2280 (Panama).

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SITUATIONAL PREVENTION, SOCIAL PREVENTION, COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS The Bank should emphasize support for a wide range of violence prevention activities because of their cost-effectiveness. The preceding sections on media and education have included some prevention activities for Bank support. More generally, the Bank should support activities classified into four groupings: situational prevention, social prevention, community-based initiatives and legislative actions. Situational Crime Prevention Situational crime prevention comprises measures that: (1) are directed at very specific forms of crime; (2) involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in a systematic and, if possible, permanent way; and (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by offenders (Clarke, 1997). Situational prevention may take place in a number of different places: residences, retail stores, bars, public transportation, parking lots, open public spaces, etc. (Eck, 1998). While the specific set of situational prevention measures will vary by location, it is possible to classify situational prevention measures into: (1) target hardening, which involves making it more difficult for potential criminals to reach their objective by installing impediments to criminal access; (2) environmental design, which makes specific locations less friendly to crime, and (3) detection and monitoring interventions, which may involve police presence, organized neighborhood groups, or electronic surveillance of public places. The Bank should

fund environmental design and surveillance of public places activities, as well as other situational prevention measures. Environmental modifications to improve security should be financed in the context of housing and urban development projects. They range from the design of access streets to the design of walkways, parks and lighting. Slum upgrading programs such as Favela Barrio in Rio de Janeiro (PR-2478) have already incorporated important elements of crime and violence prevention through environmental design. The Bank should also support detection and monitoring interventions. Care must be taken in selecting interventions, since certain actions of this type have been shown to be ineffective in some contexts. The Bank will generally not finance target hardening, since this should be undertaken by the owners of the assets in question. Social Violence Prevention Social violence prevention targets high-risk groups to reduce the probability that they will commit violent acts. Some of the most effective violence prevention activities target poor mothers and very young children providing them with the support and resources needed to ensure that the children will thrive. The Bank should support programs focused on low-income mothers, especially adolescent mothers, to make sure they receive adequate pre- and post-natal care. It should fund early childhood care and development programs, as well as a variety of activities with high risk children and youth, including training in conflict resolution and mediation skills, after school sports and community activities, skills training and incomegeneration programs.

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Community-based Prevention Community-based interventions are one of the most promising approaches to violence prevention and to delivering services to the victims of violence. The Bank should finance the provision of recreational facilities and programs, which have been shown to be effective in reducing violent and criminal behavior. Community-based mentoring programs should also be supported, but care must be exercised to make sure that mentors are appropriately trained and supervised. Bank projects should also support the provision of social skills training in communication, cooperation and sharing, which has been shown to be effective in reducing domestic and date violence. A particularly promising intervention to reduce domestic violence is to support the establishment or strengthening of local networks of service providers (health clinics, police, prosecutors, judges, shelters, organizations providing mental health counseling and job training, etc.).

Strengthening of these networks will lead to an improved quality of services to victims of domestic violence, and will also permit these networks to implement prevention activities at the community level. Many nongovernmental organizations are providing services within networks, and they should be included in the strengthening activities. Legislative/Regulatory Approaches to Violence Prevention Several legislative or regulatory actions have been successful in reducing levels of violence, including: (1) imposing curfews on teenagers,21 (2) restricting the sale of alcohol at certain times and on certain days, and (3) improving existing domestic violence legislation. The IDB should finance these initiatives. It should also finance analyses of existing legislation and the impact that changing legislation may have on levels of crime and violence. In addition, the Bank should support seminars and other forums organized to promote discussion of possible legislative and regulatory changes to reduce crime and violence.

21

This measure should be supported only if two conditions are met. First, research should document that youth crime is concentrated in hours that will be covered by the curfew; if most crime occurs during the afternoon hours, after-school and other programs may be more effective than curfews in reducing youth crime. Second, this measure should only be undertaken if the police force is accountable (see section on police above); if not, the risk of human rights abuses associated with a curfew may be unacceptable.

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Evaluating Violence Reduction Projects

Careful evaluation of violence reduction projects is especially important given these projects relative newness and the wide range of potential interventions to reduce violence. While all the interventions recommended in this document have been subject to evaluations, these evaluations have been performed almost exclusively in a developed country context. With very few notable exceptions, violence reduction interventions in Latin America have not been subject to careful evaluation. Thus, IDB projects in this area should include solid evaluation components so that policymakers in the region, as well as the Bank, can assess the cost-effectiveness of various interventions in different economic and social situations. It is important for project teams to distinguish between process and impact evaluations. IDB country offices are quite experienced in conducting process evaluations, which examine the state of disbursements, the number of beneficiaries of a project component, etc. However, impact evaluations that measure the effect of the project on the outcome variables of interest are perhaps more important for purposes of finetuning projects and informing the design of future projects. It is not feasible in this brief document to describe designs for impact evaluations for the range of interventions proposed. Nonetheless, the following brief suggestions are offered:22

For components that involve institutional strengthening of organizations that offer services to the public, it is important to measure user satisfaction with these services both before and after the strengthening takes place. For components to change individual attitudes and behaviors, two evaluation approaches are possible. The first is to measure these attitudes and behaviors before and after the intervention takes place. The second is to compare postintervention attitudes and behaviors of a group of individuals who participated in the program to the attitudes and behaviors of a control group of nonparticipants. With either strategy, there is a wide range of survey instruments available that have been carefully validated for reliability.23 For interventions designed to affect community-level variables (trust in the police force, levels of crime and fear, etc.), it is important to collect baseline data using a victimization survey, and then to re-administer this same survey periodically.

Project teams should be aware, however, that before/after differences may be unrelated to the intervention per se; they may be caused by other confounding factors. Random assignment of individuals (or communities, etc.) to intervention and control groups is the only way to make unassailable
23

22

The Impact Evaluation Plan for the Jamaican Citizen Security and Justice project (JA-0105) may provide a useful guide to project teams; it is available from SDS/SOC or from the Jamaica Country Office.

See, for example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1998 publication Measuring Violence-Related Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behaviors Among Youths: A Compendium of Assessment Tools.

21

attributions of a cause-effect relation between project interventions and observed outcomes, yet random assignment is rarely feasible in the context of Bank projects. Project teams can increase the validity of evaluations even without perfect randomization by using quasi-experimental evaluation

designs or other approaches. To explore these options, project teams are urged to seek out expertise from within the Bank or from outside consultants in the design of the evaluation components of violence reduction operations.

22

Lessons Learned
While the IDBs first stand-alone violence reduction projects and projects with components to reduce violence are still in execution, useful lessons have already been learned which can be incorporated into future project designs. 24 Keep the project focused on a limited number of risk factors directly linked to violence reduction. There are many risk factors associated with violent behavior, ranging from early exposure to domestic violence, to violent media programming, association with violent peers, and overall income inequality. No violence reduction project should attempt to address all such factors, since such a project would involve so many activities as to be completely unwieldy. A good way to focus project activities is to concentrate on reducing certain types of violence (e.g., youth violence and domestic violence against women); even with this narrower focus, project interventions should be targeted only at the most important risk factors for each type of violence addressed. Several projectsnotably in El Salvador and Uruguayhave focused on the problem of youth violence, in response to studies showing that the majority of victims and perpetrators of violence in these two countries were young males. Contract country-specific diagnostic research as part of project preparation. This
24

research is essential to identifying the types of violence most prevalent in a country, region or city, as well as to identify the risk factors responsible for the violence. Research can also quantify the economic and social costs produced by violence, which is useful both in justifying IDB participation and in mobilizing support for the project among stakeholders. In addition, it is useful to prepare a matrix showing which institutions are addressing different types of violence and in what ways; this matrix is a useful tool for project design, allowing identification of synergies and avoiding redundancies in the project. Include low-cost and high short-term impact interventions. The focus on addressing risk factors for violence is not synonymous with taking a long-run approach. Certain factorsalcohol abuse is a prime example can be addressed with interventions that are both inexpensive and deliver results in a very short time frame. Situational violence prevention initiatives, which aim to increase the perceived effort of committing crimes, increase perceived risks, reduce anticipated rewards or induce guilt or shame, may also provide high impact in a short time frame. Select a well-established and respected executing agency. The importance of the executing agency and project coordinator cannot be over-emphasized. With regard to domestic violence projects, assigning execution responsibility to a relatively weak institution may doom the project from its start. In citizen security projects, conflicts between different government institutions may hinder execution. When the various actors report to an executing agency to whom they are ultimately responsible (such as a plan-

This section was prepared on the basis of information compiled from interviews with Tracy Betts, Rafael Hernndez, Juana Salazar, Mara Teresa Traverso, Paz Castillo-Ruiz, and Loreto Biehl from IDB/Washington; Ana Luca Muoz from COF/CCO; and Carlos Bastn, Coordinator, Programa de Seguridad Ciudadana, Ministerio del Interior in Uruguay.

23

ning ministry in the case of a national project or a mayor in the case of a municipality) commitment to the projects goals is more likely. Finally, the project coordinator him/herself must also have the mandate and influence to effectively move the project forward. Devote sufficient project resources to strengthen participating institutions and improve inter-institutional coordination. Lack of institutional capacity among counterpart agencies to design and manage violence reduction projects has been one of the main challenges facing IDB project teams in this area. Project resources can be used to train counterparts in areas such as strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Interinstitutional cooperation can be improved by the creation of inter-agency committees or task forces, as well as by the development of information systems that facilitate sharing of knowledge. Create project ownership. Violence reduction efforts must be embraced by all stakeholdersincluding government and civil societyin order for a project to achieve its desired impact. Without ownership of the project there is no corresponding commitment. This requires the judicial system, police force, educational and health institutions, media and the community to be involved in project planning and execution. Effective measures taken to date include: holding a high level workshop to elevate the importance of a project nationally and create public dialogue at the design stage; creating a national commission on crime prevention; supporting dialogue between civil society organizations and government; conducting a social marketing campaign to disseminate accurate information about the problem and inform private citizens of their responsibilities in crime reduction efforts; and working directly with municipal governments, which

in turn hold public meetings to discuss project design and goals. Workshops and seminars are useful in bringing together different groups and interests to address particular problems; they are also a good opportunity to inform the public about the projects goals and activities. Support local-level institutional strengthening. Projects may encounter weaknesses in the ability of municipalities and/or civil society organizations to coordinate violence reduction efforts at the local level. In such cases, the project may need to incorporate institutional strengthening as an important component. If there is a perceived lack of commitment to the project among some local stakeholders, the project can support workshops that highlight the importance of the problem to local development. These workshops also can help ensure that project activities respond to community needs. Support dialogue between civil society organizations and police forces. In order to foster greater understanding between civil society organizations and police forces, the project can support a process of dialogue that begins to build trust and enables community policing efforts to succeed. This activity is especially important in countries in which the relationship between the police and civil society historically has been one of distrust. Mobilize a multidisciplinary team. As emphasized in this document, effective violence reduction activities can be undertaken from many sectors, including police, justice, health, education and others. Therefore, creating a multidisciplinary project team is essential if interventions will be designed in these disparate sectors. Incorporate flexibility into project design. Given the relative newness of violence re-

24

duction projects to the IDB and the fact that risk factors for violence may vary significantly between and even within countries, projects should have sufficient flexibility in order to adapt to potential changes in circumstances throughout execution. Address information system and data problems. One common constraint to project design and evaluation is the lack of an information system or data on violence. Accurate information is vital to establish the extent of the problem in the country, develop appropriate interventions, increase public awareness of the problem (projects may find public perception of the problem to be much higher than reality), and evaluate project impact. Geographically disaggregated data are also required to facilitate the allocation of resources within and among municipalities. Allocate sufficient resources for communication. Especially in pilot or innovative violence reduction projects, social marketing should be included in the projects design and must be allocated sufficient resources. Social marketing is usually understood to involve changing attitudes and behavior in the population that will benefit from a project, but another important role of social marketing is mustering support for the project in the various agencies and ministries that will execute the project. For regional projects, select countries at the same level of ability to address violence. Regional domestic violence projects may be difficult to execute simultaneously in countries at very different levels in their ability to address the issue. For some countries, the first problem to be overcome is the lack of acknowledgement that the problem exists. In these countries, it is impossible to form net-

works of service providers, given that few such providers exist. In other countries, recognition of the seriousness of the problem already exists, and interventions have been designed, implemented and evaluated. Involve influential civil society groups that are not dependent on the governing political party in project preparation. A change in government is especially problematic for citizen security projects, since a sense of ownership is so crucial to project success. Influential civil society groups remain a powerful constituency regardless of which political party is in office. If these groups are stakeholders of the project, there is less likelihood that the project will be cancelled or suffer substantial modifications when a new government assumes office. A particularly promising way to involve civil society in the execution of a project is by creating watchdog commissions (veeduras), composed of representatives of civil society, to monitor the governments performance in project execution. In Medelln, Colombia, a watchdog commission lobbied to ensure the continuation of a violence reduction project when a new municipal administration took office. Do not bypass creation of a log frame and a system of monitoring and evaluation. Citizen security projects tend to be multi-faceted. As a result, it is absolutely necessary to define project indicators (through a log frame) as well as a system of monitoring and evaluation. In just one component of a violence reduction project, there were 22 different activities occurring simultaneously, many of which were being implemented by consultants. Without a system in place as an integral part of the project, monitoring and evaluation become nearly impossible.

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