RAMENDRA

NATH

GHOSE

THE MODALITY

OF NAG,~RJUNA'S

DIALECTICS

I purport to explain the very reductio method of Nfigfirjuna's Prasaitgdpddana reasonings, ~ the modality of its significant nature and specific uses, and consider in this connection some recent interest in his dialectics precisely on the following focal points: i. The formulation of the method; ii. The interpretations for solving the apparent contradictions of the four-fold negation (Catus.kotinesedha); iii. The problem of consistency and the paradox of self-reference; iv. The correlation of findings to the central approach of Buddhism in logic and linguistics. v. Comments on the Prasahgdpddana reductio as distinguished from Nydya reductio and the cogency of its principle of pure negation with the principle of unrestricted reductio ad absurdum.

Nfigfirjuna was a renascent Buddhist of remarkable intellect, who is known to have flourished about the later half of the second century, A.D., during the rule of the Andhrabhrtya dynasty (B.C. 50--A.D. 350) of Nfisik in this sub-continent. 2 In 1919, S. C. Vidyabhusana made the following remark about Nfigfirjuna and his philosophy in the first Oriental Conference of Poona:
A n attempt has been m a d e to misinterpret it wilfully and even to discard it as a system of Nihilism, but it has e m e r g e d u n s c a t h e d . . . . He m a y be looked at from so m a n y distinct standpoints that we shall not be far wrong if we call h i m the Aristotle of India. 3

Interest in N~gfirjuna's use of the method of Prasahga in negating the fourfold position of predication (Cat~koti), particularly in respect of its apparent denial of the law of contradiction of Aristotle (384-Journal of lndian Philosophy 15 (1987) 2 8 5 - - 3 0 9 . 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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322 B.C.), has been stimulated in contemporary times. Stanislaw Schayer of the Polish Indological School, a disciple of Jan Lukasiewicz, was probably the first to make formal analysis of N~g~rjuna's tetralemma as a feature of propositional logic during the thirties of this century. Ever since it was done, interest in the West is never on the wane -- although a correct appraisal of N~g~trjuna's method of dialectics still remains a desideratum. In my opinion, mere criticism of his dialectics without a correct formulation of his method and its use in solving the problems of negation and self-reference leads to nothing but a Pyrrhic victory. Please allow me to mention a cogent remark of L. Stafford Betty 4 from his article: "N~g~rjuna's masterpiece: -- Logical, mystical, both, or neither", contributed to Philosophy East and West in 1983:5
But most of this discussion is between critics challenging each other's interpretation of N~g~rjuna rather than N~ghrjuna himself. And what challenges are aimed directly at him are mostly based on his conclusions - - specially, whether they are nihilistic or imply some kind of positive Absolute - - a n d not on h o w he arrived at these conclusions. 6

I.I T H E F O R M U L A T I O N

OF T H E M E T H O D OF

PRA SA I~GA PA DA NA

Before we proceed to explain his method we should keep in mind the following three points: (1) the very nature of his provisional assumption (avyupagama siddhdnta) which works as the principal agent of deriving an absurd consequence; (2) the implication of his deliberate imposition following upon a strict concept of logical necessity in the negation of which the modality of impossibility or absurdity is involved; (3) Nfigfirjuna points to a gap between the spheres of linguistic conventions (vydvahdrika) and reality (-- pdramdrthika) and applies prasajya-pratisedha to a form of expression which overlooks the gap. N~tg~rjuna refers to 'jfieyatvdbhidheyatvaprasahga' in VV LVII. 7 We may use this verse to illustrate the distinction between -

Prasahgdnumdna and Prasahgdpddana.

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I.I.I

Formal distinction

A. Prasatigdnumdna
1. Major Premise -- If nameability (or predicability) had deviated knowability, knowability would not have been the cause of nameability. Minor Premise -- But everyone admits that knowability is the cause of nameability. .. Nameability can not deviate knowability, i.e., nameability pervades knowability.

2. 3.

B. Prasahgdpddana
1. Major Premise -- ff knowability had been the cause of nameability, the statement 'A thing which is nameable is knowable too' would have been true. Minor Premise -- But it is impossible that the statement is true, i.e., it is necessary that the statement is false, (the statement is bound to be false). .. It is impossible that the assumption 'Knowability is the cause of nameability' is true.

2.

3.

Having recognised the fact that 'whatever is knowable (jfieya) is nameable (abhidheya)', an assumption or a hypothetical imposition is deliberately made in A in order to prove indirectly the relation of invariable concomitance (vydpti) between 'nameability' (abhidheyatva) and 'knowability' (ifieyatva), which respectively constitute the vydpya (pervaded) and vy~paka (pervader) of the relation. The reasoning here takes the above form of pramd.na-vdditdrthaprasahga or prasahgdnumdna (reductio ad absurdum) to rule out the possibility of a doubt in the apprenhension of a deviation of nameability from knowability. In a possible case of deviation apprehended, the knowability is the counter-correlative (pratiyogin) of the absolute non-existence of nameability and is thus the locus of its countercorrelativity (pratiyogitd). The essence of knowing is the limiting property (avacchedaka dharma) which limits counter-correlativity to knowability alone and delimits it from any other counter-correlatives, say the absence of a linguistic convention (loka-vyavah~ra) for which a

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thing may not also be nameable in a particular way. It is shown in A that the ground of the 'reasoning' (tarka) that 'nameability deviates knowability' is untrue. Here in this instance of 'reasoning' this untrue ground is hypothetically imposed and with this imposition the untrue consequent of the untrue ground is also deliberately imposed only to show that the hypothetical imposition gives an undesirable consequence (anista prasahga) -- 'Knowability would not have been the cause of nameability.' Reasoning (tarka) therefore involves a deliberate contrary-to-fact assumption. This contrary-to-fact assumption is technically called 'dhdryya bhrama', because in reasoning the assumption is an imaginary imposition. 8 It is intended with the cognition that it would lead to a contradiction.9 In the example -- A, the assumption of the untrue ground is made in order to show that the assumption of its untrue consequent is unavoidable. A is a hypothetical judgement consisting of two members, viz, (i) (ii) the deliberate assumption of a ground known to be false, and secondly, the assumption of the untrue consequent.

The consequent is undesirable, because its opposite is known to be the real determination of vydpya.1 In A, 'if nameability (or predicability) had deviated knowability' is dpddaka (the untrue ground imposed) and 'knowability would not have been the cause of nameability' is dpddya (the untrue consequent imposed). The former is taken to be the probans of this 'reasoning'. The former member of the hypothetical judgement is probans, because it indicates that the consequent is undesirable. In B the dpddya or vydpakdhdryya of A is ~pddaka and the dpddaka of A is dp~dya. 'Nameability really exists' is taken to be an absurd consequent, because knowability of a thing's own being as a necessary determinant (vydpaka) of its nameability is taken to be an absurd imposition. N~tghrjuna's reason of assuming the particular ground as the implicans (prasahga-hetu) of this hypothetical judgement showing an absurd consequent (-- Prasatiga-vdkya) consists in the particular

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context in VV L VIII, where he argues that when a thing is not knowable in its intrinsic nature, i.e., in respect of its substantivity, causality, motion, number, time, etc., a name also does not really exist. While naming or denoting is taken to be unreal for the presuppositional content of an ontological statement, it is admitted that it has got a conventional (sdmvrtika) meaning. So instead of assuming, in the presuppositional ground of his reasoning, the relation of vydpti between 'nameability' and 'knowability' as a proven fact of strict implication or entailment, Nfigfirjuna has questioned the very ground of the inferential cognition of a thing's nameability from its knowability. He thus makes a reductive analysis of his opponent's ontological positions. The principal instrument in this move from an assumption, say, from to - in order to reduce it to the proof of a contradiction, which is the paradox of the form --- - ~ , is the reductive principle of absurdity -- '(P D - P) D - P'. We prove it by substituting - P for P on the Axiom of Tautology and by applying the definition of implication (Def. ~.) in the next step, which purports the idea that the axiom of Taut. '(P V P) D P' is reducible into a theorem of absurdity. Hence, we find that the dpddaka and the dpddya of A change their respective places in B, and in A the dpddya is called 'an undesirable consequent', whereas in B the dpddya is called 'an absurd consequent'. 'Absurdity' indicates that the negation is pure and 'undesirability of the consequence' indicates that the negation is relational. I.I.II Material distinction The prasatigdpddana differs 'in a very material respect' from prasatigdnumdna specially because it does not indirectly validate the ground of a syllogistic argument. It only makes a presupposition or a statement about the real nature of a thing dialectical. Language as well as logic is considered to be useful for all practical purposes at the empirical or conventional level of truth 'as long as linguistic distinctions are not projected ontologically'. 11 The Sarvdstivddi views of all Dharmas, i.e., of Khandas and sense-fields, all other elements and basic ontological concepts have been brought into critical examination by this method only as to the competence of their language to express the own-being of things.

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N~tg~rjuna does not concern himself with the questions 'Does Time exist?' or 'Does soul exist?', but with the questions 'What do we mean when we say that a substantive or a property exists?' or 'How do we express when we believe and think that such things exist?' He likes to investigate only the formal mode of a speech-act than exactly its material mode. I.II PRASAI~GAPADANA IS PRASA~IGAS.4DHANA The method of Prasahgftp(~dana is prasahgasfMhana, because it brings the modal concept of impossibility in demonstrating that if an assumption necessarily yields an impossible consequent, the assumption itself is impossible. In the Section I.I.I both A and B are primarily of the form of Modus Tollens, for they deny the antecedents by denying the consequents. But the propositional form of A is: [p D - q; q / .'. - p] and the propositional form of B is: [L (p D q); - M q ( - L - q) / .. - M p ( - L - p ) ] . Here in B the form of the arguments is Modus ToIlens in a special sense. For it is a theorem of Modal Logic (System T & others including it) that L (p D q) D (Mp D Mq), which gives the following derived rule of inference, 1. 2. L ( p D q) M p / . ' . Mq

By using Modus Tollens here, we get the rule: 1. 2. L ( p D q) -Mq(= L -q)/

.'. - M p ( -= L - p )

In the prasahgfzpfMana the whole hypothetical 'if p then q' is a necessary truth [L (p D q)], meaning thereby that the relation of implication between p and q is strict, so that it is impossible for p being true without q being true too, or it is impossible that p is true and q is false. The rules of Ordinary and Modal forms of M.P. and M.T. illustrate the distinction between the relations of implication involved in A and

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B. 12

291

Nfigfirjuna's Prasahgdpddana reasonings involve the following three steps having different characteristics: 1. He accepts a position ex-hypothese as true and in his argument against its cogency enumerates all the mutually inconsistent and jointly exhaustive possibilities for its truth. Thus, for example, he examines the following three possibilities for the truth of a position about the reality of motion: (i) Ascribing movement to one that has completed moving; (ii) Ascribing movement to one that has not yet started moving; and (iii) Ascribing movement to one that is already moving. The second step takes the form of a destructive dilemma or

2. 3.

a tetralemma.
In the third and crucial step, already presupposed in the second, Nfigfirjuna uses the method of simple negation (Prasajyapratis.edha) by Prasahgdpddana to show that the propositions of three apparent possibilities involve selfcontradiction, and are therefore logically absurd.

The following argument shows how he has applied this method to a disjunct of a major premise of a possible dilemma 13 about motion: . Major Premise -- If in a proposition 'is moving' is ascribed to 'one that has completed moving', the proposition would be 'one that has completed moving is still moving'. Minor Premise -- But this is nonsense. Therefore the proposition in which 'is moving' is ascribed to 'one that has completed moving' results in nonsense, i.e., this proposition won't make sense.

3.

This argument takes the form of M.T. in a special sense [L (p D q); - M q (= L - q) / .'. - M p (-- L - p ) ] . By the Minor Premise -'but this is nonsense' is meant 'it is impossible that the consequent is true' or, 'it is necessary that the consequent is false'. Candrakirtil4 states that the conceptual implications of the terms

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'gatarh', 'agatarh', 'gamyamdnarh' and 'gamyate' have played a

significant role in this verbally-bound predicate negation. L. Stafford Betty obviously misses the point in making the following comments: 1. Here N~gfirjuna has not simply made 'an alliterative play on words,' but 'a play with words' in MMK 11.15 2. This quadruple division (or distinction) of motion into gamana ("act of going"), gamyamdna ("present going to"), gati ("process of going to") and gamyate ("being gone to") has 'no basis in the empirical world' and is 'as profitable as pigeonholing cubic yards of empty space.' 16 This criticism is not tenable because of the following reasons: Firstly, the law of excluded middle provides the classical rationale for reductio. It is therefore stated that, in the absence of positions -- I & II, viz., one who has completed going and 'one who is yet to go', there cannot be any third position about movement in space and time that 'one who is going is going'. 17 Secondly, N~tghrjuna has derived the modality of his reductio from his opponents' claim for the truth of a position. So there is nothing to be scared by the entailment of an absurd consequent. Thirdly, this distinction is not just a pigeonholing of empty space. Candrakirti refers to the infinite divisibility of space and time in his interpretation of the third position: "One who is going is going". If it is claimed by the opponent that 'the space before the infinitesimal atom at the tip of the toe '18 is the locus of the completed movement and the space before the atom at the end of the heel 19 is the locus of the future movement and the space which is covered by the foot 20 should be the location of the present movement, the third one will be an absurd position. Since the feet are also of the nature of an aggregate of infinitesimal atoms (-- Caranayorapi paramdnusdrhdh6tatvdt) Candrakirti states: As in the case of the foot, so also in the case of the atoms, the examination has to proceed by analysing the atoms into two groups --

(]) (2)

atoms which have been traversed; and atoms which have not been traversed.

THE MODALITY OF N.~G,~RJUNA'S DIALECTICS The moving foot is to be analysed into two parts, --

293

(1)

(2)

the toes or the front part of the foot which has completed movement; and the heel or the hind part of the foot which has not yet moved.

So there is no third part of the foot which can be said to be moving over and above the first two parts. The Mfidhyamika dialecticians therefore refer to the empirical basis whenever it is needed. Fourthly, a proposition about the ontological nature of an act or a thing should not be confused with a proposition about its phenomenal nature. I.III PRASAIVG.4P.4DANA IS A METHOD OF PURE NEGATION

( PRASAJYA-PRA TISEDHA )
The term 'prasahga' means 'prasakti '2~ (pra + x[sa~j + ktin) or dpatti (deliberate imposition) of an absurd consequent. The verbal root 'safij' means to 'to stick to', 'to adhere to'. The terms 'prasajyate', 'prasajyeta' (-- is being purely negated) arise from this verbal root with the prefix 'pra' before it, from which the terms 'prasahga', 'prasakta' (purely negated for entailing an absurd consequent), 'prasakti' have been derived. These terms of the same etymological import have been frequently used by NfigLrjuna 22 in his prasatiga discourses 23 to mean pure negation by entailing absurd consequents. There are thus two logically distinct steps in Prasajyapratisedha:

(i) (ii)

A ground is deliberately imposed on a position of the opponent. The position or the proposition is denied by simple Negation for entailing an absurd consequent.

The example -- B of the section I.I.I can be restated by prasajyapratis..edha as: Nameability does not fulfil knowability. Prasajyapratis..edha therefore means Pure Negation by showing that an

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assumption entails an absurd consequent [prasaktirh sampddya (dropya)

pratis.edha nisedhah].
One might argue that the supposition of a contradiction is epistemologically impossible and hence this reductio is impossible. 24 Copi's Reductio ad absurdum 25 corresponds to the indirect proof of Prasahgdnumdna. It does not proceed simply up to the contradiction, but goes on through the contradiction to the conclusion of the original argument. In this method a contradiction is supposed in the key-step. 26 The Prasahgdpddana simply negates a position which is taken to have generated the contradiction. It does not indirectly prove any original position of the proponent, hence the negation is pure and not relational. II Let us probe into the consistency of N~g~rjuna's four-fold negation (Catus.koti-nis.edha) and into the apparent paradox of having no positive self-reference. N~g~rjuna states in MMK I. 3: Entities of any kind are never found anywhere produced from themselves, from another, from both (themselves and another) and from no cause37 Candrakirti confirms that the negation intended is prasajya, and therefore the negation of the first position (Koti) -- e.g., A is not caused by A -- does not commit the respondent to an affirmation of the contrary. The contrary position is to be separately negated.

Prasajyapratisedhasya vivaks..itatvdt, parato 'pyutpddasya pratisetsyamahatvdt 28

The need of re-origination is the deliberate imposition on the concept of self-causation. Then prasa]ya-pratis.edha is thus applied to it: A thing existing by itself is not caused by itself. If self-causation is admitted to be true, it would commit the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. It would mean that any such thing (bhdva) would continue to reoriginate itself in infinite regress (atiprasahgados.ah.). While considering the above example of prasajya-pratis.edha, we should note the following three points:

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(i) (ii) (iii)

The form of a negative proposition in which it is used; the semantic content of this negation; and its lacking of a presuppositional reference.

Nfigfirjuna has applied prasajya-pratis.edha to each position separately. Prasajya is where the negation is essential and the positive element secondary, z9 The question of having a positive implication is primary when Paryyuddsa-pratisedha is applied, because 'where the positive element is essential and the negation is secondary is Paryyuddsa.'30 Prasajya-pratisedha is 'verbally bound negative TM and it is of the form 'S is-not P' as distinguished from 'S is non- P' which is 'nominally bound negative'. I have taken these two forms from W. E. Johnson's logic and the structural composition as well as the semantic reference is the same in Indian logic. 32 gfintaraksita later on distinguished Paryyuddsa into two varieties: Ontological and the logical. The former indirectly refers to the ultimate particulars, i.e., the point-instants and their causal efficiency remains unknown and unknowable. His main emphasis is on the logical variety of Relational negation which indirectly refers to mental images in the exclusional theory of meaning (apoha). It has been already referred to, in this paper, that gfintaraksita belongs to the

Yogdcdra-Svdtantrika-Mddhyarnika tradition.
Instead of going into the polemics on the nature of class-character and its relation to the individuals -- a field of dialectics exploited mainly by Difinfiga, Jinendrabuddhi, Dharmakirti, gfintaraksita and Ratnakirti of the later logical school, Nfigfirjuna maintains 'a theory of meaning which takes into account such things as coherence and pragmatic and contextual considerations.' 33 Nfigfirjuna's speciality consists in finding out adequately some contextual reasons to derive absurd consequents for the Prasajya type of negation. As for example, the difficulty in the third position arises because of the apparent meaninglessness of any sentence of the form P. N p. To give concrete illustrations, we can mention the following from his

M~la-Madhyamaka Kdrikd:
1. Entities of any kind are produced from both themselves and another (MMK 1.3).

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2. What is both void and non-void (MMK XVIII. 8) is expressible (MMK XXII. 20). 3. The dharmas are both finite and infinite (MMK XXV. 22). 4. The sufferings are both born of one self and of others (MMK XII. 9). 5. Man is both eternal (in some respects) and non-eternal (in some other respects) -- MMK XXVII. 17). We find that N~g~rjuna interprets sentences of the form P. - P in different ways in different places. We give here 3 different ways in which N~g~rjuna explains the impact of the sentences of the form P.
~p. II.II I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S

(1) The third position is just two earlier positions conjoined. This conjunction does not give any new content to the conjuncts. The conjunction is possible because both the earlier positions are false. This shows that the second position is not a truth-functional negation of the first. For, in that case both could not be proved to be false. In order to understand how this is possible, Candrakirti suggests that one position is true for one type of persons (v~la]andpeks..ay~) while the contradictory position is true for another type of persons (~rya]h~napeks..ayd). And both these positions are really false. 34 This interpretation is borne out by N~g~rjuna's refutation of the third position as given in MMK XII. 9, where he says that the conjunction involves exactly the same difficulties as the two conjuncts. The verse states: Both self and other-than-self have caused sufferings if each did
SO.35

(2) The second interpretation of the third position is that it is just a conjunction of two contradictories and is, hence, not a possibility at all. This interpretation is borne out by Nhg~rjuna's refutation of this position in MMK I. 9. An element cannot cause an origination both existent and non-existent, because 'existent' and 'inexistent' are mutually contradictory (parasparaviruddhasyaikdrthasy~bhdv~t). 36 (3) The third interpretation of this position is that it attributes to the conjunction some properties which are common to both the conjuncts. This interpretation is borne out by Nfigfirjuna's refutation of this position as given in MMK XXV. 12--13. Talking about Nirvd.na,

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Nfig~irjuna asserts that if Nirvdna be regarded as both ens and non-ens, then it would be causally dependent, for both ens and non-ens have this property in common that they are causally dependent. 37 It is thus demonstrated by Prasahgdpddana in the above three cases of Prasajya-prat~edha that the third position is not true, for it would have been true either (i) if the conjuncts were really true, or (ii) if the combination of the conjuncts would not have'been a combination of two contradictories, or (iii) if in certain contexts some properties common to the conjuncts were not found. The fourth position is of the form: - P. - - P. Some illustrations are given below: 1. Entities of any kind are found anywhere produced from no cause (MMK I. 3). 2. All is neither non-eternal nor eternal (MMK XVIII. 8). 3. What is neither void, nor non-void is expressible (MMK XXII. II). 4. Nirvana is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens. (MMK XXV. 15--16). 5. The dharmas are neither finite, nor infinite ( M M K XXV. 22). 6. Buddha would neither survive, nor not survive after cessation (MMK XXV. 17). 7. The dharmas are neither eternal, nor non-eternal (MMK XXV. 23). 8. The dharma is neither real, nor unreal (MMK L. 9). 9. I was neither there, nor not there in the past (MMK XXVII. 13). 10. The sufferings are produced neither of oneself, nor of others (i.e., of no cause) (XII. 9). Both of the contradictory alternatives fail in the fourth position -'Neither a nor non-a'. 38 This seems to deny apparently the law of excluded middle. 39 The problem here is to show how, in what sense, this fourth position is possible. There are different solutions depending on different interpretations of the fourth position.
A. a and non-a are contradictories

1. It may be argued that two contradictory terms do not exhaust all possibilities, but only all possibilities within the universe of discourse.

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Thus, for example, a thing is neither green, nor not-green, if it is colourless. The contradictory predicates 'eternal' and 'non-eternal in the positions: (i) everything is eternal and (ii) everything is non-eternal, describe only what exists -- either eternally or non-eternally. But if the real nature of the empirical world be like that of barren woman's son -- then there cannot be anything existing either eternally or even non-eternally. 4 Each position is therefore false. 2. It may be argued that the law of excluded middle fails in the border line cases. Thus if colours are arranged according to their shades, then we may come to a shade which can be described neither as red nor as not-red. 41 3. Nfig~rjuna argues that the denial of the alternation of contradictory predicates is possible, for both of the contradictory predicates are incomprehensible. In M M K XXVII. 18, Nfigfirjuna argues that the judgement 'everything is non-eternal' would have been intelligible if the judgement 'Something is eternal' would have been non-dependently established, and vice versa. 42 This argument presupposes the Nydya theory of negation, according to which only that can be negated which is prasiddhah. (not utterly unreal). B. a and non-a are contraries 1. If a and non-a are contraries in some respect, then 'either a or non-a' will not be a necessary truth, because both the alternatives may be false -- hence its negation may be true, and afortiori, significant.43 2. By using a many-valued logic, it may be shown that a sentence of the form P v - P does not express a necessary truth. Hence its negation is possible. It has been suggested by some interpreters of Nfig~rjuna (Staal, for example) that Nftgfirjuna's fourth lemma involves a manyvalued logic. N~g~trjuna recognises the law of excluded middle and the proper contexts of its use. We can solve the paradoxes by ditching the law of excluded middle on the ground of some nonsense or impossible factors in the paradoxical positions. Professor R. S. Y. Chi acknowledges the difficulty of drawing a line between nonsense and impossibility.44 But he truly says that there must be a method to say how a paradoxical sentence is significant or non-significant.

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What Nfigfirjuna has got to say about his non-commitment to any rationally knowable position in his pure negation by assuming prasahga is clear to us. But should we accept the self-referential statement of having no thesis 45 to be a significant one? While in all contexts Nfigfirjuna says that any form of statement including his own being dependently originated is intrinsically empty, we could accept N~gfirjuna's own statement 'I have, however, no thesis' to be necessarily false if and only if it were possible for us to show that in any context Nfigfirjuna ever insisted on the intrinsic truth of any statement being relatively originated in its ultimate nature. The presupposition that there exists some other statement which Nfigfirjuna believes to be both necessarily and intrinsically true is essential for the truth or falsity of this statement of having no thesis. Otherwise it will be neither true nor false, i.e., meaningless or insignificant, and we have genuine paradox here. If we call the presuppositional statement Y and the paradoxical statement X, X can have a truth value, if and only if Y is true. But if the presupposition fails to be a necessary truth, X is of course neither true or false. For X to entail Y the truth of X implies the truth of Y, but if X is false Yis true or false. For X to presuppose Y, the truth of Y must follow from the truth of X, but if Y is false then X will have no truth value, i.e., it will be neither true nor false, or it will constitute no statement at all. This is the distinction between entailment and presupposition. 46 In the above argument X presupposes Y if and only if X IF- Y and (not-X) It- Y [Bas C. Van Fraassen has used 'IF-' for semantic entailment or necessitation.] 47 What it establishes is that -"if X is true, then everything (including Y) is true" and also that "if X is false then Y is true." Thus by our definition, X presupposes Y. In addition, by similar reasoning,

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X presupposes (not-X) and we note that "if Y is true then X is false" So there are two possibilities: the presupposition holds and X is false; or the presupposition fails. In the latter case, X is of course neither true nor false: that is what the failure of a presupposition amounts t o . 48 N~gfirjuna's insight into the problems and methods, both Buddhistic and inter-systematic, turn out to be quite deep, effective and accurate. Richard H. Robinson has truly remarked: 'Thus a description of such a M~dhyamika text is a system about a system about systems about reality.' 49 According to him, 'the M~dhyamika texts are tertiary' and the description of such a text would be a quaternary. The conception of a hierarchy of languages is thus necessary for the solution of the paradoxes. In such a hierarchy, the type of secondary languages is called tertiary and the type of calculi, definitions, etc., used to explain the tertiary language, rather the tertiary words themselves belong to quaternary language. Although it is true that N~gfirjuna does not aim at constructing a positive system of cognitive ontology in his purely negative dialectics, his analysis of formal statements may be interpreted from a metastandpoint as following a system of logico-linguistic analysis. Ives Waldo, 5 a scholar associated with the translation works at Nfiland~, has suggested to consider the criteria of Gregory Bateson, 5~ G. Spencer Brown, 52 Joseph Goguen and Franscisco Varela, 53 Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in rigorously evaluating Nfigfirjuna's analysis of paradoxical forms. It is obvious from NfigL,-juna's scanning of a language system by his Prasahgdpddana reasonings that he makes us understand, to speak in the language of Gregory Bateson and Ives Waldo, that our epistemological structures are organizationally closed. They mutually determine one another in their recursive states having, in fact, no primitive or first element. But why is it so? Ives Waldo has not sufficiently backed his analysis by the Buddhist point of view of a communication gap between language and truth, or between concept and reality. He has proposed to test the applicability of G. Spencer

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Brown's basic calculus of distinguishing between higher order forms to explain Nfigfirjuna's distinction of an epistemological situation from its context and ultimately to return to his self-referential principle of Pratftyasamutpdda even after a very complicated query into infinite unfolding of successive linguistic states in time. This system presents a calculus of distinction and cancellation of distinction, and superficially resembles the tautology of the propositional calculus: P -- - ( - p).54 A calculus of this type may be adopted to reflect on Nfigfirjuna's distinction between an interdependent situation and its context, but since it belongs to the quaternary type of language it cannot explain the basic language or the object-1;anguage in its return to self-reference. Nfigfirjuna proves that the ontological concepts of being, causality, epistemic subject, act and object, object and property, etc., are some depended designata and are therefore essentially empty. Existential statements regarding the very self-conditioning nature (svabhdva) of things are not coherently possible. Neither his two cases of Prasatigdpddana reasonings are formally inconsistent, nor do they confound the distinction between the definiens and the definiendum if the negation Prasajya is accordingly applied to each case or sub-case independently in its context of co-arising epistemological situation. But these depended designata belong to his tertiary language. His equivalence 55 between Pratftyasamutpdda, ~tJnyatd and Madhyama Pratipad is also a derivative or interpretative, but not basic. If it is argued that 'the intuition of the Middle Way' (Madhyamaka dik4.d) constitutes the primary element of his object-language, it is still possible to show that it is given in a hypostatized form of certain meanings constituting the paradigm of equivalence. This is because while refuting the heterological predicability of being and nothing in his antinornies of the extreme positions, what he claims is that the middle way position is also not exclusive and real but only logical or homological for executing a pattern of prasahgdpddana reasonings in his antinomies of the form'S is-not P.' Stanislaw Schayer has remarked that individual thoughts 'are only understandable in systematic connection, as elements of structural units', and not 'in arbitrary isolation'. 56 This is true if we try to understand Nfigfirjuna's crucial statement of having no thesis also from the Buddhist point of view. It has been always a common feature of the

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Buddhistic negative dialectics that a gap is maintained negatively between language and truth and also between certainty and truth. For example, Hegel holds in his dialectic of the object and the subject that the sensation of the bare given falls short of language -- 'mere this' is reduced into nothingness and in its place a new object with a new thought-content emerges. It is consciousness which gives unity to the object. Nhgfirjuna, better say, a Buddhist maintains that language falls short of immediate sensation of the bare given. The bare given -- the object which appears to our sensibility -- cannot be conceptually described in its own-being. Our conceptual knowledge is empty and the dictum -- what is real is rational and what is rational is real, -- is not true. The view that we have a form of language to denote something which is real is wrong, but we infatuously crave it. For Hegel, contradictions which arise in negation make up the dialectical experience of the truth in negation of negation. Truth combines both the moments of negativity in a dialectical synthesis. There is no such dialectial synthesis or third value in the Mhdhyamika dialectics, according to Seyfort Ruegg. 57 Nhghrjuna might however think that the falsity of certain views of his opponents does not mean that he should have to make a positive statement about his own presupposition. In this connection we are reminded of the famous saying of Van Fraassen: 'To be presuppositionless may be a regulative ideal in philosophy, but it is not an achievable end." 58 N~ghrjuna does not completely step out of the Buddhist tradition and reflect on things. The opening two verses of M M K express by Paryyuddsa negation that the principle of origination by interdependence is non-ceasing, non-originating, neither eternal nor non-eternal, neither monistic, nor pluralistic, neither accumulating, nor releasing, i.e., it is not to be described by any ontological statement, which he demonstrates in his pure negation. How does he come to this implied affirmative content of 'S is non-P' from 'S is-not P' without however assuming t h a t ' S is'? N~ghrjuna however says in M M K XXII.II: Neither voidity is expressible, nor non-voidity is expressible; nor both, nor neither -- only what is communicable is being told (pra]~aptyartharh tu kathyate). Maitreyanatha, later" on, has given an ontological status to the synthetic consciousness of the Middle Way in his conception of the Abtitaparikalpa. 6 Candrakirti has quoted his Kdrikd 1.3 in his Prasannapada for revealing this truth. 61 As a Mddhyamika dialectician, Nhghrjuna does not make the

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notion of the Middle Way an ontological entity, but maintains that the Middle Way is a non-exclusive logical notion of solving apparent contradictions of the four-fold negation by the principal instrument of Prasahgdpddana reasonings.

I must acknowledge with deep sense of gratitude Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's specific reference to the focal points of my thesis 'The Dialectics of N~g~rjuna' in his paper "Some Unique Features of Buddhist Logic".62 'Although using the same material' as he states, his interpretation in some respects is different from mine. I have developed the above theme in my paper entitled "N~g~rjuna's Method of Prasahgdpddana Reasonings: The Problem of Consistency and Self-reference ''63 before I could have a guess or a glimpse of his paper. In this paper I have also added some new dimensions and interpretations to our earlier position in the thesis work of 1981. N~g~rjuna has simply shown that we can have a form of Reductio ad Absurdum turning the ground of universality of the Nydya Tarka into a reductio to absurdity of the form: (P D - p) D - p.64 In the form of Nydya Tarka (Prasahgdnumdna or Pramdnavdditdrthaprasatiga) the rule of double negation introduction (neg z int 65) is applied in the assumption which leads to a supposition of a contradiction in the key-steps 2 and n of the following meta-logical representation of a possible indirect proof of Nydya Tarka reductio:

1. p~ .'. - q 2. q ( = - - q )
n F. ~ r

n + 1 r n+2 -r.r n +3 -r n+4 rV n +5 -q n+6 n+7 n +8

-q

n, simpl. n, comm. n + 2 , simpl. n + 1, add. n + 3 , n + 4 , D.S. 2, n + 5, C.P. n + 6 , Impl. n + 7 , Taut.

qD -q -q V -q -q

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Since a contradiction follows from the assumption, the assumption is false. It involves the supposition in the subordinate proof that both conjuncts of the contradiction r. - r are true. Hence this supposition is shown to be irrational by some logicians.66 The Prasafigdpddana reductio is not an indirect proof of a position of the pram(m, avddins, This reductio ad absurdum involves the paradoxes of strict implication. We can solve them by finding out some nonsense or impossible factors on the ground of the law of Excluded Middle in the paradoxical positions. Professor S. Bhattacharyya is correct in assuming that in the form of Nydya Tarka (the major premise being 'p ~ - q') q is another premise, whereas in Nhghrjuna's prasatigdpddana (the major premise being 'L(p D q) ~ (Mp D Mq)') 67 L - q (= - Mq) is another premise, This is just an explication of our earlier position. His remark is important that in the form of prasatigdp(Mana the rule of double negation introduction is not applied in the minor premise. 6s To comment on his interpretations of the following schematic representation of the four independent positions (Catu4.koti) and Nhgfirjuna's negation of them, I should say that he has got some definite points to make. The schematic representation of Catuskoti P P.~P

PV

-p

~P

We have shown that Nfigfirjuna has negated each position separately. Professor S. Bhattacharyya observes that N~tghrjuna's negation of 'P. - P ' and 'P V - P ' is not truth-functional, for the former 'cannot be an object of thought',69 whereas in the latter 'the problem is that of explaining how the denial can make sense'.7 He correctly maintains in support of our earlier interpretations 71 that N~g~trjuna means by his negation not ordinary falsity, but rather absurdity'. "His prasahgdpddana proofs establish", he states, "that the positions examined are non-sense literally."73

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'P. - P ' is an A N F , and its absurdity is shown by a p a r a d o x of strict implication, viz. (P. - P ) ~ Q, which can be an object of thought. TM "Anything is true if a contradiction is true."75 'P V - P' is a P C - C N F . W e have referred to a justification of its negation by Candrakirti in the Prasannapadd, which c o r r o b o r a t e s that the law of excluded middle is not contradicted if only such possibilities are exhausted within a universe of discourse which is irrelevant or transcended, or if the possibilities are just borderline cases. Professor Sibajiban B h a t t a c h a r y y a maintains that N~g~rjuna obviously uses unrestricted reductio proofs in his prasat~gdpddana arguments. 76 T h e unrestricted principle of reductio ad absurdum says, in effect, that if p implies contradictory results, then p is false. T h e restricted reductio ad absurdum takes 'P V N p, as a hypothesis and a subordinate p r o o f having P as a hypothesis and contradictory items, say, q and - q. This principle is intuitively taken to m e a n that if P is true or false and if P implies contradictory results, then P is false. 77 T h e Prasa~gdpddana proofs here in the negation of the fourth alternative do not begin with the hypothesis P V - P to derive ultimately that P is false. T h e principle of Prasatigdpddana reductio in its p u r e negation is therefore consistent with the principle of unrestricted reductio ad absurdum. NOTES AND R E F E R E N C E S 'The Dialectics of Nfigfirjuna, unpublished thesis, Calcutta University, 1981. z Kimura thinks that N~ggrjuna flourished about the later half of the 2nd century and the first half of the 3rd century A.D.; vide, Kimura, Ryukan, A Historical Study of the terms Hinaydna and Mahdydna and the Origin of Mahdydna Buddhism. University of Calcutta, 1927, p. 1. Murty, K. Satchidananda refers to another Japanese scholar Hikata Ryusho who agrees with Kimura's date; see Murty, K. S. (1978). Ndgdrjuna. New Delhi: National Book Trust. Second edition, p. 112. Ramanan, K. V. (1966). Ndgdrjuna's Philosophy. Japan: Charles E. Tuttle, pp. 27, 337--38. 3 Vidyabhusana, S. C. (1919). 'Nfig~rjuna -- The Earliest Writer of Renaissance Period', Proceedings & Translations of the First Oriental Conference, pp. XXXIV-XXXVII, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, p. XXXVII. 4 Associate Professor of Religious Studies, California State College, Bakersfield, California. 5 Betty, L. Stafford (1983). 'Nlighrjuna's Masterpiece: Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither', Philosophy East and West 33: 123--138. 6 Loc. cir., p. 123 (italics mine).

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7 Jah Sadbhutarh ndma bruydt sa svabhdva ityevam Bhavam prativaktavyo ndma Brumagca na vayarh sat 8 Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana: Nydyadardana, Vol. I; Udayana, Nydya-VdrtikaT~tparya-Tika-Pariguddhi, p. 325. 9 Vddhakdlinecchdjanyarhjh~narh dhdryyarh. 10 The definition of the assumption (~hdryyajh6na) is: "Judgement having for its
predicate an attribute the opposite of which is known to be a real determination of the subject" (svaviruddhadharmadhdritavacchedakafn svaprakdrakafn jhdnamdhdryyam), quoted and translated by Bagchi, S., Inductive Reasoning, p. 62. 11 Jones, Richard H. (1978). 'The Nature and Function of Nhgfirjuna's Arguments', Philosophy East and West 28: 485--509, p. 485. 12 M.P. -- I M.P. -- II (Modal) A

1. p D q 2. p~ .'. q

1. L ( p D q) 2. Lp/ .'. Lq
B

1. L ( p ~ q)

2. Mp/ .'. Mq
M.T. -- II (Modal) B 1. p D q l . L ( p : 3 q) 2. - q / . ' . - p 2. L - q / . ' . L - p 13 The dilemmas are often expressed in enthymemes. Nfigfirjuna's argument against the cogency of a position about the reality of motion is given in an enthymeme: If a sentence ascribing movement to a body were true, it would have been true either in the case where movement is ascribed to a body which is moving, or in the case where movement is ascribed to a body which is not there in the place of motion (i.e., which has completed movement and which has not yet started movement). 14 Vaidya, P. L. (ed.) (1970). Madhyamakad~tra of Nhgfirjuna with the commentary: Prasannapadd by Candrakirti, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, p. 33, B 92, 9--10. 15 Betty, L. Stafford, op. cit., p. 125. Streng, Frederick J. (1967). Emptiness -- A Study in Religious Meaning. NasviUe: Abingdon Press, pp. 181--82. 16 Betty, L. S., loc. cir., p. 125. Cf. Gatarh na gamyate tavadagatarh naiva gamyate GaMgatavinirmuktarh gamyamdnath na gamyate MMKII.I 17 no ca gat(tgata vyatirekena trtiyamaparamadhva jdtarh pa@(tmo gamyamfmath ruJma M.T. -- I A

18 arhgulyagr~vasthitasya paramfmoryah, pf~rvo de~ah t9 pdrs.n.yavasthitasya caramaparam~noryah. 2o carandkrdnto degah 21 Prasaktiranumitir~pattirvd

22 Prasajyeta, MMK XXIV 4, V.I; prasajyate, MMK II, 4, MMK II.10, II.II; XX.7, XX. 9; prasakta, MMKII. 5. Cf. dvau gatitarau prasa]yete prasakte gamanadvaye / MMKII. 6.

23 utp~daprusahga, gamanadvayaprasahga, laksyalaks.anaprasahga, janyajanakaprasahga, gddvata-ucchedadardanaprasahga, 'Nirwi.naprasahga, dmtiprasahga, etc.

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24 Scherer, Donald (1971). 'The Form of Reductio ad Absurdum', Mind 80: 247-52. 2s Copi, Irving M. (1972). Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan. Fourth edition, pp. 53--56. 26 Copi's interpretation was criticised by Donald Scherer and others. He has simply explained the method in the fifth edition of his book.

27 Na svato ndpi parato na dvdbhydm ndpyahetutah. / Utpanndjatu vidyante bhdvah kvacana kecana //
English rendering, by Ruegg, Seyfort (1977). 'The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuskoti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahfiyfina Buddhism', Journal oflndian Philosophy 5: 1--7, p. 3.

~8 Prasannapadd, op. cit., p. 5, B 13, 5. ~9 Apradhdnyarh vidheryatra nisedhe ca pradhdnatd / Prasajyapratisedho'sau Kriyayd saha yatra nab//(vfikyapad~ya) 3o Paryyudasa- pari + ud + ~/as + a (ghafi) Pradhdnyarh hi vidheryatra nisedhe cdpradhdnatd / Paryyuddsa sa vij~eyo yatrottarapadena nab// 3~ Matilal, Bimal K. (1971). Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The Hague: Mouton, p. 163. 32 We find a similar distinction in Apadeva's Mfmdrhsd-Nydya-Prakdda, in Patafijali's commentary (about 2nd century B.C.) on the Pdnini-Sfttra (1.4.57 and 3.3.19), in Arcata's Hetu-vindu-77kd, Kumfirila's glokavdrtika (Apoha 33 & 34), Sfintaraksita's Tattvasarhgraha (Ts 1004) and in Kar.nakagomin's Pramdna-Vdrttika-svavrtti. The negative is connected with the verb (al ending) in Prasajya (supra, fn. 29), and
not with the next word (supra, fn. 30) as it is the case in relational negation. Johnson, W. E. correctly maintains that when the negative is hyphenated with the couple 'the attitude of negation applies to the proposition as a whole. 'S is non-P' is an affirmative proposition containing a negative predicate. See Johnson, W. E. (1921). Logic, Part I, London: Cambridge University Press, 71--72. Author's article: 'Pratisedha: Prasajya and Paryuddsa (Sfintaraksita)', Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta, vol. VI: 1981--85, pp. 5--28. 33 Siderits, Mark and J. Dervin O' Brien (1976). 'Zeno and Nfigfirjuna on Motion', Philosophy East and West 26: 281--98, p. 288. 34 Prasannapadd, ibid., p. 158, B 371, 7--8. 35 MMK XII. 9

"syddubhabhydrh Kr.tarh duhkharh syddekaika Kr.tam yadi" Pras. ibid., p. 12, B 38, I "Daf~bhydmapi nopajdyante bhdvdh, ubhayapaks.dbhihita dos.aprasahgdt pralyekamutpdddsdmarthydcca."
36 Pras., B 83, 10.

"Sadasannapi, parasparaviruddhasyaikdrthasydbhdvdt, ubhayapaks..tibhihita dosatvdcca."

37 MMK XXV. 12. 38 It is stated as a disjunctive negation of the form: neither 'is' nor 'not-is': naivdbhdvo naiva bhdva nirvdn,am iti yd~jand (MMK XXV. 15), Murti, T. R. V. (1960). The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (second edn.). 39 Cf. "The failure of the principle of bivalence does not necessarily entail a failure of

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the law of excluded middle. The proposed solution then is this: block the paradoxes by ditching the law of excluded middle on the ground of some kind of infelicity in paradoxical assertions." -- Priest, Graham (1983). 'The Logical Paradoxes and the Law of Excluded Middle', The Philosophical Quarterly 33: 1 6 0 - 6 5 , p. 160. 40 Candrakirti's commentary on MMK XVIII. 8 (naivdtathyarh naivatathyametad Buddhdnugf~sanam) in his Prasannapadd, B 371, 8--10, 13--14, MMS, loc. cit., 158. 41 K.N. Jayatilleke's interpretation regarding the possibility of a neutral third position in some cases is comparable with this. A person is 'neither happy nor unhappy' comprises the class of people experiencing a neutral hedonic tone (aduh.khamasukhamvedanft), 'The Logic of Four Alternatives', pp. 80--81. Cf. Gottlob Frege -- "The law of excluded middle is just another form of the requirement that the concepts should have a sharp boundary. This requirement is one which does exclude a middle, for when concepts are vague or not clearly defined there is a boundary area or no man's land, in which it is not clear whether the concept is applicable or not. When asked of something within this fuzzy area whether the concept or its negation is applicable to it, we may be unsure whether to say 'Both' or 'Neither'. This second requirement is, then, one which is associated with the application not only of the law of Excluded Middle but also of the law of noncontradiction." Geach P. T. and Max Black (ed.) (1970). Frege's Philosophical Writings. Oxford: Publisher, p. 159. 42 A~dgvatarh ~(tgvatarh prasiddhamubhayamyadi /

Siddhe na gdgvatam kdrh naivf~d~vatamityapi //

43 Cf., K. N. Jayatilleke's interpretation in 'The Logic of Four Alternatives.' 44 Chi, R. S. Y. (1969). Buddhist Formal Logic. The Royal Asiatic Society, Great Britain, p. 162. 45 "I have, however, no thesis. Therefore, there is no defect that is mine" (VV XXIX). 46 Kempson, Ruth M. (1975). Presuppositions and Delimitations of Semantics. London: Cambridge University Press, p. 48. 47 Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1968). 'Truth and Paradoxical Consequences', Journal of Philosophy 65: 136--52, Martin, Robert L. (ed.) (1970). The Paradox of the Liar. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 13. 48 Ibid., pp. 15--18. 49 Robinson, Richard H. (1967). Early Buddhism in India and China. The University of Wisconsin Press, p. 18. 50 Waldo, Ives (1978). 'Nfig~rjuna and Analytical Philosophy', Philosophy East and West 28: 287--298. 5~ Bateson, Gregory (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantyne. 5~ Brown, G. Spencer (1972). Laws of Form. New York: Bantam. 53 Varela, Francisco (0000). 'A Calculus for Self-Reference', International Journal of General Systems (No. 2). 54 Waldo, Ives, op. cit., pp. 290--298.

55 yah. pratftyasamutp(~da gtinyatdrh tdrh pracaks.mahe / Sd prajhaptirupdddya pratipatsaiva madhyamd // MMK XXIV. 18 Vigrahe jah. parihdrarh krte gFtnyatayd Vadet /MMK IV. 8 Vyakhyaneja upalambhath k.rte gftnyatayft vadet / MMK IV. 9. 56 Schayer: Kapitel, p. XXVIII, quoted by Robinson, Early Buddhism, loc. cit., p. 18. 57 Ruegg, Seyfort. The Uses of the Four Positions. He remarks: "If there really existed
such a dialectical synthesis or third value I'm the Madhyamika dialectics], there would be something on which conceptual thinking could base itself and cling, and the entire purpose of the M~dhyamika method could then no longer be achieved."

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Although Nfigfirjuna says that the transcendental truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth -- Vyavahdramandgritya paramartho na degyate (MMK XXIV. 10), -- he does not speculate like Bhfivaviveka that the conventional truth may be treated as having its logical ground in the transcendental truth as effect. For Nfigfirjuna, the own-being of a thing is perfectly appeasing (upagdnta) and by nature isolated (prakrtivivikta). 58 Fraassen, B. C. Van (1968). 'Presupposition, Implication and Self-Reference', Journal of Philosophy, 65, p. 120, quoted by John F. Kearns, 'Some Remarks Prompted by Van Fraassen's Paper', Martin L. (ed.), ibid., pp. 47--58, 54. 59 El. W. E. Johnson, op. cit., p. 73. "In order to pass from the denial (or contradictory) of S is P, i.e., from S is-not P to the affirmative 'S is non-P' we require the additional datum 'S is'." 60 Pandeya, Ramchandra (ed.) (1979). Madhygmta-Vibhdgagdstra, with the commentary of Acarya Vasubandhu and the Tika called Agamdnustirinfby Sthiramati. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 16, 134, 161--62, t65.

61 Na ~tinyarh na'pi ca'gfmyarh tasmdt sarvath vidhiyate / SattvSdasattvdt sattvdcca Madhyamd pratipaccasd // MVS 1.3. See P. L. Vaidya (ed.), Madhyamakagdstra, loc. cir., p. 193.
62 Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban (1984). 'Some Unique Features of Buddhist Logic',

Proceedings of the First International Conference on Buddhism and National Cultures.

New Delhi: Publisher, pp. 1--24, p. 24. 63 Ghose, Ramendra Nath: 'Nfigfirjuna's Method of Prasahgdpddana Reasonings: The Problem of Consistency and Self-reference.' Paper (unpublished) read at the 'International Seminar on Buddhism and World Culture' as the principal speaker on Buddhist philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, December, 1984. 64 Supra, sec. 1.1.1., p. 5. 65 Fitch, F. B. (1952). Symbolic Logic, New York, Ronald Press, pp. 54, 10.5. 66 Supra, p. 10, fn. 24. 67 Supra, p. 6. 68 Bhattacharyya, S. 'Some Unique Features of Buddhist Logic', p. 7. 69 Ibid., pp. 9, 11. 70 Ibid., p. 11. 7~ Ghose, Ramendra Nath: 'The Dialectics of Nfigfirjuna' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University, November, 1981, pp. 311--3,11. 72 Bhattacharyya, S., 'Some Unique Features', p. 13. 73 Loc. fit., p. 13. 74 Lewis, C. I. and Landlord, C. H. (1932). Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover (2nd edn.), pp. 250--251; Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J. (1968). An Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Methuen, p. 337. 75 Fitch, F. B. (1952). Symbolic Logic, p. 54, 10.4 (Rule of negation elimination -"ned elim").
76

Ibid., p. 8.

77 Fitch, F. B., op. cit., p. 57, 10.16.

D e p a r t m e n t o f Philosophy, University o f Ra]shahi, Bangladesh.