Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization

European Journal of Political Research 41: 3780, 2002
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Media framing and social movement mobilization: German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia
ALICE HOLMES COOPER
Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, USA
Abstract. How does media framing of issues affect social movement mobilization? This relationship is examined in light of the striking variation in levels of German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War and the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia. I argue that this variation in mobilization capacity can be explained in part by the degree of congruence between media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. Congruence between the two framings facilitates movement mobilization, whereas divergence hinders it. I compare the relative congruence between movement framing and media framing in Die Tageszeitung and Der Spiegel coverage of the three issues. I also evaluate possible alternative or complementary explanations, including public opinion, normalization and elite cues, and political opportunity structure.
Introduction
Conicting interpretations of policies lie at the heart of political debate. Like other political actors, social movements are involved in a competition over meaning as they try to modify public policy. They must engage in framing contests with political authorities if they hope to mobilize substantial protest. In their framing of issues, activists try to inuence public perceptions of which issues are important, which solutions are workable, and why mobilization is worth the trouble. Framing involves, among other possible things, identication of problems and their causes, along with suggested remedies. Framing contests play themselves out in the realm of public discourse. Public discourse consists of four sub-discourses: those found in ofcial, challenger (e.g., social movement), expert and general audience media. General audience media (such as television and newspapers) incorporate, as part of their framing processes, varying amounts of the other three. Ofcial discourse enjoys regular, routine access to the general media. Challenger discourses also depend on general audience media to reach a wider audience. Scholars have long examined how media coverage of movements affects the latters capacity to mobilize. The role of media discourse in stimulating or
European Consortium for Political Research 2002 Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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subduing protest through its coverage of issues has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. Like ofcials and social movements, the media also engage in framing. Media framing, among other things, identies problems and their causes, and evaluates possible remedies. Rather than constituting a neutral arena, media framing often lends more support to certain actors and discourses than to others. Ofcial and social movement discourses may nd varying levels of support from media framing, and this in turn may inuence the outcome of framing contests the battle for the hearts and minds of the broader public. Social movements capacity to mobilize may then depend substantially on media framing of the issue in question. I look at the relationship between mobilization and media discourse using the empirical example of German peace movements, which at different times mobilized with strikingly different degrees of success. West German peace movements mobilized against INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) missiles with phenomenal success in the early 1980s. Movement mobilization against the Gulf War in 1991 was again reasonably successful. By contrast, the movement failed utterly to mobilize the public against German participation in the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia in 1995, despite widespread popular unease with German participation in missions beyond NATO territory. What explains this variation in the peace movements capacity to mobilize? I argue that this variation can in part be explained in terms of the congruence between media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. In a nutshell, I argue that congruence between the two framings facilitates movement mobilization by privileging the latter in its framing contest with ofcials, whereas divergence hinders movement mobilization. I begin by reviewing the literature on framing in media discourse and as a mobilization tool for social movements. I then describe the ebb and ow of German peace protest since 1945. After discussing my research design, I turn to the relationship between media framing and movement framing in the three policy episodes. After considering alternative explanations, I conclude with further discussion of media framing as an important component of political opportunity for social movements.
Media framing and movement framing

A sizeable literature has examined how media coverage of movements affects the latters capacity to mobilize, along with movement strategies to attract and shape media attention. If friendly, media attention can confer standing on movements, validating them as important players (Gamson & Wolfsfeld
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media framing and social movement mobilization
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1993). Conversely, negative portrayals can marginalize movements (Gitlin 1980) and restrict mobilization even among their potential sympathizers, which reduces pressure on elites to respond to their concerns (Entman & Rojecki 1993). Media attention is indispensable in helping a movement communicate with the broad public, which is largely beyond the reach of more specialized movement organs. Friendly media thus contribute to mobilization without directly taking part (Kriesi 1996). To inuence policy-makers, movements must mobilize the wider society. Both the extent and the content of media coverage inuence whether the public develops sympathy for the movement and considers entering the fray (Lipsky 1968; McCarthy et al. 1996). For all of these reasons, the media are generally one of the main targets of movements efforts, and the need to attract media attention often shapes strategy (Zald 1996). Since media are accustomed to covering established political actors, movements must adapt their strategies to serve the news needs of the media. For example, movements often develop amboyant action strategies to attract media attention, but this leads to coverage of the dramatic action at the expense of the movements message (Molotch 1977; Rochon 1988). Despite these dilemmas, movements depend on the media to generate public sympathy for their challenges. But these are not the only functions that the media perform for social movements. Appropriately, scholars have also turned their attention to the relationship between media framing of issues and mobilization patterns. Through its coverage of issues, the mass media helps construct meaning by framing, in patterns that may well change over time. Journalists choose story lines and commentators develop arguments that support particular frames and affect the salience and intensity of issues. The mass media thus transform information rather than merely transmitting it (Zald 1996). Media coverage helps shape issue cultures, the set of discourses surrounding an issue (including expert, ofcial and challenger discourses) which span multiple competing interpretations or packages (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). When it comes to the mass media, there are many denitions of framing; Entman (1993: 52) refers to framing as a fractured paradigm suffering from scattered conceptualization. In Entmans words, to frame a phenomenon is to: select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient in a communicating text . . . Frames, then, dene problems determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benets, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgements evaluate causal
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alice holmes cooper agents and their effects; and suggest remedies offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects (Entman 1993: 52, italics in original).
In similar fashion, Iyengar (1991) notes that framing includes attribution of responsibility for problems in two senses: causal responsibility or the problems origin, and treatment responsibility or means to alleviate the problem. In general, frames call attention to some aspects of reality and deect attention from others, Norris (1995) suggests. To establish that the end of the Cold War changed framing in American television network news, Norris focused on the frequency with which certain things were covered before and after 1990 in particular international events as a proportion of total stories; the number of stories devoted to a geographic region or country (e.g., Russia); or the relative frequency with which topics such as wars, natural disasters abroad, or international economics are covered (Norris 1995). For Pan and Kosicki (1993), framing is an interactive process in which both the media and its audience engage, each operating within a shared culture on the basis of socially dened rules. Through this interactive process, meaning is constructed on multiple levels (Edelman 1993).1 Why should congruence between media framing and movement framing of a given issue facilitate mobilization and lack of congruence hinder it? Many scholars have argued that movements need viable organizational structures and positive political opportunities, moments when the distribution of power resources shifts in their favour (e.g., McAdam 1982). In addition, social movements face crucial framing tasks. Assuming that perceptions of issues are socially constructed and therefore susceptible to movement inuence, framing becomes a major strategic activity of movement organizations. Framing involves conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam et al. 1996: 6, italics deleted). To mobilize the broader public, movements must link their interpretive orientations with those of targeted constituencies (Snow et al. 1986). Snow and Benford (1988) identify three essential framing tasks: identication of the problem and attribution of blame or causality (diagnostic framing), proposed solutions (prognostic framing) and rationales for protest action (motivational framing). Adherence to at least the general spirit of a movements collective action frame(s) is a prerequisite for individual participation in collective action (Klandermans & Goslinga 1996) despite factional frame disputes over the ner points (Benford 1993). To be persuasive, movement framing must make sense to, or resonate with, its intended targets in several senses including empirical credibility an apparent evidential basis for the movements
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framing from the vantage point of the targets of mobilization (Snow & Benford 1992). Empirical credibility of a movements frames thus stems from approximate congruence between movement frames and the perceptions held by potential participants. The publics perceptions stem in signicant measure from media coverage, according to a wide-ranging body of scholarship.2 According to Niklas Luhmann (1996, cited in Kahrs 1999), what society accepts as reality is perceived through the mass media. People depend primarily on the media for information about the political world, and news frames affect causal beliefs held by citizens (Iyengar 1987). Media coverage has an important agendasetting effect; an issues prominence in the news contributes signicantly to its prominence in the public mind (Kenski 1996). This is particularly true with respect to foreign policy issues, of which individuals have little rst-hand information and little direct personal experience that could serve to lter media coverage (McCarthy et al. 1996; Brown & Vincent 1995). Of course, people do not simply absorb media messages with utter passivity. Instead, media discourse occurs parallel to the processing of information by individuals and social networks (Erbring et al. 1980; Kern & Just 1995; Gamson & Modigliani 1989). People evaluate the frames offered by movements, counter-movements and public ofcials in terms of whatever cognitive or experiential tools are available. Especially in the foreign policy arena, however, these tools are primarily news coverage and previously held values. Thus, at least modest media effects on public opinion hold true, especially for distinctive, consistent media messages presented over relatively long periods of time (Bartels 1993). In sum, media coverage helps shape individual perceptions and discussions in social networks (Gamson 1992), the micromobilization contexts for actual mobilization.3 Thus, particularly with respect to foreign policy issues, I argue, social movement mobilization is facilitated (but not single-handedly determined) by congruence between movement framing and media framing. Congruence between media and movement framing is a function of the relative frequency with which media accounts of the issues in question reect or echo the movements framing. High congruence enhances the apparent empirical credibility, and thus the resonance, of movement frames. Media framing of issues is a prime source of the cognitive tools for people to evaluate movements diagnostic framing in particular. Does congruence between movement framing and media framing have, as I argue, a signicant impact on movement mobilization? Empirically, I explore this relationship by comparing levels of congruence between movement and media framing on the one hand with levels of mobilization in three cases of German peace protest on the other. Alternative explanations will then be briey considered.
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Peace movement mobilization in postwar Germany

Peace movements have a venerable history in postwar Germany (Cooper 1996). In the 1950s, waves of protest accompanied both West German rearmament and the stationing of American nuclear weapons in Germany. During the 1960s, the Easter March movement demonstrated on behalf of test-ban treaties, nuclear nonproliferation and a new Ostpolitik (conciliatory policy toward Eastern Europe). In the 1980s, the largest protests ever seen in West Germany greeted the NATO decision to station new medium-range missiles in Germany and across Europe. In 1991, protest against the Gulf War attracted over 200,000 people to each of several major demonstrations. Peace movements thus contributed to public debate in conjunction with various critical foreign policy debates. Given this history of activism, it is all the more surprising that virtually no protest greeted the German decision to commit troops to the NATO peace-keeping mission in Bosnia. In 1995, Germany crossed an historic divide with its decision to contribute troops to the NATO effort. During the Cold War, West Germany abstained from military activity outside of NATO territory and, during the rst half of the 1990s,
200 180 160 140 Number of Events 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1980 1981 1982 Number of Events
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Figure 1. Frequency of peace protest events, 19801995. Sources: 198093, Rucht et al., Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignissen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; 199495, authors own data collected from Frankfurter Rundschau and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
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the out-of-area issue (military activity beyond NATO borders) was a major controversy in foreign policy debate. Participation in the NATO mission to Bosnia represented the biggest break with the past in this respect, since for the rst time Germany sent troops to an Eastern European region occupied by the Wehrmacht (army) during World War II. As sensitive as much of the German polity has been to any sign of militarism since World War II, it is striking that peace groups proved unable to mount signicant protest against this new direction in foreign policy. Figures 1 and 2 show the incidence of protest events and the numbers of participants in these events from 19801995. According to the Prodat project, action forms which count as peace protest events include petitions, court suits, mass demonstrations, sit-ins, etc.4 During the early 1980s missile debate, peace protest was very frequent. The years 19811984, furthermore, saw more than 1,860,000 people involved in peace protests each year. The year 1991, when the Gulf War took place, was also characterized by a multitude of peace protests with some 632,000 people taking part. In contrast, peace protests after
3500 No. of Participants (in thousands) 3000
2500 Number of Participants (in Thousands)
2000
1500
1000
500
0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Figure 2. Participation levels in peace protest events, 19801995. Sources: 198093, Rucht et al., Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignissen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat), Wissenschafszentrum Berlin; 199495, authors own data collected from Frankfurter Rundschau and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
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1992 were relatively infrequent and had relatively few participants.5 The three cases of the missile debate, the Gulf War, and Bosnia represent cases of high, medium and low mobilization, respectively not in any absolute sense, but relative to each other.
Research design
Media choices To investigate the relationship between media framing and mobilization in the three cases of peace protest mentioned above, I coded coverage of the three issues in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. Since time and money restrictions precluded systematic coding of a larger number of media sources, I chose these two print media because they are widely read by the most likely potential participants for new social movements in general and peace movements in particular. As is widely known, Germans who are university-educated, belong to the postwar generational cohorts, reside in urban areas and place themselves on the center-left or left of the political spectrum participate disproportionately in new social movements like the peace movement (Barnes et al. 1979; Kriesi 1991).6 Peace activists were, of course, strikingly heterogeneous, as was the enormous offering of books, specialty journals, etc. However, as Gamson notes, general audience media are the central forum for public discourse (Gamson 1995). As general media sources go, der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung were important, and reasonably representative, sources of political information for peace groups most likely constituencies. der Spiegel is one of Germanys most widely read print media, while die Tageszeitung is anchored in the left-alternative milieu which is home to much of Germanys hardestcore protest potential. Of Germanys weekly newspapers and news magazines, der Spiegel is one of the two most prestigious. It is considered one of Germanys Leitmedien, that is, those media that are particularly inuential in terms of their impact on society and the way other media respond to their coverage (Boothroyd 1998). Or, as Karl Kahrs puts it, no other publication has come close to matching the political impact of der Spiegel on the history of the Federal Republic (Kahrs 1999). In terms of numbers, der Spiegel has long enjoyed a high readership. As of 1979, the beginning of the time span featured in this article, der Spiegel had an estimated 4.5 million readers per issue, about 10 per cent of the adult population in then-West Germany. In 1997, just after the time span featured in this article, der Spiegel had a circulation of 1,307,300 (Stamm 1997) with a probable readership again of at least 4.5 million.7 Furthermore, sheer numbers
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are not the whole story. Der Spiegel is especially effective at reaching the politically-interested attentive public. Forty-three per cent of university graduates read der Spiegel regularly or frequently, and 60 per cent read der Spiegel for political commentary in particular. No other national publication reached both the national elite and a more mass-educated readership as effectively and consistently as der Spiegel (Herf 1991: 71). It is widely read across the political spectrum, but disproportionately on the center and left (Herf 1991). Everybody reads der Spiegel, including (as highly educated citizens on the left) the most likely adherents of new social movements. Although its readership is much smaller than that of der Spiegel, the demographic prole of Tageszeitung readers is even closer to that of the most likely adherents of new social movements in Germany. Founded in April 1979, die Tageszeitung (commonly called Taz) is ideologically close to and especially targets adherents of the ecological Green Party and the left-leaning Social Democrats (Kahrs 1999). Die Taz had a circulation of 38,000 in 1982 and a readership several times as high (Flieger 1992). By 1995 it had a readershipper-copy of 411,000 and a widest readership of 873,000 (Taz 1995). Two-thirds of the Tazs readership is 2049 years old, 60 per cent is well-educated (Abitur or university study), 45 per cent are 2049 years old and well-educated and one-half lives in cities of over 500,000 people (Taz 1996). Coding For each of the three cases (missile debate, Gulf War, Bosnia), I developed codes to capture the framing packages put forward by government ofcials and by peace groups respectively.8 I used representative texts from each side as the basis for the codes that is, documents written by peace groups (such as calls to demonstrations (Aufrufe) and pamphlets) and by government ofcials (such as speeches and White Books on defence policy along with, in the Bosnia case, essays by non-government pro-intervention gures on the left). In developing the codes, I adhered to the actual words of the two sides or paraphrased them as faithfully as possible. Drawing on these documents, I identied the issue sub-components that constituted the major points of disagreement for each policy debate. The overriding issues were, respectively: Should Germany accept INF missiles? Should Germany support the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War? Should Germany join the NATO peace-keeping missions to Bosnia? For the INF missile debate, issue sub-components included assessments of the Soviet Union, assessments of the United States, the military balance between East and West, sources of threat to Germany, effects of the INF missiles if stationed and responsibility for the failure of superpower arms-control negotiations
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concerning INF. For the Gulf War debate, the issue sub-components included assessments of Iraq, American policy and intentions in the war, causes of the Gulf War, effects of the war and appropriate responses to the war. For Bosnia, they included the nature of the conict, American policy and intentions in Bosnia, appropriate policy toward Bosnia, the nature of the NATO mission to Bosnia and Germanys proper role in international affairs. Drawing on the government and peace group documents further, I developed codes reecting the two sides positions on these issue sub-components. I modeled my coding schemes loosely on those found in William Gamsons Talking Politics (Gamson 1992). Gamsons coding schemes are based on the premise that framing packages involve not only references to values or symbols, but also to a multitude of specic idea elements that make concrete reference to the issue at hand and that collectively constitute the framing package (Gamson & Modigliani 1989: 11). This is best illustrated with reference to the codes themselves. Each code received a three-digit reference number. The rst digit referred to one of the issue sub-components referred to above (e.g., assessments of the Soviet Union), and the second two digits captured a specic idea element relevant to the issue sub-component (e.g., The Soviets are pursuing an arms build-up). For the INF issue there were a total of 141 codes reecting the government and peace groups framing in my coding scheme, for the Gulf War there were a total of 129 codes and for the Bosnia case there were a total of 114 codes. To give the reader a taste of the actual codes used to capture government and peace movement framing with respect to the INF missile debate and assessments of the Soviet Union (one of the issue sub-components), for example, I developed codes capturing specic idea elements as follows. Representing the governments framing, the codes included: Warsaw Pact armed forces have an offensive structure. The Soviets are pursuing an arms buildup. The Soviet Union has a war-ghting strategy against the West, including nuclear war. The Soviets intend to occupy Western territory in case of war. The Soviets repress freedom in Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets intervene militarily in Third World countries. The Soviets support repressive (communist) regimes or insurgencies abroad in non-Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets have damaged the dtente process. Other indications that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary. Representing the peace movements framing, the codes included:
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The Soviets are a defensive power. The Soviet Union wants to prevent war at almost all costs, has great fear of war. Maintaining their hold on the Eastern European satellites is already an economic strain for the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior represents a response to Western arms measures, is the result of feeling threatened by Western force. Afghanistan is traditionally part of the Russian/Soviet sphere of inuence. The Soviets are worried about spread of Islamic fundamentalism to their own Central Asian republics. Other indications that the Soviets are not aggressive or expansionary. Having developed codes which captured the governments and the peace movements framing on each issue, I turned to coding the media framing, namely the relevant articles in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. I coded all news accounts and political commentary related to the INF missile issue, the Gulf War, and Bosnia in every third issue of der Spiegel for the INF missile debate (19801983) and Bosnia (19911995); and in every second issue for the Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991) due to the shorter duration of the conict. (This resulted in 118 articles on the INF issue, 41 articles on the Gulf War, and 74 articles on the Bosnia issue.) I coded all news accounts and political commentary in approximately every fourth issue of die Tageszeitung for the three debates and corresponding time periods.9 (This resulted in 178 articles on the INF issue, 209 articles on the Gulf War, and 283 articles on the Bosnia issue.) I thus coded coverage for the entire length of a given conict, dened by certain temporal boundaries.10 I divided each article into a series of blocks representing three columninches of text, rounded to the nearest paragraph. I searched each block of text for passages (utterances of whatever length, from one to several sentences) which corresponded to any of the codes discussed above and recorded the three-digit number associated with the appropriate code. The relevant codeable unit was any utterance in a given block of text from a Spiegel or Tageszeitung article that echoed or reected any of the codes discussed above (i.e., that echoed or reected any idea elements contained in the governments or peace movements framing package). No code was used more than once within any given three-inch block, but many blocks contained several codeable utterances. Some blocks of text contained no codeable utterances. Others contained utterances that were too vague or ambiguous to be coded properly, in which case they were left uncoded. A second coder coded a random sample of 120 articles; intercoder reliability was 79 per cent.
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In order again to give the reader a taste of the coding process, I refer to an article in der Spiegel on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the reaction of the United States and the impact on dtente. All references in the article to the Soviet invasion were coded with the reference number corresponding to the code The Soviets intervene militarily in non-Warsaw Pact countries (e.g., Afghanistan). A statement in the article that the American government considered the Soviet Union an expansionist power was coded as Other indications that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary. The possibility that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan because they feared an American invasion of Iran (in response to the hostage crisis) was coded as Soviet behavior represents a response to Western arms measures, is the result of feeling threatened by Western force. To capture the entire content to which readers of the articles (including potential peace movement participants) were exposed, I coded all codeable utterances regardless of whether the author agreed with them or, alternatively, contradicted or qualied them in subsequent text. For the INF missile debate, this resulted in a total of 964 codable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 994 in der Spiegel for the entire set of articles coded; for the Gulf War a total of 603 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 334 in der Spiegel; and for the Bosnia debate a total of 909 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 602 in der Spiegel for all articles coded. Results After completing the coding discussed above, I tallied the data produced in order to determine levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing on the one hand, and movement or government framing of the INF, Gulf War and Bosnia debates on the other. I view congruence between Taz/Spiegel and movement/government framing as a function of the relative frequency with which Taz and Spiegel accounts of the issues reect or echo the movements or governments framing (i.e., the relative frequency with which Taz/Spiegel utterances contain idea elements belonging to government or peace movement framing packages, expressed as a percentage of the total codeable Taz/Spiegel utterances). Thus, for each of the three (INF, Gulf War and Bosnia) debates, I counted the codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel that supported the governments or peace movements framing package, both in terms of the overall count for each framing package and in terms of the issue subcomponents. I then converted these raw numbers into the percentages (in terms of the total number of codeable utterances) presented in Figures 38. Figure 3, for example, presents the percentages reecting the various levels of
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congruence between the Taz framing of the INF issue and the governments and peace movements packages. As the overall category at the far right of Figure 3 indicates, 21 per cent (or 207) of the total 964 codeable Taz utterances reected government framing of the INF issue, while 79 per cent (or 757) of the codeable Taz utterances reected the peace movements framing. With respect to the Soviet Union (the left-most set of columns in Figure 3), approximately 12 per cent (or 112) of the 994 codeable utterances supported the governments framing of the Soviet Union, while about 3 per cent (or 24) reected the peace movements framing. The Tageszeitung framing of the Soviet Union was thus more congruent with the governments framing of the Soviets than the peace movements framing of the Soviets by a ratio of roughly four to one. With respect to the United States, however, the tables were more than turned. Approximately 36 per cent (or 347) of the Tageszeitungs total codeable utterances were congruent with the peace movements framing of the United States, while only around 1 per cent (or 13) of the total codeable utterances echoed the governments framing of the United States. Thus the congruence of the Tageszeitung framing of the United States with the peace movements framing of the United States outweighed the congruence of Taz framing of the United States with the governments framing of the United States by a ratio of roughly 36 to 1. I repeated this process to arrive at the coding results for both Taz and Spiegel framing (displayed in Figures 38), both in terms of the overall count for each framing package for each debate and in terms of the issue sub-components for each of the three (INF, Gulf War and Bosnia) debates. The results are presented in the section below and in Figures 38. The Overall category in Figures 38 constitutes the totals of all the preceding columns (to the left of Overall) of the respective gure. Thus, for example, in Figures 3 and 4 the Overall score for the governments framing package is the sum of the government scores for the other ve government columns, while the Overall score for the peace movements framing package is the sum of the peace movement scores for the other ve peace-movement columns. The Overall scores for the government and the peace movement combined add up to 100 per cent, and the other columns collectively add up to 100 per cent. This system also characterizes Figures 58.
Media framing and peace movement mobilization in Germany

This section examines the empirical evidence for the argument that congruence between media framing and movement framing facilitates (but does not totally determine) movement mobilization while lack of congruence hinders
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mobilization. Media framing does not generally take a position for or against a specic policy decision, and media framing is certainly not synonymous with taking such a position. What media framing can do, however, is lend more weight to the governments or peace movements framing packages over time through, among other things, the frequency with which the media report on issues (Norris 1995) and their attribution of responsibility and remedies for the issues at hand (Entmann 1993; Iyengar 1991). The INF missile debate NATO adopted the double-track decision in December 1979. The decision mandated the stationing of new American INF weapons (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, or Pershing II and Cruise missiles) in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe unless arms control negotiations resulted in a satisfactory reduction of the newly installed Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles by late 1983. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the instigator of the NATO decision, hoped to restore the regional European balance in medium-range nuclear weapons and thereby also to shore up the credibility of deterrence. Pitted against the Schmidt government, the peace movement made serious inroads into Schmidts own party (the Social Democrats), the unions, the major
90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% Percentages 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Soviet Union
Government N = 207 Peace Mvt N = 757
United States Sources of Threat Effects of INF INF Negotiation
Overall
Figure 3. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances, INF missile debate.
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churches and society at large, as well as contributing to the rise of Germanys Green Party. As Figures 1 and 2 show, Germanys largest peace protests occurred in the early 1980s in the context of the INF missile debate. As Figures 3 and 4 show, framing of the INF issue in both die Taz and der Spiegel was much more congruent with the peace movements framing package than with that of the government. The Overall category in Figures 3 and 4 provides an initial conrmation of this congruence. It is true that framing in both die Taz and der Spiegel of the Soviet Unions foreign policy (labeled Soviet Union in Figures 3 and 4) echoed the governments framing package far more frequently than that of the peace movement. (The government framed the Soviet Union as politically repressive and militarily aggressive, while peace groups framed it as a defensive power straining to hold on to its existing sphere of inuence.) News accounts in die Taz and der Spiegel of the Soviet Unions relationship to other countries were almost always negative. References to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accounted for more than 25 per cent of all coded utterances concerning Soviet foreign policy. References to repression of freedom in Warsaw Pact countries were also relatively frequent. Assessments of the Soviet Unions armed forces focused largely on the arms buildup occurring at the time.
80.0% Government N = 327 Peace Mvt N = 667 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% Percentages 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Soviet Union United States Sources ofThreat Effects of INF INF Negotiation Overall
Figure 4. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegel utterances, INF missile debate.
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On the other hand, frames in der Spiegel and die Taz concerning all other components of the missile debate were much more congruent with the peace movements framing package than with that of the government. This was particularly true for assessments of American foreign policy and NATO (labeled United States in Figures 3 and 4). (Whereas the government framed the United States as committed to defending freedom and democracy, the peace movement framed the United States as an aggressive military power that intervened in the Third World.) Taz and Spiegel frames concerning American defense policy focused especially on the Reagan administrations alleged striving for worldwide superiority and its arms buildup, and they indicated that the United States considered nuclear war wageable on European territory. With respect to Americas relationship to other countries, Taz and Spiegel framing made frequent mention of American military intervention in Central America and its support for repressive regimes there. Forty per cent of the coded utterances in Taz reporting concerning the United States referred to American activities in Central America. Taz and Spiegel framing was also largely congruent with peace movement framing of the sources of danger to Germany (labeled Sources of Threat in Figures 3 and 4). The government maintained that the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact had aggressive intentions and that its military superiority posed the chief threat to Germany, whereas nuclear deterrence provided security. By contrast, according to Spiegel, Taz and the peace movement much greater danger to Germany was posed by: the rising conict between the superpowers and the deterioration of dtente, deterrence run amok, the arms race and the sheer presence of nuclear weapons on German soil, the destruction that nuclear weapons would wreak on Germany if used and the rising danger of war in Europe. Similarly, the governments claim that the INF missiles would chiey serve as counter-deterrents to Soviet missiles got little support from either die Tageszeitung or der Spiegel, whereas Spiegel and particularly Taz articles lent much more support to the peace movements claims that the INF missiles were usable in waging war against the Soviet Union and therefore provided tempting targets on German soil for preemptive Soviet strikes (labeled Effects of INF in Figures 3 and 4). Finally, there was the question of responsibility for the failure of the superpower negotiations to eliminate the INF and SS-20 missiles (labeled INF Negotiations in Figures 3 and 4). Spiegel and Taz attribution of the blame was modestly more congruent with peace movement framing than with the governments. In sum, in most of the individual components and certainly overall, Spiegel and Taz framing of the INF missile debate was much more congruent with peace movement framing than with the governments, which is consistent with the peace movements tremendous mobilization capacity.
media framing and social movement mobilization The Gulf War
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The Gulf War found Germany in the throes of the unication process (Mller 1992). This left Germany unprepared for sudden demands to accept more international responsibility, and Germany restricted its contribution primarily to nancial, logistical and material support (although it did send ghter jets to help defend Turkey from Iraqi attack). Germany quickly sent aid to Israel following embarrassing revelations that German rms had illegally contributed to the Iraqi military buildup, including the Scud missiles directed against Israel. Peace protests were directed against the German governments support for the war and the American-led coalition against Iraq. The demonstrations sponsors ranged from left-wing parties to unions, church groups, students, and peace and ecology groups (Cooper 1996). Figures 1 and 2 show that protest against the Gulf War was relatively substantial, although not nearly as large as protest against the INF missiles, particularly in terms of numbers of participants. Nevertheless, several demonstrations took place in January 1991 that mobilized over 200,000 people each. As Figures 5 and 6 show, framing of the Gulf War was more congruent with the peace movements framing package than with that of the government, particularly in die Taz and, to a lesser extent, in der Spiegel.
80.0% Government N = 160 Peace Mvt N = 443 70.0%
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0.0% Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall
Figure 5. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances, Gulf War.
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Government N =140 Peace Mvt N =194 60.0%
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0.0% Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall
Figure 6. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegel utterances, Gulf War.
Virtually universal agreement existed in the characterization of Iraq (labeled Iraq in Figures 5 and 6). The government, the peace movement as a whole, der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung all framed Iraq in a negative light Saddam Hussein was a dictator, Iraq had committed clear aggression against Kuwait, Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds, etc. During the actual ghting in January 1991, there was also a urry of mentions in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung of the threat posed by Iraqi Scuds to Israel. Although this characterization of Iraq did not constitute concrete bones of contention between the government and the peace movement, I have assigned the relevant codings in Taz and Spiegel articles to the Government column of the Iraq component of Figures 5 and 6. The government and other supporters of the Gulf War brought Iraqi aggression and the danger to Israel into their discourse much more frequently than did peace groups, and they linked their support for the war explicitly to this negative characterization of Iraq. On the other hand, the peace movement received more support than the government from Taz and Spiegel framing of the other components of the Gulf War debate. First, both media sources framed the motives and role of the United States (labeled United States in Figures 5 and 6) in negative tones that echoed those of peace groups the United States and its allies had con European Consortium for Political Research 2002
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doned Iraqs earlier war with Iran but now opposed the invasion of Kuwait; and the United States and its allies were waging the Gulf War primarily for economic reasons, in particular to guarantee their oil supply. With respect to causes of the Gulf War (labeled Causes of War in Figures 5 and 6), the government held Iraq responsible, whereas in the framing of peace groups and the two news media, the United States/West had contributed signicantly to the causes of the war President Bush was eager for war, the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia in 1990 paved the way for war, diplomacy and sanctions were not given enough time to work, etc. Furthermore, the West (including Germany) had earlier delivered arms to Iraq, thereby contributing to the current problem. A third component for which peace movement and media framing were congruent concerned the effects of the Gulf War (labeled Effects in Figures 5 and 6). Both media described the physical damage and civilian suffering caused by the American bombing of Iraq. Moreover, both media, and in particular die Tageszeitung, framed the Gulf War as a source of threat to Germany specically, the ecological danger posed by burning oil elds and potential climate damage. The nal component for which peace movement and media framing were congruent concerned appropriate responses to the Gulf crisis (labeled Responses in Figures 5 and 6). While der Spiegel was largely silent on the issue, die Tageszeitung lent support to peace groups views that war would not solve problems in the Gulf, their calls for continuing diplomacy in the place of force, and their calls for an export ban on war materials. In sum, in most of the individual components and certainly overall (labeled Overall in Figures 5 and 6), Spiegel and Taz framing of the Gulf War was more congruent with peace movement framing than with the governments. In the case of the Gulf War, however, the margin of victory in terms of media support for peace groups framing was somewhat lower than in the case of the INF missile debate. Nonetheless, the reasonably high congruence between media and movement framing paralleled the peace movements moderately successful mobilization against the Gulf War. Bosnia and the NATO peace-keeping mission Toward the end of the Bosnian component of the wars of secession from the former Yugoslavia, the German Bundestag voted on two issues: whether to contribute ghter jets and warships to a NATO mission to assist a possible UN withdrawal from Bosnia (June 1995) and whether to join the multilateral peace-keeping mission envisioned by the Dayton peace agreement (December 1995). The issue of involvement in military missions to Bosnia was
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extremely controversial, and it capped a lengthy debate on the out of area question the issue of whether Germany could or should participate in military activity beyond NATOs core territory. During the Cold War, West Germany restricted its military activity to defence of NATO territory, and this self-restraint became associated with an interpretation of certain constitutional clauses, shared by virtually all established elites, which seemed to restrict military engagement in just such terms. Even participation in blue helmet peace-keeping like the UN mission to Somalia in 1993 provoked both enormous controversy and a suit taken before the German Constitutional Court, as did the Kohl governments decision in 1992 to send one German destroyer and three German jets to monitor the UN embargo against Serbia. There was also little popular enthusiasm for out of area military activity. In July 1994, however, the Constitutional Court ruled that German participation in multilateral out of area missions was indeed constitutionally permissible. In spite of consistent opposition to out of area military activity, there was virtually no mobilization against the Bosnia mission, the most substantial (and the most internationally sensitive) episode of out of area activity up to that point. As Figures 1 and 2 show, mobilization protesting Western use of force in Bosnia or German participation therein was minimal to nonexistent. As Figures 7 and 8 show, framing of the Bosnia issue by both die Tageszeitung and
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Figure 7. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances, Bosnia.

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Figure 8. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in der Spiegel utterances, Bosnia.
der Spiegel was, overall (see the Overall category in Figures 7 and 8) and in most individual components, more congruent with the pro-intervention side (the government and parts of the left) than the anti-intervention (peace groups) side. The congruence in framing between both media sources and the prointervention side was particularly strong for the component of the debate which got the most notice, attribution of blame for the war (labeled Conict in Figures 7 and 8). For the pro-intervention side, as well as die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel, the Serbs were aggressors and the Muslim were victims; UN peace-keeping, sanctions and diplomacy had failed to stop the ghting. In contrast, Taz and Spiegel coverage offered considerably less framing support to the diagnosis of peace groups that the Bosnian war was caused by nationalism and aggression on all sides, had its roots in historical instances of ethnic conict in the region, and so on. Die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel also offered considerably more support to the pro-intervention than the anti-intervention side when it came to the American role in the Bosnian conict (labeled United States in Figures 7 and 8). Both media sources described the United States and Western Europe as hesitant to intervene. In so doing, neither media source offered much framing support to the concrete claims of either side, but their framing was compati European Consortium for Political Research 2002
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ble with the pro-interventionist claims that the United States had a genuine interest in peace in the region. The two media sources offered absolutely no support to the anti-intervention sides (peace groups) claims that the United States was serving self-interested economic or power motives in the Bosnian War. When it came to appropriate Western policy toward Bosnia (labeled Policy in Figures 7 and 8), the pro-intervention side enjoyed greater visibility than the anti-intervention side in die Tageszeitung and the two sides enjoyed about equal visibility in der Spiegel in terms of the relative frequency of mention of their respective positions. While the anti-interventionists denied that military intervention would serve any useful purpose and argued that the West should instead focus on humanitarian aid to Bosnia, the prointerventionists argued that force was acceptable to protect human rights and to end the ghting. In two areas Spiegel and Taz framing lent more support to the antiintervention side, but neither of these areas attained much prominence in their news accounts. These included, rst, the notion that the NATO mission would enshrine dominance of military solutions in international conicts and would serve to defend imperialist economic interests, and so on (labeled Mission in Figures 7 and 8). These included, in addition, the anti-interventionists claim that joining the NATO mission would mean breaking with Germanys postwar policy of restraint, would increase Germanys great-power role, would militarize German foreign policy, etc. (labeled Germany in Figures 7 and 8). In sum, in most of the individual components and certainly overall, Spiegel and Taz framing of the Bosnia issue was much more congruent with prointervention framing than with the peace groups anti-intervention framing, and this was consistent with peace groups incapacity to mobilize the broader public. Testing causation Table 1 demonstrates that genuine variation in the independent variable exists, exhibiting a systematic trend rather than a random occurrence. In terms of genuine differences between levels of congruence between media and movement framing, Table 1 shows that INF and Bosnia are indeed polar cases and that the Gulf War case lies in between. The chi square statistics generated by the paired comparisons demonstrate that variations in congruence across issues are statistically signicant. In particular, with respect to the Tageszeitung, the tests of signicance demonstrate the extent of the differences in congruence between media and movement framing in the INF-Bosnia and Gulf War-Bosnia comparisons. Thus, Tageszeitung framing favours the peace
Table 1. Cross-tabulations for differences between INF, Gulf War and Bosnia regarding congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and government/peace movement framing Taz PAIRWISE COMPARISONS Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention INF 207 757 Pearson c2(1) = 388.99 Gulf War Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention
Spiegel Bosnia 606 303 Pr = 0.000 Bosnia 606 303 Pr = 0.000 Gulf War 160 443 Pr = 0.021 Gulf War 160 443 Pr = 0.000 ASE = 0.024 Bosnia 606 303 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(1) = 166.86 Gulf War 140 194 Pearson c2(1) = 51.46 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(1) = 8.92 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(2) = 168.63 g = -0.4663 Bosnia
398 204 Pr = 0.000 Bosnia 398 204 Pr = 0.000 Gulf War 140 194 Pr = 0.003 Gulf War 140 194 Pr = 0.000 ASE = 0.032 Bosnia 398 204
160 443 Pearson c2(1) = 233.59 INF
Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention ALL CASES Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention
207 757 Pearson c2(1) = 5.30 INF 207 757 Pearson c2(2) = 455.01 g = -0.614
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movement with respect to INF and the Gulf War, but ips to favouring government framing with respect to Bosnia. The chi square statistic for the INF-Gulf comparison shows that Tageszeitung framing of these two cases is more alike than for any other paired comparison, which is consonant with the middle-case status of the Gulf War. The same holds true for der Spiegel, but to a lesser extent. The gamma statistic, which assumes that cases are ordered by degree of mobilization (INF > Gulf > Bosnia), indicates a strong negative relationship between Tageszeitung congruence with government framing and the extent of mass mobilization. The same holds true for der Spiegel, but less strongly; the gamma correlation is weaker but signicant and in the same direction (ASE less than 0.05).
3500 Spiegel 3000 Taz
INF
2500 Number of protest participants (in thousands)
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Bosnia 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Congruence between media framing and movement framing (% agreement)
Figure 9. Relationship between protest levels and media congruence with peace movement packages for INF, Gulf War and Bosnia.
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Finally, since levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and movement framing change systematically across the three cases and since the INF missile, Gulf War, and Bosnia cases are ordered in terms of descending mobilization by the peace movement, we can make the reasonable inference that a causal relationship exists between media/movement framing congruence and movement mobilization capacity. Figure 9 summarizes this relationship. Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was high (the INF case), mobilization was also high. Where congruence was low (the Bosnia case), mobilization was also low. Where congruence was somewhere in between (the Gulf War case), mobilization was moderate.11 Reverse causation? As noted above, I have pointed to a reasonably strong relationship between media framing and peace groups capacity to mobilize with respect to the INF missiles, the Gulf War and the NATO mission to Bosnia. But what about the possibility of reverse causation? Do media establish framing patterns in advance of movement mobilization, or does mobilization tilt media framing toward the peace groups side? This question can be most usefully addressed with respect to the INF missiles and the Gulf War, the two cases in which mobilization actually took place. I therefore compared levels of overall congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and peace group framing for the INF debate before the rst major anti-missile demonstration (October 1981) and between each of the largest subsequent demonstrations (June 1982 and October 1983) with levels of congruence for the entire missile debate. I undertook similar comparisons for the Gulf War debate, comparing levels of congruence before and after the rst major demonstration against the Gulf War on 14 January 1991. Two more large demonstrations took place in the second half of January 1991. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. During the INF debate, framing in both die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel shifted toward somewhat higher levels of congruence with peace group framing after the rst or second major demonstrations of the early 1980s, and this shift may be partly attributable to inuences of the peace movement on the two news sources. On the other hand, Taz and Spiegel framing of the INF issue was already quite congruent with peace group framing even before the rst major demonstration in October 1981. During the Gulf War, moreover, levels of congruence between Taz framing and peace group framing actually fell after the rst major demonstration; demonstrations certainly did not tilt media framing toward the peace movement in the case of the Gulf War. In sum, although it may have played a slight role in the INF missile debate, peace
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Table 2. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the INF debate, by time periods Framing congruence with peace movement, INF debate die Tageszeitung January 1980October 1981 November 1981June 1982 July 1982October 1983 Entire period (January 1980 October 1983) der Spiegel January 1980October 1981 November 1981June 1982 July 1982October 1983 Entire period (January 1980 October 1983) 65% 74% 74% 67% 35% 26% 26% 33% 77% 77% 84% 79% 23% 23% 16% 21% Framing congruence with government, INF debate
Table 3. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the Gulf War, by time periods Framing congruence with peace movement, Gulf War die Tageszeitung August 199015 January 1991 15 January 199128 February 1991 Entire period (August 1990 February 1991) der Spiegel August 199015 January 1991 15 January 199128 February 1991 Entire period (August 1990 February 1991) 59% 59% 58% 41% 41% 42% 77% 71% 73% 23% 29% 26% Framing congruence with government, Gulf War
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movement mobilization was not the driving force behind media framing of these two issues in any consistent fashion.
Weighing alternative or complementary explanations

Public opinion prior to and during the INF, Gulf War and Bosnia debates Before concluding, several alternative explanations for the ebb and ow of peace movement mobilization capacity need to be considered. First, I consider public opinion, both prior to and during the three debates. Measuring public opinion through surveys is fraught with methodological difculties, including the susceptibility of survey responses to the framing effects of the survey questions themselves (Entman 2000; Eichenberg 1989). Nonetheless, many scholars nd survey evidence useful in spite of all its well-known and indisputable shortcomings (Everts 1993: 197). All caveats notwithstanding, one might expect to see a general relationship between public opinion and movement mobilization. Let us now consider prior public opinion as an explanation for varying levels of peace movement mobilization. That is, prior to the specic controversies over the INF missiles, the Gulf War or Bosnia, the public held attitudes that increased or decreased receptivity to peace movement arguments once those controversies actually arose. If prior public opinion did indeed contribute to mobilization potential in the three cases, one would expect that it favoured receptivity to peace movement arguments about the INF missiles more than about the Gulf War or Bosnia, since mobilization against INF missiles greatly outstripped mobilization against the other two. Unfortunately, I am aware of no data that would reveal prior German public opinion concerning wars like the Gulf War. However, we can compare prior public opinion concerning issues associated with the INF missiles on the one hand, and German participation in out-of-area military activity like the Bosnia missions on the other. The status quo ante of public opinion on the eve of the missile debate (late 1979) constituted a mixed but not wholly inhospitable terrain in terms of the publics a priori likelihood of being receptive to peace movement arguments and mobilization attempts. As Table 4 shows, on the eve of the missile debate, with respect to threat of communism,military balance and nuclear balance, the percentage of (Western) Germans holding attitudes that suggested likely receptivity to subsequent peace movement positions was higher than or equal to the percentage holding attitudes that suggested likely receptivity to sub European Consortium for Political Research 2002
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Table 4. German publics prior attitudes to INF missile-related issues, 19771979 (percentage of public holding attitudes likely to make them receptive during the INF debate to peace movement arguments (P), government arguments (G)) Peace movement arguments 40 65 56 5 18 27 Dont know/no answer 18 4 17 11 4 16
Issue Threat of communism (G = great or very great; P = not great or not serious) Military balance (G = Warsaw Pact superior; P = NATO superior or both sides equal) Nuclear balance (G = Warsaw Pact superior; P = NATO superior or both sides equal) NATO essential to European security (G = agree; P = disagree) Withdrawal of American troops from Federal Republic (G = against; P = in favour) Military alliance with United States or neutrality? (G = alliance with United States; P = neutrality) Federal Republic should defend itself against military attack by using military force? (G = yes; P = no) Attack from East best prevented by deterrence with West adequately armed? (G = agree; P = disagree)
Government arguments 41 31 27 84 77 57
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Sources: Eichenberg 1989; Szabo 1987; Schweigler 1984; Schmidt 1985.
sequent government arguments. With respect to the other issues listed in Table 4, however, this relationship was reversed; attitudes suggesting receptivity to subsequent government positions outweighed attitudes suggesting receptivity to subsequent peace movement positions by a large margin. With respect to German participation in multilateral military missions beyond NATO territory (e.g., Bosnia), survey results reveal a potentially more, and in any event not less, hospitable terrain for peace movement mobilization in terms of a priori public opinion. As Table 5 shows, support for German involvement in combat missions outside NATO territory was extremely limited from 1991 to mid-1993. It is true that as much as 45 per cent of the German population was prepared to accept German participation in unarmed peace-keeping missions, and these people might be considered potential supporters of subsequent peace-keeping missions despite potential use of force
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Table 5. German publics attitudes toward German participation in out of area military missions (percentages) Combat missions acceptable March 1991 June 1992 April 1993 17 14 12 Unarmed peace-keeping only 41 44 21 Acceptable only within NATO territory 39 38 53
Dont know/no answer 3 4 14
Sources: Spiegel 1991, 1992; Die Woche 1993.
(such as the decision to send German ghter jets to aid UN peace-keeping troops in June 1995 or the decision to contribute German troops to the enforcement of the Dayton accords in December 1995). Nonetheless, whatever stance one takes on the question just mentioned, from 1991 to 1993 a substantial portion of the public (at least 38%) wanted to see the German military limited to missions within NATO territory only, which would certainly indicate receptivity to the anti-intervention position. Thus, prior public opinion was moderately propitious for peace movement attempts to mobilize against both INF missiles and German involvement in Bosnia. However, peace movement mobilization against the INF missiles was vastly more successful than against the NATO missions to Bosnia. Therefore, prior public opinion fails to provide a satisfactory alternative explanation for the varying success of peace movement mobilization. The evolution of public opinion during the three controversies themselves might also help explain the peace movements mobilization capacity. In particular, the proportion of the general public sharing the peace movements fundamental positions (i.e., opposed to INF missiles, the Gulf War and Bosnia) would logically represent an upper limit on mobilization potential (on this general point, see Klandermans & Goslinga 1996; Reuband 1985). The case of the INF missile debate sustains this expectation quite well. As Table 6 illustrates, public opinion between 1979 and 1983 increasingly turned against the INF decision and the possible stationing of missiles. (Admittedly, responses varied considerably depending on the wording of survey questions, but the bulk of those surveys conducted in 1983 found large-scale opposition to stationing INF missiles (Berger et al. 1983).) Whereas in late 1979 only 35 per cent opposed possibly stationing the missiles, by late 1983 as many as 74 per cent did so. This evolution of public opinion may well have increased mobilization potential and contributed to the actual mobilization which grew by leaps and bounds between 1981 and 1983 (see Figures 1 and 2).
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Table 6. German publics attitudes toward INF missiles, 19811983 (percentages) Opposition to INF/missile stationing October 1979 July 1981 AugustSeptember 1983 October 1983 35 44 66 74 Approval of INF/missile stationing 39 29 16 25
Undecided 26 27 18
Sources: Institut fr Demoskopie Allensbach 1981; Emnid 1983; SINUS 1983.
The case of Bosnia also sustains this expectation. German support for the use of Western multilateral force rose between 1992 and 1995. Juhasz (2001) found that 58 per cent of Western Germans and 45 per cent of Eastern Germans supported military enforcement of the UN-imposed no-y zone in Bosnia in March and October 1993; the remaining Germans divided their opinions between indifference (24 per cent of Westerners and 23 per cent of Easterners) and disapproval (18 per cent of Westerners and 32 per cent of Easterners) on this issue. Similarly, Sobel (2000) found that 59 per cent of all Germans approved of ght(ing) to get aid convoys through in late February 1994 (39 per cent opposed). Both Juhasz and Sobel found lower levels of support (around 40 per cent) for bombardment of Serb troops (Juhasz 2001) and launching air attacks (Sobel 2000) at those respective times. By late September, 64 per cent of Germans were ready to support the NATO mission to Bosnia, with 30 per cent opposing it (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1995). The acid test came, however, with the issue of German participation in such multilateral endeavours. Table 7 shows the evolution of German public opinion on this most sensitive issue. At most, 40 per cent of German respondents supported German participation in UN or NATO missions through 1994. Starting in 1995, however, support for German participation increased dramatically, with 57 per cent supporting deploying German Tornado ghter jets to support UN peace-keepers in June 1995 and 72 per cent supporting German participation in the NATO peace-keeping mission in December 1995. This rising support for German participation in the Bosnia missions corresponds to the peace movements inability to mobilize signicant protest in 1995 or at any earlier point (see Figures 1 and 2). The signicant rise of public support for German participation in 1995 was particularly constraining; the two parliamentary votes in June and December 1995 on the issues mentioned above would have provided the most logical focal points for protest. Thus, the evo-
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Table 7. German publics attitudes toward German participation in Western military intervention in Bosnia, 19931995 (percentages) Date of interview January 1993 (Western Germans only) 27 April 1994 13 March 1995 6 June 1995 11 December 1995 No 57 56 44 31 (no report) Yes 40 39 49 57 72
Note: the gures do not add up to 100% because dont know/no answer responses were generally not reported. Sources: Sobel 2000; Infas 1994; Sample-Institut 1995; Forsa 1995; Emnid 1995.
lution of public opinion may well have helped constrain the peace movements mobilization capacity concerning Bosnia. On the other hand, the case of the Gulf War lends little support to the notion that public opinion adequately explains mobilization capacity, as Table 8 shows. The rst two entries measured German support for a potential war waged by the United States-led coalition against Iraq prior to the onset of ghting in mid-January 1991. The rst two entries are also inconsistent with each other, which may be due to question wording (the October 1990 question measured support for using force to liberate Kuwait (Everts 1993), while the 16 January 1991 question measures support for military attack in the event that Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait before the expiration of the UNs ultimatum). Once the ghting began, however, it is clear that Germans supported the Gulf War in high numbers (c. 75 per cent), although this support dropped somewhat in the course of the War. Despite this high level of public support for the Gulf War, however, the peace movement was able to mobilize some 600,000 participants in over 140 events (see Figures 1 and 2). The fact that the peace movement achieved moderate mobilization (in comparison to the INF or Bosnia cases) despite high public support for the war would appear to be a paradox. Kaiser and Becher (1992) also draw attention to this; they note the high public support for the war, but they also characterize the mobilization against the Gulf War as big and suggest that it would have been even larger except for the long-held hope that a non-military solution would be found. In the nal analysis, public opinion prior to and during the INF, Gulf War and Bosnia debates turns out to be an imperfect predictor of the peace movements mobilization capacity. Prior public opinion should have prepared more
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Table 8. German publics attitudes toward the Gulf War, 1991 (percentages) Date of interview Against (potential) Gulf War 24 79 21 23 37 Support (potential) Gulf War 63 16 75 76 60
October 1990 16 January 1991 29 January 1991 6 February 1991 19 February 1991
Note: gures do not add up to 100% because dont know/no answer responses were not reported. Sources: Everts 1993; Infas 1991a, 1991b; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1991a, 1991b.
(or equally) hospitable ground for mobilization against German participation in the Bosnia mission than against INF, but mobilization was vastly more successful against the latter than against the former. The evolution of public opinion during the debates themselves seems consistent with the levels of mobilization achieved (or not) during the INF and Bosnia debates, but is apparently inconsistent with the mobilization achieved against the Gulf War. While public opinion undoubtedly plays a certain role in facilitating or constraining mobilization, the above observations dovetail nicely with my central argument, namely that media framing strongly affects movement mobilization capacity. The effect of media framing sheds light, for example, on the relationship between prior public opinion and the timing of protest with respect to the INF debate. While part of the (West) German public can be considered receptive a priori to peace movement positions in the missile debate, the rst major demonstration against the missiles did not take place until October 1981 (a full 21 months after the NATO double-track decision was announced in December 1979), despite the fact that peace groups began mobilizing in 1980. Arguably, part of the explanation for this lag lay in the need for the peace movements arguments about the missiles, deterrence and the international constellation to attain credibility with the populace. This credibility was undoubtedly enhanced by the support it found in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. Similarly, although the German public was at best highly ambivalent about, if not downright opposed to, German participation in out of area military involvement through 1993, the same public came to support German participation in the armed NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia by 1995. The peace movements chances to mobilize against participation in the Bosnia mission were also low. These developments were quite plausibly due in part to the lack of support for the movements positions in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. Furthermore, while the climate of public opinion was
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favourable to both the Gulf War and German participation in the Bosnia mission, the congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and peace movement framing facilitated the movements reasonably successful mobilization against the Gulf War, whereas the absence of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and movement framing helped hinder mobilization against Bosnia. Thus, even when majority public opinion worked against it, the peace movement was able to mobilize considerable protest against the Gulf War with the help of media framing in two of the organs read most often by those with high protest potential. Normalization of German foreign policy and elite cues on the left Yet another possible explanation for the peace movements inability to mobilize against German participation in the NATO mission to Bosnia (in contrast to its earlier successes) exists: that German foreign policy had undergone a process of normalization by 1995 which changed attitudes held by political parties and the general public concerning the use of military force. This argument intersects with an additional possible explanation of the peace movements incapacity in 1995, an argument concerning elite cues. According to this argument, potential peace protestors respond to cues emanating from leftwing elites. Thus, the fact that left elites were solidly united against the INF missiles and relatively united against the Gulf War facilitated mobilization of rank-and-le potential protestors. By contrast, the deep divisions among left elites over the Bosnia mission discouraged mobilization against it. Since the Cold War ended, German foreign and security policy has undergone a certain normalization (Otte & Greve 2000; Dufeld 1998; Gordon 1994). While some conservatives advocated that Germany become so normal as to pursue its national interests unilaterally, most of the German political class equates normality with multilateralism, including the commitment to participate in multinational military missions out of area (i.e., beyond NATO territory). This was advocated relatively quickly by the conservative-liberal coalition that governed until 1998. It was also reluctantly accepted as of 1995 by most of the Social Democratic leadership and roughly half of the leadership of the Greens, but only after sharp restrictions were placed on German deployment (McKenzie 1996; Cooper 1997). The issue of normalization intersected with the issue of elite cues on the left since normalization entailed the acceptance of German involvement in military missions on the left as well as the right. There is indeed an apparent correlation between the internal consistency of elite cues on the left and the peace movements ability to mobilize. The most prominent gures of the left were virtually united against the INF missiles and relatively united during the
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brief conduct of the Gulf War (although deeper splits became apparent in post-mortem debates conducted after the Gulf War). However, in the Bosnian case, the Social Democrats and the Greens were very deeply divided over German participation in Western intervention by the time the crucial parliamentary votes were taken in June and December of 1995. Prominent gures on the left, Joschka Fischer of the Greens most notably among them, spoke out in favour of Western use of force. Thus, rather than constituting an automatic response to the lifting of Cold War constraints on policy, acceptance of out of area military involvement evolved only gradually and as the result of a highly conicted process, in particular within the left parties and public opinion (Cooper 1997). Dufeld (1998) attributes this resistance to the persistence of a postwar national security culture (similarly described by Berger 1998) characterized by deep-seated skepticism toward the appropriateness and utility of military force. In the 19901995 period, this skepticism was slowly overcome by several countervailing factors. Germany experienced pressures from NATO, the EU, and the UN to become more involved in peace-keeping and peace enforcement. These pressures brought into play two norms of German foreign policy: namely the desire to be a reliable partner in the above-mentioned institutions and the desire to avoid a Sonderweg, a unilateral course of action (even a peaceful one) on the international stage (Dufeld 1998; Otte & Greve 2000; Banchoff 1999). The course of normalization on the political left can not be divorced from the concrete cases in which military intervention was under debate. Judging from the rhetoric concerning the NATO mission to Bosnia, the nature of the cause also played a large role for pro-interventionists on the left. For them, willingness to sanction force in Bosnia was catalyzed by the fall of Srebrenica and other UN-protected zones, and the subsequent Serbian massacre of Bosnian Muslim civilians (Maull 2000). In addition, the lefts former antiAmericanism was not a hindrance to support for intervention this time. Instead, they viewed the NATO missions to Bosnia as motivated by humanitarian concerns rather than sordid power-political considerations, which engaged the never again Auschwitz tenet (the dictum to prevent genocide) of the lefts postwar political culture (Cooper 1997), along with its desire that Germany remain a civilian power (Maull 2000). It is at this point that my argument about the congruence between media framing and movement framing comes in, as an explanation that complements and interacts with a focus on normalization and elite cues. Why did parts of the left elite change their collective minds about the use of force and communicate this to their compatriots in the citizenry at large? By 1995, the left
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elites perceptions of the Bosnian conict and the NATO missions had been at least partially formed by approximately four years of media framing of the Balkan conict, including that by die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel as outlined in previous sections. The fall of Srebrenica and the other safe areas served as the proverbial straw that broke the camels back of resistance to German participation in multilateral military missions abroad, because these events followed three years worth of reporting and commentary on (primarily) Serbian barbarism in the Balkans. And how did rank-and-le potential protesters pick up these transformed elite cues, in addition to their impressions of the Balkans conict itself? Naturally, statements supporting German participation in NATO missions by key gures on the left received ample press coverage in Der Spiegel and Die Tageszeitung as well as other media. They were particularly newsworthy because they generated intense conict within the SPD and Greens, and because they broke with the lefts consensus on anti-militarism. (The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the NATO missions without much internal controversy and did not attract as much media attention.) Coverage of these statements in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung is included in the articles coded for this analysis and adds to the frequency of the pro-intervention coded utterances captured in Figures 7 and 8. Although elite views did not receive any special weight in the coding process, they were amply discussed in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung and thus had a cumulative impact on both the readers and the coding for this article. Moreover, potential protestors are not simply passive recipients of elite cues which they duly translate into activism or lack thereof. Instead, they weigh these cues in conjunction with other sources of their perceptions of issues, including media coverage. Where left-elite cues were divided (e.g., with respect to Bosnia), potential protestors on the left may have given more heed to pro-interventionists like Fischer because these views were more consistent with the cumulative trend of media reporting. Political opportunity structure A nal possible alternative explanation might be that the political opportunity structure was better for the peace movement during the INF missile debate than during either the Gulf War or the Bosnia debate. (Political opportunities are the features of the political context that affect movements emergence and success.) Indeed, such a claim has a great deal of merit. A number of components of political opportunity, and especially their overall conguration, enhanced the peace movements mobilization capacity against the INF
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missiles. The movement had a salient issue with which to work; its positions were not co-opted by conventional politics or the major parties; levels of protest potential were high in society at large; the issue of peace squeezed out any competitors for mobilization energies in the extra-parliamentary arena; and government social, economic and foreign policy as a whole was already relatively unpopular (Cooper 1996). By contrast, in the 1990s, political opportunities for peace movement mobilization against both the Gulf War and Bosnia were less favourable overall, and these reduced opportunities dampened mobilization capacity independently of framing effects. On the positive side, the issue was salient in each case, as demonstrated by massive press coverage. Moreover, no other overriding issues competed in the extra-parliamentary arena with protest against either the Gulf War or Bosnia. Furthermore, other than the engineering of unication itself, the Kohl governments policies were not known for widespread popularity in the 1990s. (If anything, the popularity of unication in 1990 should have dampened protest against the Gulf War more than against German involvement in Bosnia.) On the more negative side, protest with respect to new social movement issues like environmentalism had subsided since the 1980s and post-material issues had lost ground to the material ones of unication (Della Porta & Rucht 1995; Veen & Zelle 1995). In comparison to the 1980s, this general decline of protest on the left may well have dampened protest on peace issues during the 1990s, in particular if this decline reected a deterioration of the informal networks that had contributed to the organizational basis and micromobilization contexts (McAdam 1988) for peace protest in the 1980s. (The anti-foreigner protest on the extreme right during this period would not be expected to feed into peace protest.) In addition, by the 1990s, many peace movement positions had become institutionalized in two of the left-wing parties: the Social Democrats and the Greens (the Eastern German PDS also maintained anti-militarist policies, albeit from a different historical perspective). One can plausibly argue that this institutionalization dampened enthusiasm for extra-parliamentary mobilization in the 1990s. Both of these negative aspects of political opportunity can be assumed to have contributed, independently of the effects of media framing, to the reduction in the peace movements capacity to mobilize in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. This difference in political opportunities also helps explain an apparent anomaly in the relationship between framing congruence and mobilization capacity. The Overall category in Figures 5 and 6 show Taz and Spiegel framing of the Gulf War to be almost as congruent with peace movement framing as was the case with the INF missiles, whereas mobilization was considerably lower. Variations in levels of active protest potential, and in insti European Consortium for Political Research 2002
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tutionalization of movement positions in party platforms, probably reduced the level of potential protest. The short duration of the Gulf War conict, and particularly the active ghting, may also have dampened protest. On the other hand, the negative aspects of political opportunity which prevailed throughout the rst half of the 1990s were held constant and thus cannot explain the differences in the peace movements mobilization capacity against the Gulf War versus the NATO mission to Bosnia. The candlelight marches in 1991 and 1992 against violence toward foreigners demonstrated that the right issue could still mobilize a certain level of protest on the left. Institutionalization of peacenik orientations in the SPD and Greens, moreover, did not stop numerous Social Democrats and Greens from protesting against the Gulf War, and it should not per se have dampened mobilization against Bosnia had potential protestors been so moved. Although worse (more mixed) in the 1990s than in the 1980s, political opportunities were roughly the same for peace groups hoping to mobilize against either the Gulf War or Bosnia. While it is not surprising that mobilization in both cases was lower than in the 1980s, the existing political opportunities should have permitted mobilization in both cases if it was possible in either case individually. The signicant differences in mobilization capacity against the Gulf War in comparison to Bosnia are thus not attributable to decisive differences in political opportunity between the two cases. Instead, comparisons of peace movement mobilization against the Gulf War and Bosnia suggest that levels of convergence between media framing and movement framing do matter (i.e., they have an independent effect on mobilization capacity). An important difference between the Gulf War and Bosnia lay in media support for movement frames which facilitated moderate mobilization against the Gulf War but virtually none against the NATO mission to Bosnia.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated a reasonably strong relationship between media framing and peace groups capacity to mobilize with respect to the INF missiles, the Gulf War and the NATO mission to Bosnia. Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was quite high, as in the INF missile debate, mobilization was also high. Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was relatively low, as in the NATO mission to Bosnia, mobilization was also low. The Gulf War case was more complicated. Signicant levels of congruence between media and movement framing were associated with medium, in-between levels of protest which was probably
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dampened, as argued above, by less favourable political opportunities in other respects. In short, media framing of issues can matter tremendously for social movements capacity to mobilize, and perhaps particularly for instrumental movements that focus primarily on policy issues rather than on sub-cultural identity or countercultures. Thus, since social movement organizations can only partially inuence media framing of issues, media framing contributes to the context, or the political opportunity structure, which expands or constricts political space for movements. Media framing can change signicantly over time, moreover, making it one of the more volatile components of political opportunity (Gamson & Meyer 1996). Ebbs and ows in the levels of congruence between media and movement framing therefore contribute to an explanation of varying mobilization capacity over time. To survive or maintain their inuence, movements interpretive packages must be able to incorporate new events or developments plausibly. They must also be able to offer interpretations of new developments that are consistent with their past story line. This can be hard. Since the 1960s, peace groups and the German left in general had subscribed to a view of the world that stressed (among other things): negative, imperialistic images of the United States; the absolute necessity of preventing war in the nuclear age; and dtente as the only viable means of managing the East-West conict and providing security for Europe. This package could be superbly adapted to the specics of the INF missile issue and reasonably well to the Gulf War. But peace groups old package was stressed by its apparent inability to offer plausible diagnostic framing of the nature of the Bosnian conict or credible prognostic framing of appropriate responses to the conict there, given Taz and Spiegel framing. Media framing as part of political opportunity structure can constrain the framing options of challenging groups. At the same time, for many peace groups, relinquishing pacism would have presumably seemed a sacrice of their very identity. Framing as a strategic social movement activity may not be innitely malleable.
Acknowledgments
I with to express heartfelt thanks to Dr Dieter Rucht for the data stemming from the Prodat project at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on protest events and numbers of participants from 19801993. For constructive comments, suggestions and encouragement, I am also extremely grateful to John Adham, Charles Amegan, Lee Ann Banaszak, Matthew Baum, Peter Hall, Mary Hampton, Paulette Kurzer, Pierre Landry, Manfred Lieb, Alan Melchior,
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Marybeth Melchior, Carol Mershon, David Meyer, Barbara Pfetsch, J. P. Singh, Mary Stuckey, the Tageszeitung archive and four anonymous reviewers for the EJPR.
Notes
1. I owe thanks to Mary Stuckey for introducing me to works cited in this paragraph. 2. Here I focus on the independent impact of media and movement framing of issues, although movements can help shape media discourse. Media are, in part, a site of struggle in the competition between movements and others in the construction of social reality. At the same time, media discourse also dominates the larger issue culture within which social movements have to contend (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). 3. Klandermans (1988) considers social networks as the locus for consensus formation and consensus mobilization, both of which are necessary for action mobilization. 4. I owe thanks to Dr Dieter Rucht for the data stemming from the Prodat project at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on protest events and participation from 19801993. (I assembled the data for 19941995 myself, following Prodat procedures.) The Prodat project denes protest events as collective, public action by non-state actors which expresses criticism and formulates a social or political demand. Action forms considered part of protest events include petitions, court suits, brochures, mass demonstrations and marches, strikes and sit-ins, etc. (Rucht et al. 1992). 5. Opposition to German participation in out of area military missions beyond NATO territory, including in Bosnia, moreover, constituted a theme of protest in fewer than half of the total peace protests for 1994 or 1995, the years in which the question of German participation in NATO efforts became most acute. Arms exports, Turkeys Kurdish policy, land mines, and French and Chinese nuclear weapons tests were other themes of peace protest in 1994 and 1995. 6. To a signicantly greater extent than in the United States, the most prominent German newspapers and news magazines are characterized by identiable ideological stances, at least in such general terms as conservative, centrist, or left. 7. This estimate is based on the ratio of readers-per-copies-sold of the major German daily newspapers: 2.5 to 4.2 readers per copy (Taz 1994). 8. During the INF missile debate of the early 1980s, conservatives supported the government and peace groups garnered support from virtually the entire political left. In the Gulf War, the battle lines were largely the same except for some notable defections of the left to support of the Gulf War. In the case of Bosnia, the pro-intervention side included the government, conservatives and parts of the political left, while the antiintervention side included peace groups and other parts of the left (Cooper 1996; Cooper 1997). 9. More precisely, I coded every third issue of die Tageszeitung for the INF debate, because during this period die Taz appeared only ve days per week. I coded all Taz articles relevant to the Gulf War in every fourth issue; taking into account the relatively short duration of the conict and the fact that by 1990 die Taz was appearing six days per week. For the Bosnia issue, I coded all relevant articles for every fth issue, due to the longer duration of the conict and the six-days-per-week appearance schedule.
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10. For the INF debate, these boundaries ran from the date of the formal NATO doubletrack decision (December 1979) to the Bundestag vote in November 1983 on whether to accept the missiles; for the Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until the end of the Desert Storm operation; and for the Bosnia issue, from the beginning of the war in Bosnia to the Bundestag debate on whether to commit troops to the NATO peacekeeping mission. 11. I would like to thank Pierre Landry for his help in constructing Table 1 and Figure 9 and in the explication of this section.
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Address for correspondence: Alice Holmes Cooper, Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, University MS 38677, USA Phone: 001 662 915 5608; Fax: 001 662 915 7808; E-mail: acooper@olemiss.edu

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European Journal of Political Research 41: 3780, 2002

alice holmes cooper

Media framing and movement framing