An Incompatible Pair

In their different ways, Thucydides and Plato both point to an undeniable, if depressing fact: democracy is simply incompatible with Justic

Thucydides and Plato are both drawn to similar conclusions on the incompatibility of justice and democracy; Thucydides through the study of history, and Plato through the philosophical parsing of the soul and the city. In the end we are left with the incontrovertible fact that justice, as defined and understood by both men, cannot exist within the framework of democracy. This will be evidenced through analysis of Platonic and Thucydidian beliefs of justice, contrasted with the working definition of Democracy held by both men, and supported by examples of the mutual exclusivity of the two terms in both mens work (Platos Republic and Thucydides Histories). Before one can adequately defend or assail the notion that justice and democracy are fundamentally incompatible, one must attempt to define the two lofty concepts. Due to ductility of the terms, one will think it best to use Thucydides and Platos own definitions so as to avoid confusion. Socrates of the Republic (the mouthpiece of Plato) begins his work on justice, not by describing what justice is, but rather by pointing out what justice is not. Socrates is quick to discount the idea that justice is Repaying debts and always telling the truth ( Republic 331c) as offered by Cephalus, just as Socrates counters Polemarchus claim that Justice is to benefit ones friends and harm ones enemies. (Republic 335d) Socrates feels Polemarchus definition precludes the notion of justice as harming enemies is, in itself, an unjust action. The final interlocutor of the evening, Thrasymachus, claims that justice is merely the advantage of the stronger ( Republic 338b ); a claim which Socrates is able to counter by stating that a ruler will often legislate for the good of the people rather than himself (Republic 342e), thereby acting in a way quite opposite of Thasymachus commonly held belief of justice. Socrates first move towards a definition of justice is to create the qualities of a just city, and through use of homology, discover the qualities of just men.

Perhaps there is more justice in a larger unit, and it may be easier to So, if you are willing, let us first investigate what justice is in the us look for it in the individual, observing the smaller. (Republic 368e)

grasp.

cities, and afterwards let

similarities to the larger in the

In book three, Socrates enumerates qualities of a just city as wisdom, courage, and self-control or moderation, with moderation being of paramount importance as it allows for the correct ordering of the city, as Socrates believed Moderation is a certain orderliness... and mastery over certain pleasures and appetites,(Republic 430e). To Socrates, moderation is the control of basic desires and elevation of virtue. To Socrates, these virtues, by way of homology, are also existent in the soul and it is the correct moderation that allows for, and is - in its very fact - Justice. Justice then is not any individual virtue, but the correct ordering of the three virtues ( courage, wisdom and moderation) within the soul; (Republic 435 b-c) the rational( Wise), the spirited(Brave), and appetitive ( Moderate) natures. If the correct ordering of the soul creates the state of justice, what then that makes Platos definition of justice incompatible with democracy? Plato answers this question with a straightforward response: A just city, must have a just ruler - a man who possesses the correct ordering of the soul; in short, Plato presents the need for philosopher-kings - the rulers of the just city. . Unless the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs philosophy to ills genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and coincide in the same place, while the many natures now making their way either apart from the other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from for the cities... (Republic 473d-e)

Understandably, this philosopher king would be a great rarity, and plato himself says, (all the while speaking through the guise of Socrates) that such a society will most probably never be realized. He continues: nor will the regime we have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of the sun. (Republic 473e) It then follows that if one extremely gifted philosopher is worthy of ruling, and he alone, that the common man, chosen at random, or able to cast a decision this way or that in the assembly could never rule the perfect city, and never therefore achieve justice. The politicians that spring from democratic society, Plato says in the Gorgias, are mere panders, seeking not the correct order of the soul or city, but who speak to gratify their audiences. (Gorgias 462-3)These politically minded individuals are the product of Democracy, and fall far short of justice seeking individuals. Under democracy, the city is ruled by equally unqualified citizens who, very likely, do not posses the correct ordering of the souls virtues, and who incline toward corrupt orators rather than wise kings. It is for this reason that justice and democracy cannot exist together in the mind Plato. Thucydides recognized the same incompatibility, but through a different means: The use of historical recounting rather than philosophical theory. The Histories plot the fall of Athenian democracy and the corruption of justice and offer an explanation of how the one necessarily leads to the other. Democracy in Thucydidian terms consists of the assembly of eligible men granted suffrage dominated by orators,common men with the ability to persuade, considered all at once to be equal and yet someone superior to the common citizen. Thucydides presents us with a democracy that is, at times, swayed by the best leader; "in name a democracy but, in fact, governed by its first

citizen" (Thucydides 2.65) as Pericles is called, but also at times by individuals who seek expediency first, and justice later; men such as Cleon, who would seek to

make justice and expediency somehow synonymous. Herein lies the chink in Athenian democracy; the institutions of democracy allow for justice to become a subjective, and malleable concept subject to the speakers will, rather than a Socratic and normative term. Cleon makes this point clear in the Mitylenean debate, as he attempts to corrupt the notion of justice as that which is most practical, a notion with which Socrates would most certainly find fault. Cleon presciently argues against his own cause when he tells of the evils of orators who would seek to control by sentiment - knowing full well that his demagoguery is an obvious extension of the tactic; ...Our natural and necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may city find other less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure. (Thucydides 3.40)

After attacking the injustices caused by rhetoric, Cleon proposes definitional change of justice through the very application rhetoric. Cleon argues: I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient. ( Thucydides 3.40) Cleon identifies the ailment of Athenian justice, in that is can be so easily changed and swayed by those entrusted to lead in a democracy. And while Cleon does not succeed in the wholesale slaughter of the Mitylenians, he foreshadows the further corruption yet to come. The corruption of justice by democracy continues in Corcyra in the city overtaken by civil war. Of the Corcyrans actions Thucydides recounts; Words had to change their ordinary meaning and

to take that which was now given them. ( Thucydides 3.82) The very nature of meaning was corrupted by the warring factions, while still very much allied with their democratic parties;

In their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what the justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of moment their only standard. (Thucydides 3.82) Thucydides writes as if to mourn the failings of justice and its corruption by democratic means. Elected, chosen, or respected individuals had the capability to change the very meanings of such important terms. Cleon demonstrates a leaders ability to capture the will of the public, to act in the way that he is so openly opposed, and in doing so, change the concept of Justice through the swaying of the common, unphilosophical man; more daring than deliberate. The same is true of the Corcyrans and their ability to follow the party line rather than justices call. Socrates understands that the presence of justice is a rarity found in a select few fit to govern, and since these men cannot be chosen by lot, or sway the common man by pandering oratory, they cannot rule as they must and justice cannot prevail. Thucydides mimics Socrates closely with the belief that the corrupt panders of Athens can alter and even abolish the true meaning of justice, not merely unimpeded by the democratic forces, but accelerated by a democratic ignorance of justice and willingness to pursue the expedient over the virtuous.