Table of Content

Table of Content .............................................................................................. 1 1. 2. Introduction .............................................................................................. 2 Power ....................................................................................................... 3 2.1 2.2 3. construction of a useful concept ......................................................... 3 Game theory ...................................................................................... 4

National minorities ................................................................................... 6 3.1 Notions of minorities ......................................................................... 6

1.2 notions of national identity ................................................................... 10 4. Britain and devolution ............................................................................ 12 4.1 Minorities in Britain ........................................................................ 12

4.2 Devolution in Britain ........................................................................... 14 5. 6. Who governs devolution? ....................................................................... 17 Works Cited ........................................................................................... 21

1. Introduction
The power of minorities in democracies is restricted to procedural restraints and sometimes extending to the power of prevention. Such is the notion which Im going to contend with this paper. Great Britain is the parliamentary democracy par exemplum, relying on single majorities in parliament with no written constitution. As such, I shall examine the power relations between majority and national minorities during the process of devolution within Great Britain. To that extent I shall try to contribute to the question: who governs devolution? If we merely consider the amount of allocated responsibilities Scotland seems to be the obvious winner.
"The Scottish Executive is, in effect, the government of Scotland. Its role in the day-t o- day governance of Scotland is similar to the Cabinet's role at Westminster. In the financial year 2005-6 it managed a budget of more than 27 billion. This figure is due to rise to over 30 billion in 2007-8."(Deacon 2007: 72)

It is hardly an insular case study but that process of asserting separation, is currently being mirrored within other European states, like Spain. Thus, what already happened and is still developing in Britain might not only highlight minority-majority relations but also envision a reverence or even a forecast for similar movements. For analytical purpose I will first discuss some notions of power and minorities specifically national minorities. Afterwards I shall try to briefly outline the case study in order to finally find a conclusive answer.

2. Power
2.1 construction of a useful concept
Concepts of powers are a dime a dozen so I will merely focus upon its actual usefulness as Wagner suggests (Wagner 1969: 8):
"the word power diverts our attention from the interesting problems. In this instance the interesting problems concern the explanation for the cooperation of all those involved in the performance of the collective act. The word power merely involves the ascription of responsibility for such acts, something which is useful for only practical purposes."

Still, the notion of power holds some intuitive connotations of like Dahl: A has power to make B do x which B would otherwise not have done. As in A has the ability to make B do something.
"A rough test of a persons overt or covert influence is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiate a policy where no opposition appears. (Dahl 1966: 66)"

So, unlike merely relational concepts of bargaining, power implies position. It asks for the location of the deciding factor. There seems to be an instant where one vote turns the tide exclusively towards one direction. Thus we might search for an undisputed example, a conflict with a decisive factor anyone would accept. So, let us consider a violent ambush where one party (A) holds a weapon and the other (B) none. Probably everyone would agree that if A would ask B to surrender any item X to him it would be a sensible decision for B to agree. The truly overpowering factor, the weapon, seems like the perfect instance of ability, it seems as if B would have no other choice left. Now consider that B actually might value the item X higher than his own life or assume that B is suicidal suddenly the impeccable example doesnt work any longer. B might simply say: fire away, Im ready to die! Of course, that answer is quite unlikely but it still is sufficient to prove that power depends upon preferences not only on the ability to convince another actor.

Therefore preferences have to be incorporated into a relational concept of bargaining. Here I shall consider game theory while searching for active change, the ability to maintain the status quo toward the anticipated outcome. That pre-supposes the assumption that a group eventually finds consent, is able and willing to express it. However, the intuitive allusion to thus conclude a personification of the collective has to deny. For even that position of power has to be agreed upon or as Wagner asserts "if a very large number of people do not cooperate by behaving as though Robert McNamara is Secretary of Defense, he cannot be Secretary of Defense" (Wagner 1969:7). So in order to establish power we have to agree upon a deciding principle, its legitimating and conduct. Fortunately, within democracies such a principle, namely that of the majority, has already been established. I shall analyze a case of a strict parliamentary democracy which relies on the simple majority principle and which has hardly and democratic restraints within the following case study.

2.2 Game theory

Game theory fulfills the requirements mentioned in section 2.1. as it focuses on the actual application of a decision concept. It concentrates on the modus of interdependent decisions to determine the outcome of a situation for both individuals and collectives.
It is a theory of interdependent decisions- when the decisions of two or more individuals jointly determine the outcome of a situation. The individuals can be persons or

collective entities that make consistent choices. (Morrow 1994: 1)

It requires the choices to be consistent. That does not necessarily mean which does not necessarily mean that B has to surrender if A holds the weapon, but rather that if B prefers life then, in consequence, he has to surrender.

Classic Game theory assumes three sets of ordinal preferences in relation to the expected final results. A notion which can be expressed, for all actors, by the following standardization: (compare Morrow 1994:18)

C: consequences

Ci: Consequences i

Cj: Consequences j Ci I Cj

1. If the actor is indifferent to both i and j consequences:

2. If the actor weakly prefers the outcome i the relation is: Ci R Cj 3. If the actor strongly prefers I over j consequences: Ci P Cj

Those three sets of preferences can only ever be useful if they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. So for the assertion to useful there can be no fourth, distinctive set of preferences, actors need to be assigned clear preferences and the border line between them needs to be easily visible for a clear analysis. Because only in so far as an actor is able to perceive is preferences is it possible to determine the eventual outcome. Thus, while applying game theory decisions need to be fixed upon a certain time and stable preference. However, we are aiming to establish a position in relation to another actor during conflict thus those limitations of game theory actually seem to be advantageous. So far, we have established the pre-conditions of actors now we have to structure the decision process. Classical Game theory assumes that decisions are based on information that is either perfect, complete or incomplete. The simplest game happens under perfect information because all nods are singletons. But:
"In games of limited or incomplete information, the players lack information about the exact nature of the game. They could be ignorant of the structure of the game, the other players utility functions, or the exact consequences of their moves" (Morrow 1994: 219)

It is reasonable to assume that most games are played with less than perfect information. But it is also logical to infer that most games are repeated. In that 5

way the rules of the game change: information about the other actor increases and it might become a rational decision to sacrifice immediate payoffs in favor of future gains. So do actors always decide rationally? It seems unlikely but there are still enough instances of rational decisions that it is a useful concept.
"Game models do not even attempt to address all the complexity of the social world. Instead, they focus on certain elements of social situations to lay bare how motivations and actions are interrelated. At times, then, game-theoretic analyses seems simplistic, but such simplifications can help clarify complex interactions." (Morrow 1994: 8)

If the actor decides rationally and is free to choose he follows his aim and takes those actions by which, he believes, to be able to achieve them. If we assume that all actors act rationally, to achieve their preferences, the value of their decisions can be measured in terms of utility.
"Utility theory is not an attempt to capture the important considerations underlying decisions in a general framework that can be manipulated mathematically while allowing for variation across the choices of individuals. Our purpose is not to explain cognition, but rather to understand political acts." (Morrow 1994: 20)

3. National minorities
3.1 Notions of minorities

As already stated, I shall relate to the concept of power as a relational concept asking for the necessary ability to change procedures. When considering a relation the first question will automatically be: the relation between whom? In general, the antagonists here are the minority versus the majority and in particular, within the following case study, Britain versus Wales and Scotland.
"The most frequently listed group dimensions for majority and minorities (in order of frequency) were social categories, power, dispositions, being the target of treatment, and numeric size." (Seyranian et al.: 32).

The most obvious criteria, probably, is the majorities size and status. However, one has to consider carefully whether the intuitive answer is an applicable and useful concept for science. Thinking about minorities one might want to include elites which are naturally a rather small group but high in status and sometimes the perceived majority of citizens might actually be small in comparison. Here the UAE would be an appropriate example where the number of immigrant workers is actually higher than that of the native population. So, are majorities really more influential than minorities?
"The more the people espousing a particular position, the more one is inclined to think that position is correct, and the more likely is me to want to incur their approval or at least not incur their disapproval. Further, being a deviant has negative consequences, both assumed and real However; there is also evidence that a minority can, under some circumstances, sway a majority to the minority position (Moscovici, Nemeth 1974: 2)"

Then if a minority can hold sway over a majority, the concept of such distinctiveness would be quite useless. Moscovici points to the acceptance of new ideas, how outsider phenomena became mainstream (compare Moscovici 1974: 9). Almost intuitively, well find various fitting examples; considering music neither jazz, nor punk not even the Beatles were part of mainstream culture- if one fixes the time period. Unless, we do that, add a specific place and social group to it we wont thereby be able to define the exact instant where such minority power might be possible. To eliminate all other interfering variables seems a feat which is unlikely at best. Furthermore it would be redundant to explain a cause by effect, to state that a majority has more power because a majority is powerful via definition. Conclusion: neither individual declaration or ascribed membership, nor conflict seems to be the best criterion so how about social categories. So if the intuitive concept is so ambiguous how can it possibly work in application? Where is the minority when both Wales and Scotland are part of Britain? Most citizens of Scotland assert a dual identity (compare Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2010). Thus, apparently, it is possible to belong to 7

several groups at once it just depends on the observer, the social role expectations. However when they were asked to choose whether they were Scottish or British first, the majority choose a Scottish identity. 2001: 86% regarded themselves as Scottish and 50% as British when asked to choose 77% were Scots and only 16% British (Institute of governance University of Edinburgh 2008: 1). It almost seems as if pressure is necessary to reach a conclusion "it seemed to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something he would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1969:82). Hence the inquiry whether decisions are only made during conflict, whether that would be a sine qua non for the application of power. The important point here is, as criticized by Barbarach and Baratz (1976: 96), that there is another face of power where a group is capable of preventing conflicts from arising thus a group doesnt even need to be active. It might be necessary to search for a concepts of majority and minority in which public opinion believes if anyone is seeking to change them, is looking for the arguments lying on the surface and are generally approved of or simply searching for public opinion. But in order to draw exact lines for analytical purposes public sentiment, in that case, forms only part of the final image.
"Der wichtigste Punkt ist hier, da eine andere Perspektive als die gewohnte eingenommen werden mu. Ein volles Verstndnis von Beeinflussungsphnomenen verlangt, das wir die Minderheit, das Individuum oder die Untergruppe im Sinne der Wirkung betrachten, die sie mglicherweise auf die Gruppenmeinung haben knnen." (Moscovici 1976: 82)

Moscovici suggests, conceding to a necessary change of perspective, to judge a minority by determining its possible influence on the majority. Still, in order to judge we have to distinguish where to place them. Therefore, first of all, we have to artificially limit the concept by focusing on one society within one social sphere. Of course interdependence is neglected but thus the concept becomes an approachable theory of a society drawing the line to international relations theory.

Minority

Social influence

Majority

Social Sphere

Within that social space position is determined by triangulation: Majority and Minority are considered in relation to each other and to an issue (A).
"Der soziale Raum ist immer vektoriell. Meinungen, Normen, und besonders Einstellungen stellen notwendigerweise die Gesinnungen entweder contra pro oder

der Gruppe dar. Es ist deshalb wnschenswert, die Richtung der von dem Individuum oder der Minderheit vertretenen Lsungen zu

abweichenden

bercksichtigen." (Moscovici 1979: 94)

In logical inference we thus have to assume a distinguishing point of view either in support or negation of issue A. If such a difference doesnt exist or one group is simply impartial it becomes impossible to establish a minority or majority with his theory. However, the very notion of a minority holds the expectation of difference. It might not differ in every single aspect but for analytical purposes the issues of difference shall show the distance and relationship between those groups. Issue related difference is one vector for the triangle, the other is determined by social influence. Moscovici describes it as a symmetric process where the broadcast and reception happen simultaneously.
"Weit davon entfernt, eine einseitige Wirkung der Quelle auf das Ziel zu sein, ist Beeinflussung ein wechselseitiger Proze, an dem Aktion und Reaktion der Quelle als auch des Ziels beteiligt sind."(Moscovici 1979: 83)

In plain terms if an opinion is asserted there will be a response. That seems to be rather optimistic. But still, if we consider it in the light of the other relevant dimension, assume the issue to be controversial; differently evaluated by both groups the triangulation can be completed.

1.2 notions of national identity

Conservative interpretation asserts that each nation shares a common ethnicity, common denominators such as religion and a shared territory. How to evaluate the position of the Welsh and Scots? How can they be Scottish or Welsh first, and then British? How can their features still be special and own a claim their own territory? In order to assert difference Jenkins (compare Jenkins 1997: 41) tries to find the perceived boarders and thus compares: "East Swansea: West Swansea Swansea: Cardiff South-east Wales: South-west Wales South Wales: North Wales Wales: England Britain: Europe" (Jenkins 1997:41) A list which could start far earlier within the different suburbs of East Swansea or even among different streets. Simultaneously, we can continue the comparison by putting Europe in contrast to the US, the rich versus the poor countries etc. That difference seems to work like a Russian matryoshka or as Jenkins asserts:
"Precisely where in this sequence does an identity that is based on community or locality become an identity that is based on ethnicity () One way to understand the Welsh illustration might be as a hierarchy of nominal identifications which overlap

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and intermesh in complicated ways, depending upon the virtualities of each." (Jenkins 1977: 41)

Clearly, we cannot assert the difference by territory alone as the limits of that are unclear. As Jenkins suggest we might take one level of difference for reference but even then boarders become blurry. Here we have to consider that boarders might have changed during history. A part of the minority might want to expand and reinstate a different demarcation line than the majority within that minority. So people across that boarder are included or excluded depending on the personal opinion. Furthermore one would have to consider nations without territory, who are in exile, evicted or shattered across the earth. Still, most nations claim a certain territory as their own. Are nations formed by common stories that tie them together? Stuart Hall agrees and explains five different kinds of those stories: that can all be subsumed under his first point, the narrative of the nation (compare Wodak 1998: 62-63). By telling the story the difference is supposedly asserted thus the nation is seen as a relational concept. In order to define a nation an antagonist has to be found. Consequently:
"then the British nation state was as much responsible for shaping the nations of which it consists as it was shaped by them. () it is not simply that Scottishness is part of Britishness- a point most people would concede - it is also that Britishness is part of Scottishness and the latter would not exist, at least in the same form, without the former." (Davidson 2000: 4)

I doubt that a narration of difference is a sufficient condition to define a nation exclusively. Even if you were to include a common culture such as language and shared rituals the definition wouldnt be sufficient. You might be finding that such a difference would also include various soccer clubs, social classes or political parties. To put it in a nutshell, if there is no common territory, no shared ethnic background and culture is an insufficient distinction: why do people still believe to be part of a nation? Belief has to be stressed, as it answers the question: if a group believes to form a nation it has the change to be one. To

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achieve that it has to be able to construct including and excluding features, by referring to conflict issues. Then it has to be recognized as a nation by others who will thus reaffirm and reconstruct their boundaries. So, to make it simple: in order to become a national minority you and others just have to believe it. Because, as Marx states: "The actual basis of the category for those excluded is relatively irrelevant" (2002: 115). Whether that is actually true shall be justified by the case study.

4. Britain and devolution

4.1 Minorities in Britain
"democracy is usually representative democracy: government by the freely elected representatives of the people () An ideal democratic government would be one whose actions were always in perfect correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens." (Dahl 1984:1)

Dahl immediately admits that his second stipulation of perfect correspondence with all citizens will hardly ever be met. However, he believes it to be important for a democracy to aspire towards that aim. In order to accomplish it the first stipulation, for a representative democracy, are freely elected representatives. He then lists necessary institutions from which, for minority relations, we should keep in mind: "Freedom to form and join organizations () Freedom of expression () Alternative sources of information" (Dahl 1984:2) which all are basic rights of liberty and equality. Those he believe are necessary restrains for a representative democracy. So how does Britain enshrine those principles?
"The essence of the Westminster model is majority rule. The model can be seen as the most obvious solution to the dilemma of what is meant by the people in our

definition of democracy. Who will do the governing and to whose interest should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences? One answer is: the majority of the people" (Lijphart 1984: 4)

The British answer is the most obvious: the majority rules. But how can the rights of liberty and equality for the minority be preserved against the

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majority? Lijphart calls for institutional constraints but Britain has no written constitution. A notion which Moran contradicts: "many key elements of the constitution are indeed written, some in the form of law; but it is true that the constitution is not systematically codified in a single document () it is what might be called an eclectic, pick and mix constitution." (Moran 2005: 71) That mix consists of the Common law, The Bill of Rights, procedural conventions, treaties such as the European convention for human rights and judicial review. Still, if you narrow it down to basics "Parliament has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever" (Moran 2005: 73). So, restrains are only ever informal but Westminster would probably face dire opposition if it were to violate those principles. However, such a breach of norm would have to be dire as most citizens otherwise wouldnt even notice it. Still, there are special concessions for national minorities, namely devolution.
Folgt man der Argumentation des Gesetzgebers bei der Devolution-Gesetzgebung, die dieser bei der Ausstattung der Regionen mit gewhlten parlamentarischen Versammlungen zugrunde legte, so wird klar, dass die regionale Selbstverwaltung, ebenso wie die kommunale brigens, Einrichtungen auf Zeit sind, die das Parlament in souverner Entscheidung jederzeit verndern oder aufheben kann. (Sturm 2009: 44)

However, devolution is only based on mutual agreement and could in theory be revised by the sovereign decision of the British parliament. In that light the conservatives assessment of devolution as a slippery slope towards federalism seems unjustified. That gains even more weight if one compares devolution to federalist states:
"Whrend in fderalen Staaten gilt, dass alle nicht geregelten Kompetenzen bei den Gliedstaaten liegen (Allzustndigkeitsvermutung) und der Zentralstaat nur einen klar umrissenen Aufgabenkatalog wahrnimmt, ist dies in Devolutionsfllen umgekehrt. Hier nehmen die dezentralen Einheiten nur die zugewiesenen Aufgaben war. Wer die dezentralen Einheiten sind, welche Aufgaben sie haben und ob die dezentralen Einheiten auf Dauer beibehalten werden, sind Fragen, die alleine der Zentralstaat entscheidet."(Sturm 2009:55)

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Federalism works the inverse way as they decide over all issues but those of central government. Devolved areas only decide over issues allocated to them by the central government. In that way the amount of their independence completely depends upon the central government and is granted only temporarily. Even their finances are completely dependent upon the central government. So how can they maintain devolution?

4.2 Devolution in Britain

"The Acts [passed by the Westminster Parliament] thus created a highly asymmetrical form of devolution, with the Scottish legislature being far more powerful than the National Assembly. This asymmetry was further highlighted by the lack of devolution to the remaining (and largest) constituent territory of the UK, England. It is this asymmetry that could be expected to generate Welsh demands for more extensive policy competences to place it on an equal footing with the SP." (Palmer 2003: 60)

It is true: the Scottish Parliament (SP) is far more influential than the Welsh assembly and both of them hold more sway than English communities. However, I, unlike the author, believe that asymmetry to be hardly surprising. The North- South divide within England existed even before the industrialization, Cornwall still claims a language of its own and the inhabitants of the Isle of White still believe that they are independent but all of them can justly claim to be English and wont be disputed. Scotland and Wales have not only been granted special rights because they are seen as national minorities.
"when the 1974 Labour Government formulated proposals for governmental devolution to Wales and Scotland, it did so on the apparent premise that there was sufficient unanimity of attitude within each of these entities to give particular legal expression to their boundaries. (). The argument went very much further than whether devolution was, or was not a good thing, or whether this power or that discretion should or should not be devolved to the new authorities. Rather, it caused people within these entities to question whether the boundaries as envisaged by Whitehall were those most salient to them. (Cohen 1985: 13)"

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Thus by finding a contested issue Labour helped to established both minorities, they were forced to assert their difference. The question should be whether that national minority actually existed, both in Scotland and Wales? Scotland was a sovereign state until the union of the crowns in 1707. And soon after that:
the Scottish office was established in 1885, with a Secretary for Scotland, to supervise the administration of everyday life in Scotland. Prior to this, the home secretary had been the person responsible for overseeing Scottish affairs at Westminster. The task of the Scottish Office was to assume responsibility within Scotland for certain aspects of social policy. (Deacon 2007:50)"

The Scottish office had to be created because even though Scotland had agreed to the union it still kept some of its institutions: its Presbyterian state church, its law and high courts (compare Budge 2004: 256). Scotland was always different. Can we infer the same for Wales?
"Wales was never really one unified nation in the form that we know today. Welsh princes, such as Llewellyn and Owain Glyn Dwr, succeeded in uniting some parts of Wales under one leadership but this never included the whole nation. It was Henry VIII, therefore, who united the public-administration systems of Wales and England under the Acts of Union (1536-42)" (Deacon 2007:108)

Historically there is no Welsh nation. Still, the government granted special rights to them and the Welsh certainly see themselves as a national minority.
"When asked what defines Welsh identity being the most important( being born in Wales is regarded as

) it is thought to be more important than speaking the

Welsh language, living in Wales, or even having Welsh parents. Therefore, the influx of those people not born in Wales is seen by some as a threat to national identity." (Deacon 2007: 143-144)

It almost seems as if only Labours claims created Welsh identity. But what could an influential, important party of a unified state gain by that policy?
Support for Labour, the national opposition party , can be seen as a

representative of peripheral protest against the center in Britain, as much as a classbased party. In south Wales both fuse because the region itself is defined by its working class nature." (Budge 2004: 267)

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Thus Labour clearly gained a profile from the offer of devolution to both nations. A peripheral supporter against centralization plus the party of the working class as both regions were economically disadvantage. An assertion which is still mostly holds true for Wales, but after the discovery of oil no longer for Scotland. So the move was clearly advantageous for Labour but the other actors agreed to the assertion. So, assuming that: "nationhood is never asserted for its own sake, but always in order to achieve some economic, social or political goal" (Davidson 2000:1) what did they gain? The answer is quite simple: Both of them gained a distinctive national identity. As I have already shown, historically, the Welsh had no common identity- they only had a number of identities. So why is the answer also true for the Scots who maintained their distinctive institutions since the middle-ages?
"The Scottish nation was partly created through two linked processes. First, the destruction of the Highland society and the incorporation of its imagery into the Scottish (and British) national self-image. Second, the consolidation of that image through participation in the conquest and colonization of North America and India." (Davidson 2000: 5)

Scotland might have been a sovereign state but its citizens were no unified nation. The Highland and Lowland culture where at odds. There was certainly no sentiment of national unity. The current Scottish and Welsh identity has been shaped by their relation towards Britain. So Davidson (2000: 4) asserts that "it is not simply that Scottishness is part of Britishness - a point most people would concede - it is also that Britishness is part of Scottishness and the latter would not exist, at least in the same form, without the former." Thus we can infer the more general assumption:
"First, there are processes of internal definition: actors signal to in- or out-group members a self-definition of their nature or identity. [ ] On the other hand there are processes of external definition. These are other-directed processes, during which one person or set of persons defines the other(s) as 1997: 53) X , Y , or whatever." (Jenkins

In that way majority and minority memberships are established and secondary, non-exclusive nationality becomes a rational choice.

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That leaves the quest to establish the amount of difference between those two actors.
"Unlike the Scottish Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru is predominantly a cultural defense organization. The party wants separate political institutions to protect and extend the Welsh language, together with a better economic and social base to support the Welsh-speaking population" (Budge 2004: 265)

So the contested issues of both actors arent completely congruent but still similar enough. Because even though the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) promotes complete independence the majority in Scotland prefers devolution. The Scottish Social attitudes survey 2001 shows that only a total 29 per cent want complete independence but 74 per cent believe that the Scottish parliament should have the most influence over Scotland. If the two issues lie so close the asymmetry on Moscovicis scale can only be explained in terms of a power relation.

5. Who governs devolution?

"There is a concordat and Inter-Departmental Concordats between the devolved bodies and Westminster and Whitehall. These are in the form of a document known as the Memorandum of Understanding. It puts the relationship between the assemblies, the Scottish Parliament and Westminster into a formal, but not legally binding framework. (Deacon 2007: 10)

The acts binding devolution and procedural restraints for the British executive are structurally identical. Both of them depend on informal rules rather than a codified constitution. Still, both concepts are thought to be irrevocable, in general.
"No-one has ever described conventions as rules of democratic conduct, because they are not: in the absence of a written constitution, they rather set out the rules of constitutional behavior. Conventions largely belong to the pre-democratic era of parliamentary government when they formed part of a complex morality of selfregulation for men in all areas of public life politics, the City, the profession. () They are the rules of a now half-obsolete club culture." (Weir 1999: 303)

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Some Conventions might be outdated but others, like the rules of constitutional behavior, or the irrevocable state of the devolution process are still accepted. Those rules do not remain as an artifact of an outdated class society but as a result of repeated games. The players of an infinite games learned that to consider possible future benefits. Each rational actor thus has to consider the consequences. If any government in Westminster would decide to revoke devolution or democratic constraints it would have to consider the possible consequences for future elections. As long as those constraints of democracy and devolved government are supported by a large group of the electorate and a violation of them is punished in consequence no British government could rationally decide against them. It might be a mistake to call those constraints a conventions due to the words historic association but arguing that Britain is an unrestricted democratic tyranny is just a manufactured provocation. If game theory is considered such informal democratic constraints can easily be explained. But who governs the game?
"The argument that they were top-down arises because devolution, being a

change in a country's constitutional set-up, requires the coming together of politicians with legal and constitutional experts in order to construct proposals for change.( The alternative viewpoint, the bottom-up )

argument, claims that there is a

widespread demand for constitutional change among the electorate at large. The contention here is that there is a grass-roots sentiment in favor of political change." (Deacon 2007:61)

The game is repeated indefinitely thus all former rounds influence future decisions. Therefore we shall start with a few important rounds: In 1975 Labour starts supporting devolution which the Conservative party opposes. Just one year later they present a bill in parliament which falls to guillotine debates in the House of Commons. In 1979 the bill fails again as it misses the majority set for the referendum. In 1989 when Mrs. Thatcher seeks to introduce an unpopular tax, Labour calls for general disobedience. Prior to the election Labour commits to devolution in Scotland and Wales. In 1997 Labour wins a landslide and enacts devolution (compare Moran 2005: 220).

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To apply game theory we have to determine the actors and their preferences. If we considering devolution as an n-person game we have to find a useful limit of actors. The Labour party played the game for Britain, the Scottish and the Welsh national party played a different game. All of them shall be considered actors. Labour plays to win British elections, the SNP aims at segregation and Plaid Cymru, the Welsh Party, at complete devolution. The game for Labour was: 1 1 0 0 1 win election

Whereas the SNP still plays for independence: 1 0,5 1

0,5 1 0 0,5 1 0,5

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And Plaid Cymru plays for complete devolution: 1

0,5

1 0,5 1 0 0,5 1 1 0 0,5

The result is quite surprising, Labour already won the game and Wales is, due to recent reforms, the runner-up whereas Scotland looses. But even though Labour might want to end the game it is still running and due to past actions Labour is still considered to support devolution. Thus if they want to win the next election they might wish to continue the game to strengthen their profile.

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6. Works Cited
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