Compendium 2007

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007
Bing Torrecampo, Flaj Gregorio, Lei Almero, Salvie Largo, Portia Paita, Karen Gonzaga, Hazel Ilao, Harlene Abiog, Bet Danabar, Shiela Labro, Wil Villar, Al Romero, Sheila Panganiban, Bunny Santayana, Mary Sangalang, Ida Hernandez, Mariz Pila
POLITICAL LAWS
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW
LEGISLATIVE POWER; LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY; EXECUTIVE ORDER 464 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO ERMITA G.R. No. 169777 April 20,2006 FACTS: On September 28, 2006, the President issued EO No. 464, effective immediately requiring all heads of departments of Executive Branch of the government to secure consent from the President prior ti appearing before the Senate or Houses of Representatives invoking the principle of confidentiality based on executive privileges. The said EO thus affected the legislative power of the Senate of the Philippines through its various Senate Committees, in conducting inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus and offices. Thus, the consolidated petition for the declaration of the EO 464 as null and void for being unconstitutional was filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress. 2. Whether EO 464 violates the right other of the people to information on public matter. 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. RULING: 1. Section 1 and Section 2 (a) of EO 464 are valid. The requirement to secure presidential consent of department heads is limited only as to appearance in the question hour. It cannot be applied to appearance in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid and explicit claim if privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. However, Sec 3. and Sec 2 (b) of EO 464 are invalid for it allows the executive branch to evade congressional request for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and explicitly presenting the reasons of why it must be respected by the Congress. 2. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is also direct violation of right of the public information and its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry. 3. Although EO 464 applies only to officials of executive branch , it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concerns and thus, due process requires that people should have been appraised of the issuance of EO 464 before it was implanted. PROPER PARTY; ORDINANCES; REASONABLENESS ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO JR. vs. HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO AND MMDA G.R. NO. 166501 November 16, 2006 FACTS: Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and
Case Digest Compendium

Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA from further implementing its wet flag scheme. The mandamus writ it to compel respondents to respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner is a proper party or has the stand to litigate. 2. Whether or not the Flag Scheme has legal basis and a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. RULING: In dismissing the petition, the Court held that: 1. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (a) he can show that he has the personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government (b) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (c) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. 2. On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, it has been noted that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city. Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. The Court is not a trier of facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; IMPLEMENTING RULES; VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER RODOLFO BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005 FACTS: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides: Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides: Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.

Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services. Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517. The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phaseout period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Section 7 of R.A. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. 2. Whether or not Section 7 of R.A. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause. 3. Whether or not R.A. 7719 is a valid exercise of police power. RULING: 1. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act. 2. Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the sprea d of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and

reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on substantial distinctions. Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. 3. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the States police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 1017; PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 1021 DAVID vs. ARROYO G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006 FACTS: These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus commanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations. She cited the following as bases: Elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004. On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus directing the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David,

a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, also was arrested. Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the Batasan 5 decided to stay indefinitely. ISSUES: A. PROCEDURAL: 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. B. SUBSTANTIVE: 1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge RULING: A. PROCEDURAL 1.) The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. 2.) Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance.

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. B. SUBSTANTIVE 1.) Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. 2.) a. Facial Challenge A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno, the US Supreme Court held that we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment (freedom of speech). Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored; Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017 The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus: First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. First Provision: Calling-Out Power Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary

police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. PP 1017 is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Second Provision: Take Care Power The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President

Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Third Provision: Power to Take Over The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. Clearly, the framers of our Constitution did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency; (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only; (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with

public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. c. AS APPLIED CHALLENGE Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow. Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct injury. A perusal of the direct injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. One requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. Unlike the term lawless violence which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably associated with invasion, insurrection or rebellion, the phrase acts of terrorism is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism. The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal. In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution

and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privatelyowned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLUKMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. APPOINTMENT WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CONSENT; EXECUTIVE PREOGATIVE PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005 FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Appointee Arthur C. Yap Alberto G. Romulo Raul M. Gonzalez Florencio B. Abad Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. Rene C. Villa Joseph H. Durano Michael T. Defensor Department Agriculture Foreign Affairs Justice Education National Defense Agrarian Reform Tourism Environment and Natural Resources Date of Appointment 15 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Edgardo J. Angara (Senator Angara), Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), Luisa P. EjercitoEstrada (Senator Ejercito-Estrada), Jinggoy E. Estrada (Senator Estrada), Panfilo M. Lacson (Senator Lacson), Alfredo S. Lim (Senator Lim), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal), and Sergio R. Osmea, III (Senator Osmea) (petitioners) filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
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ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, is constitutional. RULING: The petition has no merit. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. Moreover, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SPEEDY TRIAL; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON DUE PROCESS JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW v. Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., G.R. No. 164953 February 13, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous drug. He was charged in an Information filed with Branch 13 of the RTC of Manila Commitment Order was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz directing the detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the latters arraignment on January 8, 2003. Petitioners counsel manifested his intention to file a motion for preliminary investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to February 21, 2003. The aforesaid Motion was filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail. The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranzs retirement from public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled had to be postponed. This Court designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding judge of Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Administrative Order No. 27-2003 issued on February 18, 2003.On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an
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Order setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutors absence .On June 25, 2003, petitioners counsel received the lower courts Order granting Lumanlaws Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary Investigation for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. In the same Order, the trial court set petitioners arraignment on August 6, 2003. The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioners counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the public defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request on the ground that petitioner was already represented by a counsel de parte. The trial court then re-scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003.In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity arraignments were postponed. A year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that period of limbo. Hence, this Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release from the Manila City Jail. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is meritorious. RULING: The Petition is meritorious. Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial. On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused. Going over the causes for the delays, the SC found lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. WARRANTLESS SEARCH, WHEN ILLEGAL SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. & JOSE PANLILIO v ROGELIO SOLUTA, et al. G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006 FACTS: Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had been receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate. He then conducted surveillance, with the approval of Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) Vice President for Finance of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel). In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located at the hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners search of the union office was reasonable under the circumstances. RULING: The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners violation of individual respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. As for petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure . DUE PROCESS; WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND SEARCHES RUBY DIMACUHA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 143705 February 23, 2007 FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks her acquittal by a reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC of Marikina for violations of RA 6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. An informant/asset named Benito Marcelo relayed to the policemen information about a sale of illegal drugs to be done between 11am to 12 noon on August 10, 1995 along the corner to JM Basa and Kapwa Streets, Calumpang Marikina. He likewise describe the seller as more or less 5'4" in height, has a long hair and she will be using a sky blue colored car in delivering the shabu. At once, senior inspector Ely Pintang formulated a plan to conduct the operation of arresting the suspected seller. A police team was dispatched to said place. At about 11am of the day, 2 policemen positioned themselves along JM Basa Street, while the other members were at Kapwa St. Calumpang, Marikina. The 2 policemen were fronting a house which was more or less 5 to 7 meters away from where they were. The house allegedly owned by a certain alias Ruby Kalawang was where the sale of the illegal drugs was to take place. More or less 30 minutes later, 2 vehicles (a colored blue Toyota car with late number PPZ-254 and semi-stainless jeep with plate number DJK-840) parked near the said house. Moments later, the female driver of the car, which matched the description of the seller given by Benito Marcelo, alighted. She approached the driver of the other vehicle. After a few minutes of transaction, the jeep left. Thereafter, the female driver and her female companion went to the gate of the house while their male companion stayed at the car. At the said gate, Marcelo, the confidential informer, met the female driver and her female companion. The female driver took out from her shoulder bag one small plastic bag and gave it to Marcelo. Immediately, the two policemen approached the female driver, her female companion and Marcelo. Aside from the small plastic bag that was handed to Marcelo, the police also recovered suspected shabu inside the shoulder bag of the female driver inserted inside the cover of a check booklet. They were then bought to the headquarters. The female driver was Ruby Dimacuha, her female companion was Juvy Carpio and their male companion was Michael Mallari. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the accused was denied of her right to confront the witnesses 2. Whether or not the arrest and search conducted on the person and belongings of the petitioner without a warrant was valid RULING: 1. The right of the petitioner to confront the witnesses against her is not affected by the failure of the prosecution to present the informant. The matter of the presentation of witnesses is not for the accused nor even for the trail court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the state should present its case. The
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prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs cases, the presentation of an informant is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. It is well-settled that except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are no reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers eyewitness accounts. 2. The constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects ageist unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose. To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. In People v. Chua Ho San, it was pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations and (6) search pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest affected in hot pursuit and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Here the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methaphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from Marcelo regarding petitioners illegal drug trade. Petitioners arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of the bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her cheeckbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize the things connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime. CHECKPOINTS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES RODOLFO ABENES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 156320 February 14, 2007 FACTS: Three days prior to the May 1998 elections, Abenes was arrested at a checkpoint when the police saw a holstered firearm tucked at his right waist. The firearm was readily visible to the policemen as it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. He was charged and convicted of the trial court of Illegal Possession of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under PD 1866 and of a violation of BP Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. The CA affirmed his conviction. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the checkpoint was valid 2. Whether or not the accused right against unreasonable search and seizure was valid RULING: 1. The court upholds the validity of the checkpoint. The petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC where the court purportedly held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other circumstances showing probable cause. In the present case, the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established
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three days before the May 11, 1998 election, and the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant. In People v. Escano, the Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent on motorist's rights to free passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched not its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. 2. There was no violation of the accused right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view doctrine, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
SPEEDY TRIAL; DUE PROCESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANONAS GR No. 156847 January 31, 2007 FACTS: The respondent, a public officer, was apprehended by his colleages during a raid. At that time, he was possessing unlicensed firearm and illegal drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). On December 9, 1996, the city prosecutor of Manila filed two cases involving illegal possession of firearm and illegal possession of drugs. The latter is not bailable and as a result, he was detained in jail. Subsequently, in December 18,1996, the respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Said motion was granted on January 28,1997. However, during the pendency of the action for reinvestigation, the prosecution, the prosecutor who was assigned to his case was appointed judge of Iloilo and forgot to tell his successor about the reinvestigation. Because of the inaction of the prosecutors office, trial court ordered the termination of the reinvestigation only on February 16,2001.
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ISSUE: Is the respondent deprived of his right to due process of law? RULING: Yes. The reason for the delay of reinvestigation cannot be considered as excusable delay. The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged on November 19,1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January 28,1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation. There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confine for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the CA, respondents rights to due process had been violated. JUDGES IMPROPRIETY; EFFECT ON DUE PROCESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HONORABLE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, Chairman, Fourth Division,Sandiganbayan, and MRS. IMELDA R. MARCOS G.R. NO. 162130-39 May 5,2006 FACTS: As culled from the information of the petition, the Presidential Commission on Good Government ( PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Phil. filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of public respondent to try and judge the ten (10) consolidated cases (criminal case nos. 17287 to 19225 and 228070)charged against private respondent, Imelda Marcos for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act no. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for fear that the said cases would not be tried before an impartial tribunal. It claimed that the public respondent has at various instances, expressed extrajudicial remarks deemed prejudicial to the case, stated predisposition to dismiss the same and it apparently dislike the petitioners key witness for the prosecution, Atty. Francisco Chavez. On October 15, 2003, the petitioners motion was denied on the ground that public respondent (1) has not prejudged the merits of the consolidated criminal cases to favor the private respondent; (2) is not biased against or hostile towards the petitioners principal witness, Atty. Chavez; and (3) does not possess a judicial track record of favoring or promoting the interests of private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed but, the same was denied. Hence, the petition for Certiorari and probation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and acting in excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent when it denied the petitioners motion for voluntary inhibition despite the clear showing of his bias and partially in favor of the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the judges impropriety violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law RULING: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on the inhibition and disqualification of judges to sit in a case. Nevertheless, recuse not to hear a case is given exclusive prerogative to the judges as a cognizance of the fact that they are the one who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtroom. However, it does not provide unlimited discretion, as inhibition should be based on their rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before them. Verily, it should be bore in mind that such inhibition is rooted in the constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Due process necessarily requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All other elements of due process like notices and
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hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial ad biased judge. Similarly, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latters sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must therefore, prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial. On the case at bench, the public respondent is reminded that judges should avoid t just impropriety in the conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. In insulating the bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving a democratic way of life, it is essential that judges be above suspicion. It bears stressing that the duty of the judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. EMINENT DOMAIN MIGUEL BELUSO et al. vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ) G.R. NO. 153974 AUGUST 7,2006 FACTS: Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with the total area of about 20.2 sq. m. On November 8, 1995, Te Sangguniang Bayanof the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14,1997 by the Municipality of Panay before the RTC Br 18 of Roxas City . Petitioners file a motion to dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals. They further contend that respondent dont have the lawful power to acquire any or all of the subject properties through eminent domain; it being exercised by means of a mere resolution and not through an ordinance as required by law and applicable jurisprudence. Respondent for its part contends that its power to acquire private property for public use is just lawful upon payment of just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is correct. RULING: Eminent domain, which is power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. However such power may be validly delegated to local government units. Indeed, despite the exercise of legislative grant in favor of local government, it is still the duty if the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular property (2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, of for the benefit of the poor and the landless (3) there is a payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Art III if the Constitution, and other pertinent laws and (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. The court in no uncertain terms has pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. RA No. 7160 otherwise known as he Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.
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As respondents expropriation in this case was based on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant the judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
ADMINISTRATIVE, ELECTION AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, and PUBLIC CORPORATION

PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH; WHEN OVERCOME BY EVIDENCE ISRAEL G. PERALTA, PAROLE AND PROBATION ADMINISTRATION (PPA), COTABATO CITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al G.R. No. 141966 June 30, 2005 FACTS : PERALTA is the Director/Officer-in-Charge of the Parole and Probation Administration (PPA), Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, private respondent Nida Olegario (OLEGARIO) holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I in the same office. The Central Office of the PPA inadvertently reported to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) that the position held by OLEGARIO was an unfilled position. Consequently, the DBM did not release any allotment or funds for the position. PERALTA, as Director/OIC of PPA Regional Office XII, caused the payment of OLEGARIOs salary and other benefits from the savings of the office. Thereafter, PERALTA, brought the matter to the attention of the DBM and requested for allotment for the position of Budget Officer I, but the same was not released for some time. On March 23, 1995, PERALTA issued an Order, directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion U. Enilo, to cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1, 1995 and to go on leave with or without pay, as the case may be, on the ground of insufficiency in the release of allotment under the plantilla of the office. OLEGARIO then sought the opinion of the CSC, Cotabato City, anent the legality of the aforesaid Order. In a letter, the CSC informed PERALTA that OLEGARIO, being a government employee holding a permanent appointment, cannot be removed or separated from the service without valid cause. In the same letter, the CSC declared that the assailed Order is illegal because going on leave is a matter of personal choice and decision of the employee concerned. The CSC further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the service. It also advised PERALTA to cease and desist from enforcing the void Order. PERALTA obstinately refused to obey the CSC directive. The Office of the Ombudsman found PERALTA guilty of grave abuse of authority and meted him the penalty of suspension from office for one (1) year without pay. PERALTA filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA. Peralta contends that the letters he received from the Office of the Regional Director of the CSC are mere opinions or technical advices which are not binding on him. He argues that while under the Administrative Code of 1987, the power of the Regional Director of the CSC includes the authority to: (1) enforce Civil Service law and rules, policies, standards on personnel management within their respective jurisdiction; (2) provide technical advice and assistance to government offices and agencies regarding personnel administration; and (3) perform such other functions as may be delegated by the Commission, the power of the Regional Director of the CSC does not include the
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authority to render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices and agencies. Such power is granted only to the Commission itself. The CA denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision. RULING: The SC did not find any error in CAs decision. In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office of the CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23, 1995, directing private respondent Nida Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and functions and advising her to go on leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil Service law and rules, is binding upon petitioner. The fact that he was not satisfied with the advice or instruction of the CSC Regional Office does not justify his act of disregarding the same. He could have filed an appeal with the CSC itself questioning the ruling of the CSC Regional Office as the Commission has the power, under the law, to review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. In the alternative, Peralta could have sought the opinion of other authorities, such as the legal department of his office. He also had the option of taking the matter with the central office of the PPA, or the Department of Justice of which the PPA is a constituent unit. As the Director/Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No. XII of the PPA, it is Peraltas duty to find legal bases for his actions. However, nothing in the records at hand shows that he did. Instead, he proceeded to implement his own memorandum, which runs counter to the order of the CSC Regional Office. Thus, the presumption of good faith on his part is overcome by his obstinate and unjustified refusal to heed the directive of the CSC. Peralta, no doubt, acted in bad faith.
FALSE REPRESENTATION; WHEN MATERIAL ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY CANCELLATION OF COC VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMELEC and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO GR No. 135886 August 16, 1999 FACTS: On February 18, 1968, Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage is evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo, without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony held on September 21, 1986. Two days later, on September 23, 1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar. Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy on March 27, 1998. However, on April 17, 1998, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground that she made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was Salcedo. Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. On May 13, 1998, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo. ISSUE: Whether or not the use of such surname constitute misrepresentation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. a material
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RULING: As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate- the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code to wit: (1) Before election, pursuant to section 78 thereof which provides that: Section 78- Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy- a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (2) After election, pursuant to section 253 thereof, viz: Section 253- Petition for quo warranto- any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. In the present case, petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to run for the office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the surname Salcedo, petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Thus, petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the misrepresentation allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity is not within the scope of the provision. PROCLAMATION OF SENATOR; CONTEST AND DISPUTES; JURISDICTION ROBERT BARBERS vs. COMELEC GR No. 165691 June 22, 2005 FACTS: Robert Barbers and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 synchronized national and local elections. On May 24, 2004, the COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of senators promulgated resolution no. NBC 04-002 proclaiming the first 11 duly elected senators in the elections. The COMELEC as the NBC promulgated the resolution based on the certificates of canvass submitted by the following: (a) 78 provincial boards of canvassers, (b) 7 city boards of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts, (c) 13 city boards of canvassers from the national capital region, (d) 2 district boards of canvassers from metro Manila, (e) 74 special boards of canvassers for overseas absentee voting, and (f) 1 board of canvassers for local absentee voting. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs. On June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated resolution no. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon as the 12th ranking duly elected 12th senator of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. Claiming that Biazon's proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as senator with the COMELEC on June 7, 2004. In his petition, Barbers asserted that the
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proclamation of Biazon was illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it first correctly recognized the undisputed fact that there was an incomplete canvass at the time that respondent Biazon was initially proclaimed prematurely on June 2, 2004, but adamantly refused to restudy its void premature proclamation when it opted to reinstate the said sham proclamation of Biazon by anomalously resorting to relying on, unauthentic, dubious and noncanvassed documents rather than on the legal and lawful canvassed documents. RULING: The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the results of the election. In the present case, the report which the COMELEC supervisory committee submitted on June 29 2004 shows that Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not included in the national canvass. As for Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes. It shows that the total number of registered voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2, 931, covering only 19 precincts in three municipalities. From this summation, the lead of private respondent over petitioner undoubtedly reduced to 6, 212. Assuming that the remaining uncanvassed votes of 2,931 in places where special elections are not yet to be held were all votes in favor on petitioner Barbers, nevertheless, this will not materially affect the results of the election. To say the least, even if private respondents lead was decreased to 3,299 votes, he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful occupant of the 12th slot for the senatorial position. It suffices to say that the COMELEC based its ruling in the assailed resolution on official COMELEC records. The COMELEC enjoys the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty. The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election returns of members of the senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET. In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolution affirming Biazons proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results of the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the election. ELECTION PROTEST; DEATH OF PROTESTANT; SUBSTITUTION OF WIDOW ROLAND ALLAN POE A.K.A. FERNANDO POE JR. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO PET Case No. 002 March 29, 2005 FACTS: The case started when the congress, as the representative of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed Gloria Macapagal Arroyo the duly elected president of the Philippines. GMA took her oath of office before the Chief justice of Supreme Court on June 30, 2004. Protestant on the other hand, refusing to concede defeat filed an election protest before the electoral tribunal on July 23, 2004. However on December 14, 2004, the protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes hospital. The counsel of the protestant then submitted a manifestation of urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Poe. Protestee on the other hand asserts that the widow of the deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since public office is personal and not a property that passes on the heirs. She further contends that Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband because under the law, only the registered candidates, who obtained the second and third highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ, did not
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received the second and third highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the contended election. ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters protest case? RULING: Rule 3 Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the rules of court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. However in its application of this rule to an election protest, the court have every time ruled that public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the court consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contest where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case at hand, FPJ, himself denies any claim to the august office of the president. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, the court conclude that protestant's widow is not a real party in interest to the election protest. MATERIAL DEFECTS CONTROVERSY IN ELECTION RETURNS; PRE-PROCLAMATION
ESPIDOL vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 164922 October 11, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Raymond Espidol and private respondent Wilfredo Tabag were rival candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Ramon , Isabela in the May 2004 elections. Espidol, a re-electionist was proclaimed winner despite the objections of Tabag regarding the inclusion of several election returns which lacked inner paper seals and signature of BEI chairman, and without thumbmarks of the BEI members. The MBC included the contested election returns without any formal or written ruling thereon. Tabag then filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of proclamation. MBC Chairman Atty. Agripino de Guzman admitted that the board did not make any formal or written rulings on the objections raised by Tabag. De Guzman averred that there were persistent threats and intimidations which constrained him to hastily finish the canvassing. The COMELEC Second Division issued orders suspending the effects of petitioner's proclamation and subsequently, it promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation illegal on the ground of gross violations of Section 20 of RA 7166. The COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto the said Resolution. Petitioner then sought recourse to the Court. He argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the resolution of the Second Division. He averred, among others, that the grounds invoked by Tabag are merely defects in form and not proper subjects of a pre-proclamation controversy, and that even assuming that the grounds were proper issues, the MBC need not make any written rulings on the objections of Tabag because these were not raised properly or in the manner prescribed by Section 20 of RA 7166.
ISSUE: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming in toto the resolution of the Second Division which annulled the proclamation of petitioner? RULING: Under the circumstances of the case, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it nullified the proclamation of petitioner Espidol. The signatures and thumbmarks of the BEI members are required to be affixed on the election returns under Section 212 of the OEC. Consequently, the absence of these signatures and thumbmarks rendered the contested election returns materially
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defective and, therefore, proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy particularly falling under paragraph (b) of Section 234 of the OEC. Even granting arguendo that the objections interposed by Tabag were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy, nonetheless, the MBC should have made written rulings thereon. The requirement that the board of canvassers reduce to writing its ruling is mandatory. De Guzman, however, admitted that the board did not make any written rulings on the objections interposed by private respondent Tabag, including those reduced to writing. Petitioners argument that the MBC need not make any written rulings on the objections of Tabag because these were not raised properly or in the manner prescribed by Section 20 (c) of RA 7166, fails to persuade. The COMELEC en banc and the Second Division correctly ruled that the submission of the written objection within 24 hours from when the oral objection was made is substantial compliance with the law. Clearly then, the MBC violated its duty under Section 20 of RA No. 7166, when the MBC, without awaiting for or considering Tabag's evidence and written objections to support his oral objections and, consequently, without any lawful ruling thereon, proclaimed petitioner Espidol. To add, the COMELEC Second Division found a discrepancy between the number of votes appearing in the Statement of Votes and that in the election returns. The Court has previously held that in such a case, the true will of the electorate may not be fully and faithfully reflected by the proclamation. Equally damaging to petitioner Espidol's cause is the admission made by De Guzman of the presence of threats and intimidation that constrained him to hastily finish the canvassing and proclamation. In a long line of cases, the Court has affirmed the power of the COMELEC to annul an illegal canvass and proclamation. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power. It is also true that as a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or quo warranto. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and one of those is where the proclamation was null and void. In such a case, i.e., where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such proclamation a nullity. Hence, in no way did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. RATIFICATION OF TREATIES; AUTHORITY OF SENATE SEN AQUILINO PIMENTEL JR. et al vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 158088 July 6, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence. It is their theory that ratification of a treaty under both domestic law and international law is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines have a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
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RULING: The petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. The court disagree, Justice Isagani Cruz describes the treaty making process in this wise: The usual steps in the treaty making process are negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instrument of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the UN Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreements as between the parties. Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty making process. The signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Petitioner's submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus the president has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The power to ratify is vested in the president, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via a writ of mandamus. The court therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
BALIKATAN: CONSTITUTIONALITY ARTHUR LIM & PAULINO ERSANDO vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 151445 April 11, 2002 FACTS: Personnel from the armed forces of the US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military in Balikatan 02-1. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States
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in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti terrorism campaign declared by President Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001 by terrorists with alleged links to the al-Qaeda, a Muslim extremist organization headed by the infamous Osama bin Laden. Petitioners Arthur Lim and Paulino Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. ISSUE: Whether or not Balikatan 02-1 is constitutional. RULING: The Solicitor General claims that there is usually no question of constitutionality involved. Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA, in consideration of the presidents monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her role as commander in chief on the Philippine armed forces. From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke the provisions of its internal laws as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. PUBLIC CORPORATION; ORDINANCES; IMPLEMENTATION SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. HON JOSE ATIENZA JR. GR No. 156052 March 7, 2007 FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of business disallowed under section 1 to cease and desist from operating their business within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among these businesses are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines) Inc. Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy, through a memorandum of understanding agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. The Sanggunian Panglungsod ratified the MOU in resolution No. 97. The Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002, Thereafter, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No.97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permit to the oil companies. Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of oil companies. Petitioners contend that the respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under section 455(b)(2) of the Local Government Code to enfore said ordinance and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to say. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enfore Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. RULING: Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city Mayor to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of this is Ordinance No. 8027. As the Chief Executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. The reason for this was stated in the case of Dimaporo vs. Mitra Jr., viz: these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest
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to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
LABOR LAWS
NEGLIGENCE; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL GREG ANTHONY CANEDA vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. GR No. 152232 February 26, 2007 FACTS: Respondent Philipipine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) maintained a daily petty cash fund of Php 250,000.00 of one of its cashiers, petitioner Greg Anthony Caneda. An audit was conducted on funds and it was revealed that such is fund shortages amounting to Php 34,338.69. The audit further revealed that the petitioner is liable for misappropriating the company funds. The petitioner was terminated effective July 29, 1996. A complaint was filed by PAL for estafa and falsification against the petitioner in the city prosecution office of Makati City but the case was however dismissed. Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and was resolved in his favor on April 14, 1998. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but was dismissed for lack of merit on July 22, 1999. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration that had called the NLRC's attention to its retrenchment program in June 1998 brought about by the heavy losses caused by then by then prevailing asian economic crisis and the pilots strike. Such retrenchment had caused the abolition of the petitioners position and reinstatement became impossible. Nonetheless, the motion for reconsideration of PAL was denied. PAL filed a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals bur was partly granted stating that the petitioner is separated from his employment by reason of retrenchment and is entitled to separation pay and full backwages computed from the date of his termination on July 29, 1996 up to the time of his retrenchment in June 1998. This denied the motion for reconsideration filed by PAL. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed on July 29, 1996 or whether or not the petitioner was validly retrenched in July 1998. RULING: The petitioners dismissal on July 29, 1996 was valid. It id therefore immaterial that petitioner, as he claims, did not misappropriate the funds. The fact that there remains an undisputed shortage in the petty cash fund entrusted to him. He is therefore negligent. Whatever it was, he failed to meet the degree of fidelity demanded on him. His failure to give satisfactory explanation for the cash shortage gave PAL sufficient reason to lose confident in him. His accountability for the missing fund was clear. It would be most unfair to require an employer to continue employing as its cashier a person whom it reasonably believes is no longer capable of giving full and wholehearted trustworthiness in the stewardship of company funds. It is therefore, unnecessary to look into the respondents retrenchment in June 1998 as petitioners dismissal on June 1996 was for a just and valid cause. The petition is hereby denied. The decision of the court of appeals is set aside and a new one entered declaring the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of loss of trust and confidence as valid. POLICY OF THE EMPLOYER BANNING SPOUSES FROM WORKING IN THE SAME COMPANY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPLOYEE STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs. RONALDO D. SIMBOL et al.
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G.R. No. 164774
April 12, 2006
FACTS: A company policy promulgated in 1995, states that should co-employees decide to get married, one of them should resign. Simbol met Alma Dayrit, a coemployee, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998. Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a coemployee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000. Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga, also a co-worker. Allegedly, Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999. The respondents allegedly each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. On the other hand, Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. When she returned to work, she was denied entry. She was given a memorandum stating that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative. RULING: The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability. These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature's silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Therefore, the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. DISMISSAL OF AN ERRING EMPLOYEE; MITIGATING FACTORS
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DOMINADOR S. PEREZ et al. vs. THE MEDICAL CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL G.R. No. 150198 March 6, 2006 FACTS: Prompted by reports of missing medicines and supplies in the Emergency Room/Trauma Room (ER/TR) and upon the suggestion of one of the Hospital's staff nurses, the Hospital, on September 9, 1999, opened 22 lockers of employees assigned to the ER/TR. The Hospital found the lockers of petitioners with items belonging to it. Perez has been an employee of the Hospital for 19 consecutive years. Campos, while not employed with the Hospital as long as Perez, can lay claim to seven consecutive years. They were directed to submit written explanations as to why these items were inside their lockers. They submitted their written explanations. An administrative hearing was held where the three employees who responded were represented by a union counsel. Herein petitioners, were found to be guilty of a serious infraction meriting dismissal. The Respondent offered them the opportunity to voluntarily resign with separation pay, under a clause provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. They refused and the Hospital dismissed them from the service. ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal was the appropriate penalty. RULING: The power to dismiss an employee is a recognized prerogative that is inherent in the employer's right to freely manage and regulate his business. An employer may not be compelled to continue to employ a person whose continuance in service will patently be inimical to his interest. The dismissal of an employee, in a way, is a measure of self-protection. Nevertheless, whatever acknowledged right the employer has to discipline his employee; it is still subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Thus, it is within the power of this Court not only to scrutinize the basis for dismissal but also to determine if the penalty is commensurate to the offense, notwithstanding the company rules. The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter that dismissal would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offense considering the circumstances present in this case: Perez has been serving the Hospital for 19 consecutive years while Campos, seven (7) consecutive years. During their long tenure with the Hospital, it does not appear that they have been the subject of disciplinary sanctions and they have kept their records unblemished. Moreover, the Court also takes into account the fact that petitioners are not managerial or confidential employees in whom greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. This can be gleaned from the supervisor's letter explaining that orderlies' duties are limited to checking equipment and recommending their condemnation. The reinstatement of petitioners is in line with the social justice mandate of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court does not countenance the wrongful act of pilferage but simply maintains that the extreme penalty of dismissal is not justified and a lesser penalty would suffice. Under the facts of this case, suspension would be adequate. VALID DISMISSAL; REQUISITES; DISEASE AS A VALID CAUSE; ELEMENTS MANLY EXPRESS INC. vs. G.R. No. 167462 ROMUALDO PAYONG, JR. et al. October 25, 2005
FACTS: Hercules Balena and Romualdo Payong, Jr. were employed by Manly Express, Inc. and/or Siy Eng T. Ching on different dates, as tour coordinator (dispatcher) and welder, respectively. Balena alleged that during his employment, he demanded from his employer the payment of correct employees benefits. Nevertheless, every time he made the demand, he was told not to report for work anymore if he is not contented with the wages he was receiving. Then, herein private respondents called Balenas attention on his tardiness in work. As a result, on May 16, 2000, Balena commenced a case for constructive dismissal, payment of salaries, overtime pay, holiday pay, back wages, leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees. Romualdo Payong, Jr. has another story to tell. Sometime in December 1999, he was
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complaining of eyesight problems. Brought to an eye specialist by private respondent Ching, he was diagnosed to be suffering from eye cataract. Despite having the cataract removed in January of 2000, he was disallowed to return to his work by Ching. Much later, on August 1, 2000, he was given a letter of termination of employment. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed.
RULING: Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease. However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code gives an explicit rule. For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the employee suffers from a disease which cannot be cured within six months and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees, and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a competent public health authority. In the present case, there was no proof that Payong's continued employment was prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health and that of his coemployees. No medical certificate by a competent public health authority was submitted that Payong was suffering from a disease that cannot be cured within a period of six months. In the absence of such certification, Payong's dismissal must necessarily be declared illegal. The burden of proving the validity of the dismissal rests on the employer. As such, the employer must prove that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employee's dismissal. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee's illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. We also note that Manly failed to comply with the procedure for terminating an employee. In dismissing an employee, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee has been served two notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. The first notice must state that dismissal is sought for the act or omission charged against the employee, otherwise, the notice cannot be considered sufficient compliance with the rules. REGULAR EMPLOYEE; BUSINESS NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT TO EMPLOYERS
POSEIDON FISHING vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 168052 February 20, 2006 FACTS: Private respondent was employed by petitioner in January 1988 as Chief Mate. After five years, he was promoted to Boat Captain. In 1999, petitioners, without reason, demoted respondent from Boat Captain to Radio Operator of petitioner Poseidon. As a Radio Operator, he monitored the daily activities in their office and recorded in the duty logbook the names of the callers and time of their calls. On 3 July 2000, private respondent failed to record a 7:25 a.m. call in one of the logbooks. However, he was able to record the same in the other logbook. Consequently, when he reviewed the two logbooks, he noticed that he was not able to record the said call in one of the logbooks so he immediately recorded the 7:25a.m. call after the 7:30 a.m. entry. Around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 July 2000, petitioner detected the error in the entry in the logbook. Private respondent was asked to prepare an incident report to explain the reason for the said oversight. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, petitioner's secretary summoned private respondent to get his separation pay amounting to Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00).
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However, he refused to accept the amount as he believed that he did nothing illegal to warrant his immediate discharge from work. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is a regular employee at the time his employment was terminated. RULING: To frustrate the security of tenure of an employees is reprehensible and must be nullified. In this case, petitioners' intent to evade the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code is unmistakable. In a span of 12 years, private respondent worked first as a Chief Mate, then Boat Captain, and later as Radio Operator. His job was directly related to the deep-sea fishing business of petitioner Poseidon. His work was, therefore, necessary and important to the business of his employer. Such being the scenario involved, private respondent is considered a regular employee of petitioner under Article 280 of the Labor Code, the law in point, which provides: Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. Furthermore, as petitioners themselves admitted in their petition before this Court, private respondent was repeatedly hired as part of the boat's crew and he acted in various capacities onboard the vessel. In Integrated Contractor and Plumbing Works, Inc. v. NLRC, we held that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. And, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business. WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE; REQUISITES; TWO-NOTICE RULE ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORP. vs. REYNALDO URSABIA G.R. No. 171703 September 22, 2006 FACTS: Sometime in August 1994, Ace Promotion hired Ursabia as a company driver. On July 6, 2001 Ursabia failed to report for work. Ace Promotion through its area supervisor issued a Memorandum dated July 9, 2001. When respondent reported back to work on July 9, 2001, he was personally served with the memorandum but refused to acknowledge the same, hence, petitioner sent it through registered mail to his last known address. The following day, the area supervisor noticed some damage on the vehicle assigned to respondent, hence, he issued another memorandum. Sometime in July 2001, an anonymous note was discovered among the stocks of petitioner containing the words "(Good news) be careful and save you're (sic) life because there's a time to come everybody x x x will die." The examination conducted by the PNP crime laboratory allegedly showed that the handwriting of respondent has significant similarities with the said handwritten note. On August 6, 2001, respondent went to petitioner's office and was served with a termination letter. Again, respondent refused to receive the same prompting petitioner to serve it by registered mail to respondent's last known address.
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ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a just cause to dismiss respondent and whether he was accorded procedural due process. RULING: The Court finds that respondent should be dismissed for willful disobedience of the memoranda issued by petitioner. To be validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, the failure of respondent to answer the memoranda of petitioner is clearly intentional. He reported to and loitered outside petitioner's premises but never made any oral or written reply to the said memoranda. This shows respondent's wrongful and perverse attitude to defy the reasonable orders which undoubtedly pertain to his duties as an employee of petitioner. The Court finds that respondent was not afforded his procedural due process rights. In dismissing an employee, the employer has the burden of proving that the former worker has been served two notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. The first must state that dismissal is sought for the act or omission charged against the employee, otherwise, the notice cannot be considered sufficient compliance with the rules. In the instant case, the just cause to terminate respondent was his willful disobedience to the memoranda of petitioner. However, he was not given sufficient notice that his services will be terminated on such grounds. Respondent defied two memoranda of petitioner; hence, it is necessary that he be furnished with a third memorandum informing him that his disobedience to the previous two memoranda may cause his dismissal. The final notice of termination failed to specify the ground for his dismissal. It vaguely stated that he is being terminated for violation of company rules which were not specified by petitioner. CAUSES FOR TERMINATION; ABANDONMENT; REQUISITES JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON vs. NLRC G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004 FACTS: Private respondent is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed. RULING: To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter's representative in connection with the employee's work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
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his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or unjustifiable reason; (2) a clear intention to sever employeremployee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed intention to sever the employeremployee relationship with private respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they did not report for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would be dismissed if this happen again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee relationship. APPEAL OF LABOR CASES; VENUE; APPLICABLE RULES CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION INDEPENDENT vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 165486 May 31, 2006 FACTS: RA 6728 otherwise known as the "Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act," allows private schools to increase their tuition fees on the condition that 70% of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. Petitioner union, representing the teaching and non-teaching staff of respondent university has existing CBAs with the university. Their respective CBAs granted both the teaching and the non-teaching staff increases in their compensation. The parties submitted their position papers before the voluntary arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator upheld the position of respondent university and dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. RULING: The Court held in Luzon Dev't Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev't Bank Employees, that decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The Court observed that the Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator, unlike those if the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to the NLRC. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the RTC, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the CA before being elevated to the SC. The Rules of Court Revision Committee incorporated said circular in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Moreover, a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. There was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. What was being questioned was merely his findings of whether the university's practice of sourcing the integrated IP in the CBA
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from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP violates the provisions of the CBS. Such is a proper subject of an appeal. VALID CAUSE OF TERMINATION; ANALOGOUS; TWO-NOTICE RULE HEAVYLIFT MANILA, INC. et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 154410 October 20, 2005 FACTS: On February 23, 1999, petitioner, a maritime agency, thru a letter signed by the Administrative and Finance Manager, informed private respondent of her low performance rating and the negative feedback from her team members regarding her work attitude. The letter also notified her that she was being relieved of her other functions except the development of the new Access program. On August 16, 1999, she was terminated for alleged loss of confidence. She filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against petitioners. Before the labor arbiter, petitioners alleged that private respondent had an attitude problem and did not get along with her co-employees for which she was constantly warned to improve. Petitioners aver that her attitude resulted to the decline of the company's efficiency and productivity. Petitioners presented a letter dated February 23, 1999 and a notice of termination dated August 16, 1999. The Labor Arbiter found that private respondent was illegally terminated for petitioner's failure to prove that she violated any company regulation, and for failure to give the proper noticed as required by law. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The latter denied the said appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A motion for reconsideration was also filed but was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether or not "attitude problem" is a valid ground for the termination of an employee. RULING: An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working environment. Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the organization cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to take the necessary action to correct the situation and protect its organization. When personal differences between employees and management affect the work environment, the peace of the company is affected. Thus, an employee's attitude problem is a valid ground for his termination. It is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that must be duly proved by the employer. Similarly, compliance with the twin requirement of notice and hearing must also be proven by the employer. LISTED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ASSOCIATED WITH NON-LISTED AILMENT; COMPENSABLE UNDER PD NO. 626 PRECY P. JACANG vs. EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G. R. No. 151893 October 20, 2005 FACTS: The husband of petitioner was hired as a janitor of private respondent company from January 23, 1983 to January 20, 1985. The employer certified that he was then physically fit. January 23, 1985, he was reassigned as a factory worker. In 1985, he was diagnosed and found ill of pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB). In 1987, his ailment worsened and he was brought to the Lung Center of the Philippines where he was found to have developed "Takayasu's Disease". On February 10, 1990, he resigned from his job due to his ailment. He was thereafter confined at the Nat'l Kidney Institute from March 22, 1990 to April 4, 1990 until his death on May 24, 1990. Petitioner, as the surviving spouse, filed a claim with the SSS, for death benefits, under PD No. 626, as amended. The latter denied her claim on the ground that the cause of her husband's death had no causal relation with his job as a factory worker. She appealed to the ECC. ECC affirmed the ruling of the SSS and held that the cause
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of death, "Takayasu's Disease" is not listed as occupational disease under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation and there was no risk of contracting the disease form his employment. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review questioning the denial of her claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of petitioner's husband is compensable pursuant to PD No. 626, as amended. RULING: It has been ruled that the incidence of a listed occupational disease, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for requiring compensation. Thus, even if the "Takayasu's Disease" is not listed, perhaps for being rare and still mysterious, there can be no question that being associated with PTB which is a listed occupational disease, the death of petitioner's husband is compensable under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of the employee, considering that is a social legislation. In this case, enough substantial evidence has been shown to convince the Court that the surviving spouse of the deceased worker is entitled to compensation under said PD No. 626, because the records show his ailment and death have been associated with PTB, a listed compensable disease. CESSATION OF BUSINESS; LAYING OFF OF WORKERS INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION et al. vs. VIRGILIO ABABON GR No. 164518 January 25, 2006 FACTS: Industrial Plywood Group Corporation (IPGC) is the owner of a plywood plant leased to Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) on August 30, 1985 for a period of five years. ITC commenced operation of the plywood plant and hired 387 workers. On March 16, 1990, ITC notified the DOLE and its workers that effective March 19, 1990 it will undergo a "no plant operation" due to lack of raw materials and will resume only after it can secure logs for milling. IPGC notified ITC of the expiration of the lease contract in August 1990 and its intention not to renew the same. On June 26, 1990 ITC notified DOLE and its workers of the plant's shutdown due to the non-renewal of antipollution permit that expired in April 1990. This fact and the alleged lack of logs for milling constrained ITC to lay off its workers until further notice. This was followed by a final notice of closure or cessation of business operations on August 17, 1990 with an advice for all the workers to collect the benefits due them under the law and CBA. On October 15, 1990, IPGC took over the plywood plant after it was issued a permit. This prompted petitioners to file a complaint against ITC and IPGC for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages. They alleged among others, that the cessation of ITC's operation was intended to bust the union and that both corporations are one and the same entity being controlled by one owner. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed due to the closure of respondent's business and whether they are entitled to separation pay, backwages and other monetary awards. RULING: Work is a necessity that has economic significance deserving legal protection. The social justice and protection to labor provisions in the Constitution dictate so. On the other hand, employers are also accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence, and reasonable return of capital. This mass privileges comprises the so-called management prerogative. Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor. One of the rights accorded an employer is the right to close an establishment or undertaking. The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking is one of the authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the only limitation being that the closure must not be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on termination of
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employment embodied in the Labor Code. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay or at least one-half month for every year of service, whichever is higher. In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that ITC's closure or cessation was done in good faith and for valid reasons. The records reveal that the decision to permanently close business was arrived at after a suspension of operation for several months precipitated by lack of raw materials used for milling operations, the expiration of the anti-pollution permit and the termination of the lease contract with IPGC in august 1990 over the plywood plant. Having established that ITC's closure was done in good faith and that it was due to causes beyond its control, the conclusion is inevitable that said closure is valid. Consequently, petitioners could not have been illegally dismissed to be entitled to full backwages. Thus, the Court finds it no longer necessary to discuss the issue regarding the computation of their backwages. However, they are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
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CRIMINAL LAW
CONSPIRACY; REQUIRED EVIDENCE; TREACHERY PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUANITO QUIROL G.R. No. 149259 October 20, 2005 FACTS: In celebration of a fiesta, a benefit dance was held where Juanito and Mario Quirol and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo attended. On their way home, Benjamin and Roel passed by the house of Jed who stop and frisk them. Thereafter, he bound the victims together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport. The three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway. A few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were guilty of conspiracy and murder RULING: The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit crime. Neither is it necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. Treachery was correctly found to be present as the evidence shows that the concerted acts of appellants and Jed were consciously and deliberately adopted so that the victims would not be in a position to defend themselves or to retaliate. OTHER DECEITS JAIME GUINHAWA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 162822 August 25, 2005 FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles. Sometime in 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine went to Guinhawas Office and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which they no longer inspected since they presumed that the vehicle was brand new. The couple purchased the van though they are unaware that it had been damaged and repaired on account of accident. Later the couple found out that some parts of underneath the van had been welded but he told them that the defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses returned said L-300 Versa Van and demanded its replacement with a new one or the return of its purchase but despite follow-up demands no replacement was made nor was the purchase price returned to them. Hence, a criminal complaint was filed against Guinhawa for violation of par. (1) Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: Guinhawa is criminally liable for deceitful concealment of material facts because the false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover, a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of
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deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage. CONSPIRACY; ANTI-GRAFT LAW JAIME H. DOMINGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 149175 October 25, 2005 FACTS: During Domingos incumbency, a Multi-Purpose Pavement Project was undertaken in the Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela for the paving and repair of the barangay roads. The mixed gravel and sand was to be subsidized by the municipality through its EDF where two (2) checks were made payable to Domingo for the payment of the cost of gravel and sand delivered to the barangays whose proprietor, Diosadado Garcia is the godson of Domingo. When an audit was conducted, the audit team concluded D.T. Garcia Construction Supply was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business transaction with the municipality in connection with the truckloads of mixed gravel and sand which is in violation of Section 34 of R.A. 7160, Section 108 of PD1445 and Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan charged Jaime Domingo and Diosdado Garcia of conspiracy for violating Section 3(h) of R. A. 3019. ISSUE: Are petitioners guilty and did they conspire to commit the offense?
RULING: Domingo is guilty of violating Section 3(h) of the Anti- Graft Law. Under Section 3 (h) of R.A. 3019, the person liable is any public officer who directly or indirectly has financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the constitution or by any law from having any interest. In his official capacity, he violated the aforestated provision by intervening or taking part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in the transaction regarding the supply and delivery of mixed gravel and sand to the constituent barangays. Conspiracy is also present when he admitted acts of attempting to cover up the transactions and when the checks were made payable to Domingo instead of Garcias D.T. Garcia Construction Supply which could only have been done through his active cooperation. PRESUMPTION OF MALVERSATION ROBERT P. WA-ACON vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPIPINES G.R. No. 164575 December 6, 2006 FACTS: Robert Wa-Acon was a Special Collecting Officer of National Food Authority and as such was accountable and responsible of grains, rice stocks, and empty sacks for which he received and entrusted to him by reason of his official position. An audit team from Commission on Audit conducted an examination of the accountabilities of various Special Collecting Officers of NFA in which his presence is requested by virtue of a demand letter asking the latter to produce the cash, cash items, stocks and empty sacks and other pertinent papers however, he has no cash available and failed to explain the cash deficit. The Sandiganbayan convicted him of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. In the instant case, after the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an explanation, Wa-acon was not able to make money readily available, immediately refund the shortage, or explain satisfactorily the cash deficit. These facts or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he converted such funds to his personal use.
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ATTEMPTED RAPE; HOW COMMITTED; CONSUMMATED RAPE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006 FACTS: AAA was only 6 years old when she was first molested in 1994. It was only three years after when she slept in her grandmothers house where she was sexually abused. For the third time, she was raped again at the house of her grandmother. The following year, she was abused for the fourth time wherein Bon failed to insert his penis in her vagina. It was only years after when she decided to reveal to her mother the brutish acts of her uncle. Two days after, BBB her sister, also disclosed to her mother that she was raped by his uncle when she was 10 years old at the house of her grandmother and that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again on several occasions under threat of a bladed weapon. Thus, Eight (8) Informations were filed charging him with rape of AAA and BBB. He was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.The court convicted the accused for six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. ISSUES: Whether or not the court is correct in convicting the accused for six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape RULING: Yes. It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; CREDIBILITY PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, JR. AND EMILIANO ENRIQUEZ G.R. No. 158797 July 29, 2005 FACTS: Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were charged with kidnapping in the RTC of Cavite City for having forcibly abducted Alexander Pureza y Mendoza with the aggravating circumstances of the use of firearm, force, motor vehicle and simulation of public authority. Both pleaded not guilty during arraignment. During the trial, Rogelio Andico and Feliciano Castro,prosecution witnesses, testified that Elpidio forcibly kidnapped Pureza by the point of a gun and forcibly loaded him to a tricycle driven by Emiliano. Pureza was never seen again or heard from since then. They denied any involvement in the kidnapping and interposed the defense of alibi. Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. testified that he was in Bulan, Sorsogon with his live-in partner visiting her sick father. Emiliano Enriquez claimed that he did not leave his house during the night in question as he was taking care of his child. He also alleged that his tricycle had a broken shock absorber. In addition, Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. ascribed improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Andico and Castro. He alleged that Rogelio Andico testified
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against him because he caused the arrest of Rogelios uncle, Antonio Andico, known as the king pusher of Rosario, Cavite. He also charged that Feliciano Castro testified against him because Castro is a trusted employee and bodyguard of Jose Abutan, the uncle of Col. Pureza. He further alleged that Col. Pureza filed the case at bar against him in retaliation for having been implicated in the case involving the killing of his (Elpidios) father. After trial, appellants were found guilty as charged and meted indeterminate prison terms. They appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing the credibility of Andico for having executed one sworn statement and two other supplemental statements and Castro for having taken two years to report the incident. The CA did not only affirm their convictions but imposed upon each of the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to us pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping. RULING: The court ruled that the execution of three statements by Andico to the police does not necessarily render him incredible. He testified in a clear and straightforward manner it finds no reason to disturb the calibration of his testimony. Although Castro reported the incident only two (2) years after the incident, his reason for not reporting the same immediately, i.e., fear for his life, is reasonable considering that one of the appellants is the grandson of the incumbent mayor. His initial reluctance is not unusual and is a matter of judicial notice. Appellants alibis are also rejected. In the case of Elpidio, the Court finds it incredible that he did not inform the police about his alibi when he was brought in questioning just hours after he came back from Bulan, Sorsogon. Neither did his mother nor his live-in partner say anything to the police to defend him. It was almost a month later that he foisted the defense of alibi in his counter-affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. Emiliano also failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes drive away from the barangay hall where the victim was abducted. All the elements of the crime of kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, have been proven through the eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico, corroborated by Feliciano Castro, who have not been shown to have any improver motive in testifying in this case. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in convicting the appellants of the crime of kidnapping and in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in imposing upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.
LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT; REQUSITES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAPT. FLORENCIO O. GASACAO G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005 FACTS: Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while his nephew and coaccused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager, appellants duties included receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants and informing them of
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the agencys requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to deployment. Two informations for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment were filed against both before the RTC of Quezon City by private complainants for charging, exacting and collecting from them cash bonds and/or performance bonds in amounts ranging from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 without any authority to do so and despite prohibition by the POEA Rules and Regulations, which amount is greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and despite the payment of the said fees, the said accused failed to actually deploy them without valid reasons and despite the failure of deployment, the accused failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said private complainants in connection with their documentation and processing. The appellant contended that he could not be held liable for such crime since he was a mere employee of the manning agency. Only the appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large. Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned and the Court rendered judgment convicting him on one of the criminal cases and acquitting him on the other for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court modified pertinent provisions in the Rules of Court where direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment as in this case is provided. Thus the High Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in finding that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment. RULING: It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. The testimonies of the private complainants clearly established that appellant is not a mere employee of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. As the crewing manager, it was appellant who made representations with the private complainants that he can secure overseas employment for them upon payment of the cash bond. Appellants act of promising the private complainants that they will be deployed abroad within three months after they have paid the cash bond clearly shows that he is engaged in illegal recruitment. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found him guilty of the said crime. BIGAMY; PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS DEFENSE; BURDEN OF PROOF EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 FACTS: Eduardo P. Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa on July 28, 1975 in the Municipality of Rizal. On April 22, 1996, he subsequently married Tina B. Gandalera at the RTC of Baguio City. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single. In 2001, Eduardo left Tina and never returned. Out of curiosity, the latter inquired with the National Statistics Office and learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Thus, she filed a case for Bigamy against Eduardo. During trial, Eduardo testified that he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. And that Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again nor had he heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. The OSG posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten
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(10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead in the absence of declaration of presumptive death. 2. Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the award of P200,000.00 as moral damages. RULING: 1. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. 2. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter and thus the award of moral damages is but just and reasonable. DIRECT BRIBERY; POWER AND AUTHORITY RUBIN TAD-Y y BABOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 148862 August 11, 2005 FACTS: Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and Engineer Nestor Velez, Building Inspector, both of the Office of the City Engineer (OCE), Bacolod City, were charged with direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code for receiving and accepting marked money in the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical contractor and duly-authorized representative of Mildred Wong, offended party and owner of Atrium Building located at Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City, in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command at Andres Bakeshop, Bacolod City, which amount was earlier solicited by said accused from the offended party in exchange for the signing/approval of permit for building occupancy of the building owned by the offended party, the signing/approval of said building permit is in connection with the performance of the official duties of said accused as engineers in the Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod City, in violation of the aforementioned law. The petitioner maintains that he did not sign a certificate of occupancy. He posits that a certificate of occupancy is signed by the city building official, and that he has nothing to do with the execution of such certificate. Hence, he is not criminally liable for direct bribery. The MTC rendered judgment convicting Tad-y of direct bribery. Velez was acquitted of the charges. Tad-y appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered judgment on September 13, 1999, affirming the decision of the MTC with modification as to the penalty imposed. The RTC denied Tad-ys motion for reconsideration. However, the RTC agreed with his contention that what the latter signed was a certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of occupancy. In a parallel development, the RTC rendered judgment on May 18, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 17186, acquitting Tad-y and Velez of the charge. The accused, now the petitioner,
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filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC. The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision in toto. Upon the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the petitioner filed his petition for review on certiorari with this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the petitioners guilt for direct bribery RULING: To constitute direct bribery, it is necessary that that the officer has the official power, ability or apparent ability to bring about the desired end. The acts referred to in the law, which the offender agrees to perform or execute must be ultimately related to or linked with the performance of his official duties. In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the MTC, the RTC and the CA, on the substantial matters at hand, are absurd and arbitrary, and contrary to the evidence on record. There is no dispute that what was signed by the petitioner following his final inspection of the building, was the certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of occupancy of the building since the authority to sign the latter is vested specifically on the building official, and not on the petitioner. Thus, the Court agrees with the petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
TAXATION
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX; IMPOSITION ON SALE SOF FOREIGN CURRENCY BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 139736 October 17, 2005 FACTS: Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) is a commercial banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. On two separate occasions, it sold United States (US) $500,000.00 to the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank). On 10 October 1989, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an assessment finding BPI liable for deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) on its sales of foreign bills of exchange to the Central Bank. BPI received the Assessment, together with the attached Assessment Notice, on 20 October 1989. BPI protested the Assessment in a letter dated 16 November 1989, and filed it with the BIR on 17 November 1989. BPI did not receive any immediate reply to its protest letter. However, on 15 October 1992, the BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against petitioner BPI for the assessed deficiency DST. It served the Warrant on petitioner BPI only on 23 October 1992. Then again, petitioner BPI did not hear from the BIR until 11 September 1997, when it received a letter, dated 13 August 1997, signed by the BIR Commissioner denying its request for reconsideration. BPI proceeded to file a Petition for Review with the CTA on 10 October 1997; to which respondent BIR Commissioner filed an Answer on 08 December 1997. BPI raised in its Petition for Review the defense of prescription of the right of BIR Commissioner to enforce collection of the assessed amount. It alleged that BIR Commissioner only had three years to collect on the Assessment but she waited for seven years and nine months to deny the protest. The CTA decided that the statute of limitations for BIR Commissioner to collect on the Assessment had not yet prescribed; nonetheless, it still ordered the cancellation of the said Assessment because the sales of foreign currency by BPI to the Central Bank were tax-exempt. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the right of BIR Commissioner to collect from BPI the alleged deficiency DST had prescribed.
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2. Whether or not the sales of foreign currency by BPI to the Central Bank were subject to DST. RULINGS: 1. The efforts of respondent Commissioner to collect on the Assessment were already barred by prescription. The BIR has three years, counted from the date of actual filing of the return or from the last date prescribed by law for the filing of such return, whichever comes later, to assess a national internal revenue tax or to begin a court proceeding for the collection thereof without an assessment. In the present Petition, there is no controversy on the timeliness of the issuance of the Assessment, only on the prescription of the period to collect the deficiency DST following its Assessment. While the Assessment and its corresponding Assessment Notice were both dated 10 October 1989 and were received by BPI on 20 October 1989, there was no showing as to when the said Assessment and Assessment Notice were released, mailed or sent by the BIR. Still, it can be granted that the latest date the BIR could have released, mailed or sent the Assessment and Assessment Notice to BPI was on the same date they were received by the latter, on 20 October 1989. Counting the three-year prescriptive period, for a total of 1,095 days, from 20 October 1989, then the BIR only had until 19 October 1992 within which to collect the assessed deficiency DST. The earliest attempt of the BIR to collect on the Assessment was its issuance and service of a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on BPI. Although the Warrant was issued on 15 October 1992, previous to the expiration of the period for collection on 19 October 1992, the same was served BPI only on 23 October 1992. Under Section 223(c) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, it is not essential that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be fully executed so that it can suspend the running of the statute of limitations on the collection of the tax. It is enough that the proceedings have validly began or commenced and that their execution has not been suspended by reason of the voluntary desistance of the BIR Commissioner. Existing jurisprudence establishes that distraint and levy proceedings are validly begun or commenced by the issuance of the Warrant and service thereof on the taxpayer. 2. None of the conditions and requirements for exception from the statute of limitations on collection exists herein: BPI did not execute any waiver of the prescriptive period on collection as mandated by paragraph (d) of Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended; the protest filed by BPI was a request for reconsideration, not a request for reinvestigation that was granted by BIR Commissioner which could have suspended the prescriptive period for collection under Section 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended; and, BPI, other than filing a request for reconsideration of the Assessment did not make repeated requests or performed positive acts that could have persuaded the BIR Commissioner to delay collection, and that would have prevented or estopped BPI from setting up the defense of prescription against collection of the tax assessed. ASSESSMENT OF REAL PROPERTY FOR TAX; APPEAL WHEN TIME-BARRED CAGAYAN ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CO. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122451 October 12, 2000 FACTS: The Assets privatization Trust (APT) offered for sale all the assets and properties of the Cagayan Sugar Corporation (CASUCO), which had been foreclosed and transferred to APT by the Development Bank of the Philippines. The APT set the floor bid price at P355,000,000.00. Cagayan Robina Sugar Milling Co. (Cagayan Robina) emerged as the highest bidder. Among the properties bought by Cagayan Robina were sugar mill machineries which market value was pegged at P391,623,520.00 and the assessed value was set at P313,298,820.00. On October 18, 1990, the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan issued a Notice of Assessment of Real Property to Cagayan Robina covering the machineries based on the market value and the assessed value thereof.
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On February 8, 1991, Cagayan Robina appealed the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA), on the ground that it was excessive, erroneous and unjust. Cagayan Robina contended that the assessment should not be based on the APT-set selling price alone, but should likewise consider the operating conditions of the properties and pricing factors such as goodwill and future business potential. On April 1, 1992, the LBAA resolved that the basis of the market value for assessment purposes of the properties acquired by Cagayan Robina should be the APT floor bid price. By further deducting the value of machineries not subject to real property tax, the LBAA fixed the market value of the machineries at P260,327,060.00 for assessment purposes. On April 18, 1992, Cagayan Robina prepared an Appeal of Assessment addressed to the LBAA but did not file the same with the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). It was only on November 25, 1992, that Cagayan Robina filed with the CBAA an Appeal of Assessment. On January 2, 1994, the LBAA and the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan moved to dismiss the appeal dated November 25, 1992, on the ground that it had been filed beyond the thirty-day reglementary period therefore. On May 17, 1994, the CBAA dismissed Cagayan Robinas appeal on the ground that it was time-barred. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the assessment of Cagayan Robinas machineries is proper and correct under the Real Property Tax Code. 2. Whether or not the appeal by Cagayan Robina to the CBAA is time-barred. RULINGS: 1. Section 28 of the Real Property Tax Code provides for a formula for computing the current market value of machineries. However, Section 28 must be read in consonance with Section 3 (n) of the said law, which defines market value. Under the latter provision, the LBAA and CBAA were not precluded from adopting various approaches to value determination, including adopting the APT floor bid price for Cagayan Robinas properties. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. In the instant case, Cagayan Robina failed to show that the use by the LBAA and CBAA of the APT floor bid price pursuant to the Real property Tax Code was incorrect and done in bad faith. The method used by the LBAA and CBAA cannot be deemed erroneous since there is no rigid rule for the valuation of property, which is affected by a multitude of circumstances and which rules could not foresee nor provide for. 2. Where the owner or administrator of a property or an assessor is not satisfied with the decision of the LBAA, he may, within 30 days from the receipt of the decision, appeal to the CBAA. Cagayan Robina does not dispute the findings of the court that the former received on April 18, 1992, the LBAA resolution denying its appeal and that it had only until May 18, 1992, to appeal the local boards resolution to the CBAA. Cagayan Robina, however, only filed its appeal with the CBAA on November 25, 1992 or way beyond the period to perfect an appeal. No error was thus committed by the CBAA when it dismissed Cagayan Robinas appeal for having been filed out of time. AMUSEMENT TAX; TO WHOM PAID PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119122 August 8, 2000 FACTS: Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax. PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the Commissioner contending that PD 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, transferred the power and authority to levy and collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places of amusement from the national government to the local governments. PBA cited BIR Memorandum Circular No. 49-73 providing that the power to levy and collect
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amusement tax on admission tickets was transferred to the local governments by virtue of the Local Tax Code; and BIR Ruling No. 231-86 which held that the jurisdiction to levy amusement tax on gross receipts from admission tickets to places of amusement was transferred to local governments under P.D. No. 231, as amended. PBA further argued that income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc (VEI) is not subject to amusement tax. ISSUES: 1. Who between the national government and local government should PBA pay amusement taxes? 2. Is the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to VEI subject to the payment of amusement tax? RULINGS: 1. Section 13 of the Local Tax Code provides that the province can only impose a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included, as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959 which provides that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The said payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and description. While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 2. PD 1456 states that there shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to: xxx.....xxx.....xxx of their gross receipts, irrespective of whether or not any amount is charged or paid for admission. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. The foregoing definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR TAX REFUND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. MANILA MINING CORPORATION G.R. No. 153204 August 31, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Manila Mining Corporation, a mining corporation duly organized and existing under Philippines laws, is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT-registered enterprise. In 1991, respondents sales of gold to the Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) amounted to P200, 832,364.70. In connection with this, it filed its VAT Returns for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters of 1991, respectively, with the BIR. Respondent, relying on a letter from the then BIR Deputy Commissioner that the gold sold to the Central Bank is considered an export sale and is subject to zero-rated if such sale is made by a VAT-registered person filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an application for tax refund/credit of the input VAT it paid from July 1- December 31, 1999 in the amount of P8, 173,789.60. Petitioner subsequently filed another application for tax refund/credit of input VAT it paid the amount of P5, 683,035.04 from January 1 June 30, 1991. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manila Mining Corporation adduced sufficient evidence to prove its claim for refund of its input VAT for taxable year 1991 in the amounts of P5, 683,035.04 and P8, 173,789.60.
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RULING: Respondent miserably failed to substantiate its claim for input VAT refund for the first semester of 1991. Except for the summary and schedules of input VAT payments prepared by respondent itself; no other evidence was adduced in support of its claim. For failure of respondent then not only to strictly comply with the rules of procedure but also to establish the factual basis of its claim for refund, the Court has to deny its claim. A claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. TAX REFUND; ISSUANCE OF TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES) G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Seagate Technology (Philippines) is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines. The same is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and is VAT (Value Added Tax)-registered entity. Respondent has filed VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999. In connection with this, respondent filed an administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of P28, 369,226.38. Consequently no final action has been received by respondent on the claim for VAT refund prompting the same to elevate the case to the CTA. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Seagate Technology (Philippines) is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate for the unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods purchased. RULINGS: Special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining thereto. It has opted for the income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VATregistered and having satisfactorily complied with all the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is entitled to such VAT refund or credit. TAX REFUND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC. G.R. No. 150154 August 9, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. (Toshiba), was organized and established as a domestic corporation, duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Respondent also registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an ECOZONE Export Enterprise and with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer and a withholding agent. Respondent filed its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of taxable year 1996, reporting input VAT for a total of P18, 247,303.94. The said input VAT was from its purchases of capital goods and services, which remained, unutilized since it had not yet engaged in any business activity or transaction for which it may be liable for any output VAT. Consequently, respondent Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop InterAgency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF)
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applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT for a total of P19, 338,422.07. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. is entitled to the tax credit/refund of its input VAT payments for the first and second quarters of 1996. RULING: Sales of goods, properties and services by a VAT-registered supplier from the Customs Territory to an ECOZONE enterprise shall be treated as export sales. If such sales are made by a VAT-registered supplier, they shall be subject to VAT at zero percent (0%). In zero-rated transactions, the VAT-registered supplier shall not pass on any output VAT to the ECOZONE enterprise, and at the same time, shall be entitled to claim tax credit/refund of its input VAT attributable to such sales. Zero-rating of export sales primarily intends to benefit the exporter (i.e., the supplier from the Customs Territory), who is directly and legally liable for the VAT, making it internationally competitive by allowing it to credit/refund the input VAT attributable to its export sales. Thus, respondent Toshiba, as a PEZA-registered enterprise is entitled to a credit/refund of its input VAT. BUSINESS TAX MOBIL PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. THE CITY TREASURER OF MAKATI G.R. No. 154092 July 14, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Mobil Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing, importing, exporting and wholesaling of petroleum products. Petitioner filed an application with the City Treasurer of Makati for the retirement of its business within the City of Makati as it moved its principal place of business to Pasig City. Upon evaluation of petitioners application, the then OIC of the License Division, issued to petitioner, a billing slip. Subsequently, petitioner paid the assessed amount of P1, 898,106.96 under protest. Thus, petitioner filed a claim for P1, 331,638.84 refund but it was denied on the ground that petitioner was merely transferring and not retiring its business, and that the gross sales realized while petitioner still maintained office in Makati from January 1 to August 31, 1998 should be taxed in the City of Makati. ISSUE: Are the business taxes paid by petitioner Mobil Philippines, Inc. business taxes for 1997 or 1998? in 1998,
RULING: On the year an establishment retires or terminates its business within the municipality, it would be required to pay the difference in the amount if the tax collected, based on the previous years gross sales or receipts, is less than the actual tax due based on the current years gross sales or receipts. For the year 1998, petitioner paid a total of P2, 262,122.48 to the City Treasurer of Makati as business taxes for the year 1998. The amount of tax as computed based on petitioners gross sales for 1998 is only P1, 331,638.84. Since the amount paid is more than the amount computed based on petitioners actual gross sales for 1998, petitioner upon its retirement is not liable for additional taxes to the City of Makati. Thus, respondent erroneously treated the assessment and collection of business tax as if it were income tax, by rendering an additional assessment of P1, 331,638.84 for the revenue generated for the year 1998.
CIVIL LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case Digest Compendium 47

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD WHOSE FILIATION IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE FATHER, BEARS ONLY A GIVEN NAME AND HIS MOTHERS SURNAME ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA G.R. No. 164041 July 29, 2005 FACTS: October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate. At the scheduled hearing for the case, Armi was not present. She did not receive a copy of the order as she was no longer residing at the address furnished to the court. On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory on June 2, 1997. On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She averred that private respondent deliberately caused the service of notice to the wrong address to prevent her from opposing the petition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father may bear the latters surname. RULING: No. In dismissing the instant petition, the Supreme Court ruled that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child. AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS UNDER THE SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OF THE MOTHER JOEY D. BRIONES, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004 FACTS: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda, born in Japan in September 17, 1996, at the Court of Appeals, alleging that the minor is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel who is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and granted Loreta P. Miguel custody over the child until he reaches ten (10) of age. The Court also ruled that once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a
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week, and may take the child out upon the written consent of the mother. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE: Who shall have custody of the minor child in this case?
RULING: In denying the instant petition and affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification, the Supreme Court ruled that an illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care. However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PHILIPPINE LAWS APPLY TO FILIPINO WOMAN DIVORCED FROM HER FOREIGNER HUSBAND; INTERVENTION OF SOLICITOR GENERAL IN FAMILY CASES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Crasus married Fely on December 1961 in Cebu City. The union produced five children who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A., leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage March 1997 at the RTC of Cebu on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the marriage is null and void ab initio under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. (2) Whether or not Art. 26 of the same Code is applicable in this case? (3) Whether or not The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. RULING: (1) Using the guidelines established by them in Santos vs. Court of Appeal, Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Molina, and Marcos vs. Marcos, the Supreme Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely based on gravity, incurability and antecedence; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Thus, in any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (2) As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
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provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. And pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus. (3) The Supreme Court has issued the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003. It should dispel any other doubts as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. It recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. DIVORCE OF FILIPINO SPOUSES WHERE ONE LATER BECAME NATURALIZED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; EFFECTS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 FACTS: On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the USA bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him now live in California, USA. Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, it holds that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. However, it noted that the records of the case were bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by Cipriano concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife, thus the Supreme Court granted the instant petition. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD; ADOPTION BY NATURAL FATHER; USE OF MOTHERS MAIDEN NAME AS MIDDLE NAME IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 FACTS: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition for adoption of his illegitimate minor daughter with Gemma Astorga Garcia, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Finding the same meritorious, the trial court granted the petition and directed that henceforth, the minor shall be called Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
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Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that the minor use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. He offered the following reasons, to wit: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name GARCIA (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy, and; (6) her continued use of GARCIA as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. Likewise, the OSG agrees with the petitioner for the following reasons: (1) it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 180 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter; (2) there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows; and (3) it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committee agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Despite the reasons cited by petitioner and the OSG, the trial court denied the motion, holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. ISSUE: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? RULING: There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committee that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. Further, the underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Additionally, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189 (3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Lastly, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This provision is necessary to tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful and obscure. Considering therefore that there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name, her mothers surname, there is no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; REQUISITES JAIME S. VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON G.R. NO. 167206 November 18, 2005 FACTS: On July 12, 1996, Jaime Villalon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against his wife of 18 years, Ma. Corazon N. Villalon. He cited his psychological incapacity, which he claimed, existed even prior to his marriage. Accordingly, he
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continually refused to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; he was immature and irresponsible in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligations and his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. To prove his psychological incapacity, he presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, who testified on his Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. This, the psychologist described, led him to believe that he is entitled to emotional and sexual feelings and thus engage in serial infidelities and likewise exhibit adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners psychological incapacity was a ground for the annulment of his marriage. RULING: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. It should ... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. In this case, despite the testimony of the psychologist, petitioner failed to prove his assertions of psychological incapacity. He failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. Not prove incurable. It is not sufficient that the petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD; ENTITLEMENT TO SSS BENEFITS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS & MINOR JEYLYN H. AGUAS REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL GUARDIAN, ROSANNA H. AGUAS G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006 FACTS: Pablo Aguas, an SSS member and pensioner died on December 8, 1996. Subsequently, his surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim for death benefits for her and their surviving minor child, Jeylnn, which was approved by SSS on February 1997. However, sometime in April 1997, a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas Macapinlac, Pablos sister, was received by SSS, contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. Macapinlac alleged that Rosanna abandoned her spouse six years earlier and lived with another man named Romeo dela Pea with whom she had several children. She further stated that her brother Pablo was infertile, hence, the minor child Jeylnn is not his. As a result of the sworn statement of Macapinlac and the subsequent investigation conducted, SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension. It likewise denied the latters request and reconsideration to resume payment of benefits. It likewise ordered Aguas to refund the P 10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to her and Jeylnn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P 1,150.00 per month. This prompted Rosanna Aguas to file a claim for Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC for breviy). On such claim was appended the following: (1) Pablo and Rosannas marriage certificate; (2) Janets certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnns certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablos certificate of death. The SSC conducted a hearing on the merits and ordered SSS to verify Pablo
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Aguas signatures as appearing on the minors birth certificate, which, as manifested by the latter, was authentic. Likewise, witnesses for the petitioner stated that Jeylnn was the biological child of the deceased Pablo and Rosanna Aguas. They likewise have an adopted daughter named Janet, but it was found out that she was not legally adopted. However, Jefren, another child of Rosanna, was found to be the child of Rosanna with Romeo dela Pea. The SSC rendered a decision denying the claims of Rosanna Aguas for lack of merit and ordered her to refund the payments made to her. It likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefits to secondary beneficiaries, and in their absence, to his legal heirs. Aguas filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, hence, an appeal before the Court of Appeals was had. The CA however, reversed and set aside the decision of the SSC and remanded the same to SSC for computation of the benefits to Aguas. Hence, this petition by SSC. ISSUE: Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo. HELD: The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death benefits: the dependent spouse and the legitimate descendants. Considering that Pablo, during his lifetime, never impugned the legitimacy of Jeylnn. Further, such presumption was buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos signature, and such is a competent evidence of paternity. However, based on the testimonies of witnesses, Janet, another daughter of the couple, could not be considered a beneficiary. Her birth certificate was not supported by that from the civil registrar nor was there a legal process undergone for her adoption. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. Further, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; REQUISITES LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE YVONNE F. REYES G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Leonilo Antonio was 26 years old and respondent Marie Yvonne Reyes was 36 years old when they met in 1989 and married a year later. Three years into the marriage, Leonilo Antonio filed a petition for nullity of marriage anchoring his grounds on the following: respondents propensity for lying about almost anything, her ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities that made her live in a world of make-believe, extreme insecurities, extreme jealousy and lavish spending. He further presented a clinical psychologist to corroborate the psychological incapacity of respondent which was apparent even before the marriage was celebrated. Respondent denied petitioners allegations and also presented a psychiatrist who declared her to be normal and can perform the essential marital obligations. Shortly before a decision was rendered by the trial court, the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. The trial court, on the basis of the evidence presented, declared the marriage null and void ab initio due to the psychological incapacity of respondent. In passing, the Metropolitan Tribunal affirmed the ruling (during the pendency of the appeal before the CA) but held instead that respondent was impaired by lack of due discretion. Yet despite the ruling of the Archdiocese of Manila
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Respondent appealed to the CA who reversed the RTCs judgment, holding that petitioner was not able to present sufficient evidence nor establish the formers psychological incapacity. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code HELD: Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. Considering that the Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules, they warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
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must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently proven the psychological incapacity of respondent. It was no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which respondent was. The evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] convinced the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto. Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Hence, the petition is granted. CUSTODY; CUSTODY PENDENTE LITE JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V G.R. NO. 154994 JUNE 28, 2005 FACTS: These cases being interrelated, were addressed jointly by the Court. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against his wife Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto, and with ancillary petition for custody pendente lite of their 4 year old son. Allegedly, Joycelyn took away their son from the conjugal home and preceded to her province. Per report of a certain Renato Santos of United Security Logistic, Crisanto learned that his estranged wife was having lesbian relations with a certain Ciudadano. On April 3, 2002, the trial court initially awarded the custody of the minor child to petitioner Crisanto. However, on April 16, 2002, respondent Joycelyn filed a motion to lift award of custody of minor to petitioner, without presenting any evidence to support her motion. Nevertheless, the trial court granted her motion. Crisanto filed a petition for certiorari to the CA, charging that there was grave abuse of discretion in superseding the previous order granting him custody of the child with another order giving back the custody to Joycelyn. The CA ruled that Crisanto be
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awarded custody of the minor child. It further ruled that the trial court was not precluded from considering and resolving the motion of Joycelyn. Hence, these petitions. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the order to lift the award of custody pendente lite proper 2. Whether or not Crisanto is entitled to take custody of minor Rafaello? HELD: On the first issue, the motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite was proper. The April 3, 2002 order was not final and executory. It is provisional, as the term implies and subject to change as circumstances may warrant. Even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent; it may even be reexamined and adjusted it and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit. No. On the second issue, the Court anchors its decision on Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides: xxx Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit, and this article takes its bearing in Article 363 of the same code, which states that: In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. (emphasis supplied). Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory in character. Crisanto cited the immorality of his wife due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of the custody of Rafaello. Indeed, a mothers immoral conduct, under certain circumstances, may constitute compelling reason to deprive her of custody. However, sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. The husband must clearly establish the moral lapses of his wife and that it had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

LIBERALITY OF CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION; DEFECTS LIABILITY PERIOD WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTL. BANK G.R. No. 142830 March 24, 2006 FACTS: William Golangco Construction Corporation (WGCC) and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) entered into a contract for the construction of the extension of PCIB Tower II on October 20, 1989. The project included, among others, the application of a granitite wash-out finish on the exterior walls of the building. PCIB, with the concurrence of its consultant TCGI Engineers (TCGI), accepted the turnover of the completed work by WGCC in a letter dated June 1, 1992. To answer for any defect arising within a period of one year, WGCC submitted a guarantee bond dated July 1, 1992 issued by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. in compliance with the construction contract. The controversy arose when portions of the granitite wash-out finish of the exterior of the building began peeling off and falling from the walls in 1993. WGCC made minor repairs after PCIB requested it to rectify the construction defects. In 1994, PCIB entered into another contract with Brains and Brawn Construction and Development Corporation to re-do the entire granitite wash-out finish after WGCC manifested that it was not in a position to do the new finishing work, though it was willing to share part of the cost. PCIB incurred expenses amounting to P11,665,000 for the repair work.
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PCIB filed a request for arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) for the reimbursement of its expenses for the repairs made by another contractor. It complained of WGCCs alleged non-compliance with their contractual terms on materials and workmanship. WGCC interposed a counterclaim for P5,777,157.84 for material cost adjustment. ISSUE: Whether or not WGCC is liable for defects in the granitite wash-out finish that occurred after the lapse of the one-year defects liability period provided in Art. XI of the construction contract. RULING: The controversy pivots on Article XI of the construction contract referred to as the defects liability period which states thatthe CONTRACTOR hereby guarantees the work stipulated in this Contract, and shall make good any defect in materials and workmanship which [becomes] evident within one (1) year after the final acceptance of the workHowever, nothing in this section shall in any way affect or relieve the CONTRACTORS responsibility to the OWNER. The provision in the construction contract providing for a defects liability period was not shown as contrary to law, morals, good customs, pubic order or public policy. By the nature of the obligation in such contract, the provision limiting liability for defects and fixing specific guaranty periods was not only fair and equitable; it was also necessary. Without such limitation, the contractor would be expected to make a perpetual guarantee on all materials and workmanship. The adoption of a one-year guarantee, as done by WGCC and PCIB, is established usage in the Philippines for private and government construction contracts. The contract did not specify a different period for defects in the granitite wash-out finish; hence, any defect therein should have been brought to WGCCs attention within the one-year defects liability period in the contract. The purpose of the defects liability period was precisely to give PCIB additional, albeit limited, opportunity to oblige WGCC to make good any defect, hidden or otherwise, discovered within one year. Under the circumstances, there were no hidden defects for which WGCC could be held liable. Neither was there any other defect for which PCIB made any express reservation of its rights against WGCC. The contract should not be interpreted to favor the one who caused the confusion, if any. The contract was prepared by TCGI for PCIB. SIMULATION OF CONTRACTS; EFFECTS ON THIRD PARTIES; ASSAILABILITY MANILA BANKING CORPORATION vs. EDMUNDO S. SILVERIO and THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132887 August 11, 2005 FACTS: Purificacion Ver, registered owner of two parcels of land (TCTs No. 31444 (452448) and No. 45926 (452452)) located at La Huerta, Paraaque City, sold the said properties to Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo, Sr.) for P1,036,475.00. The absolute deed of sale evidencing the transaction was not registered; hence, title remained with the seller, Purificacion Ver. On 22 February 1990, Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) filed a complaint with the RTC for the collection of a sum of money with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Ricardo, Sr. and the Delta Motors Corporation. On 02 July 1990, by virtue of an Order, notice of levy on attachment of real property and writ of attachment were inscribed on TCTs No. 31444 (452448) and No. 45926 (452452). Thereafter, a decision was rendered in favor of MBC and against Ricardo, Sr. and the Delta Motors Corporation. The Decision was brought up to the Court of Appeals for review. In the meantime, Edmundo S. Silverio (Edmundo), the nephew of judgment debtor Ricardo, Sr., later filed in the RTC of Makati City a case for Cancellation of Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Attachment on TCTs No. 31444 (452448) and No. 45926 (452452). In his petition, Edmundo alleged that as early as 11
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September 1989, the said properties were already sold to him by Ricardo, Sr. As such, these properties could not be levied upon on 02 July 1990. In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, TMBC alleged, among other things, that the sale in favor of Edmundo was void, therefore, the properties levied upon were still owned by Ricardo, Sr. ISSUE: Whether or not a simulated contract may be assailed by a third party.
RULING: Basic is the rule that only properties belonging to the debtor can be attached, and an attachment and sale of properties belonging to a third party are void. An absolutely simulated contract, under Article 1346 of the Civil Code, is void. It takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all. The characteristic of simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. Absolute simulation implies that there is no existing contract, no real act executed; while fraudulent alienation means that there is a true and existing transfer or contract. The former can be attacked by any creditor, including one subsequent to the contract; while the latter can be assailed only by the creditors before the alienation. In absolute simulation, the insolvency of the debtor making the simulated transfer is not a prerequisite to the nullity of the contract; while in fraudulent alienation, the action to rescind, or accion pauliana, requires that the creditor cannot recover in any other manner what is due him. Finally, the action to declare a contract absolutely simulated does not prescribe (articles 1409 and 1410); while the accion pauliana to rescind a fraudulent alienation prescribes in four years In herein case, badges of fraud and simulation permeate the whole transaction, thus, we cannot but refuse to give the sale validity and legitimacy. And when a contract is void, the right to set-up its nullity or non-existence is available to third persons whose interests are directly affected thereby. As judgment creditor of Ricardo, Sr., MBC has the right to protect its lien acquired through a writ of preliminary attachment as security for the satisfaction of any judgment in its favor. MBC need not look farther than the subject properties to protect its rights. The remedy of accion pauliana is available when the subject matter is a conveyance, otherwise valid undertaken in fraud of creditors. Such a contract is governed by the rules on rescission which prescribe, under Art. 1383 of the Civil Code, that such action can be instituted only when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same. The contract of sale before us, albeit undertaken as well in fraud of creditors, is not merely rescissible but is void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties to be bound thereby. Considering that an absolutely simulated contract is not a recognized mode of acquiring ownership, the levy of the subject properties on 02 July 1990 pursuant to a writ of preliminary attachment duly issued by the RTC in favor of TMBC and against its debtor, Ricardo, Sr., was validly made as the properties were invariably his. Consequently, Edmundo, who has no legal interest in these properties, cannot cause the cancellation of the annotation of such lien for the reasons stated in his petition. LEGAL COMPENSATION; APPLICABILITY BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE CASIMIRO R. NADELA vs. ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF ASIA G.R. No. 145259 October 25, 2005 FACTS: Casimiro R. Nadela was the Regional Logistics Manager of Engineering and Construction Corporation of Asia (ECCO-ASIA) from 11 October 1982 until 11 April 1983. He was subsequently appointed as Assistant Vice-President of the Southern Philippines Division. As Assistant Vice-President, Nadela was in charge of procuring and monitoring materials, manpower and equipment requirements in the Southern Division. Nadelas contractual employment with ECCO-ASIA ended on 31 July 1985 upon the expiration of his contract.
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ECCO-ASIA suffered financial setbacks in 1983 until 1985. As Assistant VicePresident of the Southern Division of ECCO-ASIA, Nadela decided to offset the obligations of ECCO-ASIA to its creditors through payment in kind. Since the major creditors of ECCO-ASIA were located in Cebu, Nadela arranged for all the materials, tools and equipment owned by ECCO-ASIA in his division to be stored in the Cebu Oversea Hardware warehouse (warehouse) to facilitate the offsetting arrangement. Percival G. Llaban, owner of JAPER Marketing and one of the creditors of ECCOASIA, agreed to be paid in tools and equipment. To facilitate the offsetting of ECCOASIAs payables to Llaban, Nadela withdrew the remaining tools and equipment of ECCO-ASIA worth approximately P600,000 from the warehouse. After the offsetting, the excess tools and equipment of ECCO-ASIA remained in Llabans residence. Llaban later brought some of the tools and equipment to his store Casper Enterprises for storage. On 18 September 1985, ECCO-ASIA sent a letter to Nadela, requesting the immediate return of the tools and construction materials of ECCO-ASIA. On 29 October 1985, ECCO-ASIA filed with the trial court an action against Nadela and Llaban for Recovery of Personal Property and/or Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12117. On 11 November 1985, Nadelas counsel sent to the president of ECCO-ASIA, Mr. Cesar Pio Roda, a letter stating that Nadela had a right to retain and dispose the company assets in his possession until all his claims against ECCO-ASIA were satisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not legal compensation is available as a remedy in the instant case RULING: Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the debts of persons who in their own right are creditors and debtors of each other. The object of compensation is the prevention of unnecessary suits and payments thru the mutual extinction by operation of law of concurring debts. The requisites for legal compensation are provided in Article 1279 of the Civil Code: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. Legal compensation is proper in this case. The requisites for legal compensation are present. Nadela and ECCO-ASIA are creditors and debtors of each other. Nadela owes ECCO-ASIA P476,365.69, representing the value of the tools, equipment and construction materials of ECCO-ASIA for which Nadela is accountable. On the other hand, in a final and executory judgment in a labor case, ECCO-ASIA was ordered to pay Nadela P52,188.81 representing unpaid salaries and P28,500 representing separation pay. The debts, consisting of a sum of money, are due, liquidated, and demandable. Thus, compensation is proper up to the concurrent amount in this case where ECCO-ASIA owes Nadela P80,688.81 for unpaid salaries and separation pay while Nadela owes ECCO-ASIA P476,365.69. NOVATION; REQUISITES; EFFECTS SPS. FRANCISCO AND RUBY REYES vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., and MAGDALENA L. LOMETILLO, in her capacity as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff for Iloilo G.R. Nos. 149840-41 March 31, 2006 FACTS: On March 24, 1995, the Reyes spouses executed a real estate mortgage on their property in Iloilo City in favor of respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPIFSB) to secure a P15,000,000 loan of Transbuilders Resources and Development Corporation (Transbuilders). The mortgage contract between petitioners and BPI-FSB provided, among others:for and in consideration of the above-mentioned sum
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received by way of a loan, and other credit accommodations of whatever nature obtained by the Borrower/Mortgagor, the Borrower/Mortgagor by this Agreement, hereby constitutes a first mortgage, special and voluntary over the property specifically described When Transbuilders failed to pay its P15M loan within the stipulated period of one year, the bank restructured the loan through a promissory note executed by Transbuilders in its favor. The pertinent provisions of the promissory note stated that: (1) the proceeds of the Note shall be applied to loan account no. 21108336; and (2) the new obligation of Transbuilders to respondent Bank for fifteen million (P15,000,000.00) shall be paid in twenty (20) quarterly installments commencing on September 28, 1996 and at an interest rate of eighteen (18%) per annum. Petitioners aver that they were not informed about the restructuring of Transbuilders loan. claimed that the new loan novated the loan agreement of March 24, 1995. Because the novation was without their knowledge and consent, they were allegedly released from their obligation under the mortgage. When BPI-FSB refused to cancel the mortgage, petitioners filed separate petitions for mandamus and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to compel the bank to return their certificate of title and cancel the mortgage. BPIFSB, on the other hand, instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against petitioners in Iloilo City after Transbuilders defaulted in its payments. Consequently, a sheriffs notice of sale of petitioners property at public auction was issued. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a novation of the mortgage loan contract between petitioners and BPI-FSB that would result in the extinguishment of petitioners liability to the bank. RULING: Novation is defined as the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In every novation there are four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There must be consent of all the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the creation of a valid new one. Thus, the well-settled rule is that, with respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or the new contract merely supplements the old one. BPI-FSB and Transbuilders only extended the repayment term of the loan from one year to twenty quarterly installments at 18% interest per annum. There was absolutely no intention by the parties to supersede or abrogate the old loan contract secured by the real estate mortgage executed by petitioners in favor of BPI-FSB. In fact, the intention of the new agreement was precisely to revive the old obligation after the original period expired and the loan remained unpaid. The novation of a contract cannot be presumed. In the absence of an express agreement, novation takes place only when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. Moreover, under the real estate mortgage executed by them in favor of BPIFSB, petitioners undertook to secure the P15M loan of Transbuilders to BPI-FSB and other credit accommodations of whatever nature obtained by the Borrower/Mortgagor. While this stipulation proved to be onerous to petitioners, neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences. Petitioners voluntarily executed the real estate mortgage on their property in favor of BPI-FSB to secure the P15M loan of Transbuilders. They cannot now be allowed to repudiate their obligation to the bank after Transbuilders default. While petitioners liability was written in fine print and in a contract prepared by BPIFSB, it has been the consistent holding of this Court that contracts of adhesion are not
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invalid per se. On numerous occasions, we have upheld the binding effects of such contracts. SIMULATED CONTRACTS; KINDS AND DIFFERENCES; INTENTION OF PARTIES GOVERN GAUDENCIO VALERIO et al., vs. VICENTA REFRESCA et al. G.R. No. 163687 March 28, 2006 FACTS: Narciso Valerio, married to Nieves Valerio, owned two (2) adjacent agricultural lots in Calamba, Laguna, with a total area of 6.5 hectares. One of these lots, Lot 428, was a four-hectare land. A portion thereof, consisting of 511 sq. m. and known as Lot 428-A, is the subject of the petition in the case at bar. As early as 1963, spouses Alejandro and Vicenta Refresca started cultivating the 6.5-hectare land as tenants. In 1968, Narciso Valerio acquired ownership over the land. The tenancy relations between the Valerios and Refrescas were established and their harmonious relations continued uninterrupted. In 1974, the Valerios entered into a leasehold contract with tenant Alejandro Refresca allowing the latter to continue tilling the 6.5hectare land in exchange for fixed rentals. On February 10, 1975, Narciso Valerio, with the consent of his wife Nieves, executed a Deed of Sale whereby he sold his 6.5-hectare landholding to his heirs, namely: Susana de Leon, Leslie de Leon, petitioners Carlota de Leon Valenzuela, and Bienvenido, Dionisio, Conrado, Gaudencio, and Efepania, all surnamed Valerio. Narciso likewise conveyed 511 sq. m. of his landholding, known as Lot 428-A, in favor of his tenant Alejandro Refresca in recognition of his long service and cultivation of the subject land. After tenant Alejandros demise in 1994, his widow, respondent Vicenta Refresca, succeeded him by operation of law in tilling the land. Thereafter, petitioners demanded that the respondents vacate the land. They alleged that the 511 sq. m. lot was given to the respondents on the condition that they will surrender their tenancy rights over the entire land but respondents failed to do so. In 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Legal Division, in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, issued a Resolution recognizing the right of respondent Vicenta Refresca, widow of tenant Alejandro, to continue her peaceful possession and cultivation of the 6.5-hectare land. In 1998, despite the DAR ruling, petitioners sent a demand letter to respondents to vacate the land. Respondents refused. Petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, against respondents -widow and children of Alejandro Refresca -- for the annulment of documents of transfer and title of Alejandro. They alleged that the cause or consideration for the transfer of the 511 sq. m. lot to the Refrescas was an agreement between Narciso and Alejandro that conveyance of said portion would serve as disturbance compensation in favor of the latter, i.e., the 511 sq. m. lot was granted to the Refrescas in exchange for the surrender of their tenancy rights over the entire 6.5-hectare land; that Alejandro allegedly obliged himself to return the 6.5-hectare land he was tilling as a tenant; that Alejandro failed to fulfill his promise and instead continued to till the land until his death; that respondents succeeded in cultivating the entire land; that as the cause for the cession of the land was not complied with, the transfer of the 511 sq. m. lot to Alejandro should be declared void as a contract without cause or consideration produced no effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between Narciso Valerio and Alejandro Refresca is absolutely simulated and fictitious. RULING: Article 1345 of the Civil Code provides that the simulation of a contract may either be absolute or relative. In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
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parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest. In the case at bar, the records reveal that the clear intent of Narciso Valerio in executing the 1975 Deed of Sale was to transfer ownership of the apportioned areas of his 6.5-hectare land to petitioners as his heirs and to his tenant Alejandro. Although no monetary consideration was received by landowner Narciso from any of the vendees, it cannot be said that the contract was not supported by a cause or consideration or that Narciso never intended to transfer ownership thereof. Indeed, the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. One of the most striking badges of absolute simulation is the complete absence of any attempt on the part of a vendee to assert his right of dominion over the property. In the case at bar, petitioners and respondents were not amiss in claiming their right over their respective lots. Thus, we rule that the 1975 Deed of Sale between the parties is a relatively simulated contract as the clear intent was to transfer ownership over the land. Hence, the contract binds the parties to their true agreement, i.e., to cause the transfer of the specific apportioned areas to Alejandro and petitioners. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the 1975 Deed of Sale is a void contract for being absolutely simulated. RENEWAL OF CONTRACT; COMMISSION CARLOS SANCHEZ vs. MEDICARD PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. No. 141525 September 2, 2005 FACTS: Sometime in 1987, Medicard Philippines, Inc. (Medicard), respondent, appointed petitioner as its special corporate agent. As such agent, Medicard gave him a commission based on the cash brought in. In September, 1988, through petitioners efforts, Medicard and United Laboratories Group of Companies (Unilab) executed a Health Care Program Contract, for which Medicard gave the petitioner his commission. Again, through petitioners initiative, the contract between Medicard and Unilab was renewed for another year, thus, the petitioner was paid by Medicard his commission. Prior to the expiration of the renewed contract, Medicard proposed to Unilab, through petitioner, an increase of the premium for the next year. Unilab rejected the proposal for the reason that it was too high, prompting Dr. Nicanor Montoya, Medicards president and general manager, also a respondent, to request petitioner to reduce his commission, but the latter refused. Meanwhile, in order not to prejudice its personnel by the termination of their health insurance, Unilab, through respondent Ejercito, negotiated with Dr. Montoya and other officers of Medicard, to discuss ways in order to continue the insurance coverage of those personnel. Medicard did not give petitioner any commission under the new scheme. Petitioner demanded from Medicard payment of P338,000.00 as his commission plus damages, but the latter refused to heed his demand. He filed a complaint for sum of money. The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not an agent whose efforts are unsuccessful, or there was no effort on his part, is entitled to a commission. RULING:
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No. In denying the instant petition, the Supreme Court ruled that in order for an agent to be entitled to a commission, he must be the procuring cause of the sale, which simply means that the measures employed by him and the efforts he exerted must result in a sale. In other words, an agent receives his commission only upon the successful conclusion of a sale. Conversely, it follows that where his efforts are unsuccessful, or there was no effort on his part, he is not entitled to a commission. As found by the lower courts, petitioner did not render services to Medicard, his principal, to entitle him to a commission. There is no indication from the records that he exerted any effort in order that Unilab and Medicard, after the expiration of the Health Care Program Contract, can renew it for the third time. In fact, his refusal to reduce his commission constrained Medicard to negotiate directly with Unilab, thus revoking its agency contract with petitioner. Such revocation is authorized by Article 1924 of the Civil Code.
PROPERTY AND LEASE

RIGHT OF LESSOR PASSES TO LESSEE; RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS PAULO BALLESTEROS vs. ROLANDO ABION G.R. No. 143361 February 9, 2006 FACTS: Dr. Rodolfo Vargas bought from the Development Bank of the Philippines a two-door, three-story commercial building and the 229 sq. m. parcel of land on which it stands. The property was registered in the names of DBP and Dr. Vargas on February 21, 1996. Meanwhile, on March 14, 1991, petitioner entered into a contract of lease for one door of the building with Ronald Vargas, son of Dr. Vargas, who represented himself as the absolute owner of the property. Under the agreement (which was not registered in the Register of Deeds), the lease was to run until April 1, 1996. Dr. Vargas sold the property to respondent. TCT No. 949 in the name of the respondent was subsequently issued on April 10, 1996. In the meantime, petitioner entered into a new contract of lease with Ronald Vargas who again misrepresented himself as the absolute owner of the property. This new agreement extended the term of the original contract of lease between the parties and included the remaining door of the building in its coverage. It was to be effective for a period of five years from November 1, 1995, or until November 1, 2000. On April 30, 1996, petitioner received respondents letter demanding that he vacate the property and surrender its possession. On June 20, 1996, petitioner received another letter from respondents counsel reiterating the demand for him to vacate the property. All this notwithstanding, petitioner refused to vacate the premises. Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iriga City. ISSUE: lease. Whether or not respondent could legally eject petitioner or terminate the
RULING: Although the lessor need not be the owner of the property being leased, he should have a right (e.g., either as a usufructuary or a lessee) or at least an authority (e.g., as an agent of the owner, usufructuary, or lessee) to lease it out. Here, Ronald Vargas had neither the right nor the authority to grant petitioner the lease of the property. Dr. Vargas is deemed to have ratified the first lease because he never objected to it and in fact allowed petitioner to occupy the property for five years despite his knowledge of his son Ronalds misdeed. Thus, we consider the first lease valid. But the same cannot be said of the second lease. Under the principle of relativity of contracts, the sale of the property by Dr. Vargas to respondent bound Ronald Vargas as an heir of the seller. Neither did respondent authorize him to enter into a new lease contract with petitioner. Thus, Ronald Vargas could not have validly executed the second lease agreement upon which petitioner now bases his right to the continued possession of
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the property. The river cannot rise higher than its source. Where the purported lessor is bereft of any right or authority to lease out the property, then his supposed lessee does not acquire any right to the possession or enjoyment of the property. QUIETING OF TITLE; PRESCRIPTION; DEED OF DONATION EDGARDO DOLAR VS. BARANGAY LUBLUB G.R. NO. 152663 November 18, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Edgardo Dolar and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares, situated in Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay Lublub, subject to the conditions that (1) the area donated shall be for the purpose of constructing building and/or establishing public plaza, sports complex, public market, health centers and the like for the use of the Barangay of Lublub which shall be known as DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA; (2) that the construction and development of the area shall be initiated and completed within five (5) years from the execution of the Deed of Donation; and (3) that should the use of the area be converted to uses other than stipulated, the deed of donation shall be deemed revoked and the ownership shall revert back to the donors. Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub. Brgy. Lublub immediately took possession of the donated property, which soon became the site of several government office buildings and recreational facilities. However, the barangay did not have the donation registered under its name. Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the same conditions expressly set forth in the first. Barangay Lublubs peaceful possession of the donated area remained undisturbed until mother Lots No. 4181 and 4183 were included in the published list of tax delinquent properties for disposition. At the auction sale that followed, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder and was, accordingly, awarded the property. Petitioner filed against Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated. Petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners action is one for revocation of donation instead of for quieting of title; whether or not the action for quieting has prescribed. 2. Whether or not the deed of donation in question is (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or (b) no longer effective by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein. 3. Whether or not respondent barangay had acquired the property in question by acquisitive prescription. RULING: 1. As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioners complaint seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the donated property, a plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation in question. Verily, a declaration of petitioner absolute ownership appears legally possible only when the deed of donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked. It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay traces its claim of ownership over the disputed property to a valid contract of donation which is yet to be effectively revoked. Such rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the supposed title of petitioner over the same property removable by an action to quiet title. Withal, the remedy afforded in Article 476 of the Civil Code is unavailing until the donation shall have first been revoked in due course under Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Code. In all, petitioners right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the
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favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Respondent barangays right over the donated area proceeds from the 1981 donation. The legal effects, therefore, of its action or inaction respecting the donated property should be assayed on the basis of the 1981 donation. 2. According to petitioner, the subject donation is, by force of Article 745 of the Civil Code, void, the accepting barangay captain being without sufficient authority for the purpose. Since the present recourse is interposed on pure questions of law, we need not resolve the factual issue regarding Militars authority, or lack of it, to accept the donation in behalf of respondent barangay. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that petitioner is hardly the proper party to challenge the validity of the donation which is presumed to be valid - on the ground he presently invokes. This brings us to the question of the efficaciousness of the donation. Petitioner asserts that the 1981 and 1989 deeds of donation, pursuant to the uniform automatic rescission/reversion clauses therein, ceased to be effective upon respondents failure to meet the conditions for which it was charged to fulfill. To petitioner, the automatic rescission/reversion clause works, in appropriate instances, to revoke the donation and revert the ownership of the donated property to the donor without the need of judicial intervention. Petitioners argument to support his thesis on the automatic rescission of the donation in question and the consequent reversion of the property to the donor is an incomplete presentation of the Courts pronouncements on the point. If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to the donor. Such provision, is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award of the court can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not. 3. Admittedly, standing alone, adverse, continuous and long possession of a piece of real property cannot defeat the title of a registered owner. But, then, this postulate presupposes a Torrens title lawfully acquired and issued. Parenthetically, petitioners contention that the donation was invalid because it was not registered in the Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to the donation and their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is not needed for its validity and efficacy VALID OFFER BEFORE EXPROPRIATION; INCIDENTS OF EXPROPRIATION JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG G.R. No. 152230 August 9, 2005 FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an
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access road but they rejected the offer. The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property. The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. The RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the Municipality of Pasig caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street. JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint. 2. Whether or not the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with. RULING: 1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. Consequently, the authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides: ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered. (b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made. (c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed. (d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents: (1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract; (2)Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and (3)Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved. In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. 2. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. In the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and
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there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims. PRESUMPTION OF PERIOD OF LEASE TRISTAN LOPEZ as Attorney-in-Fact of LETICIA and CECILIA LOPEZ, vs. LETICIA R. FAJARDO G.R. No. 157971 August 31, 2005 FACTS: Leonor Sobrepena and her kins were the owners of a 2-door apartment at 1326 and 1328 Tomas Mapua St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apartment at No. 1328 has for so many years been occupied under a verbal contract of lease by Leticia Fajardo. The Sobrepenas sold their property to Leticia and Cecilia Lopez. The Lopez sisters attorney-in-fact, Tristan Lopez (petitioner), filed a complaint for ejectment with damages, against Leticia Fajardo on the ground of failure to pay her monthly rentals from May 1999 to February 2000. The parties amicably settled the case after Leticia paid P35,000.00 representing rental in arrears and current rental for June 2000. The case was thus closed and terminated and Leticia was allowed to remain in the leased premises. However, Tristan got wind of the filing by Leticia of a complaint for the nullification of the deed of sale between the Lopez sisters and the Sobrepenas and for the grant to Leticia of the right of first refusal over the leased premises. Leticia again failed and refused to pay her July and August 2000 rentals, drawing petitioner to send a letter notifying Leticia of their decision to terminate the lease contract effective August 31, 2000 with a grace period until September 30, 2000 within which to vacate the premises conditioned on the immediate payment of the July and August 2000 rentals. On September 21, 2000, Leticia remitted to Tristan a check in the amount of P30,000.00 representing payment of the rentals in arrears for July 2000, August 2000 and September 2000, and advance rentals for October 2000 up to July 2001. Tristan however refused to accept the check as the rental payments due to his aunts were only for July, August and September 2000, and that she was expected to vacate the leased premises by October 1, 2000. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid ground for ejectment.
RULING: Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 otherwise known as the Rent Control Law provides for the grounds for judicial ejectment two of which are (1) when there are arrears in payment of rent for a total of three months and (2) expiration of the lease contract. In the instant case, Leticia never questioned the claim that she failed to pay rentals for July, August and September before petitioner filed his complaint. Under Art. 1687, if the period of the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and form day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. A month-to-month lease under Article 1687 is a lease with a definite period and expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate. Under the Rent Control Law, the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute. There are exceptions expressly provided by law, which include the expiration of a lease for a definite period. In the instant case, it was noted that the rentals were paid on a month-to-month basis. Thus, the lease could be validly terminated at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect on the lessee. When petitioner then sent the August 18, 2000 letter to respondent informing
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her that the lease would be terminated effective at the end of the same month, it was well within his rights. CONSTITUTION USUFRUCTUARY OF USUFRUCT; RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC. G.R. No. 148830 April 13, 2005 FACTS: On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA as reserved property for the site of the National Government Center. On 19 September 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave the Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. usufructuary rights over this segregated portion. MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years, MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area. On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National Government Center. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public. Acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the ten-day period will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for injunction. ISSUE: Whether the premises leased by BGC from MSBF are within the sevenhectare area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted to MSBF by way of usufruct. RULING: A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct. A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct. The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists. MSBFs survey shows that BGCs stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the other hand, NHAs survey shows otherwise. The entire controversy revolves on the question of whose land survey should prevail. Under Art. 565, the rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed. In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the seven-hectare area shall be determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any. MSBF has the latitude to determine the location of its seven-hectare usufruct portion within the 16-hectare area. A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its benefactors property gave birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to remind the NHA to respect MSBFs choice of the location of its seven-hectare area. MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The direct corollary of enforcing MSBFs rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation of any of MSBFs acts beyond it.
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ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY MR. AND MRS. ALEJANDRO PANG-ODEN VS. ISABEL LEONEN, ET. AL. G.R. No. 138939 December 6, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners Pang-oden and respondents Leonen are the owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land. Petitioners land is at the eastern portion while that of the respondents is at the western side. The two properties have a common boundary: a creek which ran from south to north, such that petitioners property was bounded by said creek on the west, while that of respondents was bounded by the same creek on the east. Due to constant heavy rains and flood, water from the creek overflowed and destroyed the irrigation canal located at the north of the property. In order to minimize the damage, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) diverted the course of the creek so rain water will not go directly to the irrigation canal. As a result, the course of the creek diverted to run from south to northwest, passing through the middle portion of the respondents property and resulting to the formation of a new creek. NIA asked the permission of Manuel Leonen, one of the respondents, to allow it to use the new creek as an irrigation canal. Manuel Leonen consented. According to the respondents, the property in question forms part of a bigger parcel of land with an area of 5,370 square meters declared in the name of their father and predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen, under Tax Declaration No. 6473. For more than 50 years, they have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the disputed property. Sometime in 1976, Manuel Leonen saw the carabao of Alejandro Pang-oden devouring the Leonens sugar cane crops planted on the property in question. It was then that Manuel Leonen discovered that petitioners had encroached on the 1,336.5-square meter portion of their property and had in fact occupied the same. The spouses Pang-oden claimed that the 1,336.5-square meter strip of land was part of a bigger property with an area of 12,674-square meters originally owned by Alejandros mother, Sotera Apusen, under Tax Declaration No. 4506. It was around the year 1950 when Manuel Leonen started cultivating the subject strip of land and planted crops thereon, but only upon the mere tolerance of Alejandros mother. ISSUE: Who, as between the petitioners and the respondents, own the 1, 336.5 square meter strip of land subject of the suit? RULING: Article 434 of the Civil Code ordains that in an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. Hence, in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, it is indispensable that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same. The property subject of the dispute rightfully belongs to the respondents, as it was established that the same is part of the parcel of land declared under the name of respondents predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen. Too, the identity of the disputed strip of land has been proven in a conclusive manner as its location corresponds with those given by the witnesses and the record of the ocular inspection. The cadastral survey of the property clearly identifies and delineates the extent of the subject land. The evidence clearly establish that there used to be an old creek originally running from south to north and separating the property of the petitioners from that of the respondents. Then, due to expediency and necessity of protecting the irrigation canal in the area, the course of that creek was subsequently diverted to run from south to northwest, cutting through the property of the respondents. Hence, the portion segregated (the subject property) from respondents land as a result of such diversion continues to be their property and they shall retain ownership of the same. COVERAGE OF RIGHT OF WAY; PERSONS COVERED FAUSTO PREYSLER, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
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G.R. No. No. 158141
July 11, 2006
FACTS: Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc. owns Tali Beach Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private respondents subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Private respondent then barricaded the front gate of petitioners property to prevent petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels. The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent. On July 8, 1998, petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and occupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction materials. Private respondent maintained that the damages that may be caused to it far outweigh the alleged damages sought to be prevented by the petitioner. It alleged that there is an alternate route available to petitioner, particularly the barangay road leading to Balaytigue and the Calabarzon Road. For his part, the petitioner moved to clarify the December 12, 1996 writ and asked the court to clearly define the action required of private respondent to avert further damage and inconvenience to petitioner. Petitioner prayed that his contractors, visitors, and other representatives be allowed access and persons he has authorized be allowed to install power lines over private respondents property. ISSUE: Whether or not the right of passage allowed in the uncontested original writ applies not only to the petitioner and his household, but also to his visitors, contractors, construction workers, authorized persons, heavy equipment machinery, and construction materials as well as the installation of power lines. RULING: Prefatorily, we note that what was granted by the trial court was the preliminary injunction, and that the main case for right of way has not yet been settled. We have in previous cases, said that the objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. At the time the writ was applied for in 1995, there was still no construction going on in the property. The use of the subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation of power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the original writ. However, under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. However, indispensable in this instance is not to be construed literally. Great inconvenience is sufficient. In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondents subdivision. Thus we agree that petitioner may be granted a temporary easement. This temporary easement in the original writ differs from the permanent easement of right of way now being tried in the main case. The law provides that temporary easement is allowed only after the payment of the proper indemnity. As there are neither sufficient allegations nor established facts in the record to help this Court determine the proper amount of indemnity, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for such determination. Additionally, we find that the installation of electric power lines is a permanent easement not covered by Article 656. Article 656 deals only with the temporary easement of passage. Neither can installation of electric power lines be subject to a preliminary injunction for it is not part of the status quo. Besides, more damage would be done to both parties if the power lines are installed only to be removed later upon a contrary judgment of the court in the main case.
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ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY; PRESCRIPTION; IMPLIED TRUST RIGONAN vs. DERECHO G.R. No. 159571 July 15, 2005 FACTS: The instant controversy revolves around a parcel of land originally owned by Hilarion Derecho. When Hilarion died long before World War II, his eight children -Leonardo, Apolinar, Andres, Honorata, Dolores, Gerardo, Agaton, and Oliva -- became pro indiviso co-owners of the subject property by intestate succession. On July 16, 1921, five of the co-owners -- Leonardo, Apolinar, Andres, Honorata, and Dolores -sold the inherited property to Francisco Lacambra, subject to a five-year redemption clause. Notably, the three other Derecho heirs -- Gerardo, Agaton, and Oliva -- were not parties to the pacto de retro sale. Sometime in 1928, two years after the period for redemption expired, Dolores -- together with her husband, Leandro Rigonan -purchased the land from Lacambra and immediately occupied it. More than five decades passed without any controversy. On April 24, 1980, Leandro Rigonan an Affidavit of Adjudication in favor of his son, Teodoro Rigonan (the deceased husband of Petitioner Delfina vda. de Rigonan). Under this instrument, Leandro declared himself to be the sole heir of Hilarion, while Teodoro obtained the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00267, and acquired Tax Declaration No. 00667 in his own name. During the same year, Teodoro mortgaged the subject property to the Rural Bank of Compostela of Cebu. Dreading foreclosure, he settled his obligations with the bank. by securing the aid of Spouses Valerio and Visminda Laude. On April 5, 1984, Teodoro executed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Valerio Laude. On November 10, 1993, respondents -- as the alleged heirs of Hilarion and pro indiviso owners of the subject realty -- brought an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to recover the property; and to annul the Deed of Sale in favor of Laude and the Affidavit of Adjudication, whose validity and authenticity they assailed on the ground of fraud. They likewise maintained that the subject property had not been partitioned among the heirs; thus, it was still co-owned at the time it was conveyed to Petitioner Laude. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not at the time of the purchase in 1928, co-ownership still subsisted among the heirs of Hilarion Derecho. 2. Whether or not an implied trust was created. 3. Whether or not the action in the RTC was barred by prescription and laches. RULING: 1. Under a pacto de retro sale, title to and ownership of property are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject only to the resolutory condition that the vendor repurchases it within the stipulated period. In a number of cases, this Court has held that once the vendor fails to redeem the property within the stipulated period, irrevocable title shall be vested in the vendee by operation of law. In the instant case, the parties to the contract stipulated a five-year redemption period, which expired on July 16, 1926. The failure of the sellers to redeem the property within the stipulated period indubitably vested absolute title and ownership in the vendee, Lacambra. Consequently, barring any irregularities in the sale, the vendors definitively lost all title, rights and claims over the thing sold. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the vendors a retro ceased to be co-owners on July 16, 1926. Clearly then, the parties to the sale -- Leonardo, Apolinar, Andres, and Honorata (but not Dolores), as well as all their successors-in-interest -- no longer had any legal interest in the disputed property. As for Dolores, she reacquired legal interest in the property by virtue of the purchase in 1928, two years after the period to redeem had already expired. Lacambra and the heirs stipulated a five-year redemption period. When it lapsed, the vendee acquired absolute title, while the five co-owners-sellers were stripped of their co-ownership of the property. Therefore, when Dolores repurchased the property in 1928, she did so in her personal capacity, no longer as a
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co-owner-seller. She is deemed to have entered into an entirely new contract, independent of the 1921 pacto de retro sale. 2. An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud. Under Article 1456 of the new Civil Code, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. In the present case, the implied trust arose in 1921, when five of the eight co-owners assumed ownership of the whole inherited property and sold it in its entirety to Lacambra. The sale clearly defrauded the three other co-heirs who were not parties to the transaction -- Gerardo, Agaton, and Oliva -- and unlawfully deprived them of their undivided shares in the inheritance. Thus, to the extent of their participation, the property is deemed to have been acquired through fraud; and the person who acquired it, a trustee for the benefit of the person from whom it was acquired. Lacambra was the trustee who held the property partly for the benefit of the three mentioned heirs (cestuis que trustent).The CA, however, erred in finding that the implied trust had arisen in 1928, when the Rigonan spouses repurchased the property from Lacambra. By then, Petitioners Rigonan were merely stepping into the shoes of Lacambra as trustee. 3. Under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be brought only within ten years after the cause of action accrues. The cause of action of respondents accrued in 1928, when they lost possession of the property to the forebears of petitioners. These predecessors-in-interest took possession from 1928 until 1980 when Laude, their successor-in-interest, continued possession up to the present. During this entire time, respondents inexcusably failed to take action to recover the property. In 1993, they finally rose from their seeming slumber when they filed the present suit. Unfortunately, 65 years had already lapsed and, by that time, their right of action had clearly been barred by extinctive prescription. Moreover, petitioners acquired title to the subject property by prescription pursuant to Section 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). This provision, as authoritatively and consistently interpreted by this Court, allows adverse possession in any character to ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. Four elements had to be shown in order to use laches as a defense: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (2) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant, who has knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred. The four requisites are present in the instant case. BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH IS ONE WHO BUILDS WITH THE BELIEF THAT THE LAND HE IS BUILDING ON IS HIS OR THAT BY SOME TITLE ONE HAS THE RIGHT TO BUILD THEREON, AND IS IGNORANT OF ANY DEFECT OR FLAW IN HIS TITLE RODOLFO ROSALES vs. MIGUEL CASTELLTORT G.R. No. 157044 October 5, 2005 FACTS: Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosales are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856 and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort. It turned out that Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16
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of the same Subdivision Plan, from Lina Lopez-Villegas through her son-attorney-infact Rene Villegas but that after a survey, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. Castelltort averred that they were builders in good faith. Rodolfo Rosales, died on December 7, 2001 and his heirs substituted him. ISSUE: Whether or not Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING: Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas. Both parties acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case is Art. 448 of the Civil Code. Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. INOFFICIOUS DONATIONS; PRESCRIPTION IN ASSAILING INOFFICIOUS DONATIONS RONALDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA G.R. No. 154942 August 16, 2005 FACTS: Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are half-blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos who died intestate on March 10, 1986. During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation was annotated on Gregorios title. On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to Rolando. On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278 in Gregorios name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in Rolandos name. Constancia Santos filed a complaint for partition and reconveyance. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. Petitioner countered that respondents suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime. The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and registered. The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the donation to petitioner is inofficious because it impaired respondents legitime. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the donation is inofficious. 2. Whether or not Constancias action has prescribed. RULING: 1. Under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. Inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased. At this point, Gregorio did not sell the lot to petitioner. He donated
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it. Pursuant to Article 752, Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to Rolando, Gregorios donation is inofficious as it deprives Constancia of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof. 2. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, Constancia had until 1996 within which to file the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION

ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATORS OCCUPY A POSITION OF THE HIGHEST TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, AND THUS REQUIRED TO EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND ACT IN ENTIRE GOOD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT TRUST. ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006 FACTS: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). After sometime, Audrey died, leaving a will wherein, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due. The court also named petitioner Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta as ancillary administrator. Years later, Richard married respondent Candelaria GuerseyDalaygon with whom he has two children. Subsequently, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha as ancillary administrator. Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate, which was granted and approved, by the trial court. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygons cause of action had already prescribed. 2. Whether or not the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate succession should be applied and not of the Philippine laws. RULINGS: 1. The prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or the omission,
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alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof. 2. It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will it was shown that at the time of Audreys death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. Her Last Will and Testament was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court. The will was admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. Thus, being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. SURVIVING SPOUSE INHERITS THE ENTIRE ESTATE IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS AND ASCENDANTS, AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND THEIR DESCENDANTS ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006 FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximinos properties, which included five parcels of land. After being awarded ownership over the five parcels of land through a CFI Order, Donata had the parcels of land registered in her name. When Donata died, Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate. Thereafter, Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC. On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They later filed an Amended Complaint where they alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino. ISSUE: Whether or not herein respondents are entitled to the property of Maximino Briones. RULING: Maximino left no will at the time of his death, on 1 May 1952, and his estate was to be settled in accordance with the rules on legal or intestate succession. The heirs of Maximino, respondents in the Petition at bar, claimed the right to inherit, together with Donata, from the estate of Maximino, based on the Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, which read ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether
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legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001. ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. It should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino. The nonpresentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death on 1 May 1952, by virtue of Articles 995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code. Nonetheless, the CFI, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, had declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino in its Order, dated 2 October 1952. This Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only presume that Special Proceedings No. 928-R was fair and regular, which would consequently mean that the CFI complied with the procedural requirements for intestate proceedings such as publication and notice to interested parties, and that the CFI had carefully reviewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the rights of heirs to the estate. In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
PRETERITION; HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
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DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, et al. G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended among others that Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. Subsequently, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows: Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana Tantunin ng sinuman Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana. Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. (signed) Segundo Seangio Nilagdaan sa harap namin (signed) Dy Yieng Seangio Unang Saksi (signed) ikalawang saksi (signed) ikatlong saksi
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not
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contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. RULING: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON AN IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS FROM THE ISSUANCE OF THE TORRENS TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. LAURENCIO AYING G.R. No. 144773 May 16, 2005 FACTS: The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war. The siblings extra-judicially sold the lot however, three siblings, namely, Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon Aying did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. After the partition the lot was sold. Twenty-nine (29) years after, the Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon filed a case for the ejectment of the present occupants. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible
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HELD: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. With regard to petitioners argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in the land in dispute. A WILL IS SUFFICIENT IF FROM THE LANGUAGE EMPLOYED IT CAN REASONABLY BE DEDUCED THAT THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE FULFILLS WHAT THE LAW EXPECTS OF IT TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005 FACTS: This is a case of the probate of the will of Alipio Abada. Thereafter, the probate of the will of Paula Toray was also filed with the court. The oppositors in the will of Abada and Toray are their nephews and nieces. The ground for opposition is that decedent left no will or if there is a will it was executed not in consonance with the law. Belinda Caponong-Noble was assigned as the administratix of the estate of Abada by the trial court. Thereafter, Abellar was appointed administratix of Torays property. The RTC ruled only on whether or not the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues. ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws. HELD: There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is
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reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
TORTS AND DAMAGES

NEGLIGENCE; DAMAGES AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., versus NOEL CORDERO G.R. No. 138550 October 14, 2005 FACTS: AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC (Petitioner) is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers, which the latter then use to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero, wife of Noel Cordero (respondent), applied for and was issued an American Express charge card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The issuance of the charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember Agreement. As cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card, manifested her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement. An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. On November 29, 1991, Noel Cordero, together with his wife, Nilda, and relatives, went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop located at 277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card. When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior Authorizer Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in Hong Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. This is the system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated. When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office, its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the Inspect Airwarn Support System. However, respondent refused. Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish the identity of the cardholder This led to the confiscation of respondents card. On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the
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humiliation he suffered. The trial court render judgment in favor of Cordero. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals the court affirmed the decision with modification on the amount of damages awarded. ISSUES: 1. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public humiliation allegedly suffered by Cordero to Amex. 2. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to Cordero for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. RULING: 1. The Supreme Court did no sustain the trial courts conclusion. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative. 2. To be sure, pursuant to the 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed by respondent, petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done here. It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages. REQUISITES; QUASI-DELICT JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR. versus IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC., G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005 FACTS: The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR (petitioner). It is located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC., (respondent). The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. The services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 28 February 1995. Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. On 18 April 1995, a Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as Civil Case No. A-1646. Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro as third-party defendant. An Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 30 August 1995 was later filed by the respondent already naming Yoro as a party-defendant. After four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated its Decision holding that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged the petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any liability. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 18 August 1999. The Court pf Appeals denied the motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications as to the amount of damages. Hence a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2003.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Petitioner and Yoro has the effect of making the latter SOLELY responsible for damages for the respondent RULING: Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Thus, based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (a) there must be an act or omission; (b) such act or omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. All the requisites present in this case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cannot steer him clear of any liability. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. RES IPSA LOQUITOR; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON versus TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005 FACTS: This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1389. The complaint alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents, jointly and severally, P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as
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exemplary damages, P100,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. The trial court disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of the CLC. Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed by the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by Timothy Tagorio. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. The Supreme Courts pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothys own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, which originated from CLCs own negligence.
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BONUM PATER FAMILIA; RESPONDIAT SUPERIOR LARRY ESTACION vs. NOE BERNARDO G.R. No. 144723 February 27, 2006 FACTS: In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo), and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, respondent Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and 14, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. On February 18, 1993, respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint3 for damages arising from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. He alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries and suffering was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and petitioners negligence in the selection of a reckless driver and for operating a vehicle that was not roadworthy. He prayed for actual damages, loss of income, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. The trial court rendered decision, ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily, the actual, moral, litigation expenses and attorneys fees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence a petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner Estacion to annual the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner Larry Estacion exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage despite abundance of evidence to that effect. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner Larry Estacione exercised due to diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee and in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition; 3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating respondents Cecilia Bandoquillo and Geminano Quinquillera. RULING: 1. The Supreme Court agree with the trial court and the appellate court when they found that the truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was really driving at a speed of 40 kilometers per hour and considering that the distance between the truck and the Fiera in front was about 10 meters, he had more than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to avoid hitting the Fiera. However, from the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it showed that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch of police investigator Rubia of the tire marks visibly printed on the road. Moreover, the photographs taken after the incident and the testimony of Gerosano as to the extent of damage to the truck, i.e. the trucks windshield was broken and its hood was damaged after the impact,18 further support the finding of both courts that Gerosano was driving at a fast pace. The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on the sketch report, there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during the incident which, as testified to by police investigator Rubia, meant that the brakes
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of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Petitioners contention that he was able to establish that he exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his employees as well as in the maintenance of his cargo truck in good operating condition Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 2. As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Petitioner is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if he can show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 3. The Supreme Court find merit in petitioners contention that respondent Quinquillera, the Fiera driver, was also negligent. There is merit to petitioners claim that there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Respondent Noe himself had testified that he was standing at the rear portion of the Fiera because the Fiera was already full. Respondent Quinquillera should not have taken more passengers than what the Fiera can accommodate. If the Fiera was not overloaded, respondent Noe would not have been standing on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court finds that respondent Quinquillera was negligent in allowing respondent Noe to stand on the Fieras rear portion. Section 32(c) of Article III of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as "The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. DUTY OF THE BANK TO INFORM CLIENT OF CLOSURE OF ACCOUNT DUE TO INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS IND RAWING CHECKS; DAMAGES FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS versus THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR. G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner banks (FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND) Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. His account was denominated as Current Account No. 53208 (0052-00407-4). The respondent had since then issued several postdated checks to different payees drawn against the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and the same was presented for payment to petitioner bank on April 4, 1988. Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondent deposited to his current account the amount of P800.00. The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence, increasing the balance of the respondents deposit to P1,051.43. Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that his current account was closed on
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the ground that it was improperly handled. For this reason, petitioner bank, through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondents current account effective the evening of April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored. On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his account was unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado. The respondent, as complainant therein, alleged that the closure of his current account by petitioner bank was unjustified because on the first banking hour of April 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks. The petitioner banks act of closing his current account allegedly preempted the deposits that he intended to make to fund those checks. Further, the petitioner banks act exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. According to the respondent, the indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. The alleged malicious acts of petitioner bank besmirched the respondents reputation and caused him social humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless nights entitling him to an award of damages. In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado maintained that the respondents current account was subject to petitioner banks Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand Deposits which provide that the Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits and that the Bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any reason. After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered the petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent moral damages and exemplary damages and costs of suit. On appeal to the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of trial court with modification as to award of damages. Hence a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the bank. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable to the damages suffered by respondent Pacilan. RULING: The Supreme Court found the petition with merit. It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his account not just a few times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by these terms and conditions. Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the respondent the day following the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith. Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the respondents repeated improper and irregular handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors current accounts. The respondents case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria. RES IPSA LOQUITOR; NEGLIGENCE IN RESPONDIAT SUPERIOR
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PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL versus SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 200 FACTS: In 1986, respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. The building was known as Super A Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. The twostorey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building. On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita). In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner-corporation), through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building, abutting the office of Matsushita. Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms. Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances. Spouses Sarangsya filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages, alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. They prayed for payment of the damages. The RTC rendered judgment ordering the defendants, Bienvenido Pascual and Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily to the plaintiffs spouses Gaudencio and Primitiva Sarangaya, actual damages plus interest. On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the amount of damages. Hence, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the judgment of CA. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the present case; and 2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it found Perla negligent in the supervision of Pascual, and consequently, vicariously liable for the fire because Perla failed to adduce evidence of supervision of employees care and upkeep of company vehicles required by the supreme court on transportation companies; RULING: 1. The Supreme Court held that there was negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
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2. The SC finds no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The relationship between the two petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The burden of proof that such diligence was observed devolves on the employer who formulated the rules and procedures for the selection and hiring of his employees. Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascuals car or its serviceability. RECOVERY OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, vs. Spouses TEODULFO and CARMEN ARRIETA G.R. No. 152720 February 17, 2005 FACTS: Carmen Arrieta is a bank depositor of Solidbank Corporation under Checking Account No. 123-1996. On March 1990, Carmen issued SBC Check No. 0293984 in the amount of P330.00 in the name of Lopues Department Store in payment of her purchases from said store. When the check was deposited by the store to its account, the same was dishonored due to Account Closed despite the fact that at the time the check was presented for payment, Carmens checking account was still active and backed up by a deposit of P1, 275.20. As a consequence of the checks dishonor, Lopues Department Store sent a demand letter to Carmen threatening her with criminal prosecution unless she redeemed the check within five (5) days. To avoid criminal prosecution, Carmen paid P330.00 in cash to the store, plus a surcharge of P33.00 for the bouncing check, or a total of P363.00. Thereupon, Carmen filed a complaint against Solidbank Corporation for damages alleging that the bank, by its carelessness and recklessness in certifying that her account was closed despite the fact that it was still very much active and sufficiently funded, had destroyed her good name and reputation and prejudiced not only herself but also her family in the form of mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Carmen prayed for exemplary and moral damages plus attorneys fees. The trial court ruled in favor of Carmen and award the damages prayed for and attorneys fees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed seeking to reverse the judgment of CA was filed by petitioner bank. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondents are entitled to recovery of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. 2. Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees is excessive, arbitrary and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. RULING: 1. Case law lays out the following conditions for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) the culpable act or omission is factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219of the Civil Code. In the instant case, all four requisites have been established. First, these were the findings of the appellate court: Carmen Arrieta is a bank depositor of Solidbank Corporation of long standing. She works with the Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO), as an executive secretary and later as department secretary. She is a deaconess of the Christian Alliance Church in Bacolod City. These are positions which
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no doubt elevate her social standing in the community. Understandably -- and as sufficiently proven by her testimony -- she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation; and she suffered thus when the people she worked with -- her friends, her family and even her daughters classmates -- learned and talked about her bounced check. Second, it is undisputed that the subject check was adequately funded, but that petitioner wrongfully dishonored it. Third, Respondent Carmen was able to prove that petitioners wrongful dishonor of her check was the proximate cause of her embarrassment and humiliation in her workplace, in her own home, and in the church where she served as deaconess. Fourth, treating Carmens account as closed, merely because the ledger could not be found was a reckless act that could not simply be brushed off as an honest mistake. We have repeatedly emphasized that the banking industry is impressed with public interest. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them. 2. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. The business of a bank is affected with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. For this reason, the bank should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The banking sector must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is justified by the initial carelessness of petitioner, aggravated by its lack of promptness in repairing its error. It was only on August 30, 1990, or a period of five months from the erroneous dishonor of the check, when it wrote Lopues Department Store a letter acknowledging the banks mistake. In our view, however, the award of P50, 000 is excessive and should accordingly be reduced to P20, 000 ROAD SAFETY AND MAINTENANCE; LIABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engr. RAMIR J. TIAMZON, vs. FULGENCIO DACARA G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005 FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court. Fulgencio prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him. The RTC ruled in favor of the complainant, On Appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, a petition for review under RULE 45 of the Rules of Court wad filed by the petitioners. ISSUES: Whether or not the City Government of Quezon City is liable for damages. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to
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petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. With regard to the award of moral damages, the SC said, it is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; DAMAGE; REQUISITES OF CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP RULE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007 FACTS: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital and medical bills, including the doctors fees, amounted to P60,000.00. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines. On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery. On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI),
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owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. ISSUES: Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Dr. Natividad are liable for medical malpractice, more appropriately, medical negligence. RULING: This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family. On the other hand, the SC find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR EQUITABLE MORTGAGE SOCORRO TAOPO BANGA vs.Spouses JOSE and EMELINE BELLO,
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G.R. No. 156705
September 30, 2005
FACTS: On June 19, 1987 Sps. Socorro Taopo Banga and Nelson Banga mortgaged their real property covered by TCT No. 62530 in favor of Jose V. Bello as security for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00. The real estate mortgage was amended increasing the loan to P300,000.00 and later to P500,000.00. It appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Nelson purportedly on December 11, 1989 and with the marital consent of Socorro, covering the property in favor of Jose for a consideration of P300,000.00. TCT No. 62530 was later cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 3294 was issued in the name of Jose. ISSUE: Whether or not the parties intended the deed of sale to be merely an equitable mortgage. RULING: The parties intended the deed of absolute sale to be an equitable mortgage. In Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: x x x The presence of even one of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of equitable mortgage. The explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that law favors the least transmission of property rights. To stress, the existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602, not a concurrence, nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage. LIABILITY OF WITHDRAWALS BANKS FOR ACTS OF EMPLOYEES; UNAUTHORIZED
LAPRECIOSISIMA CAGUNGUN, ET AL. vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 158674 October 17, 2005 FACTS: Sps. Cagungun opened several accounts in Planters Development Bank. Due to exigencies of their business which require daily deposits, they entrusted their passbooks to some of Planters employees. At least once a day the branch manager or a certain Bong would come to get their funds and with the agreement that these would be rounded off and deposited to their account while the odd remainder would be applied to their loan. After more than a year, Sps. Cagungun were informed that their loan is past due and payment is demanded. They later found out that unauthorized withdrawals were made from their accounts. ISSUE: Whether or not the Planters Development bank is liable for the acts of its employees. RULING: The unauthorized transactions were committed by one or some of the employees of respondent bank for which it should be liable. The evidence showed that respondent did not exercise the degree of diligence it ought to have exercised in dealing with its clients -- diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. If only respondent exercised such diligence, no anomaly or irregularity would have happened. FORECLOSURE OF PROPERTY INVALIDLY MORTGAGED; EFFECTS EXPRESSCREDIT FINANCING CORPORATION VS. SPS. MORTON & JUANITA VELASCO G.R. No. 156033 October 20, 2005
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FACTS: On May 25, 1988, respondents purchased on installment, from spouses Jesus and Lorelei Garcia, a house and lot in Quezon City. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed whereby the Garcia spouses bound themselves to deliver the title of the property purchased, free from all liens and encumbrances within 15 days from full payment. Respondents were thereafter informed by the Garcia spouses that since the house on the property was still under construction, the lot was still covered by the mother title and had no separate title as yet. They promised to give the title after the construction was completed. In August 1988, the keys to the property were delivered to the respondents. They moved in, applied for a telephone connection, and insured the house. When respondents followed up on the title, the Garcia spouses told them that since the Quezon City Hall was razed by a fire in June, the title had to be reconstituted, so their separate title could not yet be delivered to them. Because the Garcia spouses would not deliver the title despite repeated demands, respondents went to the Register of Deeds in Quezon City and discovered that the Garcia spouses had mortgaged the property to petitioner, Expresscredit Financing Corporation, for P250,000 on June 15, 1989, or more than a year after the property was sold to them. The respondents filed a case for Quieting of Title and Specific Performance against the Garcia spouses. Petitioner foreclosed on the property in defiance of the notice of lis pendens and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the lower court, enjoining petitioner from selling or in any manner disposing of the property without permission from the court. Petitioner sold the property in a public auction where petitioner was the highest bidder. Due to the failure of the Garcia spouses to redeem the property, petitioner thereafter executed an Affidavit of Consolidation and secured Certificate of Title No. 69049 in its name. ISSUE: Who has preferential right over the property, the respondents who acquired it through prior purchase or the petitioner who acquired the same in a foreclosure sale as the highest bidder? RULING: Article 1544 provides that: Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. An innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent phrase shall be deemed to include, under the Torrens System, the innocent lessee, mortgagee, and other encumbrancer for value. Where the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first registers it in the Registry of Property, in good faith, shall be the owner. Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being ascertained only from the acts of one claiming its presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only be judged by actual or fancied token or signs. As shown by the evidence, the property had already been sold by the Garcia spouses to the respondents on May 25, 1988. The respondents immediately took possession, applied for a telephone line, and insured the property with Pioneer Insurance in September 1988. When the same land was mortgaged by the Garcia spouses, respondents have been, since May 25, 1988 in actual, physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession. In this case, particular circumstances constrain us to rule that petitioner was neither a mortgagee nor a purchaser in good faith and as such, could not acquire good title to the property as against the former transferee. SECURITY FOR A LOAN; JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY; DIFFERENCE SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, vs. MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION, Spouses JONG-WON HONG and SOO-OK KIM HONG, TERESITA CU, and RICARDO P. GUEVARA and Spouse. G.R. No. 153535 July 28, 2005
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FACTS: Maria Cristina Chemical Industries (MCCI) and three Korean corporations decided to forge a joint venture and established a corporation, under the name of the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation (Corporation), private respondents Guevara, Cu and Hong are officers of said Corporation. When it started its operation its indebtedness ballooned causing it secured a loan from Solidbank as evidenced by a promissory note signed by Cu and Hong and as security for the loan the Corporation executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the Bank covering its rights, title and interest to an Irrevocable Letter of Credit and a quedan which were also signed by Cu and Hong. The corporation failed to pay the loan. ISSUE: Whether or not the individual respondents are liable, either jointly or solidarily, with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation. RULING: Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this case, no conclusion of solidary liability can be made. Furthermore, nothing supports the alleged joint liability of the individual petitioners because, as correctly pointed out by the two lower courts, the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the corporation. In a joint obligation, there must be at least two debtors, each of whom is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt; and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit.
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AUCTION SALE; REQUIREMENTS ELSA TAGUNICAR and EMERSON TAGUNICAR v.LORNA EXPRESS CREDIT CORP. G.R. No. 138592 February 28, 2006 FACTS: Sps. Tagunicar obtained a loan from Lorna Express Credit and as a security mortgaged their two unregistered lots. For failure to pay Lorna Express credit applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure under Act 3135. The notice of auction sale was issued by the office of the notary public which was posted in three public places and published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. Sps Tagunicar filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Lorna Express Credit complied with the notice and publication requirement under Act 3135. 2. Whether or not the auction sale conducted by a Notary Public is void, citing Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1984 RULING: 1. Records show that the notice of auction sale was posted in three public places in the Municipality of Taguig and Pasig City. The said notice was published once a week for three consecutive weeks or on October 4, 11 and 18, 1997 in Bongga, a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, the mandatory requirements of notice and publication were complied with. 2. Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 issued by this Court sets forth the procedure in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, thus: 1. All applications for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage whether under the direction of the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff. 2. Upon receipt of an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of Court to: xxxxxx
c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure, whether the applicant has complied with all the requirements before the public auction is conducted under the direction of the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Sec. 4 of Act 3135, as amended; x x x x x x. Clearly, the Notary Public is authorized to direct or conduct a public auction. INNS; DEPOSIT BOX; LIABILITY FOR LOSS OF GUESTS PROPERTY; YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN G.R. No. 126780 February 17, 2005 FACTS: McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who was convinced by his friend, Tan to stay at the Tropicana Hotel during his visits in the Philippines. During one of his stays he rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. He placed among others three envelopes which contained US and Australian dollars. When he came back to Australia he realized that some of the money, including a jewelry he bought in Hongkong were missing. He confronted Tan who readily admitted that she opened the safety deposit box with the assistance of the manager, Lopez and two others. Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box.
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ISSUE: Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers. RULING: Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature. INDIVISIBILITY OF MORTGAGE; FORECLOSURE IN SEVERAL PLACES; EFFECTS SPS. VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK G.R. No. 147902 March 17, 2006 FACTS: Spouses Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu and others, mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank as security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P9,000,000.00. For failure to pay, PCI forclosed the properties in Dagupan and a certificate of sale was subsequently issued to PCI being the highest bidder. ISSUE: Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in different localities can be separately foreclosed in different places. RULING: In essence, indivisibility means that the mortgage obligation cannot be divided among the different lots, that is, each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt. The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces as long as each parcel of land is answerable for the entire debt. Petitioners assumption that their total obligation is P20,874,030.40 because the two notices of extra-judicial sale indicated that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.20 each, is therefore flawed. Considering the indivisibility of a real estate mortgage, the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City are made to answer for the entire debt of P10,437,015.29.
SALES
CONTRACT FOR A PIECE OF WORK; CONTRACT OF SALE; DIFFERENCE DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. NAPOLEON N. ARAGONES G.R. No. 153033 June 23, 2005 FACTS: On September 18, 1988, petitioner Del Monte Philippines Inc. (DMPI) entered into an Agreement with MEGA-WAFF, represented by Managing Principal Edilberto Garcia, whereby the latter undertook the supply and installation of modular pavement at DMPIs condiments warehouse. To source its supply of concrete blocks, MEGA-WAFF, as contractor, represented by Garcia, entered into a Supply Agreement with Dynablock Enterprises, represented by respondent Aragones, as supplier. Aragones thereupon started assembling the machines for the fabrication/casting of
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the concrete blocks which MEGA-WAFF specified to be hexagonal shaped. MEGAWAFF later directed Aragones to instead fabricate machines for S shaped blocks. As stated in the Agreement between DMPI and MEGA-WAFF, the deadline for the installation of the pavement of the warehouse was November 18, 1988, but it was not met. The installation was finished on or about February 28, 1989, but MEGA-WAFF was, in accordance with its agreement with DMPI, penalized for the delay, albeit at a reduced amount. Aragones, having gotten wind of MEGA-WAFF & DMPIs Agreement, more particularly the imposition of a penalty for the delay in the completion of the installation of the warehouse pavement, appealed to DMPI, for leniency in the imposition of the penalty which would affect him also although he was not a direct party to the contract, he inviting attention to the intricacy and enormity of the job involved. Aragones later failed to collect from MEGA-WAFF the full payment of the concrete blocks. He thus sent DMPI a letter, advising it of MEGA-WAFFs unpaid obligation and requesting it to withhold the amount of P188,652.65 from MEGAWAFFs billing to be paid directly to him. DMPI, verbally advised Aragones to secure a court order directing it to withhold payment of the amount due MEGA-WAFF. It turned out that DMPI had, released to MEGA-WAFF a check in the amount of P157,863.77 representing DMPIs balance of its obligation to MEGA-WAFF. Aragones was thus prompted to file a complaint for sum of money (P188,652.65) with damages against Garcia and/or MEGA-WAFF and DMPI. Aragones impleaded DMPI on the strength of Articles 1729 and 1467 of the Civil Code, he contending that it was liable to him who put labor upon or furnished materials for a piece of work. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract for the supply of the concrete paving blocks is one of sale or for a piece of work. RULING: The supply agreement is a contract for a piece of work. There can be no gainsaying that the specifications/conditions in the Supply Agreement and the admitted subsequent directive of Garcia for Aragones to fabricate machines for casting S shaped, instead of hexagon shaped blocks, show that the concrete blocks were manufactured specifically for, and upon the special order of Garcia. Under Art. 1467 then of the Civil Code which provides: A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether the same is on hand at the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order, and not for the general market, it is a contract for a piece of work. Aragones having specially fabricated three casting machines and furnished some materials for the production of the concrete blocks specially ordered and specified by MEGA-WAFF which were to be and indeed they were for the exclusive use of MEGA-WAFF, he has a cause of action upon petitioner up to the amount it owed MEGA-WAFF at the time Aragones made his claim to petitioner. BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST HIDDEN ENCUMBRANCES GOODYEAR PHIL., INC. VS. ANTHONY SY AND JOSE L. LEE G.R. No. 154554 November 9, 2005 FACTS: Goodyear Philippines, Inc. owned a 1984 Isuzu JCR 6-Wheeler which had since been in the service of Goodyear until April 30, 1986 when it was hijacked. This hijacking was reported to the Philippine National Police (PNP) which issued out an alert alarm on the said vehicle as a stolen one. It was later on recovered also in 1986. The vehicle was used by [Goodyear] until 1996, when it sold it to Anthony Sy. Sy, in turn, sold it to Jose L. Lee but the latter, filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against Sy because he could not register the vehicle in his name due to the certification from the PNP Regional Traffic Management Office in Legazpi City that it was a stolen vehicle and the alarm covering the same was not lifted. Instead, the PNP in Legazpi City impounded the vehicle and charged Lee criminally. Upon being informed by Sy of the denial of the registration of the vehicle in Lees name, Goodyear
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the PNP to lift the stolen vehicle alarm status. This notwithstanding, [Goodyear] was impleaded as third-party defendant in the third-party complaint filed by Sy. ISSUE: Whether encumbrances. or not Goodyear breached any warranty against hidden
RULING: In a contract of sale, the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of the sale. Moreover, the implied warranties are as follows: first, the vendor has a right to sell the thing at the time that its ownership is to pass to the vendee, as a result of which the latter shall from then on have and enjoy the legal and peaceful possession of the thing; and, second, the thing shall be free from any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the vendee. Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale, petitioner did transfer ownership of and deliver the vehicle to Respondent Sy. In the same manner, when he sold the same truck to Jose L. Lee, Respondent Sy was exercising his right as absolute owner. The impoundment of the vehicle and the failure to register it were clearly acts that were not deliberately caused by petitioner, but that resulted solely from the failure of the PNP to lift the latters own alarm over the vehicle. Pursuant to Republic Act 6975, these matters were purely administrative and governmental in nature. Hence, the former did not breach its obligation as a vendor to Respondent Sy; neither did it violate his right for which he could maintain an action for the recovery of damages. A warranty is an affirmation of fact or any promise made by a vendor in relation to the thing sold. In the present case, petitioner did not breach the implied warranty against hidden encumbrances. The subject vehicle that had earlier been stolen by a third party was subsequently recovered by the authorities and restored to petitioner, its rightful owner. Whether Sy had knowledge of the loss and subsequent recovery, the fact remained that the vehicle continued to be owned by petitioner, free from any charge or encumbrance whatsoever. Its impoundment, as well as the refusal of its registration, was not the hindrance or obstruction in the contemplation of law that the vendor warranted against. Neither of those instances arose from any liability or obligation that could be satisfied by a legal claim or charge on, or property right to -other than an ownership interest in -- the subject vehicle. PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH; CONTRACT TO SELL AS SOURCE OF RIGHT TO POSSESS PROPERTY KEPPEL BANK PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PHILIP ADAO G.R. No. 158227 October 19, 2005 FACTS: The case stemmed from the court-approved Compromise Agreement between petitioner Keppel Bank and Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMRDC). By virtue of the agreement, PMRDC through its President Mario P. Villamor assigned, transferred and conveyed to petitioner, by way of dacion en pago, twentyfive properties consisting of townhouses, condominium units and vacant lots, as partial settlement of their two hundred million pesos (P200,000,000) outstanding obligation. Pursuant thereto, petitioner secured Condominium Certificates of Title over the units. Upon inspection, petitioner found respondent Philip Adao occupying Unit 4 of the Luxor Villas Townhouse, one of the 25 properties above-mentioned. On February 18, 2000, petitioner sent a written demand to respondent to vacate the unit within 30 days from receipt of the notice. Respondent refused and, instead, offered to purchase the unit. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the matter. On October 19, 2000, petitioner sent respondent a final demand to vacate. Since the demand was not heeded, petitioner filed a civil case for ejectment. In his defense, respondent alleged that he has long been occupying the contested unit by virtue of a Contract to Sell dated February 7, 1995 between him and PMRDC. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the contract to sell. 2. Who is entitled to the physical possession of the property?
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RULING: 1. It is true that persons dealing with registered property can rely solely on the certificate of title and need not go beyond it. However, this rule does not apply to banks. Banks are required to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in dealing even with registered properties for their business is affected with public interest. As master of its business, petitioner should have sent its representatives to check the assigned properties before signing the compromise agreement and it would have discovered that respondent was already occupying one of the condominium units and that a contract to sell existed between respondent and PMRDC. In our view, petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith and we are constrained to rule that petitioner is bound by the contract to sell. 2. Nonetheless, in this case, the contract to sell does not by itself give respondent the right to possess the property. Unlike in a contract of sale, here in a contract to sell, there is yet no actual sale nor any transfer of title, until and unless, full payment is made. The payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Respondent must have fully paid the price to acquire title over the property and the right to retain possession thereof. In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the remedy of ejectment since he retains ownership of the property. Considering that respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, he cannot claim ownership of the property and his possession thereof was by mere tolerance. His continued possession became unlawful upon the owners demand to vacate the property. We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only a provisional determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER A PROPERTY SOLD THROUGH MULTIPLE SALE JUANITA NAVAL vs. CA G.R. No. 167412 February 22, 2006 FACTS: On December 2, 1969, Ildefonso A. Naval sold a parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur, consisting of 858 sq. m. to Gregorio B. Galarosa. The sale was recorded in the Registry of Property of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur on December 3, 1969 pursuant to Act No. 3344, the law governing registrations of all instruments on unregistered lands. Subsequently, Gregorio sold portions of the land to respondents Conrado Rodrigo Balilla on November 4, 1976, Jaime Nacion on January 10, 1977 and spouses Ireneo and Ester Moya in July 1977, and Juanito Camalla on September 4, 1987. All buyers occupied the portion they bought, built improvements thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto. The controversy arose when petitioner Juanita Naval, the great granddaughter of Ildefonso, was issued on April 1, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur an Original Certificate of Title covering 733 sq. m. of the subject land. She claimed that she bought the subject land from Ildefonso in 1972. On November 10, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Bartolome Aguirre, Conrado Balila, Ireneo Moya, Jaime Nacion and Domingo Nacion. However, the case was dismissed] without prejudice for failure to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time. Almost 20 years later, petitioner re-filed the complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the MCTC against JuanitaCamalla, Diosdado Balila, Conrado Balila, Forferia, Aguirre, Jaime Nacion and Ester Moya. ISSUE: Who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to different buyers at different times by its former owner? RULING: The law applicable is Act No. 3344, which provides for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens
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System. Under this law, registration by the first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith. Applying the law, the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same property. Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered the subject land in good faith and without knowledge of any adverse claim thereto, respondents still have superior right over the disputed property. The issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. In the case at bar, since Ildefonso no longer owned the subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and the latter did not acquire any right to it. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; RECEIPT AS PROOF OF CONTRACT TO SALE PERPETUA VDA. DE APE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GENOROSA CAWIT VDA. DE LUMAYNO G.R. No. 133638 April 15, 2005 FACTS: Cleopas Ape was the registered owner of Lot No. 2319 of the Escalante Cadastre of Negros Occidental. Upon Cleopas Apes death, the property passed on to his wife, Maria Ondoy, and their eleven (11) children, namely: Fortunato, Cornelio, Bernalda, Bienvenido, Encarnacion, Loreta, Lourdes, Felicidad, Adela, Dominador, and Angelina. On March 15, 1973, Generosa Cawit de Lumayno (private respondent) and her husband, Braulio, instituted a case for Specific Performance of a Deed of Sale with Damages against Fortunato and his wife Perpetua (petitioner). It was alleged that private respondent and Fortunato entered into a contract of sale of land for a consideration of P5,000.00, The agreement was contained in a receipt prepared by private respondents son-in-law, Andres Flores. As private respondent wanted to register the claimed sale transaction, she demanded that Fortunato execute the corresponding deed of sale and to receive the balance of the consideration but Fortunato refused. Fortunato and petitioner denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that Fortunato never sold his share in Lot No. 2319 to private respondent and that his signature appearing on the purported receipt was forged. They maintained having entered into a contract of lease with respondent involving Fortunatos portion of Lot No. 2319. Fortunato and petitioner also assailed private respondent and her husbands continued possession of the rest of Lot No. 2319 alleging that in the event they had acquired the shares of Fortunatos co-owners by way of sale, he was invoking his right to redeem the same. Private respondent alleged that they had purchased from Fortunatos co-owners, as evidenced by various written instruments, their respective portions of Lot No. 2319. By virtue of these sales, they insisted that Fortunato was no longer a co-owner of Lot No. 2319 thus, his right of redemption no longer existed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner had the right of redemption over the shares previously sold to private respondent and the latters husband, 2. Whether or not the receipt signed by Fortunato proves the existence of a contract of sale between him and private respondent. RULING: 1. Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides: The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. In this case, the records are bereft of any indication that Fortunato was given any written notice of prospective or consummated sale of the portions of Lot No. 2319 by the vendors or would-be vendors. The thirty (30)-day redemption period under the law, therefore, has not commenced to run. Despite this, we still rule that petitioner could no longer invoke her right to redeem from private respondent for the exercise of
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this right presupposes the existence of a co-ownership at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owners. In this case, records reveal that although Lot No. 2319 has not yet been formally subdivided, still, the particular portions belonging to the heirs of Cleopas Ape had already been ascertained and they in fact took possession of their respective parts. Although the partition might have been informal is of no moment for even an oral agreement of partition is valid and binding upon the parties. 2. This Court likewise annuls the contract of sale between Fortunato and private respondent on the ground of vitiated consent. a contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. In this jurisdiction, the general rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake in a transaction must substantiate his allegation as the presumption is that a person takes ordinary care for his concerns and that private dealings have been entered into fairly and regularly. The exception to this rule is provided for under Article 1332 of the Civil Code which provides that [w]hen one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. In this case, as private respondent is the one seeking to enforce the claimed contract of sale, she bears the burden of proving that the terms of the agreement were fully explained to Fortunato Ape who was an illiterate. This she failed to do. As can be gleaned from Floress testimony, while he was very much aware of Fortunatos inability to read and write in the English language, he did not bother to fully explain to the latter the substance of the receipt.
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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATE DOLORES A. CABELLO and TEOFILO ABELLANOSA v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 142810 August 18, 2005 FACTS: Dolores A. Cabello and Teofilo Abellanosa sought the reconstitution of an unknown OCT covering Lot No. 4504 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu pursuant to Decree of Registration No. 335316. Petitioners alleged therein that an OCT over the property was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City in the names of Basilio and Roberto Abellanosa. However, the OCT on file with the Registry of Deeds and the owners duplicate certificate of title in the possession of the registered owners were lost during World War II. Further, the petition was allegedly filed pursuant to Sec. 2(d) in relation to Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26), which dispenses with the requirement of submission of the tracing cloth/blue print plan and technical description. Attached to the petition are a certified photocopy of Decree of Registration No. 335316 issued by the Land Registration Commission; a certification issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City to the effect that its records do not show that a certificate of title has been issued over Lot No. 4504; and Tax Declaration No. 20335 in the name of co-owner Basilio Abellanosa.After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a Decision ordering the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City to reconstitute the OCT for Lot No. 4504 in the names of Basilio Abellanosa, married to Severina Bacalso, and Roberto Abellanosa, married to Apolonia Nacua, based on Decree of Registration No. 335316.The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision, contending that the certification issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City puts in doubt whether an OCT covering Lot No. 4504 was previously issued in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest. Assuming that a certificate of title was so issued, the petition should have been accompanied by a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office or a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the property since it was based on Sec. 2(f) or 3(f) of RA 26. ISSUE: Whether the reconstitution issued by the trial court was proper. RULING: The SC ruled that the reconstitution ordered by the trial court was improper. Republic Act No. 26, entitled An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed, approved on September 25, 1946, lays down the procedure by which previously issued but lost or destroyed certificates of title may be reconstituted. As the title of the law suggests, it presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System, Act 496. In this case, there appears to be no question as regards compliance with the procedural requirements of RA 26. Rather, the controversy lies in the documentary basis for the reconstitution. According to petitioners, the petition lodged before the trial court is anchored on Sec. 2(d) of RA 26, which provides that an original certificate of title may be reconstituted from an authenticated copy of the decree of registration pursuant to which an original certificate of title was issued. On the other hand, the OSG considered the petition to have been filed under Sec. 2(f) of the law.Sec. 2 (d) and 2 (f) are quoted hereunder in full for comparative reference: SECTION 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. As can be seen from the foregoing text in relation to Sec. 12 of RA 26, in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sec. 2(f), the petition shall be further
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accompanied by a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. This requirement does not exist if the source of the reconstitution is Sec. 2(d), although as worded, it must be shown that an original certificate of title was indeed issued pursuant to the very decree of registration presented as basis for reconstitution. The SC did give primacy to the findings of the trial court over the categorical certification by the Registry of Deeds that its records do not show that a certificate or title was issued over the property. Indeed, this certification presents a powerfully cogent reason for the denial of the petition for reconstitution anchored as it was on Sec. 2(d) abovequoted. The trial court should have been more circumspect in ordering reconstitution based on this section considering that the only evidence upon which it based its finding that an original certificate of title had been issued pursuant to the decree of registration adduced by petitioners was the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom is petitioner herein.
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DONATION ADORACION REYES BAUTISTA et, al. vs. CELIA REYES POBLETE et, al. G.R. NO. 141007 September 13,2005 FACTS: In order to perfect the sale of a 6.2556 hectare parcel of land identified as Lot 1234 to Whinthrop Realty Corp for P20.7 M, a Petition for Registration of Title was filed by private respondent as the successor-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. De Poblete ( Socorro.) The application alleged the following : that the lot was donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr ( Marcelo Sr.) to Socorro, his daughter by a second marriage; that the cadastral survey of the said lot had been undertaken primarily for and in the name of Socorro; that they purchased the same land from their parents Socorro and Juan Poblete; and that they and their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner for more than 50 years. Petitioners, Marcelo Sr.s children by his third marriage, opposed said application alleging that Lot 1243 had been acquired by the deceased Marcelo Reyes, Sr. by purchase from a certain Juan Aranda. Petitioners insist that Socorro expressly and impliedly recognized their rights as her co-heirs when she was entrusted with the management of the land in 1934; that the harvest had always been divided among the heirs, with petitioner Dominador Sino representing the others in getting their respective shares; that there was a demand for partition but it did not push through because the land was tenanted. The trial court dismissed the petition for registration given that private respondents failed to present the deed of donation, claiming that the deed was burned when fire razed their house sometime in 1980. On appeal, the CA considered private respondents contention that even if the donation may have been invalid, the same could still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in favor of private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in favor of private respondents. RULING: The SC found no reversible error in the appellate courts decision. The SC made the following pronouncement in Espique v. Espique: There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner. The donation of Lot 1243 to Socorro was made in 1932. She took possession of the land immediately thereafter. Under the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in force, ten years of adverse possession by the person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced, shall vest in the actual possessor of the land a full and complete title. Thus, we declare that no co-ownership existed between petitioners and respondents. Socorro obtained possession of the land even before Marcelo Sr. died. After his death, Socorro continued to enjoy exclusive possession of the land with no objection from petitioners. The land was cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name, again with no protestation from petitioners. It was only when Lot 1243 was sold for P20.7 million that petitioners suddenly fantasized about being co-owners thereof and wanted to share in the bonanza. CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; COLLATERAL ATTACK DIONISIO CARAAN, represented by HEIDI CARAAN and ERLINDA CARAAN, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SALCEDO R. COSME and NORA LINDA S. COSME, G.R. No. 140752 November 11, 2005
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FACTS: On September 16, 1992, private respondents-spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S. Cosme filed a complaint (accion reivindicatoria) with damages against Dionisio Caraan in the RTC. Therein, it was alleged that: herein private respondents are the registered owners of the real property located at No. 65 Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City under TCT No. 214949; they had been paying realty taxes on the property from 1969 to 1993; sometime in March 1991, they discovered that the land was being occupied by petitioner who had built his residential house thereon; such occupancy by petitioner was effected through fraud, strategy and stealth without private respondents knowledge and consent; demands to vacate, both oral and written, were made upon petitioner, the last written demand having been received by petitioner on August 7, 1992, but said demands went unheeded; thus, private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner and all persons holding title under him to vacate the subject premises and deliver possession thereof to private respondents. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that he had acquired the land in question through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years of continuous, public, open and uninterrupted possession; private respondents title was one of the numerous titles derived from TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Morales and Vicente Villar doing business under the style of Vilma Malolos Subdivision, which was in turn derived from TCT No. 33531 which came from TCT No. 26285 and derived from (OCT) No. 614; and OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void by the RTC, Quezon City Br 83. The appellate court, affirming the judgment of RTC ordered petitioner Dionisio Caraan to vacate subject premises and to deliver and surrender possession thereof to herein private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court. RULING: The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court. In Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the hornbook principle that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Private respondents had presented TCT No. RT-71061, which is the reconstituted title of TCT No. 214949, they have thus proven their allegation of ownership over the subject property. The burden of proof then shifted to petitioners who must establish by preponderance of evidence their allegation that they have a better right over the subject property. It should be borne in mind, that Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Petitioners defense takes the form of a collateral attack on private respondents certificate of title. The attack on the title is definitely merely collateral as the relief being sought by private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The attack on the validity of private respondents certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in petitioners Answer filed with the trial court. Therefore, as emphasized in the above quoted ruling, petitioners allegations of uninterrupted possession for 30 years cannot prevail over private respondents certificate of title, which is the best proof of ownership. As the Court stated in Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. Preponderance of evidence being in favor of private respondents, there can be no other conclusion but that private respondents, being the registered owners of subject property, should be placed in possession thereof.
JURISDICTION OF INCONTROVERTIBLE
LAND
REGISTRATION;
WHEN
TITLE
BECOMES
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC. et al v. GEORGE H. TRONO, et al G.R. No. 130871 February 17, 2006
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FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land located at Bo. Almanza, Las Pias City, Metro Manila was filed by herein respondents before the RTC Br 255, Las Pinas,M.M. Herein petitioners filed their opposition alleging that as per Survey Plan Psu-31086, respondents property partly overlaps their lot. As early as April 28, 1989, this lot was registered in their names under TCT No. T-9182 of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City. Earlier, or on July 25, 1995, Ayala Land, Inc. also filed an opposition to respondents application for registration anchored on the ground that the land applied for overlaps the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-5331, T-41326, T-15644, T41325, T-36979, T-36891, and T-36982 registered in its name in the Registry of Deeds, same city. Petitioners then filed their motion for partial reconsideration praying that LRC Case No. M-228 be dismissed with prejudice and to declare that the right of respondents to file any action for reconveyance of the property has prescribed. The CA held that: The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a land registration court from acquiring jurisdiction over a land that is applied for registration if that land is already decreed and registered under the Torrens System. Meanwhile, on July 9, 1997, Ayala Land and respondents executed a Compromise Agreement. On July 10, 1997, they filed with the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement." But CA rendered an amendatory decision holding that in view of the Compromise Agreement, the case as between Ayala Land and respondents has become moot and academic. ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over respondents application for the registration of the parcel of land and whether the action of herein respondents has already prescribed. RULING: Pursuant to Sec 2 of PD 1529 which partly states: Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens System. CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. x x x Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, the RTC (formerly CFI) has the authority to act, not only on applications for original registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Thus, it has the authority and power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pias City has no jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the ground that the land subject of respondents application for registration was already registered in the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City. As per records of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City, TCT No. T-9182 was registered in petitioners name as early as April 28, 1989, or five (5) years before the filing of respondents application for registration. Thus, it is too late for them (respondents) to question petitioners titles considering that the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration. TITLE; INDEFEASIBLE BY PRESCRIPTION; LACHES HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN & INES PANGANIBAN v. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT G.R. No. 151235 July 28, 2005 FACTS: This case stemmed from a petition for cancellation of owners duplicate copy OCT No. 7864 of the Registry of Deeds of Misamis Oriental and recovery of damages filed by the heirs of Juan and Ines Panganiban against Angelina N. Dayrit, respondent herein, on 3 April 1992. The property subject of controversy is a two thousand twentyfive (2,025)-square meter portion of a lot denominated as Lot 1436, situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City. It constitutes three-fourths (3/4) of Lot 1436, one of the three (3) lots covered by OCT No. 7864, the other two being Lots 1441 and 1485. OCT No. 7864 was registered in the names of Juan Panganiban (Juan) and Ines
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Panganiban (Ines), father and daughter respectively, on 17 April 1940. Juan died sometime in June 1942 while Ines, his only child, died in April 1944. Petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited from the late Juan and Ines Panganiban. They acknowledge that Lot 1436 was the only remaining lot covered by OCT No. 7864, Lots 1485 and 1441 having been sold in 1949 to Galo Sabanal and Pablo Dagbay respectively, by virtue of a deed denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs and Sale. The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition with the trial court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one of the heirs of Ines and a petitioner herein, the trial court granted the petition. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda. Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo (Salcedo) asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter subsequently discovered that what she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the owners copy of said title, docketed as Misc. Case No. 90-018 in March 1990. This petition of the respondent alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1981. While the petition mentioned Erlinda as the last one in possession of the alleged lost owners duplicate copy of the title, she was not notified of the proceedings. The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently granted and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent. This second duplicate certificate issued to respondent annotates a Notice of Adverse Claim (which alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a legitimate claim thereto) filed by Erlinda, ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for cancellation of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 prosper. RULING: The SC denied the petition. The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid and subsisting duplicate certificate of title are still Juan and Ines, petitioners predecessors in interest. Per Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction with the indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of the property in dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the heirs of the registered owners, both of whom are already dead. However, petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the equitable defense of laches. Petitioners inaction for forty-five (45) years reduced their right to recover the subject property into a stale demand. Their cause is defeated not by prescription and adverse possession, but by laches. All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this Court in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al. and reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, Miguel v. Catalino and Claverias v. Quingc are present in the case at bar, to wit: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
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INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE; FRAUD IN ACQUISITION; FRAUD NOT PRESUMED BU T MUST BE PROVED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN GUERRERO G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006 FACTS: Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. Upon favorable report and recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerreros application was approved per Order of Award, with the boundaries of the land awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. After the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued, the OCT No. 0-28 was then given. On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been residing since 1961. Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration upon dismissal of her protest. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the President ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR for the latters office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area. Upon receipt of the Ocular Investigation the Office of the President issued an order directing the DENR to implement ,proper correction of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to respondent. Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero]. ISSUE: Whether or not an OCT issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondents title was procured through fraud. RULING: In the instant case, petitioner failed to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the decree constitute fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause. Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof. The law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. The SC put emphasis on the fact that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. Respondents certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
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MERCANTILE LAW
INSURANCE
INSURANCE BUSINESS; DEFINITION WHITE GOLD MARINE SERVICES, INC. vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION and THE STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOC. (BERMUDA) LTD. G.R. No. 154514 July 28, 2005 FACTS: White Gold Marine Services, Inc. (White Gold) procured a protection and indemnity coverage for its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited (Steamship Mutual) through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer). Subsequently, White Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance. Pioneer also issued receipts evidencing payments for the coverage. When White Gold failed to fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage. Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum of money to recover the latters unpaid balance. White Gold on the other hand, filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual violated the provisions under the Insurance Code regarding insurance company requirements and licenses. The Insurance Commission dismissed the complaint. It said that there was no need for Steamship Mutual to secure a license because it was not engaged in the insurance business. It explained that Steamship Mutual was a Protection and Indemnity Club (P & I Club). Likewise, Pioneer need not obtain another license as insurance agent and/or a broker for Steamship Mutual because Steamship Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business. Moreover, Pioneer was already licensed, hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship Mutual was already superfluous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. Hence the instant petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Steamship Mutual, a P & I Club, is engaged in the insurance business in the Philippines. 2. Whether or not Pioneer needs a license as an insurance agent/broker for Steamship Mutual. RULING: 1. The test to determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not, depends on the nature of the promise, the act required to be performed, and the exact nature of the agreement in the light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the performance becomes requisite. It is not by what it is called. Basically, an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. In it, one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. In particular, a marine insurance undertakes to indemnify the assured against marine losses, such as the losses incident to a marine adventure. A P & I Club is a form of insurance against third party liability, where the third party is anyone other than the P & I Club and the members. By definition then, Steamship Mutual as a P & I Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business. The records reveal Steamship Mutual is doing business in the country albeit without the requisite certificate of authority mandated by Section 187 of the Insurance Code. Thus, to continue doing business here, Steamship Mutual or through its agent Pioneer, must secure a license from the Insurance Commission.
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Since a contract of insurance involves public interest, regulation by the State is necessary. Thus, no insurer or insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance business without a license or a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission. 2. Pioneer is the resident agent of Steamship Mutual as evidenced by the certificate of registration issued by the Insurance Commission. It has been licensed to do or transact insurance business by virtue of the certificate of authority issued by the same agency. However, a Certification from the Commission states that Pioneer does not have a separate license to be an agent/broker of Steamship Mutual. Although Pioneer is already licensed as an insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for Steamship Mutual. Section 299 of the Insurance Code clearly requires this. WORK HAZARDS; CONTRACTION OF DISEASE; ABSOLUTE CONNECTION NOT REQUIRED JAIME M. BARRIOS vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM (NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION) G.R. No. 148089 March 24, 2006 FACTS: Jaime M. Barrios was employed as a driver in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). On January 16, 1997, he retired as Driver-Mechanic 3 after rendering twenty-two (22) years of public service. He was then fifty (50) years old. In August 1996, Barrios, who had been suffering from diabetes for fifteen (15) years, was confined due to chronic renal failure and diabetes mellitus. After his discharge, his condition did not improve. In October 1996, he was again confined for end stage kidney disease secondary to diabetic nephropathy and on his second day he began dialysis. On September 2, 1997, Barrios filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for income benefits, pursuant to P.D. No. 626. The GSIS denied his claim on the ground that end stage renal disease and diabetic nephropathy are not among the compensable occupational diseases listed under the Decree and that there is no showing that his job as a driver-mechanic increased the risk of contracting the ailments. Barrios filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the GSIS denied the same. He then appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). While the case was pending, Barrios passed away. The cause of death was renal failure secondary to diabetes mellitus. On April 17, 1998, the ECC rendered its Decision affirming the GSIS ruling. ISSUE: 626. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to income benefits under P.D. No.
RULING: Under the provisions of P.D. No. 626, where the disease or illness that caused the death or disability of the employee is not specifically included, his or her heirs are entitled to compensation if they can prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his or her working conditions. The law does not require that the connection be established with absolute certainty. It is enough that the theory upon which the claim is based is probable. In the instant case, Barrios was tasked with transporting officials to different destinations in Metro Manila and the surrounding provinces. Job efficiency required him to transport them to their destinations on time. He thus faced a situation where he had to forego urinating for hours. To this must be added the stress and strain every driver encounters while on the road. Due to his diabetes he needed to urinate frequently, the waiting times during which he could freely relieve his bladder, however, is not enough. With high ranking passengers in his charge, he had no choice but to drive continuously most of the time. As a consequence, his disease was aggravated.
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Under these circumstances, we must apply the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislation liberally in favor of the beneficiaries and thus GSIS is directed to promptly pay the petitioners compensation benefits arising from the death of Jaime Barrios. EXCEPTED RISK; AS A DEFENSE; BURDEN OF PROOF DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES vs. RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK G.R. NO. 147039 January 27, 2006 FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network (RMN) owns several broadcasting stations all over the country. Provident Insurance Corporation (Provident), of the, covered respondents transmitter equipment and generating set for the amount of P13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. 30354. DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies covered respondents transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860. In the evening of July 27, 1988, RMNs radio station was razed by fire causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. RMN sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under the insurance contract, to wit: does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of (c) war, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil warand (d) mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power. The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of the CPP/NPA. RMN filed a case against DBP and Provident. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of RMN. The same was affirmed by the CA. DBP filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not DBP should prove that the loss was caused by an excepted risk. RULING: In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability. Consequently, it is sufficient for respondent RMN to prove the fact of damage or loss. Once it makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to petitioner DBP to controvert RMNs prima facie case. It is only when petitioner has sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from any liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk. The Court finds that DBP failed to establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. All the evidence presented show that indeed, the suspected executors of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. SSS LAW; SPOUSES; INTERPRETATION
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ELENA P. DYCAICO vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005 FACTS: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980 and named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner. Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads: Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner deserves to receive the monthly pension. RULING: The classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. The Court does not usually decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. The question of the constitutionality of the proviso, however, is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Thus, the provision being unconstitutional, the Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso. LIABILITIES OF AN INSURANCE AGENT; COVERAGE OF POLICY PANDIMAN PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. MARINE MANNING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ROSITA D.R. SINGHID G.R. No. 143313 June 21, 2005 FACTS: Rosita Singhids husband Benito Singhid (Benito) was hired by Fullwin Maritime Limited (Fullwin), through its local agent, respondent Marine Manning and Management Corporation (MMMC), as chief cook on board the vessel MV Sun Richie 5 for a term of twelve months. The vessel and its crew were insured with Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association Limited (OMMIAL), a Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I Club) of which the Sun Richie Five Bulkers S.A., owner of the vessel Sun Richie Five, is a member. OMMIAL transacted business in the Philippines through its local correspondent, Pandiman Philippines, Inc. (PPI).
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While the vessel was on its way to Shanghai, China from Ho Chih Minh City, Vietnam Benito suffered a heart attack, and subsequently died on June 24, 1997. His remains were flown back to the Philippines. After Benitos remains were interred, his widow Rosita filed a claim for death benefits with MMMC, which, however, referred her to herein petitioner PPI. Upon Rositas submission of all the required documents, petitioner approved the claim and recommended payment thereof in the amount of US$79,000.00. But, despite said recommendation, Rositas death claims remained unpaid. Hence, Rosita filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for recovery of death benefits, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Named respondents in the complaint are MMMC, Fullwin, petitioner PPI and OMMIAL. In a decision dated 16 November 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint insofar as petitioner is concerned. When elevated to the NLRC, it set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter, absolved respondent MMMC from any liability and instead held petitioner and OMMIAL liable for Rositas claim. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Thus, the petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner PPI may be held liable for Rositas claim for death benefits as Benitos widow; and 2. Whether or not respondent MMMC and its foreign principal Fullwin with whom the late Benito had an employment contract, should be absolved from death claim liabilities in this case. RULING: 1. In the instant case, the provisions of the Insurance Code is the governing law. In the subject insurance contract, the P&I Club (OMMIAL) is the insurer, the shipowner (Sun Richie Five Bulkers S.A.) is the insured, and herein respondent Rosita Singhid as widow and heir of a crew on board the insured vessel like Benito, is a beneficiary. In the decision under review, the Court of Appeals held petitioner PPI liable for Rositas death claims under the said contract of insurance, on the postulate that petitioner is an insurance agent, a term defined and understood under Section 300 of the Insurance Code, as follows: Section 300. Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy or contract of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities and penalties to which an insurance agent is subject. There is nothing therein to show that an insurance contract in this case was in fact negotiated between the insured Sun Richie Five and the insurer OMMIAL, through petitioner as insurance agent which will make petitioner an insurance agent under Section 300 of the Insurance Code. Therefore, petitioner PPI is not an insurance agent under the obtaining circumstances. In any event, payment for claims arising from the peril insured against, to which the insurer is liable, is definitely not one of the liabilities of an insurance agent. Thus, there is no legal basis whatsoever for holding petitioner solidarily liable with insurer OMMIAL for Rositas claim for death benefits on account of her husbands demise while under the employ of MMMCs principal, Fullwin. Even under the principle of relativity of contracts, petitioner PPI cannot be held liable for the same death benefits claims. The insurance contract between the insurer and the insured, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, is binding only upon the parties (and their assigns and heirs) who execute the same. With the reality, as borne by the records, that petitioner PPI is not a party to the insurance contract in question, no liability or obligation arising therefrom, may be imposed upon it.
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2. It is undisputed that Benito was employed by Fullwin through its manning agency, MMMC. Neither is it disputed that Benito died during the effectivity of their employment contract while on board the vessel MV Sun Richie Five. Fullwin, Benitos principal employer is, therefore, liable under the same employment contract. For its part, MMMC is bound by its undertaking pursuant to the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment that the manning applicants shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation. By reason of the foregoing undertaking, respondent MMMC is jointly and solidarily liable with its foreign principal Fullwin, for whatever death benefits Benitos widow is entitled to under Benitos employment contract. INSURANCE CLAIM; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. LIZA T. ONG/CHENG LING YA G.R. No. 155102 June 21, 2005 Respondent Liza T. Ong, also known as Cheng Ling Ya, is the sole beneficiary of a P1,000,000 life insurance (Policy No. J066444) with a P1,000,000 Comprehensive Accident Indemnity Rider (CAIR) procured by her brother, Henry Ong, from petitioner Philippine American Life Insurance Company (PHILAMLIFE), now known as the Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company, with principal office at U.N. Avenue, Manila. The coverage was for the period October 21, 1994 to October 21, 2069. On March 13, 1995, Henry Ong was found dead with a gunshot wound on the chest, inside a Mitsubishi L300 van. Respondent filed a claim under the insurance policy and the petitioner paid her the P1,000,000 basic life coverage. The petitioner, however, denied liability under the P1,000,000 CAIR. According to petitioner, an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the death of Henry Ong as well as the supporting documents in its possession, showed that the latter was murdered, and murder is not covered by the CAIR. Respondent thereafter filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying for payment of P1,000,000 with 24% interest, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. She alleged that Henry Ongs death was an accident, contrary to petitioners finding that the cause of his death was murder. After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the cause of Henry Ongs death was robbery, and not murder. The court noted that only crimes against persons under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., murder, are excluded from the CAIR. Considering that robbery with homicide is a crime against property, it is therefore compensable under the CAIR. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction since the appeal raised pure question of law, which is a ground for dismissal under Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. During the pendency of the instant petition, on October 14, 2002, the petitioner and respondent entered into a compromise agreement, thus: COMPROMISE AGREEMENT PARTIES, assisted by their respective counsels, and unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully aver that they settle the above case under the following terms and conditions, viz: 1. They agree to put an end to the present litigation to their mutual satisfaction; 2. In this connection, Petitioner shall indemnify the Respondent the sum of P1,000,000.00 representing the insurance proceeds under the Comprehensive Accident Indemnity Rider (CAIR) upon the signing of this Compromise Agreement; 3. They waive any and all other claims against each other.
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WHEREFORE, it is prayed the Honorable Court to approve the foregoing Compromise Agreement and to render a decision based thereon. 14 October 2002, Manila. The Compromise Agreement dated October 14, 2002, executed by Philippine American Life Insurance Company and Liza Ong/Cheng Ling Ya, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, is approved. QUITCLAIM AND WAIVERS; LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANIES ROSALINA TAGLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FAST INTERNATIONAL CORP. and/or KUO TUNG YU HUANG G. R. No. 148235 August 11, 2005 FACTS: Wilfredo P. Tagle, husband of Rosalina Tagle, was recruited by respondent Fast International Corporation (FIC), a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to work as fisherman at Taiwan for its principal, Kuo Tung Yu Huang. On May 9, 1995, Wilfredo Tagle and Kuo Tung Yu Huang concluded an employment contract for one (1) year, extendible for another year upon mutual agreement of the parties. During the duration of the contract or on November 12, 1995, the fishing vessel boarded by Wilfredo Tagle in Taiwan collided with another and thereafter sank. Despite efforts to look for Tagles corpus, the same proved futile. He was, therefore, presumed dead. Rosalina Tagle then filed a claim for death benefits with respondent FIC, which was approved and a check in the amount of P650,000.00 was issued to the former. Upon receipt by petitioner of the check, she accomplished on March 8, 1996 a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim a portion of which reads: Ihereby release and discharge the Philippine Prudential Life Ins. Co., Inc., and all other persons having interest therein and thereby from all claims, demands, causes of action, etc., and all such other claims, demands, causes of action, etc., that may arise therefrom and/or incidentally connected therewith. Tagle, however, subsequently filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region, a complaint for additional labor insurance in the amount of NT$300,000.00, invoking Article II, Section 10 of the employment contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the release waiver and quitclaim executed by the petitioner included the additional labor insurance she is entitled to as provided for in Section 10, Article II of her deceased husbands employment contract. RULING: The second paragraph of Article II, Section 10 of the employment contract explicitly states that Benefits . . . include compensation for . . . death in accordance with social insurance laws and other pertinent provisions of the Taiwan Labor Law. . . Additional Labor Insurance shall be provided to the Fisherman with a limit of NT$300,000.00 per person (or its equivalent) for accident insurance covering fisherman regardless of whether accident occurs within and/or beyond work hours. Death is defined as loss of life resulting from injury or sickness. Death could be a result of accident, but accident does not necessarily result to death. Compensation benefits for illness, death, accident which does not result to death, and partial or total disability are treated separately and differently in the 3paragraph provision of Article II, Section 10 of the employment contract. The said provision in the employment contract being clear and unambiguous, its literal meaning controls. To uphold petitioners claim for additional insurance for accident, assuming that one for the purpose was secured, after receiving insurance benefits for death arising from accident, would violate the clear provision of Article II, Section 10 of the employment contract, the law between the parties. And it would trifle with the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, another contract between the parties, barring petitioner from claiming
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other or additional benefits arising from petitioners husbands death-basis of the release of the insurance proceeds to her. Petitioners argument that the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim was executed in favor only of the insurance company does not lie, for it is therein clearly stated that she was releasing and discharging the insurance company and all other persons having interest therein or thereby which therefore includes agent and policy holder respondent FIC from all claims, demands, causes of action and the like arising therefrom and/or incidentally connected therewith.
TRANSPORTATION LAW
CARRIER WHICH USES A SHIP WHICH IS NOT ITS OWN; SINKING OF THE SHIP; LIABILITY OVER GOODS LOST CEBU SALVAGE CORP. vs. PHIL. HOME ASSURANCE CORP. January 25, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner Cebu Salvage Corporation and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. (MCCII) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc. Pursuant to the contract, petitioner received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo but said goods never reached its destination because the M/T Espiritu Santo sank resulting in the total loss of the cargo. Petitioner argues that the agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and supervision over the vessel, its master and crew. Thus, it could not be held liable for the loss of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own. ISSUE: May a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it does not own? RULING: Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a common carrier. The MCCII could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is. The voyage charter here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation. To permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate from the carrier's duty of extraordinary diligence. WHEN A COMMON CARRIER BECOMES A PRIVATE CARRIER IN A CHARTER CONTRACT; REQUIRED DILIGENCE LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. PIONEER ASIA INSURANCE CORP. G.R. No. 157481 January 24, 2006 FACTS: Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc., registered owner and operator of the vessel M/V Weasel, entered into a voyage-charter with Northern Mindanao Transport Company,
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Inc. for the carriage of 65,000 bags of cement from Iligan City to Manila. The shipper was Iligan Cement Corporation, while the consignee in Manila was Market Developers, Inc.During its voyage, its captain ordered the vessel to be forced aground. Consequently, the entire shipment of cement was good as gone due to exposure to sea water. Petitioner thus failed to deliver the goods to the consignee in Manila. Sued for damages, Loadstar contends that at the time of the voyage the carriers voyage-charter with the shipper converted it into a private carrier. Thus, the presumption of negligence against common carriers could not apply. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that Loadstar is a common carrier despite the charter of the vessel since the charter was limited to the ship only. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not, the voyage charter converted Loadstar into a private carrier. 2. Whether or not petitioner exercised the required diligence i.e., the extraordinary diligence of a common carrier or the ordinary diligence of a private carrier. RULING: The voyage-charter agreement between petitioner and Northern Mindanao Transport Company, Inc. did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. We have already resolved this issue with finality in Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals where we ruled that: It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a timecharter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer. Conformably, petitioner remains a common carrier notwithstanding the existence of the charter agreement with the Northern Mindanao Transport Company, Inc. since the said charter is limited to the ship only and does not involve both the vessel and its crew. As elucidated in Planters Products, its charter is only a voyagecharter, not a bareboat charter. 2. As a common carrier then, petitioner is required to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports. When the goods placed in its care are lost, petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Petitioner therefore has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo. Petitioner claims that the loss of the goods was due to a fortuitous event under Art. 1734 (1) of the Civil Code (flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity). Yet, its claim is not substantiated. The records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route, which exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard. Petitioner has only itself to blame for its misjudgment. STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE PHIL. CHARTER INSURANCE CORP. VS. UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V NATIONAL HONOR, NATIONAL SHIPPING CORP. OF THE PHILS. and INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES, INC. July 8, 2005 FACTS: J. Trading Co. Ltd. of Seoul, Korea, loaded a shipment in the port of Pusan, Korea, on board the vessel M/V National Honor, represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). The shipment was for delivery to Manila, Philippines and consigned to Blue Mono International Company, Incorporated (BMICI). The M/V National Honor arrived at the Manila International
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Container Terminal (MICT). The following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI), the exclusive arrastre operator of MICT. Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauzs experience, this was a normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessels twin deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.The cargo was delivered in such damaged condition. Upon receipt of the damaged shipment, BMICI found that the same could no longer be used for the intended purpose. Respondent ICTSI contends that the loss/damage was caused by the failure of the shipper or his packer to place a sign on the sides and middle portion of the crate that extra care should be employed in handling the shipment, and that the middle wooden batten on the flooring of the crate had a hole. ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent ICTSI is liable for the damaged cargo. RULING: Under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of the following causes: 1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; 2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; 3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; 4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; 5. Order or act of competent public authority. The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, particularly number (4) thereof, i.e., the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers. The trial court found that the breakage of the crate was not due to the fault or negligence of ICTSI, but to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of the said crate. It appears that the wooden batten used as support for the flooring was not made of good materials, which caused the middle portion thereof to give way when it was lifted. The shipper also failed to indicate signs to notify the stevedores that extra care should be employed in handling the shipment. Absent any signs on the shipment requiring the placement of a sling cable in the mid-portion of the crate, the respondent ICTSI was not obliged to do so. The statement in the Bill of Lading, that the shipment was in apparent good condition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of absence of defects in the merchandise. Case law has it that such statement will create a prima facie presumption only as to the external condition and not to that not open to inspection. Hence, ICTSI is not liable. LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIER ON FORTUITOUS EVENTS; ELEMENTS LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. INC. September 30, 2005 FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand. The silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer. The vessel sank during the voyage which resulted to the loss of the cargo. The RTC held that the loss was due to a fortuitous event. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held that the vessel was not seaworthy. ISSUE: Whether or not, petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargo.
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RULING: Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Thus, if the loss or damage was due to such an event, a common carrier is exempted from liability. Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor. To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event. As required by the pertinent law, it was not enough for the common carrier to show that there was an unforeseen or unexpected occurrence. It had to show that it was free from any fault -- a fact it miserably failed to prove. Petitioner presented no evidence that it had attempted to minimize or prevent the loss before, during or after the alleged fortuitous event. The alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and proximate cause of the loss. There is a preponderance of evidence that the barge was not seaworthy when it sailed for Manila. Hence, petitioner is liable. CLAIM AND PROTEST; REQUIREMENTS PHIL. CHARTER INSURANCE CORP. vs. CHEMOIL LIGHTERAGE CORP. June 29, 2005 FACTS: Samkyung Chemical Company, Ltd. shipped tons of liquid chemical from Korea to its consignee, Plastic Group Phils., Inc. (PGP) in Manila. An ocean tanker unloaded the cargo to a tanker barge and will be unloaded to tanker trucks and haul it by land to PGPs storage tanks in Calamba, Laguna.The tanker barge and trucks were owned by Chemoil Lighterage Corporation. Upon inspection by PGP, the samples taken from the shipment showed discoloration from yellowish to amber, demonstrating that it was damaged, as the liquid chemical is colorless and water clear. Sued for damages, respondent Chemoil Lighterage Corporation, contends that PGP failed to file any notice, claim or protest within the period required by Article 366 of the Code of Commerce, which is a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against the carrier and that a telephone call which was supposedly made by a certain Alfred Chan, an employee of PGP, to one of the Vice Presidents of the respondent, informing the latter of the discoloration, is not the notice required by Article 366 of the Code of Commerce. ISSUE: Whether or not, PGP has complied with the notice, claim or protest required under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the telephone call made to defendant-company could constitute substantial compliance with the requirement of notice considering that the notice was given to a responsible official, the Vice-President, who promptly replied that she will look into the matter. However, it must be pointed out that compliance with the period for filing notice is an essential part of the requirement, i.e.. immediately if the damage is apparent, or otherwise within twenty-four hours from receipt of the goods, the clear import being that prompt examination of the goods must be made to ascertain damage if this is not immediately apparent. We have examined the evidence, and We are unable to find any proof of compliance with the required period, which is fatal to the accrual of the right of action against the carrier. The object sought to be attained by the requirement of the submission of claims in
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pursuance of this article is to compel the consignee of goods entrusted to a carrier to make prompt demand for settlement of alleged damages suffered by the goods while in transport, so that the carrier will be enabled to verify all such claims at the time of delivery or within twenty-four hours thereafter, and if necessary fix responsibility and secure evidence as to the nature and extent of the alleged damages to the goods while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the parties. The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefore actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to, the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. If it fails to do so, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. The aforementioned requirement is a reasonable condition precedent; it does not constitute a limitation of action. DAMAGES TO CARGO; LIABILITY; DAMAGES SULPICIO LINES, INC. VS FIRST LEPANTO-TAISHO INSURANCE CORP. June 29, 2005 FACTS: Taiyo Yuden Philippines, Inc. (owner of the goods) and Delbros, Inc. (shipper) entered into a contract to transport a shipment of goods consisting of three (3) wooden crates containing one hundred thirty-six (136) cartons of inductors and LC compound from Cebu City to Singapore in favor of the consignee, Taiyo Yuden Singapore Pte, Ltd. For the carriage of said shipment from Cebu City to Manila, Delbros, Inc. engaged the services of the vessel M/V Philippine Princess, owned and operated by petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (carrier). During the unloading of the shipment at the pier in Manila, one crate containing forty-two (42) cartons dropped from the cargo. The wooden crate which fell was damaged such that this particular crate was not anymore sent to Singapore and was instead shipped back to Cebu from Manila. Upon examination, it was found that two (2) cartons of the forty-two (42) cartons contained in this crate were externally damaged. Sued for damages, petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc.contends that it was only the external packaging that was damaged, and that there was no actual damage to the goods such that would make them liable to the shipper because damage to the packaging is not tantamount to damage to the cargo.Therefore, its liability, if any, is only to the extent of the cargo damage or loss and should not include the lack of fitness of the shipment for transport to Singapore due to the damaged packing. ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the evidence presented during the trial, the owner of the goods did incur damages, and if so, whether or not petitioner-carrier is liable for the same. RULING: It must be stressed that in the case at bar, the damage sustained by the packaging of the cargo while in petitioner-carriers custody resulted in its unfitness to be transported to its consignee in Singapore. Such failure to ship the cargo to its final destination because of the ruined packaging, indeed, resulted in damages on the part of the owner of the goods. The falling of the crate during the unloading is evidence of petitioner-carriers negligence in handling the cargo. As a common carrier, it is expected to observe extraordinary diligence in the handling of goods placed in its possession for transport. A common carrier is bound to transport its cargo and its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all circumstances. The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding the damage to, or destruction of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. Thus, when the shipment suffered damages as it was being unloaded, petitionercarrier is presumed to have been negligent in the handling of the damaged cargo. Under Articles 1735 and 1752 of the Civil Code, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods transported by them
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are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods under Article 1735, the common carrier must prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733 of the Civil Code. Petitioner-carrier miserably failed to adduce any shred of evidence of the required extraordinary diligence to overcome the presumption that it was negligent in transporting the cargo.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

FOREIGN BILL; WHEN NO PROTEST IS MADE; EFFECTS ALLIED BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125851 July 11, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Allied Bank, purchased Export Bill No. BDO-81-002 in the amount of US $20,085.00 from respondent G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corporation (GGS). The bill, drawn under a letter of credit covered Mens Valvoline Training Suit that was in transit to West Germany. The export bill was issued by Chekiang First Bank Ltd., Hongkong. With the purchase of the bill, ALLIED credited GGS the peso equivalent of the aforementioned bill amounting to P151,474.52 and the receipt of which was acknowledged by the latter. Respondents Nari Gidwani and Alcron International Ltd. executed their respective Letters of Guaranty, holding themselves liable on the export bill if it should be dishonored or retired by the drawee for any reason. Subsequently, the spouses Leon and Leticia de Villa and Nari Gidwani also executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety guaranteeing payment of any and all such credit accommodations which ALLIED may extend to GGS. When ALLIED negotiated the export bill to Chekiang, payment was refused due to some material discrepancies in the documents submitted by GGS relative to the exportation covered by the letter of credit. Consequently, ALLIED demanded payment from all the respondents based on the Letters of Guaranty and Surety executed in favor of ALLIED. However, respondents refused to pay, prompting ALLIED to file an action for a sum of money. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Nari, De Villa and Alcron are liable under the letters of guaranty and the continuing guaranty/ comprehensive surety notwithstanding the fact that no protest was made after the bill, a foreign bill of exchange, was dishonored in accordance with Section 152 of the Negotiable Instruments Law RULING: In this case, respondent GGS, as the beneficiary of the export bill, instead of going to Chekiang First Bank Ltd., went to petitioner ALLIED, to have the export bill purchased or discounted. Before ALLIED agreed to purchase the subject export bill, it required respondents Nari Gidwani and Alcron to execute Letters of Guaranty, holding them liable on demand, in case the subject export bill was dishonored or retired for any reason. The Letters of Guaranty and Surety clearly show that respondents undertook and bound themselves as guarantors and surety to pay the full amount of the export bill. Section 152 of the Negotiable Instruments Law pertaining to indorsers, relied on by respondents, is not pertinent to this case. There are well-defined distinctions between the contract of an indorser and that of a guarantor/surety of a commercial paper, which is what is involved in this case. Therefore, no protest on the export bill is necessary to charge all the respondents jointly and severally liable with G.G. Sportswear since the respondents held themselves liable upon demand in case the instrument was dishonored and on the surety, they even waived notice of dishonor as stipulated in their Letters of Guarantee. Likewise, respondents Nari Gidwani and spouses Leon and Leticia de Villa executed Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety, holding themselves jointly and severally liable on any and all credit accommodations, instruments, loans, advances, credits and/or other obligation that may be granted by the petitioner ALLIED to respondent GGS. The surety also contained a clause whereby said sureties waive protest and notice of dishonor of any and all such instruments, loans, advances, credits and/or obligations. As to respondent Alcron, it is bound by the Letter of Guaranty. As to the other respondents, not to be overlooked is the fact that, the Suretyship Agreement they executed, expressly contemplated a solidary obligation, providing as it did that the sureties hereby guarantee jointly and severally the punctual payment of any and all such credit accommodations, instruments, loans, which is/are now or may hereafter become due or owing by the borrower. It is a
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cardinal rule that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. In the present case, there can be no mistaking about respondents intent, as sureties, to be jointly and severally obligated with respondent G.G. Sportswear. IRREGULAR INDORSEMENT; EFFECTS GONZALES vs. RCBC G.R. No. 156294 November 29, 2006 FACTS: Gonzales was an employee of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (or RCBC) as New Accounts Clerk in the Retail Banking Department at its Head Office. A foreign check in the amount of $7,500 was drawn by Dr. Don Zapanta of the Ade Medical Group, against the drawee bank Wilshire Center Bank, and payable to Gonzales mother, defendant Eva Alviar (or Alviar). Alviar then endorsed this check. Since RCBC gives special accommodations to its employees to receive the checks value without awaiting the clearing period, Gonzales presented the foreign check to Olivia Gomez, the RCBCs Head of Retail Banking. The RCBC encashed the check with certain limitation in the amount. RCBC then tried to collect the amount of the check with the drawee bank by the latter through its correspondent bank, but the account was already closed. Unable to collect, RCBC demanded from Gonzales the payment of the peso equivalent of the check that she received. Gonzales settled the matter by agreeing that payment be made thru salary deduction. ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Gomez constitute an endorsement. RULING: The dollar-check was dishonored because of the irregular endorsement. While the foreign drawee bank did not specifically state which among the four signatures found on the dorsal portion of the check made the check irregularly endorsed, it is absolutely undeniable that only the signature of Olivia Gomez, an RCBC employee, was a qualified endorsement because of the phrase up to P17,500.00 only. There can be no other acceptable explanation for the dishonor of the foreign check than this signature of Olivia Gomez with the phrase up to P17,500.00 only accompanying it. This Court definitely agrees with the petitioner that the foreign drawee bank would not have dishonored the check had it not been for this signature of Gomez with the same phrase written by her. The foreign drawee bank, Wilshire Center Bank N.A., refused to pay the bearer of this dollar-check drawn by Don Zapanta because of the defect introduced by RCBC, through its employee, Olivia Gomez. It is, therefore, a useless piece of paper if returned in that state to its original payee, Eva Alviar. There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that a subsequent party which caused the defect in the instrument cannot have any recourse against any of the prior endorsers in good faith. Eva Alviars and the petitioners liability to subsequent holders of the foreign check is governed by Section 66 Negotiable Instruments Law. Under Section 66, the warranties for which Alviar and Gonzales are liable as general endorsers in favor of subsequent endorsers extend only to the state of the instrument at the time of their endorsements, specifically, that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; that they have good title thereto; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the instrument, at the time of their endorsements, is valid and subsisting. This provision, however, cannot be used by the party which introduced a defect on the instrument, such as respondent RCBC in this case, which qualifiedly endorsed the same, to hold prior endorsers liable on the instrument because it results in the absurd situation whereby a subsequent party may render an instrument useless and inutile and let innocent parties bear the loss while he himself gets away scot-free. Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which further states that the general endorser additionally engages that, on due presentment, the instrument shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent endorser who may be
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compelled to pay it, must be read in the light of the rule in equity requiring that those who come to court should come with clean hands. The holder or subsequent endorser who tries to claim under the instrument which had been dishonored for irregular endorsement must not be the irregular endorser himself who gave cause for the dishonor. Otherwise, a clear injustice results when any subsequent party to the instrument may simply make the instrument defective and later claim from prior endorsers who have no knowledge or participation in causing or introducing said defect to the instrument, which thereby caused its dishonor. MATERIAL ALTERATIONS; EFFECTS THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC. vs. COURT OF APPELAS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK G.R. No. 129910 September 5, 2006 FACTS: The case originated from an action for collection of sum of money filed by the International Corporate Bank, Inc. against the Philippine National Bank. The Ministry of Education and Culture issued 15 checks drawn against respondent which petitioner accepted for deposit on various dates. After 24 hours from submission of the checks to respondent for clearing, petitioner paid the value of the checks and allowed the withdrawals of the deposits. However, on 14 October 1981, respondent returned all the checks to petitioner without clearing them on the ground that they were materially altered. Thus, petitioner instituted an action for collection of sums of money against respondent to recover the value of the check. ISSUE: Whether or not the checks were materially altered. RULING: The alterations in the checks were made on their serial numbers. Sections 124 and 125 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, provide: SEC. 124. Alteration of instrument; effect of. Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers. But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor. SEC. 125. What constitutes a material alteration. Any alteration which changes: (a) The date; (b) The sum payable, either for principal or interest; (c) The time or place of payment; (d) The number or the relations of the parties; (e) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made; or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration. An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instrument[s] Law. The case at the bench is unique in the sense that what was altered is the serial number of the check in question, an item which, it can readily be observed, is not an essential requisite for negotiability under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The aforementioned alteration did not change the relations between the parties. The name of the drawer and the drawee were not altered. The intended payee was the same. The sum of
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money due to the payee remained the same. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNDS MIRANDA vs. PDIC G.R. No. 169334 September 8, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Leticia G. Miranda was a depositor of Prime Savings Bank, Santiago City Branch. On June 3, 1999, she withdrew substantial amounts from her account, but instead of cash she opted to be issued a crossed cashiers check. Petitioner deposited the two checks into her account in another bank on the same day, however, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) suspended the clearing privileges of Prime Savings Bank effective 2:00 p.m. of June 3, 1999. The two checks of petitioner were returned to her unpaid. On June 4, 1999, Prime Savings Bank declared a bank holiday. On January 7, 2000, the BSP placed Prime Savings Bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. Petitioner filed a civil action for sum of money to recover the funds from her unpaid checks against Prime Savings Bank, PDIC and the BSP. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the two cashiers checks operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the petitioner. 2. Whether the respondents are solidarily liable to the petitioner. RULING: 1. The two cashiers checks issued by Prime Savings Bank do not constitute an assignment of funds in the hands of the petitioner as there were no funds to speak of in the first place. The bank was financially insolvent for sometime, even before the issuance of the checks on June 3, 1999. 2. It is only Prime Savings Bank that is liable to pay for the amount of the two cashiers checks. Solidary liability cannot attach to the BSP, in its capacity as government regulator of banks, and the PDIC as statutory receiver under R.A. No. 7653, because they are the principal government agencies mandated by law to determine the financial viability of banks and quasi-banks, and facilitate receivership and liquidation of closed financial institutions, upon a factual determination of the latters insolvency. The BSP should not be held liable on the crossed cashiers checks for it was not a party to the issuance of the same; nor can it be held liable for imposing the sanctions on Prime Savings Bank which indirectly affected Miranda, since it is mandated under Sec. 37 of R.A. No. 7653 to act accordingly. The BSP, through the Monetary Board was well within its discretion to exercise this power granted by law to issue a resolution suspending the interbank clearing privileges of Prime Savings Bank, having made a factual determination that the bank had deficient cash reserves deposited before the BSP. There is no showing that the BSP abused this discretionary power conferred upon it by law. In the absence of fraud, the purchase of a cashiers check, like the purchase of a draft on a correspondent bank, creates the relation of creditor and debtor, not that of principal and agent, with the result that the purchaser or holder thereof is not entitled to a preference over general creditors in the assets of the bank issuing the check, when it fails before payment of the check. However, in a situation involving the element of fraud, where a cashiers check is purchased from a bank at a time when it is insolvent, as its officers know or are bound to know by the exercise of reasonable diligence, it has been held that the purchase is entitled to a preference in the assets of the bank on its liquidation before the check is paid. WHEN CHECK OPERATES AS AN ASSIGNMENT SINCERE Z. VILLANUEVA VS. MARLYN P. NITE G.R. No. 148211 July 25, 2006
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FACTS: Respondent took out a loan of P409,000 from petitioner. To secure the loan, respondent issued petitioner an Asian Bank Corporation (ABC) check in the amount of P325,500 dated February 8, 1994. The date was later changed to June 8, 1994 with the consent and concurrence of petitioner. The check was, however, dishonored due to a material alteration when petitioner deposited the check on due date. On August 24, 1994, respondent, remitted P235,000 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan. The balance of P174, 000 was due on or before December 8, 1994. On August 24, 1994, however, petitioner filed an action for a sum of money and damages against ABC for the full amount of the dishonored check. On August 25, 1997, ABC remitted to the sheriff a managers check amounting to P325,500 drawn on respondents account. The check was duly received by petitioner on the same date. Respondent then filed a petition in the CA seeking to annul and set aside the trial courts decision ordering ABC to pay petitioner the value of the ABC check. The motion was granted. RULING: The RTC decision may be annulled for lack of jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The pertinent provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: SEC. 185. Check, defined. A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check. (emphasis ours) SEC. 189. When check operates as an assignment. A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check. (emphasis ours) If a bank refuses to pay a check (notwithstanding the sufficiency of funds), the payee-holder cannot, in view of the cited sections, sue the bank. The payee should instead sue the drawer who might in turn sue the bank. Section 189 is sound law based on logic and established legal principles: no privity of contract exists between the drawee-bank and the payee. Indeed, in this case, there was no such privity of contract between ABC and petitioner. Petitioner should not have sued ABC. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. None of the foregoing exceptions to the relativity of contracts applies in this case.
REMEDIAL LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE
FRESH FIFTEEN DAY RULE DOMINGO NEYPES et al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et al., filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. Petitioners filed a motion to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default while the respondents heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss. The petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
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failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper. On the other hand, the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper. In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further: ISSUE: When should have the petitioners filed their notice of appeal?
RULING: An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. This fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
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To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING; MISJOINDER OF PARTIES CHRISTINE CHUA vs. JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN G.R. No. 151900 August 30, 2005 FACTS: A complaint for damages was lodged by Christine Chua before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint alleged that on her brother, Jonathan, issued in favor of the Caltex Service Center, which Jorge Torres owns, his personal RCBC check No. 0412802. The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. Beltran, who works for Torres, then sent petitioner a demand letter. Petitioner ignored the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who issued the said check. Beltran then instituted against petitioner a criminal action for violation of B.P. 22. A criminal information was subsequently filed and an arrest warrant was issued against Christine Chua, all to the alleged embarrassment and social humiliation of petitioner. Significantly, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that he was being impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff. There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense. Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forumshopping. The RTC stressed that Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule requiring the certification, makes no distinction whether the plaintiff required to execute the certification is a principal party, a nominal party or a necessary party. ISSUE: Whether or not a co-plaintiff impleaded only as a necessary party, who however has no claim for relief or is not asserting any claim for relief in the complaint, should also make a certification against forum shopping RULING: We find the petition has merit, although we appreciate the situation differently from petitioner. Our decision proceeds from the fundamental premise that Jonathan Chua was misjoined as a party plaintiff in this case. It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party in interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs. Misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined
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party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. TERCERIA; THIRD PARTY-COMPLAINT BERNARDITO A. FLORIDO vs. SHEMBERG MARKETING CORPORATION G.R. No. 146400 October 25, 2005 FACTS: Shemberg Marketing Corporation filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money with a plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Solomon Nacua, Jr. The trial court granted Shembergs plea and ordered the issuance of the writ. On January 7, 1999, the sheriff prepared a notice of levy on attachment over five marine vessels owned by Nacua and proceeded to Nacuas house to serve the writ but learned that he had fled the country and had appointed an attorney-in-fact, Mariano Florido, Jr., brother of petitioner. The sheriff then went to Floridos house and served the summons on him, in the presence of petitioner. Seeing four vessels owned by Nacua moored at the Cabahug Wharf in Looc, Mandaue City without any officers or crew, the sheriff levied on and took possession of them and made an inventory. On January 8, 1999, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with the trial court, claiming that Nacua was indebted to him in the amount of seven million pesos (P7,000,000) and that, to secure payment, Nacua had, through his attorney-infactexecuted in petitioners favor a contract of pledge over his five vessels. He also filed, on the same day, a Motion to Declare Levy on Attachment Null and Void and for Preliminary Injunction, alleging that there had been no valid service of summons on him and that, prior to the purported service of the complaint and summons, the sheriff had already seized and taken possession of the four vessels. The petitioner likewise filed a Motion to Cancel Bond on the ground that the Office of the Clerk of Court had no copy of a Certificate of Authority issued in favor of the bonding company. Respondent opposed petitioners motion, alleging that petitioner had no legal standing to assail the levy and that there had been a valid service of summons and complaint upon Nacua. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had the personality to challenge the attachment writ and bond. RULING: In La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we discussed the remedy available to a person not a party to an action where property is seized pursuant to a writ of delivery: a stranger to the action, i.e., a person not a party to the action, or as the law puts it, any other person than the defendant or his agent, whose property is seized pursuant to the writ of delivery, is accorded the remedy known as a terceria, a third party claim. The remedy is identical to that granted to strangers in a proceeding on preliminary attachment or execution of judgments. In lieu of, or in addition to the filing of a terceria, the third party may, as Section 7 points out, vindicate his claim to the property by any proper action. This effort at vindication may take the form of a separate action for recovery of the property, or intervention in the replevin action itself. A stranger to an action where property in which he claims to have a right is attached must resort to the remedies available under the Rules of Court. The only exception to this rule is when the sheriff mistakenly levies on properties in which the defendant has no interest. In such an event, a summary hearing is held upon application to determine if he has taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. In this case, however, Solomon Nacua, Jr.s ownership of the vessels attached was never disputed. Petitioner must therefore follow the prescribed procedure for vindicating his claim on the vessels rather than attempt to erroneously short-circuit the rules. JURISDICTION; ACCION PUBLICIANA
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CESAR T. HILARIO et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR G.R. No. 160384 April 29, 2005 FACTS: Plaintiffs filed with the RTC a case for accion reinvindicatoria alleging that: the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was adjudged as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs fathers co-heirs. Sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest. Demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he has asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action and that the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
RULING: We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; REQUISITES METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC G.R. No. 167514 October 25, 2005 FACTS: Sometime in 1997, the Philippine government entered into a Build, Lease and Transfer (BLT) Agreement with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) wherein the MRTC undertook to build MRT 3. The agreement allows MRTC, either by itself or through any estate developers, to develop commercial premises in the MRT 3 or to obtain advertising income therefrom. In 1998, MRTC entered into a Contract for Advertising Services with Trackworks giving the latter the exclusive right to undertake advertising and promotional activities within and along the exterior and interior of the MRT 3 structure. Thereafter, Trackworks proceeded to install commercial billboards, banners, signages and other forms of advertisement. However, in 2001, the MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards purportedly in conformity with MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, prohibiting the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posts, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space.
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Trackworks refused to comply and invoked its advertising contract with MRTC. Consequently, MMDA started dismantling the billboards and streamers of Trackworks. Trackworks then filed with the trial court a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction. The court a quo granted the relief and issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently, the preliminary injunction was granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. RULING: Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed to protect the complainants substantive rights and interests during the pendency of the principal action. A preliminary injunction is merely temporary. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Injunction, like other equitable remedies, should be issued only at the instance of a suitor who has sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint. The existence of the right and the violation thereof must be alleged in the complaint and must constitute at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Thus, there are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, namely, (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. Further, while a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete. Thus, to be entitled to the writ, respondents are only required to show that they have the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint. Trackworks sufficiently established a right to be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. The contract with the MRTC vested it the exclusive right to undertake advertising and promotional activities at the MRT 3 structure. If not restrained, the dismantling of, and prohibition from, installing advertisements at the MRT 3 will cause irreparable injury to TRACKWORKS. This is especially so because TRACKWORKS is generally not entitled to recover damages resulting from acts of public officers done in their official capacity and in the honest belief that they have such power. Unless bad faith is clearly proven, TRACKWORKS will be left without recourse even if petitioner is later declared without authority to prohibit the posting of billboards and streamers at the MRT 3 structure. Indeed, prudence dictates that the status quo be preserved until the merits of the case can be heard fully. JURISDICTION; VENUE; DIFFERENCE ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC vs. LUCIO TAN G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005 FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) and Inquirer with the RTC Makati seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. Inquirer and Nocum filed their joint answer alleging among others that the complaint stated no cause of action and the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature. ALPAP and Umali likewise filed their joint answer additionally alleging that Tan is not a real partyin-interest and that the venue was improper. The RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Lucio Tan then filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint,
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alleging that the article was printed and first published in the City of Makati, and that thecaricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages? RULING:It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. These are the differences: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction. Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
COLLATERAL HEIRS; NECESSITY OF NOTIFICATION CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005 FACTS: On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado, who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. On 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings, an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent and to the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire
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jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, as collateral heirs of the decedent, are entitled to be personally notified of the RULING: Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION IF INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE; AMENDMENT TO CURE DEFECT VICTOR C. AGUSTIN vs. HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC 3 of Baguio City, ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164938 August 22, 2005 FACTS: On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four separate Informations charging the petitioner Victor Agustin, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel. It was alleged that the petitioner, with deliberate and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of Anthony De Leon the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community and with malicious intent of exposing Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write in his column Cocktails and publish in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines, wherein in said column the said accused did then and there defame the Anthony De Leon by branding and imputing upon him defamatory and libelous statements. Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. He then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party, Anthony de Leon, was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City. He averred that the allegations in the Informations (that the private complainant was the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club and was a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community) do not constitute an allegation that the private complainant was an actual resident of Baguio City. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations on the premise that the Informations are defective 2. Whether or not the Informations may be amended to cure the said defects. RULING: 1. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
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complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot even be inferred from the allegation the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community that the private respondent (complainant) was actually residing in Baguio City. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue. 2. We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed. VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL PROVISION GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON and VAN D. LUSPO vs. HON. FIRST DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 166606 November 29, 2005 FACTS: The case arose from the investigation initiated by a letter-complaint of then Police Sr. Superintendent Romeo M. Acop to the Ombudsman where it appears that payrolls of 2,000 enlisted men of the Cordillera Regional Command (CRECOM), who were allegedly recipients of the P20,000,000 appropriated for combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) allowance, were falsified. Subsequent investigations determined that petitioners Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for Comptrollership Guillermo Domondon, and Sr. Superintendent Van Luspo, together with other PNP officers, namely: Cesar Nazareno, Armand Agbayani, Joven Brizuela, Juan Luna and Danilo Garcia, conspired with one another in approving without budgetary basis, the release of Advice Allotment SN No. 4363 dated August 11, 1992 for P5,000,000 and Advice Allotment SN No. 4400 dated August 18, 1992 for P15,000,000, for the procurement of CCIE for the use of PNP personnel of the CRECOM, causing to be issued checks with an aggregate amount of P20,000,000 for payment of ghost purchases of the aforesaid CCIE items. On May 4, 1994, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Domondon and Luspo, and the above-named accused, with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Their arraignment was reset for several times, hence, petitioners filed on December 3, 2003 a motion to dismiss claiming that the failure to arraign them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to dismiss and dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. RULING: While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time limit for the arraignment and trial of a case, these however do not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of SC Circular 38-98 provides
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that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be excluded. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. A careful examination of the records would show that the postponements were caused by numerous pending motions or petitions. The delays caused by the filing and resolution of these motions and petitions cannot be categorized as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. After all, it is the judicious and deliberate determination of all the pending incidents of a case, with a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, that should be the primordial consideration in the full resolution of a case, more than the mere convenience of the parties or of the courts, so that justice and fairness would be served thereby. There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Sandiganbayan that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. Hence, the dismissal of petitioners motion to dismiss must be upheld. NON-RESERVATION OF CIBIL LIABILITY IN A CRIMINAL CASE; CIVIL LIABILTY OF A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE CRIMINAL CASE OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO vs. SPS. PRUDENCIO and SERLINA NOBELA G.R. No. 145823 March 31, 2005 FACTS: In May 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land belonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina. Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell or mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in Antipolo. She went to the Nobelas house where she brought with her many titles. Maccay and Potenciano comported themselves as husband and wife. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be the ones to buy the property because it will only cost P300,000.00. They would be able to make a profit because the current price was P1,500.00 per square meter. The Nobelas decided to purchase the property. Potenciano with Serlina went to Barbas lawyer, where she had the Deed of Sale prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They then proceeded to the house of both accused where Serlina paid the P300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents. Thereafter, Potenciano invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances. To Serlinas dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising showing her payments. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the relationship began to sour. Potenciano then executed an affidavitcomplaint against the accused spouses relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela. She related how the accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. The spouses received a subpoena from the fiscals office. Serlina went to the Register of Deeds to find out why they were accused and she was astonished to discover that the Deed of Sale was registered under the name of Linda Cruz. Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorneys fees. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower courts decision.
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ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court may rule on the civil liability of complainant in a criminal case where the civil action was not reserved or filed separately; 2. Whether or not a witness, who is not a party to the case, may be held liable for damages. RULING: 1. A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any. The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. The appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides that no counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding. 2.The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. The records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant. The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner Potencianos constitutional right to due process. MOTION TO QUASH; AVAILABILITY OF CERTIORARI IN A DENIED MOTION TO QUASH WILLIAM MADARANG and EVANS KHO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. OFELIA ARELLANO-MARQUEZ, Presiding Judge of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 32 and JANICE YOUNG-CHUA G.R. No. 143044 July 14, 2005 FACTS: Private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her husband, Eduardo Chan-Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against petitioners William Madarang and Evans Kho. The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car and that, petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of the subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale allegedly executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang. Petitioner Madarang was also charged with Falsification of Public Document. On the same date, petitioners were charged with Grave Coercion. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. A Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was filed by petitioner Madarang in the MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in RTC, are intimately related to the issues pending before the MeTC, the resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the criminal case for falsification. The motion was denied. On March 7, 1997, RTC dismissed the complaint for replevin upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners. On June 13, 1997, petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the falsification case on the ground that the decision dismissing the replevin suit in the RTC, involving the same parties absolved him of criminal liability in
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the falsification case. The MeTC granted such motion but later recalled the decision upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution. Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash Criminal Case Nos. 9424930 and 94-24931 on the ground that the findings of RTC, Branch 84 bar the prosecution for falsification and grave coercion. MeTC denied petitioners motion to quash, ruling that the decision rendered by the RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case cannot absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA; and that petitioners waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed. In dismissing the petition, the CA held that the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to quash. 2. Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when the motion to quash the information. RULING: 1. The declaration of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision that the signature of private respondent in the Deed of Sale is genuine and she voluntarily surrendered the car to petitioners is not res judicata in the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion because there is no identity of parties as the People of the Philippines is not a party in the replevin suit and cannot be bound by the factual findings therein. Besides, the decision of RTC, Branch 84 is still pending appeal with the CA. Hence, at the time the MeTC, the RTC and the CA rendered their assailed order, decision and resolution, respectively, there existed no special circumstance to warrant a dismissal of the cases pending in the MeTC. 2. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar. SEARCH WARRANT; MOTION TO QUASH AFTER ISSUANCE OF WARRANT MANLY SPORSTWEAR MANUFACTURING INC. vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES/HERMES SPORTS CENTER G.R. No. 165306 September 20, 2005 FACTS: On March 14, 2003, Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of the National Bureau of Investigation applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, based on the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. After finding reasonable grounds that a violation of Sections 172 and 217 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293 has been committed, Judge Estrella T. Estrada of RTC-Quezon City, issued on March 17, 2003 Search Warrant No. 4044(03). Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that the same is invalid since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that the sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not among the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293. The trial court granted the motion to quash and declared Search Warrant No. 4044(03) null and void based on its
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finding that the copyrighted products of MANLY do not appear to be original creations and were being manufactured and distributed by different companies locally and abroad under various brands, and therefore unqualified for protection under Section 172 of RA 8293. Moreover, MANLYs certificates of registrations were issued only in 2002, whereas there were certificates of registrations for the same sports articles which were issued earlier than MANLYs, thus further negating the claim that its copyrighted products were original creations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in declaring in the hearing for the quashal of the search warrant that the copyrighted products of MANLY are not original creations subject to the protection of RA 8293. RULING: The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function. As such, the power to quash the same also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists. In the instant case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash considering that no criminal action has yet been instituted when it was filed. The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier issued after finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists to justify its issuance in the first place. As ruled by the trial court, the copyrighted products do not appear to be original creations of MANLY and are not among the classes of work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293. The trial court, thus, may not be faulted for overturning its initial assessment that there was probable cause in view of its inherent power to issue search warrants and to quash the same. Moreover, the trial court was acting within bounds when it ruled, in an ancillary proceeding, that the copyrighted products of petitioner are not original creations. This is because in the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance or quashal of a warrant, it is inevitable that the court may touch on issues properly threshed out in a regular proceeding. In so doing, it does not usurp the power of, much less preclude, the court from making a final judicial determination of the issues in a full-blown trial. CLARIFICATORY HEARING DR. BENITA F. OSORIO vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO G.R. No. 156652 October 13, 2005 FACTS: Acting on the complaint filed by Beatriz L. Tenorio accusing Dr. Benita Osorio of several anomalies, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation to verify the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School. Without delay, the NBI conducted an investigation. The NBI submitted the results of the investigation which yielded the following findings: a) that petitioner Osorio authorized the sale of newspapers, but did not remit the proceeds thereof to the school; and b) that she issued a memorandum through which students were charged more than the allowable fees for their membership with Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines. The NBI suggested to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas that it ask the assistance of the Commission on Audit (COA) since the reported irregularities necessitated the conduct of proper auditing. After evaluating the report of the COA auditors, the Office of the OmbudsmanVisayas was convinced that allegations were duly substantiated. It found prima facie case of five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds against petitioner on the proceeds of the sale of the schools old newspapers. It also found prima facie evidence for violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, two (2) counts for the alleged irregularity in the purchase of school supplies, and another three (3) counts in relation to the assessment for membership fees of the Girl and Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
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which was in excess of the rates authorized under the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Based on the same findings the Office of the Ombudsman also filed an administrative case against petitioner. Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas directed the COA investigating auditors to submit a sworn affidavit of their report and additional evidence necessary for the preliminary investigation of the cases. In a resolution dated 12 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found probable cause against petitioner for five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds and five (5) counts of violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended. ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Honorable Office of the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it opted not to conduct a clarificatory hearing in the case of herein petitioner. RULING: The Office of the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against petitioner. Subsection (e) of Section 3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned. The term may under Subsection (e) of Section 3 of Rule 112 is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the investigating prosecutor to conduct a clarificatory hearing or not. If he believes that the evidence before him is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, he may not hold a clarificatory hearing. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. Bearing in mind the inferior quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we find that the Office of the Ombudsman was well within its discretion in refusing to conduct clarificatory hearing. It has found enough evidence to establish probable cause, a fortiori rendering the conduct of a clarificatory hearing unnecessary. The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. The Court cannot interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans discretion in determining the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence before it. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. Hence, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; APPEAL BY GOVERNMENT ON ACQUITTAL PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PERLITA J. TRIA-TIRONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 102, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and CHIEF INSPECTOR RENATO A. MUYOT G.R. No. 130106 July 15, 2005 FACTS: Armed with two search warrants, members of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Organized Crime Division, together with members of the NBI Special Investigation Division and the Presidential Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Task Force Hammer Head serving as security, conducted a search on the house of accused-private respondent located on Banawe, Quezon City. The alleged finding of 498.1094 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) thereat led to
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the filing of an information charging private respondent with Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. When arraigned on 27 November 1996, private respondent, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable doubt. The decision, more particularly the acquittal of private respondent, is being assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable conclusion of the latters guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It added that the appealability of the trial courts decision of acquittal in the context of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should be resolved since it has two pending petitions before the court raising the same question. ISSUE: Whether or not government can appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits without violating the constitutional precept against double jeopardy. RULING: As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process. There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the accuseds right against double jeopardy. PERIODS OF APPEAL; APPLICABILITY SANDIGANBAYAN PROCEEDINGS OF RULE SOF COURT IN
RENE P. PONDEVIDA vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 160929-31 August 16, 2005 FACTS: On April 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 24375 to 24377 convicting petitioner Rene Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, of three counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count. The anti-graft court granted the petitioner an extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration of its decision, until May 10, 2003. The said motion was filed on May 9, 2003 which the said court resolved to deny on September 5, 2003. The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on September 16, 2003, and filed his Notice of Appeal on September 23, 2003 pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1 of Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied due course to the petition for having been filed out of time. The Sandiganbayan ruled that under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pondevida had only until September 17, 2003 within which to file his notice of appeal, but did so only on September 23, 2003; by then, its decision had become final and executory. The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on October 14, 2003. On December 15, 2003, he filed his petition for certiorari before this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioners notice of appeal because the notice of appeal has been filed within the reglementary period.
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RULING: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari to this Court (from a Sandiganbayan decision) is proper only where, as provided for in Section 1(a), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the penalty imposed is less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua. Since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does not provide for a period to appeal, Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply. This is so because under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court applicable to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) shall, likewise, govern all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan insofar as applicable. Under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner had only until September 17, 2003 within which to file his notice of appeal, considering that he received the September 5, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan on September 16, 2003. However, he filed his notice of appeal only on September 23, 2003, long after the reglementary period. Hence, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with its Revised Internal Rules and the Rules of Criminal Procedure in denying the petitioners appeal. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PS BANK vs. BERMOY G.R. No. 151912 September 26, 2005 FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank, respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document. It was alleged that on or about May 11, 1994, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank thru falsification of a public document. Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten notation under the heading remarks: Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels. This was the only notation made under remarks. Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state that any of the accused made any stipulation or admission. During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo, manager of petitioners Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag, also an employee of petitioner. After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their identity during the pre-trial. In its Order, the trial court granted respondent spouses motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and acquitted respondent spouses. The Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial courts error did not amount to grave abuse of discretion and stated, on the other hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be reviewed without violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for the first time, that it is the trial courts duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-trial order or agreement embodying respondent spouses admissions and that its failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right against double jeopardy has been violated.
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RULING: For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses. INTERVENTION OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR FOR PURPOSES OF LITIGATING CIVIL LIABILITY MARY ANN RODRIQGUEZ VS. HON. THELMA PONFERRADA G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005 FACTS: On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office issued her Resolution finding probable cause to charge Mary Ann Rodriquez for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately filed against Rodriguez before proper courts, for Estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42. On the other hand, the informations for estafa cases were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court an Opposition to the Formal Entry of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor. The public respondent court during the said hearing noted the Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as private prosecutor as well as the Opposition filed thereto by herein petitioner. Private complainant through counsel filed her Comment to the Opposition of herein [p]petitioner. Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases. RULING: Under the Rules of Court, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private
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prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit. True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury. Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum shopping. There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred from others available to her. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission. PRESCRIPTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, G.R. No. 151452 July 29, 2005 FACTS: Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision. On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action. They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period. ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of the civil action has already prescribed. RULING: Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party
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expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. PROBABLE CAUSE; REQUISITES CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON SPRENGEISEN G.R. No. 162187 November 18, 2005 FACTS: On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC). The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany. The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. The BIS submitted its report to the Tariff Commission, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported goods. The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other. The parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure the local industry. HTC was required to reform
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its price policy/structure to conform to the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a compromise agreement containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia signed. However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered to the office of HTC. Gonzales and Von Sprengeisen signed the agreement. RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to the Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and noted that the normal value of the said importation under the decision of the Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such decision be declared null and void because of fraud committed during the negotiation for the preparation of the compromise agreement and that that insertions and/or substitution of the facts not agreed upon was deliberately and surreptitiously made in the compromise agreement without the knowledge and consent of the HTC. The HTC averred therein that Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when he surreptitiously inserted the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Accordingly, an Information for perjury was filed against Von Sprengeisen. ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the Von Sprengeisens indictment for perjury. RULING: Probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established. Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made. Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true. Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed not to know. In fine, the Von Sprengeisen did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations
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implementing the same to determine the base price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
EVIDENCE
TESTIMONY OF SPOUSE AGAINST HER SPOUSE MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 FACTS: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. The trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. RULING: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. However, it should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT TOMMY FERRER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 143487 February 22, 2006 FACTS: Tommy Ferrer and Ramon Ferrer, who are brothers, were charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. It was alleged that on or about April 14, 1990 in the evening at barangay Olo-Cafabrosan, Municipality of Mangatarem, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab Ricardo Ferrer, inflicting upon him Multiple stab wounds. On even
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date, another Information was filed charging Ramon, Tommy, Che-Che Ferrer (CheChe) and Robert Tan with the same crime of Frustrated Homicide. It was alleged that the accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with bladed weapon, glass and wooden cane and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and stab Roque Ferrer, inflicting upon him Multiple stab wounds. Ramon and Tommy were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Both cases were subsequently consolidated. After trial, the accused were found guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution can sustain the conviction of the petitioner herein beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The issues presented by petitioner in the instant petition boil down to the question of credibility of the witnesses. Petitioner contends that Ricardo and Roques claim that he (petitioner) stabbed them should not be given credence because their testimonies are devoid of any factual basis. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Verily, we reiterate the jurisprudential doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses; this can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the result. In the present case, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court. Besides, Ricardo and Roques testimonies as to the location and number of wounds they sustained by reason of petitioner and his brothers assault on them are materially consistent with the findings of the physician who examined and treated them. Against the positive identification of Ricardo, Roque and Leonila, all that petitioner could interpose as defense is denial, which, under settled jurisprudence, could not prevail over the positive testimony of witnesses. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, self-serving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserve more credence and evidentiary weight. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BAYANI ROMA G.R. No. 147996 September 30, 2005 FACTS: On May 20, 1991, an information for murder was filed against Bayani Roma, Edwin Galeon, Bating and Bitoy. It was alleged that the on or about April 13, 1991, said accused, armed with handguns, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly fire shots at one Garland Egos, hitting him on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries: GUNSHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE, HEAD, FACE AND RIGHT LOWER EXTREMITY as a consequence of which, Garland Egos died almost instantaneously. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Since his coaccused were at large, they were not arraigned. The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Antonio Montilla, Stephen Egos and Nicasio Egos. Antonio Montilla testified that he knew both the victim and appellant, since they were neighbors. At about 11:30 p.m. of April 13, 1991, he was standing outside the San Antonio de Padua Chapel, right beside a fenced in area where a benefit dance was going on. He heard someone shout, Watch out. At that exact moment, just two meters away from him, he saw Edwin Galeon shoot Garland Egos twice, which caused the latter to fall to the ground. Immediately after that, Bitoy and appellant fired one
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shot each at the victim successively as he was lying on the ground. He could positively identify Bitoy and appellant since the place was well lit and his view was unobstructed because most of the people had run away after the first two shots were fired by Galeon. The third witness for the prosecution was Stephen Egos. He is the younger brother of the victim. He testified that on April 13, 1991 at past 11 p.m. he was at a dance hall with his friends. His testimony corroborated that of Antonio Montilla. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses particularly Antonio Montilla and Stephen Egos and completely disregarded the testimony of the defense witnesses that the accused-appellant was not involved in the killing. RULING: As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses since the trial court judge has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness. The trial court in its decision made the following determination: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have inspired belief and therefore have to be given full faith and credence over the testimony of co-accused Bayani Roma and his witnesses. The prosecution witnesses demeanor in court [was] straightforward and candid, there [was] no tinge of ill will that can be ascribed to them to falsely testify against the accused. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the determination made by the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, delay in presenting oneself as a witness does not affect credibility if the delay is satisfactorily explained. Appellant claims that the delay of Antonio Montilla and Stephen Egos in presenting themselves as eyewitnesses was not satisfactorily explained. It can be seen from the transcript of stenographic notes that the reason for the failure of Montilla and Egos to present themselves as witnesses earlier was because they were afraid of appellant and his coaccused, since they were still all undetained and roaming freely at that time. FORGED SIGNATURE; PROBATIVE VALUE OF A NOTARIZED DOCUMENT MILAGROS ILAO- QUIANAY AND SERGIO ILAO VS. RODOLFO MAPILE G.R. No. 154087 October 25, 2005 FACTS: Subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Sta. Cruz, Manila in the name of the deceased Simplicio Ilao. In the course of the judicial settlement of Ilaos estate, his heirs found out that the title of the subject property had an annotation of adverse claim filed by a certain Juanito Ibarra. Respondent Atty. Rodolfo Mapile, filed a motion to exclude the property from the inventory on the ground that the same no longer formed part of Ilaos estate having been disposed of during the latters lifetime in favor of Ibarra. Acting upon respondents allegation, the heirs of Ilao, through petitioners, promptly filed a civil case for Quieting of Title and Damages. The Court denied respondents motion. Relevantly, it appears that in 1974, Ibarra filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the title of the subject property, claiming that he was in possession of said owners duplicate but that he lost the same in a fire that took place in Bo. Sta. Ignacia, Camiling, Tarlac on April 26, 1974. This allegation was, however, uncovered by the trial court to be false when, upon the courts subpoena, Ilaos heirs appeared and presented the certificate of title Ibarra claimed to have been lost. Respondent filed Specific Performance and Declaration of Nullity of Contract, claiming that the subject property had been sold by Ilao to Ibarra pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 7, 1972, and that Ibarra, in turn, sold the property to him. The two cases were consolidated. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, finding that the deed of sale was genuine and ordering, among others, that petitioners herein surrender the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 48529 and all documents appurtenant thereto in their possession. The decision was primarily anchored on the trial courts finding that the conflicting testimonies of the handwriting experts
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presented by both parties left it no choice but to favor the notarized deed of sale and to rule that the same is genuine. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in disregarding the testimonies of the expert witnesses allegedly to the effect that Ilaos signature on the deed of sale was forged. 2. Whether or not the notarized deed of sale should be given probative value. RULING: 1. Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. 2. In this connection, we have to say that petitioners objection to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the notary public who supposedly notarized the deed of sale taken in another case in which petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony does not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former proceeding obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former proceeding and hence without opportunity to cross-examine the notary public, there was also no proof that the notary public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence, the testimony should not have been accorded any probative weight. SOUND RECORDING; ADMISSIBILITY CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY TORRALBA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-Ani ang Lungsod which was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed against petitioner. It was alleged that on or about April 11, 1994, the petitioner, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his lifetime a CFI Judge of and for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program publicly announced libelous words and other words of similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas, one of the legitimate children of the late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas. The prosecution presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento. Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This request was approved by Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former BIR Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was behind the
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incessant criticisms hurled at them, TMSI decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. Soon thereafter, Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect. Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit: Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 1994; Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 1994; Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 1994. Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being taped. For his part, Atty. Hontanosas testified that Lim presented to him tape recordings of petitioner Torralbas radio program but disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously committed an error in admitting in evidence an unauthenticated and spurious tape record of a radio broadcast allegedly by Torralba on the basis of which the latter was convicted for the crime of libel. RULING: It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit: (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent; (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording; (6) identification of the speakers; and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering. In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recordingand that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas radio show on 11 April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit D in evidence. INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE ON APPEAL; ADMISSIBILITY SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO, vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOC. INC. G.R. No. 146823 August 9, 2005 FACTS: The tenants of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, a 6,825 square meters parcel of land, organized as the Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.
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(FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property and distributing it to its members. They were unable, however, to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property, so FETA applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latters Community Mortgage Program. As a pre-condition for the loan, and in order that specific portions of the property could be allotted to each tenant who will have to pay the corresponding price therefor, NHMFC required all tenants to become members of FETA. The spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate, refused to join the Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member. Later, FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate. To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo, FETA filed against them a complaint for unlawful detainer which was dismissed for being an improper remedy. They subsequently filed an action for recovery of possession, which was decided in favor of FETA. The said decision was appealed by the spouses Ragudo. Pending resolution in the appellate court, FETA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to which the Ragudos interposed an Opposition, followed by FETAs Reply to Opposition. Then, on 11 October 1994, the Ragudos filed with the trial court a Rejoinder to Reply with Counter-Motion to Admit Attached Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident. Attached thereto and sought to be admitted therein were documents and photographs. In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court admitted in evidence the attachments to the Ragudos' aforementioned Rejoinder With Counter-Motion, etc., and ultimately denied FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. Later, the Ragudos filed with the appellate court a Motion To Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial, In the Interest of Justice, thereunder seeking the admission in evidence of the very documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection with the then pending incident of execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents be made part of the records and considered in the resolution of their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230. The appellate court denied their aforesaid motion and ordered expunged from the records of the appealed case the documents they sought admission of, on the ground that they could not be considered as newly discovered evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting in evidence the documents sought to be introduced by Ragudo at the appellate level on the ground of Liberality of Procedural Rules, Equity and Substantial justice, the mistake and excusable negligence on the part of their former counsel, and the social justice and parens patriae clause of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. Failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. Petitioners further argue that the documents which their former counsel failed to adduce in evidence during trial of the main case must be allowed to stay in the records thereof and duly considered in the resolution of their appeal because they were duly admitted in the trial court during the hearing on the incidental motion for execution pending appeal. To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending appeal that said documents were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for which they were
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offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered. While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they do not have that same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and ought not be considered in the resolution thereof. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION; KINDS RENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006 FACTS: The facts showed that someone forcefully covered the face of Malou Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, and then commenced the commission of rape. Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. However, Renato Chito Baleros was identified only through circumstantial evidence. Witnesses testified that Chito was in the Building when the attack on Malou took place. He had access to the room of Malou as the room where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to where Malou stayed. The building security guard and Joseph Africa confirmed that Chito was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the building at the time the alleged crime was committed. Though it was dark during their struggle, Malou had made out the feel of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Renato Balleros may be convicted of rape through circumstantial evidence. RULING: Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. However, although there is a positive identification of the accused, herein petitioner, the prosecution failed to prove that in fact attempted rape was committed. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemicalsoaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. Petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. Petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing
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and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. Thus, the accused can be convicted for the crime of unjust vexation, but not attempted rape. TESTIMONY OF A PERSON; PROBATIVE VALUE WHEN NOT A DISINTERESTED PERSON ROBERT TAYABAN, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 150194 March 06, 2007 FACTS: Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). [3] Subsequently, a bidding was conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the said public market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract[4] was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989. On August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 resolving to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the Public Market building as identified and decided by this body; and further resolved as it is hereby done that this be a precedent for other future leaders. On that same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein petitioners. For violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, alleging that while in the performance of their official functions acting in evident bad faith and conspiring with each other, petitioners unlawfully pass and unanimously approve Resolution No. 20, thereby vesting upon themselves powers and authority to demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction whereby respondents themselves personally and actually demolished it, to the damage and prejudice of the government particularly the Cordillera Executive Board, being the owner of the project. They were convicted. Thereafter, herein petitioners raised the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution witness Abe Belingan considering that he is not a disinterested witness because he is given the contract of cementing the supposed second floor of the public market. Moreover, petitioners contend that the testimony of Belingan regarding the reason why Mayor Tayaban demolished the structures is mere hearsay and as such should not be given any probative value. ISSUE: Whether or not a witness may lose his credibility based on the fact that he is not a disinterested person in the case at bar.
RULING: The settled rule is that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial court, which had the benefit of observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness. It is well-settled that this Court will not reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or palpable error. It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it considers perjurious or fabricated. Moreover, the settled rule is that absent any evidence showing a reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure their testimonies, the logical conclusion is
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that no improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. In the present case, the fact that Belingan was contracted to cement the supposed second floor of the public market is not a compelling evidence to prove that his testimony is biased. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the Sandiganbayan with respect to the credibility of Belingan. PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NEEDED TO OVERTHROW PRESUMPTION FELIPA DELFIN, et al. vs. PRESENTACION D. BILLONES et. al and the Court of Appeals G.R. No. 146550 March 17, 2006 FACTS: On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 213, covered by RO5563 (14516) of the Cadastral Survey of Panitan, Capiz, was executed by Teresa Daos, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar, with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband of Teresa Daos, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo (spouses Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, as well as the thumb marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary public. On 18 November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon, a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T17071, was issued in the name of the spouses Delfin. Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T-16804 was made between Teresa Daos, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed, bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. Thus, TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No. 3414 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T16805, was issued in the names of the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. Lot No. 1, covered by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto Delfin on 21 October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daos on 25 April 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the spouses Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road. On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and damages. According to them, it was only in 1989] when they discovered that Teresa Daos, sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965. Taking advantage of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213, respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering the property was fictitious and the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged because three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960, namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946. As proof thereof, respondents presented certifications on the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz. To counter respondents arguments, petitioners alleged that respondents action was already barred by prescription and laches. Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the subsequent owners of the subject properties, are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, whose titles to the lots at the time of the purchase were all clean and free from liens and encumbrances. The documents evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and
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unilaterally executed by the vendors-signatories therein without any intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly acknowledged before a notary public, petitioners averred. Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that respondents claim of ownership over the subject properties was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE: What is the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the presumption of regularity of a public document?
RULING: Petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove that fraud attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414. The Court agrees. A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated as such until it is shown to be otherwise by either positive or circumstantial evidence. A duly executed contract carries with it the presumption of validity. The party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence. As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have the burden to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the burden of proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of the defendants. Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the execution of the deed, nor on the condition of the signatories thereto. At best, their witnesses merely testified as to the identity of the previous owners of the property. Even respondents claim of possession of the subject properties has not been sufficiently proved. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Public documents may be proved by the original copy, an official publication thereof, or a certified true copy thereof; and when a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by the officer having legal custody of the record must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications and not the certified copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the purported death certificates of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by the Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus, they do not enjoy the presumption granted by the Rules. Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to overthrow the presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Said deed, as well as the titles derived as a result thereof must be accorded respect and must remain undisturbed.
LEGAL ETHICS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; UNLAWFUL RELEASE OF ACCUSED ON BAIL ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE, vs. HON. JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS A.M. No. RTJ-02-1738 November 17,2005
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FACTS: Atty. Juliana Adalim- White filed charges against Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge Br. 2, RTC of Borongonan, Eastern Samar for ignorance of the law relative to CC Case No. 10772 entitled Pp vs Manuel Bagoporo , Jr. In his comment, respondent Judge admitted that he issued an order allowing Manuel Bagaporo, Jr ( Bagoporo) to be released upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. He averred that : Bagaporo was convicted by the trial court of the crime of frustrated murder and meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and one day; Bagaporo served sentence; subsequently, he filed an application for release on recognizance; in support of his application, Provincial Jail Warden Apelado issued a certification to the effect that Bagaporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9, 1996 and is already entitled to parole; another certification was issued by Supervising Probation and Parole Officer Eulalia R. Columbretis showing that Bagaporo had applied for parole in line with the Department of Justices Maagang Paglaya Program. Respondent contends that on the basis of these certifications and on the rule that bail being discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court granted Bagaporos application for bail upon recognizance of Apelado. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is liable for ignorance of the law for ordering the release on recognizance of a convict of frustrated murder before terminating service of the minimum penalty, and pending the approval of the prisoners application for parole. RULING: Respondent Judge is found guilty of ignorance of the law for having ordered the release of Bagoporo pending approval of the latters application for parole and before his completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him. The SC was not persuaded with the respondents contention that his order allowing the release on recognizance is in consonance with the provisions of Sec 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: Sec. 16. Bail when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide. At the outset, it must be noted that Bagaporo was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and one day. It is not disputed that he began to serve sentence on February 9, 1996. Counting four years and two months from said date the minimum period of Bagaporos sentence should have been completed on April 9, 2000.Hence it is wrong for the respondent to claim that Bagaporo had already served the minimum of his sentence at the time that he was granted bail on recognizance, that is, on February 16, 2000. Furthermore, it is patently erroneous for respondent to release a convict on recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides: SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. The only exception to the said provision of the Rules is when the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law. GROSS MISCONDUCT; APPROVAL OF BAIL BOND WITHOUT AUTHORITY AMADO L. DE LEON vs. JUDGE PATROCINIO R. CORPUZ A.M. No. RTJ-03-1780 September 14, 2005
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FACTS: Complainant charged Judge Patrocinio Corpuz with grave abuse of authority. The complaint alleged that respondent judge approved the application for bail of Noe dela Fuente, accused of fourteen (14) counts of swindling (estafa) and fourteen (14) violations of BP 22 before the MTC, Br 2 Guagua, Pampanga. At the time respondent approved the bail posted for the accused, Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Guagua, Branch 2, where the cases were filed, was in her court the whole day. In his comment, respondent denied the charge or any irregularity in approving the 14 bail bonds of accused Noe dela Fuente. Respondent explained that the accused, accompanied by SPO2 Nonato Enrico, appeared before him in his court at about the close of office hours on April 10, 2002 ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave abuse of authority for fixing and approving the bail bonds despite the presence of the judge before whom the said cases are pending. RULING: Respondent Judge Patrocinio R. Corpuz is found guilty of gross misconduct by blatantly disregarding the Rules and jurisprudence. Sec 17, Rule 114 provides that: SEC.17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. x x x In Cruz vs Yaneza, the SC held : The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city, or municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city, or municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is pending or second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city, or municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. In the instant case, accused Noe dela Fuente was arrested by virtue of the warrants of arrest all dated April 9, 2002 issued by Judge Isip of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 2, where the cases were then pending. The accused was arrested in the same municipality. Following the above Rule and our ruling in Cruz, the application for bail should have been filed with the MTC of Guagua, Branch 2. Significantly, respondent does not dispute that Presiding Judge Isip was then present the whole day. If she was absent or unavailable, then the accused should have filed his application for bail with another branch of the same court within the Province of Pampanga or San Fernando City. Considering his long service in the judiciary, he must have known he has no authority to act on the accuseds application for bail.
GROSS MISCONDUCT; ACTS OF IMPROPRIETY; APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY ONOFRE G. DULAY NG et al. vs. JUDGE ELIAS O. LELINA, JR. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516 July 14, 2005 FACTS: Two separate administrative complaints were filed by the Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino, and Onofre G. Dulay against Respondent Elias O. Lelina ,Jr. Through an Anonymous letter sent by the Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino to the NBI, the latter submitted its Investigation Report to the OCA stating that
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respondent judge usually asked money or parcels of land in exchange for favorable decision. Incidents when respondent judge would carry his .45 caliber pistol while inside the courtroom, tucked in his waits, for the purpose of intimidating others were also noted. According to the NBI, respondent judge was guilty of serious misconduct as a judge and committed acts such as extortion, intemperate language unbecoming of a judge, failure to pay debt, oppression or unwarranted display of authority and also acting as counsel for all the parties with opposing interest on a parcel of land in pursuance of his personal self-interest. On the said complaint filed by Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino, Justice Vasquez of the Court of Appeals, reported that the alleged complainants never came forward nor did they execute any affidavit or sworn statement to substantiate their claims. The only evidence submitted to support the complaint was the uncorroborated sworn statement of Editha Dumlao, who was not presented as a witness during the investigation, and the report of the NBI, which was based on second-hand information. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The second case stems from the letter-complaint filed by Onofre with the OCA. Onofre charged respondent for the following acts: 1) For arbitrarily citing him, his mother Victoria and his aunt, for indirect contempt in a civil case no longer pending in respondent judges sala; 2) Corollary to the first charge, Onofres mother and aunt were each meted fines of P15,000.00 and imprisonment of 3 months while Onofre was meted a fine of P30,000.00 and imprisonment of 6 months;3) In Criminal Case No. 1395 filed against Onofre for Grave Threats, respondent judge arbitrarily increased his bail from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00 and immediately issued a warrant for his arrest;4) Respondent judge showed bias in resolving the matters submitted to him in Civil Case No. 445;5) Respondent judge ordered Onofre to give him 160 square meters of a home lot in Cabarroguis, Quirino which respondent directed to be registered in the name of one Agnes Mariano; and6) Respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed in court by Onofres opponents in behalf of the latters counsel, Atty. Beltejar. In second case, Justice Vasquez reported that Onofres statement of facts were not accurate; that Onofre failed to prove that he was ordered to give 160 square meters of home lot to respondent judge. On the contrary, evidence shows that Agnes Mariano is the registered owner of the lot after Onofre gave her the property as payment for his debts. Neither was Onofre able to prove that respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed by his opponents. However, the investigating justice found adequate evidence showing that respondent judge committed improprieties in dealing with Onofre which warrants disciplinary sanctions ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct and should be administratively liable. RULING: Respondent judge is found guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is administratively liable. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties. NEGLIGENCE; CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A LAWYER; QUANTUM MERUIT SPS. EDUARDO AND TERESITA GARCIA VS. ATTY. ROLANDO S. BALA A.C. NO. 5039 November 25,2005
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FACTS: Complainant Sps. Eduardo and Teresita Garcia averred that Atty. Rolando Bala failed to render a legal service contracted --- the preparation of a petition for review that he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No. 5532.However, based on the findings of the IBP Commissioner, instead of filing a petition for review, respondent erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review. Because of respondents error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients. Moreover, he supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose. Finally, he allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent is liable for negligence and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. 2. Whether or not he should reimburse the money paid to him. RULINGS: 1. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on appeal and misled them as to his whereabouts. Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Furthermore, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. Respondent is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer and was suspended from the practice of law for six months upon receipt of the Decision. 2. Respondent was ordered to pay the Complainants the amount of P9, 200 with legal interest. Quantum meruit --- as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract. Based on the present case, the legal services actually rendered by respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the usefulness of the remedy he took. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; TRUST AND MORALITY EXEC. JUDGE DAVID NAVAL et al vs. JUDGE JOSE R. PANDAY, et al A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283 July 21,1997 FACTS: Exec. Judge Naval of the RTC, Br. 21 of Naga City sent a letter to the Office of the Court Aministrator(OCA) informing the latter that Judge Jose R. Panday, Presiding Judge of Br 27,same court was a suspect in an alleged rape incident which was reported by the local media. Copies of two local newspapers, namely, Bicol Standard and Iyo Ni dated 24 July and 28 July 1994, respectively, which published news reports about the alleged rape incident were attached to the said letter. In his letter of compliance, Judge Panday admits that he is one of the respondents on a criminal complaint filed by fifteen (15) year old named Cecile Buenafe y Ledesma; that the case is pending preliminary investigation before the MCTC of Tigaon-Sangay, Camarines Sur. Judge Panday claims complete innocence of the crime and believes that the filing of the complaint was merely intended to harass and possibly to extort money from him. A different letter confirming the report of the alleged rape of Cecile Buenafe by Judge Panday was sent by the then Sec. of DSWD, Hon. Corazon Alma G. de Leon to the Supreme Court. She informed the Court that Ceciles father, Regino Buenafe has entrusted her to the care and custody of the DSWD Center for girls in Sorsogon. On the basis of reports received by her office from the DSWD Field Dir. of Reg V, Sec. de Leon further alleged that Judge Panday had attempted to settle the case by offering to pay the father of Cecile the amount of one hundred fifty thousand
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pesos (P150, 000.00) and that on 16 October 1994, MTC Judge Rica H. Lacson and RTC Judge Simon D. Encinas, together with Regino, pressured Cecile into signing an Affidavit of Desistance without the presence of the head or any social worker of the Center. Cecile Buenafe and the DSWD Reg. Office No. V, represented by its Director IV, filed with the Court an Administrative Complaint charging Judge Panday with (1) immorality for the sexual abuse of Cecile, a minor, in violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), the same being also subject matter of People vs. Judge Jose R. Panday, Criminal Case No. 2990 for Rape pending preliminary investigation by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tigaon-Sangay, Camarines Sur, (2) gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary for the aforesaid sexual abuse and for attempting to bribe the father of the victim to settle the case, (3) abuse of judicial authority and deliberate obstruction of justice" for filing unnecessary motions and/or petitions to delay the criminal proceedings, and; (4) partiality, "ignorance of the law" and "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" for dismissing Criminal Case No. 94-5566 for Rape entitled People versus Luciano Matias; and Judge Encinas and Judge Lacson with gross misconduct, conduct unbecoming members of the judiciary, abuse of judicial authority and deliberate obstruction of justice for entering the premises of the Center for Girls in Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, without authority and for pressuring Cecile, who was temporarily residing thereat, into signing an Affidavit of Desistance to procure the dismissal of the criminal case for rape against Judge Panday. ISSUE: Whether respondents are guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct for their respective acts. RULING: The SC found Judge Panday administratively liable. By having sexual intercourse with Cecile who was then only fifteen (15) years old, Judge Panday violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of members of the judiciary. In addition, his subsequent act of offering Ceciles father a substantial amount of money in consideration for the withdrawal of their charges against him is considered, by law, an obstruction of justice. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: Canon I - Rule 1.01: A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Canon II- Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of even a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. Sadly, Judge Panday fell far short of these exacting standards. Accordingly, the SC ruled that the dismissal of Judge Panday from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leaves, is proper and justified. As regards to the charges against Judge Encinas, by attending the proceedings at the Center for Girls, Judge Encinas wrongfully lent the prestige of his office to Judge Panday. The conduct of Judge Encinas was undoubtedly improper and cannot be countenanced by the Court. It cannot be overemphasized that a judges official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Accordingly, the SC found Judge Encinas administratively liable as charged. Judge Lacson is also found guilty for improper or conduct unbecoming of a judge. His contention that he was just present at the signing of the affidavit of desistance was just out of curiosity was not appreciated by the SC as a valid excuse. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION), et al and ATTY. JOSELITO P. MENDOZA G.R. Nos. 151809-12 April 12, 2005
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FACTS: In 1976 General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily over drawings on its current account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, et al. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law. The PCGG then filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the CFI of Manila and was docketed as Spec Pro No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. RULING: Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retains the general structure of par. 2, Canon36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. The SC held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said act of respondent which is involved in Sp. Proc No, 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in CC No. 0096. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
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matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. MISCONDUCT; REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA Adm. Case No. 6708 August 25,2005 FACTS: Complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Nestor A. Bamba. The complainant who by then was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB)-- -- a familyowned corporation engaged in providing security services and investigation services averred that she procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the corporate affairs, but also for her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case before the MeTC of Paraaque City. About six months after she resigned as AIB president, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record in the ejectment case, which was then still pending. Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, charges the respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed to her that she organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI), which was later registered under complainants name, with the respondent as a silent partner represented by his associate Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorneys fees for his legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned to steal or pirate some of the more important clients of AIB. While serving as legal counsel for AIB and a silent partner of QRMSI, he convinced complainants brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and president. The respondent and Leodegario then illegally diverted the funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI. ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interest in contravention of basic tenets of the legal profession. RULING: Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. The SC does not sustain respondents theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the
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respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an interest in more than one security agency. From respondents position paper, it can be culled that Leodegario Quiambao is the president and managing director of AIB, holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his four other siblings who are permanent residents in the United States own the remaining 40% This prohibition notwithstanding, the respondent organized SESSI, with Leodegarios wife and son as majority stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding shares and with him (the respondent), as well as the rest of the stockholders, holding minimal shares. In doing so, the respondent virtually allowed Leodegario and the latters wife to violate or circumvent the law by having an interest in more than one security agency. Thus, in organizing SESSI, the respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS; USE OF THE TITLE JUDGE AFTER RETIREMENT SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. (SJHAI) vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS A.C. No. 5580 June 15,2005 FACTS: In 1985, respondent represented SJHAI before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano. When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the HLURB in behalf of Montealegre. SJHAIs Board of Directors terminated respondents services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association. Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783. The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach. Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals and this Court and even moved for the execution of the decision. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct. He was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. Respondent resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating his oath as a lawyer when he represented inconsistent interests of two opposing party 2. Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility when he continue to use the title Judge after he resigned. RULINGS: 1. Respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is found guilty of violating his oath as lawyer when he represented inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates
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that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. 2. Respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. He manifested undue disrespect mandates and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. With the foregoing, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. CONFLICTING INTERESTS RULE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005 FACTS: In a consolidation of NLRC Cases herein respondent, Atty. Arquillo appeared as counsel for complainants, Teresita A. Velasco, et al. In the very same consolidated case, Atty. Arquillo was also the counsel of one of the respondents therein, Jose G. Castro. Herein respondent submitted the Motion to Dismiss in representation of his client Jose G. Castro. Sixteen days later, the same Atty. Arquillo filed a Complainants Consolidated Position Paper this time representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated case. ISSUE: Is Atty. Macario D. Arquillo guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct for violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future. The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY; VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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PROV. PROSECUTOR DOENTINO FLORESTA vs. JUDGE ELIODORO UBIADAS A.M. No. RTJ 03-1774 May 27, 2004 FACTS: By a sworn complaint dated January 24, 200, regional trial court judge Dorentino Floresta administratively charged Judge Eliodoro Ubiadas with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the code of judicial conduct. Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction on motion of the accused by Order of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97.He also faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification of the aforesaid order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure, complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, rule 305 of the code of judicial conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and of SC circular No 13 which require lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months or ninety days from date of submission. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent commits gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the code of judicial conduct in dismissing by order of July 9, 1997 Crim. case No. 212-97 RULING: The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused of Crim case no 212-97 on jurisdictional ground is however a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an administrative complaint. For as a matter or public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Only in cases where the error is gross patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be imposed. There is no showing that this was the case here.
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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

Case Digest Compendium

Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

ADMINISTRATIVE, ELECTION AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, and PUBLIC CORPORATION

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

G.R. No. 164774

April 12, 2006

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Research Committee, Bar Operations Commission 2007

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