Department of the Classics, Harvard University

in Plato's "Lysis" Author(s): David Wolfsdorf Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 103 (2007), pp. 235-259 Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30032224 . Accessed: 15/03/2011 04:24
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DtXia PLATO'S LYSIS IN

DAVIDWOLFSDORF INTRODUCTION and viewedas deficient comparison Phaedrus SymOften in with How scholars whoattend it do so in a defensive posium,1 to posture. in articles that of many beginwiththe objective showing Lysis fact friendship? these,a contains substantive content regarding Among rescue thetext from claims that its of is common theme theattempted or though is treatment friendship non-altruistic instrumental-as of accusations there need Platofrom werea sympathetic to preserve of weak morals.2 More Gadamer's and article, scholars recently especially following that enactment<ptia among personae fulfills of the argue thedramatic the Conceived a negain what philosophical inquiry proper doesnot.3 one tivelight, might thatsuchliterary say interpretations-however much hermeneuticphilothey in to claim be grounded animportant or sophical at position-succeed illuminating valueofthetext the in the that is And in lacking. costofdemonstrating theinquiry thetext indeed of as has yetthis beenconceived part thepoint. What friendship truly Hence, aporia inevitable. is be is cannot said,it can only shown. Or be
so itis argued.
LYSIS HAS HAD A PARTICULARLY SORRY RECEPTION over the lasthalf-century.

Irwin, course,excellenceis conceivedas instrumental-and Adams(1992).Those of Don viewincludeGregory Vlastos(1981:3-11); F.Morris whoarguefora non-egoistic (1986); T.

conception for Terence for include Irwin argue an instrumentalist (1977:300)-although

2 W.K.C. Guthrie's criticism commonly is cited. Guthrie 4:143. See 1975 Thosewho

1 See, forinstance, Laszlo Versenyi's (1975n1)remarks his predecessors. on

Lorraine D. (2001). (1995); Pangle Michael Roth Smith

3 Gadamer 1980,Tindale 1984,Tessitore 1990, Gonzalez1995.Cp.also Haden 1983.

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DavidWolfsdorf

Theattitudeadvance hereis thatthephilosophical investigation I is in Lysis just as sophisticated interesting thosein theother and as dialogues-however earlydefinitional sophisticated interesting and thosemay There no needto defend philosophical content be. the of is merely explain accurately. has almost Lysis, This it not always been to The approached welldone. main reason that textis consistently the is about presumptions thenature friendship, thisreciprocal, with of as particularly exclusively emotional often relationhuman psychological, This experienced conceived. is anachand shipis nowconventionally misguided. ronistic otherwise Consider and thatthe psychological of to and so conditions empathy compassion common fundamental and ourexperiences loveandfriendship no placeinthediscussion. find of dimensions thetextseemto encourage the Ofcourse, dramatic the of is viewthat dialogue in essenceabouthuman the friendship, insofar Socrates, Hippothales, Menexenus, Ctesippus, and as thecharacters, are of in Lysis, all involved various as forms tXia. Butinfact, I have and has emphasized, arguedelsewhere as NaomiReshotko rightly the is for Platodevelops viewthathuman ptMia one,albeit us inLysis instance a much more humans especially of condiimportant, general the Remarkably, conception ptiMa of advanced notnecessarily tion.4 is or the psychological evenhuman. Oncethisis appreciated, misapplicabecomes tionoffamiliar clear.5 moral concerns Furthermore, false of it is the thattheE'pyov ypia that personae X6yoq notandcannot. actoutfulfills their what does Such viewaims a of and content thetext.Butit at an enlightened in synthesis form fundamentally the and misunderstands relation the between dramatic Thetheorizing, which dimensions thetext. argumentative of explicit whichconclusions about is the centerpiece thedramaand from of to the relationships the personaeare drawn, of attempts precisely experiences humans the we understand underlies familiar what share affections, friendships, including the in whatwe call ourloves, and Thisis theaimoftheearly of dialogues: relationships thepersonae.
4 Wolfsdorf 1997:198-254, Reshotko 1997.

5 Whether treatment pthia Lysis an unsatisfactory treatment Xthia in of the is of to seems meofsecondary importance.

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to abouthumanconduct an effort foster in to philosophize ethical knowledge. point-inso doing, texts But-and thisis thecrucial the of the contrary conventional reinterpret meaning thatconduct to understanding in light Platonic of andtraditional and philosophical conceptions. appearand Thus, is revealed things notas they it are that the reasons should thatvaluescommonly areheldfor wrong held or notbe heldatall. discussion The following particularly on focuses the conception the thatSocratesdevelops, namely conception yqtia as of pthia of belonging why it (OiKE16trCJ). thisis clarified, willbe explained Once theaporiain whichthe investigation does notjeopardizethis ends conception well as whythe aporiaitself nothing do with as has to the theineffability ptAia. will Finally, discussion touchuponthe of of of significance theconcept belonging Republic Gorgias I and in and clarify conceptofthefirst friend RtpWrov in thereby (r6 qpiXov) the
Lysis.

SOCRATES'FIRST CONCEPTIONOF (ptiXa relation Lysispthiais analyzedas a two-place whose Throughout may participants (qpiXot) ormaynotbe humans evenhavewhat or we considered infact states, do call most although examples would mental begins involve humans.6' 7The coreoftheanalysis with conventhe is and tional, traditional, Empedoclean that pthicabasedon likeview Threearguments madeagainst position.8 All ness(6poot6rlq). are this

6 Of course, insofar hiXta as is enacted through Socrates' engagement Lysis with and this is Menexenus relation three-place. "Plato's Lysis commonly as anearly read takes which 1997:1: 7 Cp.Reshotko is dialogue if with upthequestion: However,wereadtheLysis thesoleinten'whatis friendship?' tionofunderstanding when might Socrates' views properly concerning human beings be and we to becalled In likely confused disappointed.theLysis, friends oneanother will of he theory attractionwhich refers to Socrates develops general using word a the qtXia. also friendship, because takes human to he Socrates usestheterm qtlia torefer human friendshipbe a specialcase ofdesire In which itself form attraction. order a to to is of appreciate humans, must we saysabout first yptiabetween understand whatSocrates Cf. generally." alsoReshotko andBolotin what says qtXla 1979:130. he about 1993

8 Ly.213e4-215c2.

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thatptXhiabeneficial,9 assumption Socrates is mainan presume that the throughout discussion.10 tains First, is agreed it thatthatwhichis bad (rs KcK6v, hereafter the bad) is notqpixov thebad,becausethosewhoarebadareharmful." to be As such, bad cannot a participant pXica all. Second, is the in at it agreed likes 6pota), as are cannot insofar they alike, participate (r& that since, they notneedanything do insofar they alike, in ptXia as from are from oneanother socannot and benefit oneanother."2 itis Third, derive that insofar is the agreed that which good(TO hereafter good), &ya06v, participate qtXiasincethegood,insofar it as it is good,cannot in as andso cannot benefited.'3 be needsnothing, Accordingly, the is good, at is be in if goodcannot a participant ptXia all.In sum, pthia beneficial,then pitXia cannot basedonlikeness. be Subsequently, the Socratesand Menexenusbriefly entertain viewthatctXiais based on opposition This contrary (Evavwt6rlq). thought be attractive certain relations viewisinitially to between since beneficial. example, rich the For mayassist poor, the opposites appear this entertained thewisetheignorant.'4 However, viewis notseriously that itia exists between badandthe the is assumed imply to sinceit and was good, this previously rejected."' that Socrates questions assumption participants ptXia now the in should distinguished to be according thedichotomy goodandbad of existnotsimply likeandtheoppotypes. suggests there He the that is like site,butalso that the which inbetween, neither noropposite.
assumed thediscussion 9 This ideahasbeenrepeatedly in already. example, when For treatment Lysis, converses Hippothales about Hippothales' of Socrates Socrates with is whether subsequently to is well.Socrates interested know Hippothales treating Lysis rebukes Lysis. Socrates' it Hippothales spoiling In Lysis, is implied with for exchange Socrates benefiting byhumbling instructing andLysis ostensibly is that him; is Lysis and into provoked philosophical benefited being by investigation. that 10So,for claims admit that instance, theendoftheinvestigation, at Socrates "to (iXprlorov) is would mistaken" 222c1). (Ly. which useless isypiXov be
11 Ly.214b7-c3.
12 Ly.214e2-215a4.

15is that Xp6q (the stresses irrationality or the Socrates ofclaiming 6 ~ hateful thehated) could engaged <pitXa itsopposite 216a6-bl). with be in (Ly.

13 Ly.215a4-c2. 14 Ly.215d4-7.

in PtAl'a Plato'sLysis

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are according a trichotomytypes to Accordingly, entities categorized of is goodnorbad (rb the (ylvrl): good,thebad,and thatwhich neither be participate ptiiaandsinceptXia thebad cannot in cannot based on likeness, remains theneither it that goodnorbadandthegoodare in the participants ptXfia. thatthisdoesnotcontradict previous Note from another, Socrates claimthat goodcan derive benefit the for no the must reciprocal. inthis of be As that benefit yptia doesnotassume case,itisunilateral. is thensuggests thatthecauseof ptXia thepresence of Socrates This goodnorbad."7 point compels todistinhim thebadintheneither Precisely, if guish waysinwhich entity havea property."' two an may thebadis present theneither to goodnor bad,then must present it be a bad insuch way goodnor isnotitself So Socrates that neither the bad. claims: are to is somethings suchas thatwhich present trap6v) (rb them, other arenot.19 and things the gives following Socrates example: onetints one'sblonde if hair lead,thenthewhiteness present thehair, thehair is white but to with itself remains then However, oldageturns if blonde. one'shairwhite, present thehairis,as hesays, "such thehair.20 The to thewhiteness as" for ofthe haveimplications theinterpretation self-attripassage may and of instances. of bution properties therelation properties their and ButI willnotdwellon thesehere.It suffices notethatthiswayof to the of conceptualizing relation thebadandtheneither goodnorbad the accommodates alleged with notion thebad the that causeof piXia cannot ptiMa. in participate
the Since good nor bad).16 prTE yaOibv hereafter neither pr'rEKaK6V,

16Ly. 216d5-7. 17 In the passage under consideration,Socrates uses the expression "Sa& KaKO) napovoaiv" (Ly.217b5-6). However, when he laterrejectsthiscausal account Socrates 221c2). uses thewordai'rov (Ly. 18However, speaks of entities Socratesdoes not use any wordforproperty; simply he beinga particular way. 19Ly. 217c3-4. (Ly. T AXEUKaL. 217d8-el). XEUKOiO tIapOUMg 20 T6TEEYvOVrool6vEp "bnap6v,

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is, of as of that the I will speak this Socrates' conception yptia, first conception he himself develops. initial reaction it is that to His first this: we Lysis Menexenus, on and So now, I said, can count having is what 6 q(piXovand whatit is not.Forwe say discovered that thesoulandinthebodyand everywhere neither the in has of of goodnorbad,which thepresence thebad,is pitov thegood.21 which neither First, human is body, Twoexamples given. are the is saidtobe qfiXov medicine, of onaccount bad, is which good, goodnor is which bad.22 is Second, humansoul,which neither ofdisease, the goodnor of bad,is saidtobe cpiXov knowledge is (oopia),which good, of the is connotation on account ignorance, which bad.23 Observe broad oftheverb ptX~hv. secondexample The makessensebecauseloving condition. However, first in example which is a psychological the the diseased onlyseemssensible interpreted lovesmedicine if body figuabove, Lysis is But, ratively. as mentioned throughout ptXia notmerely relationship. includes a human 'thAa relations psychological as treated nature. fact, and ofboth psychological a physical these categorical a In are crucial theanalysis. example, analyzing distinctions not to For the in basedon opposition, viewofytXia speaks thewetdesiring of Socrates Note the and the (rTt0Ulpd) dry thecolddesiring hot.24 also,again, that mutual we while conceive friendship involving affection, type as of the ofpthiaintheseexamples non-reciprocal. ignorant loves The is soul wisdom, wisdom doesnotlovein return; diseased the bodyloves but body.25 short, In but it medicine, medicine doesnotlovethediseased is prudent interpreting conception ptXia in in the of developed the
21 Ly.218b6-c2. 22 Ly. 217a4-b6. 23 Ly.218a2-b3. ydp- -Uli' &'X oTroo 6po{iou iV y&p pb v e toytouotoO EKaaorov, 0ypo0, Ti 24 rti a Kai XqfipE8&KEVCra6eq pros E% 6S PuXp v 0eploo,T 8S~ &i60 rT68 KE"vvrtptp0o0wx, f3Xo, (Ly.215e4-8). has been noted by other in 25 The viewthat ptXhia Lysis treated as non-reciprocal is scholars.See,forexample, 1997:2-3. Robinson 1986.Cf.also Reshotko

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textnotto import preconceptions familiar aboutthenature certain offriendship. that Indeed, is Reshotko suggested Lysis primarily has the with nature attraction. might sayitconcerns also of concerned One thenature bonds. of SOCRATES'SECOND CONCEPTIONOF iptCMa conception ptAia of withhis first lastsonly Socrates'satisfaction Atoncehe is overcome a sense this with that conception momentarily. is incorrect:26
I to whichwe had agreedwas nottrue... I am afraid, replied,

suspicion cameover that conclusion the strange [A]most me

thatin our searchconcerning we qpiXov havecomeupon that braggarts.27 arguments arenobetter a setof than

In theensuing the discussion criticizes first conception Socrates ofpia anddevelops alternative. perceives problems with two an He conception: and theyconcern object thecauseofyptXia. thefirst the of First, that suggests a qpio(lover) qpixo(loving) someis Socrates thing bad goodbecauseof (6ta) something and also forthesake of loves doctor a For (EVEKa) good.28 example,patient because something a ofdisease for sakeofhealth. notion and the presents difficultwo This (loving) a qihXo ties.First, qiXoq(lover) (beloved), of a becomespiXoq says, pi'Xoq (loving) likewhich of "thuslikebecomes and,as Socrates difficulty, it for we saidwas impossible."29 However, is a trivial this in prevents at are participants piMa from existing all sincethey alike as insofar eachis a participant a relation thia. Butin thiscase, in of are are in qpiXoi onlyalikeinsofar they participants therelation as of qpiMa, arenot piXot they are Furthermore, the because since they alike. is in of each relation ytia is non-reciprocal participantnot oihXo; the is first sameway; loves, other loved. Socrates' exchange the As one with

26 Ly.218c4ff.

27 Ly. 218c5-7, d2-4. 28 Ly. 218d6-219b8. 29Ly. 219b6-cl.

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pifxoq be used has Menexenus already can madeevident, adjective the inboth senses.30 point treated moresubstantial. claim, Thesecond hereis as The is L, (lover) (pikoq (loving) a qlXo (beloved) the of after that qpikoq for a a entails regress, ifa beloved in every is sakeofa qpioq(beloved) for beloved, beloved whosesake for case loved thesakeofanother the for thebeloved loved in turn lovedfor sakeofa beloved is be will the ad expresses point follows: this as infinitum. Socrates in thisway, unlesswe can arrive somegoverning prinat us that one ciple(apxi~) willnotkeepleading on from ypilov but friend nprTovqpi'ov) the (t6o to another, willreach first are for whosesakeall theotherthings said to be beloved
(cpYjXC)?31

Noware we not bound to wear ourselvesout withgoingon

Socrates' point that misrepresents condition thiMa. is of The the L is, Thereis some drive thatgoverns ptiMa in fact, interminable. not that desired itsownsake, thesakeofnothing and object is for else, for every objectis loved.Notethat forthesakeofwhich otherbeloved (The thisideais notdefended.32 nature thisobject be discussed of will below.) of ofthe Theintroduction concept thefirst Socrates friend enables to distinguish of ptiMa types to He saysthat according their objects. be pi'ka the of thatarelovedfor sakeofotherqpiXka cannot thought insofar therealqpiov is thatwhich pursued proper, as is for as cpika thesakeofnothing Accordingly, following else. of the division txicat the goodnorbad andthefirst friend 'thia between neither results. ptXia. 'thia between neither the goodnorbad and some is intrinsic is ypiovthat notthefirst friend extrinsic Socrates beneficial is ptXica.
cptXia a phantom (E&'go)ov)of intrinsic ptia. describesextrinsic as
30 Ly.211d6-213d5. 32 The claimofa npdrovq(pkov bothan ethicaland a psychological-or has rather, since ptiMa entities On need notinvolve withsouls,motivational-implication. theone hand,it on entailsa speciesofethicalmonism; the otherhand,it impliesthatlove dependsupon a stateofdeficiency.
31 Ly.219c ff.

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Furthermore, extrinsic MtXiat bedistinguished inauthentic should from as according convenwhich, we willsee,are relations that, to piXftat, harmful appear be tXicat, areactually to understanding, and but tional properly ptMaic all. so not, speaking, at second criticism hisfirst of conception pthia concerns Socrates' of of that suggests thepresence thebadintheneither itscause.Socrates he that goodnorbad doesnotcause pitia.33 Instead, argues ifthebad nonetheless and didnotexist, neither desire the goodnorbadwould grants itis difficult imagine that lovethefirst friend. Socrates just to howthings wouldbe ifbads(r&KaKd) notexist.34 he suggests But did are as hunger thirst, notin themselves and thatsomedesires, such harmful beneficial so neither norgood.Rather, are and bad they or are as Thus, objects beneficial harmful. or goodor bad insofar their he says, desires there no reason is why thatareneither goodnorbad ceaseto existifbadsdid.Onecouldstill would desires, havethese but be the he that would Therefore, concludes desire, only for good.35 they of yptica. notthepresence thebad,causes nowexplains nature desire follows. which the of as That Socrates desires deficient is (v56Efq) desires it and thatinwhich is deficient.36 Sincedesireis the cause of pthia, thatwhich deficient is lovesthat of it is when is deprived in which is deficient.37 entity deficient it An is something & qaipirat).38 of whichan entity deprivedis its (rta That belonging oiKE"OV).39 (r6 Therefore, belongs an entity the to what is
friendship objectofitslove (ZEpxq), ((ptia), and desire(~rint8v a).40

33 Cf.Socrates'question:"Foriftherewerenothing leftto harmus,we shouldfeelno wantofanyassistance... Is notthisthe natureofthegood-to be belovedbecause ofthe bad byus who are midway betweenthe good and thebad,whereasseparately forits and ownsakeit is ofno use?" (Ly. 220c7-d2). "Or 34 Cf.his statement, is thisa ridiculous question-as to whatwillexistor not exist in sucha case? Forwho can tell?"(Ly. 222a). 35 Thisargument presented Ly. is at 221a-b. 36 Ly.221d7-el.
37 Ly. 221el-2.

38 Ly.221e2-3. Cf.the use of the verbd&qalpWt describethe confiscation one's to of property Gorg. 466c1,468d2,511a7). at thatwhich 39 Thisproposition notexpressed, is derivable but from is precedesand that whichfollows it. 40 Ly. 221e3-4.

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via that Itshould emphasized inLysis tEtu is treated a condibe as In tionmore general than what calldesire. thesamewaythat what we is conceived one manifestation thebroader as of we call friendship of we as so is condition <pXia, what calldesire conceived onemanifesthat of of tation thebroader Entities do nothave condition rimOupia. claims Again, soulsexperience inteOupia. recall Socrates' the that body desires thewetdesires dry thecoldthehot. and the and medicine that the dialogues a subject Socrates' conception desire among early of is turns whether on Socrates ofconsiderable debate. The controversy everyone what really is that goodorrather desires to commits theview discussed the what fallibly The as one regards good.41 mainpassages in 77b2-78b6, are debate Meno 466a4-468e5, Protagoras and 352b1Gorgias 357e8. the I Regarding Meno defended view, the passage, haveelsewhere consistent thedominant with ofthe interpretation passage, desire that of follows an upona fallible evaluation that for object I object good.42 as to of will conception desire. refer this thesubjectivist as I Regarding Gorgias akin passage, support viewsomewhat to a the thatSocrates' by argues arguMcTighe theoneadvanced McTighe.43 and ment against Polusis ad hominem therefore theclaim within that the argument everyone that desiresthe good-whichheremeans sound good-doesnotprovide what really evidence desires everyone is Socrates' Plato's dialogues. or conception desire of of among early the I do as however, Unlike the McTighe, notregard argument ad hominem; desiresthe goodas a dialecthateveryone I do regard premise the follows claimthathealth, ticalexpedient. thatthispremise Note the wealth, so onare(intrinsic) Thissurely nota position that is and goods. convenient the dialogues. is,however, Platoendorses among early It
41 For example, whohave some recently argued Socrates committedtheview that is to the HedaSegvic(2000), (1991), Terry Penner thatall peopledesire realgoodinclude and D. (1994:87-102); Penner C.J.Rowe Terry Thomas Brickhouse Nicholas Smith C. and

arguments ofa very are character. Crucially, andPenner's different Brickhouse Smith and suggest Socrates committeda true Penner to is self. this that rejects move. 42Wolfsdorf2006a. 43McTighe 1984.

(1994),NaomiReshotko and Smith's (1997). But cf.McTighe1984.Note thatBrickhouse

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that merely for in thepresent context, Socrates needsPolusto assent as normally health, theAthenians pursue endssuchobjects wealth, as the in I that andso on.In short, regard claim Gorgias everyone desires thegoodas carrying weight thedebate or overSocrates' Plato's no in among early of conception desire the dialogues. supports subjectivist the TheProtagoras passagestrongly concepin and analysis akrasia of tionofdesire Meno. denial intellectualist The that for or concludes all desires particular of are objects courses action upona fallible evaluation a of rational insofar all actions follow just as of objects as given including course action, pursued, good. Theconception desirein Lysis, I of which willcallthedeficiency explains causeofdesire: the by is conception, desire motivated defiof ciency; a causes moreprecisely, subject's deficiency itsbelonging are an desire. question belongings Hereitbecomes important whether Forexample, consider Menexenus be hungry or may tokens types. that and desirea particular at thefishmonger's in theagora.Is stall fish fish, in or more belonging particular fish general, still Menexenus' that option, theparticular object anydesire generally The that of food? first seemsabsurd, then particular belonging, for whatever is thesubject's one is suggests therefore, Charity, that object desires one'sbelonging. be thesetypes mustessentially types. howgeneral belongings But are andaccording whattaxonomy are to be conceived not is they to discussed Lysis. in Itsuffices thepresent are for that and discussion belongings types ofan unspecified the degreeofgenerality. Consequently, deficiency can conception be conceptualized compatible thesubjectivist as with as which a type, is of conception follows. Deficiencya belonging, causes in desire.Forexample, is Menexenus deficient foodand therefore food. object governed desire a a for Desirefor particular is desires by type. desires particular Menexenus corresponding Forexample, this Belongings notgoodorbad; fish becauseMenexenus desires food. are Particular are is of there goodfoodandbad food. objects desire good fish stall orbad.Forexample, particular at thefishmonger's may the of or be spoiled fresh. subject errinhisevaluation theparticThe may ularobjectofdesire. short, In and the pre-rationally pre-evaluatively deficiency us the type from orients toward right of motivation arising

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tokens thosetypes goodor of are objects, we must but judgewhether bad. of Socrates' In sum, secondconception pthiais this:Theneither friend good norbad lovesthe first because the first friend its is belonging. first The goodnorbad friend thebelonging theneither of is in the of because neither goodnorbadis deprived andso deficient and first friend. the so desires Finally, of applies second Socrates conception ytXia therelato his of tionships theinterlocutors: if are with "Then, you two [Lysis and Menexenus] qi0Xoi somehow one another, wouldbelongto one another you bynature "Precisely," said."And boys, they (p6aGEt)." if, one desires lovesanother, wouldnotdesire love or or person he orbefriend unlessthelover in him belonged somewayto in or manner, thebeloved, either soulorsomecharacteristic, But form soul." entirely," Menexenus. Lysis "Yes, said of fell I "it to "Well,' said, hasbeenshown what silent. belongs that isnecessary ustolove." itseems," for "So usbynature (p6uoEt) said. he [Menexenus] "Thenit is necessary thegenuine for and (npooTrotnrcy) admirer44 (yvrlaip) nottheinauthentic (pacoTfi) be lovedbyhis darling to Then (rzv xat~xKOV)." whereas nod of assent, Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint Hippothales, ofpleasure all rfq full (i6n6 ijSoviq),turned of manner colors.45 clarifies human relationships be Thepassage how psychological can ofqynia. ostensible The problem human relationships as with instances instances pthia that souls most the of are of good humans neither nor is when suggests peoplecanbelong oneanother bad.But to Socrates that manner, souls, adds"or somecharacteristic, to withrespect their he or form soul." Accordingly,allowsthatthe soulis complex of and he or so thatsomeparts aspects maybe extrinsically whileothers good arenotorneither goodnorbad.In thatcase,human cptia can occur
I refrain from translating "ipaotijq"as "lover"sincethatwouldlead to confusion. 45 Ly.221e5-22b2.
44

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benefitthat in cases where one person possesses some psychological another lacksand so desires.Human pticat extrinsic are,then, qinXat. between a genuine and an Grantedthis, Socrates distinguishes admirer inauthentic and saysthatthedarling oughttolovethegenuine Herehe employs vocabulary homosexual of the admirer. discourse. is He a abouthomosexual making generalstatement but relations, also specificallyalludingto Hippothales'love forLysis. This is clearfrom fact the and thatSocratesnotes Hippothales'responseto his remarks thatthis timesince the beginning Socrates'conversation of is the first withthe boysthatHippothales'presencehasbeen mentioned. Thisalso explains Lysis'and Menexenus'distinct When to reactions Socrates'statements. Socratessaysthatwhen "one persondesiresor lovesanother, would he not desireor love or befriend himunlessthe loverbelongedin some way to the beloved,"Menexenusconsents, but Lysisfallssilent.This that Hippothales is because Lysis assumes that Socratesis implying and Lysisbelong to one anotherbecause Hippothalesis attractedto Hippothales'affecLysis-whereasLysisdoes not wantto reciprocate tionand does notwantto feelthathe oughtto. However, once Socrates admirer, betweena genuineand an inauthentic makesthe distinction that thisrevealsto Lysisthe possibility he need notfeelboundto reciprocateHippothales'affection since Hippothales maynot be a genuine Finally, admirer. Hippothalesassumesthathe is a genuineadmirer and as so interprets Lysis reciprocate to his Socrates'statement compelling affection. withpleasure.Thereare severalindiAccordingly, is filled he cationsthatHippothalesis deceived.The first thatthewordSocrates is uses forinauthentic alludes to the bathetic (admirer),"npoono-ulr6q, and hackneyedpoetryHippothalescomposes forLysis.The second, more obvious indication is that Hippothales is described as being whichsuggests hedonistic the motivation filled withpleasure (igSovri), governing interest Lysis. in his Insofar goodnessandpleasurearenot as and Hippothales'hedonistic identical is in interest Lysis not beneficial, not a genuineadmirer. Hippothales is Recallthatearlyin the dialogue Hippothales notknowing Socrates criticizes for howto conducthimself and thereby him.46 corrupting withrespectto his darling
46

Ly. 210el-5.

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between genuineand inauthentic the admirer The distinction and the as genuine inauthentic implies distinction between desire well piXia. doesnotauthentically Lysis, as Hippothales where desire love or with "authentically" and beneficially so in accordance means nature. between Accordingly, and inauthentic belonga distinction genuine where genuine a belonging a goodtype the ingscanbe inferred, of is is a badtype thebelonging. belonging an inauthentic and of belonging a natural Moreover, belonging an authentic belonging. is APORIAIN LYSIS of begins the Thecoreoftheanalysis qtXa inLysis with conventional and traditional conception qXhia of basedon likeness concludes and novel conception pldiabasedon belonging. second, of withSocrates' ends as Theaporia which investigation occurs a conflict in the between his concepSocrates articulated second After has thesetwopositions. it tionof pliXia applied to therelationships between personae and the and to he Lysis Menexenus drawa conclusion in thetext, urges from thediscussion:
like,it seems to me ... thatwe mightgive some accountof

and between belonging the Ifthereis anydifference the

what6 are 0pioq is. Butiflikeandbelonging thesameitis that noteasyto getridofourformer statement thelikeis are useless thelike to insofar they alike; toadmit as and that howabout theuseless qpiXov mistake. is would a gross be So if from discusthe drunk weagree we now... since arerather and sion, saythat belonging thelikearetwodifferent the to things? consent.] Thenshall mainwe [Lysis Menexenus and that good the toall(Travzi), tain while badisalien belongs the to (&AXX6ptov)? Ordoesthebadbelong thebad,thegoodto thegood, theneither goodnorbad to theneither good and agree pairs nor that lastthree bad?[Lysis Menexenus and the statements regarding that rejected first; piXia we at thevery of and (piXoq theunjust, will for nowtheunjust be as much
the bad of the bad as the good of the good ... Andwhat is So belongtogether.] hereagain,boys ... we have droppedin

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more, wesaythat goodandthe the belonging thesame, are if we cannot only avoidmaking good piXov tothegood... the we Butthisagain, know, a viewofwhich thought you is we
do had disabused ourselves;you remember, you not? ... So

Or our whatmore we do with argument? is itclearthat can

we can do nothing? We havenotyetbeen able to discover ...

6 what qpixois.47

Atthe end of a denseconversation, participants the vergeon a mutually accountof ptXia. Socrates suggests thatthis satisfactory requires distinction The a the between likeandthebelonging. boys agree make distinction. pixot However, asked when to the belong which together, claim do. in they thatlikes This choice results a contradiction ofwhat Socrates calls we regarding that rejected first; ptia at thevery statements nowtheunjust be as much friend theunjust, will for of a and thebadofthebad,as thegoodofthegood.48 is stageofthecoreoftheanalysis Socrates referring thefirst to as three arguments madeagainst popular are the where, wehaveseen, basedonlikeness. describing arguments In these view tiXa I emphaof sizedtheir assumption pltiamust beneficial. theend be shared that At oftheinvestigation must benefibe that againstresses ptXia Socrates Thus, Lysis' Menexenus' cial.49 and failure distinguish belonging the to the andthelikedraws argument to thegrounds uponwhich the back of was conception taia basedonlikeness rejected. as If,however, belonging the and the like are distinguished, a account Socrates is advises, thealternative adopted, consistent and basedon belonging be maintained. option The and Lysis of iAtia can Menexenus notchooseis that goodbelongs all (tavwt), the while do to It to thebad is aliento all.50 is notobvious what nravtf refers in this sentence. as According thetrichotomizationall entities either of to
47 Ly. 222b3-223b8.
48 Ly.222dl.

49 Ly. 222b8-c9. 223c3-5. 50 Ly.

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good, bad, or neithergood nor bad, it mightbe thoughtthat naywri However, factthatin thesame sentence rangesoverall threekinds. the thatthe bad is alien to all undermines it is stated thisinterpretation. Nothing belongto the bad; therefore, inavri cannotrangeoverall can kindsofentities. navrscannotrange overonlythegood Furthermore, sincein thiscase thegoodwouldbelongto the good,thebelonging and likewouldbe indistinguishable, accordingto boththe arguments and, that likecannotbe qpov ofthe like insofaras theyare alike and the good cannotbe qpiXov the good insofar theyare good,thiswould of as lead to the same contradiction the option Lysis and Menexenus as choose.Itremains good norbad,and rangesoverthe neither thatnawri Socrates I suggestthat Socratesintendsthis interpretation. short, In mustbe usingnavri as a masculineratherthan a neuternoun where or, "each one of "everybody" withemphasison human relationships, [humans]"is to be understood.This makes sense since although us piXiais not necessarily humanrelationship, the movement the of a in discussion immediately preceding passage underdiscussion the where Socratesapplieshis secondconceptionofyptia to the relationships of focusnarrows humanrelationships. to the personae, the In conclusion, alternative optionyields a conceptionof pthiia the that is consistent withthe second one Socrates developed,whilethe choosedependson the conception ctXia optionLysis and Menexenus of on likeness thatwas rejectedearlyin the investigation. based Thus,the answertothequestionofwhobelongsto whomis thatthegoodand the good norbad belongto one another. making neither thispoint, am In I merelydrawing attention the factthat,as interpreters, have no to we reasonto believethatthe aporia itselfin whichthe invescompelling tigationends is an indication thatPlato did not intendto advancethe based on belonging thatSocratesdevelops. of conception pthiXa Rather, below,the treatment the concept ofbelonging a of in as I will suggest otherpassagesamongthe earlydialoguesstrengthens view the couple thatPlatodid intend advancethisconceptionofq~ia. to As I have argued elsewhere,the aporia in which the discussion ends reflects particulardramatictheme common amongthe early a and between conventional traditional thetension and dialogues, beliefs novel Platonicones, and serves a distinctphilosophical-pedagogical

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objective: encouragethe intended to readerto reachan understanding In forhimself.51 sum, Socrates and the boys make progresstowarda mutually conceptionof pXia, but ultimately theydo not satisfactory reach one. Althoughthe familiarview of itia based on likeness is and Menexenus notentirely do rejected earlyin the investigation, Lysis Thisview of ptMareemergesat theirsets ofbeliefs. it extirpate from conflicts withthe conceptionof pthia the end of the investigation, and based on belonging, perplexestheinterlocutors. finalscene of The regressesin its the dialoguecasts some lighton whythe investigation conclusion, Socratessays: finalstages.In describing aporetic the Wehavebeen unable (onho ... olo rE yEV6pEOa) discover to what6 qpi~o is.52 The use ofthe first personpluralrather thanthesingular signifiis cant insofaras the limitationsowe to the limitationsof the group AlthoughSocratescontributes the development the to of collectively. conceptionof cptiiafarmorethanLysisand Menexenus, aporetic the owesto Lysis'and Menexenus'decision conclusion the investigation of Despitethe progoveranother. to chooseone optionSocratespresents ressofthe investigation, Lysisand Menexenus ultimately are boundto theconventional viewthat thiMabased on likeness. is finally Whenthe group'spowersofinvestigation reachexhaustion, to Lysis'and Menexenus'pedagoguesemerge taketheboyshome: Havingthus spoken,I was mindedto stirup somebodyelse amongthe olderpeople there, spirits whenlikeotherworldly there came upon us the pedagogues of Lysis (Sa&iPovEq), the and Menexenus.Theywerebringing boys'brothers and called out to themthe orderto go home,foritwas quite late. Atfirst triedwiththehelpofthegrouparoundus to drive we off; them but theytook no noticeofus and wenton angrily accent(itnoPapPapi~ovczE). calling, beforein theirforeign as We decided that they had taken a drop too much at the
51Wolfsdorf Cf. wolfsdorf 1997. also 2004.
52 Ly. 223b7-8.

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awkward and festival would peopleto dealwith. we prove So gaveinandbroke ourparty.53 up

spirits" as speaking and to Byreferringtheslaves "otherworldly as characterizes boys'pedagogues accents,"' as the in "barbarian Socrates foreign thediscussion wereslaves, Lysis' Sincepedagogues to group. pedagogues must and Menexenus' beenforeigners. The haveliterally to roles conclusion Lysis of the shows boysreturning their familiar under careoftheir the customary emphasis But pedagogues. Socrates' on theforeignnessthepedagogues, immediately of following invesan of a thathas developed theory ptXia based on belonging, tigation in to wards a philopedagogues foreign their intimates these that are sophical too. sense are the Socrates, boys, the otherattending and youth reluctant whenthe slavescometo fetch Lysis to breakoff discussion the and Menexenus take It havebeen that to them home. is remarked theslaves wine the drinking during rites theHermaia, dayon which the of the and discussion Mikkos' it at palaestra says occurs, Socrates that seemed that account theslaves onthis Socrates would intractable. word be The the uses to describe slaves'demeanor &nopol.54 imageofthe is This drunken intractable as pedaslavesserving Lysis'and Menexenus' gogues as and contrasts theimage Socrates Lysis' Menexenus' with of of describes pedagogue. thebeginning Lysis At Socrates temporary himself making way from Academy theLyceum. word as his the The to wordofthedialogue, hiswalk, first Socrates the is usesto describe ("I was kntopeF6prlv making way").56 aporiaor intractability of my The theslavesat theendofthedialogue contrasts passage withSocrates' at (nt6poq) thebeginning thedialogue. While is in of Socrates engaged Socrates', philosophy, drunken Lysis', slavesliterally the disband and Menexenus' convivium (ouvouoaxv). of The drunkenness theslavesalso recallsHippothales' drunkenlike nessandsuggests theslaves, Hippothales, havea detrithat may influence theboys. this In particular as they hinder on the mental case,
53 Ly.223al-b2. 54 Ly.223b2. 55 Ly.203al.

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boys inquiry, areperhaps from as they philosophical intended appear to doing Tothis are, Hippothales, tpoaotolrlro also extent slaves like the so. (piXot whom do The and (inauthentic) with Lysis Menexenus notbelong. harmful may drunkenness theslaves Hippothales be contrasted of and that describes himself drunkenness which from with beneficial Socrates as investigation: of as andtheboys sufferinga result thetortuous Sinceitis as ifwewere (psE6olpEv) theX6yoq56 drunk from theyleavethe and Menexenus As Lysis company leaveSocrates' of siteofbeneficial extrinsic the <ptia andrisk dangers theinauthentic surrounding The final sceneofthedialogue, them. withthe qpthia that of indicates of entrance theslavesandthedisbanding thegroup, investigation occurred thishighly unconventional philosophical has within spacegoverned thecounter-philosophical a conventions by of thepolis.The aporiaoftheinvestigation be seento result may from While communion this Socrates' of as condition theinvestigationwell. with boys sought provoke inquiry develop the philosophical has to and the understanding conventional, views, nonetheless, beyond received boysremain practices their entrenched theconventional in of deeply daily lives.

GORGIAS r6itp'rovYpiXov AND

concludes discussion justicewith Thraof In Republic Socrates I, his symachus theargument the with that justperson happier is thanthe unust begins defining function (Epyov) person. argument the by of The The e which e e only candoorthat which candobest.57 anentityas that of or function an entity hereconceived an operation activity. as is For vine is and seeing thefunction theeyes trimming branches of example, is thefunction a pruning knife.58 attributes of funcNotably, Socrates tions both artifacts tonatural and kinds. to
56 Ly.222c2. 57 R. I 352e2-3.

OiKEOt6rl IN REPUBLICI AND

58 R.I 352e5-353a2.

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Next, elicits Socrates Thrasymachus' assentto theclaimthatthereis excellence for thatis suitedto itspartic(&pErt) each thing a particular ular function.59 is to say,foreach entity perform particular That to its thatentity excelfunction properly optimally or musthave a particular Socrates lence.Forinstance, asks: Could the eyes perform their distinct Epyovwell if they excellence(oiKEiav&pEtljv)?60 lackedtheirownproper Fromothercontexts, is clear that sight(64ptq), it conceivedas the By excellenceofthe eye.61 thisI meanthat powerto see, is thedistinct say,a particular ifthe eye has a particular physicalconsticondition, tution,that enables it under the appropriate conditionsto see. In ("proper exceluse particular, noteSocrates' ofthephraseoiKEiC paEfT lence"). This suggests thereis an optimal thatforeach type of entity specifically condition the suitedto thattypethatenables itto perform particularly function suitedto thattype.Socratesdoes nothereuse the Epyov ("properfunction"), it is reasonphraseoiKSLov but correlative it able to supply as well. These conceptsfrom I Republic suggestthat what belongsto or is oiKEov to an entity a certaintype is an excellence of a particular of to kindand thatthe possessionofthis excellence enables thatentity I operate properlyand optimally. Republic Socrates characterizes In as or suchactivity operation happiness(E65atcpovia): Anddidwe notagreethatthe excellenceofthe soul isjustice ... Then thejust man liveswell ... And he who liveswell is blessedand happy(E6l5aipCv).62 Insofar excellenceis good (&ya06v),this accordswithSocrates' as thatthegood is oiKEiov all humans, who are claimat theend ofLysis to neither good norbad. It is thisthathumanslack and thatwouldenable whichis to say,to livewell. themto function optimally,

59 R.I353b2-4. 60 R. I353b14-c2. 61 Thisis rather uncontroversial. 62 R. I353e7-354al.

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Socrates assumes thatall that is good-"we and everyIn Gorgias thingelse that is good"-is good through the presence of a certain Moreover, claims thatthe excellenceof each thinghe excellence.63 of or creature"-entails "whether an artifact bodyor soul or anyliving (rzitq) and order(6pO6rrlj): structure a certain organizedand So the excellence of each thingis something orderedin a particularstructure And so a certainorder ... belonging(oiKElOq)to each thingand presentin it makes each thinggood.64 Soon after Socratesmakesthe following thisremark, generalstatementaboutthe natureofthe cosmos: Wise men tell us, Callicles,thatheavenand earthand gods and men are held togetherby communionand cpthiaand orderlinessand sound-mindedness justice, and this is and thereasonwhytheycall thisuniverse cosmos.65 a nicely from Theseremarks Gorgias dovetail Republic withthosefrom of withrespect Socrates'conception piXIa I. Theyare also suggestive to based on belongingin Lysis; theyhelpclarify natureofthefirst and the When the concept of the first is friend. friend introduced Lysis, in no it However, is suggestedto be clear indicationis given of its identity. desiredforits own sake and to be thatforthe sake ofwhichall other are is, intrinsic desire. the friend then, desiderata desired.Desirefor first is Socrates claimsthathappiness(E6aimpovia) the In Euthydemus ultimate objectofdesireinsofar itmakesno sense,when one speaks as of desiringhappiness, to seek a further explanationforthe desire. describesthisas theeudaimonist axiom.66 Nicomachean In Vlastos Ethics, Aristotle, appropriating Platonicideas,writes: Now ifthere exists an end in the realmof actionwhichwe desireforitsown sake,an endwhich all determines ourother
63 Grg. 506d2-4. 64 Grg.506el-4. 65 Grg. 507e6-a3. 66 Vlastos1991:203.

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if, words, do notmakeall ourchoices desires; inother for we will thesakeofsomething else-forinthiswaytheprocess so and be would futile pointour go oninfinitelythat desire this less-thenobviously end willbe thegood,thatis,the good.67 highest Shortly hecontinues: after, and all To resume discussion-since knowledge every the choice directed is is somegood, us discuss let toward what in goodattainourviewtheaimofpolitics, is,thehighest that As as most ablebyaction. far itsnameis concerned, people probably boththecommon ofpeople run would agree-for by mencall it happinessand understand and cultivated the well'and 'doing happy' sameas 'living But well.' 'being when comes defining happiness they to it disagree, what is, by andtheaccount run from given thecommon differs that ofthephilosophers.68

toPlato: divide Returning scholarly principally over interpretations or whether first in is Form Goodness happiness.69 of the friendLysis the Within discursive the of of context Lysis is there no mention Forms
as the I I option misguided. whatsoever. thisreason regard former For the ofthe friend endorse identification first with happiness. However, this identification be qualified. must Wehaveseenthat distinction between inauthentic genuine the and

good. the cannot happiness objective qua first Consequently, friend be good.
69InVlastos 1991:230, first isidentified EU6atpiovia. who the friend with Scholars have that first isto include suggested the friend beidentified the with Form the Samb of good
See 1959:500. 1991. alsoKramer
67 1094a18-22. 68 1095a14-22.

that entails intrinsic piXtia notnecessarily And this qtXia. This is good. that which desired befriended itsownsake further entails that is or for words, first the good; isnotnecessarily inother is necessarily friend not

ptXia not to distinction between is analogousthe intrinsic extrinsic and extrinsic Intrinsic may genuine inauthentic; piXia be pitfa. or likewise

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Butthisis just as it shouldbe. Happiness belonging, albeit qua both belonging, a type should is goodandbad that admit superordinate that desires happiwith kinds. is consistent theprinciple everyone This notes, disagreement what for, there substantial is over ness, as Aristotle happiness, while is. happiness Accordingly, weareallmotivated toward between to happiness its genuine we are compelled distinguish and inauthentic semblances. APPENDIX Thispaperwas composedin 2002and acceptedforpublication in 2003. a number SincethattimeI havepublished haveforthcoming or of dialogues ofdiscussions desirein Plato'searly or, thatamplify in certain discussion. page245,endof respects, the supplant present On paragraph, that I write "I regard claim Gorgias everyone that first the in the overSocrates' desires goodas carrying weight thedebate no in or the conception desire dialogues." Wolfsdorf: Plato's among early of See paragraph, Again page245, of on that beginning second I write the passagestrongly the of "Protagoras conception supports subjectivist See 2006b. desire Meno" Wolfsdorf: in on paragraph, "... end I write butwemust Finally, page246, offirst a of judgewhether tokens those types goodorbad." provide fuller are I in account desire Lysis Wolfsdorf 2007. of in
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY 2008.

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