Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory Author(s): Brian Ripley Source: Political Psychology, Vol.

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Political Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993

Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory

Brian Ripley Universityof Pittsburgh

Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) can be considered an autonomous "researchprogram" in internationalrelationstheory.The basic tenets of FPDM are identified using the framework and terminologyof Lakatos. The aims and assumptions of FPDM are comparedto neorealism, a dominantresearchprogram in international relations. Distinctions between FPDM and neorealism should be maintained in the interests of internal consistency and progressive theory-building.
KEY WORDS: foreign policy; decision-making;neorealism;psychology; theory;international relations.

INTRODUCTION The rationalreconstruction a researchprogramin social science is a risky of business. It is temptingto overstateexpectations,oversimplifyassumptions,and overestimate the rationality and coherence of the scientific enterprise. In the practice of science, complex intellectual debates are never really settled; the residualambiguityleaves plenty of loose ends and unfinishedbusiness for a new generation of debaters. In the historical reconstructionof science, however, reasonable choices are made and satisfactoryconclusions are drawn in a tidy fashion. Winners and losers can be identified. The recent reconstructions reassessmentsof neorealismin international and relationstheory leave one with the impressionthatmost of the important debates have been settled-in favorof neorealism(Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1986). Those who disagree with the fundamentalpremises of this researchprogramare releof gated to the categoryof "critics" neorealism.Many scholarswho studyforeign from a cognitive perspective find themselves in this policy decision-making
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position; they can amend or challenge neorealism, but they cannot escape it (R. Herrmann,1988). In this paper a positive, constructiveoutline of the foreign policy decisionmaking (FPDM) researchprogramis presented.FPDM has the potentialto stand on its own-independent from the underlyingassumptionsof neorealism. My remarkson the natureof researchprograms. argumentrequiresa few preliminary natureof FPDM has been a mixed blessing, providing The interdisciplinary productive cross-fertilizationof ideas on the one hand but creating confusion over concepts and basic theoreticalconstructson the other. As Rosenau points out, foreign policy analysis is a "bridgingdiscipline"ultimatelyconcernedwith "politics at every level" (Rosenau, 1987, p. 1). For example, studentsof foreign policy decision-makinghave continually searchedfor the most creative, appropriate way to incorporate"psychological"variablesin their analyses.' This willingness to embracediversity is refreshingbut risky. Interdisciplinambition is worth the risk if it enables scholars to explain a vast arrayof ary political phenomenarelevantto foreign policy. It makes little sense for political scientists to probe the intricaciesof other fields, however, unless they are confident of returning with insights for the study of politics. Ambition must be grounded in pragmatism:the capacity to see useful linkages among diverse literatures,the willingness to sacrificepristineparsimonyfor thatwhich can help guide policy, and the recognition of disciplinary limits. As contributorsto a "bridging discipline" students of foreign policy decision-making need to be judicious in drawing from other disciplines-not from a petty concern for preserving traditionalacademic boundaries,but in orderto insist on maintaininga practicalfocus in our study of foreign policy. We should search for answers to questions about the politics of foreign policy ratherthan accept whatever research agenda is currentlyfashionablein anotherfield. Can we identify a set of basic principles that unite the diverse "bridgebuilding"scholars who combine relationstheory? political psychology, foreign policy analysis, and international In this article, I borrow a conceptual device from the philosophy-of-science literatureand propose a set of "hardcore" assumptionsfor the FPDM research program.

LAKATOS INVOKED Lakatosianstandardsare frequentlyinvoked in evaluatingpolitical science researchprograms(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita,Krasner,& Jervis, 1985; Hermann
'Sometimes attemptsto borrowtheoreticalinsights from psychology have been clumsy. Perhapsthis is attributable political scientists' misunderstanding important to of psychological theories (e.g. see Cottam's[1986] critiqueon this point). A differentline of criticismexpressesconcernthatpsycholodifferentphenomena(e.g. see Jervis gists and political scientists may be looking at fundamentally [1986] and Anderson [1986]).

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& Peacock, 1987; Keohane, 1986; Vasquez, 1982). Political scientists-especially students of international relations-make periodic assessments of scientific "progress" in the discipline. This helps establish the research agenda by clarifying relationships among potentially divergent hypotheses and empirical findings.2 There is a danger of exaggerating the logic and coherence of a research program, perhaps glorifying it or being excessively critical of earlier decisions by scholars (Dryzek and Leonard, 1988). Nevertheless, the exercise of identifying a research program proves useful in determining progressive "next steps" for researchers in a given field. The basic elements in a Lakatosian research program are a set of hard-core assumptions (the program's "negative heuristic") and a set of auxiliary assumptions and hypotheses (the program's "positive heuristic"). (For a cogent summary of Lakatos's [1970] arguments aimed specifically at political scientists, see Ball [1976].) The hard-core assumptions are the unassailable, albeit unprovable, defining tenets of the research program. Research progresses by acceptance of these assumptions, and "allows the scientist to get on with his work without having to constantly defend his core assumptions" (Ball, 1976, p. 164). These assumptions also delineate the boundaries of the phenomenon to be explained. The auxiliary hypotheses, on the other hand, help explain "anomalies"apparent deviations from behavior predicted by the theory-in a way that preserves the integrity of the research program. Successful creation of auxiliary hypotheses represents a "progressive problem-shift" in a research program; adherents to the program are able to explain new, previously anomalous events without abandoning the research program (Ball, 1976).

THE "HARD CORE" OF FPDM Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) provide the seminal statement on the FPDM research program. De Rivera (1968) and Jervis (1976) would also vie for the title of "seminal work" in FPDM. Nevertheless, Snyder et al. provide an early vision that anticipates many of the questions raised in subsequent theoretical efforts. These authors present a cogent argument on behalf of their "frame of reference" or "conceptual scheme" for the study of international politics.3 There are numerous theoretical claims, empirical hypotheses, and provocative philo2Lakatos'sstandardsare not without problems. The applicationof these standardsmay be strained since they were not initially intendedto help assess a researchprogramin progressbut ratherone at the climax and decline of a researchprogram.Given precedentfor use of Lakatosianstandardsin concurrentevaluations of researchprograms,however, my effort seems justified. 3Snyderet al. use the terms "frameof reference"and "conceptualscheme" throughouttheir work (e.g., pp. 26-33). As these authorspoint out, "a conceptualscheme may be of substantialhelp in asking all the possibly significantquestions, in asking them in fruitfulform, and uncoveringsome of the subtle analytical problems raised by apparentlypertinentand self-evident questions"(p. 20). This sentiment is perfectly consistent with the Lakatosian"researchprogram."

406 Table I. Defining Tenets of Neorealism and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Neorealism States are the primaryactors in world politics. Nonstate actors are acknowledged, but their role is minimal. States act on the basis of a rationalcalculation of self-interest. Foreign policy is best understoodas the attempt to pursue security in an inherently conflictual world. Power (or self-interest) is the primarycurrency of internationalrelations. The structureof the global system is the primary determinantof a state's behavior. Policy prescriptionsinvolve adaptationto the dictates of rationality(e.g., recognize the limits of collective action). FPDM

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Foreign policy elites acting on behalf of states and nonstateinstitutionsare the primary actors in world politics. Foreign policy elites act on the basis of their "definitionof the situation." Foreign policy is best understoodas the unending task of sequentialproblem-solving by goal-directedelites operatingwithin organizationaland cognitive constraints. Informationis the primarycurrencyof internationalrelations. The global system is merely an arena for the pursuitof projectsby purposiveelites. Policy prescriptionsinvolve efforts to compensate for individualmisperceptionand organizationalpathologies (e.g., recognize tendency to stereotypeenemies).

sophical nuances contained in their prescient monograph. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin offered a tentative approach to the study of decision-making, and their monograph leaves room for integrating subsequent work. The monograph contains relevant "hard core" concepts that continue to define the study of foreign policy decision-making. Table 1 compares the basic tenets of FPDM with the basic tenets of neorealism.4 1. Decision-making elites are the most important actors in international politics. While recognizing "that the nation-state is going to be the significant unit of political action for many years to come," Snyder et al. focus on the decisionmakers who actually constitute the state (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962, p. 63). Rather than assume that states have well-defined interests (i.e., "The U.S. national interest"), Snyder, Bruck and Sapin call for an examination of the beliefs, values, and goals of decision-making elites who act as the state in foreign policy. The decision to restrict analysis to elites operating within a state system would allow the FPDM research program to deviate from neorealism in important ways while still maintaining some allegiance to neorealist assumptions about the global system. One might consider FPDM as an "inside out" explanation of state behavior (based on internal features of the state) rather than an "outside in"
of 4The list of "hardcore" assumptionsin Table 1 is derived from my interpretation both FPDM and Neorealism. Of course, other scholars may wish to challenge these lists. Debates over the fundamental assumptionsof contendingtheories should be consideredpartof the intellectualevolutionof internationalrelations (Lapid, 1989).

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imposed on states by the explanation(based on the constraintsand opportunities global system) (Mandelbaum, 1988, p. 5). Despite some advantages, an intellectualalliance between neorealism and FPDM on these terms would be uncomfortablefor both parties. The cost to neorealism comes in terms of parsimony;efforts to include variables such as leadership, beliefs, and organizationalbehaviormuddy the waters of an otherwise clean systemic explanationof state behavior.The cost to FPDM is in the relations. FPDM looks to unduly restrictivestate-centricmodel of international the beliefs of elites for an explanationof foreign policy, but eligible elites could reside in nonstateinstitutionssuch as international organizationsor transnational social movements (e.g., Haas, 1990; Dryzek et al., 1989). Neorealism and FPDM must maintaintheirintellectualautonomyin orderto preservetheiressential theoreticalvitality; elaborationin subsequentassumptionsmay help clarify this point. 2. In order to interpret patterns of behaviorin global politics, we mustendeavor to understandthe decision-maker'sown "definitionof the situation." The precise meaning of "definition of the situation" is open to debate. "choice," and "expectaSnyder, Bruck, and Sapin emphasizethat "perception," tion" are crucial components in the derivationof a "definitionof the situation" can (1962, p. 66). An implicit assumptionin this researchis thatdecision-makers define their situationsin ratherperverseways and often differamongthemselves about central features of the problem they confront. The emphasison the decision-maker's"definitionof the situation" given has rise to a considerable amount of researchon the role of individualbeliefs and 1990). perceptionsin foreign policy (e.g., Sylvan and Chan, 1984; Vertzberger, "Definitionof the situation"functionseffectively as a hard-core assumptionsince it is fluid enough to incorporate diverse models of cognition and perception.An importantset of questions relatingto "definitionof the situation"has to do with theories of information-processing individualsand organizations(e.g., Larby son, 1985, pp. 24-65). For example, do individuals behave as consistencyseekers when interpretinginformation?Do they rely on a set of scripts or schemas in diagnosing policy problemsand in selecting appropriate solutions?How much variationcan be expected across individualdecision-makers?The operational code, for example, is aimed at understanding fundamental the worldview or "belief system"of a decision-maker.Operational codes have been constructed for several leaders, including Woodrow Wilson (A. George and J. George, 1964), John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1962), and Henry Kissinger (Starr, 1984; Walker, 1977). Neorealists avoid the thorny theoreticalproblems associated with subjectively derived "definitions of the situation"by assuming rational behavior by

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states. Although some variationmay be allowed (such as rationalitywithin the boundaries of different informationconstraints) substantialtinkering with the definition of "rationality"would underminethe neorealist research program. Rationality ought to be understoodas a "hardcore" assumptionof neorealism and one of the most importantfeaturesdistinguishingit from FPDM. 3. Foreign policy can best be understood as an unending task of sequential problem-solvingby goal-directedelites operatingwithinorganizationaland cognitive constraints. Stated succinctly, "for every national government, foreign policy can be viewed as a series of problem-solvingtasks. The appropriateness a particular of means of coping with a foreign policy problemis seldom certain"(C. Hermann, 1978, p. 70). We must assume foreign policy decision-makersembark on a purposive course of action they believe represents the most desirable match between availableresourcesand the problemas defined (Snyderet al., 1962, pp. 90-91). Snyder, Bruck and Sapin define decision-makingas follows:
Decision-making is a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited numberof problematical alternativeprojectsof one projectintendedto bringabout the particularfuture state of affairsenvisaged by the decision makers(1962, p. 90)

A problem-solvingperspectiveimplies considerationof goals, policy alternatives, and a feedback or monitoring system to estimate progress toward achievementof goals. Foreignpolicy problemsare rarelyif ever "solved"in their entiretybut ratherproduceconsequencesthat serve as the seed of new problems. A recurringquestion in the study of decision-makinghas to do with the locus of decision in foreign policy. Researchfocusing on the individualdecisionmaker is quite compatible with analysis of the organizationalenvironmentin which individual decision-makersfunction. The institutionalor organizational context of a decision is an important filter in decision-making.Decision-makers do not operate in isolation. They rely on organizations and institutionalized proceduresin the task of formulating,choosing, and implementingpolicy options. Even powerful individualssuch as the U.S. presidentrely on an extensive networkof organizationsand, in fact, may be constrainedin what he or she can accomplish if organizationschoose to thwartthe decision. Paul Andersonadvises us that"understanding actionsof political instituthe tions requiresan understanding social and institutional of dynamicsas well as the cognitive processes of individualdecision makers"(1987, p. 344). These levels of analysis are not contending but, in fact, complementaryelements of the research program in FPDM. The precise relationshipremains murky. Charles Kegley (1987) draws a helpful analogy between the concept of "regime" in international relationsand "regime"in foreign-policy-making process. He distin-

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regime." The former guishes between a "substantiveregime" and a "procedural the basic beliefs and core values of those in a position to determine encompasses foreign policy and correspondsto the "definitionof the situation,"or the sort of cognitive resources and biases decision-makersbring to the process. The "procedural regime" refers to the set of rules for deciding "how to decide and who will do so" (Kegley, 1987, p. 262). This most assuredlyinvolves an understanding of the relationshipsbetween key players in foreign policy and thus an appreciation of the organizationalcontext in which decisions emerge. Following Allison (1969; 1971) and Halperin (1974), there has been a traditionaldistinction made between "bureaucratic politics" and "organizational behavior."Bureaucratic refers to gamesmanshipand bargainingamong politics behaviorrefersto the dynamicsand tendenpowerful actors while organizational cies within large organizationssuch as the developmentof "standard operating procedures"and the emergence of formaland informalnetworksof communication and authority.The problem of collective reasoning (i.e., how groups or organizationsdevelop a "definitionof the situation")is far from being answered in FPDM, but is clearly part of that agenda. The prospectof returning the collective level in operational to code research is promisingbut not withoutepistemologicaldifficulties(Sjoblom, 1982; Holsti, 1982). While conceding some value in the search for a group or collective operational code, Holsti cautions against the willingness of the researcherto minimize individual differences in such an aggregationprocess. In principle a group operationalcode can be constructedat a level of abstractionminimizing sharpphilosophicaldifferenceswithin a group, but the value of such a construct is dubious. Holsti rejects the claim that bureaucratic "standard operatingprocedures" and norms are proxies for a group operationalcode. Most of his methodological objections to the creation of group operationalcodes stem from the assumptionthat effects such as groupthink mitigateagainstthe trueexpressionof beliefs by group members (Holsti, 1982). For neorealists, foreign policy is best understoodas the state's quest for means securityin a conflictualworld. Statesmust searchfor the most appropriate of obtaining security, but this search is not cast in the language of problemanarchicin character,the global system is solving or cognition. Fundamentally always susceptible to a Hobbesian war of "all against all" in the absence of hegemonic stabilityor some comparableantidoteto anarchy.Althoughthe means and ends of security may vary, the central problem of "self help" in a hostile world remains the same. 4. The primary currencyof foreign policy is information. Informationis a pivotal concept in FPDM,just as "power"(or, more recently, "self-interest")is a motivatingconcept in neorealism. One must endeavorto

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understandthe way in which informationis gathered, processed, and remembered by individuals and organizations. Given the precedingassumptionsof decision-makerprimacyin defining the situation, the problem-solvingnatureof foreign policy, and the impactof organizational arrangements policy-making, it stands to reason that informationis on central to understanding foreign policy. Decision-makersdeal with an interestingparadoxin foreignpolicy: they are hampered by too little informationand too much information. Informationis never perfect with regardto the motives or intentionsof other actors, and therefore decision-makersare forced to draw inferences from available information (e.g., Snyder et al. 1962, p. 102). are On the otherhand, large foreignpolicy bureaucracies capableof producmountainsof information(like intelligence estimates, cable traffic, reports, ing and contingencyplans) thatmust somehow be handledwithinthe time frameof a given decision. Inevitably, some of this informationis lost, misrouted, suppressed, or ignored;this stems partlyfromthe organizational dynamicsdescribed in assumptionnumber3. In addition,decision-makers develop shortcuts,rules of and "heuristics"for organizing mass amounts of information into a thumb, usable form (Tamashiro,1984). Advances in cognitive psychology and artificial of intelligence may soon supplementour understanding informationprocessing in foreign policy settings. 5. The global system is the arena of politics rather than the majorforce in internationalpolitics. The global system creates constraintsand opportunities,but these must be perceived by actors in order to have an effect. This is a rathersharpdeparture from "structuralrealism," where the global system is the dominant force in producingstate behavior(Waltz, 1979). One need not assume a wildly solipsistic world where only the decision-makers truly exist and all else is imaginary. Instead, the importanceof this assumptionis that any "objective"change in the global system-an exchange of resources, troops crossing borders-only gains and maintains importanceif those decision-makersin a position to direct resources consider the problem important(Snyder et al., 1962, p. 67). The system may be historically bounded, in that some periods of history produce unique demands on decision-makers.For example, the emergence of large administrativestructuresfor handlingforeign policy create new obstacles and opportunitiesfor decision-makers. The advent of nuclear weapons in the 20th centurygives rise to situationswhere decision-makers called upon to act are with previously unnecessary speed in order to avoid previously unimaginable destruction. In this sense, changes in the global system can influence foreign policy, but the system retainsits statusas a stagingareain which decision-makers

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adjust or modify their behavior. While the system may change, the sociopsychological causes of human behaviorare assumed to be enduring. 6. Policy prescriptions involve efforts to compensatefor individualmisperception and organizationalpathologies. An important"meta-assumption" underlyingnumber6 is that policy intervention is possible and can resultin alteredoutcomes. The qualityof the decision process is assumed to have an effect on policy outcomes. In this respect, FPDM of is pragmatic and differs from the most austere structuralistinterpretations Humandecision-makersare not locked into a preordained international politics. marchof history or constrainedby a dominantglobal system. Instead,decisionmakers select projects in accordancewith their diagnosis of policy problems, some attentionto goals, and with an eye to availableresources. Sometimes the decision process fails. While there may be no "ideal" decision process, some conditions foster relativelyineffectiveoutcomes because of biased problemdiagnosis, systematic informationdistortion, and a failure to anticipatethe consequences of a policy (Herek et al., 1987). Since learningis possible in foreign policy, researcherswithin the tradition of FPDM harboran interventionist motive. Josephde Rivera, a FPDM"founding takes the interventionistmotive as a centraltheme of his classic work, father", The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy:
We can gain the freedom to control ourselves-to meet destiny ratherthan fate-only if we can conceptualizethe forces thatact upon us. We must realize the situationwe are in if we are to master it instead of having it control us. (1968, p. 18)

Students of FPDM examine the process of foreign policy problem-solving in order to offer insights to policy-makers.While sometimes difficult to sustain, the promise of policy relevance sets FPDM apartfrom the more abstractsubfields within international relations. What can scholars in the FPDM tradition bring to the policy process? George (1972; 1980), Janis (1982) and Etheredge(1985) exemplify this type of policy-oriented research explicitly aimed at producing more effective use of information by the presidential staff. These three authors draw upon a vast theoreticalliteratureand numerouscase studies to diagnose and correctadministrative malfunctionsin the advisory process. George, for example, offers some administrativesolutions, such as the implementationof a "multipleadvocacy" approachin informationgathering, routine encouragementof a "devil's advocate" role in staff policy debates, and the institutionalization executive role of playing ("choice rehearsals")to facilitate decision-making. Most of the policy solutions generatedby neorealisminvolve acceptanceof an anarchicglobal system and adaptingto the implicationsof this "reality." For

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example, a substantialliteraturehas developed aroundthe question of cooperation under anarchy(e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986). Cooperationis presumed to be difficult and fragile because of the logic of collective action andtemptationto-defect confronting self-interestedstates. Cooperationmay be possible under unusual circumstances if the risks of discord appearto outweigh the costs of coordination(Keohane, 1984). The domain of nuclear strategyand proliferationprovides a vivid example of differencesin the kinds of policy prescriptions emanatingfrom neorealismand FPDM. Prominent neorealists such as Waltz (1981) and Mearsheimer(1990) have authoredwidely cited articleson the consequencesof nuclearproliferation. While these authors stop short of explicitly advocatingproliferation,they do arguethatconcernsaboutthis problemhave been widely exaggerated.According to neorealistlogic, nuclearproliferation boundto take place, and it might well is bring greater stability to world politics. Self-interested states will not be so foolish as to initiate a nuclear war. It is certainly conceivable that other neorealistswould argue with the position put forwardby Waltzand Mearsheimer.It is important,however, that their critiqueof the Waltz/Mearsheimer position be groundedin the basic assumptions of neorealism. Appeals to the prospect for nuclearaccidents, human fallibility, ideologically based aggression, or irrationalitymust all be ruled out of order unless one is willing to departfrom the neorealistframe of reference. FPDM scholars, on the other hand, have consistently expressed concern about nuclearproliferationbecause of their assumptionthat individualcognitive processes and organizationalbehaviorgive rise to errors. RichardNed Lebow (1987) and RobertJervis (1984) have both warnedof the difficultiesof managing nuclearcrises. Voluminousevidence on the Cubanmissile crisis, includinginterviews with participants and recently declassified archival material, portray decision-makersbattling fear, stress, and the prospect of their own mortality (Blight & Welch, 1989; Blight, 1990). Effortsto explaindecision-makingbehavior during a nuclear crisis need not accept the false dichotomy of "rationality" and "irrationality," sober reason versus unmitigatedpanic (Blight, 1990). or Nevertheless, we have reason to doubt the pristine logic of neorealism(and its complacency about nuclearproliferation)in confrontingthe post-Cold Warera.

RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND PROGRESS These six major assumptionsrepresentthe hard core of FPDM. As is the case with other research programs, FPDM will prove its durabilityonly if it retainscertaincharacteristics.Its assumptionsneed to be coherentand internally consistent. That is, the hard-coreassumptionsought to be logically connected

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and should not contradict one another. I have attempted to demonstratethe interrelatednessand logical coherence of FPDM's "hardcore." A second importantcharacteristicof a research programis its ability to stimulatefurtherresearch. In orderfor a researchprogramto stimulateprogress, thatan explanationof the phenomeit ought to inspireconfidence in its adherents non of interestlies within the boundariesof the researchprogram.Opportunities for filling the gaps in the researchprogram-the so-called practiceof "normal science"-must exist as well. For this reason the metaphorof "puzzle solving" dominates discussions of scientific progress in internationalrelations (e.g., Zinnes, 1976; Zinnes, 1980). Neorealism and FPDM are similar in respect to their reliance on other disciplines for basic concepts and theoreticalassumptions.Neorealismis ostensirealistnotions. FPDM bly the applicationof microeconomictheoryto traditional continues to importideas from cognitive psychology and organizationaltheory. work is productiveand infuses the In the best of all worlds, such interdisciplinary researchprogramswith new energy. There are substantialdrawbacks respective as well. One possible drawbackof such reliance is that theoreticalprogressin international relations is heavily dependentupon progress in other fields. A second problem is the loss associated with translationfrom one domain to the next. Neorealists who lack sophisticatedknowledge of the nuancesof microeconomic theory may fumble in their attemptsat applying those theories to international politics. FPDM advocateswhose enthusiasmfor advancesin cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, or learningtheory outpaces their knowledge of these fields risk severe embarrassment.Finally, theories of international politics are vulnerableto the well-entrenchedcriticisms of externalfields. Economic theory applied to internationalpolitics has all the problems associated with economic of theory applied to economics, plus the additionalproblemof appropriateness of "reductionism" quote Waltz), fit. Cognitive psychology still runs the risk (to even if it is applied to the domain of foreign policy. CONCLUSION The study of foreign policy decision-making merits its own status as a researchprogram.The basic tenets of FPDM are not compatiblewith the tenets of neorealism. The FPDM researchprogramdeserves the opportunity advance to independentpropositions,ratherthan serving as some kind of elaborateauxiliary hypothesis to neorealism. The virtue of pragmaticLakatosianism,however, is its philosophicalplea for tolerance. Neither neorealism nor FPDM will make substantialprogress if

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adherentsof each programmust constantlydefend the "hardcore" assumptions of their program.Each researchprogramhas a large and unfinishedagenda. The field of international relationsis fortunateto have morethanone active, coherent researchprogramgiven the urgency of the problems it endeavorsto solve. REFERENCES
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