The Kurdish dimension to Turkey's Syria policy

Posted By Gonul Tol Tuesday, April 10, 2012 - 2:23 PM

As escalating numbers of Syrians flee across the Turkish border to escape President Bashar alAssad's brutality, Turkey is stepping up diplomatic efforts to exert increased international pressure on the regime. While the international community is inclined to give Assad more time to implement Kofi Annan's peace plan, Turkey feels that the urgency of the situation demands immediate action. Tensions between Turkey and Syria have further escalated after shots fired across the border wounded four people in Turkey's Kilis refugee camp and Syrian forces and Free Syrian Army fighters clashed over control of a nearby border gate. On Sunday, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that Turkey would enact measures against the Assad regime if Damascus fails to abide by an April 10 deadline to cease violence. He did not outline what specific steps his government would take, but the likely scenario being floated by the press includes setting up a buffer zone along the

border to protect refugees. No matter how Turkey responds to the Syrian crisis, however, it will not easily extract itself from the ongoing turmoil that the country is likely to experience in the months and years ahead. Syria's geopolitical proximity, its Kurdish minority, and the economic, cultural, and strategic cooperation between the two countries raise the stakes for Turkey in finding a swift and sustainable resolution to the Syrian crisis. Syria occupies a central place in Turkey's regional and domestic calculations for several reasons. Regionally, Syria has been a key component of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "zero problems with neighbors" policy. Domestically, engagement with the Syrian regime ensured Syrian cooperation on Turkey's three-decade fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Assad's brutal crackdown on his own people, however, forced Turkey to cut ties with its onetime ally and altered Turkey's strategic calculations. Deteriorating security conditions in Syria, coupled with suspicions of Assad's support for the PKK, have made the Kurdish issue the focal point in Turkey's Syria policy. Nervous about spillover effects of the Syrian crisis, Turkish strategists lost no time in gaming out possible scenarios for Syria and how each might impact Turkey and its Kurdish question. There are several scenarios for how the Syrian crisis might unfold. If Assad does not fall soon and somehow reasserts his control, Turkey might face several challenges. The most critical challenge would be posed by a strengthened PKK-Syria alliance. The deterioration of Turkish-Syrian relations has already reawakened the mutual interest of Damascus and the PKK in using each other against Ankara. The Assad regime has granted several concessions to the PKK since Ankara cut ties with Assad. Saleh Muslim, the head of the PKK in Syria who lived for years in Iraq's Qandil Mountains, was allowed to return to Syria, marking the beginning of a new era in PKK-Syria relations, which had been suspended for 13 years since PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's expulsion from Syria in 1998. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK offshoot in Syria, was allowed to operate freely, recruit new fighters for its campaign against Turkey, and undertake a pseudo-governmental role in Kurdish regions of Syria. In return, the PYD used its influence on Syrian Kurds to prevent their participation in the uprising. On several instances, the PYD harshly criticized the opposition Syrian National Council, called Kurds who joined the opposition "collaborators," and even attacked anti-regime demonstrators in Efrin and Aleppo. If the Assad regime survives, at least for a while, Damascus will

continue to tolerate the PKK presence in Syria, which will make Turkey's fight against the PKK more arduous. Assad's continued rule also carries the risk of the "PKK-ization" of the Kurdish opposition in Syria. Currently, Syria's Kurds are fragmented over their stance on joining the anti-Assad opposition and their status in the post-Assad era. This fragmentation weakens moderate Kurdish groups' hand and prevents their proactive participation in the uprising. If they continue to limit themselves to being mere spectators to the unfolding crisis, they may find themselves deprived of any long-term political gains in a post-Assad Syria, a development that will strengthen the PKK/PYD faction within Syria's Kurds. This matters for Turkey for several reasons. There are significant cultural, linguistic, and historical ties between Kurds in Syria and Turkey, as well as ideological affinities. Over one third of the PKK members, for instance, are of Syrian origin. The lengthy PKK presence in Syria under Hafez al Assad allowed organizational networks to emerge between the PKK and Syrian Kurdish parties. Therefore, radicalization within Syria's Kurdish political movement might have a similar impact on Turkey's Kurds. Another challenge posed by continued Assad rule would be the increasing number of Syrian refugees on Turkey's southern border. There are already more than 25,000 Syrian refugees living on the Turkish border, and Assad's sustained grip on power will only exacerbate the refugee onslaught. Turkey fears that the refugee influx might contain PKK members and sympathizers settling in Kurdish cities along the Turkish border, and therefore radicalize the Kurdish political movement within Turkey. In an attempt to prevent PKK infiltration through Syrian refugees, Turkey stepped up the border patrols, increased the number of security personnel on the border, and issued ID cards for refugees. If and when Assad leaves, however, Turkey will have more leverage over the new Syrian government. No matter who comes to power, Turkey-Syria cooperation against the PKK will be strengthened due to several factors. First, Turkey hosted the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, and over 20,000 Syrian refugees who fled Assad's violent crackdown and has been at the forefront of international efforts to pressure Assad to leave power. Second, considering the poor economic state of Syria due to a sharp drop in consumption, capital outflow, cancelled investments, and massive cash withdrawals, the Syrian economy will be desperate for investment from Turkey, a

country with which Syria enjoyed close trade relations before the Arab spring. This dependency will force the new Syrian government to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against the PKK. Additionally, a Muslim Brotherhood government in post-Assad Syria will be particularly sympathetic to the AKP. Ali al-Bayanouni, the head of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood from 1996 to 2010, and the current leader Muhammed Riad al Shaqfa declared their willingness to adopt the "AKP model" recently. The Turkish government's relatively early engagement with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood reinforced the possibility of future collaboration between the two. As early as April 2011, long before Turkey asked Assad to step down, a press conference condemning the Assad regime was held in Istanbul by important Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Gazi Misirli, a Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader who has been living in Turkey and who has Turkish citizenship. A Muslim Brotherhood government would work closely with Turkey against the PKK. The Syrian crisis poses a challenge to Turkey economically, strategically, and politically, but the main issue for Turkey in Syria remains the status of the Kurds. Any unrest among Syria's Kurdish population or the prospect of autonomy is Turkey's worst nightmare. The PYD in Syria calls for autonomy of the Kurdish regions, but Syrian Kurds' reluctance to join the anti-Assad movement is likely to prevent any political gains for them once Assad is gone. The Syrian National Council has given some assurances to Kurds, but Burhan Ghalioun, the chairman of the SNC, made it clear that full-fledged federalism would not be accepted. Discontent from the Syrian Kurdish community in the post-Assad era remains a possible scenario, however, if the new Syrian government maintains a grudge against the Kurds for not supporting the revolution. Turkey cannot afford a protracted civil war in Syria. Given the prospect of an enhanced PKK threat and a mass influx of Syrian refugees across its border, the stakes for Turkey in resolving the Syrian conflict are extremely high. Given the international community's demonstrated lack of consensus on diplomatic intervention and lack of appetite for military involvement, Turkey may be forced to direct the effort toward curbing the Assad regime. That includes the prospect of sending Turkish troops to the border, something it has been reluctant to consider. The crisis in Syria will put Ankara's muchtouted regional influence to the test. How it responds to this test remains to be seen. Gonul Tol is the founding director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.

Stifled Kurdish opposition

Posted By Denise Natali Wednesday, February 23, 2011 - 2:42 PM Share

Iraqi Kurds have belatedly followed the Egyptian revolution by protesting against the region's democratic deficit. The demonstration for "people's rights and freedom" held in Sulaimani city last week turned into a violent, stone-throwing episode against a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) office, whose chief patron is Kurdish president Mas'ud Barzani. Local officials responded by gunning down the protestors, burning down opposition party offices, and implementing a curfew, while insisting on their commitment to democracy and stability. Although more protests could occur, the possibilities that Iraqi Kurdistan will emulate the Egyptian model are limited. A lack of consciousness of citizenship rights, a controlled economy and absence of a real civil society will prevent the Kurdish opposition from escalating to a broad-based movement capable of mobilizing populations across sectors and classes. To be sure, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is not unfamiliar to revolts against political authoritarianism. For the past 80 years, Iraqi Kurds have been fighting against Baghdad and rival Kurdish parties for political autonomy or independence. These conflicts, however, have been driven by nationalist sentiment and personal rivalries and not demands for individual liberties as Iraqi or Kurdish citizens. Even after the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) formed in 1992, a state-society relationship based on citizen rights failed to develop. Socio-political structures continued to be defined by loyalty and patronage to traditional leaders in small isolated localities. It was only after a decade of self-rule, marked by democratization efforts, civil war, and increasing authoritarianism that a new breed of independent thinkers started to openly criticize the KRG.

Through their semi-free media, they pressed for greaterpolitical freedoms, an end to government corruption, and better social services. Frustrations peaked in 2006 in the border town of Halabja, which led to the first violent protests against the KRG and the use of government force to quell opposition. Other attempts to instigate political change soon followed. In an effort to replicate the Egyptian alKifaya movement, in 2008 a small group of Kurds created the Hatakay movement (in Kurdish meaning "enough"), and made the first calls for the KRG's resignation. Although it garnered support from independents and youth in Sulaimani, Hatakay had neither the finances, leadership nor institutional support to mobilize the Kurdish masses. In fact, the movement petered out before reaching Arbil, the region's capital, where it could not withstand the centralizing tendencies of Barzani family power. Potential repression is not the only reason why a broad-based Kurdish opposition has failed to take root. Unlike Egypt, the Kurdistan region has no private sector that can encourage independent enterprise or create alternative avenues for income generation outside the KRG. For average Kurds, the KRG and its party-apparatus control all aspects of economic and professional life. This dependency has increased since 2005, as the KRG has used its generous oil-based budget from Baghdad to expand its bureaucracy and distributive function, allocating more than 75 percent of its revenues to public sector salaries. Nor does the region have a real civil society that could support alterative political ideas or activities. Kurdish associational life is created, financed and controlled by the KRG and its political parties, thereby creating another layer of dependency of public life. Even the opposition party, Goran (whose seed money was provided by its chief party rival), had to request "permission" from the KRG Ministry of Interior to conduct a pro-democracy demonstration. When the request was refused, Goran cancelled the protest. Consequently, opposing the government in Iraqi Kurdistan assumes a different meaning than it does in Egypt. For the vast majority of Kurds, opposition means breaking a social contract not between citizen and state, but between Big-Daddy and child and leader and tribal member. Opposition does not only mean the risk of repression for a protestor, but loss of an entire family's income, as well as their economic and political disfranchisement from society. These particular circumstances are reinforced by the Kurds' overriding need to remain unified in Baghdad to protect their nationalist interests and to assure international oil companies that their region is secure for investment. Maintaining stability is considered an obligation to Kurdish nationalism; those who threaten it are considered traitors.

Thus, whereby the Egyptian opposition gradually garnered open support over time as government violence increased, the Kurdish protestors and their supporters have been relatively silent. Even though most local populations unanimously agree that the use of force against the protestors was unwarranted, few outside Sulaimani city are willing or able to openly criticize the KRG. Even Goran wanted no responsibility for the protest or its victims, leaving the political aftermath as a score to be settled between the feuding Kurdish parties. This is not to say that the Kurdistan Region is immune to revolutionary outcomes. Although the KRG has been able to coopt, control and coerce its populations into passivity, largely through financial incentives and under the guise of Kurdish nationalist interests', it will eventually have to engage in real political reforms or further jeopardize its image as a budding democracy. The brewing youth movement in the Kurdistan Region may not overthrow the regime at present, but it can certainly raise awareness of citizens' rights and destabilize the region's oil-dependent economic development plans. Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University and the author of The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in PostGulf War Iraq (Syracuse University Press, 2010).

Turkeys Kurdish cards

Posted By Denise Natali Monday, September 12, 2011 - 6:03 PM Share

Turkey's air strikes in recent weeks in search of Partiye Karkaren Kurdistane (PKK) insurgents along the Iraqi Kurdish border have fueled a growing crisis. They have caused civilian deaths and displacements, raising criticisms by human rights organizations, local populations, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and even the Baghdad Parliament. This predicament has not only undermined possibilities for negotiating Turkey's Kurdish problem, but has also heightened tensions among Kurdish groups in Iraq and the region. Still, complaints against Turkish incursions will continue to be checked by concomitant demands to control the PKK, assure regional security, and guarantee shared economic interests. The military interventions may therefore have less effect than expected on the alliance between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, but may further fragment cross-border Kurdish groups and encourage regional unrest. Turkish military interventions should come as no surprise to a region where the PKK is still active and borders are highly porous. They have been occurring sporadically for over two decades, since the Government of Turkey signed a hot pursuit agreement with Baghdad to search and seize

terrorists along the northern Iraqi border area. That security agreement did not necessarily include bombing campaigns that violated Iraqi sovereignty, but aerial incursions were tacitly recognized by regional states with Kurdish populations of their own. They also were tolerated by the Iraqi Government, which had insufficient resources and checked political authority to monitor its northern air space. The security pact eventually became part of a leveraged deal between Ankara and the KRG as well. In exchange for shared communications and border security assistance, Iraqi Kurds were given access to an open Turkish border that provided them with humanitarian goods and lucrative profits from the food-for-fuel smuggling trade. Given the double embargo placed on the Kurdish north at the time, it was in KRG's interest to maintain the deal with Turkey, which had become a lifeline to the landlocked northern region. The need for a security pact also reflected the shifting geography of the PKK. After being expelled from its Beqaa Valley base in Syria in 1998, the PKK relocated to the Kurdish safe haven, where it re-established training camps and military operations in the mountainous regions, as well as offices in Iraqi Kurdish towns and cities. A triangular relationship soon emerged between Ankara, Iraqi Kurds, and the PKK that created a more regionalized Kurdish problem, although one that each party has used to its advantage. Ankara could pursue the PKK in Iraq with reluctant assistance from the KRG. Iraqi Kurds could keep minimal PKK forces in their region to leverage Turkey and regional security interests. The PKK could use its new base to exert pressure on uncooperative regional states and mobilize or oppose fellow Kurds. Even then, the relationship -- and the nature and timing of Turkish cross-border interventions-- was largely defined by Turkey's own Kurdish problem that waxed and waned between ceasefires and renewed conflict between Ankara and the PKK. Although unable to resolve its internal Kurdish problem, Turkey has increased its leverage over Iraqi Kurds, and its ability to maneuver the PKK issue. With the creation of a federal Iraqi state Turkey has become a key source of investment in the Kurdistan region, alongside the KRG and its affiliated families. Turkey not only provides Iraqi pipelines access to European energy markets via its Ceyhan port, but continues to control the only legally open border point for commercial trade into the Kurdish north. Turkey's guardianship role over the Kurdistan region, alongside its growing position as a regional security policeman, has allowed Ankara to pursue the PKK unilaterally without legal or

political sanction from Arbil or Baghdad. In fact, the more embedded Turkey has become in the Kurdistan region, the more autonomy it has gained in influencing PKK activities outside its borders. To be sure, the KRG has attempted to differentiate its economic and political interests with Kurdish nationalist demands, both internally and across borders. It has closed down PKK offices inside urban centers and condemned all forms of terrorism. While calling on the PKK and its Iranian Kurdish affiliate, The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK), to cease all military operations, Iraqi Kurdish officials have also assured the PKK that they will not send their peshmerga (militia) to the border area to fight their Kurdish brethren. Kurdish President Mas'ud Barzani reiterated to the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament last week that if Turkey fails to control the PKK, the KRG would "not want to be part of this fight." Yet given its satellite status with Turkey and position as an emerging energy market, the KRG may indeed have to become part of the PKK fight. In contrast to the 1990s, when Iraqi Kurds had little to lose from internal instability, the political and financial stakes today are much higher, and the dependencies far deeper. Not only does the KRG have to protect its special status in Iraq and alliance with Turkey, but it has to assure regional states and the international community that it is serious about combating terrorism and keeping its region safe for investment. Protecting these security and financial interests will become increasingly salient as the United States withdraws its combat forces from Iraq, and Turkey asserts greater influence in the region. As long as the Kurdish problem in Turkey remains unresolved and the PKK can use the Kurdistan region as a base, Turkish military incursions in the northern Iraqi border area are likely to continue. Similarly, as discrepancies become increasingly evident between Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish claims across borders, the Kurdistan region will continue to attract and repel Kurdish dissidents. Instead of disengaging from these cross-border conflicts, the KRG may find itself in the uncomfortable position of clamping down further on radical Kurdish nationalists in support of its own interests and its regional allies. Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University and the author of The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in PostGulf War Iraq(Syracuse University Press, 2010). The views expressed are her own and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Kurdish nationalism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring

Posted By Michael M. Gunter Tuesday, November 8, 2011 - 9:44 AM Share

In the midst of all the changes the Arab Spring has brought in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, among others, the intelligent lay, media, and policy worlds have remained largely deaf to the Kurdish question. This is an unfortunate situation because much has occurred concerning Kurdish nationalism, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. However, the Kurdish version of the Arab Spring did not just begin in 2011, but has been going on for decades: In Turkey (at least since the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) formally began its insurgency in August 1984), as well as in Iraq since the days of Mulla Mustafa Barzani beginning in the early 1960s, but especially since the end of the two U.S. wars against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and even more in 2003. These two wars led to the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, the most successful attempt at Kurdish statehood in modern times. On a lesser scale Iran, too, has long been going through its own periodic Kurdish Spring, the Mahabad Republic in 1946 being the most famous example. Although the Iranian Kurds are bitterly divided into several competing parties, protests and even armed struggle by the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), ensconced in the Iraqi Kandil Mountains just across the border from Iran, continue today. And even in Syria, where the Kurdish population is much smaller and not as geographically united as it is in the other three states, some Kurds have possibly broken out of their muted and divided existence to join the anti-Assad movement in protest against the assassinationon October 7, 2011 of Mashal Tammo, one of their most promising leaders. Indeed, even earlier, largely inspired by the KRG in Iraq, Syrian Kurds had begun agitating for basic rights as citizens when rioting broke out at a football match in Qamishli in March 2004.

Still, the most fundamental gains for Kurdish nationalism to date have been solidified in Turkey (despite renewed violence there since the national elections held on June 12, 2011) and Iraq, and thus require the most immediate attention in the post-Arab Spring regional context. Turkey In July 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a much publicized and promising Kurdish Initiative, later called the Democratic Opening and then National Unity Project. It soon became evident, however, that Erdogan's AK Party (AKP) had not thought its Kurdish Initiative out very well and subsequently proved rather inept in trying to implement it. For example, although there were many proposed reforms, such as writing a new, more democratic Turkish constitution that would include provisions on decentralizing the overly centralized state, changes to laws regarding human rights violations, permitting the use of formerly Kurdish titles for districts, eliminating legal barriers for speaking Kurdish during prison visits, and establishing Kurdish language and literature departments at various universities, among many other proposals, little tangible had been accomplished. In addition, the PKK's "peace group" gambit on October 18, 2009 to return home to Turkey 34 members from northern Iraq backfired badly when these Kurdish expatriates were met by huge welcoming receptions at the Habur Border Crossing with Turkey and later in Diyarbakir. These celebrations were broadcast throughout Turkey and proved too provocative for even moderate Turks who perceived the affair as some sort of PKK victory parade. Then on December 11, 2009 the Constitutional Court, after mulling over the issue for more than two years, suddenly banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) because of its close association with the PKK. Although the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) quickly took the DTP's place, coming when it did, the state-ordered banning of the pro-Kurdish DTP could have not come at a worse time and put the kiss of death to the Kurdish Initiative. In short order more than 1,000 BDP and other Kurdish notables were placed under arrest for their supposed support of the PKK, yet another body blow to the Kurdish Initiative. Soon the entire country was ablaze from the fury that had arisen, and the Kurdish Initiative seemed closed.

Despite the problem of how now to bring the two sides together, by the fall of 2010 talkswith the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan appeared to have begun over such important issues as a cessation of military operations, the release of KCK detainees, an initiative for a new constitution, and a review of the 10 percent electoral threshold that made it so difficult for regional pro-Kurdish parties to win seats in the Turkish parliament. Moreover, on September 13, 2011, a 47-minute recording was leaked to the press revealingon several recent occasions Turkish representatives had met with some senior PKK leaders in Oslo. Although the AKP won practically 50 percent of the popular vote or 326 seats while the BDP and its allies won a record 36 seats in the parliamentary elections held on June 12, 2011, hopes for a renewed and more successful Kurdish Initiative quickly foundered. Shortly after the election results had been announced, the newly elected BDP MPs began to boycott parliament in protest over the jailing of five of their elected colleagues, while a sixth (the well-known Hatip Dicle) was strippedof his seat for "terrorism" offenses. Then, on July 14, the DTK, another umbrella Kurdish NGO, proclaimed "democratic autonomy," a declaration that seemed wildly premature and over-blown to many observers and which infuriated Turkish officialdom. Amidst mutual accusations of initiating renewed violence and warlike rhetoric, the Turkish military launched several days of cross-border attackson reputed PKK targets in northern Iraq's Kandil mountains on August 17. Ihsan Dagi, a respected progressive Turkish academic and journalist, concludedthat Ocalan had lost control of a weakening and divided PKK, and that further negotiations with it were impossible. Others argued, however, that instead, the ultimate problem was the inherent ethnic Turkish inability to accept the fact that Turkey was a multi-ethnic state in which the Kurds have similar constitutional rights as co-stakeholders with the Turks. More specifically, the Turkish government refuses to truly negotiate with the Kurds' main representative -- the PKK -- and instead insists on continuing to brand it as a terrorist movement. Until the Turkish government truly accepts the PKK as a legitimate negotiating partner -- along the lines of Sinn Fein and the IRA in northern Ireland -- it is doubtful whether a political solution to this continuing crisis can be reached. As of November 2011, therefore, hopes for a renewed Kurdish Initiative have been put on hold. Iraq

In Iraq, of course, autonomy had already been achieved with the creation of the KRG following the Gulf War in 1991 and the KRG's constitutional recognition in 2003. However, many wonder what will happen to the KRG once remaining U.S. troops withdraw from Iraq at the end of 2011. Already the KRG and Baghdad have come perilously close to blows over Kirkuk and their disputed internal border, often referred to as "the trigger line." Will the KRG and Baghdad begin fighting once the U.S. troops are no longer there to separate them? In addition, despite warming economic and even political relations between Turkey and the KRG, Turkey began bombing PKK militants in northern Iraq in August 2011 and then even sent troops over the border to pursue them in October. Turkey also asked the KRG for help in these efforts, even though it is clear that the KRG does not want to fight against fellow Kurds in the PKK. Iran, too, has been shelling the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) -- dissident Iranian Kurds -entrenched just over the border in northern Iraq. How will all this play out once U.S. troops are withdrawn and both Turkey and Iran have a freer hand in intervening in northern Iraq? It remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds have had their own "Kurdish Spring" of sorts. First, the anti-corruption Gorran (Change) Party split the long-entrenched Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the KRG elections held on July 25, 2009. Subsequently, violent demonstrations broke out in Sulaymaniya on February 17, 2011, the KRG's second largest city, and continued until they were forcibly curtailed by the KRG leadership on April 19. Most of the demonstrators were protestingagainst corruption, nepotism, and the lack of effective services such as jobs and electricity. Intellectuals and journalists also protested against limitations against speech and press as well as daily harassment. Among all there was a deep anger against the Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Talabani's PUK family domination over society and government. Unlike the objects of the Arab Spring demonstrators, however, the KRG had just been democratically elected in July 2009 and thus was not so readily able to be denounced as illegitimate. The KRG also was able to prevent demonstrations from breaking out in Irbil, its capital and largest city by closing the universities, sending the students home, and banning large gatherings.

Nevertheless, the anti-KRG demonstrations that did occur constituted a serious wake up call that all was not well with the KRG. *** While less prominent in the media and in policy-making circles than the perennial Arab-Israeli dispute, for instance, Kurdish nationalism remains a continuing and leading factor of instability in the geostrategically important Middle East. Furthermore, since the Kurds sit on a great deal of the Middle East's oil and water resources, Kurdish nationalism probably will become increasingly salient in the coming years. Unlike the Arab-Israeli dispute, however, the Kurdish issue no longer seems intractable as it once was, as the Kurds have actually established an autonomous state in northern Iraq, the KRG. Although this entity's future remains somewhat uncertain, relative to the other states in the Middle East, the KRG situation is not really impossible. Given continuing U.S. diplomatic backing as well as wise KRG leadership, it is not nave to believe that the KRG will be able to survive and even prosper amidst all the birth pangs of the new, democratic Iraq. The situation for Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, of course, is more problematic. However, a quick comparison with where the Kurdish issue stood in Turkey just one or two decades ago, when the very term Kurd constituted a four-letter word in the Turkish lexicon, illustrates the enormous progress that has been made. The immediate task now is for the fighting to stop and the writing of a new, more democratic constitution to commence. Both sides are on record as favoring just such a scenario, so the burden is on them to now produce. Given the progress that has been made over the past two decades, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. Only time will tell. Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University

Turkey's Kurdish conundrum

Posted By Mohammed Ayoob Wednesday, November 9, 2011 - 5:52 PM Share

Any time spent in Turkey and one cannot help but be taken in by the country's economic dynamism and political vibrancy that is unique in the region it inhabits. With a 9 percent growth rate in its GDP in 2010, Turkey has become the fastest growing economy in the OECD and is projected to remain so until 2017. Its commitment to democratic governance was demonstrated in the elections earlier this year that kept the ruling AKP in power with almost 50 percent of the votes. That the Turkish democratic process has become irreversible was confirmed soon thereafter by the fact that the resignation of Turkey's top four generals in an effort to unnerve and destabilize the civilian government hardly created a stir in the country. Even a couple of years ago such a deliberately contrived crisis could have provided the military brass with an excuse for staging a coup. In the context of this upbeat picture, which has turned Turkey into a model for Arab democrats next door, the festering Kurdish issue has gained greater saliency both because of increased acts of terrorism by the PKK and, more importantly, because it strikes a highly discordant note in an otherwise bright scenario. The recent escalation of terrorist activity by the PKK can in part be attributed to its declining political appeal among Turkey's Kurdish citizens who now enjoy cultural and linguistic rights that had been denied to them by the hyper-nationalist Kemalist elite in the first 80 years of the Republic's existence. The PKK leadership feels that it is in danger of becoming politically irrelevant and has, therefore, escalated terrorist activity to prove that no solution to the Kurdish problem is possible without its participation. Turkey's economic buoyancy has also ensured that large segments of the Kurdish population both in the predominantly Kurdish areas in the east and southeast, as well as in the huge Kurdish diaspora in western and central Turkey (Istanbul is the largest Kurdish city with a reported Kurdish population of 2 million), now have a major stake in the well-being of the Republic. Finally, the rise in PKK's terrorist activities can be attributed also to the ultra-nationalist backlash amongst a section of Turkish opinion that has put the AKP government on the defensive and forced it to slow down the reform process that could ensure further rights for the Kurdish minority extending beyond the cultural and linguistic spheres. The AKP's foot-dragging on the issue has led to Kurdish disappointment and in some cases increased sympathy for the PKK fighters after an initial period of rising expectations bordering on euphoria.

Above all, it seems that the PKK's recent activities are related to the accelerating process of constitutional reform set in motion by the AKP government after the recent elections. A Preparatory Constitution Commission of 12 members -- three each from the four parties represented in parliament including the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) -- has been set up to produce a draft constitution to replace the military supervised and crafted 1982 constitution that can be debated in parliament and among the general public. The issue of Kurdish identity (or rather how the identity of Turkish citizens is to be defined in the new constitution) will be one of the main subjects to be discussed by the commission. If, despite the differences on this issue, progress is made toward greater acceptance of a multi-ethnic definition of the Turkish identity, it would take the wind out of the PKK sails. The pro-Kurdish BDP, which has 36 members in the 550-member parliament (although six of them are currently in jail allegedly for supporting the PKK), was expected to be a major player in the constitution drafting process. However, it seems to have become hamstrung by its refusal to distance itself from the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is currently imprisoned in Turkey. In conversations BDP leaders repeat ad infinitum that no solution can be found without the concurrence of Ocalan and the PKK fighters who they refer to as "the young men in the mountains". However, this formula is unacceptable to the other Turkish parties who consider PKK to be a terrorist organization. The BDP, which was beginning to be increasingly perceived as the legitimate face of Kurdish sub-nationalism in Turkey, has drastically reduced its effectiveness as the Kurdish interlocutor in constitutional talks by surrendering its autonomy to the PKK and appearing to many to be nothing more than the latter's political arm. Moreover, BDP leaders constantly repeat the formula that no solution to the Kurdish problem can be found except on the basis of "democratic autonomy", which they stubbornly refuse to define. When pressed they say that this must be negotiated by the government with Ocalan. While the Turkish government may not be totally averse to such negotiations, as recent reports of talks between MIT, Turkey's intelligence agency, and PKK leaders have revealed, it would be impossible for any Turkish government to publicly admit that it has been negotiating with what it terms a terrorist organizationand its leader. The BDP could have adopted the role of acting as the primary Kurdish interlocutor and negotiating an end to the conflict if it had had the political courage to distance itself from PKK. Unfortunately, it has not been able to grasp this opportunity.

The BDP's refusal to define "democratic autonomy" is mirrored by large segments of the Turkish elite, including many in the ruling AKP, who refuse to countenance any derogation from the model of the unitary state and the myth of a monolithic Turkish identity imposed by the Kemalist elite since the early years of the Republic, in defiance of the multi-ethnic nature of Turkish society. It is time that the AKP, as well as the main opposition party, the CHP, which is the standard bearer of Kemalism, seriously reconsider their stance on the issue of a unitary mono-ethnic state. Federalism or quasifederalism is usually the best antidote to separatism. Imposing a contrived mono-ethnic identity and a unitary state remote from the concerns of peripheral areas and populations normally aggravates, rather than resolves, separatist problems. A federal system is not necessarily antithetical to a strong center and need not come at the latter's expense. In fact, as the experience of successful federations from the United States to India demonstrate, a federal system bolsters the legitimacy of the central government in the long run and aids in the process of nation-building, rather than hindering that process. As these examples demonstrate, trappings of autonomy are often more important than its content. Furthermore, they also reveal that federalism need not have an economic rationale for it to be successful. A federal system is basically a political tool utilized to respond to ethnic and geographic diversity even if it means that more prosperous regions must continue to subsidize the poorer parts of the country. In the final analysis, this is a small sacrifice to maintain national unity. The solution to Turkey's Kurdish conundrum may, therefore, lie in some form of devolution of powers to regional entities. It will help both in the consolidation of democracy in the country as well as give greater legitimacy to a central government whose political and economic record under the AKP is in other ways extremely impressive. However, in order to achieve this goal the Turkish elite and the AKP government must break decisively from the outmoded thinking of the Kemalist past and show a degree of political flexibility that has unfortunately been in short supply thus far. Furthermore, they will have to do so even as PKK terrorism increases in the short-term, more as an act of desperation rather than of carefully thought political strategy. Prime Minister Erdogan has the stature, legitimacy, and charisma to make this decisive break from the Kemalist past. If he does so, it will demonstrate that he is a real statesman and not merely an extraordinarily skillful politician.

Mohammed Ayoob is the university distinguished professor of international relations at Michigan State University and adjunct scholar at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

Kurdish leader: No to arming the Syrian opposition

Posted By Josh Rogin Thursday, April 5, 2012 - 3:37 PM Share

The international community should support a transition to democracy in Syria, but shouldn't arm the rebel fighters, Kurdistan regional PresidentMassoud Barzani said in Washington Thursday. "It's important that the future government of Syria be a democratic coalition that protects the rights of Kurds and all other Syrians," Barzani said at a Thursday speaking event at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) supports whatever dialogue and negotiations that the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition may enter into and said that the safety and security of Syrian Kurds was a high priority. As for the Kurdistan National Council of Syria, a recently formed

umbrella group representing Kurdish opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Barzani said the KRG would help, but not with weapons. "We are ready to support them, but not with military support or providing ammunition ... It could be moral support, political support, financial support. And we will use our influence to help solve their problems," he said. "It would be good for them to enter into talks and negotiations so they can reach an agreement with the other groups of the opposition." "What we see right now, neither the current government not the opposition have anything decreed to provide for the Kurdish people," he said. "But that issue is left to them, so whichever way they conduct their negotiations, we will support the outcome of their negotiations." Barzani's comments were starkly different than those of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who said this week that Assad "will not fall" and said he was against any process that led to the overthrow of the Syrian regime. Barzani said he met with President Barack Obama twice and also met with Vice President Joseph Biden on Wednesday, and told them that Maliki is consolidating power in a dictatorial way. He said Obama and Biden reassured him that the United States would remain committed to cooperation with Kurdistan and committed to helping Iraqi solve its serious internal political problems. "Iraq is facing a serious crisis ... it's coming towards one-man rule," Barzani said. "We have a situation in Baghdad where one man is the prime minister and at the same time he is the commander in chief of the armed forces, he is the minister of defense, he is the minister of the interior, and he is the chief of intelligence. And lately, he has been communicating to the head of the Central Bank that that should also come under the power of the prime minister. Where in the world can you find such an example?" Barzani called for a multiparty, multiethnic process to address the issue of power sharing in Iraq. If that process fails, Barzani said he would hold a referendum in Kurdistan to determine the way forward. He implied, but didn't say explicitly, that that referendum would be for Kurdish impendence.

"The current status quo in Baghdad is in no way our option and we will not accept that as an option," he said. "Otherwise, we will be obliged to go back to the people and have the people make their decisions." The Maliki government is reneging on its agreements that allow Kurdistan to sign its own oil contracts and is taking total control of Iraq's armed forces, according to Barzani. "The new Iraqi army needs to be formed on the basis of being an army of the country, not the army of an individual," he said. Barzani said he disagreed with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's decision to publicly denounce Obama's selection of former NSC staffer Brett McGurk to replace Jim Jeffrey as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Allawi said McGurk was too close to Maliki to be objective. "Had Allawi consulted with me, I would have told him not to issue that statement. He has been nominated to be the U.S. ambassador to Iraq and he will implement U.S. policy," Barzani said. Barzai also staunchly defended the innocence of fugitive Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, against whom Maliki's government has brought charges. Hashemi had been evading those charges in Kurdistan and is now in Saudi Arabia, though he has pledged to return to Iraq. "He is still the vice president of Iraq. He has not been convicted, and this issue has been politicized," Barzani said, adding that Maliki had told him to help Hashemi escape Iraq, revealing the politicization of the issue. "Why does Maliki send me a message so we should help him sneak out of the country? If he's a criminal, why should he be given that opportunity to sneak out? They wanted to show that everybody wants to respect the judicial system except for us."

An introduction to a Kurd in Czech

12/04/2012 10:29 By Bakhtiyar Amin During one of my visits to the Czech Republic for participation in an international conference, I met Karel Schwarzenberg, 75, who is the foreign minister of the Czech Republic, deputy prime minister, the leader of the Tradice Odpovdnost Prosperita 09 Party (TOP 09/Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09), the 12th prince of his family and the head of Schwarzenberg family.

The same feast was attended by my wife Safya Suhail and a number of Arab and European personalities. While talking to me, Schwarzenberg turned and said: "Do you know that I'm also Kurdish?" His words sounded strange for me, though he looked Kurdish. I asked how come he is Kurdish? He said: "I'm a Kurd and 200 years ago my ancestors left Caucasus for this region and we are Kurds by descent." I expressed my happiness to find one of my nationals in such a high rank. My wife Safya was there for the same feast, but she did not hear the conversation between us because she was talking with a Saudi prince. When leaving in the presence of Dr. Saadaddin Ibrahim (an Egyptian intellect and scholar), I told Safya about the news. She jokingly said "you [Kurds] have even changed [the nationality of] Um Kalthum [the late Arab singer] to a Kurd". Dr. Saadaddin answered that he had also heard about that. After expressing my happiness for knowing another member of my nation, I said to Schwarzenberg "we will be glad if you visit Kurdistan". Schwarzenberg said whenever he receives an invitation, he will happily visit Kurdistan and will try to make the visit this year. What is important about this new member of our nation is that Schwarzenberg has connections to many great politicians and European businessman. There are many martials, generals, cardinals, politicians, artists and intellectuals in his family, who played a major role, especially during the Austrian-Hungarian historical stage. Also Schwarzenberg have affinity and relations with several big, aristocratic families in Europe, such as with the Lubkobig Sove of the Czech Republic. The Lubkobig's history dates back to 1172 as part of the family of Seinfhein intermarriage with the Erkingers barons of the Franconia region. Schwarzenberg were the richest family during the Austrian-Hungarian empire. They also owned the largest area of Bohemia, which is a wide region in former Czechoslovakia. They have palaces and skyscrapers in Czech, Vienna and the Bavaria region of Germany. There is a huge building in Vienna called Schwarzenberg. Schwarzenberg also have affinity with Prince Rein the Third of Monaco. When Czechoslovakia was occupied by Hitler's Nazis, some members of the Schwarzenberg family were arrested and some fled to the US. Their entire land and fortune was confiscated by Nazis. This family witnessed many difficulties because they refused to meet with Hitler and the Nazi officials. They also supported the counter-Nazi forces financially and hoisted black flags as a sign of grief over the occupation of their country by Hitler's army. After the end of the Second World War and the changes in the European arena, communists overwhelmed Czechoslovakia and the country was led towards a Stalinist dictatorship. They did not restore the Schwarzenberg' fortune and lands. In 1948 after the domination of communists, the family fled to Austria and settled in Vienna. There Schwarzenberg, for a while, became an active leader in the conservative Austrian People's Party and later it was proposed he should become Austrian foreign minister. At the same time he worked as a activist for the Green Party. Away from his homeland, Schwarzenberg supported greatly all the individuals who joined the opposition of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In 1984-1991 he chaired the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. In 1989 after the fall of the communists he returned to Czech. That year Vaclav Havel assumed the presidency of the country. In 1990, since Schwarzenberg was a close friend to Havel, he was assigned as aide and advisor to the president. Later, he became a member in the Forum 2000 until he declared his new party TOP 09. For a while Schwarzenberg led the committee of foreign relations security and defense. Then he became an MP in the NATO treaty. For a short while he also led the European Union. Schwarzenberg is a law graduate. From 2007-2009 he was Czech foreign minister. He was reinstated in his post in 2010 and has been in office since that time. His party now has 16 percent of seats in the Czech parliament. Bakhtiyar Amin was the former Human Rights Minister in the Iraqi Interim Government from June 2004 to May 2005. LH/DM/AKnews

America needs a Kurdish policy

Posted By John Hannah Thursday, March 22, 2012 - 3:30 PM Share

Among the Iraq-related anniversaries to consider, here's one more: Twenty-one years ago this week, millions of Iraqi Kurds set flight for the desolate, snow-capped mountains bordering Turkey and Iran, frantically seeking to escape the advancing armies of Saddam Hussein. Fresh off his humiliating defeat in the first Gulf War, Saddam had quickly trained his guns on wiping out all internal opposition to his tyrannical rule. Where the Kurds were concerned, his purpose seemed clear. Saddam aimed to eliminate once and for all the persistent challenge this proud, irrepressible minority had long posed to his dictatorship. Genocide was on tap, the completion of a job begun in 1988, when Iraqi forces razed thousands of Kurdish villages, murdered their inhabitants, and rained chemical weapons down on the innocent men, women and children of a town called Halabja. Now, with their backs literally to the wall, freezing to death on a barren mountainside, facing Saddam's full vengeance, the Kurds' destruction seemed nigh.

Until, that is: America. Said. No. Working with a small group of allies, the United States, quite simply, saved the Kurds. Saddam's army was ordered to stand down or face renewed hostilities. U.S. ground forces deployed to northern Iraq and organized one of history's greatest humanitarian rescues, Operation Provide Comfort. A no-fly zone was established over Kurdistan, which U.S. aircraft patrolled until 2003, when America finally settled its score with Saddam for good, liberating almost 30 million people from his republic of fear, including the long-suffering Kurds. It's a story of deliverance and American leadership well worth recalling, especially this year. For the first time in a generation, Iraq's Kurds find themselves without direct American protection. President Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq has once again left the Kurds largely alone. While no longer confronting Saddam's terror, the long shadow of their anguished history remains, as do unresolved tensions not only with Iraq's majority Arabs, but with powerful neighbors in Iran, Syria and Turkey struggling with disadvantaged Kurdish minorities of their own. It's a mix of fear, loathing and foreign meddling that, left untended, could easily lead to conflict and even war -- both inside Iraq and, perhaps, regionally. That, indeed, would be tragic -- for the oftenbetrayed Kurds, to be sure, but also for the prestige and long-term interests of their main benefactor, the United States. Say what you will about the American project in Iraq, its application in Kurdistan was well down the path toward success. As happened in Germany, Japan and South Korea after World War II, a few decades of intense American engagement had begun working wonders for the Kurds. Excellent security -- indeed, not a single U.S. combat death in areas under Kurdish control. A booming economy with growing levels of foreign investment. And an emerging democracy that, while far from perfect, has seen real opposition parties emerge, as well as a burgeoning civil society and media. Yes, corruption, lack of accountability, and uneven development remain serious problems. But certainly no worse than, say, South Korea circa the 1970s, at a similar point in that country's experience under America's wing. Properly nourished, Iraqi Kurdistan has all the makings of a U.S. strategic asset. Iraq's Arabs may have been profoundly ambivalent about a continued role for American troops. But not the Kurds, whose leaders loudly proclaimed their desire for a permanent U.S. presence, and whose population

of some 5 million is overwhelmingly pro-American. Sharing borders with Iran and Syria, Kurdistan could play a vital role in U.S. strategy to combat the serious threats now emanating from those antiAmerican regimes. Kurdish security and intelligence forces are competent and battle-hardened, and after years of cooperation have built up excellent working relations with their U.S. counterparts, including in fighting Al Qaeda. And sitting atop 40-50 billion barrels of oil, Kurdistan is poised to become one of the world's largest petroleum producers, a major contributor to global energy security. Confident in its U.S. backing, Kurdistan could serve as both engine and anchor for the rest of Iraq's democratic development. But America's precipitous retreat has left behind a dangerous vacuum, a potential breeding ground for destructive acts of self-help that could easily spiral out of control That vacuum urgently needs to be filled by a concerted American strategy to define a new, "special" relationship with Iraq's Kurds. Making clear that Kurdistan's well-being within a truly federal Iraq is a high U.S. priority could serve both to deter potential aggressors while encouraging Kurdish restraint, patience and cooperation in dealing with the turmoil of Baghdad's day-to-day politics. When Kurdish President Masoud Barzani visits Washington next month, the Obama administration would be well advised to use the opportunity to establish a new Joint Commission on U.S.-Kurdish relations to oversee the bilateral relationship, composed of high-level officials from both sides. America's consulate in Kurdistan should be led by a senior foreign service officer of ambassadorial rank, perhaps seconded by a retired general. Under the rubric of U.S. security assistance for Iraq, programs for equipping and training Kurdish security and intelligence services should be established, including robust channels for information sharing and other cooperative efforts. A joint initiative to expand dramatically American investment in Kurdistan needs to be launched, with a focus on expediting the region's emergence as a reliable energy exporter to Western markets. Technical assistance should be provided to support Kurdish efforts to battle corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and ensure human rights. More than two decades after saving Iraq's Kurds from annihilation, it's time for America to institutionalize a long-term strategic relationship with them -- one that understands that a secure and prosperous Kurdistan, confident in its ties to the world's sole superpower, can be a boon to U.S. interests, and a force for stability and modernism throughout Iraq and the broader Middle East.

An Encounter with Barzani

10/04/2012 02:28:00By KANI XULAM Font size:

The announcement arrived via Facebook and email. It said: President of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), His Excellency Massoud Barzani, would address a gathering of Kurds at Marriott Hotel in Tysons Corner. The meeting was going to take place on Saturday, and the President had been in the Washington, DC area since Monday, April 2, 2012. I marked my calendar accordingly. I wanted to see what my President was going to say about his meeting with the President of the United States. Because the President of Kurdistan uses some Arabic words in his Kurdish, and because I use some Turkish ones in mine, I cant say I understood him fully. Suffice it to note that when I left the hotel I thought I had understood him at least 80 percent. I need to get rid of the Turkish words from my Kurdish and start watching Kurdistan TV to better understand Berez Barzani. In the meantime, I want to, with these musings of mine, give you a sense of what transpired at the Kurdish gathering. Berez Barzani is much more forceful in Kurdish than when he talks to foreigners through his able translator. In Kurdish, you see him raising his voice when it is needed and lowering it when that is appropriate. Gracious, compassionate, kind, animated and direct were some of the descriptions that crossed my mind when I saw him interacting with the Kurds. He had a piece of paper in front of him. He was apparently following some talking points, but the occasional use of his glasses to see the written word made me feel sad for the old Peshmerga. Historians tell us George Washington did the same when he talked to his soldiers and later colleagues.

I wanted to see what my President was going to say about his meeting with the President of the United States.
The overall news was good from the little Kurdistan, but not so from the countries surrounding it. In 2003, the income of an average Kurdish family was 275 dollars per year. Today, it is 5,000.00. In the year of Saddams toppling, our illiteracy rate was at 56 percent. Today, we have reduced it to 16 percent. And right after saying so, President Barzani raised his voice, and added: our goal is 0 percent illiteracy in Kurdistan. Needless to say, I was reminded of an encomium to a teacher by Cicero in his beautiful

address, Pro Archia. It was the most sublime use of a raised voice I had ever witnessed in my entire life. And I am an old man by Kurdish standards. There were other tidbits about little Kurdistan, but I am going to be picky for the purposes of this report. In America, he said, he was happy to meet with the likes of President Obama and conveyed to him our peoples unswerving commitment to the constitution of Iraq, which recognizes Kurdistan as a federal state. But, he added, there were unmistakable signs of trouble in the city on the Tigris. The source of that concern was Nouri Maliki. He was concentrating power in his hands, he was like five ministers at once, and now, again, Mr. Barzani raised his voice: He also wants to be head of the Central Bank of Iraq. I like it when politicians speak from the heart. But when deceit is the coin of the realm, especially in the Middle East, I worry and become very protective of truth. The region is full of politicians who will sell their mothers for power and dealing with them is not exactly a game of logic. I guess, what I am saying is this: Kak MaSsoud Barzani, you have to work with the likes of Nouri Maliki. He, after all, represents 80 percent of Arab Iraq compared to your 20 percent Kurds in little Kurdistan. The one time seller of worrybeads is not exactly a Kurdish farmer who, even if he tried, wouldnt know how to lie. Had I been asked, I would have cautioned Berez Barzani to be a bit more circumspect for the sake of the Kurds and Kurdistan. The best part of the gathering was the Q&A session. Kurds were alone with their leader. They talked to him as a friend. They appealed to him as a leader. They tickled him with words of reverence. They questioned him about the unfolding struggle in Syria, the ongoing war of Turks on Kurds everywhere, and the ceasefire between PJAK and Iran. Yours truly joined the questioners as well and asked him about term limits. Suffice it to note, I was surprised by his answer. You will have to read a bit more to find out what he said.

Mr. Barzani has become a peace activist. He doesnt believe wars can win the Kurds anything.
Mr. Barzani has become a peace activist. He doesnt believe wars can win the Kurds anything. When I fought, or my dad did, ours was to assert our very existence. The existential war is won now. No one, not even the most implacable Turk, questions the existence of the Kurds. What we need to do from now on is to sharpen our pens and our tongues, and make use of all the tools of forensic science to win the world to our side. A genuinely fearless and proud Peshmarga paying homage to peace is beyond me to put into words. You should have been there to witness it, or perhaps called on Shakespeare to write it out for you.

I told you about the Kurds who wanted to tickle Kak Massoud. One stood next to me where I was sitting and waited patiently for his turn. I had a chance to study his demeanor. He was like a Buddha. Peaceful within and without. What is he going to ask a wartime president? I murmured to myself. His question was as good as his disposition. He said he was from a village called Rezan inside Iranian Kurdistan. He had seen Kak Massoud as a small child. Upon hearing the news that he was in Washington, he drove here to see him again and thank him for his leadership. If you were President Barzani, what could you possibly say to this fellow? While I was thinking of that, Kak Massoud said, Thank you. Next time you talk to the folks in Rezan, please tell them I greet them all, warmly, through you. It was a presidential response. He knew how to tickle back. I was impressed. Then there was another fellow, a bit on the melancholic side. Very slowly and very politely, he told Kak Massoud of his late fathers death wish. The old man had been a Peshmarga. The room went into total silence. It was that the son should kiss Kak Massoud on the eye, as we say in Kurdish, when fate brought them together. I was witnessing live drama at a political event. Again, Kak Massoud handled the situation well. First, you could tell, his facial expressions said that he knew of the old fighter and ached after the remembrance of his memory. He then told the son, your dad was a great man. The room went electric. It was, again, an unforgettable moment. Then I caused a bit of a stir as well, even though that was the last thing on my mind. I introduced myself like other Kurds and added: I was asking my question as a Kurdish intellectual. I said Americans, those who pass as our friends, often complain about one thing about the Middle Eastern leaders and I wanted to express it today. George Washington, I went on, was the first president of the United States. He served eight years. He strengthened the national institutions of his country and relinquished power voluntarily. Boris Yeltsin of Russia did the same. Kurdistan, I said, I know, is not exactly free. Dark clouds still hover over its skies, but if it were and its institutions strong, would you, Berez Barzani, be willing to tell this Kurdish audience that you too would consider relinquishing power voluntarily, just like they did? You have to put up with me for a year and a half more, he said. At least 500 hundred Kurds were in the room. I am hoping he will not renege on his word. But my question apparently did not sit well with everybody in the room. A Kurd from Iranian Kurdistan used his time to criticize me and another Kurd -- instead of asking his question -- for voicing impertinent concerns. He wanted to know if I would dare to ask other, some useless, Kurdish leaders the same question? To his credit, Kak Massoud said the questions should be voiced.

After the gathering, I got a few more Barzani loyalists telling me I had overstepped the boundaries of what was proper.After the gathering, I got a few

more Barzani loyalists telling me I had overstepped the boundaries of what was proper. This time, I wanted to act like a Buddha myself and patiently listened to the elaboration of their views. But many other Kurds approached me as well and thought I had asked a fair question, some called it a right one, but added, the practice in the Middle East was that those who hold onto power often go through the motions of wanting to grow cabbages like Cincinnatus, but use every ounce of their energy to stay in the presidential palace, just like Bashar Assad. I will end these musings with an email that I received from a friend who was also at the meeting. Although I dont like to blow my own horn, this email speaks of a longing for transparency, for accountability, and for fairness. It also sums up the sentiments of those who thanked me for my question. Authors permission granted, I am submitting to your perusal as a sample of what our youth are thinking about term limits. Sir, today, you did something few people have the guts to even think about doing. Those who oppose President Barzani go on the streets and use signs and demand what they want, but they would never have the guts to speak to him face to face... Not that I think you oppose him; I'm sure you're a supporter of the KRG. But I just want to commend your courage in standing up in front of a political figure and icon and respectfully asking him how much longer he plans on staying in the office. Like I said before, there was a lot of opposition to what you said at the hall and that, as you know, is because there were a lot of brown-nosers, Barzani worshipers and KDP loyalists. But don't be daunted, the other speaker's response, to your comment and question, was out of place and completely disrespectful, and as you saw even President Barzani didn't agree with his comments Keep your head up and remember that today you did something that most are too afraid to even imagine doing. I thanked the fellow Kurd for his kind words. Competing in bravery with a battle-tested Peshmerga was not my motivation; inviting him to measure himself next to the other great leaders of the world was. 235 years later, George Washington is honored in America voluntarily. In three hundred years, will Kurds equate Kak Masoud to Boris Yeltsin or Hosni Mubarak? I want to be proud of my leader(s). I want my American friends to feel good about associating with the Kurds and Kurdistan. Please, Kak Barzani, drink from a cup called humility; it will add luster to your family name and elevate us, as a people, for introducing a new concept, term limits, at the highest levels of the government, in the Middle East.

* Kani Xulam is a political activist based in Washington D.C. He is the founder of the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN).