American Academy of Religion

Gersonides, Providence, and the Rabbinic Tradition Author(s): Menachem Marc Kellner Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 673-685 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1461134 . Accessed: 20/04/2012 21:43
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Gersonides,Providence, and the Rabbinic Tradition*

MENACHEM MARC KELLNER

views concerning God's providence.' Either providence extends to all men, to some men, or to no men. By providence Levi usually means guidance, although sometimes he uses it in the sense of retribution. Understood in the first way, the three possible views about providence are that God guides all men, some men, or no men. Understanding providence in the second sense, the three possible views are that first, all good deeds are rewarded and all bad deeds punished; second, some good deeds, but not all, are rewarded and some evil deeds, but not all, are punished; third, no good deeds are rewarded and no evil deeds are punished. In his Milhamot Adonai Gersonides generally uses providence in the *Thisis an expandedversionof a paperreadto the MedievalJewishPhilosophysection of the meetingsof the AmericanAcademyof Religion,SoutheasternRegion, Chattanooga, Tennessee, on March 15, 1974. I would like to thank Steven Schwarzschild,Norbert Samuelson,SeymourFeldman,BairdTipsonand HarryGamblefor theirhelpfulcomments on earlierversions of this essay. is IGersonides' doctrineof providence found in his Commentary Job, whichis printed to in all editions of the Mikraot Gedolot Bible, and in the fourth book of his philosophic magnumopus, MilhamotAdonai (Warsof the Lord). MilhamotAdonai was publishedin Riva di Trento, 1569and in Leipzig,1866.The Riva di Trentoeditionwas photo-duplicated by Philip Feldheim,New York, nd. (All referencesto the Milhamotwill cite book number, chapter number, and page number of the Leipzig edition.) Books one through four of Milhamot Adonai have been translatedinto Germanby Benzion Kellerman,Die Kampfe Gottesvon Lewi ben Gerson(Berlin:Maye and Muller, 1914). Books three and four have been translatedinto French by CharlesTouati, Les Guerresdu Seigneur(Paris: Mouton, 1968).Book Threehas been translated'intoEnglishby NorbertSamuelsonin his excellent doctoral dissertation, The Problem of God's Knowledge in Gersonides (unpublished, IndianaUniversityDepartmentof Philosophy, 1970).Gersonides' to Commentary the Book of Job was translatedby AbrahamLassen (New York: Bloch, 1946) under the title, The Commentaryof Levi ben Gerson Gersonides)on the Book of Job. (All referencesto the Commentarywill cite chapter numberand'page numberof the Lassen translation.)The following is, with the exception of purelybibliographicworks and encyclopediaarticles,a bibliographyof scholarly works on Levi ben Gerson. Nima H. Adlerblum,A Study of Gersonidesin his Proper Perspective(New York: Columbia University Press, 1926). J. Carlebach, Levi ben Gerson als Mathimatiker(1910). Curtze, "Levi ben Gerson fiber
MENACHEM MARC KELLNER (Ph.D., Washington University) is a member of the Departmentof Religion at the College of Williamand Mary. He is the author of various articlesin Sh'ma,Elul, and Tradition.He is workingon a book on the theology of Levi ben Gerson.

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firstsense;in his Commentary Job he generally it in the secondsense.2 uses to to Inbothworks identifies viewthatprovidence extends nomenwiththe he the extends allmen, to viewsof JobandAristotle. contrary The view,thatprovidence and of with of he identifies theopinion themasses theJewish People withEliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar.The last opinion he identifiesas belongingto Elihu, and Maimonides, himself. that He rejects Job-Aristotle the by positionon thegrounds it is contradicted
und (1898),97-112.SeymourFeldman, Trigonometrie Jakostab,"BibliothecaMathematica on "Gersonides Creation," Proceedingsof the AmericanAcademyof JewishResearch(New York, 1967). Bernard R. Goldstein, "Preliminary Remarks on Levi ben Gerson's Contributions to Astronomy," Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (1969), 239-254. Julius Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism, chapter on Gersonides,(New York, 1966).Julius Guttmann,"Leviben GersonsTheoriedes Begriffs," Festscriftzum 75 JahrigenBestehungdes Jud. Theol.Seminars,Vol. 2 (Breslau, 1929),pp. 131-49:reprintedas "ToratHamusagshel Ralbag,"in Guttmann,Dat uMada (Jerusalem, 1960).Isaac Heinemann,Ta'ameiHamitzvotb'Safrut Yisrael,Vol. 1 (Jerusalem,1954),97201. E. Hoffmann, "Levi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph," Monatschriftfu'r die Geschichte und Wissenschaftdes Judentums 10 (1860). Isaac Husik, "Gersonides,"in Philosophical Essays (Oxford, pp. 172-85. Issaac Husik, History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, chapter on Levi ben Gerson (New York, 1940). Isaac Husik, "Studies in JewishQuarterly Review(n.s.)7(1916-1917),pp. 172-85and 8 (1917-1918),pp. Gersonides," 113-56 and 231-68; reprinted in Philosophical Essays, pp. 186-234. J. Karo, Kritische Untersuchungenzu Levi ben Gersons Widerlegungdes Aristotelischen Zeitbegriffen, (Leipzig, 1935). Manuel Joel, Levi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph(Breslau, 1862). GeorgeSarton,chapteron Levi ben Gerson,Introductionto the History of Science, Vol. 3, Part 1 (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1947), pp. 594-606. Norbert Samuelson, "Gersonides'Account of God's Knowledge of Particulars,"Journal of the History of Philosophy 10, (October, 1972), pp. 399-416. Norbert Samuelson, "Philosophic and CentralConference of ReligiousAuthorityin the Thoughtof Maimonidesand Gersonides," American Rabbis Journal (hereaftercited as CCAR Journal)(October, 1969), pp. 31-43. NorbertSamuelson,"TheProblemof Free-Willin Maimonides,Gersonides,and Aquinas," CCAR Journal (January, 1970), pp 2-20. Norbert Samuelson, "The Problem of Future Contingentsin MedievalJewish Philosophy,"Studies in MedievalCulture6 (1972). Isidor Weil, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson (Paris, 1868). Harry Wolfson, "Maimonidesand Gersonideson Divine Attributesas AmbiguousTerms,"Mordecai M. KaplanJubilee Volume(New York, 1953), pp. 515-30.
2 Gersonides' account of his doctrine of providenceis found in Book IV of Milhamot Adonai (Wars of the Lord) and throughout his Commentary to Job. There are no differences substancebetweenthe positionsdescribedin the two books. Not only does he of constantly refer one to the other, but he uses identical arguments,and often identical passages, in them both. This supports Nima Adlerblum'scontention (in A Study of Gersonidesin His ProperPerspective[New York: 1926],p. 29n) that Levi"workedout the substanceof all his books simultaneously." for example, MilhamotAdonai, Book IV, See, to Chapter4, p. 165and his Commentary Job 38, Lassen,pp. 232-33.Levi'sHebrewtermfor His is "providence" "hashgaha". discussionof providencein the MilhamotAdonai is basically a sequel to his discussionof God's knowledgeof particularsin Book III. Most of his examples,therefore,relateto the ways in which God does and does not extend providential guidance to individualmen. In his Commentaryto Job he discusses the same issue with respectto the questionof how God'sguidingprovidencerelatesto rewardand punishment. Most of his examples, therefore,relate to retribution.The theological and philosophical problems,however, are the same.

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sense experience:3 we all have experience of dreams, divination, and prophecy, all of which indicate that God does indeed guide his creatures.4 Gersonides rejects the popular position on the grounds that it, too, contradicts sense-experience: we all have experience of the righteous suffering and the wicked prospering. Levi discusses three attempts at circumventing this difficulty. The first is that of Zophar, who maintains that we confuse the righteous with the wicked. The second is that of Bildad, who maintains that we confuse good with the evil. The third attempt is that of Eliphaz, who argues that God does reward and punish in accord with desert, but that the good and evil which befalls men unjustly does not come from God. Gersonides points out that Zophar and Bildad are basically appealing to mystery.5 But then they are neither following the evidence of sense experience nor, indeed, showing the justice of God's ways. Eliphaz, Levi explains, must hold either that divine providence extends to all individuals but does not govern all the details of their lives or that divine providence extends to some men and not to others. We know that he rejects the second view while the first also fails to show the justice of God's ways. More generally, Gersonides argues against the second view in the following way: We have already proved that God's knowledge does not extend to particulars insofaras they are particulars.6 knows these particulars they are orderedby He as the spheresand stars ... He also knows that man'sfree actions might upset this ordering.Now if God rewardedor punishedeach man in accordwith his actions, one of thesetwo thingswould have to be true. EitherGod rewardsand punishesin accordwithwhat He knowsfromthe heavenlyorder,orjudgesthemin accordwith theirdeeds, whethergood or bad. But if we say that Hejudgesthemin accordwith what He knows of theiractionsfromthe [heavenly]ordering,therewill be injustice in God'sverybreastfor they mightnot haveactedin accordwiththat ordering.But this is exactly the opposite of what those who hold this position wanted!On the other hand, if we say that God judges them in accordwith their actions, it is then necessarily the case that He knows their actions insofar as they are -and we have already shown that to be false. Further, it is selfparticular evidentlyclearthat evil cannot come from God except by accidentor the necessity of matter ...7 3Gersonideswas a thorough-goingempiricist(in the Aristotelian,not Humean,sense). The followingis typicalof his view:". .. unlessmenderiveknowledgefromsenseexperience it is valueless"(Commentaryto Job, chap. II, very end; Lassen, p. 87). 4 Gersonides,Milhamot IV, 3, p. 159. 5Commentaryto Chapter 11, end; Lassen, p. 87. 6 For a detailed analysis and criticismof Gersonides'account of God's knowledge of particulars, see Norbert Samuelson, "Gersonides Account of God's Knowledge of Journalof the History of Philosophy 10 (October 1972), pp. 399-416and his Particulars," excellent and exhaustive dissertation, The Problem of God's Knowledge in Gersonides (Indiana University,1970). 7Milhamot IV. 3, p. 159. Levi accounts for the existence of evil in the sequel to this passage(p. 160)and in the introductionto his Job Commentary(Lassen, pp. 7-9). (In this passagein the Commentary,by the way, he refersto the MilhamotAdonai.) He tracesthe source of all evils happening to man to the hylic cause (i.e., man's materiality)and to accident. Evilsconsequentupon the hylic cause originatein the recipientof the evil and are due either to his temperament(i.e., the combination of his bodily humors) or to the evil

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maintains the Gersonides that the thus positions, Having refuted twoextreme intermediate mustbe true,sincethesethreearethe onlypossible third, position positionsin thismatter. in correctview of providence the articulates purportedly this Gersonides world of in proximity varyinterms their following way: Living beings thesublunar are to the ActiveIntellect.8 Thosecloserin degreeto the ActiveIntellect better fromit. Amongmen, thananimalsfarther to prepared guardtheirwell-being Thosethatarecloser thanothers. somearecloserto theActiveIntellect similarly, to the ActiveIntellect to deserve be guidedmorethanthosefarfromit. To the intellect achieves he unionwiththeActive extentthatmanactualizes material his will thanothers whatevents becaused Intellect. Suchmencanseemoreclearly by theiractionsand by the actionsof theirfellowsandcanthustakethe necessary of measures increase to theirpain.Menbecome theirgoodandminimize worthy divineprovidence, of then, when they fulfill theirend as men:the perfection in themselves knowledge, and character, morals.9 In his Commentary Job he writes: to
to Elihuexplains that man'slow state,as compared God,does not in any way of the to prevent latterfromextending himHis Providence... Manis "mighty ideas.Ifthisis thecase,wehave he able heart"; namely, is potentially to conceive in then,on theonehand,Godgreatin understanding actuality ontheother and, in It hand,manof greatunderstanding potentiality. is also knownthatwhatis actualcompletes that whichis only potentialand helpsto bringit out into from We of his actuality. find,then,in theendeavor a manto realize conceptions the potential stateto theactual, quality a which uniteshimwithGodin a certain as of way, inasmuch actuality thoughtis commonto both of them,thoughin It that that man, widely differing degrees. is thenevident it is notright Goddespise butonthecontrary, account hisstriving unity andcleaving Him,it to on of for with
propensitiesof his (material)soul. Evils consequent upon accident are those which arise throughexternal causes and are due either to the behaviorof others (traceablein turn to their temperaments souls) or to naturaldisasterswhich are purelyaccidentalbut which or occur in order to keep the elements in equilibrium. 8 The Active Intellectis the intelligenceof the lunar spherewhichgovernsthe sublunar world.It has two functions:first,to endowsublunarnaturewiththe intelligenceand purpose visible in its processesand evolutions;second, to actualizeman's potential for knowledge. (Cf. Gersonides,MilhamotAdonai, Book I, 5, pp. 35-36;Husikand Guttmann,chapterson Gersonides, passim.; Samuelson,dissertation,p. lxxii, and text footnotes 27, 128, 130, 131, 339, 344, 349, 354, 374,377, 565,and 607.) Theknowledgewhichmanactuallygainsis called the acquiredintellect(Book I, 10)and is the immortalpartof man. Levimaintainedthat the and purposeof the observanceof the mitzvot "is to guide us to trueperfection" thus enable us to earn eternal life by teaching us true opinions. Cf. Yitzhak Heinemann, Taamei Hamitzvot B'Safrut Yisrael,Vol. 1 p. 97 (Jerusalem, 1959). 9Ibid., IV, 4, pp. 164-5. In his Commentary to Job (Introduction, Lassen, p. 9) Gersonideswrites:It is worthwhilefor you to know that these evils that accruefrom bad orderingare not proper human evils for human evils should happen to that part of man where properhumangood occurs, as the subjectwhereincontrarietiesoccur is always the same. Now sinceproperhumangood pertaining the partof the soul, whichwe call reason, to is not in the nutritiveor sensoryparts, for these parts do not belong to man qua man, it is evident that proper human evils also pertain wholly to this part, and just as we call the perfectionof human reasonproperhuman good, so we should call lack of that perfection, properhuman evils.

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is meet that He watchover man in a completemanner.And since this unity arises through man's actual attainment of conceptions, not because of his potential comprehensive power which is possessed by the entire human genus, it is evident that the providenceextended to the intellectualman is primarilybecause of his individual capacity to bring his potential power of conception into a state of actuality.

of It is therefore the clearthatGoddoes not forsake individuals thehuman overintellectual of men;and since speciesbecause theirlow state,but watches wickedness exaltedideas,as was statedby Job menfromconceiving prevents it to but is that himself, follows no providence extended thewicked theyareleftto theevilfatedestined thembytheconstellations, theyalsolackthesalvation for and of thesoul..... Butit is meet weunderstand Divineprovidence with varies that that withGod, thedegree its recipient, of man to that namely, themore endeavors unite to thegreater thedegree providence is of extended him;butthisis quiteevident to our everyone studying words.'

Having thus characterizedthe correct view of providence, Levi, in the sixth chapterof Book IV of the Milhamot, arguesthat his view is consistentwith that of the Torah and the Rabbis."I This argumentis interestingboth in its own rightand for the furtherlight it sheds on Levi's views. Levi first shows that his theory has sound biblical warrant.Indeed, he cites distincttexts from all threeportions of the biblicalcanon in proof of twenty-three his theory. Since one can use isolated Bible verses to prove almost anything,this part of the argumentis of little interest. Levi then points out that the sages held that reward and punishmentwere reservedfor the worldto come and that it is not necessarythat materialretribution be justly apportionedin this world. Levi welcomesthis view, of course, becauseit helpsto explainthe evidenceof our sensesthat the righteoussufferand the wicked prosper.He could acceptthis view becausehe felt that the goods and evils enjoyed and sufferedin this earthly life are not truly human goods and evils.12 Levi was indeed forced to adopt this view because it is clear that on his theory the most could lead lives of near-perfect (material)bliss werethat ordainedfor undeserving them in the stars. Levi then notes two problemswith his position. First, how can he account for the fact that the Torah often speaks of Israel and other nations suffering punishmentat God'shands?Second, the Torahclearlystates,in manyplaces,that a man is judged by all his actions, be they good or evil. The first is a problem becauseLevideniesthat evil can come from God. This we saw above. The secondis difficult to reconcile with his position because he denies that God knows individualsin their particularity.He knows what people are ordainedto do, and He further knows that they might exercise their freedom in not doing what is ordained,but He does not know what they actuallyend up doing. How, then, can He rewardthem for their good deeds and punish them for their wicked ones? Levi assertsthat the first problemis not difficultto solve. All the punishments about which the people of Israel are warned are not punishments so much as instances of guiding providencecausing the people to turn from their evil ways. They are thus more properlyconstrued as rewards.
10Commentary,end of Chapter38; Lassen, pp. 232-33.
12Ibid.,

" Pp. 179-84. pp. 181-82.

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Levi in withthe problem raised the by Similarly, findslittledifficulty dealing to of suffering nationsotherthanIsraelwhichis attributed God.Suchsuffering
serves as a demonstrationto the righteous, or actually protects the righteous.
Thus, these evils too are really examples of providential guidance and reward for the righteous.13 In dealing with the second problem with his theory, that of the repeated claims in the Torah that each man is judged by all his actions, Levi writes: It is clearthat this problemis not beyondsolution.Thisis so because,accordingto our theory,each man is truly rewardedfor his righteousnessand surelyrewarded for his wickedness.His rewardconsistsin successof the soul, his punishmentin its lack. It is furtherclear that each man is materiallypunishedfor his wickednessto the greatestextent consistentwith orderandjustice.The providential guardingof a man from evil will extend to the righteousaccording to their goodness and be lacking to the wicked. It is thus clear that it is possible to say that man is judged with reference all his actions,be theygood or evil. Withthis, the secondproblem to is solved.14 These "solutions," however, raise serious problems of their own. It is to their articulation that I now turn. Gersonides argues, in effect, that there are two types of providence. A general providence, extending to the entire world, and manifested in the good order we find in nature.'5 This ordering, on its own, generally rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked. In his Commentary to Job he argues ... God possessesall the possible wisdom and might to bring good to this lower existence,andthat He does extend His providenceto it in the best mannerpossible. God also mentioned, in his reply [to Job] the fact that the created things from which evil ensues, bringalso some good, namely, the punishmentof the wicked. This thought is containedin the expression"Andthe wickedwill be removedfrom it."(Job 38:13)This shows that the righteousare not affectedby theseevils, for it is said, "thewicked,"since they alone are thus harmed,as Elihuexplained(Job 35). From the punishmentof the wickedgreat use is derived,for other people will be and therebychastened turnto God andthus attainthe salvationof theirsouls. Now just as natureimplantedin plantsa powerto repelthat whichdoes not agreewith their essence, in orderthat they be not injured,likewiseGod placedsuchforces in the world, which, in some way, drive out the wicked from human society so that othermen shall not be harmedby them. Thisis accomplishedby the accidentalevil ensuingfrom the orderdeterminedby the heavenlybodies, which evil, as said, is intendedto harm the wicked.'6 A more specific providence is extended to the righteous, who, through the unification of their intellects with the Active Intellect, are thus able to foresee events ordained by the order of the stars and take appropriate pre-emptive measures. We see here, by the way, how the two senses of providence distinguished above come together. God guides the righteous and thus assures their (material) rewards; they are protected from avoidable evils. By punishing the wicked, God further guides the righteous, encouraging them to eschew evil and thus win the delights of the world to come (eternal unification with the Active Intellect).
13Ibid., pp. 183-84.
14 Ibid., p.

184. Emphasisadded. Gersonides,Milhamot III, 1, p. 123. 15 '6 Commentaryto Chapter49, end; Lassen, p. 252.

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This two-fold theory of providence raises a number of problems of which Gersonidesfails to take explicit account. Basically, Gersonidesargues that the wickedarepunishedby the very fact that they do not unifytheirintellectswiththe Active Intellect and thus cannot avoid evils ordained by the stars. But, beyond that, the wicked are punishedby the loss of immortalitywhichgoes hand in hand with unification with the Active Intellect. There is one immediatetechnical problem with this approach. The material punishment of the wicked consists in their being left to their fate. This fate, however, might be good, not evil! Indeed, since the order of the universeis such that it maximizes all possible good, it is likely that their fate will be good. This, Gersonides recognizes, is the reason the wicked may prosper. Their real punishment,however, is saved for their deaths, when they suffer deprivationof eternal life. We are faced with a more serious problem, however, when we seek to understandpunishmentsmeted out to the people of Israel as a whole. God can never be sure that abandoningthem to their fate will reallychastisethem:even if the fate ordainedfor them is evil (not necessarilythe case) they can change it by their own free action. More troublesomethan this problem is the fact that, on inflictedon the people of Israelarenot so much Gersonides' account,punishments punishmentsas instancesof God'sguidingprovidence.But, as the people become more evil, they become less worthyof divine providence,and thus thereis less of a likelihood that God will rewardthem; yet the chastisementsare exactly rewards. unificationwith the Active Intellectis supposedto lead to material Furthermore, reward (as well as eternal life). Why should that unification be rewardedwith materialpunishments? Last, and I think, most important,Levi is failing to live up to his own empiricist standards here. He is, indeed, grotesque. He is forced to interpret greatcalamities- the destructionof the two temples,the expulsionfrom Spain,even I imagine,the holocaust - as instancesof God'sspeciallove and favor for Israel. That, surely, is to turn upside down the evidence of both sense and reason. Levialso seemsto be fallinginto the sametrapwhich, he said, undid Bildad.He writes in his Commentaryto Job or Ch. 11 that Bildad holds "that what we consideran evil is not an evil, becauseit ultimatelybringsgood and the apparent good whichcomes to the wickedis in realityevil, for it ultimatelybringsevil." 7 He then rejectsBildad'sview (along with that of Zophar) because they of and statements tookno account senseexperience; merely madeconfused they But are that to difficulties saying the things mysterious. if the by attempted remove in in are that caseis so, howthencantheymaintain things thisworld conducted the is do Whence theyknowthat,sincethere order followa planofjustice? and proper the for these a mystery they enveloping things, havenocriterion testing knowledge themfrom with thereof? onlywillthisprinciple whichtheyoperated Not prevent be but the reaching truthin thisdisquisition, onewhofollowsit willnever ableto it from men in for reach truth anything, unless derive knowledge senseexperience is valueless.'"
'7Chapter 11; Lassen, p. 84. '8Ibid., p. 87.

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NowGersonides this for First,he would,I think,reject criticism tworeasons. evils thathedoesnotdenythatmaterial areevil,merely wouldprobably that argue nullifies human the maintain, evils; hewould this, undoubtedly theyarenotproper thathe is appealing mystery ignoring evidence oursenses. to and the of charge asserts all "things that in Second,he wouldprobably pointout thathe nowhere in this worldareconducted the properorderand followa planof justice." Levi'sreply,however, not raisesa veryseriousquestion, abouthis internal
consistency - he is nothing if not internally consistent - but about the extent to which his views may be said to be consistent with those of the rabbis. The problem may be made clearer if we summarize what we have said to this point. Levi would like to say that failure to unify one's intellect with the Active Intellect leads to material punishment. But, because of the order inherent in the world, and because of pre-ordained fate, it is likely that a miscreant will prosper. Levi is thus forced to say that there is no justice in this world and that true rewards are of the soul and pertain to the world to come. There are a number of ways in which this theory of providence would seem to fall clearly outside of the realm of rabbinic thought on the subject. It clearly violates the spirit of the vast number of rabbinic dicta concerning God's personal and very intimate love for each and every one of His creatures. Levi recognizes this and tries to accommodate the two views.19 But there would seem to be no way that Levi could accommodate his view to the rabbinic claim that all retribution is done measure for measure (midah k'neged midah). Further, in denying that all matters of this world are governed in accord with justice, Levi is clearly flying in the face of the near-absolute rabbinic unity behind the claim that God orders everything justly. Levi himself was well aware of how innovative his ideas were, and recognized the tension between his position and that of the rabbis. In concluding his discussion of the problems raised for his theory by the rabbinic position, he writes: "It is thus clear that it is possible [yitakhen] to say that a man is judged with reference to all his actions, be they good or evil." 20Gersonides seems to asserting that his position is formally consistent with rabbinic thought on the subject, even if it does not approach it in the same spirit. In this I think that he is wrong. Job 19 39:1:"Knowestthou the time whenthe wild goats of the rock bringforth?Orcanst thou mark when the hinds do calve?"Gersonidessays:"Thisanimal [the wild goat of the rocks],accordingto the rabbis,ascends,at time of giving birth,to a rock,and God sends,at the particular moment,an eagle to receivethe newlyborn babyon its wings,so that it should not fall off the rock. If such is the case, then this is the meaning of the verse. If not, the meaningis, accordingto our opinion, as follows:The young of this animalis bornwithgreat difficultyand dangerand thereforespecialcareis taken by God to bringthe young forth in such a state that they do not die at birth..." (Commentaryto Job 39:1).Levi is referring to the followingpassage(BabaBathra16a-b):"'Knowestthou the time when the wildgoats of the rock bringforth?Orcanstthou markwhenthe hindsdo calveTThiswild goat is heartless towardsheryoung. When she crouchesfor delivery,she goes up to the top of a mountainso that the young shall fall down and be killed, and I [God] preparean eagle to catchit in its wingsand set it beforeher, and if the eagle wereone second too soon or too late it would be killed. I do not confuse one moment with another .. ." For a general and very helpful discussionof Gersonides'understanding the Torah'sauthority,see NorbertSamuelson, of "Philosophicand Religious Authority in the Thought of Maimonidesand Gersonides," CCAR Journal (October, 1969), 31-43. '0 Milhamot IV, 6, p. 184.

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The idea of retributionin kind (midahk'negedmidah)is firmlyentrenchedin rabbinicliteratureand is nowhereseriouslydoubted. The pithiest, and certainly most famous expressionof this opinionis the sayingattributedto Hillel in Avot II, 7: "Moreover,he saw a skull floating on the face of the waterand he said:'Because thou drownedstthey drownedthee and in the end, they that drownedthee shall be drowned.'" It is even confirmedin the well-knownmishnaicattemptto spiritualize the doctrine of retribution:"Ben Azzai said: 'Be swift in fulfilling even a light preceptand flee from transgression.For the rewardof a preceptis a precept,and the rewardof a transgressionis a transgression"'(Avot IV, 2). There can be no doubt that in denying the principle of measure for measure in rewards and punishments in this world, Gersonides is stepping out of the mainstream of normativerabbinicJudaism. In denyingthat strictjustice obtains in this world, Gersonidesis takinga much bolderstep. The doctrineof God's unfailingjustice, extendingto all His creatures at all times is basic to the rabbinic world-view.2'Levi bases his claim on two passagesin the Talmud.In Kiddushin39b we readthat "R. Jacob said:'Thereis no rewardfor the fulfillmentof preceptsin this world.'" This, says Levi, implies"that it is not necessarythat physical reward and punishment be justly apportioned here."22 Gersonidescontinuesthe citation from Kiddushinby recountingthe story told thereof how Elishaben Abuyahcame to sin. It came about that Elisha saw a son fulfillinghis father'scommandto ascenda treeto get birdseggs (thusfulfilling the commandmentto honor one'sparents,the promisedrewardfor whichis "that thy days may be prolonged"[Deut 5:16]). When the boy reached the nest he fulfilledthe commandmentto chase away the motherbird beforetaking the eggs, the promisedrewardfor which is "thatit may be well with thee and thou mayest prolong thy days" (Deut 5:22). When descendingfrom the tree, the boy slipped, fell, and died. Elisha saw this and exclaimed:"Whereis this boy's happinessand where is his prolonging of days?"He thereuponbecame an unbeliever. But R. Jacob, Elisha's grandson, interpretedthe verses in the following way: "But 'in orderthat it may be well with thee,'means on the day that is wholly good; and 'in orderthat thy days may be long,' on the day that is wholly long." Both promises, R. Jacob seems to be saying, refer to the next world. True rewardcomes after death. Levi cites one other passagein supportof his position, from Moed Katan 28a: "Length of life, children, and sustenance depend not on merit, but rather on mazal."23 The fact that Gersonides cites only two supporting texts is itself instructive. His general tendency is to quote supporting texts at interminable length, when they are available. Moreover the texts which Levi quotes here are hardlytypical of rabbinicutteranceson the question of justice in this world. Not only that, but they reallydo not do what he needs them to do. Neitherexplicitly denied that "things of this world are ordered in justice," nor need they be interpreted in that way. Indeed, given the overwhelming preponderance of rabbinicopinion to the contrary,it would be presumptuousto so interpretthem.
21

Era(NewYork: See Schocken Vol. 1, pp. 357-400. especially Books,1971), pages379and 388andthe sources therecited.
22Milhamot IV, 6, p. 180. 23Ibid.

See, for example,GeorgeFoot Moore, Judaismin the First Centuries the Christian of

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In fact,Leviwrenches out thesepassages of context,totallyobscuring their

meaning. In the first instance he says of the rabbis: "They said: 'There is no reward for precepts in this world.' "24 Levi was referring to a passage in Kiddushin 39b where Raba says: "This latter agrees with R. Jacob, who said: 'There is no reward for precepts in this world."' Raba, in turn, was referring to (and indeed, immediately cites) the following passage at the very end of Hullin 142a: "It was taught: R. Jacob says: 'There is no precept in the Torah, where reward is stated by its side, from which you cannot infer the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.' " It is clear that R. Jacob was not trying to imply, as Levi maintains, that there is no justice in this world, but was trying to prove the doctrine of resurrection. R. Jacob's point was that one ought not to expect rewards for his good deeds (and punishments for his evil ones) in this life. But even this claim is modified in the sequel: of Butdid not R. Eleazarsaythat those engagedin the performance a preceptnever come to harm? Jacob hadcited,in proof of his dictum,the example,mentioned [R. above, of the boy fallingfrom the tree after both obeyinghis fatherand dismissing the dam.] When returning of fromthe performance a preceptit is different.But did not R. Eleazarsaythat those engagedin a preceptnevercome to harm,eitherwhen from the performance thereof?It musthave going to performit or when returning been a brokenladderthat was used, so that injurywas likely;and whereinjuryis likely,it is different,as it is written:"And Samuelsaid, 'How can I go? If Saul hear it he will kill me.' " The Gemara asserts here, then, that R. Jacob is basically wrong. Generally speaking, one is rewarded for precepts in this world, except in cases where such reward would depend upon a miracle, contravening the general principle that one may never rely upon a miracle (ein somkhin al hanes). It is only in these instances that there is no reward for precepts in this world. The tendentiousness of Levi's reading of R. Jacob's claim is thus clear. Levi follows up his use of R. Jacob's dictum with the following: It has alreadybeen explainedto you that rewardand punishmentdo not occurin physicalgoods and evils and it is thusnot impossiblethat they occurwithoutorder andjustice.They[the rabbis]said:"Lengthof life, children,and sustenancedepend not on merit,but ratheron mazal."It is clearthat they did not meanto differhere with the Torah which promisedin many places that physical rewardsaccrue to those who walk in her paths, but only that this matter is dependent upon the principlesof mazal.Therefore,it should not be a causefor doubt if the wickedare rewardedmaterially,for these rewardsaccrue to them by the workingsof mazal, not by virtue of their evil deeds.25 Levi, again, is building a lot on one short quotation. Material reward and punishment is governed, not by justice, but by mazal, "luck," "destiny," "that which is determined by the stars." And again, the context of this quotation is instructive: Raba said: "Lengthof life, children, and sustenance depend not on merit, but ratheron mazal. For, take Rabbahand R. Hisda. Both were saintly rabbis;one
24Ibid. 25Ibid.

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master prayed for rain and it came. R. Hisda lived to the age of ninety-two. Rabbah only lived to the age of forty. In R. Hisda'shouse there were held sixty At marriagefeasts, at Rabbah'shouse there were sixty bereavements. R. Hisda's house there was the purest wheaten bread for dogs, and it went to waste; at Rabbah'shousetherewas barleybreadfor humanbeings,and that not to be had." Now, in the first place, Raba says that three things, and three things only, depend upon mazal: length of life, children, and sustenance. The specificity of his claim is made clear by the anecdotes about Rabbah and R. Hisda. In the second place, the Gemara (Shabbat 156a and b) argues at great length that Israel is immune to mazal. Thus, at the very best (from Levi's perspective) the view he cites is that of a minority of one and the view itself is much more restricted than necessary for his purposes. Indeed, in the one instance where a rabbi explicitly uttered the view that there is no justice in this world he was immediately and harshly silenced by none other than Rabbi Akiba who, in his long life, was given plenty of reason to question God's justice on this earth. R. Pappiasalso expounded:"But He is at one with Himself, who can turn Him? (Job 23:13)He judges all that come into the world by Himselfand there is none to argue against His words."Said R. Akiba to him: "Thatis enough, Pappias."He, then, said to him:"Howdo you interpret,'But He is at one with Himself,andwho can turn Him?"'Akiba said to him: "Thereis no possible argumentagainstthe wordsof He who spoke and the worldcame into being,for everywordis in accord with truth, and every decision in accordancewith justice."26 Rabbi Akiba's judgment here is final, unequivocal, and fully representative of rabbinic thought on this issue. I am not trying to imply here that the rabbis were blind to the problem of the righteous suffering and the wicked prospering. They expend much energy in trying to deal with this problem. Their general approach, however, is that of Rabbi Yannai who said (Avot IV, 19): "Within our reach is neither the tranquillity of the wicked nor even the suffering of the righteous." This is generally understood to mean, in the words of the Mahzor Vitry (ad loc.), that "it is not within our power to understand why the way of the wicked prospers and why the righteous are made to endure sufferings." The rabbis recognized the seeming injustice in the world; but they refused to take the logical step of affirming that the injustice was real and place responsibility for it with God. It remained for them a problem. For Gersonides this approach was impossible. The problem of justice and providence was, he was convinced, a genuine problem which needed a genuine solution. This he provided. Levi ben Gerson expounds his doctrine of providence through his Commentary to Job. It may be that he finds support for his position in that book and can claim biblical, rather than rabbinic authority for it. This possibility is certainly worth examining. The Book of Job can certainly be interpreted as expounding the doctrine that there is no justice in this world. Throughout the book Job's friends enunciate a 26Mekhilta, Tractate Beshallah, Chapt. VII (to Exodus 14:26-31), ed. Lauterbach (Philadelphia:Jewish Publication Society, 1933), Vol. 1, p. 248.

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that of view insisting Jobmustbeguilty somesin, veryconventional of retribution, for otherwise wouldnot be suffering. consistently Job denieshis guilt and he Himself his the affirms innocence. Throughout bookhecallsuponGodto present to The of before barofjustice, it were, testify hisbehalf. question whowas on the as here.If Jobis right,thenwecannotavoid right- Job orhisfriends is decisive the conclusion thereis no justicein this world. that The to the Thereis strongevidence support claimthatJob wascorrect. very that was firstverse informs reader "There a maninthelandof Uz,whosename the and and wasJob and thatmanwaswhole-hearted upright, one thatfeared God to andshunned attests Job'srighteousness: theLordsaid "And evil." GodHimself untoSatan: 'Hastthouconsidered servant Job, thatthereis nonelikehimin my Godand shunneth a and the earth, whole-hearted upright man,one thatfeareth evil?"' (Job 1:8). in of a God Thesource Job'strialsis clearly stated: wager, effect,between and Satan.Thebook'sprologue makesit clearbeyond doubtthatJob'ssuffering any calls to Job wasgratuitous, totallyundeserved. repeatedly uponGodto testify this it his innocence. Nowhere, shouldbe noted,doesJobdoubt fact,to affirm (Job's) the of God'spower,only Hisjustice,thuspresenting problem evilin its starkest form. is of whenGoddoesexactly Thepresumption Job'sinnocence strengthened him Not whatJob demanded, answering out of the whirlwind. onlydoes God it but Job'sfriends: "And wasso, thatafter accede Job'sdemand, Hecastigates to theLordhadspoken untoJob,theLord to Eliphaz Temanite: said the thesewords for 'My wrathis kindled againstthee,and againstthy two friends; ye havenot Job spokenof Me the thingthatis right,as My servant hath'"(Job42:7).God Himselfthusatteststo Job'sinnocence, that clearlyimplying thereis no strict, isomorphic justice in this world. If the world were orderedjustly, Job's him wouldhaveprotected fromsuchsuffering. righteousness ButGod'sspeeches mustnot be ignored. doestestifyto Job'sinnocence, God At that his suffering undeserved. the sametime, however, was God implying Job for doubtingHis justice:"TheLord answered out of the Job castigates and counselby wordswithout whirlwind, said: 'Who is this that darkeneth Girdup now thy loins like a man;for I will demand thee,and of knowledge? declare thouunto me"'(Job 38:1). God'sspeeches takento meanthat Hisjusticecannotbe are Traditionally, is comprehended manand thattheymustacceptit on faith.This,however, by not the only reasonable of thetext. God'sspeeches, withtheir certainly reading on and emphasis cosmicphenomena, couchedas theyare in verybroadterms, of and of mightbetakento bea demonstration theperfect justordering thewhole universe. universe a wholemaybejust,evenif thatjustice notmanifested as The is in all its parts.Thus, God is just, and thereis, at least from our perspective, in injustice this world. to towards somevariant thisposition Gersonides seems beleaning of whenhe says:
Job God,in His discourse, reproached for his judgingDivineactionsas being defective imperfect. referred Job'scomplaints, and He to first,whyGodplaced human individuals under order the which ensues fromtheactivity theheavenly of in there injustice manifested theprosperity thewicked is as of and bodies, which by the suffering therighteous. if of to Second, it wereimpossible arrange differently,

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then the create unfortunate towhom ones is death preferablelife?" to why didGod Tomeet complaints, unfolds these God before thewonderful Job of panorama Hisactions theUniverse. unfolding twopurposes: to tell that in has This Job first, it is notright him judge actions, hedoes conceive anda for to His since not them, first of he it must, ofall,have Second, judge knowledgethethings judges. complete all become evident him God to that possesses thepossible wisdom might and may to bring tothislower and He extend providence His toit existence, that does good in thebest manner God in the possible. alsomentioned, Hisreply, factthatthe created the thingsfromwhichevil ensuesbringalso somegood,namely, of punishmentthewicked ...27 He thengoes on to say: that should guarded evil, (God) be to from I it ... Were possible arrange allpeople failed accomplishing I placed men, are in it.But in who at would certainly nothave not times protected thestars, instrument means which cansave an of they by by evil is intellect. canbesaved if from themselves theimpending which their They Intellect.28 of to strive unite, means their reasoning with Active power, the by they someformof the interpretation Job of is Evenif Gersonides hereadopting described above- andit is not clearto methatheis - thisin no way briefly just In willsavehisclaimthathisviews consistent thoseof theRabbis. thefirst are with this interpretation. Second, the Bible as place, they overwhelmingly reject for Judaism. in understood theTalmud, theBibleitself,is normative rabbinic not of Gersonides could not consistently appealto an interpretation the Biblenot withinthe and sanctioned the Talmud at the sametimeclaimto be working by rabbinic tradition. to Theconclusion whichwe are thusforcedis thatRabbiLevibenGerson's in world- striking, solution theproblem divine to of creative, justice animperfect viewsof the withthe standard and original it is - cannotbe easilysquared as of Giventhetendentious nature hisattempts foundin rabbinic literature. subject that to provehisconsistency rabbinic thereis goodreason suspect to with thought Gersonides awareof this tension. was the In a widersense,however, shouldbe noted,first,thatLeviwashardly it in like firstto enunciate viewson providence theonesdiscussed thisessay.To one wereforcedto adopt positions extent or anotherall the JewishAristotelians the the to and similar his.ButLeviwascertainly clearest, boldest, the substantially fromthefactthat mostforthright thegroup.Second,it shouldnotbe inferred of from tradition Levi's was different thatadopted therabbinic by position strikingly if thathe is therefore necessity heterodox of a thinker; nothingelse,his writings availablewithinthe demonstrate wide rangefor theologicalmaneuvering the contextof rabbinic Judaism.29
27End of Commentaryto Job 39; Lassen, pp. 251-252. 28 End of Commentaryto Chapter41; Lassen, p. 264. 29That is not to implythat Levi did not receivea lot of criticism.Shem Tob'spun on the title of his book, WarsAgainstthe Lord, becamebetterknown than the book itself. Indeed, it was ignored to such an extent that, of the originalprintededition of the book (Riva di Trento, 1569)only seventeencopies remain. Yet, despite this, his non-PentateuchalBible are commentaries printedin the standardJewisheditionof the Bible(MikraotGedolot)and he is everywhere consideredby those who pride themselveson their strictadherenceto the rabbinictraditionto be a Rishon, one of the earlyones, a standardearlymedievalauthority, one whose statementsand decisions a later scholar cannot dispute.