Moralism, inasmuch as it applies to policy debate, is the idea that, no matter how practical or good a policy is, it should

be rejected if it is amoral. The argument is that morality is a priori, because if we ignore it this once it justifies amoral actions in the future.

Morality is relative and cannot be determined

Gowans 08 (Chris, December 9, department of philosophy at Fordham University, Ph.D from University of Notre Dame, Moral Relativism,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ForArg DOA: 1/17/12 ARW) The metaethical position usually concerns the truth or justification of moral judgments, and it has been given somewhat different definitions. Metaethical relativists generally suppose that many fundamental moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved , and on this basis they argue that moral

judgments lack the moral authority or normative force that moral objectivists usually contend these judgments may have. Hence, metaethical relativism is in part a negative thesis that challenges the claims of
moral objectivists. However, it often involves a positive thesis as well, namely that moral judgments nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following definition will be a useful reference point:

Space policy must be pragmatic; basing decisions on morality paralyzes practical problem-solving
Williamson 03 (Mark, space technology consultant, Science Direct, Elsevier Science, Space ethics and protection of the space
environment, http://www.medicine.mcgill.ca/mnmsmi/Williamson%202003.pdf DOA: 12/7/11 ARW) So, in

the same way that medical ethics concerns real world issues, such as organ donation, assisted policy of space ethics must evolve by addressing actual issues. Any attempt to derive a code of ethics from a philosophy is missing the point: the code must be an operational tool, not simply a list of postulates. Moreover, time is of the essence. The construction of the
conception and cloning, a International Space Station in low-Earth orbit and the formulation of plans to search for life on Marsone day by means of manned missions indicate that humanity is intent on making the space environment part of its domain. Publicity surrounding space tourism, in-space burials and the sale of lunar real estate suggests that, some time in the 21st century, the

space environment will become an extraterrestrial extension of our current business and domestic environment.

Making amoral decisions in the face of death is justified

iek 03 (Slavoj, September 29, Slovenian philosopher, political theorist, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, interviewed by
Eric Dean Rasmussen, who is Associate Professor of English at Nord-Trndelag University College, Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj iek, http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/endconstruction/desublimation DOA: 1/17/11 ARW) Let me put it this way. Bernard Williams, the English moral philosopher, develops, in a wonderful way, the difference between `must' and `have to.' He opposes the logic of positive injunction - in the sense of "you should do this" - with another logic of injunction, a more fundamental sense, of "I just cannot do it otherwise." The first logic is simply that of the ideal. You should do it, but never can do it. You never

can live up to your ideal. But the more shattering, radical, ethical experience is that of "I cannot do it otherwise." For example - this is one of the old partisan myths in Yugoslavia - Yugoslavian rebels killed some Germans, so the Germans did the usual thing. They encircled the village and decided to shoot all the civilians. But, one ordinary German soldier stood up and said, "Sorry, I just cannot do it." The officer in charge said, "No problem, you can join them," and the German soldier did. This is what I mean by sacrifice. There's nothing pathetic about it. This honest German soldier, his point was not, "Oooooh, what a nice, ideal role for me." He was just ethically cornered. You cannot do it otherwise. Politically, it's the same. It's not a sacrificial situation where you're secretly in love with your role of being sacrificed and you're seeking to be admired. It's a
terrible, ethical, existential deadlock; you find yourself in a position in which you say, "I cannot do it otherwise."