Chavez v. Martinez 538 U.S. 760, 123 S.Ct.

1994 Statement of the Case: Respondent Oliverio Martinez brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against petitioner Ben Chavez because of an allegedly coercive interrogation of respondent. He maintains that Chavezs actions violated his Fifth Amendment right to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself as well as his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning. Facts: On November 28, 1997, Police officers Maria Pea and Andrew Salinas were in an empty parking lot in Oxnard, California investigating suspected narcotics activity. They heard a bicycle coming towards them and told the rider to get off, spread his legs, and place his hands behind his head. During the pat down, they found a knife around his waistband. (This is where parties disagree as to what happened next) The officers maintain that Martinez attempted to run away so they tackled him. Officers claim that Martinez drew Salinas gun and pointed it at them Martinez asserts that he never attempted to flee and that Salinas tackled him with no warning. Martinez denies that he ever grabbed Salinas gun.

Both sides agree that Salinas shouted, Hes got my gun! and Officer Pea drew her gun and shot Martinez several times, blinding him and paralyzing him from the waist down. They placed him under arrest and he was quickly brought to the hospital. There, Chavez, a patrol supervisor, questioned him for about 10 minutes over a 45-minute period (Breaks were for medical treatment). He refused many but answered some questions. At no point during the interview was Martinez given warnings under Miranda v. Arizona. Martinez was never charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against him in any criminal prosecution. Procedural History: District Court granted summary judgment to Martinez as to Chavezs qualified immunity defense on both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Ninth circuit affirmed the District Courts denial of qualified immunity and concluded: - Chavezs actions, as alleged by Martinez, deprived Martinez of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. - Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights asserted by Martinez were clearly established by federal law Issue: Whether or not the officers alleged conduct violated a constitutional right so that we can determine the big picture question of whether or not Chavez is entitled to qualified immunity. (Majority Opinion: Thomas)

Holding: Because Chavez did not violate Martinezs Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, he was entitled to qualified immunity Reasoning: Part A 1 - We fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. - Martinez tries to argue that scope of criminal case should extend to police interrogations. o Court disagrees; a constitutional violation only occurs at trial - Martinez was never made to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendments Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case. Part A 2 - Existing case law o Minnesota v. Murphy- The government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury, on pain of contempt, so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal case in which he testifies o Brown v. Walker- Even if they fear their testimony will be used against them, we have permitted incriminating testimony so long as those statements cannot be used against the speaker in a criminal case. o Lefkowitz v. Turley- governments may penalize public employees and contractors if they fail to give testimony, as long as the answers elicited are immunized from use in criminal case against speaker o Griffin v. California- No penalty may ever be imposed on someone who exercises his core Fifth Amednment right not to be a witness against himself in a criminal case ***These holdings show that, contrary to Ninth Circuits view, mere coercion does not violate the text of the Self Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the witness. - Court fails to see how Martinez was any more compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself than an immunized witness forced to testify on pain of contempt. - Accordingly, the fact that Martinez did not know his statements could not be used against him does not change our view that no violations of the Fifth Amendments Self-Incrimination Clause occurred here. Part A 3 - Concludes that a violation of the constitutional right against selfincrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. - There are prophylactic rules designed to safeguard core constitutional rights o Privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in non-criminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and derivative use in a future criminal proceedings before it is compelled.

o Miranda exclusionary rule prevents violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Rule Accordingly, Chavezs failure to read Miranda rights did not violate Martinezs constituional rights and cannot be grounds for a 1983 action (Because Miranda warnings is not itself required by the Fifth Amendmentbut is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose.) Because we find that Chavezs alleged conduct did not violate the Self Incrimination Clause, we reverse the Ninth Circuits denial of qualified immunity as to Martinezs Fifth Amendment claim. Would be a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, not Fifth Amendment

Part B - We are satisfied that Chavezs questioning did not violate Martinezs due process rights. - There is no evidence that Chavez acted with a purpose to harm Martinez by intentionally interfering with his medical treatment. - We (also) find no basis in our prior jurispudence or in our Nations history and traditions to suppose that freedom from unwanted police questioning is a right so fundamental that it cannot be abridged absent a compelling state interest - We conclud that Martinez has failed to allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is therefore unnecessary to inquire whether the right asserted by Martinez was clearly established. Judgment The judgment for the Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further hearings (Justice Souter) Holding: Respondent Martinezs claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his priveleg against compelled self-incrimination should be rejected and his case remanded for further proceedings. Reasoning: - Text in the Fifth Amendment refers to courtroom action - Does not believe that Martinez can make the powerful showing, subject to a realistic assessment of costs and risks, necessary to expand protection of the priblege against compelled self incrimination to the point of the civil liability he asks us to recognize here. - Substantive due process claim is an issue that should be addressed on remand (Justice Scalia)

Holding: Agree with Courts rejection of Martinezs Fifth Amendment claim that Chavez violated his right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Reasoning: - Section 1983 does not provide remedies for violations of judicially created prophylactic rules, such as the rule of Miranda v. Arizona nor is it concerned with extensions of constitutional provisions designed to safeguard actual constitutional rights. o Rather, a plaintiff seeking redress through 1983 must establish the violation of a federal, constitutional, or statutory right. - Rejects Fifth Amendment argument on same grounds as Thomas - I see no basis for a remand to determine whether Martinez may pursue aa claim of liability for substantive due process of violation. o Not only is the claim meritless, but Martinez already had his chance to press a substantive-due-process theory in the court of appeals and he chose not to.

Chavez v. Martinez dissent

Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part New Facts: He includes a transcript of a portion of the interrogation that occurred in the emergency room. He suggests that this is evidence that vividly demonstrates that the respondent was suffering severe pain and mental anguish throughout the petitioners persistent questioning. Page 11 Issue: Whether the brutal police conduct used here constitutes a deprivation of the prisoners constitutionally protected rights Holding: The interrogation is a classic example of a violation of a constitutional right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty (page 12) Therefore, the lower courts were correct in finding that the petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity. Reasoning: Follows the reasoning of Justice Kennedys dissent. Also, he concurs with Part II of Justice Souters opinion, which says the issue of whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be decided on remand. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part (with whom Stevens joins, and Ginsberg joins for Parts II and III) New Facts: Martinez had been shot in the face, both eyes were injured; he was screaming in pain, and coming in and out of consciousness while being repeatedly

questioned about details of the encounter with the police. His blinding facial wounds made it impossible for him to visually distinguish the interrogating officer from the attending medical personnel. The officer made no effort to dispel the perception that medical treatment was being withheld until Martinez answered the question put to him. There was no attempt through Miranda or other assurances to advise the suspect that his cooperation should be voluntary. (page 17) Issue: First, whether the failure to give a Miranda warning was itself a constitutional violation actionable under 1983. Second, whether an actionable violation arose under the Self-Incrimination Clause when the police, after failing to warn, used severe compulsion in an attempt to elicit a statement (page 13) Holding: Concurs with Thomas on Issue 1, that failure to give a Miranda warning does not establish a constitutional violation. Dissents with Souter and Thomas conclusions that violation of the Self-Incrimination clause can only occur when a statement is introduced a trial. Would affirm the lower courts ruling but if he, Stevens and Ginsberg did so, there would be no controlling opinion. So, he concurs with Part II of Souters opinion (which says the issue of whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be decided on remand) because he feels a ruling on substantive due process will provide much of the essential protection the Self-Incrimination Clause ensures. Reasoning: The Clause protects an individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the future. (page 14) The Self-Incrimination clause is applicable at the time and place police use compulsion to extract a statement. Though there is no rule in interrogating suspects who are in pain (because there may be a legitimate need to get answers quickly in some circumstances), there is a 1983 violation If the complainant can demonstrate that an officer exploited his pain and suffering with the purpose and intent of securing an incriminating statement. (page 17) Further, police should not make the suspect believe that his treatment would be delayed by refusal to answer. The record in this case shows that Chavez did exactly that. Thus, Kennedy believes there has been an actionable 1983 violation, though the majority disagrees. Justice Ginsberg, concurring in part and dissenting in part Joins with Kennedys opinions that the Clause is applicable at the time and place police use compulsion to extract a self-incriminating statement, and that evidence shows that the prisoner believed his treatment would be delayed by refusal to answer. However, he emphasizes that he thinks an actionable violation would have occurred even if there was no belief that treatment was being withheld. Given the circumstances of the questioning, he was at the complete mercy of the interrogator and the resulting statement could not possibly be construed as voluntarily given. Holding: Would affirm the judgment of the lower courts, but to assure a controlling judgment, joins with Part II of Souters opinion (which says the issue of whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be decided on remand. )