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Title and Citation

Ewing v. California (538 U.S. 11 (2003), 123 S. Ct.1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108, 2003 U.S.)

Facts of the Case

Petitioner Ewing has been charged with a felony of stealing three golf clubs worth $399.00 a piece from a sports store. He is charged under the three strikes law of California. The judges took note of the substantial history of the Defendant and sentenced him to a 25 year to life sentence in prison. Before this incident, the Defendant had, in 1984, he pleaded guilty to theft. In 1988, Defendant was convicted of felony grand theft auto. In 1990, Defendant was convicted of petty theft with a prior. In 1992, he was convicted of battery. One month later, Defendant was convicted of theft. In January of 1993, he was convicted of burglary. In February 1993, he was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia. In July 1993, Defendant was convicted of appropriating lost property. In September 1993, he was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm and trespassing. And there other petty crimes he committed. Prior to this incident, the defendant had been charged with four serious or violent felonies for the three burglaries and the robbery in the Long Beach apartment complex. According to Californias three-strike law, Defendant was Sentenced to a 25 year to life sentence in prison.

The Vote

What is the vote in this case? How many justices are in the majority? Who is the author of the majority opinion? What justices join that opinion? Who offers concurring or dissenting opinions? The vote was; No, it does not violate the 8th amendment, and Gary Ewing should be charged to a 25 to life sentence in prison. There are 4 justices in the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens is the author of the majority opinion. Justice David Souter Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen Breyer join the majority opinion of the three strikes law isnt cruel and unusual and therefore the defendant should be sent to a 25 to life sentence in jail. Justice Antonin Scalia offers the concurring opinion. J. Scalia believes that the principle of proportionality cannot be intelligently applied. Certainly, in the present case, a sentence of 25 to life is not proportionate to the theft of three golf clubs, and the sentence of 25 to life is cruel and unusual.

The Law and/or Constitutional Provisions at Issue

The Supreme Court is assigned to interpret the law deciding Californias Three Strikes law. A defendant with two or more "strike" priors faces a minimum of 25years-to-life in prison. He earns no time off for good behavior or working. After serving the determinant minimum amount of time, he is then eligible for, but not guaranteed, parole. Whether and when an eligible life prisoner is paroled is up to the Board of Prison Terms (BPT). The BPT is made up of members appointed by the Governor and tend to be very conservative about paroling eligible life inmates. Since no 3-Strike life prisoner has become eligible for parole and none will until 2019, no one knows how the BPT will deal with 3-Strike inmates. Three Strikes laws are legislation enacted by many states that target repeat offenders. After three separate felony convictions, or "strikes," convicts are "kicked out" of society - that is, they're sent to jail for life. The reasoning behind these laws is that those who repeatedly commit felonies likely pose a serious threat to society and should be imprisoned for the greater good.

The Legal Questions

Does Californias three strikes law violate the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed?

Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the States Three Strikes law?

It is the responsibility of state legislature to put deterrent penalties into place?

Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit CA's "three strikes" law?

The Opinion of the Court:

The opinion of the court was held that the 25 year sentence due to burglary does not violate the 8th Amendment. In light of Ewing's lengthy criminal record, his sentence is not grossly disproportionate. California's three strikes law plays an important role in reducing crime through deterring or incapacitating chronic offenders. Common sense says that those who continue to offend should be subject to lengthy sentences in order to protect society. Numerous studies show that a relatively small number of offenders are responsible for a very disproportionately large share of crime, and that past criminal behavior is an excellent predictor of future crime. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence to show that three strikes may have contributed to California's dramatic drop in crime since the implementation of the law. While California does not have the burden of proving three strike's efficacy, this does place the defendant's sentence in its appropriate context.

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:

Justice Scalia held the concurring opinion. Justice Scalia believes that the principle of proportionality cannot be intelligently applied. He orates that since the majority

acknowledges, a sentence can have a variety of justifications including incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation, it is insufficient to merely assess whether the gravity of the offense is proportionate to the harshness of the penalty. Certainly, in the present case, a sentence of 25 to life is not proportionate to the theft of three golf clubs. Justice Stevens, with Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join the dissents. In direct disagreement with the concurrences, Justice Stevens says that the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution indeed expresses a broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into account all of the justifications for penal sanctions. While Justice Breyer says that, Defendants recidivism despite, the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the crime of stealing three golf clubs.

Evaluation of the Case:

The importance of this decision is that it will further protect citizens from the petty criminals. For future dissenters, the argument that they have against this case is that this law is unjust and does not evaluate ones circumstances and does not evolve

into a more reasonable law which then tries to comprehend what the individuals past, and present. The three strikes law provides a fix for a defective justice system so that repeat offenders stay in prison. To many crime victims, the U.S. judicial system has turn into somewhat of a joke. Eviscerate exception rules, case backlogs, liberal sentences, plea bargaining, and a protect-the-criminal-rather-thanthe-victim mentality has far too often let criminals slip through the cracks. Repeat offenders nowadays commit most of the crime. The three strikes law is a way to ensure justice is done even if the system otherwise fails miserably. The law provides a very effective restriction after the 2nd conviction. Arguments always arise over what is the best deterrent. Is there a better deterrent than the knowledge you will definitely go to jail for at least 25 years if convicted again? This will not only discourage the more serious crime such as rape and armed robbery, it will discourage the more minor offenses of things like burglary. It's not like this law is secret or unknown to the criminals. We all know that in the real world criminals get away with many crimes. The police may not have any clue that committed the crime, the police may not have near enough evidence to prosecute, and the criminal may simply slip through the system with the aid of a slick lawyer. It's a major judicial accomplishment to get one conviction. Thus, when the three-strikes law is applied, it is often applied to a criminal who has committed far more than 3 crimes. The liberal media obviously has an agenda to push when it portrays poor, helpless felons in jail for the rest of their lives for stealing videos or pizza, or committing some other harmless crime.

Title and Citation

Atkins v. Virginia

(536 U.S. 304 (2002)

Facts of the Case: Around midnight on August 16, 1996, following a day spent together drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, Daryl Atkins and his accomplice, William Jones, walked to a nearby convenience store where they abducted Eric Nesbitt, an airman from nearby Langley Air Force Base. Unsatisfied with the $60 they found in his wallet, Atkins and Jones drove Nesbitt in his own vehicle to a nearby ATM and forced him to withdraw a further $200. In spite of Nesbitt's pleas, the two abductors then drove him to an isolated location, where he was shot eight times, killing him. Footage of Atkins and Jones in the vehicle with Nesbitt were captured on the ATM's CCTV camera, which was of the two men with Nesbitt in the middle and leaning across Jones to withdraw money, and further forensic evidence implicating the two

were found in Nesbitt's abandoned vehicle. The two suspects were quickly tracked down and arrested. In custody, each man claimed that the other had pulled the trigger. Atkins' version of the events, however, was found to contain a number of inconsistencies. Doubts concerning Atkins's testimony were strengthened when a cell-mate claimed that Atkins had confessed to him that he had shot Nesbitt. A deal of life imprisonment was negotiated with Jones in return for his full testimony against Atkins. The jury decided that Jones' version of events was the more coherent and credible, and convicted Atkins of capital murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense presented Atkins's school records and the results of an IQ test carried out by clinical psychologist Dr. Evan Nelson confirmed that he had an IQ of 59. On this basis they proposed that he was "mildly mentally retarded". Atkins was nevertheless sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence after finding that an improper sentencing verdict form had been used. At retrial, the prosecution proved two aggravating factors under Virginia lawthat Atkins posed a risk of "future dangerousness" based on a string of previous violent convictions, and that the offense was committed in a vile manner. The state's witness, Dr. Stanton Samenow, countered the defense's arguments that Atkins was mentally retarded, by stating that Atkins's vocabulary, general knowledge and behavior suggested that he possessed at least average intelligence. As a result, Atkins's death sentence was upheld.

The Vote What is the vote in this case? How many justices are in the majority? Who is the author of the majority opinion? What justices join that opinion? Who offers concurring or dissenting opinions? The vote was; the constitutionality of the case is upheld, and the prosecution of a mentally retarded person is unconstitutional and it violates the 8th Amendment. There are six justices in the majority, they are Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Barder Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day OConnor, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens. Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Barder Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day OConnor, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens offer the concurring opinions, while dissenting opinions are stated by William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.

The Law and/or Constitutional Provisions at Issue:

According to the Supreme Court, the case Atkins v. Virginia is to be announced unconstitutional and the charge of death penalty held against Atkins should be upheld because it violates the 8th Amendment, the crime would be cruel and unusual due to the fact that he is mentally retarded. The Court also invalidated an Oklahoma law (57 O.S. 1941 173, 174, 176181, 195) that compelled the state government to sterilize "feeble-minded" or "habitual" criminals in an effort to prevent them from reproducing and passing on their deficient characteristics Significantly, however, the Court had let stand, fifteen years earlier, a Virginia law (1924 Va. Acts C. 394) that authorized the sterilization of mentally retarded individuals who were institutionalized at state facilities for the feeble-minded. The laws from other states respectively show the constitutionality of the death penalty being reduced due to his mental retardation.

The Legal Questions:

Does the execution of mentally retarded individuals convicted of capital crimes violate the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

How does the 8th Amendment succinctly prohibit excessive sanctions?

How does it interpret: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted 9?

Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons cruel and unusual punishment?

The Opinion of the Court:

The opinion of the court stated that it was unconstitutional to prohibit Atkins his 8th Amendment right that states; Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. These disabilities aggravate those with mental retardations diminished ability to understand and process information, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. Thus, they remain subject to criminal sanctions, but with diminished personal culpability, which undermines the purposes of capital punishment as defined by the Courts capital punishment jurisprudence. Finally, owing to this proven reduced capacity of offenders with mental retardation, the Court noted that these offenders face enhanced risk of wrongful execution and specifically identified numerous riskenhancing characteristics. It was asserted that persons with mental retardation rely on authority figures and work hard to please them. Given this fact and the political pressures of policing, interrogator-coerced false confessions remain a sad reality confronting suspects with mental retardation.

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:

In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice John Paul Stevens held the concurring opinion; "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Which means that he and the court think that those executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The dissenting opinions were held by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Rehnquist who argued that in spite of the augmented number of states which had forbidden the capital punishment of the execution to the mentally retarded, there was no obvious national consensus, and that even given if there were, there was no basis in the Eighth Amendment for using such measures of opinion to determine what is "cruel and unusual". Justice Scalia commented in his dissent "seldom has an opinion of this court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members". The citing of an amicus brief from the European Union also drew criticism from Chief Justice Rehnquist, who denounced the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws.

Evaluation of the Case:

The importance of this decision is that there is justice is the system which means that there will be a law against and an individually whose is out of the norm and even the norm are going to be given rights. The only possible inclination about this decision is to protect the rights of an individual. Even in previous court decision people who were mentally retarded are found to be incapable of connecting with individuals based on society. Because the mentally retarded are not able to communicate with the same sophistication as the average offender, there is a greater likelihood that juries will interpret their deficiency in communicative ability as a lack of remorse for their crimes. They typically make poor witnesses, being more prone to suggestion and willing to "confess" in order to placate or please their questioner. As such, there is a greater risk that the jury may impose the death penalty despite the existence of evidence that suggests that a lesser penalty should be imposed. In light of the "evolving standards of decency" that the Eighth Amendment demands, the fact that the goals of retribution and deterrence are not served as well in the execution of the mentally retarded, and the heightened risk that the death penalty will be imposed erroneously, the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of the mentally retarded.

Title and Citation

Thompson v. Oklahoma (487 U.S. 815 (1988))

Facts of the Case:

At the age of 15, William Thompson brutally murdered his brother-in-law, who had been abusing his sister. According to Oklahoma law, Thompson was a minor and must be tried as one, thereby receiving a reduced sentence and other considerations. Due to the gravity of the crime, the prosecutor requested an order

that would allow the boy to be tried as an adult. In order to do this, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the case had merit and that the chance for rehabilitation of the child within the juvenile system was slim. An Oklahoma District court granted the order after hearing of the boy's violent nature, past offenses, and psychiatric testimony. Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The ruling was appealed and the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence, holding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense." The Court thereby ruled that applying the death penalty to a 15 year old was prohibited under the Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment clause.

The Vote What is the vote in this case? How many justices are in the majority? Who is the author of the majority opinion? What justices join that opinion? Who offers concurring or dissenting opinions? In the case of Thompson v. Oklahoma, the vote was that execution of a juvenile is unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment. There are five justices in the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens is the author of the majority vote. Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice O'Conno. Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and

Justice White offer the concurring opinion. The court voted for Thompson due the Court who has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.

The Law and/or Constitutional Provisions at Issue:

The Court recorded the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" as a chief apprehension. Many U.S. jurisdictions and all industrialized Western nations had excluded the death sentence of juveniles under 16 years of age. They entirely sidestepped any discussion of the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment and instead claim to look to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. The majority ignores the fact that there is overwhelming evidence in both historical practice and the common law

that the Eighth Amendment was not originally meant to entail a prohibition against the execution of anyone under 16.

The Legal Questions:

Can a defendant be lawfully executed for a crime he committed when he was 15 years old?

Would the execution of a 15 year old violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"?

Whether executing a 15 year old is a violation of the cruel and unusual statute of the eighth amendment.

The Opinion of the Court:

The court ruling was a yes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The evolving standards of decency doctrine has become part and parcel of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In his dissent, Justice Scalia points out the danger of this doctrine; The risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views. To avoid this danger we have, when making such an assessment in prior cases, looked

for objective signs of how today's society views a particular punishment. The most reliable objective signs consist of the legislation that the society has enacted. It will rarely if ever be the case that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the American people than do their elected representatives.

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:

As for the concurring opinion Justice Rehnquist stated, For such a young offender, the deterrence rationale is equally unacceptable. The Department of Justice statistics indicate that about 98% of the arrests for willful homicide involved persons who were over 16 at the time of the offense. Thus, excluding younger persons from the class that is eligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent value of capital punishment for the vast majority of potential offenders. And even with respect to those under 16 years of age, it is obvious that the potential deterrent value of the death sentence is insignificant for two reasons. The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. This means that age should only make a little difference depending on what age, that there should be a capital punishment of execution if charged with a 1st degree murder, or crimes equally disgusting.

Evaluation of the Case:

In this case, the importance is also the justice served in protecting the individuals who lack experience or knowledge of the law. Particularly during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults. Adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults therefore they dont have the capacity to think long-range like adults. The argument that a juvenile should not be charged with execution as an adult because he did not have the capacity to think long-range as an adult sounds relevant. The cruel and unusual punishments clause in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is not fixed firmly to the superseded but may obtain meaning as a humane justice that enlightens public opinion. This case defines that stature of a minor under 16, and his rights as an individual to be protected from harmful laws committed without thinking long range like adults.

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