Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship Author(s): Jason A. Scorza Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol.

32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148170 . Accessed: 27/03/2012 15:00
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LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP

JASONA. SCORZA Fairleigh Dickinson University

Aristotle famously argues thatfriendshipcan serve as a normativemodelfor thepractice of citizenship, and this view has been widely accepted by neo-Aristotelians.Liberals, however,are quickto rejectbothAristotle'sview offriendshipand his viewof citizenship.Does this meanthat the conceptoffriendshipis politically irrelevantforliberalism?Thisessay suggests, on the contrary,thatthe conceptoffriendshipisfarfrom obsolete,evenfor liberals.Specifically,communicative constraintsderivedfromthe normsoffriendship,as interpreted RalphWaldo Emerson, by could serve to promotethe modestinstrumental purposes of liberal citizenship-personalfreedom, social justice, and civil peace-while simultaneouslyallowing thepractice of liberal citidirections,enrichedratherthanstrainedby the multiculzenshipto develop in noninstrumental tural realities of most modernsocieties. Keywords: friendship; citizenship;Emerson;liberalism

that When RalphWaldoEmersonsuggests, in his 1844 essay "Politics," citizens might someday "exercisetowardseach otherthe grandestand simplest sentiments,as well as a knotof friends,or a pairof lovers,"he appearsto be talkingpurenonsense.' If citizenshipis conceived in largelyinstrumental terms,as liberalindividualistscommonlydo, thereis no obviousjustification for citizens as such to model theirconducttowardone anotheron the norms of friendship.Fellow citizens may reasonablydemandfromeach otherbasic respectand toleration,as well as some assuranceof social welfarecommenof suratewith the requirements humandignity.But they may not demandthat otherslove them, treatthem as friends,or abandonself-determined projects for their sake. In fact, such demands would be completely externalto the
AUTHOR'S NOTE:I am deeply grateful to JonathanAllen, KatharineLawrieBalfour Patrick Beth Posner,KathyPurnell, and Deneen, AmyGutmann,GeorgeKateb, W.CareyMcWilliams, the editor and anonymousrefereesof Political Theoryfor their thoughtfulcommentson earlier versions of this essay.
POLITICALTHEORY, Vol. 32 No. 1, February2004 85-108

DOI:10.1 177/0090591703252378
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usual instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship, which include the common defense of personalfreedom, the establishmentof basic conditions of social justice, and the maintenanceof civil peace. It is not surprising, tendto relegatethe therefore,thatliberalindividualists of friendship(andits norms)to the privatesphere,where citizens as practice privatepersons are free to establishamicablerelationswith whomeverthey choose (regardlessof whethertheirfriendsarefellow citizens).2They do not, as a rule, proposethatfriendshipserve as a normativemodel for the practice of citizenship,as Aristotleand some of his contemporary admirers and as do Emersonappearsto do in this passage. But Emersonis not an ordinaryindividualist,andcertainlynot an ordinaryliberal.Significantly,his conceptions of friendshipand citizenshipareboth informedby a commitmentto "democraticconnectedness," noninstrumental a value enjoyedthroughresponsiveness orreceptivityto others,andexpressedthroughmembership a commuin of equals based on openness and empathy, rather than merely on nity contractualobligations. As such, Emerson's conceptions of friendshipand to, (or citizenshiparesympathetic andmay very well enrich,rights-based liberal) conceptionsof citizenship,but should not be mistakenfor them. The term "democraticconnectedness"was first used by George Kateb, who illuminatesand refines Emerson'soriginal idea.3According to Kateb, Emersondoes not embracean extremeor unmodifiedindividualism.Rather, he attemptsto reconcile a strongcommitmentto individualismwith a strong commitmentto a distinctivelydemocraticform of association.Self-reliance, definedby Katebas thinkingone's own thoughtsandthinkingthem through, is the centralpracticeof Emersonianindividualism,while democraticconnectedness is the centralpracticeof the democratic-rather than religious, racial, tribal,or national-form of associationtheorizedby Emerson. Self-relianceand democraticconnectednessdo not themselves constitute a positive vision of a good life. Rather,they are practices that, in theory, enable individualsto choose for themselves a good way of life from myriad possible ways of life, or to engage in a succession of experimentsin living. The practiceof democraticconnectednessintroducesindividualsto the variousness andpossibilityof humanlife throughimmediaterelationswith other persons, while the practiceof self-reliance enables individualsto navigate deliberatelythroughthe gardens-and minefields-of human variousness andpossibility.Herewe begin to see the intrinsicvalueof the practiceof civic friendship,which contributesboth to the developmentof the individualand to the shareddemocraticculture. Althoughdemocraticconnectednesscan mitigatesome of the worst egoistic, selfish, competitive,andacquisitivetendenciesof unmodifiedindividualism, this is not the mainreasonwhy we shouldvalue it. Almost any form of

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connectedness-including manyformsof religious,racial,tribal,andnational unity-can tame individualismas well or betterthandemocraticconnectedness. However,these othertypes of connectednesstend also to foster chauvinism andintolerance,rather thanpromotingcivic friendshipwithina heterogeneous community.They appealmoreto the authoritarian personalitythat seeks to evade fears of freedom and responsibilityby submittingthe conscience to some externalauthority.Indeed, these other types of connectedness oftenworkto stigmatize suppress-ratherthanenrich-individualism. and As such, religious, racial,tribal,and even most kinds of nationalunity play no partin Emerson'sconceptionof civic friendship,which standsas muchin forms. oppositionto these forms of unity as it does to merely contractual By theorizingaboutcitizenshipin termsof friendship,Emersoncontributes to an understanding civic life thatis thickerthanconventionalliberal of conceptions, but more individualisticthan typical communitarianviews. However,Emersondoes not aim at a middlepositionbetweenliberalindividualism and more collectivist visions of citizenship,such as those articulated Rather,Emersoncalls us to a radical recentlyby the so-called civic liberals.4 democraticvision in which the nation-statefades into the background,and primaryrelationshipsbetween citizens as such emerge as the focus of civic identity and activity,and of personalstrivingand transcendence. The significanceof Emerson'svision shouldbe obvious.Politics in liberal into democracieshas graduallydegenerated the worstconceivableversionof Madisonianpluralism,with citizens dividedand conqueredby special interests, and public opinion manufactured powerfulmedia forces. Ties unitby ing citizens as such arepracticallynonexistent,except at the concretelevel of the state, where individualsenjoy the statusof taxpayersand clients, and at the abstract level of the nation,wherecitizens often love theircountrybutnot theircountrymen.And so Emersonwonders,"Couldnot a nationof friends even devise betterways?" In this essay, I explore Emerson'sconception of friendshipand consider and how its two crucialcommunicativenorms (which he calls "truth" "tenThe derness")could help to enrichthe contemporary practiceof citizenship.6 norm of truth, briefly, is a posture of candor and directness in political speech, anda willingness to listen to such speechfromothers,while the norm of tendernessis an attitudeof gentle respecttowardothersand a responsivethose who are differentfrom oneness or openness to others (particularly, Constrained the normof tenderness,relationsof friendshipareproself). by vided with an element of civility (a quality that is no less importantfor by citizenshipthanit is for friendship).Constrained the normof truth,friendship is provided with a crucial element of incivility.7Workingin tandem, these two normscan help to promotethe limitedinstrumental purposesof lib-

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eral citizenship,while simultaneouslytranscendingthis instrumentalism by elevatingthepracticeof citizenshipto an encounterwith the radicalpossibilities of democraticconnectedness. In additionto providinga conceptionof friendshipthatis compellingin its own right,Emersonmakesat least threedistinctiveandworthwhilecontributions to ourunderstanding the relationship of betweenthe practiceof citizentheoristsof shipandthe normsof friendship.First,unlikemost contemporary civic friendship, he emphasizes communicativenorms, ratherthan more demandingcivic obligationssuch as the communalethic of careendorsedby the Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, generalresponsibilityfor the welfareof compatriotsproposedby AndrewMason,or the obligationto fellow citizens to parand ticipatefully in public life supportedby numerouscommunitarian civic Contrasted with these theories,Emerson'smore modrepublicantheorists.8 est communicativenormscan enrichthe practiceof liberalcitizenshipwithout attempting erase, replace,or transform into a watered-down to it version of republican,communitarian, Aristoteliancitizenship. or These communicativenormsarealso morerelevantthanmany otherconceptions of civic obligationto some of our most urgentcontemporary political problems.The resurgenceof chauvinisticnationalismaroundthe world, the dumbingdown of democraticdiscourse, and the political infantilization of the democraticcitizen all seem to demandcommunicativenormscapable of defusingtensionsandfosteringappreciative connectionsbetweengroups, elevating political conversation,and activatingthe deliberativecapabilities of citizens, who mustlearnto give fellow citizens (andexpect to receivefrom them) reasonable accounts of their political preferences.The Emersonian normsof truthandtendernesswould be transferable anyof the deliberative to and settingsthatAmy Gutmann Dennis Thompsoncall "middledemocracy," including governmentalinstitutions,such as legislative sessions, courtproassociaceedings, and administrative hearings,as well as nongovernmental tions, such as grassrootsgroups, labor unions, citizens committees,professional organizations,and, of course, schools and universities.9 is here, in It middledemocracy,thatcitizens can get a feel for one another,as actual-not abstract-persons, andwherecommunicativenormsderivedfrom a concept of friendshipmight be practiced,initially, for purely instrumental reasons but, ultimately,perhaps,for normativeones. It shouldalso be notedthatEmerson'scommunicativenormsrely farless on formal civic educationor indoctrinationthan do other theories of civic friendship,includingthose of both civic liberalsandthe criticsof liberalism. Whereascitizens could not reasonablybe expected to engage in communal care, general responsibilityfor the welfare of compatriots,or fully active without first being taught the intrinsicvalue of these political participation

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practices,they could begin to practicethe communicativenormsintegralto Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipin publiclife for purelyinstrumental reasons (i.e., because they help addressthe aforementionedpolitical problems andbecausethey promotethe basic purposesof liberalcitizenship).Citizens might then discover the intrinsicvalue of citizenship-namely, the value of democraticconnectedness-by actually practicingthese norms. Bonds of civic friendship would emerge as individuals began to feel valued and respectedby theircompatriots, virtueof how they arespokenandlistened by to in the public sphere,not merely because they are urgedby teachers,leaders, or imploredby politicaltheoriststo treattheirfellow citizens like friends.

THEPOLITICAL RELEVANCE FRIENDSHIP OF Systematic attemptsto establishthe political relevanceof friendshipcan be tracedback to Aristotle,who identifiesthreedifferenttypes of friendship, based,respectively,on utility,pleasure,andvirtue.As he arguesfamouslyin TheNicomacheanEthics, friendshipbasedon virtueis the most perfecttype, insofaras it aims at the pursuitof goodness or moralexcellence for its own sake ratherthan merely the interestsor pleasuresof individuals.1o However, each kind of friendshipis, in a sense, altruistic,since we are concernedwith the welfareof ourfriendsfor theirsake,not merelyfor ourown.'1The general bonds of civic friendship(politikephilia), which are almost certainlya variety of utility friendshipratherthanof virtuefriendship,12 help maintain justice and law in the state,thus preservingspace for the cultivationof personal of friendshipsbased on virtue.Meanwhile,the proliferation personalfriendbased on virtue serves as an independentcheck on the possible civic ships corruptionof the state as a whole.'3Citizens who view one anotheras civic friendswould come togetherin a broadconsensus on mattersof public policy, a consensus made easierin Aristotle'sschemeby the exclusion from the groupswith potentiallydiffering political communityof manymarginalized interests,such as women, slaves, and persons of foreign descent.14 Therehavebeen numerousattemptsin recentyearsto restorethe AristoteThese efforts,however, lian conceptionof friendshipto preeminentstatus.'" have consistentlygeneratedfartoo demandinga notion of civic friendship.'6 Nevertheless,it may not be necessaryto abandonfriendshipas a normative model for citizenshipjust becauseAristotelianandneo-Aristotelian conceptions areunsuitedto modem liberalsocieties. Likewise, it may not be necesgoals of liberalcitizenship) sary to condemn liberalism(or the instrumental because they are incompatiblewith civic friendship,as it was consimply two ceived by Aristotle.Thereare,in particular, strikingbutoften overlooked

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structural similaritiesbetween friendshipand citizenshipthatjustify further into the usefulnessof the normsof the formerfor improvingthe pracinquiry tice of the latter. First, relationshipsbetween citizens as such, like relationshipsbetween friends,may-but, obviously,do not necessarily--evolveanddevelopthrough the investmentof time andeffort.Like friendships,relationships betweencitizens seldom begin at the highest level of intimacy, mutuality,and trust. Hence, just as one may chafe when a new acquaintance presumesa level of intimacy that has not been earned,claims made upon us by fellow citizens who are practicallyor completely strangersto us can feel excessive. However,when people investin theiracquaintanceships, they do sometimesblossom into deeper,more trusting,and more mutuallysatisfyingrelationships. Likewise, if people invest in the practice of citizenship, it could gradually develop beyond its original, modest instrumental purposes, into a practice that is, potentially,both noble and ennobling. Secondly, membersof modem liberal societies often disagree and fight with each other,muchas friendsdo. An important difference,however,is that friends try to govern their disagreementsin such a way as to preserve and develop, ratherthanterminate,the bond between them. They do not excessively stifle or suppressdisagreements,creatingdeadly silences that could cause the bondsof friendshipto graduallyerode.Nor do they engage in unrestrainedfree-for-alls,risking the eruptionof violence that could cause the bonds of friendshipto suddenlysnap.Instead,they employ relativelysimple (but subtle) communicative norms to achieve a balance, somewhere in between. One might say that friends try to disagree today in a mannerthat will allow them to disagreeagaintomorrow.Liberalcitizens could, perhaps, also learn to govern their disagreementsin much the same mannerand for some of the same reasons. On the otherhand, Christopher HeathWellmanarguesthatrelationships fellow citizens are disanalogousto those among friends, for at least among threecogent reasons.First,friendshipsarebased to some degreeon consent, whereas consent is missing from citizenship. Second, the strongemotional bonds foundin genuinefriendshipareabsentfromrelationships betweencitizens as such (especially in largecommunitiesor states).And, third,whereas rather thaninstrumentally, friendshipis commonlyjudged to be intrinsically, valuable,the same cannotbe said for citizenship.'7 These objectionswould appearto damnthe ethics of friendshipto irrelevance where the practiceof citizenship is concerned.None of us, initially, consentsto membership ourstateor nation,althoughit is possible for usin with considerabledifficulty-to withdrawfrom such membershipswhen we find themunpalatable. Wellman'spoint,though,is thatwe incurspecialobli-

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gationsto friendspreciselybecausethese relationshipsareconsensual.In the absence of consent, there can be no such special obligations to fellow citizens. While I am inclinedto agreewith this analysis,I would note one caveat. of Althoughthe relationship citizenshipmay or may not entailspecialobligations, such as giving preferenceto the welfare of fellow citizens over "simiit larly situatedforeigners,"'" does convey a duty to be mindful of how one to fellow citizens andhow one listens to them. Ourfellow citizens are speaks our civic equals, as well as free and autonomouspersons. As such, we may not conversewith them as if they arechildren,subjects,or slaves. As long as our account of obligations to fellow citizens does not extend prima facie beyond certain obligations on democratic discourse, but are discovered instead through democratic discourse, Wellman's first objection against modeling citizenship on friendshipcan be refuted. Wellman'sassertionthat the emotional ties between fellow citizens are empirically, nothing like those between friends, although unsubstantiated rings trueenough to be taken seriously.As he explains,
states entail natureof contemporary Not only does the enormoussize and bureaucratic thatcitizens will nevermeet (let alone become intimatelyattachedto) more thana tiny of the fractionof theircompatriots, multiculturalism most statesoftenresultsin xenophoratherthan sympathytowardeach other.19 bic citizens' harboringantipathy

This seems somewhat muddled, however. As we will see, the practice of friendshipis dynamic. Individualsdo not as a generalrule begin theirrelationshipat the most intenselevel of mutualregard.Instead,friendshipsgrow and evolve over time, propelledby an innermomentumof which we are not always fully aware.Friendshipshave a way of sneakingup on us. Consider Thomas Jefferson and John Adams who-once bitter political enemiesbecame friends in the end.20 of Wellmanalso arguesthatthe relationship friendshiphas intrinsicvalue, and is properlyvalued for its own sake, whereas citizenship can only ever with that haveinstrumental value.21Wellman'spositionis usefully contrasted of Mason who arguesthatspecial obligationsto fellow citizens emergefrom the intrinsicmoralvalue of the relationshipof citizenship.This, he suggests, is based on being "a memberof a collective body in which they enjoy equal statuswith its othermembersand are therebyprovidedwith recognition."22 Although I am inclined to agree with Mason thatfree and equal democratic of citizenshiphas an intrinsicmoralvalue,vested in the treatment each member as worthyof equal recognitionand respect, I am less confidentthat one can, or should, attemptto derive more thana very limited set of obligations from this premise.Such obligations,it seems to me, do not include a duty of

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or political participation giving preferenceto the welfare of fellow citizens, as Masonargues,but,rather, only a dutyto speakandlisten to fellow citizens with respectand regardfor theirequality.23 Thatis, these duties pertainonly to the enactmentor realizationof the intrinsicvalue of citizenship, namely, the feeling of mutualrespect,recognition,andresponsivenessthat(following Kateb) I have been calling democraticconnectedness.I would add that the of dynamiccharacter friendship,which Wellmanneglects in his analysisbut which Emersonemphasizes,againmakesfriendshipan excellent analogyfor the relationship citizenship,which may begin primarilyas an instrumental of but, with time and practice,may evolve into something more arrangement meaningful. Turningfrom the theoreticalto the practical,there are some important ways in which the dynamicsof actualpolitical life in the late twentiethand early twenty-firstcenturiesdefy any attemptto establishnormsof friendship as norms of citizenship. In particular, inequalitiesof power; hierarchiesof class, race, and gender;and the relativepowerlessnessof ordinarypeople in many contemporarysocieties seem to make the idea of genuine friendship between all citizens laughable.Additionally,Wellmanis right to point out thatusing friendshipas a model or analogyfor citizenshipis potentiallymisguided because it "lends credence to the dangerous idea that others have This idea, he thinks,susstandingonly if they standin some relationto us."24 tains (or at least fails to deter)ethnicconflict, violation of humanrights,and (presumably)indifferenceto such violations. However, it is not my contention, nor was it ever Emerson's, that true in friendshiprepresents, general,a good basis for politics. Rather, pointis my thatcertaincommunicative normsbasedon the normsof friendshipmay also on betweenmembersof modserve,effectively,as constraints disagreements ern societies who often have differentvalues, competinginterests,and conof flictingunderstandings the good. At the very least, theymayprovidea critical vantagepoint with broadcultural(and intercultural) appealfrom which to assail manipulativeand/or coercive communicativestrategies,a benefit not to be taken lightly. In some respects, the premise I am presenting follows the aims of discourse ethics. The communicativeconstraintstypically set by discourseethics, including mutual recognition of the equality of all participantsand a numberof constraints rationality(e.g., absenceof force or structural of pressure, the admissibilityonly of rationalarguments,the privilegingof no unsharedassumptions,etc.), work to promotejustice by constrainingdialogue and provide critical leverage against manipulativeand coercive discourse. these ideal conditionsarrivefrom nowhere,relateto no comUnfortunately, mon practice, and are connected to no cultural (much less transcultural)

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norms. Moreover,they take no accountof religious, cultural,racial, territorial, and socioeconomic divides among participants. The normsof friendship,on the otherhand,derivefroman almostuniversal practicethat cuts across religious, cultural,racial, territorial, socioand economic divides.25 have all experiencedfriendshipandknow its norms We intimately,even if we practicethem imperfectly.Althoughmuch moremodest, perhaps, than the ideal conditions of full-blown discourse ethics, the normsof friendshipare at least availableand familiarto anyone who has, or has been, a friend.This is not to say thatbeyond some basic normsthereare not also significantdifferencesbetweenthe attitudestowardfriendshipin different traditions.26 However,in spite of these differences, there are enough similaritiesbetween conceptionsof friendshipto providea basis underlying for intercultural discussion and cross-culturalunderstanding.Many tradifor instance,suggest thatfriendshipmustinvolve a significantmeasure tions, of franknessor truth-telling,in additionto the expected kindness or gentleness.27 common norms,such as these, can be transferred the practiceof If to liberal citizenship, then its practicemay be enhanced, without resortingto liberalapproach. conceptionsof citizenshipinconsistentwiththe contractual

EMERSON AND THENORMSOF DEMOCRATIC FRIENDSHIP Like most important conceptsin Emerson'sunsystematictheoreticalsystem, friendship,to him, is closely relatedto the conceptof self-reliance.Persons practicingself-relianceheed theirown moraljudgmentas muchas possible, anddependas little as possible on the opinionsof others,or on societal conventions. However, the relationshipbetween self-reliance-the core of Emerson'sindividualisticcreed-and the practiceof friendshipis a paradoxical one, for friendshipis a relationship promotesself-relianceby threatthat ening always to undermineand destroy it. It is, for Emerson, a crucible throughwhich self-reliancemust pass in orderto realize itself fully. Ideally,friendshipserves as an aid to self-reliance.Throughacquaintance with friends, one's acquaintance with oneself can be renewed. So Emerson 'Whatam I? companion,say.'/Andthe friend writes, in his poem "Astraea,"" not hesitates/Toassignjust place and mates;/Answersnot in word or letter;/ Yetis understoodthe better;/Each each a looking-glass,/Reflectshis figure to thatdothpass."28 Emersonmeansthatonly anotherself, to whom one is open and responsive, can reveal one to oneself.29In a gesture, pause, word, or glance, individuals can, in a flash, see themselves through the eyes of a friend. Friendscan also renew one another'sacquaintance with the world in

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which they live. For instance,a friendcan introduceus to new perspectives and viewpoints, share with us a new experience or way of life, or even increase our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human life itself by shaking us from our doldrums, depressions, and dogmas. And it is through this process of developing or awakening friendship that the value of democratic connectedness-understood as receptivity or responsiveness to others-is realized. In spite of these apparent benefits,however,Emersonrealizesthatfriendship also can undermineself-reliancebecause one's integrityis almost constantlyundersiege by the influenceof one's friends.While we mightdeliberately, or playfully,choose to try out a way of life thatour friendhas already explored or embraced,we also may sometimes feel compelled to accept a friend's way of life as our own, eitherfor fear of losing thatfriendor due to self-doubt.As Emersonexplains in his essay "Friendship" (1841), the ideal friendis "a sortof beautifulenemy, untamable,devoutlyrevered."30To conceive of a friend as an enemy, even as a beautiful one, is shocking. And, clearly,Emersonwants to shock, as does Nietzsche when he transformsthe Aristotelianepitaph"friends,there are no friends"to "enemies,there is no enemy!"3' It is his way of disrupting conceptionsof friendshipthatpictureit as a perfect harmonyor unity, or which reduce it to casual companionship or (e.g., friendsas golf partners drinkingbuddies).Of course, Emersondoes not meanthatfriendsareenemies in theconventionalsense. Theydo not, normally, try to kill or ruinus, althoughthey may, periodically,misunderstand, mislead,or disappointus. Rather, appealingmagneticallyto our sensibiliby ties, by being attractiveto us, friendstemptus to become morelike them and less like our own ideas of ourselves. Although drawn by thoughts of ideal friendships, Emerson also frequentlyemphasizestheirfrustrating reality.Among his chief concernsis the of friendship to degeneration and disintegration.Emerson vulnerability explains, "Ourfriendshipshurryto shortand poor conclusions, because we havemadethema textureof wine anddreams,insteadof the toughfibreof the humanheart."32 his own analysis, friendshipcannotbegin in the clouds. By He writes, "I wish that friendshipshould have feet, as well as eyes and eloquence. It must plantitself on the ground,before it vaults over the moon."33 muchof Emerson'stheorizing aboutfriendship concernedis Consequently, quite properly-with the norms by which its bonds may, slowly and over time, be developed.In contrast,while Aristotlealso discusses the frustrations of "inferior" types of friendship(i.e., those based on utility or pleasure),he offers little insight into how these could develop into higher sorts of friendship. This represents a significant difference between his conception of

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friendshipandEmerson's,especially if the practiceof friendshipis to be seriously consideredas a normativemodel for liberalcitizenship. for Importantly, Emerson,friendshipdoes not entaila perfectharmonyor he union, unanimitybetweenpersons.Rather, views friendshipas a turbulent characterized almostas muchby incivility as by civility, andalmostas much by separatenessas by unity or harmony.Once again, therefore,his conception of friendshipis uniquelysuitedas a model for the practiceof citizenship in modem liberalsocieties, since they areoften characterized deep asymby metries of power and resources, by enduring ethnic, racial, and religious antagonisms,and, most importantly, moral and culturalpluralism.As a by model for liberal citizenship, Emerson's conception of friendship distinguishes itself from Aristotle's,which presupposesa broadmoralconsensus as well as virtualunanimityconcerningquestionsof public importance.34 Truth Foremostamong the norms of friendshipidentifiedby Emersonare two communicativeconstraints,which he calls truthand tenderness.35 Truth,in the context of friendship,is a practiceof franknessconjoinedwith openness to the frankspeech of one's friends.The developmentof the bonds of friendor shiprequiresa kindof mutualunderstanding, at least a willingness to work towardmutualunderstanding, both by speakingfranklyand by listening to frank speech. As Emerson writes in "Behavior"(1860), there "is a French definitionof friendship,rien que s'entendre,good understanding. highThe est compactwe can makewith ourfellow, is,-'Let therebe truthbetweenus two forevermore.' Therefore,amongfriends,thereshouldbe no predeter"36 mined limits to what may be said and heard.So Emersonwrites in "Friendship,""A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think aloud.""37 According to Emerson,the bonds of friendship,like the muscles of the humanbody, must be exercised regularlyif they are to grow stronger,over are time, ratherthan degenerate.Truth-sayingand truth-hearing practices that test and develop the muscularityof a friendship.Of course, speaking franklyis difficult. One may, reasonably,worry that one will be misunderstood, or even scorned.Opennessto franktalk is also problematic,for in disputes and disagreementswith friends the desire to win can be extremely strong,andwinning can requireomission, as well as deception.However,as Emersonexplains,

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POLITICAL THEORY/ February2004 The greatgain is, not to shine, not to conqueryourcompanion,-then you learnnothing butconceit,-but to find a companionwho knows whatyou do not;to tilt with him andbe horse and foot, with utterdestructionof all your logic and learning.38 overthrown,

Applied to politics, the normof truthcannotinvolve the telling of the literal truthin all instances because the practicalitiesof politics would never permit such a thing. Deception, misinformation,and misdirectionare, for betteror worse, partof the everydayarsenalof the politician,andalways will be.39 The norm of truth,in the context of politics, is much more concerned with the frankrepresentation perspectives,purposes,andvalues, and with of the ability of citizens to listen seriouslyto such representations, even if they appearto be threatsto theirown way of life. Throughthe practiceof truth,so conceived, members of modern liberal societies may come to know and better understandone another, although not necessarily agree with one another,or even like one another,as personalfriends hopefully would. Examplesof how disarmingfranktalk can be areeasily observed.I experiencedthis while sittingin an interfaith gatheringof some sixty studentsand in the aftermath the September11, 2001 terrorist of attacks.Sevcolleagues, eralMuslimsin the groupwere at greatpainsto expresssympathy,anger,and regret regardingthe tragedy, overtures and acknowledgementsthat were heartfeltand, obviously, welcomed by non-Muslimmembersof the group. But they seemedto follow a formula,saying thingsthatneededto be said and thateveryoneexpectedto hear.Similarly,a numberof non-Muslimmembers of the group acknowledgedthatAmericanforeign policy was not, perhaps, alwaysbeneficialto the worldandthatmanyMuslimsin the MiddleEastmay have legitimate grievances with the U.S. This, too, needed to be said, and there was a certainexpectationthatit would be. Nonetheless, a great divide of understandingremained and the group seemed hauntedby thingsunsaid.Apparently, therewere non-Muslimmembers in the group (includingmyself) who expected a lesson on the natureof Islam.It was not untila numberof Muslimscandidlyexplainedthatthey had no intentionof explaining or apologizing for Islam, and that they were not inclinedto justify theirreligion to anyone,thatthe airbegan to clear,even as the tension momentarilyheightened.And it was not until the non-Muslims began to grasp why the Muslims were so unwilling-they felt they were too-that the groupbegan being askedto explainwhy they weren'tterrorists, to pull togetheracross the divide. The ritualformulasof rapprochement dissolved andwhatensuedwas a realdiscussionof whatcould be done together, as a group,in responseto the tragedy. To say thatpoliticalconversationis constrainedby truthis sometimesjust anotherway of sayingthatit is unconstrained silence. A model of "unconby

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strained" public discourse,which requiresmembersof a society to articulate theirtruecommitments,desires,needs, projects,and so on, would, in theory, promotea communityin which the genuine needs andpurposesof individuals are taken into account.40 Although a mutualunderstanding commitof ments, desires, needs, and so forthalone cannotsettle controversial political issues such as abortion,school prayer,affirmativeaction, or capitalpunishment, when citizens find themselves in conflict with one anotherover such of issues, they are well-served by an understanding the values and commitments of their fellows. There is no guaranteethat any particularview or vision of social justice would emerge from a condition of improvedmutual between citizens. However,one would expect rival views or understanding visions of justice to receiveproperhearings.And, any consensusconcerning principlesof justice thatemergedfrom such hearingswould be the resultof the process and practice of politics, ratherthan the result of a prepolitical attemptto squelch or silence genuine disagreementswithin a community. Even so, some theoristsdo not believe that members of modem liberal societies should be expected to expose to one anothertheir most intimate beliefs, desires, fears, and commitments.Accordingto J. Donald Moon, for instance,thereis a coercive aspect to this expectation,violating the value of privacyfor individualsandgroups.Moreover,Moon argues,this expectation runsafoul of normalpsychologicaldefenses againstvulnerability.41This is a seriousobjectionto unconstrained discourse,or truth,conceived of as a constrainton public discourse.Certainly, Moon's assessmentof the psychological barriersto such a practiceis painfully accurate.If one's principles and commitmentsarebased on deeply personalreligiousbeliefs, as was the case for Muslim participants the campusteach-in,it could be agonizingto talk in to nonbelieversaboutthem. Nonetheless, when fellow citizens seek to bind one anotherby law-as, for example,prolife and prochoiceadvocatesdowe can reasonablyexpectthemto presentthe truereasonswhy they aredoing so. It may be intrusive,but it is not unreasonable, ask one's fellow citizens to to explain why they are attemptingto use the coercive power of the state to thwartone another'sgoals, hinderthe satisfactionof one another'sneeds, or block the enjoymentof one another'sconceptionof the good life. However, the requirementof truth would pertain only to political disagreementsin which citizens intendto subjectone anotherto a common law or policy. No one should expect fellow citizens to bare their souls or expose their most cherishedbeliefs to public scrutinyunderany othercircumstances. Anotherobjectionto the idea of truthas a constrainton public discourse on concernsthe potentialimpactof truth-telling mutualrespect.JohnRawls, for one, urgescitizens to invokeonly publicreasonsderivedfroman overlapping consensus concerning constitutional essentials. Nonpublic reasons,

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derived from the many comprehensivemoral, philosophical, and religious doctrines that constitute the backgroundculture of a society, are to be excluded from public discourseand debate.42 Accordingto Rawls, one does not demonstrate for one's fellow citizensby offeringreasonsthatthey respect cannot reasonablybe expected to comprehendor recognize as legitimate. Therefore,citizens have a duty of civility
to explainto one anotheron those fundamental questionshow the principlesandpolicies they advocateandvote for can be supported the politicalvalues of publicreason.This by in dutyalso involvesa willingness to listento othersanda fairmindedness decidingwhen accommodationsto their views should reasonablybe made.43

This argumentis quite compelling. It is, certainly,reasonableto expect fellow citizens to speak the same political language, in the name of mutual respect,wheneverthey tryto bind one anotherby law. It is also reasonableto ask citizens to listen to one another,and try to make compromisesbetween mutualrespectfor stronglyheld opinions. However,we do not demonstrate ourfellow citizensby deprivingthemof the rightto expresstheirdeepest and most passionate commitments in the political sphere. Indeed, this denial makes a mockery of our duty to listen to them. The norms of citizenship should aim at broadening,ratherthanrestricting,dialogue between citizens with differentstronglyheld values andbeliefs. Hence, while a requirement to offer mutuallycoherentreasonsin public disagreementsis sound, a prohibition on nonpublicreasons is not. Tenderness The basic meaningof tendernessis somethinglike "kindness" "affecor tion."However,a richermeaningis intendedby Emerson.In his discussionof the norms of friendship,he understands tendernessto be both a posture of and a postureof receiving, one of speaking and listening. In "Mangiving ners,"Emersondescribesa debatebetweenBurkeandFox in the EnglishParliament,duringwhich Fox "urgedon his old friendthe claims of old friendIn ship with such tenderness, that the house was moved to tears.""44 this instance, Emersonseems to mean by tendernesssomethingthat is given or proffered.It is a gentlebutrespectfulmannerof handlingotherswho are,presumably,one's equalsanddeserveto be treatedas such. However,in "Friendship,"Emersonconfesses to "anextremetendernessof nature" uponmeeting a new personwho may be a potentialfriend.In this instance,Emersonseems to mean by tendernessa kind of permeabilityor responsiveness.Through responsiveness,we adopta postureof opennessto ourinterlocutor, exposing

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ourselves to his or her words and thoughts,while throughgentle respectfulness, we try to be sensitive to thatperson'spotentialpermeabilityor responsiveness to our words andthoughts.Therefore,no unfairadvantageis taken. Instead,we attemptto carefor ourinterlocutor throughourwords(even if we feel no genuine affection for thatperson). as when properlyunderstood a mannerof speaking,demands Tenderness, recognitionand respectfor the dignity and autonomyof others.Yet, tenderness also connotessomethingof firmness.Neitherfriendsnorcitizens should deal with one anotheras if they were madeof glass or with gratuitous roughness or cruelty.Similarly,one may carefor otherswithouttreatingthem as if they are incapableof making choices for themselves. Hence, one sense of This is not a termof love or affection,but one that tendernessis "to tender." describesa relationshipinvolving somethingof closeness and somethingof distance. Importantly, tenderness,in this first sense, means respecting the of other individualsfor self-reliance. Throughouthis essays and potential lectures,Emersonarguesthatevery humanlife is properlyviewed as an avenue throughwhich great thoughtsand great actions not only may flow but also deserve to flow. He insists, therefore,thatevery personhas a right(and, perhaps,even a duty) to think and act self-reliantly,dependingas much as possible on one's own thoughtsand sense of justice for guidance,and living as much as possible as one likes (providedthatone's way of life and experiments in living do not transgressupon the dignity or rightsof others).Emerson writes, "Fornonconformitythe world whips you with its displeasure."45 Tenderness,in this first sense, meansneverholding the whip, if one can possibly avoid it. On the other hand, tendernessunderstoodas a mannerof listening connotes a permeabilityor responsivenessto impressionsreceived from others us and aboutothers.This responsivenesscan enrichour lives by introducing to different ways of life, as well as the variousness of human life itself. Describing this responsiveness,Emerson writes, "High thanks I owe you, excellent lovers,who carryout the worldfor me to new andnoble depths,and enlargethe meaningof all my thoughts.... I confess to an extremetenderness of natureon this point."46 cautious about the possibilities for Emerson himself is understandably tendernessas a constrainton personalfriendship.Certainly,he is more cautious, say,thanWaltWhitman,who pictureshumanlife as ajourneydown an open road, a quest for individuality undertaken,perhaps paradoxically, throughsomethinglike responsivenessto others,and manifested,variously, Howas camaraderie, friendship,erotic love, and democraticcitizenship.47 like Whitman,Emersonbelieves that the practiceof tendernesshelps ever,

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introduceindividualsto the variousnessof humanlife andhelps themachieve a distinctlydemocraticconnectednesswith others.Emersonwrites,

Analogous to the laws of society are those of conversation,which is the first office of friendship. In able conversation we have glimpses of the universe, perceptions of immensepowernativeto the soul, fardarting lights andshadowsof a mountain landscape, such as we cannotat all attainunto in our solitary studies.48

Of course,this responsivenesswould haveto be strictlybalancedby thepractice of self-reliance, which enables individuals to navigate intelligently throughthe depths-and shoals-of humanvariousnessand possibility. Transferred the politicalrealm,the normof tendernessis not without into certain limitations and liabilities. For instance, one might complain that effective political talk could never be characterizedby tenderness (in the sense of gentle respectfulness)but must be characterizedby eloquence. to Indeed,most effectivepoliticalspeakersattempt become mastersof words, while takingcare themselvesto avoid being victims of words;to remainunmoved, while moving others. However,practicingtenderness-understood as gentle respectfulness-does not necessitateunilateraldisarmament the in political arena.Treatingone's fellow citizens with gentle respect can be as as to sound, strategically, attempting trickthem.This is especially truein the many smaller settings of middle democracy,where citizens encounterone another face to face, and where participantsin a discussion can respond directly to attacks.If we take the possibility of social justice seriously, we must acknowledgethe importanceof tenderness.Otherwise,unconstrained by tenderness,or some comparablenorm, political conversationis likely to be just anothermode of dominationor cynical manipulation,deaf to the claims of justice. Anotherpossible objection to tenderness as a communicative norm for democraticdeliberationis thatit goes far beyond the practice of toleration normally required by liberalism. While toleration merely requires citizens to put up with difference, tenderness(in the sense of responsiveness) attemptsto entertainthe possibilities thatdifferencesuggests. This is one of the more invitingnoninstrumental possibilities of citizenshipunderstoodin conjunctionwith the communicativenormsof friendship.However,tenderness may be, in otherrespects,a moremodest,andless taxing,constraint than toleration.Whereas tolerationappearsto requirecitizens to exercise selfcensorshipwhen they encounterways of life inconsistentwith their values and principles,therebyprojectingthe appearanceof at least tacit approval, the normof tendernessrequiresonly thatcitizenshave a go attryingto understand one another.

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Again, the gap in intercultural understandingrevealed by the Septem11 terrorist ber attackson the United Statescan illustratethis problem.Some or have arguedthatattemptsto understand motivationsof terrorists, their the admirers,is somehow equivalentto justifying their actions, or that attemptof ing to imaginehow an AmericanMuslim feels in the aftermath the attacks somehow diminishesthe memoryof those who perished.However,assuming a postureof responsivenesstowardone's fellow citizens (or towardcitizens of other nations) does not necessarily involve abandoningone's own values andprinciples,or giving up the fight (if one happensto be in one). It is not moralbankruptcy politicaltreason.Instead,it is an attemptat empathic or identificationwith others.If genuine sympathyor affectiondoes not emerge fromthis practice,so be it. If membersof modem liberalsocieties musthave enemies, they can, at the very least,takethe time to get to know these enemies better.This practiceis exemplified by the United Nations, where ambassadors and staffersof rival nations maintaincordial relationsin spite of their of differences,andwhererepresentatives formerenemies (andpotentialenemies) may be observed chattingaffably in the corridorsand dining rooms. The UN may be an unexpectedplace to discoverthe practiceof Emersonian civic friendship.However,if it can be practicedthereit can, perhaps,be practiced elsewhere.

CONCLUSION The use of Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model for liberalcitizenship is neither obvious nor unproblematic.Indeed, some scholars, like Wilson Carey McWilliams, have found this conception unsatisfying and peremotionallycold. Indeed,McWilliamsobservesthatEmersondistrusted sonal friendshipsbecausethey are"basedon qualitiesof personality[which] hampermen in theirefforts to 'merge'with the all."49In otherwords, Emerson is too willing to sacrificefriendsfor the sake of an idealizedtranscendental connectedness. McWilliams also notes that Emerson's conception of friendshipis premisedupon a radicalindividualismthat, in spite of Emerson's own intentions,could serveto "moralizedisloyaltyandself-seeking."50 Rejecting Emerson,McWilliamswrites approvinglyof ancient Greek conas ceptionsthatview fraternity a need establishedby the natureof man,without which society would be sick, alienated,individualistic,and withoutany tractionon the trulyhumanexcellences thatturnmerelife into the good life. Nonetheless, Emerson'sconceptionof friendship,with its twin practices of truthand tenderness,representsa compelling challenge to the traditional Aristotelianview that tends to dominatediscussions of friendshipand citi-

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zenship. One majoradvantageof Emerson'sconception over Aristotle's is that the former accepts as given the moral and culturalpluralismof most modem societies, and does not insist that a strongor comprehensivemoral consensus exist between citizens priorto politics.51 Unlike Aristotle,Emerson had the opportunityto immerse himself in Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian, and other non-Westernwritings, and can acknowledge significant intellectualdebts outside of the Westerntradition.52 instance,in his For essay "PersianPoetry,"Emerson asserts that certainEasternpoets, among them Ibn Jemin, Hafiz, and Jami, make contributionsto the philosophy of friendshipequalto thatof Montaigne.He admiringlyquotes Jami,who (like Emersonhimself) portraysfriendshipas growing strongerthroughconstant testing, writing,"A friendis he, who, huntedas a foe,/So much the kindlier shows him than before;/Throwstones at him, or ruderjavelins throw,/He buildswith stone andsteel a firmerfloor."53Similarly,one of Emerson'smore famousobservationsconcerningfriendship,"Hewill have learnedthe lesson of life who is skilful in the ethics of friendship," based on a quotationfrom is "Thoulearnestno secret until thou knowest friendship,since to the Hafiz, unsoundno heavenly knowledge enters."54 The main strengthof Emerson'sconception of friendshipas a model for liberal citizenship, when comparedwith Aristotle's, is a dynamic element thatcould give both defendersand critics of liberalismreasonto believe that the practiceof citizenshipin liberal societies can evolve in noninstrumental directionswithoutjeopardizingliberalcitizenship'susual instrumental purposes. Friendshipsdo not spring forth, fully grown, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Rather,if friendshipsare to grow and flourish, they require investmentandgradualdevelopment."Letus buy ourentranceto this guild," Emersonadvises, "bya long probation."55 normsof friendshipidentified The by Emersonwork to promoterelationshipsthatgrow, and grow more solid, over time, ratherthan weakeningand dying by degrees. By practicingtruth andtenderness,the two crucialnormsof friendship,relationsbetweenfellow citizens also can slowly develop, andcan graduallycome to be characterized a and by a moreopen formof deliberation, morestableformof disagreement, a more trulydemocraticconnectedness. The communicativenormsof friendshiptheorizedby Emersonpromote solid relationships where disagreements are possible but not explosive. Friends,afterall, disagreeall the time but makereservingand strengthening the bonds of friendshipa priorityand winning a particular argumenta secondary consideration.Strategiessuch as pulling one's punches or leaving things unsaid may be employed to maintainfriendships,but such strategies could also indirectlyserve to weakenthe bonds of friendshipin the long run.

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Friends who cannot be frankwith one another,or are afraidthat frankness will jeopardize their relationship,cannot be friends in the richest possible sense. They may be close acquaintances know one anothervery well, or and think they do. But such relationshipsare fragile and unsure. To endure, a friendshipmust develop, and to develop a friendshipoccasionally must be tested by an element of incivility.Therefore,Emersonwrites, "Ido not wish to treatfriendshipdaintily,but with roughestcourage. When they are real, they are not glass threadsor frost work, but the solidest thing we know.""56 Truthandtendernesscould, conceivably,be viewed as competingor contradictorynorms, since the former is primarilyconcerned with testing the bonds of friendship,while the latteris primarilyconcernedwith preserving them. Although Emersondoes not say so explicitly, it seems to me that the normsof truthandtendernessarenot necessarilyopposedto one anothercategorically, where the practicesof friendshipand citizenshipare concerned, but, instead,may be dialectically opposed. Thatis to say, the normsof truth and tendernessmay turnout to be dialectical correlatesin a process of personal andsocial developmentthatoperates,at least in part,throughthe mechanism of disagreementand deliberation. Workingtogether through the norms of friendship, truth and tenderness, as theorized by Emerson, can help produce a social union that is characterizednot by fear or decorum, which may leave too much unsaid, or by street fighting, which leaves too much unheard.Instead,it would be characterized a synthesis that BernardCrick once called "a rough civilby The ity."57 element of incivility-namely, truth-pushes a society to recognize the divisions and tensions within it, while the element of civilitynamely, tenderness-helps that society reach an endless series of deliberative compromises. Working together against silence and violence, both norms promote a more durablesocial union and, ultimately,a greaterand more meaningfulharmony. If the norms cultivated within friendships are transferableto political what it meansto be a goodfriend communities,thenpeople who understand also will know something,althoughnot everything,aboutwhatit meansto be a good citizen. People will not necessarilypracticegood citizenshipbecause they actually are unitedwith theirfellow citizens by reciprocalgoodwill, as Aristotle had hoped. Friendshipwill not become the concretebasis for the state.Rather,people will practicegood citizenship,at least initially,because they recognize thatthe samenormsthatworkfor friendshipalso will workto preserveand strengthenmodernliberalsocieties, even in the face of inevitable disagreementbetween memberswith differentvalues and interests.The liberalcitizenpracticeof citizenshipthatemergeswill resemblecontractual

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in of ship in manyrespects,particularly its affirmation expansiveindividual But it also will be enrichedby a democraticconnectednessthatis both rights. radicalin characterand, it must be said, indefinitein its possibilities.

NOTES
1. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Politics," Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte (New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 570-71. 2. ChristopherHeath Wellman is typical of this view. See ChristopherHeath Wellman, "Friends,Compatriots,and Special Political Obligations,"Political Theory29 (April 2001): 217-36. 3. Katebexploresthe idea of democraticconnectednesswith referenceto WaltWhitmanin in "Walt Whitmanandthe Cultureof Democracy," TheInnerOcean(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press, 1992), 240-66. He investigatesthis conceptionfurtherwith referenceto Emersonin Emersonand Self-Reliance(ThousandOaks, CA: Sage, 1995), esp. chap. 4. 4. Articulationsof civic liberalism include William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, and UK: Cambridge Virtues, Diversity in theLiberalState(Cambridge, UniversityPress, 1991); Stephen Macedo, Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a MulticulturalDemocracy (Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 2000); StephenMacedo,Liberal Virtues:Citizenand Community LiberalConstitutionalism in (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, ship, Virtue, and 1990); PeterBerkowitz,Virtue the MakingofModernLiberalism(Princeton,NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1999);ThomasSpragensJr.,CivicLiberalism:Reflectionson OurDemocratic Ideals (New York:Rowman& Littlefield, 1999); EamonnCallan, CreatingCitizens:Political Educationand LiberalDemocracy(Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1997). 5. Emerson,"Politics," 570. 6. James R. Martelalso identifies these two centralfeaturesof Emerson'sconception of See friendship,but defines themratherclumsily as "repulsionand attraction." JamesR. Martel, LoveIs a Sweet Chain:Desire,Autonomy Friendshipin LiberalPolitical Theory(New York: and Routledge, 2001), 127. 7. The word "incivility"has come to enjoy an almost purelynegativeconnotationdue, in part, to the efforts of critics like StephenL. Carter.See Stephen L. Carter,Civility:Manners, Basic Books, 1998), 134. Compare with this Morals,andthe EtiquetteofDemocracy(New York: MarkKingwell who, in an excellent study of the practiceof civility, acknowledgesthatcivility maynotbe sufficient.Concedingthatcivility could "bea meansof oppressionor anexpressionof power, not a restrainedand open orientationto understanding," Kingwell arguesthat we must rebukeone another, end"otherthan frankly,when we suspectthat"civilityhides an instrumental civil peace andsocial order.See MarkKingwell,A Civil Tongue: Justice,Dialogue, maintaining and the Politics of Pluralism(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress, 1995), 23839. 8. See Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, Civic Friendship," "On Ethics 107 (October1996): 97-128; AndrewMason, "SpecialObligationsto Compatriots," Ethics 107 (April 1997):427-47; David Selbourne,ThePrinciple of Duty (London:Sinclair-Stevenson,1994), 156, 230-31. 9. Amy Gutmann Dennis Thompson,DemocracyandDisagreement(Cambridge, and MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1996), 12. 10. For discussion, see Paul Schollmeier,OtherSelves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship(Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1994).

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11. See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1155al-1158a36. 12. JohnM. CooperarguesthatAristotle'sconceptionof civic friendshipis properlyunderstood to be a varietyof utilityfriendship,andthatutilityfriendship,like truefriendship,involves in on mutualanddisinterested well-wishing. See JohnM. Cooper,"Aristotle Friendship," Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie OksenbergRorty (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, inAristotle'sPolitik:Pro1980);andJohnM. Cooper,"PoliticalAnimalsandCivic Friendship," ceedings of the XIth Symposium Aristotelium, ed. Gunther Patzig (Friedrichshafen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht,1990), 220-41. In contrast,AlasdairMacIntyreviews Aristotelian 2d civic friendshipas akind of virtuefriendship.See AlasdairMacIntyre, After Virtue, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1984), 156. 13. See PaulJ. Waddell,Friendshipand theMoralLife (NotreDame, IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1989), 49, 61-68. Aristotle'sPhilosophyof Friendship(Albany: 14. For discussion, see SuzanneStern-Gillet, State Universityof New YorkPress, 1995). 15. For instance,Schwarzenbach attemptsto shed the Aristotelianconceptionof some of its infamousmasculinist,elitist, andxenophobicconnotations,arguingthatcitizens of modernsociof eties can maintaina close approximation Aristoteliancivic friendshipbased on a relatively thin consensus regardingtoleration,mutualrecognitionof rights,and a universalvalue of care. "OnCivic Friendship," 105-14. See Schwarzenbach, membersof modernliberalsocieties areunableto prac16. Indeed,accordingto MacIntyre, it. tice civic friendshipas Aristotleunderstood Forliberalindividualists,MacIntyre explains,"a communityis simply an arenain whichindividualseachpursuetheirown self-chosenconception of the good life, andpolitical institutionsexist to providethatdegreeof orderwhich makes such self-determinedactivitypossible."See Maclntyre,After Virtue,195. 221-23. 17. Wellman,"Friends," 18. Ibid., 220. 19. Ibid., 222. 20. See MerrillD. Peterson,Adamsand Jefferson:A Revolutionary Dialogue (Oxford,UK: "PoliticsandFriendshipin the Adams-JefOxfordUniversityPress, 1995);JeanM. Yarbrough, in fersonCorrespondence," Friendsand Citizens:Essays in Honorof WilsonCareyMcWilliams, ed. PeterDennis BathoryandNancy L. Schwartz(Lanham,MD: Rowman& Littlefield,2000); Jean M. Yarbrough,The Adams-JeffersonLetters: The Complete Correspondencebetween ThomasJeffersonandAbigail and JohnAdams,ed. LesterJ. Cappon(ChapelHill: Universityof North CarolinaPress, 1988). 21. While friendshipis "aconstituentof well-being,"the powersandrightsof citizenshipare 223. no more than a means to well-being. See Wellman,"Friends," 442. Masonbuildsuponthe workof JosephRaz, who 22. See Mason, "SpecialObligations," has arguedthatthe obligationsof friendshipare constitutiveof the intrinsicgood of friendship, Duties,"Lawand Phirather thanmerelybeing burdensthatbenefitothers.See Raz, "Liberating losophy 8 (1989): 3-21. Forrefinementsof Raz's basic argument,see Samuel Scheffler,"Relationships and Responsibilities,"Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (summer 1997): 189-209; Michael O. Hardimon,"Role Obligations,"Journal of Philosophy 91 (July 1994): 333-63. that Schefflerarguesthatspecial obligationsadhereto relationships one happensto value, while Hardimon suggests that role identification provides the moral reasons to assume special obligations. 23.Accordingto Mason, this obligationcannotbe derivedfrom nationalidentitybut,rather, only fromcivic identity,althoughthe reasonsfor this arenot entirelyclear.See Mason,"Special Obligations,"442. Wellman argues that no such distinction can be made between civic and

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nationalidentity,since both provide mainly instrumental goods that promotewell-being. See 223. Wellman,"Friends," 24. Wellman,"Friends," 230. 25. Some culturescautionagainstcross-cultural friendships.See for instanceQu'ran,3:26, 3:116,4:137, and5:51. However,treatingothersaccordingto some of the normsof friendshipfor instrumental reasons is not the same as forminggenuine friendshipswith them. 26. For an account of the historical developmentof the concept of friendshipin Islamic thought, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Friendshipin Aristotle, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazali,"in FriendshipEast and West:Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Oliver Leaman (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1996), 164-91; for discussion of Confucianthinkingon friendship,see David L. Hall andRogerT. Ames, "Confucian The Friendship: Roadto Religiousness,"in TheChangingFace of Friendship,ed. Leroy S. Rouner(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1994), 77Indianviews of friendship,see BhikhuParekh,"AnIndianView 94; for discussionof traditional of Friendship," The ChangingFace of Friendship,ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: in Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1994), 95-113. 27. We read in al-Ghazali,for instance, that friendship"entailslove as well as candorand only benevolencecan guide the choice betweenspeakingout andkeepingsilent."See Goodman, in "Friendship Aristotle,"184. Similarly,it was recognizedin the Indianepics thatfriendship"is one of the few relationships whichhonestandfearlesscriticismis bothpermitted required. in and Friendsmust 'speaktruth'(satyamvada)to each other;otherwisetheirfriendship restson untruth and is 'false.' " See Parekh,"AnIndianView,"102. 28. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Astrea," TheCompleteWorks in Emerson,cenofRalph Waldo tenaryed., ed. EdwardW. Emerson, 12 vols. (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04), vol. 9, 80. 29. In an early lecture, "Society,"Emersonwrites of friendship,"This is anotherself. He of occupies anotherpointof view, andsees the same objecton anotherside. His confirmation our makes us pause."RalphWaldoEmerson,"Society,"TheEarly reportrejoices, his contradiction Lecturesof Ralph WaldoEmerson,3 vols. (Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1972), vol. 2, 102. This notion of a friend as "another self' recalls Aristotle'sunderstanding a true of friendas a "secondself." See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1166a30-35. However,Emerson does not mean, as Aristotledoes, thatmy friendis anotherme, possessing the same moralperspectiveandconcernfor virtue,so thatself-love embracesbothpersonsequally.Thereis a crucial separateness involved in Emersonianfriendship,which does not appearto exist in Aristotle's Aristotle'sPhilosophy,37-40. conceptionof virtuefriendship.For discussion, see Stern-Gillet, Also see Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance, 106-7. 30. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Friendship," Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte in (New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 351. 31. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Human,All TooHuman,ed. MarionFaber(Lincoln:University of NebraskaPress, 1984), section 376. For discussion, see JacquesDerrida,Politics of Friendship (London:Verso, 1997), throughout. 32. Emerson,"Friendship," 345. 33. Ibid., 348. 34. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1167a22-1167b15. 35. Katebidentifiesandelaboratesthese two aspectsof Emerson'sconceptionof friendship. AlthoughEmersonclaims, initially,to give these aspectsequalweight in constitutingfriendship, Katebis probablycorrectin his view thattruthreceives a largerplace in Emerson'ssystem, perhaps due its more intimateconnectionto self-reliance,which is the centralconcept of this system. See Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,esp. 102-9. 36. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Behavior," Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte in (New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 1049.

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37. Emerson,"Friendship," 347. 38. RalphWaldoEmerson,"SocialAims,"CompleteWorks RalphWaldo Emerson,centeof W. Mifflin, 1903-04), vol. 8, 95-96. naryed., ed. Edward Emerson,12 vols. (Boston:Houghton 39. Fordiscussion,see Sissela Bok, Lying(New York:Vintage, 1989), esp. 90-106. Also see Gutmannand Thompson,Democracyand Disagreement,esp. chap. 3. 40. For discussion, see Seyla Benhabib,"LiberalDialogue versus a CriticalTheoryof Discursive Legitimation," Liberalismand the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, in MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1989), esp. 146-54. Comparewith BruceAckerman'sdefense of conversational restraintin "WhyDialogue?"Journalof Philosophy86 (January1989): 5-22. 41. See J. Donald Moon, ConstructingCommunity: Moral Pluralismand Tragic Conflicts (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 92. For a contrastingview, see Stephen and Holmes, "GagRules or the Politics of Omission,"in Constitutionalism Democracy,ed. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988). 42. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1993),fn. 220. 43. Ibid., 217. 44. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in "Manners," Emerson: Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte (New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 525. 45. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Self-Reliance," Emerson:Essays andLectures,ed. Joel Porte in (New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 264. 46. Emerson,"Friendship," 343. 47. Whitman's"Songof the OpenRoad"concludeswith, "Camerado, give you my hand!/I I give you my love morepreciousthanmoney,/Igive you myself beforepreachingor law;/Willyou give me yourself? Will you come travelwith me?/Shall we stick by each other as long as we live?" See Walt Whitman,Leaves of Grass (New York:New American Library,1980), 144. Derridaappearsto echo this sentimentin Politics ofFriendship,wherehe writes,"Whenwill we be readyfor an experienceof freedomand equalitythatis capableof respectfullyexperiencing that friendship,which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measuredup against its measurelessness?O my democraticfriends"(p. 306). 48. RalphWaldoEmerson,"TheHeart," EarlyLecturesof Ralph WaldoEmerson,3 vols. in (Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1972), vol. 2, 292. 49. Wilson CareyMcWilliams,TheIdea of Fraternityin America(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1973), 285. 50. Ibid., 285. 51. Bernard Crickarguesagainstthe need for such a consensus, writing,"Themoralconsensus of a free state is not somethingmysteriouslypriorto or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself." See BernardCrick,In Defense of Politics, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), 24. 52. Among Emerson'ssources were the BhagavadGita, the Hindu VishnuSarma,the four classic books of Confucianism(namely,theAnalects,the Bookof Mencius,the ChungYung, and the TaHeo), variouscollections of sayings of Buddha,several volumes of Persianand Arabic poetry(includingFirdusi'sepic ShahNameh),andseveralvolumesof Islamichistoryandphiloswhich introducedEmersonto Sufism). For discussion of ophy (includingthe Akhlak-I-Jalaly, Emerson'sexposureto non-Western philosophies,see RobertD. RichardsonJr.,Emerson:The Mindon Fire (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1995), 218-23,376-80, 391-94,404-9. 53. RalphWaldoEmerson,in "PersianPoetry," CompleteWorks Ralph WaldoEmerson, of W. 12 Mifflin,1903-04),vol. 8,259. ed., centenary ed. Edward Emerson, vols.(Boston:Houghton 54. CompareRalphWaldoEmerson,"DomesticLife,"in CompleteWorks Ralph Waldo of W. Emerson,centenaryed., ed. Edward Emerson,12vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04), vol. 7, 129, with Emerson,"PersianPoetry," 258.

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351. 55. Emerson,"Friendship" 56. Ibid., 346. 57. Crick,In Defense of Politics, 161.

JasonA. Scorza is an assistantprofessorofphilosophyandpolitical science at Fairleigh Dickinson Universityin Teaneck, New Jersey.He is presentlycompletinga book on the theoryand practice of liberal citizenship.