THE SUBJECT IN THEORY:

HUMANIZING INTERPELLATION

I shall then suggest that ideology acts or functions in such a way that it recruits subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or transforms the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: Hey, you there!
Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)

I saw it all, for I too was walking down the street and anxiously watched him go by; dark-blue uniform, badge glistening in the sun, dark sunglasses and a walk that was purposeful if not arrogant. Peering, looking, he stared in my direction. I turned away though I had nothing to hidestill, I was uncomfortable. I had noticed the other as well, or thought I had, a minute before. Hey, you there! And as he turned I saw his guilty look, his fidgeting hands; Who, me? he asked, knowing already, as I do, and as Louis Althusser does, that the cop has got his man.1 In looking closely at the theater of policeman and subject, a controversial passage that has become synonymous with interpellation, it is productive to push forwardand backwardin Althussers essay to understand the complexity of this moment. Interpellation is, after all, not simply this moment, which is its climax, but the result of a process that neither begins nor ends with the instance of hailing. One might start then, as Althusser does, at the beginning, with a discussion of the problem of the reproduction of labor power and relations of production. It is useful to locate Althussers topographical definition of base/superstructure and the role of both the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses within it (see fig. 1). However, these considerations must remain in the background, for, as Althusser states prior to addressing the question of interpellation, we need not a

SUPERSTRUCTURE

Repressive State Apparatus Politico-Legal (Law/State) Functions by violence / force

Ideological State Apparatuses Ideology (Religious, ethical, political) Functions through Institutions
N O M I C

B A S E Figure 1 Base / Superstructure

theory of particular ideologies, whichalways express class positions, but a theory of ideology in general (159). This passage is critical in two senses. In arguing for a general theory of ideology, Althusser makes it clear that in what follows he is considering ideology outside of history. To think outside of history means, therefore, to think outside of how different life histories and flowing temporalities, each grounded in a particular space, affect each instance of interpellationin short, to think outside of human agency. As Stuart Hall reminds us, theory is always closed, because theory cantmatch the infinite openness of the world. So you have to understand the arbitrary closure that is required to make sense of a thing theoretically (225). We are
1

One might question whether the policeman and suspect are gendered individuals and how, or if, the public space of the street is conceived of as a masculine arenaeither by Althusser or by the reader. Clearly interpellation itself is not a gendered concept, however to the extent that ideology conditions and creates gendered subjects, the figure of the policeman and suspect are gendered subjectivities.

right, then, to think of interpellation as a rigid model, as structuring; it would be a mistake, though, to discard interpellation or Althussers theory of ideology out of a belief that it denies human agency, for this is not Althussers primary concern. It can be, however, ours, and there are, I argue, important inroads for thinking of human agency within Althussers concept of interpellation that allow us to open up what appears to be a rigid, constraining system of always-already and permits (an)other interpretation.2 Let us, then, refuse a deterministic reading of Althusser, and instead turn to the tensions in and within the theory of interpellation, for, as Hall states, theory is not an end but a tool: one must think from [theory] and see where it takes you in terms of different contexts, different conjunctures, different language games (216a). Methodologically, in turning to Althussers concept of interpellation and considering closely the critiques of it, I am interested (as Hall is), in construction rather than deconstruction. The question I am asking is not, therefore, whether this interpretation is the definitive one, or assessing whether an insightful critique renders Althussers concept untenable. I will not draw a line in the sand. I will, however, take a position and make a proposition. My aim is neither Truth nor Falsity, therefore, but dialogueto engage these authors in a dialectical conversation about the subject in theory. In doing so let us now turn to Althussers text and explore how Identity, Ideology, Structure, and Practicei.e. Subjectivityare interwoven. A brief outline of Althussers general theory of ideology is necessary. Althusser begins by presenting us with the following two theses as a way to frame interpellation: Ideology represents the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence (162), and, Ideology has a material existence (165). Although seemingly contradictory, the relationship between these two terms is, for Althusser, mediated by and through the individual in the process of becoming a subject. As he states:
[T]he subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system: ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which [sic] practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief. [170]

We may map out the following relationship by a diagram, figure 2, where each term is circumscribed and defined by the parameters of the larger term encompassing it. Following the relationship between these terms leads Althusser to state that there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possibleby the category of the subject and its functioning (170). While for Althusser the concrete subject is necessary, however, the category of the subject is always-already in

I use the word interpretation intentionally for, although I feel that the outline of interpellation Althusser provides us is not merely the world of always-already, the gapsand the possibilities they open upare outside of Althussers analysis. As he states on the first page, the ideas expounded should not be regarded as more than the introduction to a discussion (footnote, 127, my emphasis). It is my intention to continue the discussion through and into these gaps.

Material Ideological Apparatus: Education, law, religion, ethicsetc. Material Ritual: Expectations Material Practice: Behavior Subject (A) Belief Action

Figure 2 Field of Ideology and a Single Subjectivity

existence; that is, every individual exists in and through subject categories that precede him/her stepping into their skin. If ideology exists in and through individuals becoming subjects, the mechanismits functioningis what Althusser refers to by interpellation and is his central thesis: Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects (170). Althussers example of the policeman hailing an individual reveals that interpellation, as an active function of ideology, works in two simultaneous instancesor, rather, through two complementary engagements. First, within an individual subjectivity, interpellation connects each term inside the field of ideology outlined in diagram 2 (i.e. material ideological, material ritual, material practice, subject). Second, interpellation is a process set in motion in an encounter between subjectsit is, in other words, relational. Having broadly sketched out the outlines of Althussers general theory of ideology, let us interrogate its terms, and its attending critiques, more specifically. In examining the Althusserian subject, we may begin by asking what kind of figure this is? How is the subject and his/her identity represented? Gayatri Spivak notes that in analyzing representations one must distinguish between representation as speaking forand representation as re-presentation (275) or, in other words, distinguish the contrastbetween a proxy and a portrait (276). Is the subject in Althusser either proxy or portrait, however? Focusing upon the policeman hailing his suspect, Althusser is neither speaking for, nor is he re-presenting either the policeman or suspect in a detailed sketch, much as a painter would; ultimately, both the policeman and suspect remain figures, structured categories and subjectivities that an(y) individual may occupy, but which remain outside of the realm of representation. We must not confuse, therefore, Althussers model as a mirror of reality. Spivaks critique of the subject in theory hinges precisely on this point; quoting Ajit K. Chaudhury, Spivak states that it is the slippage from rendering visible the mechanism to rendering vocal the individual, both avoiding any kind of analysis of [the subject] whether psychological, psychoanalytical or linguistic, that is consistently troubling (285, brackets in original). Althussers concern is, however, only with the first termexposing the mechanism by which individuals become subjects; the slippage Spivak speaks of, then, exists only if it is assumed that interpellation is more than a model or theory.

If the theory of interpellation attempts to reveal the mechanism by which individuals become subjects, however, this does not mean that it does not have an important role to play in an individuals identity. As subjects, Althusser notes, we constantly practice this ritual of ideological recognition, which guarantees for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects (172). Our sense of being is, therefore, critically tied to interpellation. It is thus not only powerful in producing a particular subjectivity, but also in ensuring social stability (the relationships between individuals), as well as an individuals stability (ones psyche). Althussers revisions, Hall reminds us,
sponsored a decisive move away from the distorted ideas and false consciousness approach to ideology. It put on the agenda the whole neglected issue of how ideology becomes internalized, how we come to speak spontaneously, within the limits of the categories of thought which exist outside of us and which can more accurately be said to think us. [30b]

If for Althusser it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power (133), and if the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses are the primary sites for the ideological subjection of individuals, interpellation answers how this ideological subjection works. In thinking of the relationship between ideology, subjectivity, and individuality, and in proposing interpellation as the form by which this relationship is structured, Althusser was not only taking Marxs statement that man first sees and recognizes himself in other men (in Zizek, 24) extremely seriously, but pushing and pursuing the question of how. Let us examine, then, the structure and mechanics of interpellation more closely. As Althusser states, the existence of Ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing (175). There is, in other words, no temporal distinction and thus, individuals are always-already subjects (176). This does not mean, though, that the always-already must mean the always-exactly-this-way, which denies the process of ideological formation that Althusser describes in his discussion of the Ideological State Apparatuses (through family, school, church, etc) and which are critical to creating and maintaining the material ideological apparatus. The language of the always-already needs to be carefully unpacked and its context kept firmly in mind. Immediately after positing that we are always-already subjects, Althusser continues: individuals are abstract with respect to the subjects which they always-already are (176). Individuals and subjects are, therefore, not synonyms but are in a relationship with each other; so that, for example, I can say, as an individual in this particular moment, that I am a student, student here being a subjectivity that is always-already. That is, thein this case primarily educationalmaterial ideological apparatus prescribes a set of material rituals (going to classes, reading, writing, adopting a particular style of language and knowledges) that define expectations about appropriate behaviormaterial

practiceswhich are reflected in my beliefs and action as a student subject. Each ideological framework, Hall writes,
locates us differently. Each thus situates us as social actors or as a member of a social group in a particular relation to the process and prescribes certain social identities for us. The ideological categories in use, in other words, position us in relation to the account of the process as depicted in the discourse. [39b]

Always-already. The hyphen demands close attention. Always implies a fixed temporal relationship, a structural relation; already also refers to a temporality, but this qualifies the first: specifically, already refers to a past actionit has beenand so the always-already is the structural relation which we step into, or assume, but which has already been defined. Ideology positions us. Critics of Althusser, however, have pointed out that there is a dialectical relationship between positioning and being positioned. Thus, Paul Willis concludes his study of how working class kids in Britain learn working class values by stating that
Structuralist theories of reproductionpresent the dominant ideologyas impenetrable. Everything fits too neatly[whereas, as] this study suggests. social agents are not passive bearers of ideology, but active appropriators who reproduce existing structures only through struggle, contestation, and a partial penetration of those structures. [175]

Althusser, it seems to me, would not disagree. First, we must keep in mind that in describing the functioning of ideology in general, Althusser is concerned with developing a model of how individuals internalize an ideology. He explicitly distances himself from a discussion of how historythat is a specific context and particular individualstransform ideologies. As we have noted, the subjects in Althusser are not individuals but categories. It seems there is room to suggest, therefore, that if for Althusser the ideological relationships between subjects are structured, as individuals engage with these subjectivities in the complexity of history, their meaning is transformable. For Althusser, who states that the peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and a functioning [which]are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history (161), the site of intense struggle is in determining meaning, not form. The significance of the meeting between policeman and suspect is thus not everywhere and at all times the same, the process of interpellation between these two subjects, however, is. Secondly, we must remember that if interpellation involves an individual internalizing an alwaysalready subjectivity, this subjectivity is critically dependent on an engagement with an external other. Interpellation is, in other words, relationally defined. Moreover, interpellation is an unending process; the dialectic between positioning and being positioned is constant. The consequence of this is underscored by Pierre Bourdieu when he states that even in cases in whichthe interlocking of actions and reactions is totally predictable from outside, uncertainty remains as the outcome of the interaction as long as the sequence has not been completed (9). While ideology may set the parameters of the impossible, the

possible, and the probable (Bourdieu, 78), the outcome in a meeting between two individuals is never assured. The importance of this is evident if we ask what happens to Althussers field of ideology when another subject is introduced (see fig. 3). Although two subjects may share the same, or similar, material ideological apparatuses, and thus have similar expectations, behavior, beliefs, and actions, the correspondence between these parameters will never be the same in all instances. This revised diagram makes evident that how far
Material Ideological Apparatus: Education, law, religion, ethicsetc. Material Ritual (A): Expectations Material Practice (A): Behavior Subject (A) Belief Action Material Practice (B): Behavior Subject (B) Belief Action Material Ritual (B): Expectations

Shared Space of Expectations / Behavior

Spaces outside of shared Expectations / Behavior

Figure 3 Field of Ideology and Multiple Subjectivities (An Encounter)

apart these terms are is highly significant in determining not only the degree of uncertainty in an encounter, but also the degree to which the encounter will be meaningful for each subject. Hence, each encounter between subjects is a fragile and uncertain process of interpellation that involves meaningmaking both on an individual and a social level. That is to say, the cultural context, and each individuals engagement and understanding of it, provides not only the backdrop for this encounter, but is also with each encounter either further supported, undermined, or transformed. As Willis states, cultural forms provide the materials towards, and the immediate context of, the construction of subjectivities and the confirmation of identity (173). It is in the uncertainty of a relational encounter that we find the seeds of a (re)introduction of historyof individuals, time, place, culture, and changeinto Althussers formulation.3 If introducing history results in a slippage from subjects to agents as the figures of interpellation, Althusser would nevertheless ask that we distinguish between agency and freedombetween a range of choices and freedom of choice. All actions involve choices, but actions can

I term this a reintroduction because Althusser does engage with the issue of history, even if it is to place it outside of his discussion of ideologys function and form.

only be evaluated in terms of the range of available choices. As a critic noted, moreover, we must be careful to distinguish between ideology and the products of ideology, that is, desire, needs, and interests.4 Interestingly, the distinction between ideology and practice is often predicated on a Descartian split between thought and action, between body and mind. In thinking of the link between belief and action, moreover, the common assumption is that an individual acts according to her/his beliefs; the arrow of intentionality runs, in other words, from ideology through practice, but rarely in the opposite direction. Althussers second thesis in the section on ideology demonstrates that he is very aware of this distinction: the ideas or representationswhich seem to make up ideology do not have an ideal or spiritual existence, but a material existence (165). Belief is, then, not only embodied, but shaped by the body, by our actions in social relationships. Furthermore, insofar as there is a recursive relationship between the material and the spiritual, one that is manifested in and through social relationships, both terms are consequential. Thus, as Slavoj Zizek notes, the unidirectional arrow of intentionality is a fiction: we often reason beliefs in a secondary fashion, that is, we act, and then believe that we have acted out of belief, when it is rather our actions that determine this belief (see pg. 40 especially). Nonetheless, if in Althusser a recursivity is established between belief and action, and if later thinkers make it clear that a discussion of the subject in theory cannot privilege ideology over practice, the discussion remains up to this point abstract. In thinking of structure and agency, we must turn to concrete examplesto ethnography. Like Hall, who believes that it is in the dialogical relationships between theoretical concepts and the concrete that one finds an interface that [is] meaningful and productive (238), our turning to ethnographic examples becomes a way of grounding and understanding theory, not a departure from it. Tania Murray Lis article, Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot, provides a concise and fruitful example in which to work through the interwoven nature of identity, ideology, structure, and practice that we have outlined. In this piece Li sets out to explore the paradoxical process by which the Lindu, a prosperous and literate group of farmers, have come to be identified as indigenous while their nearby neighbors, the Lauje, a poor and illiterate community, are for the most part ignored and thus have yet to make the specificity of their identityexplicit (149). Contrary to our common conception of tribal communities, the affluent and politically engaged Lindu have come to occupy the tribal slot while the (more) marginalized Lauje have not. As Li argues, though, the tribal slotis a simplified frame whose existence depends upon the regimes of representationthat preconfigure what can be found there, together with the processes of dialogue and contestation through which identifications are made on the
4

Note from 2/12/02 class on Ideological Representations, Althusser, Zizek, Butler. Speaker unknown.

ground (153). The regimes of representation are, in this case, the government and NGO activist groups. While the Indonesian government constructs the tribal slot as a negative category in opposition to a modern subjectivity, NGOs and activists frame the tribal slot positively as a site of unique and invaluable wisdom. In Althusserian terms, the Indonesian state and NGOs function as distinct material ideological apparatuses, each influencing the expectations and behavior of the subjects which they interpellate. In this account, the NGOs and the Indonesian state are, therefore, competing ideological structures that position the Lindu and Lauje in specific ways. As Li makes clear, however, while the ideological discourse of each structures the terms of engagement, the Lindu and Lauje are not passively interpellated vis--vis the tribal slot, but have some room to maneuver as they situate themselves in relation to the images, discourses, and agendas that others produce for or about them (157). Drawing upon Stuart Halls concept of articulation, which captures the duality of positioning [that] posits boundaries separating within from without, while simultaneously selecting the constellation of elements that characterize what lies within, Li notes that by drawing upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and by engaging and making connections with both the media and activist organizations, Indonesian communities articulate a particular position for themselves (151-152); they are, in other words, agents within the structural sphere of the tribal slot. Thus, although the tribal slot is an always-already category, it is only within the dialectic between positioning and being positioned that meaning is created. The fact that who occupies, or what is understood by, the tribal slot is constantly being worked and reworked highlights the contingent and constant nature of the dialectics of interpellation. While so far we have looked at how structure and agency are relationally positioned, without exploring the concrete historical context that informs both the Lindu and Lauje the disparate identity of each group remains perplexing. Generally speaking, Li notes that historically, both in present and in colonial times, the infertile condition of their land meant that the Lauje did not attract outsider interestnor did they seek it. Consequently, the Lauje have not been exposed to the overtly coercive dimensions of state power, nor to the threat of having lands and livelihoods removed from them in the name of development and thus the ideology of indigenous people has not found its subject in the Lauje hills (162-163). As Althusser might say, invoking and being interpellated as an indigenous subject is predicated in engaging in a relational social relationship. The Lindu, on the other hand, have a deeper history of engagement with both colonial and state authorities, a history that culminates in their present struggle to halt the Indonesian states attempts to create a hydroelectric plant on the lake they occupy, a project which would mean their relocation. Understanding that an indigenous subjectivity would provide them with an advantageous position, the Lindu have allied themselves with NGOs who interpellate them as an indigenous subjects.

Insofar as these historical factors make some outcomes more plausible than others, they play a critical role in determining the context for interpellation. That is to say, the parameters within which interpellation operates are not defined solely by the range of ideological discourses at hand, but also by the particular specificities of time, place, and the individuals that make up that historical moment. As Li reminds us, moreover, the outcome of the ongoing process in Indonesia of positioning and being positioned, i.e. interpellation, is not outside of historical revision: Every articulation is a creative act, yet it is never creation ex nihilo, but rather a selection and rearticulation of elements structured through previous engagements. It is alsosubject to contestation, uncertainty, risk, and the possibility of future articulation (169). The Lindus indigenous status is, therefore, not only precarious, but in constant need of being both articulated and accepted. It depends, in other words, not only on the existence of the indigenous category of the tribal slot, but on the establishment of a common and coherent definition of its boundaries among the parties involveda situation which is historically and contextually informed; it will depend, as a result, on the government, NGOs, and the Lindu themselves, recognizing and acting as if the Lindu are an indigenous group. The fact that the Lauje fall outside of the tribal slot while the Lindu occupy it is evidence that, as we trace the moments of interpellation in their historical complexity, they are anything but a rigid always-already. While some may argue that this discredits Althussers theory, I would argue that it complements and broadens it without rendering it untenable; we must not lose sight of the fact that interpellation describes the structure and functioning of ideology (Althusser, 162), that is, its mechanicsapplying its illuminating insights in the space of history and practice is up to us. Social scientists, let alone anthropologists, may never agree on the real relations or specific lines of interaction between practice and theory, or be able to trace exactly the myriad processes by which individuals become subjects, but, as Michael Taussig notes, perhaps we can listen to these stories neither as fiction nor as disguised signs of truth, but as real (75). The lesson of interpellation is precisely that as historically situated individuals we participate and are active in creating and maintaining the ideological and material structures that define both our own and others social realities. There is, then, an ethical argument being made. As we explore further the conjuncture between theory and practice in the future, the most important question is, therefore, not whether this or that interpretation is true, but the work that it does and what its consequences are. Keeping this in mind will allow us to maintain a responsibility both to ourselves and also to the individuals we study and live among, as well those to whom we write.

Velasquez, Diego. Las Meninas. 1656, Oil on canvas. 10'5" x 9'1" Museo del Prado, Madrid

The question of identity, subjectivity, and interpellation could be examined in other waysthrough art for example, where the subject of positioning and being positioned is critical not only to the relational dynamics between viewer and artwork but also in the relational dynamics of the artwork itself (determining what is being observed, from what point of view, and our identity and subjectivity vis--vis the art-object and the art-world being presented and represented).

Picasso, Diego. Girl Before a Mirror. 1932. Oil on canvas. Museum of Modern Art, New York.

Bibliography (references cited) Althusser, Louis. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation). In Lenin and Philosophy. Ben Brewster, trans. London: Monthly Review Press, 1971 [1970]. Pgs. 127-186. Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Hall, Stuart. Cultural Composition: Stuart Hall on Ethnicity and the Discursive Turn. Interview with Julie Drew. In Race, Rhetoric, and the Postcolonial. Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, eds. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999. Pgs. 205-240. Hall, Stuart. The problem of ideology: Marxism without guarantees. Journal of Communication Inquiry (10)2, 1986. Pgs. 28-44. Li, Tania Murray. Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot. In Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, 2000. Pgs. 149-179. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Can the Subaltern Speak? In Marxism and the interpretation of culture. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. Pgs. 271- 313. Taussig, Michael. Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: a study in terror and healing. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991 [1987]. Willis, Paul. Learning to Labor: how working class kids get working class jobs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981 [1977]. Zizek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 2001 [1989].