Hong-Hai Lim Universiti Sains Malaysia

Essays on Reframing Bureaucracy

Representative Bureaucracy: Rethinking Substantive Eects and Active Representation

Hong-Hai Lim is an associate professor in the School of Social Sciences at the Universiti Sains Malaysia. He holds a doctorate from the University of Malaya. His interests include the politics of plural societies, the politics of public administration, and management theory and practices in the public sector. He has published mainly on Malaysian politics and public administration. E-mail: hhlim@usm.my.

This article addresses perceived deciencies in the study of representative bureaucracy by explaining and classifying the sources of passive representations substantive eects. This classication is used to clarify existing empirical research and normative thinking on active representation. Doing so produces a more modest but more accurate interpretation of existing research ndings and helps to indicate future research needs. It also reduces normative disagreement to a single source of substantive eects, namely bureaucratic partiality. Minority bureaucratic partiality is of dubious value for helping minorities, and bureaucratic partiality should generally be rejected. However, a passively representative bureaucracy increases in importance because of its other sources of substantive eects. This demonstrates the need to go beyond the passiveactive distinction: It is more adequate and accurate to speak of representative bureaucracy and the sources of its substantive eects.

representation; however, many cannot bring themselves to follow him in rejecting active representation because of the belief that it can enhance equity for minorities. The result is a normative impasse that remains to this day. The literature on active representation continues to accumulate; however, it is not free of problems. The empirical research seems to claim something more specic and therefore more than is warranted. The urgent normative questions it nonetheless raises about the role of bureaucrats remain not only unresolved but also unexamined. This less than happy state of aairs has much to do with the initial failure to adequately understand how passive representation can produce substantive eects. In other words, the failure to see that these substantive eects can be produced other than by active representationand to examine what active representation really consists ofhas led to inaccuracies in interpreting research ndings. The inadequate notions about how passive representation can produce substantive eects have also led scholars to overrate the need for active representation as well as its benets for minorities, thus making them reluctant to reject active representation and perpetuating the normative impasse. This article takes on three needed tasks: First, it provides a more adequate understandingin eect, a better taxonomyof how passive representation can increase substantive benets for the represented group. This is essential for apprehending weaknesses and making further progress in both the positive and normative theory of representative bureaucracy. Second, it uses the classication to clarify empirical research; limitations have to be realized if more is to be achieved. Third, with the help of the classication, it tries to resolve the present normative impasse, which has become more pressing with advances in empirical knowledge. Moshers Articulation A quick review of Mosher (1968) is useful for understanding the present situation and its problems.
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ingsley (1944) is generally credited with launching the subject of representative bureaucracy, but it is the articulation of Mosher (1968), especially his distinction between passive and active representation, that has structured subsequent discourse. Most studies examine the extent to which existing bureaucracies are passively representative and the factors aecting it. However, it is the substantive or policy eects that may be produced by subsequent active representation that mainly imbue passive representation with its importance and especially intrigue scholars. Focusing on minority or female bureaucrats, research has progressed from examining the values and beliefs of bureaucrats to verifying the substantive benets they provide to their social group. The actual occurrence of active representation has been establishedor so it is claimedby research that shows a positive relationship between the presence of minority and female bureaucrats and the substantive benets received by their social group. Normative concerns have received less attention. Virtually all scholars join Mosher in supporting passive representation. They do not dispute Moshers normative objection to active

Mosher distinguishes two meanings of bureaucratic representation. Passive representation concerns the source of origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror the total society. It may be statistically measured in terms, for example, of locality of origin and its nature (rural, urban, suburban, etc.), previous occupation, fathers occupation, education, family income, family social class, race, religion (12). In contrast, in active representation, the individual (or administrator) is expected to press for the interests and desires of those whom he is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or some segment of the people (12). Moshers denition of active representationin terms of expectations and as inclusive of promoting the interests of the whole peoplemay lack precision. However, his formulation raises the important question of whether passive representation, once achieved, leads to active representation as well. Like Subramaniam (1967) just before him, Mosher stresses that it does not necessarily mean that a public servant with given background and social characteristics will ipso facto represent the interests of others with like background and characteristics in his behavior and decisions. He further remarks that in fact vigorous disciplinary measures may be invoked to prevent such partiality and that active representation may be expressly forbidden and incumbents encouraged to lean over backwards to avoid the appearance of partiality (13). Importantly, these remarks show that Mosher sees active representation as bureaucratic partiality. Mosher states his normative position on passive and active representation based on their supposed eects. He supports passive representation on the basis of its symbolic eects: While passive representativeness is no guarantor of democratic decision-making, it carries some independent and symbolic values that are signicant for a democratic society. A broadly representative public service, especially at the level of leadership, suggests an open service in which access is available to most people, whatever their station in life, and in which there is equality of opportunity. Negatively, its signicance rests on the absence, or conspicuous underrepresentation, of certain categories of people, suggesting or reecting barriers to their entry or advancement. (1314) Although he is uncertain of the occurrence of active representation, Mosher nds it to be normatively objectionable: It may be noted that active representativeness run rampant within a bureaucracy would constitute a major threat to orderly democratic
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government. The summing up of the multitude of special interests seeking eective representation does not constitute the public interest. The strengths of dierent private interest groups within administration are vastly unequal, and the establishment of anything approaching equity would be nearly impossible . Thus there are very real problems in the development of a rounded concept of representative bureaucracy within our democratic framework. (12) Moshers view that active representation is a major threat to orderly democratic government and his broad denition of active representation to include even bureaucratic representation of the interests of the whole people suggest support for the traditional democratic argument against any independent representation of interests by nonelective bureaucrats. However, he nds especially repugnant the balkanization of the public service and the inequity among unequally represented groups that would ensue from active representation. Although they are not elaborated by Mosher, the symbolic eects of passive representation can, in turn, have important eects on the attitudes and behavior of underrepresented groups toward the bureaucracy and the political system generally. However, subsequent scholars have focused on the empirical question raised by Subramaniam and Mosher: Does active representation occur? To the extent that it does and that passive representation has substantive and not just symbolic eects, it becomes more important to ensure fair passive representation for all social groups and to resolve the normative status of active representation. Subsequent scholars have tightened Moshers denition of active representation to refer only to the actual behaviors of bureaucrats that benet their own social group. However, they largely follow Mosher in seeing active representation as bureaucratic partiality and as the only way bureaucrats can increase substantive benets for their social group. It is this awed conceptual foundation that has limited both empirical research and normative thinking from the outset. So the rst task is to formulate the various ways in which passive representation can produce substantive eects. Substantive Effects of Passive Representation: Direct and Indirect Sources So far, the study of representative bureaucracy has been largely concerned with racial minorities and women. My analysis of the substantive eects of passive representation will focus on a racial minority, but transposing it for women or any kind of social group is straightforward. Bureaucrats from the focal minority group are called minority bureaucrats; bureaucrats from

other social groups are collectively called other so-called precursors to active representation. Another bureaucrats. These may be from a single majority is identication arising from the perception of group, a majority group and one or more other common demography, even before the discovery or minority group(s), or other minority groups when no presumption of shared values and beliefs. Yet another one group forms a majority of the population. is more and better communication because of shared Bureaucrats from the majority group are called majority values and beliefs and other proximities associated with bureaucrats, and bureaucrats from minority groups common demography. What is important, however, is other than the focal group are called other minority that we need to specify how or why each of the bureaucrats. The question to be addressed is this: How concomitants of common demography leads minority can the passive representation of a bureaucrats to behave in ways minority group in the that increase the substantive How can the passive representa- benets for their social group. bureaucracy produce substantive tion of a minority group in the Only then can a precursory benets for that group such that bureaucracy produce substanan increase in passive factor be properly regarded as a representation would result in tive benets for that group such source of substantive eects. more benets for that group? that an increase in passive representation would result in more The most obvious direct source is Obviously, minority bureaucrats partiality among minority benets for that group? can produce substantive benets bureaucrats, that is, bias in favor for their social group directly of their social group and against through their own administrative behavior. However, other groups. Partiality leads minority bureaucrats to this is not the only way. Minority bureaucrats can also provide more substantive benets to members of their produce substantive benets for their social group social group than to equally eligible members of other indirectly or through the changes they induce in the social groupsin contravention of the bureaucratic behavior of other participants (i.e., other bureaucrats norm of impartiality and existing rules. Mosher and focal clients). Whether minority bureaucrats evidently has this source in mind when dening active produce benets for their social group directly or representation and denouncing its rule violation as a indirectly, it is important to identify the specic threat to orderly democratic government. Partiality is factors that lead them to do so. Each of these factors more specic than the frequently used term constitutes a source of substantive eects that benet advocacy. The object of advocacy may be only the their social group. Factors that produce benets cessation of bias or discrimination against the directly (i.e., through minority bureaucrats own represented group (i.e., restoration of the spirit of behavior) are called direct sources. Those that produce impartiality or neutrality in making decisions and benets indirectly (i.e., through the behavior of other applying rules) or something more than that (i.e., bureaucrats and minority clients) are called indirect reverse discrimination in breach of impartiality and sources. The benets from direct and indirect sources rules for the purpose of helping the represented are respectively called the direct and indirect group). Only the latter is partiality and attracts contributions of minority bureaucrats. Moshers objection. The direct production of substantive benets for their social group by minority bureaucrats has been the dominant focus of scholars (Meier 1993a; Saltzstein 1979; Selden 1997b; Thompson 1976). The theory of representative bureaucracy, Saltzstein states, requires that bureaucratic policy making be responsive to the interests of represented groups, which necessarily implies a link between passive representation and values, values and behavior, and behavior and policy (1979, 470). In other words, bureaucrats with a particular demographic background have experienced signicantly similar socialization and thus share similar values and beliefs with members of their social group. Shared values and beliefs, in turn, lead bureaucrats to behave in ways that increase the substantive benets for their social group. Although they are almost exclusively identied in the literature, shared values and beliefs are not the only concomitants of common demography that constitute Now, partiality is not the only direct source of increased substantive benets for a represented group. Minority bureaucrats who consciously avoid partiality can still increase benets for their social group. They may even bend over backwards to be neutral or impartial to all groups, but intentionally neutral minority bureaucrats still end up providing more substantive benets to their social group than intentionally neutral other bureaucrats. This is a result of other direct sources of substantive eects. At least two can be identied. The second direct source of substantive eects is shared values and beliefs. As Kranz states, minority and female representatives as a group will more closely mirror the needs and wishes of their group, whether overtly or subconsciously, than non-minorities do (1974, 435). With shared values and beliefs, A acts as B would if B were in As position (Meier 1993a, 7). Thus, when minority bureaucrats act in accordance with their own
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values and beliefs (we all do unless prevented), they also servewhether they intend or know itthe interests of their social group. The third direct source is empathic understanding. Compared to other bureaucrats, minority bureaucrats better understand the values and beliefs of their minority group, even if they do not or no longer share them. When Herbert (1974a, 519) asserts that the views and perceptions of minority group peoples vary considerably relative to the good will of public administrators, his point is not so much that other bureaucrats do not share the values of minorities but that they do not understand them. Shared values and beliefs and empathic understanding constitute sources of substantive eects because they lead minority bureaucrats to articulate the interests of their social group as decision inputs and to take these interests into proper account in their own decisions and actions. This conceptualization of direct sources can be compared to that of Hindera (1993b; see also Hindera and Young 1998). Hindera formulates three theoriesin-use involved in active representation: advocacy, attitude congruence, and communications. As I explained earlier, partiality is more specic than advocacy. Value congruence means essentially the same thing as shared values and beliefs. Finally, empathic understanding appears to be both more pertinent and proximate as an inuence on behaviorhence a source of substantive eectsthan communications. Empathic understanding can result from communications or other factors. Shared values and beliefs and empathic understanding can contribute substantive benets to the represented group regardless of whether partiality (and its added contribution) also occurs. Indeed, they are more reliable than partiality, both because they are bound to operate to some extent and because of organizational rules and controls that inhibit partiality. A minority bureaucrat may eschew partiality for two other quite dierent reasons. The rst is a personal or professional normative belief in impartialitythat it is wrong to be partial to any group, especially ones own. Saltzstein (1979, 473) notes another interesting possibility: A minority bureaucrat wants to serve his or her own group but is convinced (correctly, I shall argue later) that the best way to do so in the long run is to behave in a scrupulously and manifestly impartial manner. Shared values and beliefs and empathic understanding suce to make an important point: A social group has to be adequately represented in the bureaucracy if it is to be fairly served. This realization evidently underlies Longs argument for a representative bureaucracy to represent societys diverse interests in bureaucratic policy makingeven as he sees bureaucrats as mediator, moderator and synthesizer, as needed counterpoise to the narrowness of pressure group perspective and as providers of the long view and
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the broad look (1952, 815). At any rate, these words strongly suggest that Long neither supports bureaucratic partiality nor sees it as necessary for focal bureaucrats to benet their own social group. Minority bureaucrats can increase substantive benets for their social group indirectly through their inuence on the behavior of other bureaucrats. Colleague pressures are explicitly noted as an important inuence on minority bureaucrats by Herbert (1974b, 560) and more recently in the critical mass theory of active representation (Meier 1993b; Hindera and Young 1998). Kim (1994, 388) notes, but only in passing, the constraining eects of minority passive representation, presumably on other bureaucrats. Hindera and Young (1998) actually examine the interaction eect between black and white passive representations (664) in their study of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission district oces and nd that white bureaucrats are more responsive to blacks when black bureaucrats become the largest plurality (666). However, even they stop short of erecting the inuence of minority bureaucrats on other bureaucrats as a separate category through which minority bureaucrats can increase substantive benets for their social group. Only Meier and NicholsonCrotty (2002) have explicitly formulated the inuence of minority bureaucrats on other bureaucrats in these terms. Three forms of inuence can be distinguished. When minority bureaucrats work with and know the behavior of other bureaucrats, they can physically check the excesses of the latter against minority group members, as when a black policeman in Hartford, Connecticut, physically restrained a white ocer whom he thought was abusing a Puerto Rican girl (Thompson 1976, 218). Such a check by the black policeman is at least as likely when the victim is black. Minority bureaucrats can also express disapproval of discriminatory behavior by other bureaucrats. Indeed, Burke (1986, 1135). includes remedying the wrongful acts of other bureaucrats in his conception of a bureaucrats responsibility. Such reactive checks by minority bureaucrats benet their social group by tempering biased behavior or preventing its continuation by other bureaucrats. Check is probably only the visible tip of the iceberg. More important is the prior restraint felt by other bureaucrats in acting on their bias (not just against the minority group but also in favor of their own) for fear of being disapproved of, exposed, or otherwise checked by minority bureaucrats. This reects the well-known rule that a persons behavior is inuenced by the anticipated reaction of relevant others. Other bureaucrats feel restrained only when their values and beliefs remain unchanged. This suggests a third eect of minority bureaucrats on other bureaucrats that also benets the minority group.

Over a longer period of time, minority bureaucrats can bring about changes in the values and beliefs, not just the behavior, of other bureaucrats. This may be called the resocialization eect of minority bureaucrats. Kranz refers to this eect when he observes, Propinquity reduces ignorance and rejection; increased bureaucratic understanding of minority views and feelings would lead to greater responsiveness to minority problems and needs (1974, 435). Citing another work by Kranz (1976), Selden similarly notes, The presence of underrepresented groups should enhance the majority groups empathic understanding and responsiveness to previously underrepresented or excluded groups (1997b, 6). Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2002) note that female police ocers can sensitize their male colleagues to gender issues. To the extent that other bureaucrats are resocialized in this way, they would be fairer to minority-group members on their own accord, not because of check or restraint. Minority bureaucrats can thus moderate bias by other bureaucrats against the minority group in at least three ways or stages: check, restraint, and resocialization. Arguably, this sequence reects increasing levels of ecacy as well as desirability. These three kinds of minority bureaucrat inuence on other bureaucrats would lead the latter to behave more fairly toward the minority group. Thus, they constitute sources of substantive eects that benet the minority group. However, their ecacy requires that minority bureaucrats themselves eschew partiality. The other indirect way in which minority bureaucrats can benet their social group is through changes they may induce in the behavior of clients from their social group. Shared demography can fundamentally change the bureaucratclient relationship, not only for bureaucrats but also for clients (Meier and NicholsonCrotty 2002). The eect on clients is captured by the observation that whether one is black, brown, or red, the visible presence of an administrator with whom he/she can identify causes at least greater initial security that someone is listening who can understand the needs, realities and perceptions being described, and who would help if at all possible (Herbert 1974b, 559). Because of this, minority bureaucrats can lead minority clients to change their behavior in at least two ways that benet the clients themselves. First, the presence of minority bureaucrats can stimulate more applications or service demand from minority clients. Selden notes, Potential clients may be more apt to participate in government programs when they identify and are comfortable with program administrators. Similarly they may avoid taking part in programs if they are intimidated by or feel awkward around program personnel (1997b, 7). Selden also cites Hadwigers nding (1973, 51) that black county

supervisors in the U.S. Farmers Home Administration (which Selden also studies) believed that their presence had a favorable impact on black participation as blacks had previously been afraid to approach some all-white oces (Selden 1997b, 74). Another study of agencies oering services to people living with AIDS showed that clients, whether they are categorized by race, gender, or sexual orientation, care about having agency sta who share their characteristics, especially frontline sta who directly oer services to them (Thielemann and Stewart 1996). From this, the authors infer that the agencys clients are more or less likely to use the services depending on its representativeness (169). This eect of representative bureaucrats on their social group may be called demand inducement. Second, minority bureaucrats can better stimulate clients from their social group to make the eort or behavioral changes that some programs need in order to improve outputs and especially subsequent outcomes for clients. In more durable relationships, such as between teachers and students, clients may even behave in this way to seek the approval of bureaucrats whom they like or identify with (Keiser et al. 2002, 558). This may be called coproduction inducement by representative bureaucrats. Both demand inducement and coproduction inducement by minority bureaucrats constitute indirect sources of substantive benets for the minority group. This section has identied and parsed the various sources of passive representations substantive eects. Most of these sources can be found scattered in the literature, and some scholars have begun to recognize them as such. It is hoped that systematic classication will make them more available and thus more likely to inuence empirical research and normative thinking. This is needed in both areas, as the next two sections will show. Empirical Research: Verifying Active Representation? This section uses the foregoing classication to review the main empirical studies that seek to verify active representation. Appearing since the 1990s, these studies initially focused on bureaucrats from minority racial groups and, more recently, on female bureaucrats. Henceforth, where convenient, the term focal bureaucrats will be used to refer to minority bureaucrats or female bureaucrats or both, as the case may be. All the studies report varying degrees of success in showing active representation. Their common features will rst be noted before examining how well their ndings hold up when seen through the classicationin eect, the higher-resolution conceptual lensprovided in the preceding section. Except for the second part of the study by Selden (1997b, chapter 6), which will be examined separately,
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all the studies reviewed dene active representation as the administrative behavior of focal bureaucratsin eect, the direct sources of substantive eectsthat benet their own social group. This follows Thompsons (1976) reformulation of Moshers loose denition to limit active representation to bureaucrats actual behavior (instead of Moshers expected behavior) on behalf of their social group (i.e., only Moshers some segment of the people but not the whole people). To avoid the dicult operational problems of determining whether bureaucrats act for or on behalf of their social group, Thompson proposes the following: [B]ehavior actively represents a racial community when it increases the wealth, prestige or other advantages associated with belonging to that race. Ditto when the focal group is women. These studies deliberately select sites where active representation is thought most likely to occurthat is, where bureaucrats possess signicant discretion in making decisions directly aecting access to substantive benets that are salient to the represented social group (Keiser et al. 2002, 5567; Meier 1993a, 828; Thompson 1976, 2128). They also use a design that Saltzstein believes avoids the problems of specifying a link between representation, values and behavior by looking only at the extent to which representation is linked to substantive products (or policies) that reect the interests of represented groups (1979, 47071). This design necessitates relatively large samples and the institution of (statistical) controls for factors other than passive representation (that) might produce outputs aording group benets (47273). Multiple regression is clearly indicated and is used in all these studies. Controlling for alternative explanatory factors, active representation can be said to occur if the level of passive representation varies positively and signicantly with substantive benets (policy outputs and sometimes outcomes) for a social group. In this way, the empirical studies purportedly nd active representation by minority and female bureaucrats. For minority bureaucrats, Meier and Stewart (1992) nd active representation by black school administrators and teachers in Florida school districts; Meier (1993b) nds active representation by Latino school principals and teachers, also in Florida school districts; Hindera (1993a, 1993b) nds active representation by black and Hispanic (but not white, male or female) bureaucrats in district oces of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Hindera and Young (1988), in a reexamination, conrm active representation by blacks in the same oces; and nally, Selden (1997a, 1997b, chapter 5) nds active representation by African American (black), Hispanic, and Asian American (but not Native American or female) county supervisors in district oces of the Farmers Home Administration.
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For female bureaucrats, Wilkins and Keiser (2001) nd active representation by female supervisors (but not caseworkers) in child support agencies; Keiser et al. (2002) nd active representation by female math teachers, female teachers in general, and female administrators in Texas high schools; and Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2002) nd active representation by female police ocers in the 60 largest metropolitan counties in the United States. The important common nding of these studies is a signicant positive relationship between passive representation and substantive benets for focal groups (minorities and women) in public organizations or administrative districts. They conclude that the respective focal bureaucrats have practiced active representation. However, does that relationship suce to show active representation? More generally, what does it show and not show? Three main points can be made in reply. First, the relationship shows that passive representation has signicant substantive and not just symbolic eects. This is an important contribution that eectively answers the initial skepticism on this score and strengthens the case for a representative bureaucracy. Focal bureaucrats are doing something or having some eect on other bureaucrats or focalgroup clients that collectively increases substantive benets to the focal group. In other words, one or more of the sources of passive representations substantive eects are at work. Howeverand this is the second pointthe relationship does not show that variations in substantive benets are specically the result of what the authors call active representation. This point needs some explanation. The second part of Seldens study will then be presented as an exception to it. To establish active representation, which the authors dene as the direct sources of substantive eects, the indirect sources need to be controlled for or plausibly ruled out. Control for indirect sources is neither consciously attempted (evidently because these sources are overlooked) nor fortuitously accomplished by other control variables in all the reviewed studies with the partial exception of Meier and NicholsonCrotty (2002). This study uses sexual assault reports as an independent variable and thus controls for clientdemand inducement by female police ocers. Also, the indirect sources not controlled for cannot plausibly be ruled out. The indirect sources consisting of focal bureaucrats inuences on other bureaucrats are likely to exist when both share a common workplace, as is the case in all the studies. As previously noted, Hindera and Young (1998, 666) actually nd evidence that black bureaucrats inuence the behavior of white bureaucrats. The inducement of

client demandwhether in the form of making applications and complaints or seeking help from teachersis controlled for only in Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2002), but it is also likely to occur in the other studies. Selden (1997b, 74) actually cites Hadwiger (1973) on the importance of this source in the organization she examined. The possibility of coproduction inducement is clearly present in educational outcomes (test scores) for students and even in successful child support enforcement and sexual assault investigations culminating in arrest. With indirect sources neither controlled for nor plausibly ruled out, we cannot be sure that variations in policy outputs and outcomes are the result of direct sources of substantive eects alone. Thus, the relationship between minority passive representation and substantive benets found in these studies constitutes weaker evidence of active representation than the authors suppose. Strictly speaking, the inference of active representation remains a non sequiturpossible, even likely, but not necessary. The second part of Seldens study (Selden 1997b, chapter 6; see also Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998) is more successful in demonstrating active representation and thus provides an exception to the just-explained second point. Here, Selden uses individual bureaucrats rather than administrative districts as the unit of analysis. Her sample consists of 141 or 76.6 percent majority (Caucasian) and 43 or 23.4 percent minority (African American, Hispanic, and Native American) supervisors heading county oces of the Farmers Home Administration. Active representation is dened as minoritybeneting administrative behavior, whether by minority or other bureaucrats. Selden identies a more proximate precursor called the minority representative role and assesses factors that determine its adoption by bureaucrats. Signicantly, minority status is found to be the most important. She then examines whether the minority representative role and minority status explain variations in two kinds of substantive benets, housing loan approvals for minorities and the publicizing of the loan program to minorities. The minority representative role of county supervisors is signicant in explaining the variation in housing loans they approve for minorities in their counties. Race or minority status itself is not signicant, suggesting that its eect is largely mediated by the minority representative role. Importantly for her purpose (although her data for loan approvals are at the county level), approval decisions are made by county supervisors (Selden, 1997b, 6970) and thus reect their own behavior but not their inuence on other bureaucrats. For this reason, Seldens nding

provides stronger evidence of the occurrence of active representation than earlier studies. However, as in the rst part of her study, there is no control for the other indirect source that may be operative (i.e. clientdemand inducement, including inducement by the county supervisors minority subordinates). Both minority status and the minority representative role are signicant in explaining the extent to which county supervisors publicize the loan program among minorities. Unlike the number of loans approved for minorities, publicity eorts do not appear to be inuenced by minority client behavior. Thus, with the indirect contribution of focal bureaucrats through their inuence on other bureaucrats also ruled out as explained previously, this nding provides even stronger evidence of active representation of minorities: rst by minority bureaucrats, and second by bureaucrats of all races who assume the minority representative role. The third point about the empirical studies, including Seldens second part, can now be made. None of these studies either deconstructs active representation into its constituent (direct) sources or clearly separates out partiality for independent verication. Thus, they fail to demonstrate partiality by the focal bureaucrats. Hindera (1993b) and Hindera and Young (1998) infer advocacy from their analysis, but even accepting this inference and putting aside their failure to control for indirect sources, advocacy does not suce to establish partiality. It may mean only the restoration of fairness or impartiality. Essentially the same ambiguity pertains to the concept and index of minority representative role and hence the nding of active representation in Seldens second part. Selden (1997b, 1456) uses eight statements to construct her minority representative role index. These statements gauge respondents support for the following purposes or actions to promote them: making decisions concerning minority community needs, policies that address the needs and concerns of minority clients, greater and more equitable access by minorities, more equitable distribution of program services to minorities, insure the representation of minorities, greater government responsiveness to minorities, recruit qualied minorities, and greater minority representation and ethnic balance in federal personnel. These purposes and actions benet minorities and accord with the adopted denition of active representation. However, it is by no means clear that respondents who indicated support intended to convey partiality and not just abstention from bias against minorities and hence fairness on their part. The latter interpretation is at least equally plausible. It may even be the reason for
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the substantial support of the minority representative rolean average score of 29.1 on an index scaled 840 (Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998, 731) in a sample consisting mainly of majority Caucasian bureaucrats. Some lessons can be drawn in recapitulation. Empirical research has clearly shown that passive representation has substantive eects but, except in a single case, has not established active representation. It has also not established bureaucratic partiality. To establish active representation, as Seldens second part shows, individual bureaucrats seem more promising than organizations as the unit of analysis, although organizations are more appropriate for other purposes. Individual-level but not organizational-level outputs are free of the indirect contribution of focal bureaucrats through their inuence on the decisions of other bureaucrats. The possible indirect contribution of focal bureaucrats through induced changes in client behavior still has to be controlled for. For loan approvals and other applied-for outputs, this would require data on the number of focal-group applications processed by individual bureaucrats. Inability to get this data mars Seldens ndings on loan approvals but not her ndings on publicity eorts because the latter outputs do not appear to be dependent on client behavior. This oers a further lesson: When the needed data for control are not available, use bureaucratic outputs (such as publicity eorts) that are not aected by client behavior instead of outputs (such as loan approvals) that are or may be. With indirect contributions and their sources absent or controlled for, the direct sources of active representation by focal bureaucrats can be unambiguously veried. To verify partiality in particular, it is dicult to avoid looking into the individual bureaucratic black box. A more specic index of partiality is also needed. Selden (1997b, 143) suggests supplementing survey data with personal interviews and observations of bureaucrats. Two nal points are worth noting. One is that the analysis in this section implies that the empirical research on precursors, mainly shared values and beliefs, has established only the potential for substantive eects generally, not the potential for active representation or partiality specically. The other is the paucity of research on the indirect sources of passive representations substantive eects. Hindera and Young (1998, 666) report evidence of black bureaucrats inuence on white bureaucrats in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission oces. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2002) show that women le more sexual assault reports when there are more female ocers in police departments. However, the indirect sources of substantive eects have yet to become a focus of research.
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Normative Denouement: Rejecting Bureaucratic Partiality The classication of the sources of substantive eects helps to overcome the present normative impasse with respect to active representation. Normative debate on active representation, such as there is, focuses on racial minorities. This section follows suit to engage it. It examines the divergence in scholarly opinion and then argues for rejecting bureaucratic partiality. Even before Mosher, Subramaniam cautioned that the bureaucratic representation of conicting group interests would result in a divided and even ineectual bureaucracy and challenges its proponents to explain the process by which a representative bureaucracy becomes responsive to sectional as well as general interests (1967, 1014). What Subramaniam objects to is clearly bureaucratic partiality, which Mosher was soon to call active representation. An interesting aside: Subramaniam directs his objection principally at Long (1952), but as I explained earlier, this is probably unfair. Mosher formulates his objection in terms of the threat that active representation poses to orderly democratic government and the public interest. He also notes the unequal representation of various groups in the bureaucracy, thus clearly implying that active representation by all bureaucrats would not eliminate inequity against minority groups. Amplifying Mosher, Larson (1973) reiterates that it would be a mockery of democratic government if bureaucrats were suered to modify established policy to favor their own group. Also, active representation would not provide a basis for the formulation and administration of policies which served all groups equally. Such policies would have to be based on a set of values and interests which was shared by all administrators, and which took precedence over their more parochial views (Larson 1973, 84). However, subsequent scholars are not persuaded to reject active representation. Thompson (1976, 21819) acknowledges the normative complexity arising from possible gross favoritism (clearly meaning partiality) along sectional lines on the one hand and the appreciable contribution to the representation of minorities on the other. He notes that ones position on active representation depends in part on ones vision of the role of bureaucracy in a democratic state but remains noncommittal. Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh (1977, 88081) note that passive representation can become active and support representative bureaucracypresumably including its active form for aording wider representation of groups in society. Meier (1993a, 2829) only briey notes that active representation is controversial but a fact of life. This appears to indicate resignation or even tacit acceptance. (Is this also the position of those who remain silent?) Selden raises the fundamental issue

 whether active representation is always good since it may conict with notions of bureaucratic neutrality (1997b, 142)note the implication that active representation is partialityand answers it as follows: Based on the ndings of this research, employing minority administrators helps to ensure that minority interests and concerns are taken into consideration. The extent to which one supports the goal of incorporating minority needs and concerns in policies will dictate the extent to which one perceives active representation as benecial. To exclude minorities from participating in public organizations is clearly an injustice. These statements appear to support minority active representation. Thus, there is a normative divide between the early scholars who reject active representation and later scholars who do not reject itin short, between the rejecters and nonrejecters. Importantly, however, both sides generally see active representation as partiality and the only source of passive representations substantive eects. The rejecters oppose partiality for all bureaucrats because of its deleterious eects on orderly democratic government and the public interest. In fact, the point applies regardless of whether government is democratic. The nonrejecters acknowledge this objection but are reluctant to reject partiality by minority bureaucrats because of their belief that it reduces the disadvantage suered by minority groupseven though consistency would require them to allow partiality to other bureaucrats as well. This normative divide has to be claried before it can be addressed. The rejecters objection is surely serious and weighty and one that accords with established principle. Orderly government and the public interest require limits to the commitments (Selznick 1966, 255) that public organizations and their members are allowed to pursue. It matters naught that none of these entities is value neutral. Bureaucrats cannot be allowed, as bureaucrats, to pursue their extraorganizational commitments, however meritorious these may appear to them. Any compromise of this principle damages organization and government alike. From time to time, those committed to certain values have called on public administration (scholars or practitioners) to help remedy their putative neglect. Recent examples include the New Public Administration, the Blacksburg Manifesto, and more unbridled bureaucratic entrepreneurship. For good reason, all these calls have been met with mainstream resistanceor redirected to the political process. Only another variant, bureaucratic partiality toward ones own group arguably has even fewer redeeming

qualities than the others. Certainly, it is no less subject to the same fundamental objection, as the rejecters point out. Yet the nonrejecters have not attempted to refute the rejecters long-standing objection. They merely note the objection and then assert the usefulness of minority active representation for helping minoritieswhich, of course, neither weakens nor answers the objection. The rejecters objection is dicult to refute, which may be why the nonrejecters have not attempted to refute it. Does this mean that the refusal to reject bureaucratic partiality is irrational or without basis? The answer, nevertheless, is no or, at least, not necessarily: The nonrejecters position may rest on a dierent appraisal of costs and benets. They can rationally refuse to reject minority bureaucratic partiality if they see or value its benets to minorities as outweighing its costs to orderly government and the public interestor if they are just not persuaded that the said costs outweigh the said benets. It is more likely that because the nonrejecters do not clearly support bureaucratic partiality, they are just not persuaded that the said costs outweigh the said benets. Contrariwise, the rejecters may be understood thus: They see the costs to orderly government and the public interest as outweighing the benets to minorities. To be sure, no rejecter or nonrejecter has explicitly formulated his or her position in these terms, although Selden clearly implies such a formulation. However, formulation in these terms does no violence to either side. It only claries the opposing positions so that they can be addressed in a rational manner. In fact, the clarication suggests a way out of the normative impasse: Address and reject the nonrejecters position on its own terms (i.e., in terms of the importance and utility of minority bureaucratic partiality for helping minorities). This is where the earlier classication of the sources of substantive eects again proves useful. The classication shows that partiality is only one of several sources of substantive eects. Moreover, unlike partiality, the other sources that have been overlooked by both sides are not objectionable. Indeed, far from threatening orderly democratic government or the public interest, the other sources may well serve these causes better when the bureaucracy is (passively) representative. This should provide considerable relief to the nonrejecters. As noted, the nonrejecters (like the rejecters) not only see active representation as partiality, they also see it as the only source of passive representations substantive eects. Thus, they see the
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choice facing them as a cruel, all-or-nothing one. Rejecting partiality and avoiding its costs to orderly government and the public interest would deprive minorities of all the substantive benets of their passive representation. Keeping these benets by not rejecting partiality would incur the said costs. Reluctant to choose the former, they live with the latter. However, the classication shows that the choice is not so all or nothing: One can decide on the substantive benets from dierent sources separately. It is also far from cruel: The substantive benets from all sources except partiality are free of the said costs and thus exempt from the rejecters objection. Accepting, of course, the cost-free benets, the nonrejecters only have to decide whether to purchase the additional benets from minority bureaucratic partialitybe it noted at the same undiminished price of partiality by all bureaucrats. They should be less hard put and more inclined to decline. Thus far, it has been accepted that minority bureaucratic partiality increases benets to the represented minority group. However, does it really do so? This question may startle, but it arises because minority bureaucratic partiality also entails a heavy price to the minority group itself. What is more, it is this price that should compel the nonrejecters to reconsider their position, even if bureaucratic partiality does no damage to orderly government and the public interest. This price consists of three parts. The rst part may be called the aggravated costs to the minority group. These costs can arise because partiality by minority bureaucrats legitimizes partiality by other bureaucrats and makes them less restrained in discriminating against the minority group. In other words, partiality by minority bureaucrats may increase discrimination against the minority group by other bureaucrats. The second part is the benets forgone by the minority group because of minority bureaucratic partiality. As explained earlier, minority bureaucrats can indirectly produce benets for their social group through their eect on other bureaucrats. These benets are forgone because partiality by minority bureaucrats would reduce and even completely vitiate their eectiveness in making other bureaucrats less biased against the minority group. It is reasonable to suppose that both the aggravated costs and forgone benets of minority bureaucratic partiality have been overlooked because the eects of minority bureaucrats on other bureaucrats have been generally overlooked. The third and perhaps most serious part of the price of minority bureaucratic partiality to the minority group is the benets forgoneor, logically at least, have to be forgoneby the minority group because of another reason. The nonrejection of bureaucratic
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partiality by minority (and therefore all) bureaucrats logically entails forgoing public policy against bureaucratic partiality, and thus the benets to the minority group from the reduction of discrimination by other bureaucrats that could be achieved by public policy. Any person who wants both minority bureaucratic partiality and public policy against partiality by other bureaucrats is simply not consistent, even practicing double standards. As minority bureaucratic partiality has both costs and benets for the represented minority group, the real question is whether it produces any net gain for the minority group. This is a dicult-to-answer empirical question. However, a positive answer is by no means assured. In fact, when other bureaucrats hold not only a higher proportion of positions but also an even higher proportion of senior positions in the bureaucracyas appears to be the typical if not universal casea net loss is far more likely than a net gain. Thus, as a means of helping minorities, minority bureaucratic partiality is highly dubious and most likely self-defeating. Minority bureaucrats would probably serve their social group better by studiously avoiding partiality, as noted earlier. Stretching (actually violating) their role to include partiality toward their own group and enduring role conict (Henderson 1988)more costs but to minority bureaucrats themselvesmay be to little or no purpose, or worse. It follows that Seldens previously quoted assertionthe extent to which one supports the goal of incorporating minority needs and concerns in policies will dictate the extent to which one perceives active representation as benecialis questionable. One can passionately support the stated goal but doubt that active representation (read: partiality) is benecial to it. The nonrejecters position can be formulated and refuted more logically. It is based or dependent on the assumption that discrimination against the minority group by other bureaucratsor the partial behavior of other bureaucratsremains constant. The nonrejecters positive argument follows logically as a result: If so, or all else being equal, minority bureaucratic partiality would add benets for the minority group. This addition, Mosher implies when he notes the vastly unequal strengths of groups in the bureaucracy, is unlikely to come close to fully compensating the minority for the losses it continues to suer from discrimination by other bureaucrats. However, the argument still stands: Some compensation is better than none. The normative argument or justication follows just as logically: Given partiality by other bureaucrats, it would be clearly an injustice (Seldens words and apparent point) to deny partiality to minority bureaucrats.

The nonrejecters position is belied because their assumption does not hold: Minority bureaucratic behavior inevitably relaxes it. And it need not be allowed to hold: Public policy can relax it. The positive argument is defeated because minority bureaucratic partiality entails the three-part price explained earlierunless, of course, this price is exceeded in sum by the benets added, which is most unlikely. The normative argument is vitiated by public policy against bureaucratic partiality. That is to say, it is not an injustice to deny partiality to minority bureaucrats if partiality is also denied to other bureaucrats.

suce to establish active representation (direct sources) or, a fortiori, partiality (the direct source of major normative concern). It also shows that much research remains to be done on both the direct and indirect sources of passive representations substantive eects. The classication also helps to resolve the existing normative impasse. It isolates bureaucratic partiality as the only source of substantive eects that is detrimental to good government. It also shows some of the costs of bureaucratic partiality to the represented minority group and thus helps to round out the case for rejecting bureaucratic partiality. However, the other sources of substantive eects make representative bureaucracy (in the passive sense) more imperative, its possible compromise of merit criteria notwithstanding.

The foregoing formulation clearly points to what should be done: invalidate or relax the nonrejecters assumption in ways that help the minority group. Minority bureaucrats should inuence other bureaucrats to abstain from partialitybut rst they have to abstain from partiality Finally, readers will note the themselves. Public policy against absence of the term active Minority bureaucrats should bureaucratic partiality should be inuence other bureaucrats to representation in the promulgated and, no less classication of the sources of abstain from partialitybut important, eectively enforced. substantive eects. That itself rst they have to abstain from makes a terminological point. Academics matter too (beware): partiality themselves. They aect students or future Since Mosher, scholars have bureaucrats and perhaps also generally dened active public policy. They should stop being nonrejecters and representation (how they have operationalized the play the role assigned by Mosher (1968, 219) term is another matter) as the group-beneting making public administration professionals safe for behavior of focal bureaucratsin eect, all the democracy. direct sources of substantive eectsand misconstrued it as consisting of only one direct In sum, bureaucratic partiality should be clearly source, namely partiality. Even if we take more care denounced, prohibited in practice, and curbed by in using the term, we would need additional terms appropriate measures if it is found to exist, regardless for distinguishing the various sources of substantive of which social group bureaucrats are from or partial eects. But then, when we have specic terms for toward. Both government and minorities would be the various sources, why do we still need the term better served in this way. active representation or the passiveactive distinction? We can speakand speak more Conclusion accuratelyof representative bureaucracy or a This article has sought to clarify and address basic social groups representation in the bureaucracy and deciencies in the study of representative bureaucracy. the various sources of its substantive eects. A better understanding of the sources of passive representations substantive eects seems foundational. References A classication of these sources has been provided that Burke, John P. 1986. Bureaucratic Responsibility. identies partiality, shared values and beliefs, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. empathic understanding as direct sources; check, Hadwiger, Don F. 1973. Experience of Black Farmers restraint, and resocialization as indirect sources that Home Administration Local Oce Chiefs. Public produce eects through other bureaucrats; and Personnel Management 2(1): 4954. demand inducement and coproduction inducement as Henderson, Lenneal J. 1988. Urban Administrators: indirect sources that produce eects through The Politics of Role Elasticity. In Urban Minority represented clients. Administrators: Politics, Policy, and Style, edited by Clarifying the existing empirical research on socalled active representation with the help of this classication yields a more modest but more accurate understanding of the research ndings. It shows that the establishment of substantive eects (resulting from some combination of direct and indirect sources), which research has clearly accomplished, does not
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