PRM ATR Cap130 Ed2009v2

AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500 NDICE GENERAL NDICE
NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES NDICE
1.3.i. PAG 1
VERSIN 00/09 15 JUN 09
NDICE ...................................................................................................................... 1.3.i LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR .................................................................................... 1.3.ii NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND A. GENERAL .......................................................................................... 1.3.1. P.1 B. EXTERNAL WALKAROUND SEQUENCE ................................................. 1.3.1. P.1 B.1. MAIN LEFT LANDING GEAR AND FAIRING ............................... 1.3.1. P.2 B.2. LEFT WING TRAILING EDGE .................................................. 1.3.1. P.2 B.3. LEFT WING LEADING EDGE ................................................... 1.3.1. P.2 B.4. LEFT ENGINE ....................................................................... 1.3.1. P.2 B.5. LEFT FORWARD FUSELAGE .................................................. 1.3.1. P.3 B.6. NOSE .................................................................................. 1.3.1. P.3 B.7. RIGHT FORWARD FUSELAGE ................................................. 1.3.1. P.3 B.8. RIGHT ENGINE ..................................................................... 1.3.1. P.4 B.9. RIGHT WING LEADING EDGE ................................................. 1.3.1. P.4 B.10. RIGHT WING TRAILING EDGE .............................................. 1.3.1. P.4 B.11. MAIN RIGHT LANDING GEAR AND FAIRING ........................... 1.3.1. P.4 B.12. RIGHT AFT FUSELAGE ........................................................ 1.3.1. P.5 B.13. TAIL .................................................................................. 1.3.1. P.5 B.14. LEFT AFT FUSELAGE .......................................................... 1.3.1. P.5 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1.3.2. P.1 B. WEATHER CONDITIONS ...................................................................... 1.3.2. P.2 B.1. PRECIPITATION .................................................................... 1.3.2. P.2 B.2. ICE ...................................................................................... 1.3.2. P.2 B.3. ICING CONDITIONS................................................................ 1.3.2. P.3 B.4. BUILD UP PROCESS ............................................................. 1.3.2. P.3 B.4.1. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SEVERITY OF ICING .......... 1.3.2. P.3 B.4.2. ICE ACCRETION ON THE AEROFOIL........................... 1.3.2. P.4 B.5. TYPES OF ICE....................................................................... 1.3.2. P.4 B.5.1. HOAR FROST ......................................................... 1.3.2. P.4 B.5.2. RIME ICE ................................................................ 1.3.2. P.4 B.5.3. CLEAR ICE ............................................................. 1.3.2. P.5 B.5.4. GLAZE ................................................................... 1.3.2. P.5 B.5.5. MIXED ICE .............................................................. 1.3.2. P.6 B.6. CLASSIFICATION OF ICING SEVERITY...................................... 1.3.2. P.6 B.6.1. TRACE ICING .......................................................... 1.3.2. P.6 B.6.2. LIGHT ICING ........................................................... 1.3.2. P.6 B.6.3. MODERATE ICING ................................................... 1.3.2. P.7 B.6.4. SEVERE ICING ........................................................ 1.3.2. P.7 AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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LINEAS AEREAS
MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500
1.3.i. PAG 2
SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER (CONT.) C. EFFECTS OF ICE ACCRETION ON THE AIRCRAFT ....................................1.3.2. P.7 C.1. GENERAL .............................................................................1.3.2. P.7 C.2. LIFT .....................................................................................1.3.2. P.8 C.3. DRAG ..................................................................................1.3.2. P.9 C.4. PERFORMANCE ....................................................................1.3.2. P.9 C.5. ROLL CONTROL....................................................................1.3.2. P.9 C.6. ELEVATOR CONTROL ............................................................1.3.2. P.9 C.7. FLAPS AFTER ICE ACCRETION .............................................1.3.2. P.10 D. AIRFRAME DE-ICING AND ANTI-ICING, GENERAL PRECAUTIONS ...........1.3.2. P.10 E. DE-ICING / ANTI-ICING FLUIDS ...........................................................1.3.2. P.10 F. HOLDOVER TIME (HOT) ....................................................................1.3.2. P.11 G. PILOT REPORTS ...............................................................................1.3.2. P.13 H. IN-FLIGHT ICE DETECTION.................................................................1.3.2. P.13 I. GROUND PROCEDURES ......................................................................1.3.2. P.14 I.1. SNOW REMOVAL PROCEDURE...............................................1.3.2. P.14 I.2. ON GROUND DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING OPERATIONS ....................1.3.2. P.14 I.2.1. SPECIAL CARE .......................................................1.3.2. P.15 I.2.2. HOTEL MODE DURING DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING PROCEDURE ...........................................................1.3.2. P.15 I.3. RECOMMENDATION S FOR OPERATING FOLLOWING COLD SOAK ..1.3.2. P.16 I.3.1. PROPELLER BRAKE ................................................1.3.2. P.16 I.3.2. COMMERCIAL WATER SUPPLIES ..............................1.3.2. P.16 J. FLIGHT PROCEDURES .......................................................................1.3.2. P.16 J.1. EXTERIOR SAFETY INSPECTION ............................................1.3.2. P.16 J.2. FROST DUE TO CONDENSATION ...........................................1.3.2. P.17 J.3. COCKPIT PREPARATION.......................................................1.3.2. P.17 J.4. TAXI ON CONTAMINATED TAXIWAYS .....................................1.3.2. P.18 J.4.1. BRAKE HEATING BEFORE TAKE-OFF ......................1.3.2. P.18 J.5. TAKE-OFF ..........................................................................1.3.2. P.18 J.5.1. TAKE-OFF IN ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS .......1.3.2. P.19 J.5.2. TAKE-OFF IN GROUND ICING CONDITIONS BUT WITHOUT ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS ..........................1.3.2. P.19 J.5.3. FLUID TUPE II AND FLUID TYPE IV PARTICULARITIES ....1.3.2. P.20 J.6. FLIGHT PROFILE IN ICING CONDITIONS ..................................1.3.2. P.20 J.6.1. PROCEDURES IN ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS......1.3.2. P.21 J.6.2. PROCEDURES AT FIRST VISUAL INDICATION OF ICE ACCRETION.....................................................1.3.2. P.21 J. 6.3. END OF ICE ACCRETION BUT STILL IN ICING CONDITIONS.................................................1.3.2. P.22 J.6.4. LEAVING ICING CONDITIONS ...................................1.3.2. P.22 J.6.5. AIRCRAFT CHECKED CLEAR OF ICE ........................1.3.2. P.23 AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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1.3.i. PAG 3
VERSIN 01/09 25 OCT 10
SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER (CONT.) J.7. PROCEDURES FOLLOWING APM ALERTS ............................. 1.3.2. P.23 J.7.1. CRUISE SPEED LOW (BLUE) .................................. 1.3.2. P.23 J.7.2. DEGRADED PERF (AMBER) .................................. 1.3.2. P.23 J.7.3. INCREASE SPEED (AMBER) .................................... 1.3.2. P.23 J.7.4. APM ALERT RELATED PROCEDURES ..................... 1.3.2. P.24 J.8. LANDING ............................................................................ 1.3.2. P.24 J.9. PARKING ............................................................................ 1.3.2. P.25 J.10. PERFORMANCE................................................................. 1.3.2. P.25 J.10.1. MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS ....................................... 1.3.2. P.25 J.10.2. PERFORMANCE IMPLICATION................................ 1.3.2. P.25 J.10.3. BEST CLIMB GRADIENT SPEED ............................ 1.3.2. P.26 K. SEVERE ICING.................................................................................. 1.3.2. P.26 K.1. GENERAL .......................................................................... 1.3.2. P.26 K.2. CONDITIONS FOR FORMATION ............................................. 1.3.2. P.26 K.2.1. MECHANICAL PHENOMENON: DROPLET DIAMETER . 1.3.2. P.26 K.2.2. THERMAL PHENOMENON: SKIN TEMPERATURE AND/OR LIQUID WATER CONTENT ...................................... 1.3.2. P.27 K.2.3. MIXED ICING CONDITION ....................................... 1.3.2. P.27 K.3. CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ICE ACCRETION ....................... 1.3.2. P.27 K.4. DETECTION ........................................................................ 1.3.2. P.27 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER HOT WEATHER A. EFFECTS OF HEAT AND HUMIDITY ON THE AIRCRAFT ............................ 1.3.3. P.1 B. BEFORE ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT ...................................................... 1.3.3. P.1 C. BEFORE STARTING ENGINES / STARTING ............................................. 1.3.3. P.1 C.1. AIR CONDITIONING ............................................................... 1.3.3. P.2 C.2. OVBD VALVE OPERATION ON GROUND ................................ 1.3.3. P.2 D. AFTER STARTING ENGINES / TAXI ....................................................... 1.3.3. P.3 E. TAKE-OFF.......................................................................................... 1.3.3. P.3 F. CRUISE.............................................................................................. 1.3.3. P.3 G. LANDING ........................................................................................... 1.3.3. P.3 H. BEFORE LEAVING THE AIRCRAFT AND TRANSITS .................................. 1.3.3. P.4 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION ............................................................... 1.3.4. P.1 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATIONS IN WIND CONDITIONS OPERATION IN WIND CONDITIONS............................................................ 1.3.5. P.1 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER WINDSHEAR A. WINDSHEAR RECOVERY PROCEDURE AT TAKE-OFF ............................. 1.3.6. P.1 B. WINDSHEAR RECOVERY PROCEDURE DURING AN APPROACH ............... 1.3.6. P.1 C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ................................................................. 1.3.6. P.1
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1.3.i. PAG 4
SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER LIGHTNING STRIKES LIGHTNING STRIKES................................................................................1.3.7. P.1 SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER VOLCANIC ASH A. VOLCANIC ASH DESCRIPTION..............................................................1.3.8. P.1 B. AVOIDANCE .......................................................................................1.3.8. P.1 C. DETECTION ........................................................................................1.3.8. P.1 D. EFFECTS ON POWERPLANT .................................................................1.3.8. P.1 E. EFFECTS ON THE AIRFRAME AND EQUIPMENT .......................................1.3.8. P.2 SPECIAL PROCEDURES PRNAV OPERATIONS A. PRE-FLIGHT .......................................................................................1.3.9. P.1 A.1. OPERATIONAL APPROVAL .....................................................1.3.9. P.1 A.2. IDENTIFICATION PAGE ...........................................................1.3.9. P.1 A.3. POSITION REFERENCE PAGE .................................................1.3.9. P.1 B. REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE (RNP) AND ACTUAL NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE VALUES ......................................1.3.9. P.2 C. RAIM CHECKS ..................................................................................1.3.9. P.3 C.1. RAIM AT DESTINATION ........................................................1.3.9. P.3 D. NORMAL PROCEDURES.......................................................................1.3.9. P.5 D.1. SID ACCEPTANCE AND CLIMB GRADIENT ...............................1.3.9. P.5 D.2. CRUISE AND DESCENT PATH .................................................1.3.9. P.5 D.3. COURSE DEVIATION INDICATIONS ..........................................1.3.9. P.5 D.4. FLIGHT DIRECTOR INDICATIONS .............................................1.3.9. P.5 E. CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES ..............................................................1.3.9. P.5 F. APPROACH SCRATCHPAD ANNUNCIATIONS ..........................................1.3.9. P.6 G. GPS STATUS ANNUNCIATIONS ...........................................................1.3.9. P.6 H. HT1000 MESSAGES ...........................................................................1.3.9. P.7 H.1. ALERTING MESSAGES ...........................................................1.3.9. P.7 H.2. ADVISORY MESSAGES ........................................................1.3.9. P.10
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR
NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR
1.3.ii. PAG 1
Pgina 1.3.i. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 1.3.ii. p.1 p.2 1.3.1. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 p.5 p.6 1.3.2. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 p.5 p.6 p.7 p.8 p.9 p.10 p.11 p.12 p.13 p.14 p.15 p.16 p.17 p.18 p.19 p.20 p.21 p.22 p.23 p.24 p.25 p.26 p.27 p.28
Fecha 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09
Pgina 1.3.3. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 1.3.4. p.1 p.2 1.3.5. p.1 p.2 1.3.6. p.1 p.2 1.3.7. p.1 p.2 1.3.8. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 1.3.9. p.1 p.2 p.3 p.4 p.5 p.6 p.7 p.8 p.9 p.10 p.11 p.12
Fecha 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 15 JUN 09 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10 25 OCT 10
Pgina
Fecha
B - indica Pgina en Blanco
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR
1.3.ii. PAG 2
INTENCIONADAMENTE EN BLANCO
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LINEAS AEREAS
NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND
1.3.1. PAG 1
1.3.1. EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

A. GENERAL
The exterior inspection is primarily a visual check to ensure that the overall condition of the A/C, the visible components and equipments are safe for the flight. It is normally performed by maintenance or in the absence of maintenance by the CM2 before each originating flight. During this inspection, CM2 has to check: Cabin inspection (safety device, emergency exit, holds, smoke detector, door). Overall condition of the aircraft. Visible components. The equipment for the flight. Aircraft clear of frost, ice, and snow. Control Surfaces and Flaps: observe that the surfaces are clear and memorize surface position to compare with command levers position. Check hydraulic or fuel leaks (specially puddles on the ground) State of tyres brakes and shock absorbers. Access doors closed and latched. When external inspection is completed, CM2 returns to cockpit.
B. EXTERNAL WALKAROUND SEQUENCE
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1.3.1. PAG 2
B.1. MAIN LEFT LANDING GEAR AND FAIRING PARKING BRAKE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE CHECK ................................................... 1600 PSI MIN MAINTENANCE DOORS .................................................... CLOSED GEAR DOORS ...................................................................... CHECK WHEELS AND TIRES................................................... CONDITION BRAKE TEMPERATURE SENSORS ................................... CHECK BRAKE WEAR DETECTORS .............................................. CHECK LANDING GEAR STRUCTURE ........................................... CHECK HYDRAULIC LINES.............................................................. CHECK WHEEL WELL ...................................................................... CHECK UPLOCK ................................................................................. OPEN On ground, the landing gear uplock box in a closed position leads to the red local UNLK alarm in the cockpit. The uplock box can be opened by pulling the landing gear emergency extension handle. Then, replace it in its initial position. FREE FALL ASSISTER.................................................. REMOVED SAFETY PIN ......................................................................... CHECK BEACON LIGHT ................................................................... CHECK AIR CONDITIONING PANEL ............................................ LOCKED PACK RAM AIR INLET ...................................................... CLOSED LANDING LIGHT .......................................................... CONDITION TAT PROBE ......................................................................... CHECK MAGNETIC FUEL LEVEL ............................................................. IN B.2. LEFT WING TRAILING EDGE BANANA SEAL .................................................................... CHECK FLAPS .......................................................................... CONDITION EXHAUST NOZZLE .............................................................. CLEAR FLAPS POSITION ................................................................ CHECK AILERON AND TAB ............................................................. CHECK STATIC DISCHARGERS ...................................................... CHECK HORN............................................................................ CONDITION B.3. LEFT WING LEADING EDGE NAV AND STROBE LIGHTS ........................................ CONDITION WING DE-ICING BOOTS.............................................. CONDITION FUEL VENT NACA INLET .................................................... CLEAR MAGNETIC FUEL LEVEL ............................................................. IN ICE DETECTOR ................................................................... CHECK B.4. LEFT ENGINE LEFT COWLING ............................................. CLOSED / LATCHED
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1.3.1. PAG 3
OIL COOLING FLAPS ......................................................... CHECK ENGINE AIR INTAKE............................................................ CLEAR ENGINE DE-ICE BOOTS .............................................. CONDITION SPINNER .............................................................................. CHECK PROPELLER .......... FEATHERED, CONDITION, FREE ROTATION RIGHT COWLINGS ........................................ CLOSED / LATCHED INNER WING LEADING EDGE AND FAIRING ............ CONDITION B.5. LEFT FORWARD FUSELGE WING AND EMERGENCY LIGHTS .............................. CONDITION EMERGENCY EXIT ............................................................ CLOSED AVIONICS VENT OVBD VALVE ............................................. OPEN CARGO DOOR OPERATING PANEL DOOR .................... CLOSED CARGO DOOR ............................................... CLOSED / LATCHED 02 BOTTLE OVERLOAD DISCHARGE INDICATION .......... GREEN ANGLE OF ATACK PROBE ......................................... CONDITION COCKPIT COMUNICATION HATCH ................................... CHECK ICING EVIDENCE PROBE ............................................ CONDITION STATIC PORTS .................................................................... CLEAR PITOT PROBES AND COVERS ..................... CHECK / REMOVED B.6. NOSE WIPERS......................................................................... CONDITION RADOME AND LATCHES ................................................... CHECK NOSE GEAR WHEELS AND TIRES ............................. CONDITION NOSE GEAR STRUCTURE .......................................... CONDITION TAXI LIGHTS ................................................................ CONDITION WHEEL WELL ...................................................................... CHECK SAFETY PIN.................................................................... REMOVED NOSE WHEEL STEERING ........................................... CONDITION HYDRAULIC LINES ...................................................... CONDITION NOSE GEAR DOORS .............................. CONDITION (2 CLOSED) B.7. RIGHT FORWARD FUSELAGE PITOT PROBE AND COVER .......................... CHECK / REMOVED STATIC PORTS .................................................................... CLEAR ANGLE OF ATTACK PROBE ....................................... CONDITION EXTERNAL DC AND AC POWER ACCESS DOORS ......... CHECK EMERGENCY EXIT .............................................................. CHECK EMERGENCY LIGHT .................................................... CONDITION ANTENNAE .......................................................................... CHECK WING LIGHT ................................................................. CONDITION
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1.3.1. PAG 4
B.8. RIGHT ENGINE INNER WING LEADING EDGE AND FAIRING ............ CONDITION LEFT COWLINGS........................................... CLOSED / LATCHED ENGINE AIR INTAKE ........................................................... CLEAR ENGINE DE-ICING BOOTS .......................................... CONDITION SPINNER .............................................................................. CHECK PROPELLER ..........FEATHERED, CONDITION, FREE ROTATION RIGHT COWLINGS ........................................ CLOSED / LATCHED OIL COOLING FLAPS .......................................................... CHECK B.9. RIGHT WING LEADING EDGE WING DE-ICING BOOTS.............................................. CONDITION MAGNETIC FUEL LEVEL ............................................................. IN FUEL VENT NACA INLET .................................................... CLEAR NAV AND STROBE LIGHTS ........................................ CONDITION HORN............................................................................ CONDITION B.10. RIGHT WING TRAILING EDGE STATIC DISCHARGES ........................................................ CHECK AILERON AND TAB ............................................................. CHECK FLAPS .......................................................................... CONDITION EXHAUST NOZZLE .............................................................. CLEAR FLAPS POSITION ................................................................ CHECK BANANA SEAL .................................................................... CHECK B.11. MAIN RIGHT LANDING GEAR AND FAIRING MAGNETIC FUEL LEVEL ............................................................. IN TAT PROBE ......................................................................... CHECK LANDING LIGHT .......................................................... CONDITION AIR CONDITIONING GROUND CONNECTION ................ LOCKED PACK RAM AIR INLET ...................................................... CLOSED REFUELING CONTROL PANEL ACCESS DOOR ............................................. CLOSED / LATCHED GEAR DOORS ...................................................................... CHECK LANDING GEAR STRUCTURE ........................................... CHECK HYDRAULIC LINES.............................................................. CHECK WHEEL WELL ...................................................................... CHECK UPLOCK ................................................................................. OPEN FREE FALL ASSISTER........................................................ CHECK SAFETY PIN ................................................................... REMOVED WHEELS AND TIRES................................................... CONDITION BRAKE WEAR DETECTORS .............................................. CHECK BRAKE TEMPERATURE SENSORS ................................... CHECK AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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1.3.1. PAG 5
REFUELLING POINT ACCESS DOOR ............................... CHECK B.12. RIGHT AFT FUSELAGE VHF ANTENNA .................................................................... CHECK SERVICE DOORS ................................................................ CHECK TAIL PROP AND TAIL SKID ............................................... CHECK OUTFLOW VALVES ..................................................... CONDITION B.13. TAIL FLT CONTROLS ACCESS DOOR .................................... LOCKED VOR ANTENNAE ................................................................. CHECK STABILIZER DE-ICING BOOTS ................................... CONDITION LOGO LIGHTS ..................................................................... CHECK HORNS .......................................................................... CONDITION STABILIZER, ELEVATORS AND TABS ............................. CHECK STATIC DISCHARGERS ..................................................... CHECK FIN, RUDDER AND TAB...................................................... CHECK TAIL CONE, NAV AND STROBE LIGHTS .......................... CHECK VORTEX GENERATORS ..................................................... CHECK B.14. LEFT AFT FUSELAGE WATER SERVICE PANEL ACCESS DOOR ..................... CLOSED TOILET SERVICE PANEL ACCESS DOOR...................... CLOSED CABIN DOOR....................................................................... CHECK ENTRY EMER LIGHT.................................................... CONDITION
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1.3.1. PAG 6
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER
1.3.2. PAG 1
1.3.2. ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

The following information contains guidelines and recommendations in order to achieve a safer ATR operation during wintertime and has been extracted from the following documents: AFM (ATR) FCOM (ATR) BE PREPARED FOR ICING / COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS (ATR) NOTAS TECNICAS (AIR NOSTRUM).
Cold weather operations refer to ground handling, take-offs and landings conducted on surface conditions where frozen moisture is present, these conditions are commonly encountered when the surface temperature is at or below 0C, although frozen moisture may be present and persist at higher temperatures (encountering heavy frozen rain even at ground level with temperatures close to zero, frozen condensation on airframe surfaces in contact with cold fuel). When operating in such conditions, supplementary procedures are required to account for the operational hazards associated with frozen contamination: Performance losses and degradation of the aircrafts handling characteristics caused by contamination of aerodynamically critical surfaces. Ground handling difficulties and performance penalties on take-off and landing caused by the contamination of runways and aircraft movement areas. In all cases it is assumed that the decision to operate the aircraft in cold weather conditions will be based on sound airmanship. The problems associated with icing of the aircraft have not changed and, in principle, deicing and anti-icing procedures have not varied with the introduction of new technology and fluids. The final objective remains the same, an aircraft ready for flight must NOT have ice, snow and/or frost adhering to its critical flying surfaces. The CLEAN AIRCRAFT CONCEPT and the MAKE IT CLEAN, KEEP IT CLEAN rule still applies.
A. INTRODUCTION
From the early stage of aviation, icing has been one of the most frightening atmospheric phenomena. Today it remains a major concern for commuter aircraft particularly during takeoff and landing despite anti-icing and de-icing systems. Due to their flight level and speed, turboprops aircraft fly where icing conditions are most likely to occur. For this reason, pilots of such aircraft must pay attention to clues leading to ice accretion. They must keep in mind that adverse weather conditions play significant causal roles in nearly one third of all aircraft accidents, including general aviation. Weather is a causal factor in some 30% of all aviation accidents, with many due to a lack of weather situational awareness Aircraft icing is a major hazard because it can alter the flight characteristics of an aircraft until it is unable to fly. The effects of ice build-up on aircraft are cumulative. Thus, a pilot encountering icing may have to change his flight procedure or alter his course or altitude in order to maintain safe flight. In extreme cases, two or three inches of ice can form on the AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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1.3.2. PAG 2
leading edge of an aircraft in less than five minutes. One half inch of ice noticeably reduces the lifting ability for an aircraft as well as increases the drag. Ice on aircraft results in the following: Lift of the wings decreases as ice accumulation changes the aerofoil shape. The mass of the aircraft increases due to the added mass of the accumulated ice. The combination of the above conditions increases drag by offering more resistance to the atmosphere. If the propeller accumulates ice, thrust decreases. With an aerofoil changing shape and mass increasing, the stall speed of the aircraft increases. Airflow separation may cause roll control problems. Elevator control may freeze. Ice build-up on engine and air data probes can result in erroneous engine operation or cockpit indications. Ice ingestion by the engine, or inlet flow distortions can cause engine surging or flameouts. Two conditions are needed for a substantial accumulation of ice on an aircraft: The aircraft is flying through visible moisture such as rain or clouds. The temperature of the water drops encountered must be 0C or below. Icing is most heavily concentrated in cumuliform clouds at a range of temperatures from 0 to -10C. Usually from near the freezing level to 5000 feet above the freezing level. However, super cooled water and icing have been encountered in thunderstorms as high as 40000 feet with a temperature of -40C. Icing occurs in layers or stratiform clouds, as well as in cumulus clouds. However, the rate of ice accumulation is not as fast in stratiform clouds. Continuous icing at a slower rate is normally associated with stratus clouds in the range from 0 to -15 C. When water droplets are cooled below the freezing temperature, they are in an unnatural state and turn to ice quickly when disturbed by an aircraft passing thorough them. Liquid water below freezing is called super cooled. Severe icing will occur in rain containing super cooled large droplets (SLD). Droplets that splash or splatter on impact are considered to be large. Pilots must be aware that significant icing conditions may be encountered in climb just prior to reaching VMC on top. This phenomenon may be observed without temperature inversion, but associated with a turbulent layer generated by a moderate windshear. In these conditions, super cooled small droplets may aggregate, generating larger ones.
B. WEATHER CONDITIONS
B.1. PRECIPITATION Precipitation may occur as rain, drizzle, snow, ice pellets or hail. The effect of rain on the visual range from the cockpit is very noticeable. When rain flows over the windshield, the visibility will be reduced. The use of windshield wipers should be kept to a minimum. Heavy snow frequently reduces horizontal flight visibility to zero. Drizzle is often accompanied by fog, haze or smoke, resulting in lower visibility than rain. B.2. ICE Icing is defined by any deposit or coating of ice on an object caused by the impact of liquid hydrometeors usually super cooled. This phenomenon generally occurs first on parts exposed to relative wind (i.e. probes, antennas, leading edge) AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 3
Super cooled water is a physical state where liquid water exists below its normal freezing point without freezing. B.3. ICING CONDITIONS Atmospheric icing conditions: Atmospheric icing conditions exist when OAT on ground and for take-off is at or below 5C or when TAT in flight is at or below 7C and visible moisture in the air in any form is present (such as clouds, fog with visibility of one mile or less, rain, snow sleet and ice crystals). Ground icing conditions: Ground icing condition exist when the OAT is at or below 5C when operating on ramps, taxiways and runways where surface snow, standing water or slush is present. Regulatory requirements: Certification requirements consider droplet sizes up to 50 microns in diameter. No aircraft is certified for flight in conditions with droplets larger than this diameter. However dedicated flight test have linked unique ice accretion patterns to conditions of droplet sizes up to 400 microns. Procedures have been defined in case of inadvertent encounter of severe icing. B.4. BUILD UP PROCESS Ice can form by three processes described below. At least one of them is involved, whatever the weather situation. Super cooled water droplets: Large quantities of super cooled water are present in the atmosphere, basically in clouds and freezing precipitation. Ice deposits on airframe are directly related to super cooled water concentration in atmosphere, size of droplets and precipitation intensity. This phenomenon appears when it is raining in very cold air. Freezing of liquid water: This case occurs when liquid water, at positive temperature remains on exterior parts of the airplane, typically scratch on skin, landing gear case, probes and control surfaces gap. This water is very likely to freeze as soon as the aircraft enters a very low temperature atmosphere after uncompleted snow removal on ground for instance. Sublimation from vapour to ice: This is a transition from the vapour phase directly to the solid phase. This phenomenon is likely to occur outside the clouds in a high moisture atmosphere on an aircraft with particularly cold skin. This case typically happens while aircraft is descending from its cruise flight level. B.4.1. Factors Affecting The Severity Of Icing Icing intensity is directly related to the super cooled water quantity available. In addition, the speed of accretion is linked to the size of the super cooled water droplets, which depends on several factors among them: Cloud type Air in vertical motion Horizontal distribution of water content AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 4
B.4.2. Ice Accretion On The Aerofoil As the aircrafts external shapes are carefully optimized from an aerodynamic point of view, it is no wonder that any deviation from the original lines due to ice accretion leads to an overall degradation of performance and handling, whatever the type. The real surprise comes from the amount of degradation actually involved and the lack of a logical relationship with the type of accretion. B.5. TYPES OF ICE The following classification refers to the aspect of the accretion. It depends on several factors like Quantity of super cooled water droplets (LWC) Size of droplets (diameter and distribution) Environment OAT
B.5.1. Hoar Frost Deposit of ice, which generally assumes the form of scales, needles, feathers or fans and which forms on objects whose surface is sufficiently cooled, to bring about the direct sublimation of water vapour contained in the ambient air. The build-up process is through sublimation, that is to say by direct transformation of vapour to ice. This phenomenon occurs with negative temperatures. Ice accretion appears on ground with a parked plane or in flight, particularly during descent with a cold airplane. Associated weather conditions: On ground: Anticyclonic conditions in winter, with clear night skies and little wind, can cause a sharp drop in ground temperature, which leads to formation of hoar frost on an aircraft parked outside overnight. In flight: Hoar frost can form on an aircraft, which was parked in a cold area and quickly climbs to a warm moist atmosphere. It can also form on an aircraft which has flown in a cold area and quickly descends into a warm moist atmosphere. Air in contact with the cold aircraft skin freezes quickly producing hoar frost. Consequences: Hoar frost generally leads to light icing conditions, with little effects on aerodynamic qualities. Nevertheless introduction of ice crystals dramatically increase the build up process and the accretion, particularly in super cooled cloud layer. In the same way hoar frost accretion could increase the severity of icing in super cooled cloud layer during descent. B.5.2. Rime Ice Rime ice has a milky, opaque appearance. It forms when the liquid water droplets freeze on impact. This usually occurs at lower temperature or when the liquid water content is low. The build-up process is through a fast freezing process of very small, super cooled water droplets in stable clouds layer. This kind of icing builds up on parts exposed to the relative wind. The capture of little air bubbles during the sublimation process gives rime ice its opaque aspect. The accretion grows up forward.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 5
Associated weather conditions: Rime ice builds up in stable clouds layer like As and Ns of cold and warm fronts of polar fronts. Rime ice also builds up in radiation fog at negative temperature in high pressure area in winter. Consequence: Rime ice formations generally conform with the shape of the airfoil leading edge, causing less disruption in the airflow at sufficiently low AOA and therefore fewer handling and performance problems than clear ice. B.5.3. Clear Ice Clear ice can be lumpy and translucent or clear and smooth. The build-up process is through slow freezing of super cooled water droplets in stable or unstable clouds with high liquid water content. The range of temperature allowing this process comes from 0C to -10C. At impact a super cooled water droplet spreads on the airplane skin due to sublimation, conforming plane shapes. No air bubbles are captured during the process giving clear ice a compact texture and a transparent aspect. This kind of icing generally grows up backward, conforming plane shapes or with a double horn shape. Associated weather conditions: Clear ice forms in cloud layers with high liquid water content: Very unstable clouds along cold and warm fronts of polar fronts: CB and very unstable Ac. Orographic lifting: Cb and very unstable Ac The Orographic effect of a range of hills is likely to increase uplift in cloud so that the concentration and size of the super cooled water droplets are increased. Convective clouds and rear of depression, dense fog and St. Due to the high disparity of droplet size inside a cloud layer, ice accretion is a nonhomogeneous process. Thus rime ice and clear ice accrete alternatively forming mixed ice. Consequences: The relatively slow freezing process can lead to the formation of horns and other shapes that can dramatically disrupt airflow and lead to substantial decrements in performance and handling. B.5.4. Glaze Glaze ice is very close in shape, texture and aspect to clear ice. The essential difference lies on the freezing mechanism. A smooth compact deposit of ice, generally transparent, formed by the freezing of super cooled drizzle droplets or rain drops on aircraft skin with a temperature slightly above 0C. The build-up process is through a sublimation process of drizzle or raindrop. At impact a big super cooled water droplet spreads on the aircraft skin due to sublimation, conforming to plane shapes. Glaze could also build up on an aircraft with a very cold skin under rain at positive temperature. In this case, the phenomenon has a short duration. Associated weather conditions: Presence of super cooled precipitations is a regular phenomenon along frontal surfaces: Glaze accretion area is wider under warm front The higher the temperature difference between cold and warm air, the thicker the glaze accretion area Glaze accretion areas are more dangerous in winter than in summer Glaze accretion areas are likely to appear inside occlusions AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 6
In winter on the ground or at low level, freezing rain can form when the rain follows an Anticyclonic period. Air close to the surface in valleys remains very cold, freezing rain is formed when water droplets pass through this layer.
NOTE: Special case is glaze in Cb. Due to lifting currents inside the cloud, super cooled precipitations could strike a plane flying above freezing level from the bottom. Consequences: Glaze is likely to induce severe icing. This type of icing is not only dangerous because the speed of accretion is fast, but also because the entire airframe is affected. In this situation the de-icing system is inefficient. B.5.5. Mixed Ice Mixed ice forms at conditions between rime and clear ice in that it may form horns or other shapes that disrupt airflow and cause handling and performance problems. B.6. CLASSIFICATION OF ICING SEVERITY To standardize the reporting of the severity of icing encounters, 4 levels of icing severity have been defined: Trace icing Light icing Moderate icing Severe icing
NOTE: These definitions are under constant review so the following should be used as a guideline. For the exact definition used by the legislators, check the corresponding requirements. B.6.1. Trace Icing Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation is slightly greater than the rate of sublimation. Pilot action recommendation: Monitor the situation, the icing severity could increase. NOTE: Because its definition implied that it was not hazardous to flight, the term trace ice has been eliminated from latest proposed definitions. B.6.2. Light Icing Light ice indicates that the rate of accumulation is such that occasional use of ice protection systems is required to remove or prevent accumulation (1cm in 15-60 minutes). The rate of accumulation may create a problem if flight is prolonged in this environment (over 1 hour). If in rime conditions, the accumulation on the leading edge appears as a band several centimetres wide. If clear or glaze, roughened edges may start to appear. Pilot action recommendation: This is a potentially hazardous condition. Either activate the ice protection system or exit the conditions.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 7
B.6.3. Moderate Icing Moderate ice indicates that frequent use of ice protection systems is necessary to remove or prevent ice (1cm in 5-15 minutes). Unless actions are taken, substantial amounts of ice will build up on the airfoil. At this intensity, the rate of accumulation may present a problem even with short encounter. Pilot action recommendation: This is a potential hazardous condition. Activate the ice protection system to control ice accretion while exiting the conditions. B.6.4. Severe Icing Severe icing indicates that the rate of accumulation is so fast that ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice (1cm in less than 5 minutes). The crew need to exit this condition immediately. Severe icing is usually a product of clear or mixed icing encounter. Severe icing occurs most frequently in areas where the air has high levels of liquid water or there are very large droplets. Pilot action recommendation: Immediate pilot action is required. Performance and handling may be seriously affected after only a few minutes exposure. Activate the ice protection system and work to exit the conditions immediately.
C. EFFECTS OF ICE ACCRETION ON THE AIRCRAFT

C.1. GENERAL Icing conditions should never be assessed with complacency. Although the aircraft is adequately protected for the most of the encountered cases, any severe icing exposure should be minimized by a correct evaluation and proper avoiding actions. Operations in atmospheric icing conditions require SPECIAL ATTENTION since ice accretion on airframe and propellers SIGNIFICANTLY modifies their aerodynamic characteristics. The primary considerations are as follows: Even small quantities of ice accretion, which may be difficult to detect visually, may be sufficient to affect the aerodynamic efficiency of an airfoil. For this reason, ALL ANTI ICING PROCEDURES and SPEED LIMITATIONS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH as soon as and as long as ICING CONDITIONS are met and even before ice accretion actually takes place. Main effects of ice accretion on airfoils are: Maximum achievable LIFT is reduced For a given angle of attack, LESS LIFT and MORE DRAG are generated. In order to maintain a SAFE MARGIN AGAINST STALL, which will occur at a higher speed when ice accretion spoils the airfoil: The stall warning threshold must be reset to a lower value of angle of attack. The stick pusher activation threshold is lowered accordingly. NOTE: These lowered thresholds are effective when switching horns anti icing ON and illuminating the ICING AOA green caption. NOTE: the lower AOA of stall warning threshold and the lower stick pusher activation threshold defined for icing remain active as long as the ICING AOA caption is illuminated. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 8
Accordingly, the minimum manoeuvre / operating speeds defined for normal (no icing) conditions MUST BE INCREASED. These new minimum speeds are called MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS.
The AIRFRAME de-icing will LIMIT the amount of ice adhering to the airfoil but CANNOT eliminate ALL ICE ACCRETION because of the unprotected elements on the leading edges and the continuous accretion between two consecutive boot cycles. RESIDUAL ICE must be considered, not only during periods when accretion develops, but ALSO AFTER ICING CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN LEFT (continued climb above icing clouds as an example). ICE accretion may also affect the forces required to manoeuvre the flight controls: Rudder forces are not affected Aileron forces are some what INCREASED when ice accretion develops, but remain otherwise in the conventional sense Pitch forces are not affected in flaps 0, 15 and 30 The main effects of ice accretion can be summarised as follows: C.2. LIFT The lift curves are substantially modified compared to clean aircraft; Reduction of lift at a given angle of attack, Reduction of maximum lift, Reduction of maximum lift angle of attack. When the maximum lift capability of the wing decreases by 25%, the actual stall speed is 12% higher than the basic stall speed (clean aircraft). Consequently an iced aircraft flying at a given speed (and thus at a given CL) will have a reduced stall margin either looking at angle of attack (6,5 less margin) or looking at stall speed (12% less margin). More surprising is the fact that the bulk of maximum lift degradation is already present with accretions as small as a few millimetres. A CLmax decrease of 0.5 typically means a stall speed increase of 10kt for an ATR 42 with flaps 15. The ATR 42 wind tunnel test results with single or double horn shapes are consistent with the curves derived from extensive tests carried out on conventional airfoils by the Swedish-Soviet working group on flight safety. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 9
C.3. DRAG The drag polar is also heavily affected: Greater drag at a given angle of attack, Greater drag at a given lift, Best lift/drag ratio at a lower lift coefficient C.4. PERFORMANCE The drag and lift penalties described above give a good idea of the performance impacts that could be expected from ice accretion. Beyond the main phenomenon, other effects should not be underestimated : for example, ice accretion on propeller blades will reduce the efficiency and the available thrust of propeller driven aircraft, ice accretion in the engine air intakes may cause engine flame out. Evidence has shown that unusual accretion patterns located further aft the leading edge, can have an even more adverse effect on performance. On the other hand, ice weight effect will remain marginal when compared to other penalties C.5. ROLL CONTROL Degrading of roll control effectiveness results from flow disruption over the wing ahead of the ailerons, and the controls do not produce the rolling moments associated with a given deflection and airspeed. Aileron snatch (or roll upset) is a condition that results from an imbalance in the sum of aerodynamic forces at an AOA that may be less than wing stall, and that tends to deflect the aileron from neutral position. This situation may be the result of ice formed aft of the de-icing boots. On unpowered controls, it is felt as a change in control wheel force. Instead of requiring force to deflect aileron, force is required to return the aileron to neutral position. With the autopilot engaged, an aileron mis-trim warning could be a tactile cue to flow disruption. Anticipate heavy control forces and disengage the autopilot. Aileron instability sensed as an oscillation, vibration or buffeting in the control wheel is another tactile cue that the airflow is disturbed. C.6. ELEVATOR CONTROL Ice on the stabiliser leading edge reduces stabiliser lift and increases the risk of stabiliser stall. Partial flow separations at the stabiliser may result in unpleasant airplane pitching motions and control column vibrations. When wing flaps are extended a rearward shift of lift is obtained and the nose down pitching increases. Hence, the down load on the stabiliser increases. If there is a risk for stabiliser stall this will increase with increasing flap angles. This problem limits the maximum speed at which flaps can be lowered. Flap extension above the maximum flap speed may result in stabiliser stall. The risk of stabiliser stall increases with increasing speed. In icing conditions the crew may be faced with wing stall if the speed is reduced and stabiliser stall if it is increased. If the stabiliser stalls the flaps should be retracted immediately. Pitching motions, increasing stick forces and control column vibrations are signs of imminent stabiliser stall and the flaps should be retracted. During retraction the airspeed must be increased to avoid a roll upset or wing stall situation to develop. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 10
A strong tactile cue is the illumination of elevator mis-trim warning. Be prepared to counteract stick forces of 25 kg. and disengage the autopilot immediately. If the pitch controls are stuck, accomplish pitch disconnect and try to free one control. If successful, free the other control and reconnect controls. With stuck elevator controls, moving passengers has proved to be a successful method of adjusting pitch. The elevator mis-trim caution could also be an indication of frozen or stuck elevator trim tab. Again, heavy stick forces should be anticipated when disengaging autopilot. Try to free trim tab by moving the elevator trim wheel. Operation of the standby elevator trim will have no effect, the system is just another method of operating the autopilot elevator trim servo and intended for use in situations when manual control of elevator is lost (cable breakage). C.7. FLAPS AFTER ICE ACCRETION Holding with any flaps extended is prohibited in icing conditions (except for single engine operations).
D. AIRFRAME DE-ICING AND ANTI-ICING, GENERAL PRECAUTIONS

The following general precautions must be observed when operating in cold weather conditions: All areas of the upper wings and tail surfaces and their attached control surfaces are considered as critical surfaces and must be free of all contamination. Never assume that dry snow will be removed during take-off roll by action of slipstream. Snow, falling on an aircraft that has recently been removed from a hangar could experience melting and re-freezing. A layer of ice could form on the aircraft surface. Before entering the aircraft the pilot in command or qualified delegate, must complete a thorough inspection of the critical surfaces to determine the extent of contamination, it is necessary to physically touch the surfaces to detect clear ice. After de-icing confirm all surfaces are clear. If the take-off cannot be started before the expiration of the holdover time, the aircraft must again be inspected and de-iced and anti-iced if necessary before attempting takeoff. It is essential to take-off with an aerodynamically clean aircraft. All surfaces of the aircraft (wing, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, flight control surfaces, spoilers and flaps) must be free of frost, ice and snow before take-off.
E. DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING FLUIDS
De-icing is the removal of snow, ice or frost from aircraft surfaces using mechanical means, hot water or heated mixture of water and de-icing fluid. Anti-icing is the application of deicing/anti-icing fluid with a useful holdover time to prevent the accumulation of snow, ice or frost on aircraft surfaces after deicing. Current practice prescribes the following general methods for effecting deicing/anti-icing: Mechanical removal of loose contamination: If a significant amount of loose snow is on the aircraft, the expenses of a large amount of deicing fluid can be avoided if the snow is removed mechanically. Subject to the results of visual and tactile inspection, this may achieve complete deicing of the aircraft. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 11
One-step Deicing/Anti-icing: Fluid is applied in one step to remove frozen contamination and apply a limited anti-ice protection. In this process, the residual fluid film, regardless of type of fluid used, will provide anti-icing protection only for a very limited duration. Two-step Deicing/Anti-icing: Two fluid applications are made: the first to deice using hot water or a water/fluid mixture; the second to anti-ice, using undiluted (100%) fluid or a water/fluid mixture. This method ensures that the full anti-icing holdover time available from the fluid will be obtained. CAUTION: De-icing/anti-icing fluids have not been tested for ice pellet precipitation and holdover tables do not address ice pellet precipitation. When ice pellet precipitation occurs after the application of de-icing/anti-icing fluid, the deicing/anti-icing fluid dilutes, which results in rapid wing contamination. WARNING: Fluids used during ground de-icing are not intended for and do not provide ice protection during flight. The application of de-icing/anti-icing fluid is the most common way of cleaning and protecting the aircraft surfaces. These fluids are classified as follows: Type I Fluids: In concentrated form, these fluids contain glycols to a minimum concentration of 80%, but with no thickening agent. Their resulting low viscosity and very short holdover time provide very limited anti-icing protection. These fluids are especially used for de-icing operations. AIR-NOSTRUM policy is to use Type I Fluids as an anti-icing agent only if no other type of fluid is available. Type II and Type IV Fluids: These fluids contain glycols to a minimum concentration of 50% as well as thickening agents. Their relatively high viscosity permits the application of a layer of fluid that is effective in anti-icing and persists for a significant holdover time to provide anti-icing. During take-off, the slipstream imparts a shear stress to the fluid layer causing it to flow off the surface to which it is applied. AIR-NOSTRUM policy is to use Type II Fluids when available. Type II Fluid can be applied pure (100%) or mixed with water to a minimum concentration of 50/50. Type III Fluids: These are thickened fluids which has properties that lie between Types I and II. Therefore, they provide a longer holdover time than Type I but less than Type II. AIR-NOSTRUM policy is to not use Type III Fluids.
F. HOLDOVER TIME (HOT)

Anti-icing effectiveness, however, is subject to many variables. Of fundamental concern to flight crews is the calculation of the anti-icing holdover time available after de-icing given prevailing conditions and the use of a particular fluid type and concentration. To provide some assistance in this regard, flight crews may find tables located in the QRH, Miscellanea Section that show holdover times for Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV fluids, as influenced by the kind of freezing precipitation present. These tables provide an estimate of the length of time anti-icing fluids will be effective. However, flight crews must remember that these tables do not account for all the factors that influence holdover times. Diverse and individually variable factors such as fluid temperature, relative humidity, wind direction and speed, can significantly shorten the AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 12
holdover times shown in these tables. Therefore, the established times must be adjusted by the pilot-in-command according to weather and other conditions. The estimated time is expressed as a range in the tables and is based upon the type and concentration of the specific fluid, the OAT and the kind and intensity of the precipitation involved. The HOT guidelines are applicable to an aircraft experiencing ground icing conditions and do not apply once an aircraft is airborne. The time that the fluid remains effective is the time from first application of the fluid on a clean wing until such time as ice crystals form or remain in the fluid creating a surface roughness. Holdover time cannot be precisely determined because it depends on many variables. Some of the variables include: prevailing precipitation type, intensity, temperature, wind and humidity. The aircraft type and its configuration, effectiveness of the treatment on surfaces, taxiing direction relative to the wind and jet blast from other aircraft are equally important. The effects of these variables need to be taken into account by the pilot-in-command when establishing the HOT value. Establishing the appropriate HOT time range will require the acquisition of at least the following information: Precipitation Type Precipitation Rate Fluid in use, including, Type and Manufacturer Fluid Dilution OAT Using this information, the pilot-in-command will enter the appropriate HOT table and identify the HOT cell containing the range of times available. The following table comparing light conditions, temperature and visibility is to be used when assessing the precipitation rate in a snowfall. Visibility in Snow Vs Snowfall Intensity Time of Day Darkness Daylight OAT (C) -1 and above Below -1 -1 and above Below -1 Visibility in Snow (Statute Miles) Heavy 1 3/4 1/2 3/8 Moderate > 1 to 2 > to 1 > to 1 > 3/8 to 7/8 Light > 2 to 4 > 1 to 3 > 1 to 3 > 7/8 to 2 Very Light >4 >3 >3 >2
When assessing the precipitation rate for other types of precipitation (freezing drizzle, for example), the pilots do not have at their disposal methods or instruments to measure or otherwise reasonably judge what the precipitation rate is, other than receive information about the measurements taken by qualified meteorological personnel. Even then, the same report may imply a wide range of values. For example, a light freezing drizzle may have a range of values from trace to 1.2 mm/hr of precipitation, or a light freezing rain values from 1.2 to 2.5 mm/hr. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 13
Therefore, the worst case rate must always be assumed and hence the lowest HOT value in the cell, for the conditions, should be chosen. When the time that has expired since the anti-icing was applied is less than the minimum value or is within the range of time of the HOT cell chosen by the pilot-in-command for the conditions present, there is a requirement to conduct an inspection immediately prior to take-off. This inspection will be conducted from within the aircraft and may be an inspection of one or more of the representative surfaces of the aircraft and must be conducted within five minutes prior to the beginning of the take-off roll, except when Type I fluids are used. Due to the short HOT times of Type I fluid, the five minute interval prior to take-off is not considered acceptable. Therefore this procedure shall only be used when using Type II, III or IV fluids and the pertinent minimum HOT equals or exceeds 20 minutes. If the inspection cannot be performed from inside, the five minute window has been surpassed or the time elapsed since the fluid was applied is greater than the largest value in the range of time chosen for the conditions present, then an inspection of the critical surfaces prior to take-off must be performed. This inspection must be conducted from outside the aircraft. If either inspection shows signs of icing or fluid degradation, the inspection (either internal or external) cannot be performed, more than five minutes has passed since the inspection and take-off has not commenced or in doubt, the aircraft must return for de/anti-icing. The HOT tables have not been assessed for all meteorological conditions, for example: snow or ice pellets, hail, moderate and heavy freezing rain, heavy snow have not been assessed.
G. PILOT REPORTS
Pilot reports are very useful in establishing a heightened sense of awareness to a possible icing condition and to aid forecasters in correlating forecast meteorological data with actual ice, Although a forecast projects what may be, and a pilot report chronicles what was, the most important issue is: what is the icing condition right now? In flight meteorological conditions reported by the crew of one airplane may not reflect the hazards of that same airspace for other airplanes, because of the many variables involved. The variables include the size and type of the airplanes. Airfoil, configuration, speed, AOA, etc. If the reporting airplane was a large transport, the effect of icing may have been unnoticed and unreported, but the conditions could be a problem for a smaller airplane. Pilot reports from an identical model airplane are most likely to be more useful, but even the identical model airplane climbing through and icing layer would likely result in a different ice accretion than one descending. Descriptions of the severity will be subjective, and based upon the experience level of the pilot. Air Nostrum pilots will always report when severe icing conditions have been encountered. It is important not to understate the conditions or effects of the icing observed.
H. IN-FLIGHT ICE DETECTION

When the aircraft enters in ice accretion area, ice builds up on airframe. Three devices are provided to detect such a situation: Ice Evidence Probe (IEP) (the primary means): This component is located near the cockpit left side window. When encountering ice accretion, ice builds up on the leading edge of this probe allowing visual detection. An integrated light, controlled by the NAV LIGHT switch, has been included for night operations. Ice accretion may also be
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 14
detected on windshield, airframe (leading edges), wipers and side windows. Ice Detector The ice detector electronic sensor is located under the left wing and alerts the crew with a single chime, a master caution and an icing amber light as soon as ice accretion is sensed. If ice accretion is detected with horns anti-icing and/or airframe deicing still OFF, the icing light will flash until the crew selects both anti-icing and de-icing systems ON. The icing light remains steady ON as long as ice builds upon the aircraft. Enhanced Ice accretion monitoring with the APM: ATR has developed the APM to enhance the Severe Icing conditions detection. This system includes low speed warning devices that enhances crew awareness, in case of severe icing threat. Icing drastically decreases the aircrafts performance, an abnormal drag increase can be due to ice accretion on the aero dynamic surfaces of the aircraft. Monitoring aircraft performance is thus an efficient means of ice detection.
I. GROUND PROCEDURES
I.1 SNOW REMOVAL PROCEDURE Before de-icing, ground staff has to sweep or blow off the snow layer. Check that ground staff: Pays attention to antennas, probes and vortex generators and avoids walking on no step areas. Starts from the various hinge points to avoid snow accumulation. Removes snow from engine air intakes, propeller blades, landing gears and brakes. I.2. ON GROUND DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING OPERATIONS ATR aircraft can be de-iced and anti-iced both at the parking area and at the holding point, with engine running in hotel mode and bleeds OFF. If a procedure is initiated at the parking area it is recommended to observe the following points: Check that all doors and emergency exits are closed. The aircraft shall be placed facing into the wind, engines not running. Apply parking brakes and install wheel chocks. CAUTION: Maintain the control column at full forward position during whole operation and engage gust lock. CAUTION: Wing, tail plane, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, all control surfaces and flaps should be clear of snow, frost and ice before take off. External de-icing / anti-icing will be performed as close as possible from take-off time in order not to exceed the hold over time. CAUTION: The type II/IV fluids are used for their anti icing qualities. As airflow increases the fluid is spread through the elevator gap and over the lower surface of the elevator. Depending on the brand of the fluid and the OAT, this phenomenon may temporarily change the trim characteristics of the elevator by partially obstructing the elevator gap. This may lead to a considerable increase in control forces necessary to rotate. This effect is most pronounced when centre of gravity is forward. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 15
To ensure the best possible tail plane de icing / anti icing, all along the fluid spraying, the pitch wheel must be firmly maintained on the forward stop together with the aileron gust lock engaged. De icing/anti icing may be performed in Hotel mode provided BLEEDS are selected OFF. If a de-icing gantry is used, both engines must be shut down. For manual propeller deicing, the engines must be shut down and air intake blanked or precautions taken not to have de-icing fluid enter the air intake. No propeller blade should be located at the 6 oclock position during this procedure. Proceed as follows: Set platform to suitable height so that the ground staff is above the surface to be treated. The spray must be applied at a low angle (less than 45 degrees). De-icing or anti-icing of horizontal stabilizer must be performed with the elevators at full downwards position. On the various fairing and fillets, the de-icing or anti-icing fluid should not be sprayed at pressure higher than 1,5psi (0,103 bar). On the other parts, the pressure of the sprayed fluid should not exceed the pressure recommended by the fluid manufacturer. I.2.1. Special Care De-icing or anti-icing of the fuselage: Avoid as much as possible direct spraying on the windshields and windows. De-icing or anti-icing of airfoil and control surfaces: Start de-icing/anti-icing by filling the gap between fixed and movable surfaces in order to avoid accumulation of contaminant, then proceed from the leading edge backward. CAUTION: special care must be paid to the gaps between: Wings/ailerons/tabs Horizontal stabilizer/elevators/ tabs Rudder/vertical stabilizer/tab These gaps must be clear of any contamination and must be checked after any deicing or anti-icing procedure. De-icing of landing gear: Prevent fluid contact with shock absorbers. Avoid de-icing or anti-icing fluid entering brake unit. Pay particular attention to proximity switches. De-icing of propellers: Propeller covers should be used when possible. In order to avoid any de-icing fluid ingress in the engine air intakes, no propeller blade should be in front of the air intake or the air intake cover should be installed. In case of air intake de-icing fluid ingestion, the area must be wiped up. I.2.2. Hotel Mode During De-Icing / Anti-Icing Procedure Hotel Mode is specific to ATR. It allows the aircraft to be de-iced while the right engine is running with the propeller stopped and bleed air valve off. Thus the ATR could be de-iced and anti-iced like jet aircraft at the holding point Air intake and wing snow removal, and propeller de-icing must be performed prior to hotel mode activation.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 16
Hotel mode de-icing/anti-icing procedure can be conducted provided: De-icing/anti-icing gantry is not used, Manual procedures are applied (with a de-icing nozzle from a movable platform) to avoid any inadvertent entry of fluid into engines, naca ports, air conditioning inlets, static ports, pitot probes, temperature sensors, and engine 2 bleed air valve off. I.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPERATING FOLLOWING COLD SOAK Preparation and operation of the aircraft following cold soak in very low temperatures requires particular precautions. The following recommendations, which complement normal operating instructions, should be observed when applicable. I.3.1. Propeller Brake Avoid immobilisation of the aircraft with propeller brake engaged if severe cold soak is expected (temperature <= -20C for a prolonged time). I.3.2. Commercial Water Supplies Water draining requirements are summarized in the table: CONFIGURATION AIR COND ON CABIN TEMP Above 10C OAT Between 0 & -15C Below -15C Between 0 & -7C OFF Between -7 & -15C Below -15C EXPOSURE TIME ANY 1h 15 min 1h 30 min 0h 45min ANY REQUIRED WATER TANK DRAIN NOT REQUIRED
After required draining, refilling should be performed 10 min before ENG START with warm water (30C)
J. FLIGHT PROCEDURES
J.1. EXTERIOR SAFETY INSPECTION A specific exterior inspection must be performed for cold weather operation. Thus, the crew must check the following parts of aircraft before flight: Engine inlets Engines cowling and draining Propellers Pack inlets Landing gear assemblies Landing gear doors Pitot, and static vents Angle of attack sensors Fuel tank vents
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 17
All these external parts and following surfaces must be clear of ice or frost or snow: Fuselage Wings Vertical and horizontal stabilizer Control surfaces
If the crew detects ice or pollution on any surface, de-icing and anti-icing procedures are required. J.2. FROST DUE TO CONDENSATION Light hoar frost can appear under fuel tanks with winter Anticyclonic conditions and light wind. This phenomenon is induced by a difference of temperature between wing skin and fuel inside tanks. NOTE: Takeoff is only possible with no more than 2 millimetres of frost under wings. The rest of the aircraft must be totally clear of frost. Takeoff must be performed with atmospheric icing speeds and performance penalties must be applied. It is the Captains responsibility to assess the under surface of the wings before initiating a takeoff with the under surface polluted. J.3. COCKPIT PREPARATION Apply normal procedures plus the following items: Provided air intake and both pack inlets are free of snow, frost, ice Start engine 2 in Hotel Mode In order to quickly improve cabin warm up, select the overboard valve to full close position. With this position selected, the overboard valve drives hot avionics cooling flow to the cabin, thus increasing quickly cabin temperature. Before each flight the crew must select permanent anti-icing ON (LEVEL 1). Probes and front windshield are then heated to prevent ice building up. NOTE: Starting on aircraft batteries is possible without special precautions down to -15C / 5 F. For cold soak at significantly lower temperatures, it is recommended to remove the batteries and keep them in heated storage. NOTE: When starting the engine in extremely cold conditions: Start up time is slightly increased, Oil pressure raising time is considerably increased: OIL LO PRESS red warning may be activated for 60 seconds, After the initial increased raising time, OIL PRESS will be higher than usual (up to 70 PSI) FOR SEVERAL MINUTES, Propeller unfeathering may not occur normally. If NP does not increase correctly, revert to FEATHER position until oil temperatures above 0C. NOTE: PL motion above FI is only allowed when OIL TEMP is at or above 0C. This warm up time may take up to 4 minutes when OAT is -35C / - 31F. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 18
NOTE: During cockpit preparation, both packs should be used to warm up cabin and cockpit whilst running engine 2 in hotel mode Using gust lock stop power with HI FLOW selected (together with all doors, particularly cargo, closed) is recommended for warm up with OAT below -15C/5F NOTE: Below -15C/5F, several equipment (e.g. fuel flow, pressurization ind., ADU/AFCS control box) may be not working INITIALLY, but should automatically recover as cabin and cockpit warm up takes place and compartment temperature rises. J.4. TAXI ON CONTAMINATED TAXIWAYS The standard TAXI procedure may still be used provided the friction coefficient remains at or above 0,3 (braking action medium, snowtam code 3) and nose wheel steering is not used with too large deflections. However, it is recommended to use both engines: To avoid skidding by using differential power when friction coefficient is low (especially when OAT is very low). To allow a good warm-up of Eng #1 before takeoff. NOTE: If the OAT is very low, it may be necessary to start up Eng #1 early enough to get the necessary oil warm up time. For taxiing with the very low friction coefficients (icy taxiways, slush), it is recommended to use both engines, limit nose wheel travel and use differential power as necessary NOTE: Single engine taxi will not be performed in following cases: Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) are in force When taxing in ground icing conditions When wind blows more than 20 kts. J.4.1. Brakes Heating Before Take-Off If contaminant layer is significant enough to possibly accumulate in the brake area during ground operation, brakes disks may block due to icing during the flight, leading to possible tyre damage at subsequent landing. The following special procedure should be applied during taxi before and as close as possible to take off: Set 18% torque on each engine and keep taxi speed down to a man pace during 30 seconds using normal brakes with minimum use of nose wheel steering to ensure a symmetrical warming up of the brakes J.5. Take-Off Icing conditions and contaminated runways introduce operational constraints. Thus to ensure both safety and payload maximization on take-off crew have to focus on some important points. Take-offs on contaminated runways are not recommended when: Crosswind component exceeds 15 knots. Standing water is more than 12.7 millimetres (0.50 inch) in depth. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 19
Slush is more than 12.7 millimetres (0.50 inch) in depth. Wet snow is more than 25.4 millimetres (1.00 inch) in depth. Dry snow is more than 76.2 millimetres (3.00 inch) in depth. Standard take-off procedures will be used with the following additions: If runway is contaminated (ice, snow, slush), use the relevant performance penalties. Use of reverse on contaminated runways has to be limited at very low speeds to avoid contaminant projections at the level of cockpit windshield which may reduce visibility to zero (snow, slush). In atmospheric icing condition, refer to appropriate speeds and performance penalties and add the following: With very cold OAT, delay start of take-off roll until oil temperature is at least 45C. J.5.1.Take-off In Atmospheric Icing Conditions When taking-off in atmospheric icing conditions the crew must select anti-icing ON to prevent ice accretion on airframe. As soon as anti-icing is ON, confirmed by the ICING AOA light ON, the crew must monitor speed to stay in the flight envelope. Furthermore, take-off speeds are to be increased while ICING AOA light is ON, leading to performance reduction. The take-off sequence is assumed to last until the aircraft has reached 1500 ft AGL or acceleration altitude whichever occurs later. Once the take-off sequence is completed and when the icing conditions are met, the antiicing AND de-icing systems are switched ON and the icing speeds are set. The take-off performance, and the payload are thus maximized. The anti-icing procedure is: PROPELLER 1 & 2 ANTI-ICING .................................................. ON HORNS ......................................................................................... ON SIDE WINDOWS .......................................................................... ON J.5.2. Take Off In Ground Icing Conditions But Without Atmospheric Icing Conditions In these conditions, contaminant may adhere to wheels brakes when taxiing on contaminated ramps, taxiways and runways and, ice may form on the blades induced by the projection of contaminants such as slush or snow. In this case, the crew has to select propeller anti-icing only and, thus, take-off performance is maximised. Furthermore, landing gear must be cycled after take-off to avoid ice accretion on rods and paddles. The anti-icing procedure is: Before Take-off: PROPELLER ANTI-ICING ONLY ................................................ ON After Take-off: LANDING GEAR (if possible) .............................................. CYCLE PROPELLER ANTI-ICING ONLY ............................ AS REQUIRED NOTE: Take off may be scheduled using normal minimum V2=1.13 Vs AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 20
CAUTION: Horns anti icing must not be selected ON to avoid lowering AOA of the stall warning threshold NOTE: Landing gear cycling after take-off with a significant layer of contaminant on the runway (slush, snow) is highly recommended to avoid brakes freezing especially if the procedure Brakes Heating Before Take-Off has not been followed for any reason. J.5.3. Fluid Type II And Fluid Type IV Particularities High stick forces may occur after fluid type II&IV de-icing/ anti-icing procedure. These control forces may be more than twice the normal take-off force. This should NOT be interpreted as a pitch jam leading to an unnecessary abort decision above V1. Although not systematic, this phenomenon should be anticipated and discussed during pre-takeoff briefing each time de-icing/anti-icing procedures are performed. These increased pitch forces are strictly limited to the rotation phase and disappear after takeoff. In very exceptional circumstances, because of increased rotation forces, the pilot can consider that takeoff is impossible and consequently initiate an aborted. AFTER V1, BE TAKE OFF MINDED To handle this problem, two methods are described: Method 1: This method applies to a crew who has not received a specific training. In this case the crew applies the standard takeoff procedure, but TOD, TOR and ASD are increased by 25%. Method 2: This method applies to a crew who has received specific training. In this case, the crew has to perform a specific briefing to review possible increase stick force at rotation. If this happens, the Captain request the first officers assistance. He orders PULL and the first officer will pull the control wheel until pitch reaches 5. Proceeding in such a way minimizes takeoff penalties. With this method only 70m are added to the takeoff distance. J.6 FLIGHT PROFILE IN ICING CONDITIONS The following table is a sum-up of the different procedures for flight in atmospheric conditions: CONDITIONS Speeds Icing Light ON (2) Icing AOA Light ON (3) Protection Level (4) Non-Icing Conditions Normal NO NO 1 Entering Icing Conditions Icing NO YES 1&2 1st Visual Indication of Ice Accretion
(1)
Leaving Icing Conditions Icing NO YES 1
When Aircraft Visually Clear of Ice Normal NO NO 1
Icing YES YES 1, 2 & 3
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 21
NOTE (1): This situation is applicable for as long as the aircraft remains in icing conditions. NOTE (2): ICING amber light will come ON when the Ice Detector senses ice accretion and remain steady ON for as long as ice builds up. The light will flash if the aircraft anti-icing and de-icing systems are not ON and will remain flashing until the crew selects both systems ON. NOTE (3): ICING AOA green light will come ON when one or both Horns pushbuttons are to ON alerting the crew that the stall threshold alarm has been decreased. Normal stick shaker threshold with flaps 0 is set to approximately 12 AOA, when ICING AOA light is ON, the threshold is reduced to approximately 7. NOTE (4): Protection Level 1 corresponds to the Permanent Protection, Level 2 to Anti-icing Protection and Level 3 to De-Icing Protection. J.6.1. Procedures In Atmospheric Icing Conditions During operations with AP ON during climb and descent, vertical speed mode should not be used unless the airspeed is carefully monitored. The suggested procedure is to use IAS mode with a speed selected which is equal to, or greater than, the appropriate minimum speed (VmLB or VmHB) in accordance with the BANK selection on the autopilot). CAUTION: Close attention should be paid to the appearance of an AILERON MISTRIM message flashing on the ADU: If the message appears, apply the AILERON MISTRIM procedure. As soon as, and as long as, atmospheric icing conditions exist, the following procedures must be applied (applicable to all flight phases, including take-off): ANTI-ICING (propellers, horns, side windows) ........................ ON MODE SEL .............................................................................. AUTO Minimum Manoeuvre/Operating Icing Speed............................................... BUGGED & OBSERVED ICE ACCRETION ............................................................. MONITOR CAUTION: Horns anti-icing selection triggers illumination of the ICING AOA green light and lowers the AOA stall warning threshold. J.6.2. Procedures At First Visual Indication Of Ice Accretion At first visual indication of ice accretion and as long as atmospheric conditions exist, the following procedure must be applied: ANTI-ICING (propellers, horns, side windows) ...... CONFIRM ON MODE SEL ................................................................. CONFIRM ON ENG DE-ICING ............................................................................. ON AIRFRAME DE-ICING .................................................................. ON Minimum Manoeuvre/Operating Icing Speed............................. CONFIRM BUGGED & OBSERVED AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 22
CAUTION: Flight crew must remain alert to severe icing detection. In the case that severe icing is encountered, the Severe icing Emergency Checklist must be applied. When flying in icing conditions, the flight crew must consider the following: When ice accretion is visually observed, DE ICERS MUST BE SELECTED and maintained ON as long as icing conditions exist. Ice detector may also help the crew to determine continuous periods of ice accretion as the ICING amber light remains illuminated as long as the ice detector senses ICE ACCUMULATING. However, the ice detector may not detect certain ice accretion form. If a noticeable performance decrease and (or) significant vibrations occur due to propeller residual icing then, in order to improve the de icing of the blades, it is recommended: To check that the MODE SEL is AUTO, or that the MAN mode is selected in accordance with SAT To set CLs on 100 OVRD for continuous periods of not less than 5 minutes in order to benefit from an increased centrifugal effect. If ice accretion is seen by the detector with HORNS ANTI -CING and/or AIRFRAME DE-ICING still OFF, the ICING light will flash until corrective actions are taken. Engines de-icing must be selected ON prior to airframe de-icing to take benefit of an immediate engines de-icing. If not, engines de-icing will be effective 60 or 240 seconds later depending on MODE SEL selection. J.6.3. End Of Ice Accretion But Still In Icing Conditions In icing conditions, even if ice accretion stops, CREW MUST MAINTAIN ANTI-ICING AND DE-ICING ON (LEVEL 2 AND 3) for many reasons: To anticipate further ice accretion areas To keep aircraft in the flight envelope (due to ice on airframe, aerodynamic characteristics could change). NOTE: The blue memo de-icing light will flash 5 minutes after the last detection of ice accretion by the ice detector. This must be disregarded and de-icing systems must remain ON until icing conditions are left. J.6.4. Leaving Icing Conditions The flight crew can consider that they have left icing conditions when: Total Air Temperature (TAT) is above 7C, and/or Aircraft is flying without visible moisture When leaving icing conditions, the crew will select anti-icing and de-icing systems OFF and CONTINUE FLYING WITH ICING AOALIGHT ON UNTIL AIRCRAFT IS CHECKED CLEAR OF ICE. NOTE: The DE ICING blue light on memo panel will blink if de-icers are still ON more than 5 minutes after ice detector has stopped to signal ice accretion ( ICING amber light OFF). AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 23
J.6.5. Aircraft Checked Clear Of Ice As soon as conditions are recovered (temperature, visibility), airframe condition must be monitored. If IEP (Ice Evidence Probe) is checked clear of ice, then depress ICING AOA light. Experience has shown that the IEP is the last part of the aircraft to be cleared of ice. As long as this condition is not reached, the icing speeds must be observed and the ICING AOA caption must not be cancelled When ICING AOA light is OFF, normal flight conditions are recovered and normal operating speeds must be applied J.7 PROCEDURES FOLLOWING APM ALERTS APM and its associated alerts are additional means to detect the ice accretion, but do not replace the general methodology for flight in icing conditions. The APM calculates, during the flight, the aircrafts actual performance and compares them with the expected ones. It also computes the actual minimum icing and severe icing speeds for the given flight condition. The APM is activated in icing conditions, i.e. when icing AOA is illuminated, or if the airframe de-icing is activated, or if ice accretion has been detected. It alerts the crew of a risk of severe icing condition, through three different levels of signals: Cruise Speed Low Degraded Performance Increase Speed J.7.1. Cruise Speed Low (Blue) The speed in cruise is monitored and if an abnormal increase in drag induces an abnormal speed decrease of more than 10 kts compared to the expected one , this message lights ON. Its an advisory alert to warn the flight crew to monitor potential ice accretion. J.7.2. Degraded PERF (Amber) In cruise or in climb, if an abnormal drag increase induces a speed decreased or a loss of rate of climb, this alert is triggered in association with a single chime and a Master Caution. In cruise, this occurs right after the CRUISE LOW SPEED alert. The flight crew has to switch on the de-icing systems to determine if the atmospheric icing conditions are confirmed. J.7.3. Increase Speed (Amber) In cruise, climb or descent, if the drag is abnormally high and the IAS is lower than the MSIS (Minimum Severe Icing Speed, equivalent to red bug + 10 kts), this message flashes in association with a single chime and a master CAUTION . This occurs right after the DEGRADED PERF caution. The flight crew has to check if the abnormal conditions are observed and once confirmed, they have to recover the aircraft speed immediately
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 24
J.7.4. APM Alert Related Procedures
DEGRADED PERF
Mainly appears in level flight after CRUISE SPEED LOW or in climb, to inform the crew that an abnormal drag increase induces a speed decrease or a loss of rate of climb The most probable reason is an abnormal ice accretion. AIRFRAME DE-ICING ON...................................................... CHECK IAS > RED BUG+10 KT ..................................................... MONITOR AP (if engaged) ........................... HOLD FIRMLY CONTROL WHEEL and DISENGAGE If SEVERE ICING conditions confirmed - or If impossibility to maintain IAS > RED BUG+10 KT in level flight - or If abnormal aircraft handling feeling SEVERE ICING (procedure) (1.09)............................... APPLY If not SCHEDULED FLIGHT ...........................................CONTINUE ICING CONDITIONS and SPEED .......................... MONITOR
INCREASE SPEED
Appears after DEGRADED PERF to inform the crew that the drag is abnormally high and IAS is lower that RED BUG+10 KT If abnormal conditions confirmed IMMEDIATELY PUSH THE STICK TO INCREASE SPEED TO RECOVER MINIMUM IAS = RED BUG+10 KT SEVERE ICING (procedure) (1.09)............................... APPLY J.8. LANDING If take-off has been performed on a slush contaminated runway, this slush may seize the brakes during cruise. To prevent tire damage at touch down, in final approach, after the selection of GEAR DOWN, select the ANTI-SKID to OFF, then pump the brakes at least 5 times and then reselect the ANTI-SKID to ON. Same restrictions on reverse than for accelerate stop. Apply relevant performance restrictions. Use of reverse on contaminated runways has to be limited at very low speeds to avoid contaminant projections at the level of cockpit windshield which may reduce visibility to zero (snow, slush). In atmospheric icing conditions refer to appropriate speeds and performance penalties.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 25
J.9. Parking When OAT is below -5C /23F, particularly in wet conditions, avoid leaving the aircraft with the parking brake engaged and use chocks instead, whenever possible. J.10. PERFORMANCE J.10.1 Minimum Icing Speeds The minimum manoeuvre/operating speeds defined for normal conditions MUST BE INCREASED and the new value enforced whenever ICE ACCRETION is possible (flight in atmospheric icing conditions), or exists (ice accretion developing or residual ice). They are defined by the following table where VSR is the non affected 1G stall speed Flaps 0 VmHB 1,46 VSR VmLB 1,40 VSR 1,22 VSR T/O 2nd Segment 15 1,35 VSR 1,27 VSR Final Take-off 1,30 VSR En Route 1,24 VSR Go-around 30 1,32 VSR -
CAUTION: For obstacle clearance, the en-route configuration with engine failure is FLAPS 15 at a minimum speed of 1,30 VSR if ice accretion is observed. Relevant MINIMUM ICING SPEED are also given directly in the speed booklet for all weights. J.10.2. Performance Implication The drag increase associated with ice accretion will induce a decrease in performance which must be taken into consideration. The dominant effects are: Twin ENGINE ceiling is reduced SINGLE ENGINE ceiling is reduced However, on ATR 72, the performance loss may be minimized by using FLAPS 15 This is the reason why, IF OBSTACLE LIMITATIONS EXIST whenever MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS ARE IMPOSED (ICING AOA light illuminated), SINGLE ENGINE CRITICAL PHASES (FINAL TAKE OFF, CLIMB, EN ROUTE, DRIFT DOWN PROCEDURES) MUST BE PERORMED WITH FLAPS 15 CONFIGURATION. NOTE: If no obstacle limitation exist Flaps 0 may be used for single engine cruise in order to benefit from a higher cruise speed but at a lower cruising altitude.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 26
J.10.3. Best Climb Gradient Speed It is essential to understand that the MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS must be observed to maintain a minimum safe margin against stall but also to minimize performance losses: the minimum icing speed is always close to best climb gradient speed with ice accretion. any attempt to reduce below minimum icing speed can only give a loss of steady climbing performance. NOTE: All performance data given for ICING CONDITIONS were derived from flight test measurements performed with ICE SHAPES representative of the worst icing cases considered by certification and applicable losses of propeller efficiency. Because of variability of REAL ICING, climb and cruise performances published for icing conditions MUST BE regarded as operational information only.
K. SEVERE ICING
K.1. GENERAL Current certification standards for icing call for protection against ice accretions generated within a certain icing envelope. Icing conditions in clouds were established as being satisfactory standards for the design and the certification of airplane ice protection provisions. However atmospheric icing conditions are highly variable and can exceed these standards. An aircraft certified for flight into known icing conditions may transit into more severe icing conditions. Under these conditions, the ice protection systems may not be able to adequately protect the aircraft. All the ice not shed by using the ice protection systems may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane. The aircraft is said to encounter Severe Icing when the rate of accumulation is such that de-icing/anti-icing equipment fails to reduce or control the hazard. In these conditions, IMMEDIATE FLIGHT DIVERSION IS NECESSARY. K.2. CONDITIONS FOR FORMATION The icing conditions are characterized by their median volumetric diameters of droplets, the liquid water content, the outside air temperature and the time of exposure. Exceedance of one of these parameters may lead to accumulation of ice either beyond the capacity of the ice protection systems or in locations not normally prone to icing and not protected. In this case the ice protection provisions may no longer be effective to provide safe operations and the flight crew may be required to promptly exit these conditions. Three phenomena may lead to surpass the ice protection capabilities: K.2.1. Mechanical Phenomenon: Droplet Diameter The droplet diameter may be up to 3 to 30 times greater than the upper limit of the certification envelope in freezing drizzle or freezing rain conditions. The inertia of these droplets is such that the ice may cover all the frontal surface of airfoil exposed to the cloud, outside of the protected areas. Depending on the angle of attack of the airfoil, a ridge may form, mainly on the upper side of the airfoil (e.g. flaps 15) or a granular pattern may accrete on the lower surface of the airfoil up to 50% of the chord (e.g. flaps 0). AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 27
Freezing rain and freezing drizzle conditions are found typically at low altitudes with a static air temperature around -4C (3000 ft) and associated with temperature inversion. However, freezing drizzle conditions may be found at higher altitudes (up to 15000 ft) with a static air temperature down to -18C. They may be the consequence of the turbulence effect which leads to a coalescence process of small droplets into large droplets. It may be encountered on top stratiform clouds. K.2.2. Thermal Phenomenon: Skin Temperature And/Or Liquid Water Content When the flight in icing conditions is such that the total temperature is above 0C with a static air temperature close to 0C, droplets cannot freeze on the leading edge because the skin temperature is positive, they roll along the chord till they encounter a surface at a negative temperature. The leading edge is free of ice but a ridge or rivulets may be formed aft of the protected areas. The rivulets are oriented in the air stream direction. They accrete on the lower and upper surfaces. This phenomenon may occur also with colder temperatures but when a large amount of water is present in the cloud. The structure of the leading edge is not cold enough to freeze the whole water amount and the remaining droplets freeze with delay behind protected parts. K.2.3. Mixed Icing Condition Mixed icing condition may be encountered in the range of temperatures -10C/ 0C. It is basically an unstable condition, it is extremely temperature dependent and it may change quite rapidly. This condition may surpass the ice protection capabilities because the aggregate of impinging ice crystal/snow and water droplet can adhere rapidly to the airframe surpassing the system capabilities to shed ice, causing significant reduction in airplane performance as in case of system failure. K.3. CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ICE ACCRETION The consequences of severe ice accretions are ice location dependent. If the pollution extension occurs on the lower surface of the wing, it increases the drag and the airplane speed decreases. It may lead to stall if no action is taken to recover a correct speed. If the pollution occurs first on the upper part of the wing, the drag is not affected noticeably but controllability anomalies may be encountered. Severe roll anomalies may be encountered with flaps 15 accretions flown with flaps 0 setting. It should be emphasized that is not the flaps 15 configuration itself that is detrimental, but the low angle of attack that may result from such a setting, especially close to VFE. This low or negative AOA increases the wing upper side exposure to large droplet impingement. This is why holding with any flaps extended is prohibited in icing conditions (except for single engine operations). K.4. DETECTION During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following: Severe icing is characterized by ice covering all or a substantial part of the unheated portion of either side window (this cue is visible after a very short exposure, about 30 seconds), and/or AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.2. PAG 28
unexpected decrease in speed or rate of climb, and/or The following secondary indications: Water splashing and streaming on the windshield Unusually extensive ice accreted on the airframe in areas not normally observed to collect ice. Accumulation of ice on the lower surface of the wing aft of the protected areas. Accumulation of ice on the propeller spinner farther aft than normally observed. The following weather conditions may be conductive to severe in-flight icing: Visible rain at temperatures close to 0C ambient air temp (SAT) Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures close to 0C ambient air temperature (SAT) The occurrence of rain when SAT is below freezing temperature should always trigger the alertness of the crew. There are no regulatory requirements to certify an aircraft beyond the definitions used in the regulations. However, in case of inadvertent encounter with such conditions, the crew must execute the Severe Icing procedure found in the QRH and EXIT THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER HOT WEATHER
1.3.3. PAG 1
1.3.3. ADVERSE WEATHER HOT WEATHER

Extremely hot environments present operational problems of a different nature than those associated with cold weather operations. The main concerns focus primarily on passenger and crew comfort and the significant decrease in aircraft performance which high ground temperatures can cause
A. EFFECTS OF HEAT AND HUMIDITY ON THE AIRCRAFT

High humidity may result in the condensation of moisture throughout the aircraft causing electrical equipment to malfunction, instrument fogging, rust and the growth of fungi in vital areas. It may also cause pollution of hydraulic fluids and lubricants and deterioration of non-metallic materials. The following recommendations are made for safeguarding the aircraft while parked in such conditions: Park the aircraft with control locks engaged in an area that is unlikely to be affected by sand or dust being blown by other aircraft. Induce air circulation as much as possible by leaving hatches and doors open if weather conditions permit. An external air-conditioning unit can be connected to the aircraft system to supplement air circulation and cool the aircraft interior. Maintain fuel tanks full to reduce the susceptibility of fuel to be contaminated by moisture. Use covers to prevent the entry of sand or dust into the engines and pitot heads. Head aircraft into wind for loading and unloading.
B. BEFORE ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT

In tropical conditions perform a pre-flight inspection as detailed in the flight manual, giving particular attention to the following: Check fuel strainers and fuel tanks for condensation. Maintenance should drain off a small amount for examination. Examine tires for deterioration and check pressure. Check tires for slippage marks. Check for corrosion of fungus at joints, hinge points and other critical locations. Inspect and ensure that witness marks are visible. Check for hydraulic leaks, as heat and moisture may cause seals and packaging to swell. Inspect shock struts and actuators for cleanliness. Inspect tires for proper inflation. Inspect all visible proximity switches. Remove all protective covers and shields. Check nacelles and areas on the ground below for any signs of oil leaks. High ambient temperatures decrease aircraft performance; mass/altitude/ temperature limits, take-off distance and take-off power settings should be carefully determined.
C. BEFORE STARTING ENGINES / STARTING

Check for normal procedures 1.1.X. and briefing about the sequence for start-up operating in hot weather conditions.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.3. PAG 2
A ground power unit should be used to start the engines. This avoids excessive drain on the aircraft batteries since high ambient temperature (above 33C) cause a reduction in available cell capacity. Sustained high temperature degrades battery life. Strictly observe generator load limitations shown in the flight manual. C.1. AIR CONDITIONING When operating from airfields with high OAT, it is essential to cool down the cabin before boarding passengers: This is best achieved by use of a ground conditioning unit, but may also be done through the use of Hotel Mode, and in that case the following considerations will apply: As soon as OAT>22C and aircraft has remained exposed to direct sun, PRECONDITIONING becomes necessary for passengers comfort, prior to boarding; Allow a reasonable period of time for preconditioning, and use up to MAXIMUM POWER AVAILABLE ON R/H ENGINE (GUST LOCK STOP) together with HI FLOW selection. The flight crew should also take into consideration the following: HI FLOW is very effective when R/H PL is advanced beyond GI Proper orientation of the aircraft on Parking area (wind blowing from 10 Oclock ideally) during Hotel Mode pre-conditioning is very favourable as it gives better efficiency and allows to continue pre-conditioning during AFT CARGO loading (hot air from RH engine exhaust blown away from service door) Hotel mode has no limit in time, the only limits are related with operation, load and unload cargo and baggage, fuel loading. Check also APU Limitations in the airport briefing, operation hours, stands restricted, environmental restrictions Be aware about nacelle overheat and of course in Hotel mode at least one technical crew must be in the cockpit. C.2. OVBD VALVE OPERATION ON GROUND When the OVBD VALVE CTL sw is in AUTO mode, the extract fan runs continuously and the OVBD valve is: Opened as long as the engine 1 is not running (oil low press signal) Closed as soon as the engine 1 is running When door is closed after boarding (engine 1 not running = OVBD valve opened), the extract fan suction will create a very noticeable pressurization change (more important when operating with GPU than in hotel mode due to absence of inlet air flow). In order to avoid this uncomfortable situation , when cockpit preparation is performed and in any case before closing the passengers door, the cockpit communication hatch must be opened. It will be closed after engine 1 start. NOTE: Before closing, the temperature selectors may be set to FULL COLD position in order to limit the packs air flow thus avoiding a pressure shock.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.3. PAG 3
D. AFTER STARTING ENGINES / TAXI

If for any reasons, it has not been possible to bring cabin temperature down to comfortable values prior to boarding, the following consideration will apply: Packs operation during taxi should be performed with HI FLOW selected Switch FLOW selection to NORM prior to take-off, but keep bleeds ON, unless performance limited. NOTE: In high altitude and/or high temperature conditions, concurrent high electrical and engine bleed loads should be avoided when taxiing.
E. TAKE-OFF
Normal take-off and climb procedures should be used as defined in the flight manual. The effects of high temperature, combined with high airport elevations and humid conditions decrease aircraft performance. NOTE: Take-off run is increased, and rate of climb decreased. Greater allowances should therefore be made for clearing obstacles. As soon as CLB POWER is selected after take off, select HI FLOW and maintain HI FLOW until comfortable cabin temp is obtained
F. CRUISE
The flight crew should consider the following: During cruise, monitor cabin temp when operating in NORM FLOW: If cabin temperature tends to increase again above comfortable values, use HI FLOW as necessary. Set Pack temp on Auto mode, this position assures protections to avoid ice on pack turbine. On Manual mode (if Auto mode is out of service), constantly check duct temperature, avoiding negative temperatures on this duct. Write on technical log book any deviation from normal operation or results from these packs (Duct temp high or low, cabin / cockpit temperature too high / too low). Obtaining this information will assist Maintenance actions and keep packs running in good condition. To obtain high cold outlet, duct temperature should be between 5 and 10 C.
G. LANDING
Due to the low air density the true airspeed of the aircraft will be greater than the indicated airspeed resulting in a longer landing ground roll. Determine the ALD limits and landing data from the appropriate performance charts shown in the flight manual. When landing in mountainous terrain, wind shear and clear air turbulence may be present.
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1.3.3. PAG 4
H BEFORE LEAVING THE AIRCRAFT AND TRANSITS

As soon as the disembark ends , pull down all of the windows shades on the sun side and open air outlets , on the cockpit use appropriate covers protection from the sun. To minimise the effects of heat and humidity, the following recommendations are made: Refuel as soon as possible to keep condensation in fuel tanks to a minimum. Weather conditions permitting, leave passenger door open to ventilate the aircraft.
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION
1.3.4. PAG 1
1.3.4. TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION

Severe turbulence should be avoided whenever possible. This may imply the delay of the take-off or approach. e.g. if visual observation or radar indicates thunderstorm activity in the departure or approach area. Deviation from track or complete re-routing should be considered if en-route conditions become unfavourable. Whenever turbulence is expected the seatbelt signs should be switched on. If moderate, severe or extreme turbulence is encountered: Maintain control of the aircraft by primary reference to attitude. Allow airspeed and altitude to fluctuate within acceptable limits. Avoid sudden or large power inputs. Reduce to Maximum Rough Air Speed VRA 180 KIAS. Avoid use of large bank angles due to increased wing loading. Do not use large elevator (control column) or elevator trim inputs. Pitch mode may be used to minimize the effects of the turbulence but the flight crews must keep in mind that this mode does not assure that altitude nor speed will be maintained
If any report of Mountain wave is known in the route, the aircraft should be flown at an altitude at least 50% higher than the height of the mountainous area. If moderate, severe or extreme turbulence has been experienced inform ATC
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION
1.3.4. PAG 2
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATIONS IN WIND COND.
1.3.5. PAG 1
1.3.5. ADVERSE WEATHER - OPERATIONS IN WIND CONDITIONS

Precautions or special instructions may be necessary depending on the force and direction of the wind: Tail wind limit and demonstrated cross wind Check QRH Section MISCELLANEOUS for latest information. Final approach speed and wind factor NOTE: During approach a Wind Factor is added to give extra margin against turbulence, the risk of wind shear, etc. The value of this Wind factor is calculated as the highest of: 1/3 of the head wind velocity, or the reported gust in full, with a maximum wind factor of 15 kt. The flight crew must always consider the effect of wind during other situations, like: Taxiing with strong wind. Hotel mode. Tail wind taxiing. Nacelle overheat. Cargo door operation
NOTE: Do not operate cargo door with a cross wind component of more than 45 Kts. NOTE: The recommended landing flaps configuration is the same as the Standard landing flap setting, even with strong crosswind. Large flaps extension does not impair the controllability in any manner. Moreover it minimizes the flare duration and allows a quicker speed decrease down to the taxi speed.
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATIONS IN WIND COND.
1.3.5. PAG 2
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER WINDSHEAR
1.3.6. PAG 1
1.3.6. WINDSHEAR
This phenomenon may be defined as a notable change in wind direction and/or speed over a short distance. Windshear can be encountered in the vicinity of thunderstorms, into rain showers (even without thunderstorms), during a frontal passage or on airports situated near large areas of water (sea breeze fronts). Severe windshear encountered above 1000 feet, whilst unpleasant, can generally be negotiated safely. However if it is encountered below 500 feet on take off or approach/landing it is potentially dangerous. As far as possible this phenomenon must be avoided.
A. WINDSHEAR RECOVERY PROCEDURE AT TAKEOFF

Delay the take off. If a low-level windshear is reported, calculate VR, V2 at the maximum take off weight available for the day. If windshear is experienced, do not change the configuration until safe speed and altitude are reached regardless of FD indication, increase pitch to 10. When clear of obstacles, accelerate as much as possible and clean up the aircraft. Climb at the normal climb speed.
B. WINDSHEAR RECOVERY PROCEDURE DURING AN APPROACH

Initiate a normal go around procedure then increase to 10 pitch, regardless FD indication. Be aware of stick pusher Do not retract LDG Gear. When positively climbing at a safe altitude, retract the gear and complete the normal go-around procedure.
CAUTION: Positive rate of climb must be verified on at least two instruments, both speed and vertical speed must be checked increasing for more than 5 seconds.
C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A pitch attitude of ten degrees is the best compromise that allows an adequate climbing slope while respecting acceptable high value of AOA. lf necessary, Max Power (PL to Ramp Position) or Emer Power (PL to Wall Position) will be used with a smooth pitch increase, to the limit of stick shaker activation. Leaving the gear down until the climb is established will allow the aircraft to absorb some energy impact should the microburst exceed the aircraft capability to climb.
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER WINDSHEAR
1.3.6. PAG 2
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER LIGHTNING STRIKES
1.3.7. PAG 1
1.3.7. LIGHTNING STRIKES

Lightning is normally related to thunderstorms. Avoiding lightning strikes is, therefore, related to the avoidance of turbulence, icing, and hail. At night, switch on the storm light to prevent temporary blinding from lightning, and keep eyes on the instruments. If a lightning strike is experienced while the landing gear is down, test the skid control system before landing. After landing perform an outside inspection, call maintenance, fill in respective forms and inform operations.
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER LIGHTNING STRIKES
1.3.7. PAG 2
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER VOLCANIC ASH
1.3.8. PAG 1
1.3.8. ADEVERSE WEATHER - VOLCANIC ASH

A. VOLCANIC ASH DESCRIPTION
Volcanic ash is, essentially, extremely fine particles of glass shards and pulverised rock, the composition of which reflects the composition of the magma inside volcanoes. It is composed predominantly of siliceous materials (>50%) that are both very hard and very abrasive. The melting point of glassy silicates is around 1100C and therefore close to the operating temperature of the engine at cruise thrust. The ash is accompanied by gaseous solutions of sulphur dioxide (sulphuric acid) and chlorine (hydrochloric acid).
B. AVOIDANCE
Flight operations in volcanic ash are extremely hazardous and must be avoided. Flights in areas of known volcanic activity must be avoided. When a flight is planned into an area with known potential for volcanic activity: All NOTAMs and air traffic advisories have to be checked for the current status of volcanic activity. The planned route has to well avoid the area of volcanic activity. If possible, stay upwind of the volcanic ash. The first two or three days following and explosive eruption are especially critical because high concentrations of gas with hazardous concentration could be encountered at cruise levels some considerable distance for the volcano. Beyond three days, assume that if ash is still visible by eye or from satellite data, it still represents a hazard to aircraft.
C. DETECTION
Volcanic ash clouds do not produce return or echoes on the airborne weather radar. Volcanic ash may be difficult to detect visually, especially at night or in instrumental meteorological conditions. However, the following have been reported by flight crews: Acrid odour, similar to electrical smell, burned dust or sulphur. Smoke or dust appearing in the cabin and cockpit, leaving a coating on cabin and cockpit surfaces. Multiple engine malfunctions, such as stall, increase ITT, flameout. Airspeed fluctuating erratically. At night, static electric discharges (St. Elmos Fire) visible around cockpit winshields. At night, landing lights cast sharp, distinct shadows on the volcanic ash clouds as opposed to the normally fuzzy, indistinct shadows cast on water/ice clouds.
D. EFFECTS ON POWERPLANT
The melting point of volcanic ash is close to the operating temperature of the engine at cruise power. This can cause serious damage in the hot section of the engine that could result in engine thrust loss and possible flameout. Pilots are therefore asked to reduce engine power settings to flight idle when possible to lower the engine operating temperature below the melting point of volcanic ash. AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
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1.3.8. PAG 2
The volcanic ash, being abrasive, also damages engine components causing loss of engine thrust. The erosion also results in a decrease in the engine stall margin. Although this abrasion effect takes longer than the melting fusion of volcanic ash to shut down the engine, the abrasion damage is permanent and irreversible. Reduction of engine thrust to idle slows the rate of erosion by the compressor blades but can not eliminate it entirely while the engine is still ingesting air contaminated by volcanic ash. Propeller blades may also be degraded by erosion inducing loss of traction efficiency. Oil cooler efficiency may also be decreased either due to excessive erosion of the cooler or due to blockage of the air intake by ashes.
E. EFFECTS ON THE AIRFRAME AND EQUIPMENT

Volcanic ash abrades cockpit windows, airframe and flight surfaces. Any parts protruding from the airframe such as antennas, probes, ice detectors, can be damaged and may be rendered inoperable. The abrasion of the cockpit windows reduces the pilots forward visibility. This can lead to serious problems during the landing phase. The abrasion damage of the wing or horizontal stabilizer leading edges can either prevent correct operation of the de-icing boots or even detach parts of the boots with subsequent drag increase. The abrasion damage of the landing lights can significantly reduce landing light effectiveness. Damage to the antennas can lead to degradation, or even complete loss, of VHF communications. Damage to the various sensors can seriously degrade the information available to the pilots through the instrumentation. Volcanic ash can obstruct probes and penetrate into air conditioning and equipment cooling systems. It can contaminate electrical and avionic units, fuel and hydraulic systems and smoke detection systems. Pitot probe can be blocked by volcanic ash resulting in unreliable airspeed indications or complete loss of airspeed indication in the cockpit. Volcanic ash columns are highly charged electrically. The static charge on the aircraft creates a cocoon effect which may cause a temporary defection, or even complete loss, of VHF communications with ground stations. For more comments on the effects on the aircraft and on airports, indications of accidental entry into a volcanic ash cloud, recommended actions and risk mitigation refer to the MO(A), Chapter 8.3.8.F. Following is the procedure to be performed by the flight crew in the event of an encounter with a volcanic ash cloud:
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1.3.8. PAG 3
VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER

FOLLOWING ITEMS HAVE TO BE APPLIED WHILE MAKING A 180 DEGREES TURN AND STARTING DESCENT (IF MSA PERMITS): ATC ........................................................................................NOTIFY PL 1 + 2 (if conditions permit) .............................................. RETARD SPEEDBUG TO VmHB................................................................... SET HDG MODE .................................................................... HIGH BANK CREW OXY MASKS ......................................................... ON / 100% CABIN CREW ........................................................................NOTIFY PASSENGER OXYGEN ............................................ AS REQUIRED AIR FLOW .................................................................................. HIGH ENG PARAMETERS .......................................................... MONITOR AIRSPEED INDICATORS .................................................. MONITOR NOTE: Reducing TQ reduces ash ingestion, maximizes engine surge margin and lowers engine turbine temperature. Monitor particularly ITT; it may become necessary to set PL to Flight Idle, if conditions permit. In extreme cases, it may be necessary to consider precautionary engine shut down and engine restart in flight. If both engines flame out, refer to BOTH ENGINE FLAMEOUT procedure (2.04.02). Volcanic ash may clog the pitot tube resulting in unreliable speed indications. If airspeed is unreliable or lost, adjust airplane attitude and torque.
NOTE:
NOTE:
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1.3.8. PAG 4
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NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES PRNAV OPERATIONS
1.3.9. PAG 1
1.3.9. PRNAV OPERATIONS

A. PRE-FLIGHT
A.1. OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Aircraft equipped with basic GNSS receivers (either as stand-alone equipment or in a multi-sensor environment) may use these systems to carry out RNAV procedures provided that before conducting any flight, the following criteria are met: The GNSS equipment is serviceable; The pilot has current knowledge of how to operate the equipment so as to achieve the optimum level of navigation performance; Satellite availability is checked to support the intended operation; An alternate airport with conventional navaids must be selected; and The procedure is retrievable from an airborne navigation database. During pre-flight the pilot verifies the HT1000 status, initializes the system, enters or modifies the route, and configures the HT1000 for flight. A.2. IDENTIFICATION PAGE When aircraft power is supplied, the HT1000 is powered up. It does not have a power on/off switch. The first screen the HT1 000 displays is the IDENT page. The IDENT page allows the pilot to review the aircraft type, engine type, and navigational database. NOTE: AII data on the aircraft IDENT page should be reviewed for accuracy and applicability. The only data that can be changed on the IDENT page is the active navigational database. A.3. POSITION REFERENCE PAGE
Pressing 6R on the IDENT page or 2L on the data index page provides access to the Position Reference (POS REF) page. The POS REF page displays present position, time, ground speed, RNP, and actual navigation performance.
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1.3.9. PAG 2
Where: 1L POS (GPS) - Displays the present HT1000 calculated position and source of position. Position source is identified by either: (GPS), (DR), (DME), or (INS) on the display. 2L UTC (GPS) - Universal Coordinated Time. UTC time is provided by the GPS signal. In the event GPS is lost, time will be replaced with the HT1000's own internal clock. RTC (Real Time Clock) will then be displayed adjacent to UTC time. When the system again acquires a GPS signal, the UTC time will be updated. 3L RNP/ACTUAL - Displays Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and Actual Navigation Performance values. 4L HDG/TAS/OVERRIDE - Accesses the HDG/TAS/OVERRIDE page for entering and displaying data (HDG, TAS, GS, TK, WIND). If the system looses GPS signal, the HT1000 goes into Dead Reckoning mode and <DR appears at 4L. 4L can then be used to access the Dead Reckoning page for entering and displaying data (HDG, TAS, GS, TK, WIND). 5L ACT RTE - Accesses the Active Route Integrity Prediction page. Available only when there is an active route and the aircraft is on the ground. 2R G.S - Displays the ground speed of the aircraft in knots as computed by the HT1000. 3R SV DATA> - SV data is displayed if no other sensors are configured. If the system is configured to use DME or INS, SV data is not displayed on this page, but it can be accessed on page 3/3. When the SV DATA> prompt is present, pressing 3R will display a page of satellite data (azimuth, elevation, and signal quality.) 5R DEST RAIM> - Accesses the Destination RAIM Prediction page. The Destination RAIM Prediction requires an active route and can be run in the air or on the ground. 6R ROUTE> - Displays the RTE page, which is used to continue the pre-flight initialization sequence.
B. REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE (RNP) AND ACTUAL NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE VALUES

The displayed RNP value is based on the aircraft's phase-of-flight. For oceanic/remote operations the RNP default is 12 NM, For en route operations the default RNP is 2.0 NM, For terminal operations it is 1.0 NM, and for approach operations the default RNP is 0.3 NM.
The RNP value will automatically default to these values as the aircraft flies through the different phases of flight. These default values can be overridden by the pilot by typing in a value and line selecting the value to 3L. CAUTION: Overriding default values will prevent the system from automatically defaulting to the next phase-of-flight RNP. To return to the automatic default logic, press the CLR key and line-select DELETE to 3L.
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1.3.9. PAG 3
The Actual navigation performance number is a measure of the navigation accuracy of the system. It computes the actual navigation performance number based on the known satellite geometry and the known inherent system errors (such as receiver noise, multipath and atmospheric effects). If the RNP value exceeds the RNP value, the system will generate an UNABLE RNP message or annunciation.
C. RAIM CHECKS
If desired, the crew can run a DEST RAIM check to view approach GPS accuracy predictions. However, at 30 NM to the destination, the system will perform its own RAIM prediction test. If the system passes the RAIM prediction test, nothing occurs. If the RAIM prediction test fails, the following annunciations occur: The MSG annunciator turns on (flashing WHITE). The scratchpad message CHECK DEST RAIM-POS REF is displayed in the scratchpad. At 2 NM outside the FAF, the HT1000 performs another accuracy integrity check. The APPR approach annunciator will be illuminated if the HT1000 meets the RNP requirements for the approach being performed (both predictive RAIM and current RAIM must pass accuracy integrity checks). If it does not, the following annunciations will occur: The RNP ALERT annunciator is turned on (steady AMBER). The GREEN APPRoach light does not illuminate. The MSG annunciator turns on (flashing WHITE). The scratchpad message UNABLE APPROACH is displayed in the scratchpad. C.1. RAIM AT DESTINATION The DEST RAIM page provides access to the DESTINATION RAIM PREDICTION for the active route destination airport. The RAIM prediction looks at a 30 minute window around the aircraft's ETA for the arrival airport and determines whether there will be enough satellites in the proper geometry to ensure that required navigation performance is met. NOTE: DEST RAIM provides a prediction only. This prediction provides the crew with a "Iook ahead" to see if there will be enough satellites in the proper geometry at the time of their ETA. Keep in mind that real time RAIM is always provided throughout flight including the descent and approach flight phases. NOTE: Should RAIM become invalid during any portion of the flight phase it will be annunciated in the scratchpad as UNABLE RNP. The crew may check PREDICTIVE RAIM at any time (on the ground or in the air) by using the steps described below. The following figure shows a typical result on the DEST RAIM page. Destination RAIM can be accessed on the POS REF page at 5R.
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1.3.9. PAG 4
At 30 NM from the airport the system performs a RAIM prediction for the DEST airport (based on satellites that should be available). RAIM must be available for 15 minutes around desired predicted arrival time. RAIM OK: Nothing happens RAIM not OK: Check DEST RAIM POS REF message ILA remains active as long as ABLE RNP At 2 NM before FAF the system checks for RAIM at the FAF and MAP (based on satellites that should be available). RAIM OK: APPR light ON ILA remains active RAIM not OK: APPR light OFF UNABLE RNP (10 second delay) NAV Flag drops into view ILA deactivates
At the FAF the system checks for RAIM based on tracked satellites only. RAIM OK: APPR light ON RAIM not OK: APPR light OFF UNABLE RNP (10 second delay) NAV Flag drops into view ILA deactivates At MAP: Localizer deviation transitions to Lateral deviation Glideslope deviation blased out of view Tune to LOC, ILS Energize becomes INVALID System RAIM Checks in Approach Mode
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1.3.9. PAG 5
D. NORMAL PROCEDURES
D.1. SID ACCEPTANCE AND CLIMB GRADIENT Load RNAV departure on the flight plan and accept this SID from ATC, if able to fly in lateral mode and also in vertical according to published climb gradients, once airborne and above 400 feet, select LNAV and adjust climb speed according to the climb gradient on SID. D.2. CRUISE AND DESCENT PATH Adjust descent path to RNAV STAR requirements, remember A above xxx alt, B below xxx alt or be level at xxx alt on the selected point, use VNAV profile and remember to adjust actual vertical speed with vertical speed required for the STAR, also check accuracy in the VNAV screen comparing BV (bearing angle), FMS angle calculated to be established at RNAV point at desired altitude and FPA (flight plan angle, actual angle). D.3. COURSE DEVIATION INDICATIONS As the aircraft flies towards the approach, the CDI sensitivity increases corresponding to changes in RNP. En route RNP is 2.0 NM and occurs outside of 30 NM from the airport. Within 30 NM of the airport the RNP changes to Terminal RNP (1.0 NM) and just outside the FAF the RNP changes to 0.3 RNP. With each change in RNP the CDI indicator sensitivity increases. During final approach the full scale deflection of the CDI represents 0.3 NM. The HT1000 has the following default RNP/COI settings: Flight Mode Approach Terminal En Route Default RNP 0.3 NM 1.0 NM 2.0 NM HIS Scaling 0.3 NM 1.0 NM 4.0 NM
D.4. FLIGHT DIRECTOR INDICATIONS The HT1000 will provide roll steering commands to the autopilot and flight director.
E. CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES
The flight crew must establish working procedures that will enable erroneous flight crew inputs to be detected before the aircraft position accuracy is dangerously degraded. It is the crews responsibility to ensure that the navigation accuracy is maintained. In particular, the following common mistakes must be avoided: Insertion errors: When coordinates, STAR, SID are inserted incorrectly into the system. De-coupling: When the pilot allows the autopilot to become de-coupled from the equipment which he thinks is providing steering output. Using faulty equipment: When the pilot might continue to use a navigation system which has become inaccurate.
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1.3.9. PAG 6
NOTE: The flight crew must check every message on the scratchpad or GPS status message. This cross-check is the only way to discover a degraded RNAV system. REMEMBER: If as a result of a failure or degradation of the RNAV system, an aircraft is unable to either enter the designated airspace or continue operations in accordance with the current air traffic control clearance, a revised clearance shall, whenever possible, be obtained by the pilot. The phrase NEGATIVE-RNAV shall be included by the pilot immediately following the aircraft call sign whenever initial contact on an ATC unit frequency is established.
F. APPROACH SCRATCHPAD ANNUNCIATIONS

CHECK GPS STATUS-POS REF - At 30 NM from the destination, this message will be generated if the system is not using GPS for navigation. UNABLE APPROACH - If there is a loss of RAIM or if the GPS accuracy does not meet approach requirements during the approach mode, this message will appear in the scratchpad. UNABLE RNP - This message will be displayed if the GPS accuracy or integrity does not meet a phase-of-flight RNP requirement. NO TRANSITION SELECTED - This message is displayed if an approach has been selected without a transition at the time of execution. It is advisory only, since a transition to the approach may not be desired. CHECK DEST RAIM-POS REF - Upon entering the terminal area, the HT1000 predicts that the approach RNP will not be available to support the approach procedure.
G. GPS STATUS ANNUNCIATORS

STATUS Annunciators - The status annunciators are on the left side of the Navigation Select Panel and are labelled GPS STATUS. The HT1000 status annunciators are active only when GPS is selected as the navigational source. These GPS annunciators are usually located on the front panel in the pilot's primary field of view. APPR Annunciator - Used during precision and non-precision approaches, the APPR annunciator turns ON to indicate that the HT1000 is operating in the approach mode. When the APPR annunciator is illuminated, it is a "go" annunciator for the approach. Two APPR annunciators are installed on the flight deck, one in front of each crew member. The annunciator does not flash. UNABLE RNP - The annunciator turns ON to indicate to the flight crew the HT1000 does not meet accuracy and/or integrity requirements for the current phase-of-flight. During approaches using the HT1000, the annunciator is a "no-go" annunciator. Should it turn ON during an approach, the flight crew must use other means for navigation or abandon the approach. NOTE: The APPR and RNP ALERT annunciators are mutually exclusive (only one annunciator can be ON) during an approach being flown by the HT1000.
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1.3.9. PAG 7
WPT - The WPT annunciator is the lateral track change annunciator. It turns ON 30 seconds prior to the aircraft sequencing the TO waypoint during the en route phase-offlight. The time is 10 seconds for terminal and RNP approach phases of flight. The annunciator does not flash. The WPT annunciator lights two minutes prior to sequencing in oceanic phase. The colour is typically WHITE, but it may vary with aircraft installation. MSG - This annunciator turns ON to inform the flight crew a message is being displayed on the HT1000. The annunciator flashes until the message is cleared from the scratchpad. OFSET - The OFSET annunciator illuminates to indicate the pilot has entered an offset. The OFSET annunciator turns OFF when the offset is cancelled.
H. HT1000 MESSAGES
Alerting and Advisory messages illuminate the MCDU message (MSG) Light. Clearing the message or correcting the condition cancels the message. Once the message is cleared, it will not reappear even if the condition triggering the message is still current. H.1. ALERTING MESSAGES HT1000 alerting messages are displayed on the MCDU scratchpad in YELLOW, and they illuminate the MCDU message light (MSG). Use the CLEAR key or correct the condition responsible for the message to remove the message permanently. The message is pushed to the background when data is manually entered into the SP. The message returns to the SP when the data is removed. HT1000 Message ACT DESCENT PATH INVALID ALTITUDE INPUT FAIL Condition Pilot Action
System detects a rise within the Recheck the descent path and descent path. modify if necessary. Crew awareness. TOC and TOD The system has no source for computations are inoperative. altitude data. VNAV is disabled. VNAV is inoperative. Altitude There will be no TOC or TOD legs in procedures will require computed. manual sequencing. At 30 NM from the destination, Crew must use alternate means message will be generated if of navigation for the arrival and the system is not using GPS for approach. navigation. Insufficient satellites available to support navigation. are Go to 4L on the DR page. GPS Manually insert forecast wind for current legs.
CHECK GPS STATUS-POS REF
DEAD RECKONING
DME INPUT FAIL
No DME data has been Monitor HT1000 position using received from DME 1 or DME 2 alternate external sensors as for 10 seconds. available.
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1.3.9. PAG 8
HT1000 Message
Condition
Pilot Action
GNSSU 1 FAIL or GNSSU 2 FAIL
ON SIDE lateral and vertical path deviations for the approach are invalid. BITE has detected a failure in 1. Verify that OFFSIDE unit is one of the Global Navigation operable. Satellite Sensor Units in a dual 2. If OFFSIDE unit is inoperable, installation. suitable supplemental navigation is required for the approach. Lateral and vertical path BITE has detected a failure in deviations for the approach are the Global Navigation Satellite invalid. Suitable supplemental navigation is required for the Sensor Unit. approach. BITE has detected a GPS Monitor HT1000 position using antenna failure. external sensors as available. The system is not receiving any If failure persists, manually heading data. Wind data and enter HDG on the ETAs may be in error. HDG/TAS/OVERRIDE page. The HT1000 is configured for 1. If in GPS position updating, no action required. Inertial Navigation System (INS) interface and the INS 2. If in INS position updating, reports a failure or stops verify an alternate source communicating. has been selected.
GNSUU FAIL
GPA ANTENNA FAIL HDG INPUT FAIL
INS INPUT FAIL
NAV CORRUPT
The HT1000 navigation data 1. Reload Nav Data Base. base has been corrupted. 2. If reload not possible, select DATA Attempts to access Nav Data alternate HT1000 data base will result in NOT IN DATA from IDET page until reload BASE message. may be performed.
NAV DATA OUT OF He HT1000 navigation data Verify navigation/route data DATE base has expired. using current information. If the system is configured for VNAV this will be an alert message. The onside unit is VNAV operations failing to receive onside altitude authorized. data, but is still receiving data from off side unit. The HT1000 contains an invalid or corrupt software System is INOP. configuration. HT1000 MCDU will not leave the IDENT page.
ONSIDE ALT FAIL
not
SOFTWARE CONFIG INVALID
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1.3.9. PAG 9
HT1000 Message TAS INPUT FAIL
Condition
Pilot Action
The system is not receiving any If failure persists, manually True Airspeed data. Wind data enter TAS on the and ETAs may be in error. HDG/TAS/OVERRIDE page. A communication failure has occurred between the HT1000 NPU and MCDU. This message generally indicates an NPU failure. 1. Select GPS/NAV from MENU is displayed. 2. If message repeats, cycle power on HT1000. 3. If GPS/NAV prompt still does not appear, the NPU or MCDU is failed.
TIME OUT RESELECT
UNABLE APPROACH
Crew must have an alternate Triggered by the system if means to navigate the RAIM prediction fails or if the approach or execute a missed current RAIM FAILS. approach. The current HT1000 navigation accuracy or integrity does not Monitor HT1000 position using meet the current RNP external sensors available. requirements. BITE has detected a failure in DGPS approach tuning is not the VHF data link (VDL). available. The system has transitioned to a flight phase (en route, terminal, etc.) for which the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) is more stringent than the pilot input. On POS REF page, verify that the entered RNP value still applies for the current phase of flight.
UNABLE RNP
VDL FAIL
VERIFY RNP-POS REF
HOST PROCESSOR FAIL DBASE PROCESSOR FAIL AIO PROCESSOR FAIL DIO PROCESSOR FAIL MATH COPROCESSOR FAIL
The system has detected an Cycle power. If message internal memory or timing repeats, system is inop. violation. The system has detected an Cycle power. If message internal memory or timing repeats, system is inop. violation. The system has detected an Cycle power. If message internal memory or timing repeats, system is inop. violation. The system has detected an Cycle power. If message internal memory or timing repeats, system is inop. violation. The system has detected an Cycle power. If message internal memory or timing repeats, system is inop. violation.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.9. PAG 10
H.2. ADVISORY MESSAGES HT1000 advisory messages are displayed on the MCDU scratchpad in WHITE, and they illuminate the MCDU message light (MSG). HT1000 Message EXIT HOLD ARMED Condition Pilot Action
Appears one minute prior to Crew awareness. aircraft exiting hold. Five minutes after landing at the destination airport, the IDENT page displays this message. Crew awareness. The flight complete logic erases the current active flight plan, PERF INIT data (except CRZ ALT) and winds. Inactive route is retained.
FLIGHT COMPLETE
FLIGHT PLAN DISAGREE
Displayed when the active Initiate flight plan transfer by reroutes in a dual or triple entering cruise altitude. installation do not match. Crew awareness. Fuel computations on PERF INIT and The system has no source for PROG pages ate inop. Message fuel data. CHECK FUEL-VNAV will not be available. The size of the upcoming hold has been restricted due to airspace limitations. The HT1000 Crew awareness. may not be able to maintain the speed if desired. pattern due to aircraft speed and configured bank limits.
FUEL INPUT FAIL
HIGH HOLDING SPEED
Reduce
MOD HOLD PENDING NOT ON INTERCEPT HDG NO TRANSITION SELECTED
The message is displayed when a pending modification Execute or erase modification has not been executed prior to prior to reaching hold fix. reaching the hold fix. Current aircraft heading does not Manoeuvre aircraft to enable allow execution of programmed intercept, then execute course course to intercept. to intercept. An approach has been If desired, select approach activated without specifying a transition on arrival page. transition. Onside unit is failing to receive its own onside alt data input but is still receiving alt data from offside unit. This message Crew awareness. will turn yellow and be upgraded to an alert level message.
ON SIDE ALT FAIL
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.9. PAG 11
HT1000 Message ONSIDE HEADING FAIL ONSIDE TAS FAIL RAIM LIMIT EXCEEDS XX NM REAL TIME CLOCK ERROR RNP AVAILABLE
Condition
Pilot Action
Onside unit is failing to receive onside HDG data from the Crew awareness. offside unit. Onside unit is failing to receive onside TAS data from the Crew awareness. offside unit. The GPS RAIM protection limit Monitor HT1000 position using exceeds the specified (XX) value. external sensors as available. Internal battery on the HT1000 Notify maintenance to schedule may be bad. service. The HT1000 navigation Monitoring of HT1000 position accuracy and integrity supports using external sensors is not the current RNP requirements. required. Route 1 has been or is being modified by the offside system. Onside display will change to the RTE LEGS page when Crew awareness. complete and will be in a MOD state. Message will clear automatically when the mod active route is EXECuted. Route 2 has been or is being modified by the offside system. Onside display will change to the RTE LEGS page when Crew awareness. complete and will be in a MOD state. Message will clear automatically when the mod active route is EXECuted. Displayed on the system that EXECuted the active route Flight plan must be manually when the route transfer to the entered into the other MCDU. offside system fails. The active route is too short to Access PERF INIT (VNAV key) achieve the programmed cruise page to update cruise altitude altitude. as required. Displayed at 2 minutes, 30 seconds or 10 seconds prior to vertical track change based on RNP for Oceanic/remote, Enroute Crew awareness. or Terminal. The vertical track or change alert will be given at every altitude constraint and the two deceleration points if present.
RTE 1 UPDATING
RTE 2 UPDATING
TRANSFER UNABLE UNABLE CRUISE ALT
VERT TRACK CHANGE ALERT
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM
AIR NOSTRUM
LINEAS AEREAS
1.3.9. PAG 12
HT1000 Message VNAV PATH NOT RECEIVED
Condition VNAV path information was not received by the receiving unit. Message may be the result of a temporary interruption in the transfer process
Pilot Action Modify flight plan so another automatic transfer can be attempted by the system. If a second failure occurs, notify maintenance.
AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

PRM ATR Cap130 Ed2009v2

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AIR NOSTRUM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500 NDICE GENERAL NDICE

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES NDICE

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES NDICE

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES NDICE

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES NDICE

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR

B - indica Pgina en Blanco

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES LISTA DE PGINAS EN VIGOR

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

1.3.1. EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

B. EXTERNAL WALKAROUND SEQUENCE

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES EXTERNAL WALKAROUND

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

1.3.2. ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

AIR NOSTRUM - PRM

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

C. EFFECTS OF ICE ACCRETION ON THE AIRCRAFT

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500

NORMAL OPERATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES ADVERSE WEATHER COLD WEATHER

D. AIRFRAME DE-ICING AND ANTI-ICING, GENERAL PRECAUTIONS

MANUAL DE OPERACIONES: PARTE B: PRM ATR 72-500