Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The failure of Boeing Vertol 234 LR, Identification G-BWFC, 4 kilometres east of Sumburg, Shetland Isles on the 6th November 1986.
Table of Contents
1) 2) Note on Bibliographic Citations...............................................................1 Introduction........................................................................................1 2.a) Time, Date and Place of Accident......................................................1 2.b) The aircraft model and manufacturer.................................................1 Operating Environment Conditions..........................................................2 3.a) History prior to failure.....................................................................2 3.b) Meteorological conditions.................................................................2 Assembly Affected by Failure..................................................................3 4.a) Description of the assembly affected.................................................3 4.b) The part that failed.........................................................................4 4.c) The final result of the failure.............................................................5 Contributing Factors Toward Failure.........................................................5 5.a) The maintenance factors..................................................................5 5.b) Service Update Bulletins from the Manufacturer..................................5 5.c) Implementation of service bulletins...................................................6 Failure Analysis....................................................................................6 6.a) The testimony of witnesses..............................................................6 6.b) Acquisition of specimens..................................................................6 6.c) Testing methods and results.............................................................7 6.d) The parts tested for confirmation......................................................9 6.e) The material factors........................................................................9 Damage not part of the aircraft.............................................................10 7.a) Damage to surrounding area..........................................................10 7.b) Statistics as a result of the failure...................................................10 The consequences from an engineering view..........................................10 8.a) Commentary and Conclusion..........................................................10 8.b) The lessons learned......................................................................11 8.c) The new measures put in place as a result........................................12 Bibliography.......................................................................................12
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
Illustration Index
Illustration 1: Boeing Vertol 234 LR showing outline of power transmission. [2]...1 Illustration 2: The transmission shaft common to both rotor assemblies.[2]........3 Illustration 3: Assembly pictorial of partial shaft assembly. [2]..........................3 Illustration 4: Picture of the actual spiral bevel ring gear subject to failure.[2].....4 Illustration 5: Separation due to circumferential cracking. [2]...........................8 Illustration 6: Groove present on mating flange of the failed gear. [2]................8 Illustration 7: Section through the flange groove showing the build up of corrosion products and the fatigue originating from V-notches.[2]...................................8 Illustration 8: Detail of another gear showing the same wear pattern groove. [2] 8 Illustration 9: Picture showing rapid tearing and fatigue sections. [2]...............11
Index Page II
2) Introduction
2.a) Time, Date and Place of Accident
The failure occurred at 11H31 GMT on Thursday 6 th November 1986, approximately 4 kilometers east of Sumburg Airport in the Shetland Isles: 0595330N 0011200W.
Illustration 1: Boeing Vertol 234 LR showing outline of power transmission. [2] Boeing Vertol 234 LR of a registration G-BWFC, henceforth referred to as WFC. This aircraft manufactured in 1981 by Boeing Vertol Company, Philadelphia. WFC had accumulated 7690 flight hours, and was last checked 10 hours before failure. The BV234 is a development of the CH47C Chinook helicopter. The main rotors are in tandem configuration, being 18.3 metres in diameter, having 3 blades and an interference rotation of about 80% when taken along the fuselage axis. The blades are separated vertically, but due to droop and pitch considerations will mesh at low speeds and when given certain input at high speed.
Page 1
The blades are driven via a combining transmission fed by two right angle gearboxes, supplied by two engines sitting either side of the tail pylon. The head and tail rotors are fed by synchronous shafts that maintain the relationship between the rotors, running fore and aft of the combining transmission. Engines are both the Avco Lyncoming AL5512.
Page 2
Illustration 2: The transmission shaft common Illustration 3: Assembly pictorial of to both rotor assemblies.[2] partial shaft assembly. [2] The forward transmission, powering the forward rotor, is fed by the combining transmission via a synchronising shaft. Here a speed reduction from a nominal 6912rpm to 225rpm rotor speed is performed in three gear stages. The first stage is a spiral bevel pair that reduces speed and angles the drive. The second and third stages are planetary gears for power conversion only. The spiral bevel ring gear, the larger in the set, is bolted via 24 bolts to the sun gear of the planetary system. The flanges between the two are separated by a steel shim with anti-fretting coating on each side, used to aid alignment calibrations. Friction through the shim is the primary torque transfer mechanism, the bolts providing the necessary normal force component.
Page 3
Illustration 4: Picture of the actual spiral bevel ring gear subject to failure.[2] The failure occurred on the spiral bevel ring gear from the first stage of the forward rotor transmission. The gear was responsible for power delivery to the forward rotor, a loss of this function in the correct manner would thus desynchronise the fore and aft rotors. There were no auxiliary systems in this regard, the importance of the part and the violent nature of the failure precludes any kind of possible hand-off to secondary systems of any foreseeable kind.
Page 4
Page 5
6) Failure Analysis
6.a) The testimony of witnesses
The primary witness in an aircraft crash is the cockpit voice recorder CVR, known as the black box, even though it is usually a highly visible orange colour. The CVR recorded the crew noticing an increase in noise, described as a roaring sound, coming from the flight deck. An explosive retort was captured before the instrumentation log captured the tail dropping to a near-vertical elevation, the pilot immediately applied pitch control via the controls but the aircraft did not respond. Later the pilot recalls seeing the sea some 50 metres away as the aircraft dropped, indicating that the tail-down condition did not remain. A witness on the ground saw WFC drop from what he estimated was 90-120 metres, the aircraft weaved from side to side and the lower rotor blades flew off and hit the sea. The splash produced was confirmed by fishing boats and observers at the airport. The coastguard S61N reported to control of seeing two inflatable life rafts in the sea, later the wreckage of WFC was seen floating on the sea and a survivor was seen clinging to a large piece of the wreckage. The coastguard immediately came to help, and observed another survivor clinging to a raft while winching up the first. Many lifeless bodies were floating around the wreckage, the coastguard did not detect any other signs of life and thus flew the two rescued to Lerwick Hospital, some 29 kilometres away. Later searches did not find further survivors, but the dead bodies still floating were brought to Sumburg Airport.
employed. Despite rough sea conditions the main fuselage was lifted by the 10 th, including most of the transmission. The aft pylon and transmission were away from the wreckage, along the flight path that consisted mainly of small pieces of broken rotor. Approximately 85%-90% recovery figures were estimated, despite the extensive structural disintegration suffered by the upper parts of the fuselage.
Page 7
The fatigue cracks that formed the circumferential crack were examined microscopically, they were earlier formed between the bolt holes and not from them. Penetration of the flange by the fatigue cracking varied from 25%-100% in different sectors between bolts. In general no fatigue origins were found at the bolt holes, the circumferential crack had diverted to them at a later stage. The radial fracture
Illustration 8: Detail of another gear showing the same wear pattern groove. [2] originated from the circumferential fracture, also being due mainly to metal fatigue. Corrosion activity while the cracks were progressing was indicated by staining of the crack surfaces, different to the general corrosion present. Other indications of a corrosion fatigue mechanism of the cracks were V-notches in the base of the groove from which ghost-cracks emanated.
Illustration 7: Section through the flange groove showing the build up of corrosion products and the fatigue originating from V-notches.[2]
Page 8
The surface of the shim had suffered corrosion due to the coating having lost adherence to the core. There was intermixing of the coating material with corrosion debris originating from the groove.
Page 9
The oil used in the transmission was hygroscopic to a certain extent, analysis showed that the possible wet areas in conjunction with chloride ion contamination from the maritime environment would create a corrosive environment under stress conditions. The corrosion from the moisture alone would increase wear, and with deposition on the shim this wear would increase steadily as the interface changed character. A wet environment has been shown to increase fatigue crack growth rates and chance of formation due surface stress raisers. The method used to monitor the health of the transmission was based around monitoring the metal content of the oil and comparing it to previously gained data to check for patterns that would indicate wear. One of the limitations of the system is the inability to detect fatigue and cracking, due mainly to the negligible impact on the oil this has.
Page 10
The primary collision of the rotors was due to an opening of the gear along the radial crack, this increased the effective number of teeth in the gear. The addition of one tooth would have resulted in blade collision in only 1.5 seconds due to different ratios between the fore and aft rotors. The wear on the case supports this, since the gap would have increased with the load imposed by the driving pinion and effectively expanded the gear until it impacted nearby geometry.
Page 11
not suffer from issues in this regard. This culminated in a short 150 hour test, of an aft transmission, which traditionally given more problems under the -5 design. The FAA accepted this rationale and certified the design in collaboration with the CAA. The expectation of the previous history of the original transmissions indicated even wear between fore and aft transmissions. The work done before and experience with no fatigue issues on the flange lead the designers to believe that fatigue in the joint was only as a result of stresses from the bolt holes. As a result the effect of flange surface damage was not considered. This chain of events indicates a failure on the part of the rigour of the certification process.
9) Bibliography
[1] K.V. Kellaway, F.D. King, P.G. McNeill, and P. Hancock, Aircraft Accident Report 2/88, London: 1988. [2] K.V. Kellaway, F.D. King, P.G. McNeill, and P. Hancock, Aircraft Accident Report 2/88 (Appendices), London: 1988.
Page 12