Argentina Beef Beef has been a tradition in Argentina for two centuries.

It had always exported salted meet and later chilled beef, but with the establishment of "barriers" internationally the Commonwealth preference System, and other environmental factors like World War II, Argentina's international beef market contracted and so it standardised the domestic market. Argentina's beef consumption per capita is almost four times that of Western Europe (70-80 kgs compared to 15-25 kgs) Despite its domestic orientation recently. Argentina is stilt the world's third largest beef producer and fourth in exporting terms behind Australia, Germany and the US. its traditional export markets for lower value products (boned and manufactured -beef) has been lost to subsidised EU supplies and because of other developed country protection measures. However it has maintained or increased its export of high value products (boneless cute, canned beef, frozen beef) which now account for over 80% of export value. Its export value is now near the $800 million mark although only 10% of its total agricultural exports. The Argentina beef industry faced all the "macro* forces described by Porter internally and externally, and the threat of new entrants, but survived. This success was not necessarily built on favourable trading conditions but its ability to maintain international competitiveness through rampant inflation, currency overevaluation, heavy taxation, potential uncertainty and increased competition from substitute products internationally and from the Argentine cereals subsector which was clamouring for more resources, Its success was sustained by a) low cost production of quality beef (climate and extensive grasslands); b) well developed, flexible and transparent livestock marketing system; c) Innovations in beef distribution domestically (butcher chain stores, vacuum packing); d) development of new: international market outlets. (Mid East); and, e) debt rescheduling by banks for livestock and trading enterprises. With recent measures to make the industry viable again, including capacity rationalisation, Argentina beef is now back in profit and. is exporting a little more now

Israel Fresh Citrus Fruit By the early 1950's, fuelled by mass immigration and large capital investments, the citrus subsector grew rapidly. Hectarage rose from 14 000 to over 40 000 hectares. With the well respected "Jaffa" label and the Citrus Marketing Board as the Only exporter (in Porter's term's giving huge, "supplier power") Israel oranges and grapefruit dominated many markets. However, by the late 1970's stiff competition from Spain, Morocco and Cyprus and changing consumer tastes led to a levelling off of demand, and the once powerful, Citrus Marketing Board found it had to shift its orientation from powerful, bargaining seller to a marketer" naturing new demand patterns. Whilst it succeeded in some of its promotion and utilisation campaigns, it increasingly found Itself with excess supply and a product which was less in demand. Consumer tastes had shifted to "easy peeling" oranges and tangerines and sweeter red grapefruit, away from Israeli Shamuti (Jaffa) orange and white grapefruit. The 1980's saw a major decline in international competitiveness and profitability with more than 20% of its planted citrus area uprooted, pack houses mothballed and volume levels falling to 1930's levels. The once powerful Citrus Marketing Board's monopoly was rescinded in 1991. Several factors led to Israel's decline. These included:a) rapid cost inflation in the mid 1980's; b) the strength of the USD vis a vis European currencies. The CMB's unit of accounting was USD; c) a significant rise in international shipping costs in the early 1980's; d) financial crisis within Israel's agricultural settlements; e) improper export product mix; f) conflict of interest in the subsector giving weakened incentives for product innovations and quality; g) inability of the Citrus Marketing Board (CMB) to reposition itself to maintain competitiveness; and, h) Quality and supply of competitors, especially in demanded products for example Spain. The Israeli citrus industry experienced all the problems envisaged by Porter In maintaining industry competitiveness. Bargaining power by the CMD shifted from supplier to the buyer. Competitors had a better product and lower costs and a product that was now demanded. These directly substituted for the Israeli product. However, Israel responded. In 1990 a few cooperatives and processors began processing fruit, despite the unsuitably of the product in many cases, and were able to absorb one million tons of fresh fruit product. Export of processed citrus products (concentrates, bases, essential oils etc) first exceeded its value of fresh fruit in 1984 and are now double the export of fresh fruits. Technological advances and the ability to tailor make to niches has ensured international competitiveness. However, the greatest potential, looks like in the supply of root stock to other producers and processors, although Florida and Brazil are doing the same.