RULE 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR SECTION 1. Who may practice law.

Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. SEC. 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America.Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office: "I,_____________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God." SEC. 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions.Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit Court of Appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination. SEC. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants.All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law ,school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the

university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court. No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. SEC. 6. Pre-Law.No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics.* SEC. 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications.All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within sections 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. SEC. 8. Notice of applications.Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Filipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination. SEC. 9. Examination; subjects.Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation: Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing). SEC. 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing.Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone. Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time, the

Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used. The committee of bar examiners shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given. SEC. 11. Annual examination.Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subject shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon). SEC. 12. Committee of examiners.Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports. SEC. 13. Disciplinary measures.No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provision, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court. SEC. 14. Passing average.In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent. SEC. 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers.Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report. SEC. 16. Failing candidates to take review course.Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another

examination unless they show to the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school. The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject. SEC. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants.An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. SEC. 18. Certificate.The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice. SEC. 19. Attorneys' roll.The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate. SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.It is the duty of an attorney: (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines. (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law; (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law; (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; (f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear.An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal.An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients.Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. SEC. 26. Change of attorneys.An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He

may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. For the payment of such compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and execution issued in pursuant of such judgments, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. (Asamended by Rep. Act No. 636.) SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC Res. dated Feb. 13, 1992.) SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court.The Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court.Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. SEC. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants.A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. SEC. 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio.Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensated in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses. SEC. 33. Standing in court of persons authorized to appear for Government. Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect. SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.In the court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice,No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. SEC. 36. Amicus curiae.Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amid curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. (As amended by Resolution of the Supreme Court, dated May 20, 1968.) SEC. 37. Attorneys' liens.An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same

extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE SECTION 1. Conditions for Student Practice.A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. SEC. 2. Appearance.The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under, the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervening attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. SEC. 3. Privileged communications.The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic. SEC. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision.The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (SC Circular No. 19, prom. Dec. 19, 1986.)

BAR MATTER NO. 702 May 12, 1994 Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a Resolution of the Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994. Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner) Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the instant petition praying that this Court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within their respective jurisdictions. On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further argues that, being a special member of the Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed as notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner likewise claims that Shari'a lawyers cannot be appointed as notaries public in their places of residence and in cities and other pilot centers where Shari'a courts are established because the RTC Executive Judges in Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure certifications from the IBP Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the place where they are applying. Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to be appointed as notaries public because of the policy of the IBP chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP members practically in all municipalities and provinces. The petition is denied. The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers of notaries public are governed by the provisions of the Notarial Law embodied in Sections 231 to Section 241, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 232 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Executive Order No. 41, May 11, 1945 provides: Section 232. Appointment of notaries public. Judges of Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the respective may appoint as many notaries public as the public good requires, and there shall be at least one for every municipality in each province. Notaries public in the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of the

judges of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila to be chosen by the judges of the branches of said court" (Words in parenthesis supplied) Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system of the Philippines. Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated judicial system. Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding that, when said B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of including them "in the funding appropriations." The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as those of Regional Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the Regional Trial Court. The latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court, created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases specifically enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law. The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply that they are on equal footing or are identical with regular courts, for the word "court" may be applied to tribunals which are not actually judicial in character, but are quasi-judicial agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology, Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1 Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are not elevated to this Court by appeal under Rule 41, or by petition for review under Rule 45, of the Rules of Court. Their decisions are final "whether on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit Court or not" 2 and hence, may reach this Court only by way of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, similar to those of the National Labor Relations Commission, or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 3 Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court are different from those required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides: Section 15. Qualifications No person shall be appointed Regional trial Court Judge unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requirement.

In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a Special Bar Examination for Shari'a Courts was authorized by the Supreme Court in its En Banc resolution dated September 20, 1983. Those who pass said examination are qualified for appointment for Shari'a court judges and for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation to Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No. 1083 provides, thus: Art. 152. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years of age, and has passed an examination in the Sharia' and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be given by the Supreme Court for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts. The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, in their respective provinces to appoint notaries public cannot be expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a District Court with the same statutory authority. The authority to appoint notaries public contemplated under Section 232 of the Notarial Law and the corresponding supervising authority over them authorized under Section 248 thereof require the qualifications and experience of an RTC Judge. It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination does not automatically become a regular member of the Philippine Bar, he lacks the necessary qualification to be appointed a notary public. Section 233 of the Notarial Law provides for the qualifications for appointment as notary public, thus: Section 233. Qualifications for Appointment. To be eligible for appointment as notary public, a person must be a citizen of the Philippines (or of the United States) and over twenty-one years of age. He must, furthermore, be a person who has been admitted to the practice of law or who has completed and passed in the studies of law in a reputable university or school of law, or has passed the examination for the office of the peace or clerk or deputy clerk of court, or be a person who had qualified for the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty. In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the provinces, where there are two or more lawyers appointed as notaries public, no person other than a lawyer or a person who had qualified to hold the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty shall hold said office. In municipalities or municipal districts where no person resides having the qualifications herein before specified or having them, refuses to hold such office, judges of first instance may appoint other persons temporarily to exercise the office of notary public who have the requisite qualifications or fitness and morality.

In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts," this Court categorically stated that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to practice only in the Shari'a courts. Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in accordance with the Rules of Court are entitled to practice law before the regular courts. Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681, that: In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the candidate must pass an examination for admission covering the following subjects: Political and International Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec. 11, Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the bar examination, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in all the aforementioned subjects without failing below 50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand, the subjects covered by the special bar examination for Shari'a courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary laws (Adat); (2) Persons, Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions, Wills/Adjudication and Settlement of Property; (4) Procedure in Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated September 20, 1983). It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations are different. The Philippine Bar Examination covers the entire range of the Philippine Laws and jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar Examination covers Muslim personal laws and jurisprudence only. Hence, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination, who is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular courts because he has not passed the requisite examinations for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal Trial Courts as agent or friend of a litigant, if appointed by the latter for the purpose but not before the Regional Trial Courts as only duly authorized members of the Bar may conduct litigations in the latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138). Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is not qualified to practice to qualified to practice law before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a

Lawyer is not possessed of the basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers as notaries public in their respective jurisdiction is DENIED. Very Truly Yours, LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO Clerk of Court By: ( Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA Assistant Clerk of Court Footnotes 1 See Circular 1-91, February 27, 1991. 2 Art 145, P.D. 1083. 3 See Resolution of November 26, 1990, G.R. No. 95895, Heirs of Datu Mangindra Sinsuat, represented by Lourdes Sinsuat v. Datu Haakon Sinsuat and Hon. Corocoy D. Moson, Shari'a District Judge; cf., Tampar v. Usman, 200 SCRA 652 (1991); Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih, 165 SCRA 771 (1988).

Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5. RULE 12 NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance The following shall constitute non-compliance: (a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period; (b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption; (c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period; (d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice; chan robles virtual law library (e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.chan robles virtual law library Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following language in capital letters: YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NONCOMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER. The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for compliance. Credit hours earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of

RULES 11 14 OF BAR MATTER NO. 850, OCT. 2, 2001 RULE 11 GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Section 1. Compliance card Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the day after the end of the member's compliance period. Section 2. Member record keeping

the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. RULE 13 CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE Section 1. Non-compliance fee A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee. Section 2. Listing as delinquent member Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply. RULE 14 REINSTATEMENT Section 1. Process The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it shall be made with notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.

EN BANC [B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999] RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D. CHING, applicant. RESOLUTION KAPUNAN, J.: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching. The facts of this case are as follows: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents: 1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant; 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age of majority. The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:" The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states: 1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official document; 3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens; 4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote; 5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995; 6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625; 7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public; 8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines; 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and 10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees. Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person

was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirtyfive (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, the pertinent portion of which reads: And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated: Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court we held: Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship (p. 52: emphasis supplied) The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. xxx The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he

delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951). Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed. p 359. Citing Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962). Sec. 1. Art IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office; (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippine; (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship; (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

Sec. 1(1), Article III, 1973 Constitution. Sec 1(3), Article IV, 1987 Constitution. BERNAS The constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First Ed. (1987), p. 502. Ibid., citing Convention Session of November 27,1972 and noting that it is also applicable to the 1987 constitution. Art. 402. Civil Code Lim Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 SCRA 84, 88 (1912). Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 SCRA 494, 498 (1911); Lorenzo vs. Collector of Customs, 15 SCRA 559 592 (1910). 5 SCRA 108 (1962). Id., at 110. Id. 59 SCRA 45 (1974). Id., at 52. Id. 199 SCRA 692 (1991). Id at 707-709 (Underscoring Supplied). Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364, 379 (1989).

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATHTAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. RESOLUTION FELICIANO, J.: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar. The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of

good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect: In Re Farmer: 3 xxx xxx xxx This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . . xxx xxx xxx And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . . xxx xxx xxx 4 In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710: It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a

lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license. In Re Keenan: 6 The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it. Re Rouss: 7 Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8 Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice. It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning: . . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187): The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper

administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment: Re Stepsay: 10 The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding. Re Wells: 11 . . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12 Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted

evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character. Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office. Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law. Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J. is on leave. Footnotes 1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of permission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of this Court dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof: "The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following candidates with dismissed charges or complaints, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations:

xxx xxx xxx 3349. Al C. Argosino

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997] RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH RESOLUTION

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then paroled. 2 G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at p. 13; In Re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948), reiterated in Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, 481 (1992). 3 131 S.E. 661 (1926). 4 131 S.E. at 663. 5 69 Idaho 297, 206 P2d 528 (1949). 6 314 Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943). 7 221 NY 81, 116 NE 782 (1917). 8 43 Mich 289, 5 NW 309 (1880). 9 In Re Farmer, supra at 663. 10 15 Cal 2d 71, 98 P2d 489 (1940). 11 174 Cal 467, 163 P 657 (1917).

PADILLA, J.: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that: a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery. b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident. c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death. d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court. The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated: "x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death. Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness. However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Resolution, p. 8.

A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974 PURISIMA BARBA, Complainant, vs. HECTOR S. PEDRO, Respondent. RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.: Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, having obtained an average of 81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the complainant resulting in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter chosen another woman for his bride. After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that his conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole shown to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that youthful indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of prominence in the municipality where he resides, did intercede on his behalf. Accordingly the long-sought privilege of membership in the bar will not be denied him any longer, but with this caveat. He must comply with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock with complainant Purisima Barba. He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January 15, 1969: "In the matter of the petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed the bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of 81.16%, he was not permitted to take his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint against him filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three different occasions accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a matter which when investigated resulted in a report that the complaint was well-grounded, petitioner being prevented thus from taking his oath; the present petition alleging further that petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been employed as community development worker with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) that he has since then conducted himself well in his relations with the community as well as in the performance of his duties as such official, attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior from the Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial Development Officer of the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the Grand

Knight of the Knights of Columbus of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his taking his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer action on such petition until petitioner has given satisfactory proof to this Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima Barba." 1 Thereafter came this resolution of February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in compliance with the resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's oath." 2 Unfortunately, before he could do so in accordance with the above resolution, there was a letter from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer, premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the bar did not represent her true feelings. Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its previous resolution of February 26, 1969, which would have allowed him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to comment. This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant and the respondent, the conclusion is warranted that complainant "had all along thought that the document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine Bar." 3 The parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has maintained all this while. It remains her deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral character, as proven by his failure to marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was twenty seven years old when he committed the acts complained of and he was very much qualified to marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply with his promise to march her to the altar. Instead he married another woman." 4 It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has

behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain period. 5Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire," 6this Court feels that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. 7 It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good standing, that he complies with the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba. WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous resolution of February 26, 1969, is set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution. Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.