1 IN THE 7TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI

2 rOTTNTY OF CLAY
COUNTY OF CTAY -- DIVISION 2
DIVISION 2 Bounty Qp^
3
4 William Duff, ) CASE NO. 07CY-CV06125
5 Plaintiff, )
6 ) ACTION
1 v. ) FOR TRESPASS, AND
8 ) TRESPASS ON THE CASE
9 OFFICER WHXIAM FRAZIER, (SERIAL 3092) )
10 AND )
11 OFFICER ALAN ROTH (SERIAL # 4090) ) VERIFIED
12 Defendants. )
13
14
15 PLIANTIFF INVITES THE COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE September 12, 2007
16
17 To wit;
18
19 The Subject matter being adjudicated in this case is specific to plaintiffs individually held Right of
20 Liberty and Right to own property. Recently, defendants have injected, by way of their motions to
21 dismiss, an additional right of action as subject matter here to be adjudicated; Plaintiffs Right to
22 contract. All of which, plaintiff declares are Rights of Action belonging to Plaintiff. The controversy
23 arises from Defendants and their agent's insistence upon regulating these rights of action;
24
25 1. The attempted regulation upon plaintiff1 s right of action arises from Plaintiff s presence on the
26 public right of way with his property (auto) without;
27 a. State permission in the form of State Driver license;
28 i. Defendants make the statutory claim plaintiff "must" have a State issued Driver
29 license, however, Defendant fails to provide this court with competent evidence
30 that said State Statutory Claim is superior to Plaintiff's Right of action to be on
31 the public right of way with his property where no claim of injury attends.
32 ii. Conversely, plaintiff offers City of Chicago v. Collins et al., Supreme Court of
I
33 Illinois. 175 111. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (Oct. 24, 1898).
34 b. State permission in the form of State issued license tags;

1
The license in the latter-named case is designed to operate upon those who hold themselves out as
common carriers, and a license may be exacted from such as a proper exercise of police power; but no
reason exists why it should be applied to the owners of private vehicles, used for their individual use
exclusively, in their own business, or for their own pleasure, as a means of locomotion. Farwell v. City of
Chicago, 71 III. 269; Joyce v. City of East St. Louis, 77 111. 156; Chy of Collinsville v. Cole, 78 111. 114; Chy
of St. Louis v. Grone, 46 Mo. 575; Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 657; City of Covington v. Woods
(Ky.) 33 S.W. 84 A license, therefore, implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with reference
to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over the
streets of the city without charge and without toll, provided he does so in a reasonable manner.

William duff Page 1 9/14/2007

 -• ^* I H
)

35 i. (see la(i))
36 c. State mandated commercial contract for automobile insurance;
37 i. All insurance companies will not sell automobile insurance to anyone who does
38 not consent to and use the State Driver License. As such, having automobile
39 insurance, while generally being a good idea which plaintiff would have were it
40 possible. However, being impossibility, the law could not expect it.
41 And now
42 d. An automobile (they call a "motor vehicle") that Attorney Generals office now claims;
43 is purchased fraudulently Even though Plaintiff lias entered into evidence in this case a
44 copy of the bill of sale ceding "all Right, Title and interest of every kind" in that
45 automobile to Plaintiff. And to which Plaintiff now adds, a copy of the certified check
46 used to purchase said property (see exhibit Z attached hereto), complete with sellers
47 name and assignment, as further evidence of said ownership.
48
49 From this analysis of the issues, it is becoming apparent there is possibility of a fraud being perpetrated
50 somewhere in this controversy. But is it the Plaintiff that is perpetuating it? Or is it the people in State
51 offices, whom the Attorney General is really acting to protect, who have devised or are perpetuating a
52 scheme designed and implemented into Missouri Statutes that serves to severely diminish the peoples
53 Right to Liberty and to own and use Property, which the State could not ordinarily restrain, all the
54 while generating fines and fees for State Revenue out of what would otherwise be the practice of
55 people enjoying the fruits of their Liberty and property, free from restraint by the State? It should
2
56 come as no surprise, given the path plaintiffs proof is taking us; Plaintiff sees fraud in the latter and
57 none in the former.
58
59 SUMMARY
60
6! In their official capacities, defendants can act only in accordance with powers granted by the people
62 against plaintiff upon subject matter that comprehends an injury plaintiff has done or by some form of
63 contract plaintiff has consented to. Plaintiffs papers filed in this case state expressly he does not
64 consent to any such contract, and certainly not an adhesion contract as defendants are intimating exists.
65
66 Statutes are claims of authority that represent rebuttable presumption of law. Plaintiff has more than
67 rebutted the statutory presumption being subordinate to plaintiffs Right of Action. Defendants do not
68 assert that plaintiff has injured anyone. As such, only one possibility remains that would lend any
69 credibility at all to defendants claims, to wit; The state of Missouri possesses an ownership interest in

we don't know for sure because it is not clearly stated in statute or in practice and it is not stated clearly in any contract

william duff Page 2 9/14/2007

70 the 1996 Buick sufficient to decide its use and disposal. If this were the fact, and what defendants are
71 hiding behind in their assertion of statute, even if it were true, that fact would provide no authority for
72 defendants to put their hands on plaintiff or bind and imprison him. They have NO authority to do so
73 unless an intentional injury is comprehended, (see 4th amendment)
74
75 Lets assume for a moment that it is so. The man that sold the 1996 Buick to plaintiff believed he
76 owned all right, title and interest of every kind in the auto. How do we know? He stated it on the bill
77 of sale (see exhibit B). That would suggest the State has NO interest sufficient to support the statute
78 defendants claim applies here. What could make the statute apply to all motor vehicles without the

79 owners of the property knowing it? How about this scenario;

80
81 When an auto is manufactured, its Statement of origin (MSO) is evidence of all right title and
82 interest in that property (fact). The State comes along and forces the manufacturer, over which the
83 state wields undue power and influence4, and/or its dealers to turn over the MSO to the state upon
84 sale to one of the people (fact). Then the state transfigures and transforms the auto into a "Motor
85 Vehicle" upon which the State issues the buyer a "Certificate of Title"(fact). All of this is done
86 without a clear disclosure to the buyer. All the buyer sees is the certificate of title. The seller
87 assures the buyer they are the proud new "Owner" of the car. The buyer provides the full
88 consideration to the dealer for the property (car)(fact) but the State took ownership of the buyer's
89 property and issued the buyer a certificate of title as recognition for the buyers right to possess and
90 use it. What just happened there? Before we discuss that lets look at a legal definition;

91 • FRAUD, TO DEFRAUD, torts: Unlawfully, designedly, and knowingly, to appropriate

92 the property of another, without a criminal intent.
93 • FRAUD, contracts, torts: Any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce another
94 to fall into an error, or to detain him in it, sv that he may make an agreement contrary to
95 his interest. The fraud may consist either, first, in the misrepresentation, or, secondly, in the
96 concealment of a material fact. Fraud, force and vexation, are odious in law. Booth, Real
97 Actions, 250. Fraud gives no action, however, without damage; 3 T. R. 56; and in matters
98 of contract it is merely a defence; it cannot in any case constitute a new contract. 7 Vez.
99 211; 2 Miles' Rep. 229. It is essentially ad hominem. 4 T. R. 337-8.

3
if you ask 100 people if they own their car, 99.99% will say they do.
4
The Manufacturer is a State created Corporation and therefore subject to State Regulation, (fact)

William duff Page 3 9/14/2007

100 o Fraud avoids a contract, ab initio, both at law and in equity, whether the object be
101 to deceive the public, or third persons, or one party endeavor thereby to cheat the
102 other. 1 Fonb. Tr. Equity, 3d ed. 66, note; 6th ed. 122, and notes; Newl. Cont. 352;
103 1 Bl. R. 465; Dougl. Rep. 450; 3 Burr. Rep. 1909; 3 V. & B. Rep. 42; 3 Chit. Com.
104 Law, 155, 806, 698; 1 Sch. & Lef. 209; Verpl. Contracts, passim; Domat, Lois Civ.
105 p. 1, 1.4,t.6 5 s.8, n. 2.
106
107 Undisclosed to the buyer and by force upon the seller, a third party (The State) stepped into the
108 contractual proceedings between the buyer and seller and took the value of the property without
109 providing any consideration thereto and without the express knowing and voluntary consent of the
110 buyer. The buyer, happy with "their" new property pays for it in lull and then,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, The State,
111 with its new prize bounty enacts statutes, to:
112
113 • Force the buyer, in excess of the full price of the property, to pay a sales tax, annual
114 property tax etc.;
115 • Force the buyer, in excess of their belief in their foil ownership of the property, to follow
116 every "good idea" State statute enacted for the use and disposal of that property, wherever it
117 is.
118
119 Why? Because the state claims an ownership interest in the property. It doesn't openly
120 claim this. The State does it by subterfuge through its "use statutes'0. As here in this case
121 when defendants claim that it is against the statute to buy or sell a "motor vehicle" without
122 assigning the title (certificate of title), what they are saying is, we own it, and it can only be
123 bought or sold according to our rules.
124
125 The scenario I just provided is not an analogy, it is a reality, it is unassailable in fact and in law. It is
126 fact, this is what is being done and that fact clearly identifies the fraud that is apparent in this case.
127 Plaintiffs dealings with the previous owner do not comprehend fraud by either party thereto.
128 Plaintiffs choice not to be party to the fraudulent actions of the corporate State of Missouri is a choice
129 Plaintiff, in his sovereign dominion over his own private domain, does as of Right to Liberty and
130 Property, that being superior to the State Interests being adjudicated here, be they just or be they
131 fraudulent. Plaintiff has no duty to perpetuate fraud. Neither do the office holders herein consumed.
132
133 Plaintiff, recognizing the fraud by State agents, purchased the 1996 Buick, took the fraudulent
134 certificate of title and extinguished it as the property entered plaintiffs domain. Plaintiff correctly
5
In Missouri, many such statutes are located in RSMo chapter 300.

William duff Page 4 9/14/2007

 )
135 owns all right title and interest of every kind in said property and defendants, by force of arms, in an
136 armed criminal action did trespass upon plaintiffs domain, and steal plaintiffs Liberty and property in
137 his Body, his Right of Action, and in his 1996 Buick and personal property therein. Defendants
138 excuse: Criminal enforcement upon a civil matter arising out of a fraudulent act of the State of
139 Missouri.
140
141 Even the Missouri Supreme Court declares all of the acts, complained of by defendants, as being
142 "CIVIL" in nature (that can only mean contractually) and the only reason offenders are tried under
143 criminal rules is that the prosecution has a higher burden of proof attendant to the fines imposed.
144 There is, and there can be, no authority that would support defendants trespasses upon plaintiff and
145 plaintiff is due the remedy sought here.
146
147 This court, and the magistrate designated generally to hold it, are now fully informed of the fraud
148 suborned by defendants and their attorneys and the injuries that is causing plaintiff. Both the court and
149 the magistrate have a duty to seek a remedy against these state actions, just as plaintiff is doing in this
150 action. To ignore the duty is to vacate the office of trust.
151
152 WHEEFORE, this plaintiff, demands this court issue the orders previously entered in this case, with
153 preceape to the clerk for writ of execution thereof, on the seal of the 7th Judicial Circuit Court of
154 Missouri, and without further delay and for all other considerations and support due this plaintiff.
155
156
157 >ate
158 wffih
159 Plaintiff
160
161 Cc: William Duff to: wdd@williamduff.com,
162 William Frazier and Alan Roth to: 1001 NW Barry Rd. Place
163 Kansas City, Missouri C/O KCMO Police Department - North Division
164 EMILY A. DODGE Assistant Attorney General at; a.g@ago.mo.gov and
165 emi ly. dodge(o).ago. mo. aov
166

william duff Page 5 9/14/2007

 Ridge Bank
K. wi it'll I '-i JH-* .»>»•:««

09/08/07
Account: 991112
•Jame: Cashier Checks
Blue Ridge Bank & Trust Co
Vddress: HOLD MAIL
,XXXXXXXXXXX

The image shown below represents an official copy of the original document as processed by our institution

lue Ridge Bank CASHIER'S CHECK H-W/.OIO 901200001057

" andTrusiCo
PAY$
REMITTER: William Duff CENTS

********* «2,850.00
Pay To The Older Ofc Johnny Jones
»»»»»*»»»»»»»»»*»:>*4 05/05/2005 • Two Thousand EijhfHundred Fifty Dollars And Zero Cents

/OOOOJ85000/

200001057 05/10/05 73203370 2850.00

; :
IIIIS I i
«f.CADi
i-
1:1
il CT;

A.
0&02S?
\
oooooooeoi 17"
Hi
«*o
. SSs .
LPS1 L OU KY II 3
89l8£t«473 6 5 / 8 9 / 5
HiiS " SiY. » LH 6£84 17
m
3*3
RftftS

.tp://10.1.1.248/gw-bin/gwgtwy.dlI/print?20050510-103-5-3370-73203370.htm 9/8/2007