Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

186450 April 14, 2010 NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD (NWRB), Petitioner, vs. A. L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from de cisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources Board (petitioner ). A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application for a Cer tificate of Public Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate and maintain a w ater service system in Alijis, Bacolod City. Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondents application on the groun d that it is the only government agency authorized to operate a water service sy stem within the city.1 By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondents CPC application. B ACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due process was violated when it was not allowed to present evidence in support of i ts opposition.2 Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present evidence,3 dr awing respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and BACIWA. Petitioner moved to dismis s the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to the Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005,4 dismissed respondents petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has "exclusive appel late jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission [s] . . . except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC explained: Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended, which has effectively and explicitly removed the Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdicti on over the decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of quasi-judicial agencie s such as [petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the Court of Appeals, very clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this instant petition. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition f or certiorari at the Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of January 25, 2008,5 annulled and set aside the RTC April 15, 2005, holding that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from petitioners decisions. Thus the appellate cour t discoursed. In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Intermedi ate Appellate Court[,] the Supreme Court . . . categorically pronounced the RTCs jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the NWRB consistent with Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this wise: x x x x. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction over actions for annulme nt of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Cour t over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. N o. 1067). This conclusion is also in keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization A ct of 1980, which vests Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to issu e writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or omissions of an inferior court (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Co urt). x x x x.

Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton, the Supreme Court conform ably ruled, viz: "Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization and con trol of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in t he first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case." Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt that [petitioner] NWRB i s mistaken in its assertion. As no repeal is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals or petitions for certiorari of the decisions of quasi-ju dicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph 2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Ru les of Court wherein it is stated that, "If it involves the acts of a quasi-judi cial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all pe titions for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the decisions of quasi-judicial a gencies must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule admits of some excepti ons as plainly provided by the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law or these rules" and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of these exceptions . (italics and emphasis partly in the original; underscoring supplied) Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of February 9, 2009,6 petitioner filed the present petition for re view, contending that: THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER] SI NCE SECTION 89, PD NO. 1067, REGARDING APPEALS, HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED AND REPEALED BY [BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG] 129 AND THE RULES OF COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITS ELF DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CERTIORARI JU RISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER].7 (underscoring supplied) Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasijudicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner c ontends that there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a petition for certiorari over its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than the Court of Appeals.8 Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa B ilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067) otherwise known as the Wate r Code of the Philippines.9 Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed decisio n of the appellate court. The petition is impressed with merit. Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the Intermed iate Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibit ion, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processe s, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.10 Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judici al agencies under Rule 4311 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certio rari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-judicial a gencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the R ules imposes for procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction i s when the law or the Rules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rul e 65.12 The appellate courts construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads : ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be appeal ed to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is s ituated within fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a co py of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discreti on; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law (emphasis and undersc oring supplied), is such an exception, is erroneous. Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of BP 12

9. Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs , Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified: x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciar y Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x x x. (emphasis an d underscoring supplied) The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended repeal un der the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prio r acts."13 In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it.14 Th e legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to provide a homogeneous procedure for th e review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals. More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the power of review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate c ourt gave significant consideration to the ground of "grave abuse of discretion" to thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioners decisions . A reading of said Article 89 shows, however, that it only made "grave abuse of discretion" as another ground to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indee d, the provision was unique to the Water Code at the time of its application in 1976. The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of App eals, then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulatio n of the Rules, clarified and delineated the appellate and certiorari jurisdicti ons of the Court of Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies. Grave a buse of discretion may be invoked before the appellate court as a ground for an error of jurisdiction. It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioners order via certiorari before the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to l ack or excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In other words, it invoke d such ground not for an error of judgment. While Section 9 (3) of BP 12915 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court16 does not list petitioner as "among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final jud gments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over petitioners judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive.17 The employment of the word "among" clearly instructs so.1avvp hi1 BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 a 1987 ca se cited by the appellate court to support its ruling that RTCs have jurisdictio n over judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no longer cont rolling in light of the definitive instruction of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules o f Court. Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton19 is not in point either as the issue raised th erein was which between the RTC and the then National Water Resources Council ha d jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation, utilization and control of wa ter. In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner properly belongs to the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are RE VERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ba colod City dismissing petitioners petition for lack of jurisdiction is UPHELD. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC G.R. No. 154117 October 2, 2009 ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, FRANK LIN M. VELARDE, ROBERT C. NACIANCENO, REY DIVINO S. DAVAL-SANTOS, SOLEDAD S. MED INA-CUE, PATRICK B. GATAN, LUIS V. MEDINA-CUE, SILVESTRE A. DE LEON, RAMON V. DU MAUAL, RUBEN A. DE OCAMPO, MARIANO A. BENEDICTO II, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, LUIS JU AN L. VIRATA, CESAR E. A. VIRATA, MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR., RONALDO B. ZAMORA, FRIS CO F. SAN JUAN and ARSENIO B. YULO Respondents. R E S O L U T I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of t he 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to review and set aside the Resolution1 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman dated November 16, 2001 dismissing, for lack of e vidence, the case filed by petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (hereinafter, pe titioner); and the Order,2 likewise issued by said Office, dated June 24, 2002 d enying, for lack of merit, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS. On 16 April 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-01-05 77 with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that the following respondents, by their individual acts and/or by conspiring and confederating with one another, have committed the offenses/acts enumerated hereunder: a) For violation of Republic Act No. 7080, otherwise known as an Act Defining an d Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, specifically Section 2, in relation to Sectio n 1, sub-paragraph d(1), (3) and (6), as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659[:] 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada former President of the Republic of the Philippines 2. Mariano "Bro. Mike" Z. Velarde 3. Franklin M. Velarde 4. Gregorio R. Vigilar former Secretary of [Department of Public Works and Highw ays (DPWH)] and Chairman, [Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)] 5. Mariano E. Benedicto II Executive Director, TRB 6. Ramon V. Dumaual former Officer-in-Charge, TRB 7. Frisco San Juan former Chairman, [Public Estates Authority (PEA)] 8. John Does and Jane Does b) For violation of Section 3(a) of [Republic Act No. 3019:] 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada 2. Gregorio R. Vigilar 3. Mariano E. Benedicto 4. Ramon V. Dumaual 5. Frisco San Juan 6. John Does and Jane Does c) For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada 2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde 3. Franklin M. Velarde 4. Gregorio R. Vigilar 5. Mariano E. Benedicto II 6. Ramon V. Dumaual 7. Ruben de Ocampo 8. Frisco San Juan 9. Arsenio B. Yulo former Chairman and [General] Manager, PEA 10. Robert Nacianceno former [Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)] Manager and Chairman, Paraaque City Appraisal Committee (PCAC) 11. Patrick B. Gatan DPWH Representative, PCAC Member 12. Luis V. Medina-Cue Pasay City Assessor, PCAC Member 13. Soledad V. Medina-Cue Paraaque City Assessor, PCAC Member 14. Rey Divino Daval-Santos OIC Paraaque City Engineers Office, PCAC Member 15. Silvestre de Leon Paraaque City Treasurer, PCAC Member 16. Ronaldo B. Zamora former Executive Secretary

17. Luis J. L. Virata 18. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. 19. Cesar E.A. Virata 20. John Does and Jane Does d) For violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019; 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada 2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde 3. Franklin M. Velarde 4. Gregorio R. Vigilar 5. Mariano E. Benedicto, II 6. Ramon V. Dumaual 7. Ruben de Ocampo 8. Frisco San Juan 9. Ronaldo B. Zamora 10. Luis J. L. Virata 11. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. 12. Cesar E.A. Virata 13. John Does and Jane Does e) For violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019; 1. Ronaldo B. Zamora f) For violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019; 1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada 2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde 3. Franklin M. Velarde 2. Gregorio R. Vigilar 3. Mariano E. Benedicto, II 4. Frisco San Juan 5. Ronaldo B. Zamora 6. Luis J. L. Virata 7. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. 8. Cesar E.A. Virata 9. John Does and Jane Does [g] For violation of Section 7(a) and (d) of R.A. 6713; 1. Ronaldo B. Zamora3 On May 31, 1990, during the administration of President Corazon Aquino, the Repu blic of the Philippines, through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB),4 granted the P ublic Estates Authority (PEA) a Toll Operation Certificate to construct, rehabil itate, maintain and operate a toll expressway, namely, (a) Seaside Drive at Paraa que to C-6 at Bacoor, Cavite; and (b) Expressway Extension to Noveleta/Kawit. On February 3, 1994, during the administration of President Fidel Ramos, Renong Berhad, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), and the PEA entered into a Memorandum of Un derstanding to jointly undertake the implementation of the tollway project.5 On December 27, 1994, also during the administration of President Ramos, Renong Berhad, MARA and the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement to develop and o perate as a toll road the R-1 Expressway Extension. The entire project became kn own as the "MCTE Project."6 On August 17, 1995, Renong Berhad, MARA, PEA and United Engineers (Malaysia) Ber had entered into a Novation Agreement whereby Renong Berhad assigned to United E ngineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) its rights, liabilities and obligations under t he Joint Venture Agreement.7 On July 26, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the TRB, PEA a nd UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) entered into a Toll Operations Agreem ent (TOA)8 for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the MCTE p roject, which covered the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway, the R-1 Expressway, the C-5 Link Expressway, and the R-1 Expressway Extension. President Fidel Ramos ap proved the TOA on the same day, July 26, 1996. Under the terms of the TOA: 1. UEM-MARA shall design and construct the expressways covered by the TOA; 2. TRB shall ensure the availability and assume responsibility for the acquisiti on of the lands required for the right of way including the costs for procuring the area for the right of way;

3. PEA shall operate and maintain the expressways; and 4. PEA shall advance the funds necessary for the acquisition of the Right of Way subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines.9 On August 9, 1997, the TRB approved the original alignment for the C-5 link. On the basis of this alignment, the TRB issued notices to the owners of all propert ies affected, some of which either belonged to AMVEL Land Corporation (AMVEL) or were part of joint venture agreements between AMVEL and the property owners. Pr ivate respondent Mariano Z. Velarde is the Chairman of AMVEL while private respo ndent Franklin M. Velarde is the Executive Vice President. Among those property owners to whom TRB sent notices were the following: a. Mariano Z. Velarde; b. Asuncion de Jugo; c. Cornelia Medina; d. Rosario Medina; and e. Silvestre Medina.10 Under the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) between PEA and the Republic of the Ph ilippines through the TRB and the DPWH, the obligations of PEA and TRB/DPWH with respect to the acquisition of the right-of-way were set forth. Under the MOA, t he parties agreed that PEA shall have the following obligations: 1. To pay the purchase price of the lots to be expropriated for right of way as determined and requested by TRB/DPWH, x x x 2. To pay the expenses incurred in the relocation or eviction of squatters for t he right-of-way requirements, subject to TRB/DPWHs repayment x x x; 3. The total amount to be disbursed in the acquisition of right-of-way and the a dditional expenses incurred in the relocation and eviction of squatters shall no t exceed the amount borrowed under the loan agreement.12 On the other hand, TRB shall have the following obligations: 1. To identify and locate the lots to be acquired for the right-of-way; 2. To negotiate with individual owners of the lands their purchase price in acco rdance with Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11, 1988, Executive Order No. 368 dated August 24, 1989 and Executive Order No. 369 dated September 14, 1989; 3. To cause the removal and/or relocation of the squatters that may hinder the c onstruction of the expressway; 4. To prepare the necessary documents between the TRB/DPWH and the lot owners an d owners of improvements; 5. To cause the cancellation of the Certificate of Title in the name of individu al lot owners; [and] 6. To certify to the PEA that the lots for payment are free from all encumbrance s and liens in accordance with the TOA. It was pursuant to this MOA that the TRB identified and negotiated with the owne rs of the properties affected by the construction of the Tollway Project C-5 Lin k Expressway. Among the properties affected by the Tollway Project were properti es owned or held by AMVEL Land Development Corporation (AMVEL), namely: Land No Landowner TCT No. Affected Area (sq m) Lot 1-A Corazon & Cornelia Medina 33989 1,520 Lot 1-B AMVEL Land Development Corp. (AMVEL) 33989 6,583 Lot 2-A AMVEL 33988 6,062 Lot B-3-1 ADV Realty Corp. 122510 2,153 Lot 1 AMVEL 33550 6,643 Lot 2-B AMVEL 31446 3,908 Lot 2-C-1 AMVEL 31460 3,813 Lot 2-D-1 Ma. Asuncion de Jugo 113793 753 Lot 2-F-1 Rona Agustines 113796 2,973 Lot 1 Julieta Evangelista, et al. 122378 5,229 Lot 3-A E. Tirona, et al. 133990 16,543 Lot 2-B AMVEL 31988 16,313 Lot 4-A Tirona, et al. 133991 7,075 T o t a l 79,568 Pursuant to the MOA, the TRB requested the Paraaque City Appraisal Committee (PCA

C) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to appraise the affec ted properties. This Appraisal Committee was created by virtue of Executive Orde r No. 329 dated July 11, 1988 as amended by Executive Order No. 369 dated August 24, 1989 specifically for the purpose of determining the fair valuation of prop erties to be purchased or acquired for development and infrastructure projects f or public use.13 On April 21, 1998, PCAC issued Resolution Nos. 98-5,14 98-615 and 98-716 apprais ing properties along Dr. A. Santos Avenue as follows: 1. All lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000 .00) per sq. m.; 2. All lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue particularly along Palasan and Cala ng-Calangan, Bgy. San Dionisio at TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) per sq. m.; 3. All untitled lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HU NDRED PESOS (P17,500.00) per sq. m.; and 4. All untitled lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue along Palasan and Calang-C alangan at FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00) per sq. m.17 On May 6, 1998, the PCAC transmitted copies of Resolution Nos. 98-5, 98-6, 98-7 to the TRB.18 On May 7, 1998, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 98-26, approved the acquisit ion of properties affected by the C-5 Link in accordance with the PCAC appraisal s.19 On May 8, 1998, the TRB, through Ramon V. Dumaual, made Payment Instructions20 t o PEA to pay AMVELs property at P20,000.00 per sq. m. pursuant to the PCAC Recomm endation. On April 28, 1998, PEA received a copy of the Memorandum from then President Fid el Ramos, dated April 27, 1998, regarding the "Request of Bro. Mike Velarde Re: DPWH Road Right of Way Payments/Settlement on C-5 (PEA-Renong Berhad)." The Memo randum contained the handwritten marginal note of then President Fidel V. Ramos directing the DPWH to "Fast-Track the remaining issues NLT April 30, 1998 re the C5-Coastal Road Project in order to alleviate heavy traffic congestion in the a rea." At that time, one of the remaining issues was the payment of the purchase price of AMVEL lands for the right of way, which was then fixed at P20,000.00 pe r sq. m.21 To determine further the fair market value of the affected lands, the matter was referred to three independent appraisers, namely: Asian Appraisal, Inc.; Royal Asia Appraisal Corporation, and Cuervo Appraisal, Inc. On October 6, 1998, Asian Appraisal, Inc. submitted its Appraisal Report22 on th e affected lands. It determined the fair market value at P422,622,000.00 for 130 ,848 sq. m., or P3,229.87 per sq. m. In its letters dated October 19 and 20, 1998, AMVEL questioned the valuation and sought a reconsideration of said appraisal. In reply thereto, the TRB, in its l etter dated October 20, 1998, informed AMVEL that it would commission another pr ivate appraisal company to determine the true market value of the properties in the area. On December 28, 1998, Royal Asia Appraisal Corporation submitted its Appraisal R eport23 on the affected lands. It determined the fair market value at P4,395,179 ,000.00 for 319,398 sq. m., or P13,760.82 per sq. m. In a letter24 dated November 8, 1998, AMVEL also questioned the valuation of Roy al Asia and claimed that it was "not realistically indicative of the prevailing market value of the properties." To break the impasse, AMVEL proposed that a thi rd appraisal be conducted to which then Secretary of the DPWH, respondent Gregor io Vigilar, agreed. For this purpose, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. was engaged to con duct a third appraisal. On December 9, 1998, AMVEL complained of the "long-delayed payment" for its land s while "other landowners adjoining [their] property also affected by the C-5 ro ad right-of-way have already been paid at a price of P25,000.00 per sq. m."25 In his reply dated December 29, 1998, respondent Vigilar took exception to the c laim of AMVEL that there was "long-delayed payment," considering that several ap praisals of the affected properties were made. In the same letter, he proposed t hat the average of the three (3) private appraisals be used as a final valuation

. On January 11, 1999, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. submitted its Fair Market Value App raisal26 of the affected lands. It determined the fair market value at P4,531,75 2,000 for 251,764 sq. m., or P18,000 per sq. m. Further negotiations ensued between the parties. Finally, a consensus was reache d to fix the price by averaging the four appraisals done by MMDA, Royal Asia, As ian Appraisal, and Cuervo. On January 15, 1999, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 99-02,27 approved the p urchase price of P1,221,799,804.00 for the acquisition of a total area of 79,598 sq. m. The average price per sq. m., as approved by the TRB, was P15,350.00. On February 17, 1999, respondent Joseph E. Estrada, then President of the Republ ic of the Philippines, issued Administrative Order No. 50 entitled "Prescribing the Guidelines for the Acquisition of Certain Parcels of Private Land for Public Use including the Right of Way, Easement of Several Public Infrastructure Proje cts." On March 30, 1999, respondent Estrada issued two (2) Memoranda to respondent Ben edicto, the Executive Director of TRB. The first Memorandum28 states: "You are hereby directed to proceed with right of way acquisition of properties covered by the TRB Resolution #99-02 dated January 15, 1999, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations." The second Memorandum29 states: "The contracts for acquisition of the right of way at the C-5 Link of the Manila -Cavite Toll Expressway, stated in Resolution No. 99-02 of the Toll Regulatory B oard, is hereby approved, subject to compliance with existing laws, rules and re gulations. "Further, you are directed to submit to this office a certification, stating tha t the said contracts are above board, that due diligence has been complied with, that these contracts are free from all defects and that the terms of the contra ct are the most advantageous to the government." On March 30, 1999, TRB transmitted to PEA the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by TRB and AMVEL as well as the other parties represented by AMVEL. TRB advised PE A that it shall immediately inform PEA of the approval by the President, and tha t, in the meantime, PEA should take note of the Deed of Sale and prepare for the eventual payment of the properties in accordance with the TOA and the MOA.30 On April 5, 1999, the TRB, in compliance with the Memorandum of the President da ted March 30, 1999 and pursuant to its express obligations under the MOA to cert ify to PEA that the lots to be acquired were free from all liens and encumbrance s, issued its Compliance and Certification31 stating that the Deed of Sale betwe en the Republic of the Philippines and AMVEL Land Development Corp., dated March 30, 1999 "was above-board; that due diligence had been complied with in the neg otiation and execution thereof; that to the best of our knowledge, the same are free from defects and that the terms thereof are not disadvantageous to the Gove rnment." Based on such Compliance and Certification issued by the TRB, PEA paid fifty per cent (50%) of the purchase price to AMVEL.32 On April 8, 1999, respondent Benedicto sent a memorandum33 to the TRB informing it that: a. The parties executed three (3) deeds of sale on [March 30, 1999]; b. The amounts for the right of way acquisition were those stated in the TRBs Res olution No. 99-02; c. Total amount payable of P1,221,766,640 actually lower by 33,244 from the Boar d approved amount of P1,221,799,884. 34 On April 29, 1999, or after nearly a year of negotiations for the purchase of th e properties subject of the Right of Way and upon receipt of the required docume ntation, PEA released the balance of the purchase price for the AMVEL properties .35 II. PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS Petitioner, in his complaint-affidavit36 filed before the Office of the Ombudsma n, alleges irregularities in the above-mentioned transactions. In particular, pe titioner contends that the government acquisition of the AMVEL lands took place

in just two and a half working days, considering that it was Holy Tuesday on Mar ch 30, 1999, the date that respondent Estrada issued the Memorandum to TRB and P EA to proceed with the acquisition of lands for the right-of-way of the C-5 Link of the MCTE Project, and PEA immediately released on April 5, 1999 fifty percen t (50%) of the total purchase price. He points out that Holy Wednesday was a hal f-working day, and what followed was a long holiday, commencing on Holy Thursday and ending on Easter Sunday.37 Petitioner alleges that it was due to the person al intervention of respondent Estrada and his close association with respondent Mariano Velarde that AMVEL was able to close this deal. In his 183-page petition , he alleges: 65. Respondent Mike Velarde received a P685,892,495.00 windfall from the governm ent for a property which he acquired for almost nothing! His only capital was hi s closeness to respondent Estrada and the tremendous amount of influence he wiel ded in the latters administration. Of course, all of these he owes to his mostly impoverished flock who voted for respondent Estrada after "Brother Mike" endorse d him as "tiyak yon."38 Petitioner claims that the nine (9) parcels of land sold by AMVEL to the governm ent, subject of his complaint, were outrageously overpriced. He alleges that the Transfer Certificates of Title covering said parcels of land and their correspo nding areas, declared market values, assessed values and selling prices are as f ollows:39 Transfer Certificate of Title Area (sq. meters) Declared Market Value (P esos) Assessed Value (Pesos) Selling Price (Pesos) 140389 2,153 1,507,100 301,420 33,059,315 140388 6,643 4,650,100 930,020 102,003,265 131446 3,908 1,914,920 382,980 60,007,340 140402 3,813 1,868,370 373,670 58,548,615 140396 9,427 6,598,900 1,319,780 144,751,585 140397 44,669 31,268,300 6,253,660 685,892,495 140404 753 368,970 73,790 11,562,315 140405 2,973 1,456,770 291,350 45,650,415 140408 5,299 2,562,210 512,440 81,366,145 Total 79,638 52,195,640 10,439,110 1,222,841,490 Petitioner likewise claims that based on the 1999 tax declarations, AMVEL sold p arcels of land, which were "undeveloped agricultural lands and salt-making beds (salinar) but which had been reclassified as residential, to the government at a p rice which was more than 2,300% percent of their total declared market value and 11,700% percent of their total assessed value."40 Petitioner asserts that the purchase price for right-of-way acquisition "should be the equivalent of the zonal value plus ten (10%) percent thereof," based on A dministrative Order No. 50,41 which respondent Estrada issued on February 17, 19 99 and was made effective immediately. Since the zonal value of the subject parc els of land was set the year before at Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P4,500. 00) per sq. m. by the Department of Finance,42 the purchase price should have be en Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Pesos (P4,950.00) only, for a total purchase price of Three Hundred Ninety-Four Million Two Hundred-Eight Thousand and One H undred Pesos only (P394,208,100.00). He claims that the price that the governmen t paid (P15,355.00 per sq. m.) was 310% of the zonal value.43 Petitioner argues that "[by] not following the guidelines set by Administrative Order No. 50, the government was defrauded of the staggering amount of [P828,633 ,390.00]" and burdened with the payment of interest. The government was made to pay in full when the guidelines set by said Administrative Order provided that, should the landowner refuse to accept the purchase price, the government would b e mandated to initiate expropriation proceedings and deposit only ten (10%) perc ent of the offered amount.44 Petitioner notes that even respondent Estrada chose not to follow the guidelines prescribed by Administrative Order No. 50 by "directing TRB to proceed with the acquisition and approving [AMVELs] Deeds of Sale." He alleges that there was no legal impediment to its application because the Deeds of Sale for the AMVEL acqu isitions were executed long after the effectivity date of Administrative Order N

o. 50.45 Petitioner questions the findings of the government appraisal body, MMDA-PCAC, t hat the subject parcels of land "have already been developed," and that these we re classified as commercial lands. He relies on "a document found among the reco rds of the Legal Office of the Presidential Management Staff"46 that states that the lands were "formerly salt-making beds (SALINAR) which are not suitable for residential or commercial purposes;" that "AMVEL merely covered these salt facto ries with trash and other low-grade filling materials;" that the properties "did not even have access to the highway .. [until] AMVEL built a bridge from said p roperties to Dr. A. Santos Avenue when it was already negotiating with the gover nment;" and that AMVEL knew beforehand about the proposed highway when it acquir ed the properties at a purchase price of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per sq. m., properties that were later sold to the government at Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Five Pesos (P15,355.00) per sq. m.47 The rest of petitioners allegations were summarized by respondent Office of the O mbudsman in the questioned Resolution,48 which summary we find to be succinct an d hereby quote in part below: The complainant points out that much earlier, in March 1996, the heirs of a cert ain Andres Buenaventura filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance against the Tirona-Medina families before the RTC-Paranaque, docketed as Civil C ase No. 96-0141. The Buenaventura heirs claimed that they were rightful owners o f the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 14729. The Buenaventura heirs caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 14729. This notice of Lis Pend ens was carried over to the subdivided lots covered by TCT Nos. 133988, 133990 a nd 133991. On 06 November 1998, AMVEL submitted to the TRB what it claimed to be a Decision dated 29 October 1998 of the Court of Appeals First Division in CA-G.R. No. 544 02, which supposedly affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Paranaque dismissing the c ase filed by the Buenaventura heirs. The purported Court of Appeals Decision was signed by Associate Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili, Fidel Purisima and Corona Ibay-S omera. The complainant alleges that the supposed 28 October 1998 Decision was falsified and non-existent. In fact, the records of the Court of Appeals show that, on 22 February 1999, "its Docket was instructed to (a)wait result of the investigatio n of NBI as per instructions of J. Valdez." However, based on the same records, nothing was heard or mentioned again about the result of the said NBI investigat ion. Notwithstanding the attempt to defraud the government with the submission of the falsified and non-existent Court of Appeals Decision, TRB did not charge AMVEL and, instead, proceeded with the execution of the Deeds of Sale on 30 March 1999 . The complainant further alleges that the original projected cost of the right-of -way for the MCTE Project at the time the Toll Operation Agreement between the g overnment and the foreign investor, Renong Berhad, was being deliberated in late 1995, was P900 million only. However, by the time the Toll Operation Agreement was approved by the Office of the President on 26 July 1996, the cost of the rig ht-of-way acquisition had already risen to P1.7 billion. The Toll Operation Agreement dated 26 July 1996 itself, in paragraph 5.04 thereo f, likewise provides that "the Grantee (PEA) shall advance the funds necessary f or the acquisition of the Right of Way except land to be reclaimed subject to a limit of [P1.7 million] and such funds shall be reimbursed by the Grantor to the Grantee." As late as October 1998, UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation ("UMPC"), the local su bsidiary of UEM Berhad and a signatory to the Toll Operation Agreement, in a rep ort to the Board of Investments entitled "Manila Cavite Toll Expressway ProjectProject Description October 1998," reported in its Summary of Project Costs that the total right-of-way cost is only P1.7 billion. This is broken down as follow s: C-5 Link Expressway, P1.356 billion; and R-1 Extension Expressway, P344 milli on. UMPC further reported that "TRB on the other hand will be responsible for th e acquisition of the right-of-way which will be financed by PEA in accordance to

the terms and conditions of NEDA as stipulated in the TOA." Also, under the aforesaid NEDA Board Resolution No. 2, the Malaysian government agency, Majilis Amanah Rakyat ("MARA") and Renong Berhads construction affiliate, United Engineers Berhad (UEB), were supposed to advance P900 million of the P1. 7 billion cost of right-of-way acquisition to be guaranteed by the national gove rnment. Further, MARA and UEB would secure foreign currency denominated loans fo r the P900 million that they were willing to advance. It appears that the project proponents did not even comply with the aforesaid co ndition for NEDAs approval of the project. The Malaysian firms were no longer mad e to advance the sum of P900 million. Instead, on 5 December 1997, a Loan Agreement was executed among PEA, as borrowe r, the Republic of the Philippines, as guarantor, and a syndicate of local and f oreign banks, namely, Solidbank Corporation, Far East Bank and Trust Company (no w part of the Bank of the Philippine Islands), Asianbank Corporation, Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank Corporation, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group L imited, Standard Chartered Bank, The Bank of Nova Scotia (Manila Offshore Branch ), The Development [Bank] of Singapore Ltd., and Bank of America (hereinafter co llectively referred to as the "lender banks"). The Lead Arranger for the loan was Exchange Capital Corporation, which is majori ty-owned by respondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. [The] Co-Lea d Arrangers were FEB Investments, Inc. and SolidBank. As earlier mentioned, TRB sent notices of acquisition to the landowners of the p arcels of land that would be affected by the C-5 Link sometime in 1997. Thereaft er, the TRB Officer-in-Charge requested the Paranaque City Appraisal Committee t o appraise the said parcels of land. Thus, the City Appraisal Committee came out with Resolution No. 98-5 dated 21 April 1998 with bloated appraisals of said pr operties. Complainant asseverates that in what appears to be an attempt to "legitimize" th e bloated appraisal made by the Paraaque City Appraisal Committee on 21 April 199 8, on 7 May 1998, TRB and PEA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement which, amon g others, explicitly provides that TRB shall "identify and locate the lots of la nd sought to be acquired for the right-of-way" and "negotiate with the individua l owners of the land the purchase price in accordance with Executive Order No. 3 29 dated July 11, 1998, Executive Order No. 368 dated August 24, 1989 and Execut ive Order NO. 269 dated September 4, 1989." These Executive Orders were even mad e part of the Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant points out that seven (7) months after respondent Mike Velarde g ot his P1,222,841,490.00, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, together with respondents Ronaldo B. Zamora, then Executive Secretary, Gregorio R. Vigilar, t hen Public Works and Highways Secretary, and Frisco San Juan, then PEA Chairman, gave his imprimatur and approval to the proposal of a four (4) month-old, P15 m illion company, the Coastal Road Corporation ("CRC"), to take over UMPC and the P7.73 billion MCTE Project (including the 800-hectare reclamation project along Manila Bay going towards Cavite). This is now the subject of a separate case bef ore the Ombudsman entitled "Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrad a, et al.," docketed as OMB Case NO. 0-00-1758. Complainant Francisco further points out that the beneficial owners of CRC are r espondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. Respondent Luis J. L. Vir ata is also CRCs President and Chief Executive Officer, while respondent Cesar E. A. Virata is CRCs Chairman of the Board and is also a beneficial owner of CRC to the extent of ten (10%) [percent] of its equity. Also, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, in the presence of respondents Ro naldo B. Zamora, Gregorio R. Vigilar and Frisco San Juan, gave his imprimatur an d approval to CRCs proposal to de-prioritize the construction of the C-5 Link Exp ressway, on the one hand, and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, on the other. This was done despite the lack of the requisite evaluation and approval of the TRB Board and the fact that CRC does not have the requisite financial and technical capability and track record to take over the MCTE Project. Worse, the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link despite the P1.85 billion already spent for r ight-of-way acquisitions caused the government tremendous losses in terms of the

interest on the dollar-denominated loan used to fund the said acquisitions. Respondents LUIS J. L. VIRATA and MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR. had another reason for p ushing the prioritization of the R-1 Expressway Extension. Respondents wanted to expedite the development of the Caylabne Bay Resort in Ternate, Cavite. In the words of respondent Luis J. L. Virata, the Caylabne Bay Resort will be developed into a "top-quality resort . . . with a whole bunch of a Mediterranean-looking buildings" and with "a first-class resort operation." In an interview with Mr. P hilip Cu-Unjieng, which appeared in the 7 February 1999 issue of the Philippine Star, respondent Virata himself had categorically admitted how critical is the R -1 Expressway Extension to the development of the Caylabne Bay Resort. The real problem is that under UMPCs project timetable, the construction schedule of the C-5 Link Expressway was set from March 1997 to September 1999, while tha t of the R-1 Extension was set almost near the same period, from October 1997 to September 1999. Thus, the idea is for both expressways to be constructed and fi nished almost at the same time. However, by October 1998, both were already dela yed by eighteen (18) months and fourteen (14) months, respectively. Instead of c orrecting the problem, the government allowed respondent Luis J. L. Virata and M anuel B. Zamora, J. to take over the project despite their lack of financial and technical capability to do so. They even tried to borrow from public funds from the Development Bank of the Philippines to finance their acquisition of UEM Ber hads share in UMPC. Respondents Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Luis Juan L. Virata, Cesar E.A. Virata, Manuel Zamora, Jr., Ronaldo Zamora, Mariano E. Benedicto II, Frisco F. San Juan, Ruben A. de Ocampo, and Ramon V. Dumaual filed individual CounterAffidavits; while respondents Robert C. Nacianceno, Reydivino Bernabe Daval-Sant os, Soledad Samonte Medina-Cue, Patrick Beltran Gatan, Luis Vicente Medina-Cue, and Silvestre San Agustin de Leon, all members of PCAC, filed a Joint Counter-Af fidavit. Respondents Joseph Estrada and Arsenio Yulo were ordered to file their counter-affidavits, but they did not file any. Based on its findings of fact, the Office of the Ombudsman resolved to dismiss t he case for lack of evidence.49 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration50 on January 14, 2002, alleging th at serious errors of law and/or irregularities had been committed prejudicial to his interest, as follows: 1. The Ombudsman did not conduct fact-finding in the instant case and pursue inv estigation requested by the complainant. 2. The Ombudsman did not issue the subpoena duces tecum requested by the complai nant as would afford the complainant the chance to file a reply-affidavit. 3. The inhibition of Desierto came too late since he had already prejudged the c ase. 4. The Ombudsman did not act on the motion for the inhibition of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. At any rate, Gervacio, out of delicadeza or sense of decency, should have voluntarily inhibited himself. 5. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman does not have authority to approve the dismissal of the instant case. 6. The Ombudsman took at their face value the arguments of, and interpretation o f the law by, the respondents, on the one hand, and totally disregarded the evid ence of complainant, on the other. 7. In their haste to dismiss the instant case, Desierto and Gervacio did not con sider additional evidence submitted by the complainant. 51 Respondent Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an Order52 dated June 24, 2002. III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors against the questioned Reso lution and Order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman: I The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law in ruling that "the tr ansaction/negotiation for the purchase of affected lands was consummated as earl y as May 1998" and that "Administrative Order No. 50 finds no application to the already perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL.

II The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, in concluding, without basi s in fact, "that respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in determini ng a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties in question" and in not fin ding that respondents committed plunder and/or graft. III The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that responde nts committed plunder and/or graft when they changed the original alignment of t he Sucat Interchange which increased the affected land area of Amvel from 63,629 sq. mtrs. to 80,256 sq. mtrs. or a difference of 16,897 sq. mtrs. which was sol d to the government for about P259,115,495.00. IV The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that responde nts committed plunder and/or graft when respondent Mike Velarde made a billion-p eso killing from the transaction. V The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that responde nts committed graft when they proceeded with the transaction despite the fact th at 44,699 sq. mtrs. of land sold to the government did not have a clean title at the time of sale. VI The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that responde nts committed plunder and graft when they bloated the cost of the road-right-ofway and depleted the proceeds of the US$68.6 Million loan for right-of-way acqui sition. VII The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that responde nts committed graft when they de-prioritized the R-1 Expressway Extension over t hat of the C-5 Link Expressway. VIII The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack o r excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately did not conduct fact-finding to ga ther more evidence in the case below despite repeated requests by the complainan t. IX The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack o r excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately failed to act on motions to issue subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to further strengthen the case. X The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he failed to act on the motion for the inhibition of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. Likewise, Overall Deputy Ombudsman G ervacio committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction wh en he failed to voluntarily inhibit himself out of delicadeza or a sense of dece ncy. IV. THEORY OF RESPONDENTS A. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS ROBERT C. NACIANCENO, REYDIVINO B. DAVAL-SANTOS, SILVE STRE S.A. DE LEON, PATRICK B. GATAN, SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, AND LUIS V. MEDINA-C UE The case docketed as OMB-0-01-0577 is "primarily an action to hold them accounta ble for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Prac tices Act, on account of their approval, in 1998, of PCAC Resolution No. 9805 .. . as the same resolution had been allegedly used to justify the alleged over-pri cing and related graft and corrupt practices of other respondents in connection

with the acquisition of lands by the national government, in 1999, for the right of way of the C-5 Link of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project". Respondents were "charged in their respective [capacities] as the Chairman and m embers of the [PCAC] created under [Executive] Order No. 329, as amended by Exec utive Order No. 369, primarily for the determination of the reasonable compensat ion to be paid to properties that will be affected by public works and projects in Paraaque City."53 Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, under which respondents are charged, provides : (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving a ny private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discha rge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partia lity, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall ap ply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Underscoring supplied b y respondents.) Respondents claim that they are neither alleged nor shown to be, as they in fact are not, "officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."54 Respondents assert that PCAC Resolution No. 98-5 is recommendatory in nature, an d that the adoption of the recommendations was within the prerogative and discre tion of the implementing officers, most of all Fidel V. Ramos, then the Presiden t of the Republic at the time of issuance of said resolution. Respondents note that the alleged acts of plunder and graft and corrupt practice s attributed to the other respondents have been shown to have transpired during the incumbency of respondent Joseph E. Estrada as President of the Republic, and after the issuance of said PCAC Resolution No. 98-5.55 Respondents further argue as follows: [PCAC] had undertaken diligently and carefully the study and evaluation of the p roperties that will be affected by the C-5 Link Expressway in Barangay San Dioni sio, Paraaque City, taking cognizance of the sale of comparable property, the app licable BIR Zonal Value, the opinion solicited from the residents of the propert ies near the subject parcels of land, the condition or status of the parcels of land, the presence of other buildings and structure near the vicinity of the pro perties, and the consequential damages to the owners of the affected properties. And, contrary to the allegation of petitioner, the BIR Zonal Value (6th Revisio n) which took effect on February 2, 1998 provides for P20,000.00 per sq. m. valu e for commercial land along Dr. A. Santos Avenue; and P30,000.00 per sq. m. valu e for Commercial land along Ninoy Aquino Avenue; furthermore, while the allegati ons of the complainant that the zonal value of the residential regular (RR) land s in Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City, was fixed by the Departme nt of Finance at P4,500.00 per sq. m. just a year before the AMVEL sale, the sam e department has fixed the zonal value of commercial land along Dr. A. Santos Av enue, Brgy. San Dionisio, Paraaque City at P20,000.00 and along Ninoy Aquino Aven ue at P30,000.00 per sq. m. Paraaque City Ordinance No. 97-08, prescribes the lan d use plan and the zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque, [and] provides that th e lands along Dr. A. Santos Avenue is classified as within C-3 high intensity co mmercial zone.56 (Emphasis added) [The] valuation of the subject properties is justified, and shown to be consonan t and consistent with existing accepted appraisal practice and procedures in the appraisal of properties, considering that: a) The appraisal of the properties was based on such factors as location, access ibility, selling prices of comparable properties, opinion of people living withi n the vicinity of the subject properties, the amenities present like water, elec tricity, transportation and communication with the vicinity of the property and the status or condition of the parcels of land. The Committee has noted that the parcels of land have been developed to mean a great change in its former condit ion as salt beds or Salinas and the complainant has acknowledged this truth in h is complaint when he stated that the former salt beds are filled up or covered b y filling materials;

b) During the ocular inspection conducted by the technical committee tasked to i nspect the subject properties, these parcels of land were already filled and dev eloped. c) Ordinance No. 98-08, which prescribed the land use plan and zoning of the Mun icipality of Paraaque, provides that Barangay San Dionisio where subject properti es are located, is within C-3 high intensity commercial zone.57 B. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MARIANO Z. VELARDE AND FRANKLIN M. VELARDE Private respondents Velarde allege that the transactions involving the purchase of the subject nine (9) parcels of land were perfected before Administrative Ord er No. 50 came into effect. The sale was perfected on May 8, 1998, almost a year before the issuance of Administrative Order No. 50, when the TRB sent a letter to the PEA instructing the latter to prepare the checks representing payments fo r the subject properties.58 Private respondents Velarde aver that Amvel never questioned the amount of the p urchase price, gave its imprimatur to the purchase price set by TRB, and the las t thing to be done was the actual receipt of the checks in payment thereof by Am vel. Unfortunately, however, Amvel was not paid. Instead, TRB conducted a series of appraisals of the subject property. As of December 9, 1998, Amvel wrote to the DPWH Secretary, asking that it be pai d the purchase price set by the PCAC as directed by TRB.59 In a letter dated Jan uary 20, 1999, TRB informed Amvel that it was willing to purchase the latters pro perties at a price arrived at by adopting a formula close to averaging all four (4) appraisals obtained from the PCAC, as well as the three (3) private appraisa l companies.60 Thereafter, TRB issued Resolution No. 99-02 on January 15, 1999 a pproving the purchase of the subject properties in the aggregate amount of P1,22 1,799,804.00.61 On April 22, 1999, Amvel was able to receive full payment of the agreed purchase price, but the amount received was P1,221,766,640.00.62 Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not overpriced. The p roperties were zoned and classified as commercial areas, not agricultural or res idential. Massive development and improvement works were immediately carried out and introduced after these properties were acquired by Amvel through purchase o r joint venture agreements.63 Private respondents cited several factors why a higher appraisal value than the one eventually used should be adopted, and these are: a. The PCAC, as early as April 21, 1998 (way before the election of respondent E strada to the presidency in the May 10, 1998 elections), had already fixed the p rice of the properties on the site, along with those found in the area: between P20,000.00 and P25,000.00 per sq. m. b. In 1997, the site was appraised at P18,000.00 per sq. m., and a portion of th e same with an area of 49,316 sq. m. covered by TCT No. 133550 was given a devel opment loan accommodation by Metrobank in the amount of P550,000,000.00. c. The current Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation appraised the vi cinity at P25,000.00 per sq. m. Private respondents claim that the other properties affected by the C-5 Link Pro ject adjacent to and near the vicinity of the site were acquired and paid for by the government at P25,000.00 per sq. m. in accordance with the MMDA appraisal.6 4 For the subject properties, the government was able to save P4,645.00 per sq. m.65 The private appraisal companies were engaged by TRB and not Amvel. The final pur chase price was imposed upon Amvel by the government, and respondents Velarde ha d no hand in fixing the said amount. Private respondents Velarde merely acted wi thin the bounds of their duties and powers as officers of Amvel. It was only nat ural that they would negotiate for an amount most advantageous to the said compa ny. The fact that the purchase price of the subject properties considerably plum meted would certainly negate the allegation that respondent Mariano Z. Velarde e xerted influence on respondent Estrada or any other public officer for that matt er. Furthermore, private respondents aver that, except for a small portion, Amvel ac quired the properties at prices ranging from not less than P7,500.00 per sq. m.

to as high as P9,000.00 per sq. m. Petitioner thus failed to take into considera tion the significant incidental expenses for the acquisition, consolidation, imp rovement and development of the subject properties. Private respondents claim that the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project has actu ally resulted in the significant reduction and decrease of the affected areas, t hat is, from the original 12 hectares to 7.9 hectares. Hence, petitioner complet ely erred in claiming that the realignment had actually resulted in a greater pr ofit to Amvel. The subject property, measuring 79,568 sq. m., was just 34.28% of the total area of the site, which was 232,078 sq. m. To provide a background of the transactions leading to the purchase by the gover nment of the subject properties, private respondents gave its version of the ant ecedent facts, as follows: a. As early as June 1994, a company by the name of "ADV Realty" had set its sigh ts in developing [a] large expanse of undeveloped parcels of raw lands around th e Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaqu e City into a commercial and business park by entering into various joint ventur e agreements with several landowners, particularly the Medina-Tirona family.66 b. A large amphitheater would also be constructed to serve as a multi-purpose co mplex that would principally serve as the venue for the weekly prayer meetings a nd healing sessions of the members of the El Shaddai Movement of which herein re spondent Mariano Z. Velarde is the Servant Leader. c. In order to consolidate the whole area, joint ventures were likewise forged w ith the other landowners of the adjacent properties who were all prominent famil ies of Paraaque City (e.g., Medina-Evangelista, Balinghasay and Santos). More imp ortantly, for those properties that were not available for joint venture, ADV Re alty acquired them by purchase. d. In 1996, development efforts were immediately poured and instituted into the properties in accordance with the master plan and the business development conce pts for the area. In 1997, ADV Realty was able to consolidate a 23-hectare prope rty and pre-development operations thereon were in full blast. ADV Realtys name w as then changed into Amvel Land Development Corporation. e. However, Amvel was notified by the government, through the TRB, in the last q uarter of 1997 that the site will be affected by the C-5 Link Project. Ex-presid ent Fidel V. Ramos was still the incumbent president at that time. f. Upon examining the proposed alignment of the aforesaid project, Amvel was sur prised to find out that it would cut across right at the center of the site. Thi s would render the whole property unattractive to prospective investors as the C -5 Link Project would block all possible ingress to and egress from the property , making accessibility a major concern. g. This would entail a re-evaluation and a radical change in the master plan of the commercial and business park. Once the C-5 Link Project would be constructed , the remaining property of Amvel would be divided into two (2) portions. Both p ortions would be enclosed by the proposed C-5 Link Project and the rivers found on the north and west side of the property. h. Even other property owners in the area, most notably the SM Holdings Property and ADELFA Property, Inc., also raised objections to the C-5 link Project as th e original plan of the said Project posed serious threat to their respective dev elopmental plans for their properties. i. As a result, Amvel, along with SM Holdings Property and ADELFA Property, Inc. , negotiated for the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project. j. As a consequence thereof, Amvel was constrained to construct another bridge a s a passageway for the portion located at the southern side of the property. To accomplish such a task, Amvel was forced to purchase the property where the brid ge would be constructed. k. The final re-alignment plan that was jointly prepared by Amvel, SM Prime Hold ings and ADELFA Properties, Inc. and duly approved by the TRB, had actually and in reality resulted in the substantial reduction of the portion of the site that would be affected by the C-5 Link Project. From the original area of TWELVE (12 ) hectares, it was reduced to only 7.9 hectares. l. Had Amvel really intended to capitalize on the business opportunity brought a

bout by the C-5 Link Project, as wrongfully alleged by petitioner, it could have proposed a re-alignment plan that would consume a larger portion of the site. Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not bought by Amvel f or the purpose of selling them to the government, in the light of the proposed c onstruction of the C-5 Link Project. After Amvel and TRB finally agreed on the t erms of the sale, all the portions of the site that were caught along the path o f the C-5 Link Project were sold to the government.67 These properties are descr ibed in the following table: TCT No. Original Size (sq m) Previous owner Date of JVA/ Purchase Size sol d to govt. 140397 140396 122,694 10,099 Emmanuel Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T. Medina (JVA with ADV Realty) November 16, 1994 44,669 9,427 140388 49,316 Josefina, Adelaida, Jose and Teofilo, all surnamed Balinghasay Purchased by ADV realty on January 23 1998. 6,643 140389 15,721 Balinghasays Purchased, by ADV Realty on January 21, 1997 2,153 140402 3,813 Arcadio C. Santos Purchased by ADV realty on September 12, 1997 3,813 131446 3,908 Victor B. Santos Purchased by ADV Realty in 1997 3,908 140404 140405 2 parcels 19,543 sq m Ma. Asuncion Jugo, Jose Ramon L. Santos and Rona S. Agustines JVA with ADV Realty on May 27, 1997 753 2,973 140408 62,448 Leonor Crisostomo, Julieta, Amelia, Elizabeth, Angela Katrina an d Kristina Isabela, all surnamed Medina Land Development Agreement with ADV Real ty on December 19, 1996 5,229 The properties acquired by the government that were previously owned by (1) Emma nuel Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T. Medina; (2) Ma. Asuncion Jugo, Jose Ramon L. Santos and Rona S. Agustines; and (3) Leonor C risostomo, Julieta, Amelia, Elizabeth, Angela Katrina and Kristina Isabela, all surnamed Medina, were all part and parcel of larger tracts of land that were sub ject of several joint venture agreements. The remaining portions were developed in accordance with the undertaking of Amvel under said agreements. In a Memorandum of Agreement68 dated February 2, 2000 entered into by Emmanuel T irona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T. Medina, and Amvel , the latter paid the former the amount of P320,000,000.00 as their share of the purchase price paid by the government in acquiring the portion of the property subject of the Development Joint Venture Agreement (with a Lease Clause) entered into by the same parties. Private concrete roads were already constructed within the vicinity and modern d rainage systems were already installed therein. More than one (1) million cubic meters of soil were deposited on the site to raise its elevation above the highe st flood level recorded in the area, appropriately compacted with the use of hea vy equipment as required in a business/commercial land use. If Amvel had an advance information that the C-5 Link Project would traverse a p ortion of the site way back in 1996, then it should have only focused its sight and poured its resources on the 79,568 sq. m. of land affected by the said Proje ct by simply purchasing only to the extent of the same. Because of the intrusion of the C-5 Link Project into its property, Amvel had to re-evaluate and change the master plan to conform to the significant changes in the shape and configura tion of the site, which was destructively broken into two parts by the C-5 Link Project. That the C-5 Link Project greatly reduced the viability and marketabili ty of the intended commercial and business park is beyond cavil, as the construc tion of the C-5 Link Project would leave Amvel with a property enclosed or bound ed by a highway and rivers without any access, thereby forcing it to incur major additional costs and expenses to build the necessary bridges and access roads t o connect the remaining portions to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue.

Amvel, as a consequence of the Project, likewise incurred delays in introducing the needed developments it undertook to infuse into the property, subject of the Land Development Agreement it entered into with the Medina family. The amount o f P10,000,000.00 was paid by Amvel to the Medina family as penalty for the afore mentioned delay.69 Respondents Velarde allege that they had no participation whatsoever in the prep aration of the fabricated CA Decision70 dated October 29, 1998 in Buenaventura-S antiago, et al. v. Sps. Medina, et al., docketed as CA G.R. No. CV 54402. Amvel received a copy of said decision on November 25, 1998. After receiving the same, Amvel immediately furnished a copy to the TRB and the Register of Deeds of Paraa que City, to have the same annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title cover ing the parcels of land subject of the aforesaid case. When Amvel tried to secur e a certified true copy of the said decision from the CA, as required by the Reg ister of Deeds and the TRB, it discovered that the case was still pending for re solution and no such decision had been promulgated. Amvel sent a letter dated Fe bruary 8, 1999 to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City to explain what happened and request that the annotations already made on the titles be immediately canc eled.71 On the same date, Amvel sent a letter to the TRB informing the latter of its discovery that the alleged decision was spurious.72 Amvel requested that th e CA conduct a full-blown investigation regarding the matter. C. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT DUMAUAL73 Respondent Dumaual was Officer-in-Charge of the TRB from November 28, 1997 to Se ptember 8, 1998. In his statement of the facts, he pointed out that the alignment of the C-5 Link Expressway project was revised on April 1998 because, during the discussion wit h AMVEL on the acquisition of right-of-way ("ROW") for the revised alignment, it was found that an area between the south slip road and the main C-5 Link would not be acquired for ROW, which in effect would have produced a pocket with limit ed use.74 On September 16, 1998, a Memorandum was sent by respondent to the Board suggesti ng that "the south slip road be located nearer to the main C-5 Link to maximize use of real estate." As of that date, TRB was still unable to formalize the tran saction with AMVEL and to pay the latter. Respondent Dumaual, despite due dilige nce, was unable to determine the veracity of the relevant titles submitted for p ayment. He wrote to the TRB about the problems with the titles and recommended t hat said properties be expropriated. He was relieved as OIC of TRB on September 8, 1998 and had no more personal knowledge regarding the other allegations of pe titioner.75 D. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIGILAR Private respondent Vigilar raises the following grounds for the dismissal of the petition: 1. The petition is not the proper remedy. Petitioner cannot invoke Rule 45 to qu estion the subject resolution and order of the Ombudsman. 2. The petition fails to raise any question of law. 3. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman acted correctly, on the basis of evi dence presented, in dismissing the complaint considering that a. Private respondent Vigilar, being the ex-officio chairman of the TRB during t he relevant period, was in no position to be legally responsible for the TRBs acq uisition of AMVELs properties. b. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning the right-of-way for the C-5 Link was perfected before the promulgation of Administrative Order No. 50. c. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning the right-of-way for the C-5 Link is valid, regular, and complies faithfully with Executive Order No. 13 2, the law governing at the time the contract of sale was perfected. The said pu rchase was not grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. d. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause for the crime of pl under against private respondent Vigilar. e. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause for violation of Se ction 3 (A), (E), (G) and (J) of Republic Act 3019 against private respondent Vi gilar.

f. The petition, like petitioners complaint before the Ombudsman, is built on mal icious half-truths, hearsay and even fabricated evidence. Private respondent Vigilar avers that he only exercised administrative supervisi on over the TRB under the provisions of Sec. 38, Ch. 7, Book IV of the Revised A dministrative Code of 1987; and that he acted in good faith, relying on the reco mmendation of the technical officers of the TRB, and cites Arias v. Sandiganbaya n76 to support this averment. He asserts that as early as May 7, 1998, the TRB had already approved the proper ties to be affected by the C-5 Link based on the PCAC recommendation of P20,000 per sq. m., and such approval was made in accordance with Executive Order No. 13 2, the law then prevailing. Unfortunately, the TRB had limited funds, so, hoping for a lower price, it started negotiations with the property owners, including AMVEL. The TRB and AMVEL agreed subsequently that the price should be adjusted b y hiring independent appraisers and getting the average of the values to be dete rmined by these independent appraisers and the values stated in the PCAC resolut ions. Later, on January 15, 1999, in keeping with that agreement, the TRB approv ed the new, substantially reduced purchase price of P15,350.00 per sq. m. More t han a month later, on February 17, 1999, Administrative Order No. 50 was promulg ated setting new standards for the determination of the fair and reasonable valu e of private lands that would be expropriated for government infrastructure proj ects. This Administrative Order was intended to supplant Executive Order No. 132 . Private respondent alleges that it is a basic fact that a "contract of sale is p erfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the o bject of the contract and upon the price" (Article 1475 [1], Civil Code). Theref ore, at the time TRB and AMVEL agreed as to the process for determining the purc hase price, the contract of sale was already perfected. The requisites for a valid price in a contract of sale are: (1) it must be real; (2) it must be in money or its equivalent; and (3) it must be certain or ascert ainable at the time of the perfection of the contract (Articles 1471, 1458, 1468 , 1469 and 1473, Civil Code).77 Under Article 1469, price is considered certain if "it be so with reference to another thing certain, or that the determination thereof be left to the judgment of a specified person or persons." Said article further provides: "Even before the fixing of the price by the designated third p arty, a contract of sale is deemed to be perfected and existing." Private respondent Vigilar avers that from the time AMVEL agreed sometime in the middle of 1998 that the price would be the average of the values stated in the independent appraisers reports and the PCAC resolutions, the government could no longer re-negotiate for a lower price. Thus, even before the TRB approved the pr ice at P15,350.00 per sq.m. on January 15, 1999, the price had already become ce rtain. It was immaterial that the Deeds of Sale were signed later. The execution of these Deeds of Sale was a mere formality; it was meant to document a contrac t that had been perfected earlier.78 Private respondent claims that applying Administrative Order No. 50 retroactivel y to the contract between the TRB and AMVEL violates Article 4 of the Civil Code , which provides that "[l]aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contr ary is provided." Administrative Order No. 50 does not state that it is exempt f rom this rule; it does not provide for retroactive effect. Petitioner has not shown that private respondent Vigilar, as Secretary of the DP WH and concurrent TRB chairman, amassed any ill-gotten wealth to warrant a charg e of plunder. Petitioner does not allege that private respondent Vigilar receive d any money or derived any benefit, of any kind, from the right-of-way acquisiti on of the affected lands. Regarding the allegation that he violated Sec. 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, private r espondent points out that it is not clear whether he was accused of being the pu blic official who persuaded, induced, or influenced another public officer to pe rform an act in violation of rules and regulations; or the one who was so persua ded, induced, or influenced. Petitioner likewise failed to prove that the elemen ts of violation of Section 3 (a), (e), (g) and (j) of Rep. Act No. 3019 have bee n committed by private respondent Vigilar. Thus, petitioners case against him is

inadequate. Private respondent argues that petitioner likewise failed to prove conspiracy. H e states that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.79 He cites the "w ell-settled rule" that "conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission o f the offense itself."80 Petitioner alleges that respondents Estrada, Ronaldo Zamora, and Vigilar gave th eir imprimatur to the takeover by the Coastal Road Corporation of the UMPC, as w ell as the de-prioritization of the construction of the C-5 Link when, on Novemb er 23, 1999, they were present in a "photo-op" that took place in Malacaang. Priv ate respondent avers that the "photo-op" was staged by Cavite government officia ls to show their constituents that the MCTE Project was being fast-tracked. Resp ondents merely graced the occasion in response to requests made by these local o fficials. They could not be taken to court simply because of this; otherwise, it would be "guilt by photograph," which was contrary to plain and common sense.81 Private respondent points out petitioners reliance on a certain "executive summar y"82 to support the latters allegation that the subject transaction was grossly a nomalous. This document, according to private respondent, has absolutely no evid entiary value, as its origin is unknown, and it is unsigned. As regards petition ers submission of a Special Report dated August 16, 2000 from the Philippine Dail y Inquirer as evidence, private respondent points out that newspaper and magazin e articles are "hearsay twice removed and have no evidentiary value whatsoever." Private respondent Vigilar cites in support of this contention the decision lai d down by this Court in People v. Woolcock, et al.83 E. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Public respondent raises the following grounds for the denial of the instant pet ition: 1. The assailed resolution and order of the public respondent are not appealable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2. Petitioner has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the transactions involving the purchase of the AMVEL lands under Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937 are unlawful or irregular. 3. Whether under Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1999 or Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937, respondents substantially complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties in qu estion while exercising the power of eminent domain. 4. There is no law or particular rule that prohibits the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project. 5. There is nothing unlawful or irregular in getting a reasonable return on inve stment; neither is there evidence of bloating of prices. 6. Petitioners assertion that TCT No. 140397 (formerly TCT No. (S-14729) 876474) comprising fifty-six (56%) percent of the total area sold by AMVEL to the govern ment was not a clean title is rendered moot and academic by the Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 April 1999 and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and bet ween the contending parties. 7. The public respondent cannot act on complaints based on mere speculations and conjectures. 8. Matters that are left to the exercise of wisdom and discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman are not appealable under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Pro cedure, and absent any jurisdictional infirmity, the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause, or the lack of it, deserves great respect and finality. According to public respondent, the law on sales contemplates the consummation o f the sales transaction at the moment there is a meeting of minds of the parties thereto, upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. 84 In the case at bar, the meeting of the minds for the purchase of AMVEL proper ties occurred on May 8, 1998, the date TRB instructed PEA to pay the checks for the properties expropriated through the mode of voluntary sales. Public responde nt alleges: Significantly, the purchase transactions over the subject properties are negotia ted ones. On 9 August 1997, notices of acquisition were sent by TRB to the affec

ted landowners. In view of the acceptance by AMVEL of the amount offered by the government during the negotiation process, no expropriation proceeding was initi ated in court. Upon appraisal by the [PCAC], the parties successfully arrived in to an agreement as to the value or purchase price of the affected properties on or before 08 May 1998, as evidenced by a letter sent by respondent Ramon V. Duma ual, Officer-in-Charge, Toll Regulatory Board, to the Public Estates Authority, instructing the latter to prepare the checks representing payments for the subje ct properties. It is therefore clear that the governing law at that given time w as still Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937, and not Administrative Order N o. 50, which took effect on 17 February 1999.85 Public respondent Ombudsman contends that in claiming that the subject propertie s were overpriced, petitioner failed to consider that the transactions were ente red into by the State in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, which nece ssarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. P ublic respondent asserts that "[the] appraisal or assessment of the property sub ject of the taking is not based solely on the market value or zonal valuation ma de thereof by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)."86 Administrative Order No. 50, which petitioner believes should have been followed , provides the following standards for the assessment of the value of the land: SECTION 3.Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expro priation Proceeding. x x x (a) The classification and use for which the property is suited; (b) The developmental costs for improving the land; (c) The value declared by the owners; (d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; (e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of improvements thereon; (f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land ; (g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and (h) Such facts and events so as to enable the affected property owners to have s ufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as thos e required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as e arly as possible. Executive Order No. 132 issued on December 27, 1937, on the other hand, laid dow n the following procedure: (i) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City or District Engineer or oth er officials concerned shall make the necessary negotiations with [the] owner of the property needed for public use with a view to having it donated, or sold to the government at not to exceed the assessed valuation prior to the investigati on and survey of the project. (j) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall forthwith and by for mal notification submit the matter to an Appraisal Committee which is hereby cre ated and which shall be composed of the Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman, and t he District Engineer and the District Auditor, as members, of the province where the land is located. If the property is situated in a chartered city the Apprai sal Committee shall be composed of the City Treasurer, as Chairman and the City Engineer and City Auditor, as members thereof. x x x Public respondent contends that there was sufficient compliance with the guideli nes and prescribed procedure set forth in both issuances. The referral to PCAC f or the determination of the fair market value of the properties was in order. PC ACs appraisal of P20,000.00 per sq. m. was a result of several factors: assessing the location accessibility; selling prices of comparable properties; the amenit ies present like water, electricity, transportation and communication within the vicinity; and the status or condition of the parcels of land. TRBs act of subjec ting the properties to another round of appraisal by independent appraisal compa nies was but a manifestation that it was protecting the governments interests by ensuring that it would not be put to a disadvantageous position by the appraisal recommended by PCAC. The result of the appraisals conducted by the three indepe

ndent appraisal companies led TRB to come up with an average appraisal in the am ount of P15,355.00 per sq. m. in purchasing AMVELs properties. The amount was bel ow the original recommendation of PCAC to purchase AMVELs properties at P20,000.0 0 per sq. m. The determination of this just compensation price was fair and reas onable. The Zonal Valuation (6th Revision) that took effect on February 2, 1997 fixed th e amount of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as valuation of the residential regular (RR) la nds situated on Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Commercial lan d along the same place was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. and along Ninoy Aquino International Airport at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected AMVEL properties we re classified by Ordinance No. 97-08 as within the C-3 high-intensity commercial zone. Public respondent claims that the Appraisal Committees created under E.O. 132 ar e endowed with special technical knowledge, skills, expertise and training on th e subject of appraisal; that the discretion given to the authorities on this mat ter is of such wide latitude that the Court will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is being used as a shield to a fraudulent transaction; a nd that government agencies or bodies dealing with basically technical matters d eserve to be disentangled from undue interference from the courts, and so from t he Ombudsman as well (Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sew erage System [MWSS] v. Vasquez,87 citing Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deput y Executive Secretary88).89 Public respondent further contends: [The] final re-alignment plan duly approved by the TRB resulted in the substanti al reduction of the area traversed by the C-5 Link Project from the original are a of twelve (12) hectares to only 7.9 hectares, and only after averaging the app raisals of government and private appraisers. This factual circumstance indicate d prudence on the part of private respondent PEA and TRB officials in effecting the power of eminent domain, as they gave due regard to the rights of the landow ners thereof. Again, the reduction in the expropriated private lands upon consid eration of the rights of the landowners may not be criminally actionable absent any showing of irregularity aliunde. x x x There are well-observed rules in the field of real estate. Judicial notice may b e taken of a cardinal rule, which is likewise of common knowledge, that the valu e of real property appreciates over time and at a rate which depends on the exte nt of development of the area where the land is situated. Thus, the price sold a t any given time does not mean that the same price would be utilized for a subse quent sale thereof, especially where the property has undergone development or h as been converted into land for commercial purposes. [Even] petitioner concedes that AMVEL developed the lands which were sold to the government. Thus, it was b ut reasonable for the price of the lands to have appreciated. Besides, private r espondents Velarde and/or AMVEL being engaged in real estate business, it is onl y natural for them to ensure that profits are obtained on top of their investmen ts, or even speculate, for that matter. As declared by this Honorable Court in t he case of Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., "in all cases where a party enters into a cont ract with the government, he does so, not out [of] charity and not to lose money , but to gain pecuniarily."90 x x x In relation to petitioners allegation that the bloated cost of right-of-way (ROW) project depleted the proceeds of the US $68.6 Million loan for the right of way acquisition, the public respondent finds the said allegation vague and without factual basis. The amount of loan proceeds was not a factor that should be consi dered in appraising the value of the subject properties.91 (Emphasis ours) F. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS RONALDO B. ZAMORA, MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR., CESAR E.A. V IRATA, AND LUIS L. VIRATA 1. Petition should be dismissed as Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping Private respondents allege that petitioner admits that he previously filed a com plaint92 with respondent Office of the Ombudsman against respondents Ronaldo B. Zamora, Manual B. Zamora, Jr., and Luis J. L. Virata (OMB Case No. 0-00-1758); h

owever, he did not attach a copy of said complaint to his petition filed before this Court. Said complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in said case was still pending as of the time of the filing of the Comment. Private respondents conclude that petitioner had filed multiple sui ts involving the very same issues against respondents, and he merely rehashed th e very same charges and allegations in the second complaint. This, according to private respondents, was forum shopping, defined by this Court in Gatmaytan v. C ourt of Appeals,93 as "the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Both complaints filed by petitioner are grounded on the same causes and allegati ons surrounding the purported illegality of the "transfer" of the Coastal Road P roject to the Coastal Road Corporation. Respondents contend further: [Petitioner] simultaneously and successively availed himself of several judicial remedies by filing two (2) separate complaints against herein respondents, all substantially founded on the same essential facts and circumstances, and all rai sing substantially the same issues. Petitioner obviously did this to increase hi s chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one case or one court or t ribunal, then in another.94 2. Petition does not raise any question of law. Private respondents submit that a question of law "exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falseho od of facts." They further submit that "[one] test is whether the appellate cour t can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, i n which case it is a question of law; otherwise it will be a question of fact. T he question must not involve the examination of the probative value of the evide nce presented."95 3. Petition, on its face, does not raise any credible factual issue in respect t o the dismissal of the complaint against respondents. Petitioner failed to controvert the findings of fact and law made by the Ombudsm an in his assailed Resolution. Furthermore, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution dat ed July 16, 2001 in OMB Case No. 00-00-1758, comprehensively passed upon the ver y same allegations of petitioner in OMB Case No. 0-001-00577. Petitioners allegations in his complaint are contradictory. On the one hand, he c laims that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway and the prioritizati on of the R-1 Expressway Extension would benefit Caylabne Bay Resort. On the oth er hand, complainant himself alleges that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway will result in a minimal increase in vehicle volume along the R-1 Exp ressway. Clearly then, no appreciable benefit would result if Coastal Road Corpo ration indeed pushed for the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway becaus e the alleged benefit to Caylabne Bay Resort would be negated by the revenue los s due to minimal increase in the vehicular volume along the entire expressway.96 4. The petition, like petitioners complaint before the Ombudsman, is anchored on hearsay evidence twice removed. Private respondents allege that in building a case against them regarding the pu rported de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway, petitioner quotes extensiv ely from the February 7, 1999 article from the Philippine Star newspaper. They c ontend that "[it] is elementary that newspaper and magazine articles are hearsay twice removed and have no evidentiary value whatsoever.97 G. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RUBEN A. DE OCAMPO98 Private respondent Ruben de Ocampo (de Ocampo) argues that the dismissal by the public respondent of the complaint in the proceedings a quo should be sustained in toto because: 1. Petitioner fails to raise distinct and pure questions of law in the instant p etition which omission is fatal to his appeal by certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. The petitioner has no legal standing to institute the charges with the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violations of Sec.2 in relation to Sec. 1 sub-para graph d(1), (3) and (6) of R.A. 7080, and Sec. 3 sub-paragraph (e) and (g) of R.

A. 3019. 3. The facts as alleged in the complaint-affidavit and herein petition for revie w do not constitute the commission of any offense on the part of respondent De O campo and no evidence whatsoever was presented against respondent De Ocampo to s upport the allegations in petitioners complaint-affidavit. De Ocampo avers that he held the position of Public Utility Regulation Officer I I at the Toll Regulatory Board, a position rated at Salary Grade-15, and one tha t was neither managerial nor supervisorial in nature. As such, he neither had re commendatory nor decision-making powers or functions as regards the TRB. De Ocampo contends that petitioner lacks the required personal knowledge of fact s constitutive of the charges in the latters Complaint before the Office of the O mbudsman. Petitioner failed to allege the means by which he supposedly came to b e acquainted with the material facts stated in his Complaint. According to him: It is patent and undeniable that Petitioner was never privy to the contracts and communications alleged in his Complaint and in this Petition for Review. Nowher e in the records does it appear that Petitioner ever participated in any of the transactions referred to. Petitioners conclusions are merely hearsay and should t herefore be disregarded. x x x 99 De Ocampo cites Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6770, "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," wh ich states: SECTION 20.Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believe s that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body; (2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; (4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In this case, de Ocampo alleges that petitioner failed to show any interest in o r show proof of personal knowledge of the transactions as investigated by the Of fice of the Ombudsman, and has neither alleged nor proven that his rights have b een violated or that he has been put at a disadvantage by the consummation of th e assailed transactions through any act or omission of de Ocampo.100 Furthermore, private respondent contends: [The] acts complained of by Petitioner occurred more than one (1) year prior to the institution of the original Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on 16 April 2001. The last assailed transaction, more specifically, the act of then President Estrada in granting his imprimatur and approval to CRCs proposal to de prioritize the construction of the C-5 Link Expressway and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, was consummated on 23 November 1999 or at least one (1) y ear and four (4) months prior to the filing of the Complaint. The above-quoted S ec. 20 par. 5 of R.A. 6770 clearly states that "The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission of if it believes that The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of." Considering the length of time which elap sed between the act complained of and the filing of the Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have even considered the charges put forth by Petition er. In any event, the Complaint was correctly and cogently dismissed by the Ombu dsman for utter lack of merit. x x x 101 H. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT FRISCO F. SAN JUAN Private respondent Frisco F. San Juan (San Juan) raises the following arguments in his Comment: I. The petition must be dismissed outright as it does not raise pure questions o f law or cite any special and important reasons for its allowance under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. II. In any case, respondent Ombudsman did not commit any reversible error or gra

ve abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint a quo, in that: a. Petitioner completely failed to establish the existence of any of the element s of plunder in order for the complaint to prosper as against respondent San Jua n or any of his co-respondents. b. Nor was petitioner able to establish any violation by respondent San Juan of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the contrary, the acquisition of th e AMVEL Properties for the governments tollway project was neither disadvantageou s to the government nor did it give any unwarranted benefits, advantages or pref erence to any party. c. Petitioner failed to otherwise specify any act or behavior on the part of Res pondent San Juan which constitutes a breach of the Code of Conduct and Ethical B ehavior for public officials and employees. d. Petitioners other imputations and insinuations of anomalies in respect of the subject expressway construction are equally baseless and purely speculative accu sations of wrongdoing on respondents part. e. Given the patently baseless and utterly deficient complaint for "plunder", "g raft", etc., the additional "fact-finding" proceedings which petitioner sought t o have in the case would have added nothing to petitioners cause against responde nts.102 San Juan, the Chairman of the PEA from July 1998 to February 2001, submits that a petition for review on certiorari, under the mode of appeal provided by Rule 4 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is required to raise "only questions of law" which shall be distinctly set forth in the petition, the Honorable Court no t being a trier of facts. Thus, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the fin dings of fact below as well as the conclusions on the credibility of witnesses a re generally not disturbed, the question before the court being limited to quest ions of law.103 According to San Juan, Rule 45 likewise provides that for the petitions to be fi led under it to be allowed, there must be special and important reasons therefor , as when the court a quo has decided a question of substance not heretofore det ermined by the Honorable Court, or has decided it in any way probably not in acc ord with law or with the applicable decisions thereof; or when the court a quo h as so far departed from the accepted and usual course of proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for the exercise of the po wer of supervision of this Court. San Juan contends that at the heart of all the purported "serious errors of law" raised by petitioner are essentially factual questions, which petitioner would have the Honorable Court resolve. Thus, San Juan avers that petitioner asks that this Honorable Court determine: if based on the appraisals of the properties involved, the right-of-way acquisit ions were "overpriced"; if the purchase of the subject properties "had been consummated on 7 May 1998" ; if there was "compliance with the procedure for the valuation of the properties involved"; if respondents "amassed wealth" from the subject transaction as to be liable for plunder; if President Estrada "intervened" in the purchase of the right-of-way and the pa yment thereof; if the titles transferred to the Republic were clean; and so on. San Juan concludes from the above that all these questions require an appreciati on of the evidence and an examination of the probative value of the proofs prese nted to determine the truth or falsity of the factual claims of the parties belo w; these are thus factual questions. As regards petitioners allegations of plunder, San Juan notes that "nowhere in th e complaint was it alleged that respondent San Juan or any of his co-respondents received any art of the purchase price for the lands purchased by the Governmen t from AMVEL from the right of way."104 The initiative of the TRB not only in re negotiating the purchase price and in causing the re-appraisal of the properties

by three (3) appraisers but also in successfully reducing the purchase price ca nnot be the product of, and is in fact inconsistent with, respondents supposed "c onnivance" or "collusion" with AMVEL. San Juan further alleges that the negotiation, perfection and execution of the D eed of Sale of the lands in question between TRB and Amvel were all done without the participation or involvement of PEA, as it was never involved in the renego tiation efforts. This is consistent with the terms of the TOA and the MOA, where the "responsibility for acquiring the lands," "the negotiation with its individ ual owners" and "the preparation of the necessary documents" including the "canc ellation of the titles in the name of the individual lot owners" and the "transf er thereof in the name of the government" were all vested in TRB without the int ervention of PEA. San Juan alleges that the following steps were taken to ensure the regularity of the questioned transaction: 1. Prior to the full payment of the purchase price to the sellers, TRB ensured t hat the Deeds of Sale were executed by authorized signatories, with the required Board resolutions and Special Powers of Attorney and duly notarized. 2. TRB likewise made certain that the real estate taxes covering the remaining q uarters of the year and the documentary stamp taxes due on the transactions equi valent to 1.5% of the purchase price were shouldered and paid for by AMVEL with the corresponding tax clearance duly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; a nd that all titles to the properties were clean and transferred in the name of t he Republic of the Philippines before the balance of the purchase price was full y paid. 3. Other than paying the purchase price for the properties, the Government did n ot pay any expenses for notarization, taxes and transfer fees, registration and processing of the transfer of titles to the Republic of the Philippines and clea ring the properties of occupants and their relocation. San Juan concludes that contrary to petitioners claims, AMVEL never received a "w indfall from the government for which it acquired for almost nothing." In truth, apart from receiving a purchase price reduced to the extent of P370 million, AM VEL was required to pay, as it did, expenses normally shouldered by a seller all these on top of what petitioner himself recognized as developments undertaken b y AMVEL on the properties prior to their acquisition by the government.105 San Juan contends that tax declarations, which petitioner presented as evidence of the alleged overpriced purchase price of the properties, are neither proof of the true market value of properties nor conclusive evidence of their value, but only enable the assessor to identify the same for their assessment levels.106 Furthermore, San Juan alleges that the acquisition cost of a property cannot be the sole basis for determining its fair value; the current value of similar prop erties and their actual or potential uses must be considered together with other factors.107 Regarding petitioners insistence that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50 should h ave been applied, San Juans averments are summarized below: 1. A.O. No. 50 would have no application to the contract between TRB and AMVEL w hich had been priorly perfected on May 7, 1998. 2. The Zonal valuation (6th Division) which took effect on February 2, 1997, fix ing the amount of P4,500/sq m as valuation of the affected properties, refers to residential regular (RR) lands situated in Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque City. The commercial lands along same place was fixed at P20,000.00/ s q m and along Ninoy Aquino International Airport at P30,000/00 per sq m. The aff ected AMVEL properties were classified by Ordinance No. 97-08 as within the C-3 high intensity commercial zone. 3. A.O. No. 50 does not in any way prohibit the conduct of a negotiated sale whi ch is more expeditious and less expensive for the Government than engaging in a protracted expropriation proceedings over the properties with the owners thereof . The purported costs in terms of time, resources and money will not necessarily result in savings for the Government. 4. Even in expropriation proceedings, just compensation for the properties must be determined. And by "just compensation" is meant "a fair and full equivalent f

or the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity x x x the market va lue of the land taken x x x being the sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would ag ree on as a price to be given and received for such property." Thus, to determin e just compensation, the parties must add to the market value, the consequential damages. (Tuason v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413) In the present case, the final valuation agreed upon by the TRB and AMVEL, upon consideration of the market value as dete rmined by four (4) independent appraisers, constitutes such just compensation th at is not only fair to the seller but to the Government as well. 5. The Honorable Court itself had occasion to observe that protracted expropriat ion proceedings do not only mean delay and difficulty for the Government, it als o results in the citizen losing faith in the Government and in its readiness to pay for what it appropriates. x x x In this case, the properties affected by the right-of-way involve numerous owner s. Thus, in pursuing a negotiated sale instead of opting for expropriation proce edings and arriving at a mutually acceptable acquisition price in consideration for the transfer of clean and unencumbered titles to the Republic, the Governmen t did not suffer any losses, contrary to petitioners claims.108 San Juan claims that neither the TRB nor PEA could have aborted the purchase of the AMVEL properties based on the alleged falsification of the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 29, 1998. These properties were essential for the Tollway Project a fact which petitioner himself concedes is a reasonable, necessary and urgent public work. Thus, the TRB, more so PEA, could not have simply re-arrang ed the project plans and decided not to acquire the AMVEL properties. In fact, i t is absurd to even suggest that PEA could override the decision to build a chea per and faster expressway traversing the AMVEL properties. Not only did the AMVE L properties have the most advantageous access to the NAIA, their development wa s the easiest to implement, because they had already been cleared of squatters a nd other occupants.109 As for San Juans purported "approval" of the take-over of the Tollway Project by the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC), San Juan states that there is simply no basi s for this claim, for the following reasons: a. At the end of 1999, the Malaysian counterpart could no longer fund the projec t due to currency regulations. After CRC offered to take over the interest of Re nong-Berhad, PEA in fact required it so show proof of its financial and technica l capability. When respondent San Juans term as PEA chairman ended, CRC had not y et submitted the PEA requirements. Consequently, respondent San Juan could not h ave given my approval to de-prioritize the C-5 project and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway extension as allegedly proposed by CRC. Other than his bare allegati ons, petitioner has not presented any proof to show that respondent San Juan and the other respondents have turned-over the project to CRC and acceded to its pr oposal to de-prioritize C-5 project and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extensi ons. b. x x x [The] Ombudsman had already dismissed a related complaint by the same p etitioner when he similarly questioned the transfer and takeover of the Project to CRC. Thus, in a Resolution dated 16 July 2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the co mplaint for plunder and violation of RA 3019 filed by the herein petitioner agai nst Joseph Estrada and other respondents for the transfer and take-over of the M CTE Project to CRC.110 San Juan also claims that in asserting that the acquisition price arrived at for the questioned transaction exceeded the limit of P1.7 billion for the right-ofway purchase, petitioner ignores that the landowners of the affected properties are entitled to just compensation for the taking of their properties. San Juan c ontends that such just compensation is not based on the budget of the government for the project, but is "the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, w hich is the measure of the indemnity x x x the market value of the land taken x x x being the sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, an d an owner, wiling, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be g iven and received for such property." San Juan further contends that petitioner has not otherwise shown how the entire MCTE Project could be achieved within the

said limit of P1.7 billion.111 V. ISSUES The following issues were raised in the petition as well as in respondents respec tive Comments: A. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for using the wrong mode of a ppeal and for raising questions of fact B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious er rors of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolution and Order VI. DISCUSSION A. Whether or not petition should be dismissed for using the wrong mode of appea l and for raising questions of fact Respondents Office of the Ombudsman, Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Gr egorio R. Vigilar, Ronaldo B. Zamora, Manuel B. Zamora Jr., Cesar E.A. Virata, L uis L. Virata, and Frisco F. San Juan contend that a petition for review on cert iorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before this Honorable Court is not the proper mode of appeal in questioning any final order or resolut ion of the Office of the Ombudsman; thus, the instant petition should be outrigh tly dismissed motu proprio. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certi orari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly s et forth. Private respondents Velarde aver that the "courts" referred to in the provision quoted above are "the courts that compose the integrated judicial system and do not include quasi-judicial bodies or agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsma n."112 They claim that the proper mode of appeal in questioning the final judgme nt, order, or resolution of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies is provided under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of said Rule states: Section 1. Scope.. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orde rs of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resol utions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quas i-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Cen tral Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Ae ronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunica tions Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6557, Gov ernment Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultura l Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, B oard of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law." To support their contention that Rule 43 applies to this case, private responden ts rely on the Courts ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,113 which provides: Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified pe tition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was pr ecisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate proced ure for quasi-judicial agencies. It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "o rdinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which i s a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hi erarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the f act that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commissio

n, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but s tatutorily-created body. (Emphasis ours.) Public respondent Ombudsman likewise argues that petitioner has taken the wrong mode of appeal, citing the rule as laid down by this Court in Tirol v. del Rosar io,114 which states: Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of th e Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v. Desierto, we declared that Sect ion 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the Supreme Court s jurisdiction, w ithout its advice and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Con stitution. Hence, all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 199 7 Rules of Civil Procedure. True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsma n found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have h eld that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directive s and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we rul ed in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of A ppeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and d ecisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indi ct accused persons. Public respondent avers that no information has been filed with either the Sandi ganbayan or the Regional Trial Court; and not only did petitioner resort to the wrong mode of appeal, he also raised factual issues in his petition, which are n ot proper grounds for appeal under the rule. Public respondent further avers tha t an error in the choice or mode of appeal is one of the grounds for the dismiss al of the appeal under Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.1 15 This, aggravated by improper grounds raised on appeal, has rendered the insta nt petition dismissible. Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief fr om final judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of the Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court,116 we find that the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 posited by private respondents V elarde is not proper either. This Court subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, "all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative discip linary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule s of Civil Procedure."117 Said remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases inv olving criminal or non-administrative charges filed before the Office of the Omb udsman, which is the situation in the case before us now. As we further stated i n Tirol v. Del Rosario: [An] aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a peti tion for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In Fabian v. Desierto,118 the case was dismissed and remanded to the Court of Ap peals. This case being criminal and not administrative in nature, however, the c onclusion in Fabian is not applicable. Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse o f discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court had already provided this remedy in Nava v. Commission on Audit,119 w herein we held: The remedy availed of by petitioner is erroneous. Instead of a petition for cert iorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court p

ursuant to the provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only judgments or final orders or re solutions of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court and o ther courts, whenever authorized by law, may be the subject of an appeal by cert iorari to this Court. It does not include resolutions of the Ombudsman on prelim inary investigations in criminal cases. Petitioner s reliance on Section 27 of R .A. No. 6770 is misplaced. Section 27 is involved only whenever an appeal by cer tiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an i ncident in a criminal action. In other words, the right to appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases , like the case at bar. Such right is granted only from orders or decisions of t he Ombudsman in administrative cases. An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the findings of the O mbudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of di scretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may fi le a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis ours .) Again, in Flores v. Office of Ombudsman,120 we ruled as follows: x x x The instant petition was captioned as a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the arguments raised refer to alle ged grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. In deter mining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. According ly, we are compelled to consider the instant petition as one under Rule 65 of th e Rules of Court. This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released by th e government to a private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road rig ht-of-way in a major infrastructure project that was undertaken by the former an d that naturally affected the general public. Therefore, even if this case was e rroneously filed as shown above, and may be dismissed outright under the rules, the Court deems it appropriate to brush aside technicalities of procedure, as th is involves matters of transcendental importance to the public;121 and to consid er the petition as one for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 122 Respondents argue further that the petition should be instantly dismissed for fa iling to raise purely questions of law. As may be gleaned from petitioners assign ment of errors, this Court is being asked to determine the following, which invo lve questions of fact: 1. Whether or not Administrative Order No. 50, s. 1999 is applicable to the sale of the subject properties in this case; 2. Whether or not private respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the subject properties; 3. Whether or not respondents bloated the purchase price; 4. Whether or not respondents changed the original alignment of the Sucat Interc hange, which resulted in an increase in the size of the AMVEL property sold to t he government; 5. Whether or not respondent Mariano Z. Velarde "made a killing" in the sale of the subject properties; 6. Whether or not a portion of the subject properties did not have a clean title at the time they were sold to the government; 7. Whether or not the cost of the right-of-way was bloated, which led to the dep letion of the proceeds of the US$68.6 Million loan for the right-of-way acquisit ion; and 8. Whether or not respondents de-prioritized the R-1 Expressway Extension over t he C-5 Link Expressway. It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts123 and its jurisdiction is limited to errors of law. As we held in Tirol v. Commission on Audit, "There is a question of law in any given case when the doubt or difference arises as to w

hat the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact arises when the d oubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts."124 Moreover, in Medina v. City Sheriff, Manila,125 we have stated: For this petition to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgm ent, which are correctible by appeal. B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious er rors of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolution and Order In the case now before us, petitioner wants this Court to review the evidence th at was already thoroughly studied by public respondent Ombudsman and passed upon in the questioned Resolution.126 Thus, public respondent found that: The uncontroverted facts clearly show that Administrative Order No. 50 was issue d on February 17, 1999, while the transaction/ negotiation for the purchase of a ffected lands was consummated as early as May 1998. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the governing law is Executive Order No. 132, (E.O. No. 132) issued on December 27, 1937, which laid down the following procedure: a) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City or District Engineer or othe r officials concerned shall make the necessary negotiations with owner of the pr operty needed for public use with a view to having it donated, or sold to the go vernment at not to exceed the assessed valuation prior to the investigation and survey of the project. b) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall forthwith and by form al notification submit the matter to an Appraisal Committee which is hereby crea ted and which shall be composed of the Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman, and th e District Engineer and the District Auditor, as members, of the province where the land is located. If the property is situated in a chartered city the Apprais al Committee shall composed (sic) of the City Treasurer, as Chairman and the Cit y Engineer and City Auditor, as members. x x x A perusal of the guidelines as well as the documentary evidence on the transacti on reveals that respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in determinin g a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties in question. The referral fo r the determination of the fair market value of the properties to [the] Paranaqu e City Appraisal Committee which recommended the payment of P20,000.00 per sq. m . thereof was in order. The appraisal was a result of several [factors] ranging from assessing the location accessibility, selling prices of comparable properti es, the amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and communicat ion within the vicinity and the status or condition of the parcels of land. TRBs act of subjecting the properties to another round of appraisal, this time, by th ree independent appraisal companies is a manifestation that TRB had made sure th at the Government would not be put in a disadvantageous position in view of a ve ry high appraisal recommended by PCAC. Clearly, the result of the appraisals con ducted by the three (3) independent appraiser companies led TRB to come up with an average appraisal in the amount of P15,355.00 per square [meter] in purchasin g AMVELs property. The amount is far below the original recommendation of PCAC to purchase AMVELs property at P20,000.00 per sq. m. Complainant merely relied on Administrative Order No. 50 issued by respondent Es trada and on the fact that the valuation must be based on zonal valuation fixed by BIR at P4,000.00 per sq. m. a year prior to the sale. As earlier stated, Administrative Order No. 50 finds no application to the alrea dy perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL. On the Zonal Valuation (6th Revisio n) that took effect on February 2, 1997 whereby it fixed the amount of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as valuation of the affected properties however refers to residentia l regular (RR) lands situated in Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque C ity. The commercial lands along same place was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. an d along Ninoy Aquino International Airport at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected AMVEL properties were classified by Ordinance No. 97-08, pages 32, 33, 34 as wi thin the C-3 high intensity commercial zone. The properties in question being wi thin commercial zone, PCAC properly recommended valuation of P20,000.00 is justi

fied (sic). We agree with the PCAC that the appraisal of a property is not limit ed only to the zonal valuation by the BIR. As correctly pointed out by responden ts Nacianceno, Daval-Santos, Medina-Cue and de Leon, the appraisal of properties are also based on location, accessibility, selling prices of comparable propert ies, the amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and communica tion, etc. In fact, in Administrative Order No. 50, zonal valuation is only one of the many factors being considered in the payment of just compensation. Complainant also anchored his complaint on two (2) Memoranda dated March 30, 199 9, from then President Estrada x x x. x x x We find no circumstance to consider the two (2) Memoranda anomalous or irregular . The approval of the Deeds of Sale between TRB and AMVEL by respondent Estrada was in pursuance to the provisions of P.D. 1112. It may not be amiss to state that the transaction between TRB and AMVEL was cons ummated as early as May 1998 during the administration of former President Fidel V. Ramos. The payment of the purchase price was only delayed as the TRB conduct ed a re-appraisal of the property until the new administration of respondent Est rada in June 1998. It was only in January 1999 that TRB, then having come out wi th a new price per sq. m. after averaging the appraisal of the three (3) indepen dent appraisers and of PCAC, approved the purchase price of P1,221,799,806.00 fo r the acquisition of AMVELs property totaling 79,598 per sq. m. at P15,350.00. Th is delay in the determination of the consideration did not affect the already pe rfected contract as the consideration thereof was already determined or determin able. The events negate complainants claim that the transaction was concluded in just 2 working days. The insinuation that respondent Estrada favored AMVEL in ap proving the purchase of subject properties . . . has no basis. If indeed AMVEL p ersuaded respondent Estrada to act on its favor, then AMVEL could have pushed fo r the acquisition of the properties not at P15,350.00 but at P20,000.00 per sq. m. Besides, the valuation of P15,355.00 per sq. m. paid to AMVEL is much lower t han the advertised price of the properties adjacent to AMVEL pegged at least P19 ,000.00to P55,000.00 per sq. m. x x x Further, [with] respondents Velarde and/or AMVEL, being engaged in business, it is natural that they engage in profit sche me (sic) which in this case appears justified. While there was a complete payment in favor of AMVEL of the purchase price of P1 ,221,766,640.00 within one (1) month from the time respondent Estrada approved t he transaction, we find the same not anomalous. The several [Deeds] of Sale exec uted by the parties, TRB and AMVEL, stipulate that fifty (50%) percent of the pu rchase price shall be paid upon execution of the contract. The other fifty (50%) percent upon issuance by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding Transfer Ce rtificate of Title covering the properties in the name of the Republic of the Ph ilippines. In the crime of Plunder, the following elements must exist: 2. A public officer acquires wealth by himself or in connivance with another per son; 3. The acquisition of the wealth was obtained through the means described in Sec tion 1 (d). In the instant case, the alleged ill-gotten wealth consisting of the overpriced purchase price of the properties affected by C-5 Link, was allegedly obtained by respondents by taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, re lationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino People. We find no evidence to support complainants claim of the existence of ill-gotten wealth. The purchase price of P1,221,799,804 paid to AMVEL could not be consider ed as ill-gotten wealth as said amount is a consideration of a legally entered D eeds (sic) of Sale. There is no evidence that public respondents benefited/profi ted or had taken shares with private respondents in the transaction. Complainant contends that public and private [respondents] acts constitute also v iolation of Section 3(a), (e), (g), (h) and (j) of Republic Act 3019, as amended . We find no evidence to support said allegation.

In reference to Section 3(a), there is no sufficient evidence showing that respo ndents, especially respondent Estrada, induced or influenced anybody to perform an act in violation of rules and regulation (sic). Neither was there proof of a violation of any rules or regulations promulgated by competent authority. Admini strative Order No. 50 cannot be considered as the rule violated since it finds n o applications (sic) on the questioned transaction. Insofar as Section 3(e) is concerned, there was no showing that the government s uffered undue injury when the AMVEL properties were purchased at P15,355.00 per sq. m. As earlier pointed out, complainant relied on the valuation of P4,500.00 per sq. m. fixed by the BIR when the said valuation applies to regular residenti al land and not to commercial lots fixed at least P20,000.00 per sq. m. The P15, 355.00 per square meter [price] is relatively low compared to that recommended b y PCAC and contained at BIR Zonal Valuation which was P20,000.00 per sq. m. Referring to Section 3(g), there was no basis to conclude that the contract was grossly disadvantageous to the government. On the contrary, the government was a ble to save money when it decided to purchase the questioned properties at P15,3 55.00 per sq. m. and not at P20,000.00. Section 3(j) has no application in the instant case as it pertains to the granti ng of a license, permit or benefit. Assuming as it does, it established a record that the affected properties were purchased from persons or [entities] who were legally authorized to sell or own the same in accordance with the applicable la ws, rules and regulations. We find no evidence that the elements of Section 3(h) exist. The provision requi res that there must be an actual intervention in the transaction for financial o r pecuniary interest by public respondent. While there was an intervention by pu blic respondents the same were in pursuance to the exercise official duties. Nei ther public respondents have direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest with AMVEL. Considering that the crimes imputed against the respondents were not shown to ex ist, conspiracy could not likewise be appreciated. It is a well settled ruled th at conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of eviden ce. SO RESOLVED.127 Upon Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, respondent Office of the Ombudsma n issued an Order,128 the pertinent portions of which are quoted below: There is no truth to the allegation that the Ombudsman deliberately failed to or der the conduct of fact-finding investigation. To conduct a fact-finding investi gation is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the Ombudsman and not therefore as a matter of right. When the instant complaint was filed complainant attached voluminous documents which when evaluated was sufficient in form and s ubstance to conduct preliminary investigation. To that matter, there is no need to conduct fact-finding activities as the compliant already reached the formal s tage of investigation to determine whether or not probable cause exists to charg e respondents. In the same manner, the request for subpoena duces tecum cannot b e demanded as a matter of policy for every [case] filed before this Office. From the very beginning it is the duty of the complainant to present complete and am ple evidence to support his allegation and not to rely on the coercive processes of this Office lest to be accused of being a tool for every complainants crusade and be labeled as engaged in fishing evidence. [Complainant] questions the inhibition of the Honorable Ombudsman. We view howev er the same inhibition a prudent exercise of impartiality. Prudence dictates tha t the Honorable Ombudsman himself should inhibit to clear any suspicion that he would engage in any retaliatory [act] against the complainant in view of the imp eachment case filed by the latter. Far from the accusation that the Honorable Om budsman prejudged the case as well as the members of the Panel, we submit that t he resolution was arrived [at] after a painstaking appreciation of the available evidence of the complainant and respondents. As a consequence of the inhibition of the Honorable Ombudsman, the Overall Deput y Ombudsman, Hon. Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. had to perform the duties of the Om

budsman and assumed and took charge of the disposition of the case. This finds s upport under Section 8 of R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "Ombudsman Act of 1989". On the contrary, complainant failed to cite the particular provision of law all egedly violated when the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the dismissal of the case. In the same manner we find the insinuations of the complainant against the Overall Deputy Ombudsman baseless much more sufficient to affect or disturb wha tever findings we have in our resolution. Complainant alleges that his evidence were totally disregarded. He forgot howeve r, that respondents have evidence too. Notwithstanding with the voluminous docum ents complainant submitted, this Office has to weigh the evidentiary value and c redibility of the evidence as well as the arguments of both parties. It so happe ned that in the appreciation thereof, we gave credence to the evidence of the ot her parties. That judgment cannot be put as an issue that would warrant the reve rsal of our decision. In general, the Motion for Reconsideration failed to advance new arguments that would warrant the reversal of the questioned Resolution. There was no new eviden ce submitted by the complainant to warrant a second look of our resolution. The supposed documents he attached in the Motion were already passed upon and examin ed by this Office. Lastly, complainant miserably failed to point out specificall y the findings or conclusion of the resolution which was contrary to law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration of the complainan t is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. We find no cogent reason to weigh all over again the evidence in this case and t o reverse the findings of the public respondent quoted above. This is because, a s we held in Tirol v. COA: [This] Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as wel l. Otherwise the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by immeasur able petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, i n as much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or d ismiss a complaint by a private complainant.129 More recently, we had occasion to pass upon a similar case, the core issue of wh ich was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint against the respondents. In that case, we ruled in the ne gative and, accordingly, dismissed the petition.130 Thus, we held: We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or o mission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The raison d etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insul ate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public o fficials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, d elay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, we dwelt on th e powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit: The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but f ree from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the Offi

ce is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable g rounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probab ly guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with th e appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the com plaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the Om budsman may also dismiss the complaint should it be found insufficient in form o r substance. Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain fr om interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman s powers, and respect the init iative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service. The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory po wers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practic ality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampere d by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they woul d be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals o r prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private complainants. From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombuds man s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested by the Constit ution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman s exercise of discretion in pros ecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the exercise thereof is tainted wi th grave abuse of discretion.1311avvphi1 In the recent case Lazatin v. Ombudsman,132 this Court held that the question of whether "the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to suppor t a finding of probable cause pertains to a mere error of judgment." The Court f urther held: It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First Corporat ion v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, to wit: It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not t he province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem be yond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the pr obative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of t he evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of j udgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. A n error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the cou rt without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, whic h is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correcti ble only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the par ties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of la w. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a q uo.133 Even if the issues involved here are factual, petitioner invokes the power of th e Court to reverse the decision of the Ombudsman by alleging that the latter act ed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. H owever, as in Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman,134 we fin d that: [The] Order and the Resolution of the Ombudsman are based on substantial evidenc e. In dismissing the complaint of petitioner, we cannot say that the Ombudsman c ommitted grave abuse of discretion so as to call for the exercise of our supervi sory powers over him. This court is not a trier of facts. As long as there is su

bstantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman s decision, that decision will no t be overturned.1avvphi1 As regards petitioners insistence that the Office of the Ombudsman should have co nducted a fact-finding investigation and issued subpoena duces tecum as requeste d, we find that the Ombudsmans action not to issue the same was not made in grave abuse of discretion.135 We have previously ruled regarding this matter in this wise: If the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessar ily follows that it is also within his discretion to determine whether the evide nce before him is sufficient to establish probable cause. Thus, petitioners may not compel the Ombudsman to order the production of certain documents, if in the Ombudsman s judgment such documents are not necessary in order to establish the guilt, or innocence, of the accused. It has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman s exercise of his investigatory powers. xxx [It] is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of t he Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such init iative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, a cts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public s ervice. The rationale underlying the Court s policy of non-interference was laid down in Ocampo v.Ombudsman and reiterated in the more recent case of Venus v. Desierto, to wit: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory po wers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practic ality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampere d by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they woul d be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals o r prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.136 Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as "such capricious and whimsical exe rcise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion m ust be "so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a v irtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplat ion of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."137 We do not find this situation to be prese nt in the instant case so as to merit a reversal of the questioned Resolution an d Order issued by respondent Office of the Ombudsman. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed R esolution and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-01-0577 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents. ROMERO, J.: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Associat ion of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to res olve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement prov ision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Positi on Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Volu ntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE s Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on t he other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Vol untary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collectiv e Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the dec ision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impa rtial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments pres ented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the ar bitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is bas ed, as either compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelle d by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1 The esse nce of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by reso rt to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the par ties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government. Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the par ties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agr eement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. 2 Ideal ly, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is le ft to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are p resumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that par ticular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitr ator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator s decision. In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA ) are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or co mpany personnel policies. 3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and de signate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a p rocedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National C onciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingl y provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or p anel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 26 2 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdict ion over other labor disputes. On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has juris diction over the following enumerated cases: . . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision witho ut extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases inv olving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may f ile involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from t

he employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including quest ions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and mater nity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, inclu ding those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exce eding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a c laim for reinstatement. xxx xxx xxx It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbi trator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4 The state of our present l aw relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of t he Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calend ar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," 5 whi le the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executo ry unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) cale ndar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 6 Hence, while the re is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic A ct No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for cert iorari, 7 in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecess ary burden upon it. In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal eff ect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her funct ions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that th e voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the s tatus of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC si nce his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that t he Court of Appeals shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolu tions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, in strumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Co mmission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission , except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presi dential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagr aph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of S ection 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. xxx xxx xxx Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitr ators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commis sion, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quas i-judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under th e Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11 that the broader term "instru mentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision. An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus, the terms g overnmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that eithe

r of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain governmen t act or function is performed. 13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental powe r for the performance of a state function. 14 An individual person, like an admi nistrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estat e, 15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, 16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corpor ation is an instrumentality of the state. 17 The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governm ental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are p rovided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said S ec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It w ill be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provid ed for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the pres ent Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the ap pealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationa lization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitr ators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the pr ocedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Ci rcular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjud ications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 not expressly excepted from the cover age of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor wil l it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be rev iewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adj udicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdict ion of the NLRC or the labor arbiter. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act N o. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proce eding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shal l have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an orde r confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is v acated, modified or corrected. 19 In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with t hat of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall hen ceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper dispo sition. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 140423 July 14, 2006 JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO C. ROA, respondent. D E C I S I O N GARCIA, J.: Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review is the Resolutio

n1 dated July 8, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53190, dism issing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedur e thereat filed by the herein petitioner from an adverse resolution of the Secre tary of Justice. The petition is casts against the following factual backdrop: On November 27, 1996, petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging respondent Alberto C. Roa , likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint, docketed in said o ffice as I.S. No. 96-5442, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Q uestions against Dr. Orosa" written by respondent and published in the March-Apr il 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into the possibility of a father , who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same. In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is d efamatory as it besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topn otcher in the dental board examinations held in May 1994. Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a matter of both public and social concern." He averred t hat the article in question was not written with malice but with a sincere desir e to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of professional examinations . After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolut ion, dismissing petitioner s complaint in this wise: The publication being a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, an d made without malice, we find the respondent entitled to the protection of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Acting on the appeal, Ch ief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo issued a Resolution (Zuo Resolution), setting a side the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Inf ormation for libel against respondent. Accordingly, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, an Information for libel was filed against respondent, ther eat docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517. Adversely affected, respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuo Resolution and d irected the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information earlier filed w ith the RTC. In compliance therewith, a "Motion to Withdraw Information" was acc ordingly filed in court by the Pasig City Prosecution Office. Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by t he Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of May 12, 1999. Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 432 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 53190. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Resolution dated July 8, 1999, dismissed petitioner s petition for review. Partly says the CA in its dismissal Resolution: The Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among th e quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court in its Resolution En Banc dated April 8, 1997, approving the 1 997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Bar Matter No. 803, did not include final orders or resolutions issued by these agencies as appealable under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals is therefore not at liberty to supply the omissions in the Rule, that would constitute an encroachment on the rule making power of the Supreme Court. 3 With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its subseque nt Resolution of October 14, 1999, petitioner is now with this Court on his subm ission that the appellate court erred: I XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE NOT REVIEWA

BLE BY IT UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II XXX IN FINDING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 [WAS] PREMATURELY FILED. III XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSAILED IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 ARE NOT REVIEWABLE UNDER RULE 65 (sic) OF THE 1997 RULES OF CI VIL PROCEDURE SINCE THESE RESOLUTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER PROSECUTORS. IV XXX IN NOT RESOLVING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 ON THE MERITS. V XXX IN NOT REVERSING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: a. RESPONDENT S APPEAL FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THROUGH THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DATED JANUARY 22, 1998, WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE. b. RESPONDENT S ARTICLE WAS DEFAMATORY. c. MALICE ATTENDED THE PUBLICATION OF RESPONDENT S ARTICLE. d. RESPONDENT S ARTICLE WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE OF PRIVILEGED MATTER. As the Court sees it, the petition commends for its consideration the issue of w hether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Pro cedure is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case. It is petitioner s thesis that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judici al agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Upon this premise, petitioner s ubmits that resolutions of the DOJ in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functio ns are properly appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43, ad ding that the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under said Rule are not exclusive . Petitioner s above posture, while valid to a point, will not carry the day for h im. Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bod ies to the CA. Section 1 thereof provides: Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolu tions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi -judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Cent ral Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of t he President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aer onautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunicat ions Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Gove rnment Service and Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricul tural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commissio n, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and volun tary arbitrators authorized by law. As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Se ction 1 of Rule 43, albeit any suggestion that it does not perform quasi-judicia l functions may have to be rejected. However, its absence from the list of agenc ies mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusi on from the coverage of said Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phras e "among these agencies," thereby implying that the enumeration made is not excl usive of the agencies therein listed. There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ fr om the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control4 lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices . This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, m eans the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencie s, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.5

Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse f rom the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative reme dies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery , this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.6 Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; 7 subject to defined exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies.8 Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, the reby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must fi rst be taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to. Given the above perspective, the question of whether or not a preliminary invest igation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, as petitioner posits, or whether or not the Secretary of Justice performs quasi-judicial functions when he reviews the f indings of a state or city prosecutor is of little moment. The Court wishes, how ever, to draw attention to what it said in Santos v. Go9 where the Court, citing Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 stated: [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making func tions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determi ning whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to b elieve that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal [prosecutor] makes t hat determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is th e courts, ultimately that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal [prosecut or]. (Words in bracket ours) While now perhaps anti-climactic to delve into, the ensuing holdings of the appe llate court are worth quoting: The petition is premature. The Information charging respondent with the crime of libel, docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517, is now with Branch 155 of the Regi onal Trial Court in Pasig City. Thus understood, the said trial court has now th e control of the case. The remedy of petitioner is to reiterate the reasons or g rounds alleged in his present petition by way of an appropriate opposition to th e Pasig City Prosecution Office s "Motion to Withdraw Information" dated Novembe r 5, 1998, filed in compliance with the assailed directive of the Secretary of J ustice. Having control of the case, the trial court can look into the claim of p etitioner. This will enable the trial court to rule on the matter first without the precipitate intervention of this Court. In other words, this is a prerequisi te to the elevation of the case to this Court.11 In view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court deems it unnecessary to address the other issues raised in the petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution of the Cou rt of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 142261 June 29, 2000 GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG ATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, D EPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents. R E S O L U T I O N GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us are the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the National Bureau of Inv estigation and the Department of the Interior and Local Government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor-General, and the Office of the Ombudsman of our 5 April 2000 Resolution.1 In this resolution, we ordered the immediate reinstatem ent of petitioner Manuel Lapid to the position of Governor of Pampanga as the re spondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate exe cution of a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case wh ere the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The factual antecedents are as follows: On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly originating fr om the "Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga," addressed to the National Burea u of Investigation, the latter initiated an "open probe" on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga & exaction of exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by u nscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking government officials . The NBI Report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was docketed as OM B-1-98-2067. On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid , Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provin cial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales and Senio r Police Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with alleged "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and C onduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" for allegedly "having co nspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various qu arrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, travel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issu ing receipts for its collection. They were also accused of giving unwarranted be nefits to Nestor Tadeo, Rodrigo "Rudy" Fernandez & Conrado Pangilinan who are ne ither officials/employees of the Provincial Government of Pampanga nor quarry op erators by allowing them to collect the said amount which was over and above the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance and in allowing Tadeo, Fernandez and Pangilinan to sell and deliver to various quarry operators bookle ts of official receipts which were pre-stamped with "SAND FEE P40.00." 2 The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively suspending pet itioner Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao, Sabado, Morales and Tadeo for a period of six ( 6) months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the Depa rtment of the Interior and Local Government (hereinafter the "DILG") implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid3. On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision4 in the administrative ca se finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct thus: Wherefore, premises considered, respondent Manuel M. Lapid, Clayton A. Olalia, J ovito S. Sabado and Nestor C. Tadeo are hereby found guilty of misconduct for wh ich they are meted out the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay pursua nt to section 25 (2) of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Respondent Marino P. Morales is hereby exonerated from the same administrative charge for insufficien cy of evidence. The complaint against respondent Enrico P. Quiambao, who resigne d effective June 30, 1998 was dismissed on March 12, 1999, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case.5 The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on Nove mber 25, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration was filed on November 29, 1999. T he Office of the Ombudsman, in an Order6 dated 12 January 2000, denied the motio n for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 18, 2000 praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin th e Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The temporary restraining or der was issued by the appellate court on January 19, 2000.7 When the 60-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 19, 2000 without the Court of Appeals resolving the prayer for the issuance of a wri t of preliminary injunction, a petition8 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamu s was filed with this Court on March 20, 2000. The petition asked for the issuan ce of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the

assailed decision of the Ombudsman and prayed that "after due proceedings, judg ment be rendered reversing and setting aside the questioned decision (of the Omb udsman) dated November 22, 1999 and the order January 12, 2000.9 On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 10 denying the petitioner s prayer for injunctive relief. T he following day, or on March 23, 2000, the DILG implemented the assailed decisi on of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C. Governor of the Province of Pampa nga. On March 24, 2000 a Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Cert iorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 11 and the Supplement to the Petition 12 itself were filed in view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the petiti oner s prayer for preliminary injunction. In addition to the arguments raised in the main petition, the petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-jud gment of the case on the merits by the Court of Appeals in its resolution denyin g the prayer for preliminary injunction. In so doing, petitioner argued that the respondent court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction. Proceeding from the p remise that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become final, the petition er argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the r espondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision. Finally, the petitioner prayed for the setting aside of the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2000 and for the issuance of a new one enjoining the re spondents from enforcing the said decision or, if it has already been implemente d, to withdraw any action already taken until the issue of whether or not the sa id decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory has been settled. The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective com ments 1 to the petition praying for the dismissal thereof. Regarding the issue o f the immediate enforcement of the decision of the Ombudsman, the Solicitor-Gene ral maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the R ules of Court and is therefore, immediately executory. For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman maintain that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering th at the portion of the said law cited by petition pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its enforcement pending appeal. The Office of the Ombudsman also stated that it has uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Governmen t Code and Administrative Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cas es are immediately executory. The Solicitor-General filed an additional comment 14 alleging that the petitione r did not question the executory character of the decision of the Ombudsman and that he is presenting this argument for the first time before the Supreme Court. The appellate court should be given an opportunity to review the case from this standpoint before asking the Supreme Court to review the resolutions of the Cou rt of Appeals. The petitioner filed a consolidated Reply 15 to the Comments of t he respondents. After oral arguments before the Third Division of this Court on 5 April 2000, th e Resolution 16 subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was issued. T he Resolution provides as follows: From the pleadings filed by the parties and after oral arguments held on April 5 , 2000, the petitioner represented by Atty. Augusto G. Panlilio, the respondent Ombudsman represented by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National Bureau of Inv estigation and the Department of the Interior and Local Government represented b y the Solicitor General, and after due deliberation, the Court finds that the re spondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate exe cution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalt y imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate implementation of the decisi on of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus premature. WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the pe titioner to the position of Governor of the Province of Pampanga. This case is h ereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR. SP

No. 564744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same wit h utmost deliberate dispatch. This is without prejudice to the promulgation of an extended decision. From this 5 April 2000 Resolution, the Offices of the Solicitor-General and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration. The sole issue addressed by our 5 April 2000 Resolution is whether or not the de cision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspensio n without pay is immediately executory pending appeal. Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R .A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as foll ows: Sec. 27. Effectively and Finality of Decisions. All provisionary orders of the O ffice of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office o f the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written noti ce and shall be entertained only on the following grounds: x x x x x x x x x Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial ev idence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month s salary shal l be final and unappealable. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petiti on for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in acc ordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman 17 likewise contain a simila r provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides as follows: Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month sa lary, the decision shall be final and unapllealable. In all other cases, the dec ision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt ther eof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certi orari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770. It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitione r, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is no among those listed as final a nd unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provis ionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and execu tory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month s salar y is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim "inclusion unius est exclus io alterus" finds application. The express mention of the things included exclud es those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken toget her is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose pena lties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This find s support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for re consideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review unde r Rules 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 677 0." The Office of the Solicitor General insists however that the case of Fabian vs. Desierto 18 has voided Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Admini strative Order No. 07. As such, the review of decision of the Ombudsman in admin istrative cases is now governed by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates, under Section 12 19 thereof, the immediately executory character

of the decision or order appealed from. The contention of the Solicitor General is not well-taken. Our ruling in the cas e of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Sec tion 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law i mplementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in admini strative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Cour t. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Co urt of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the p roper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including t he finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand. Neither can respondents find support in Section 12, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows: Sec. 12. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall dire ct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. On this point, respondents contend that considering the silence of the Ombudsman Act on the matter of execution pending appeal, the above-quoted provision of th e Rules of Court, which allegedly mandates the immediate execution of all decisi ons rendered by administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, should apply supplet orily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. We do not agree. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. 20 Section 27 of t he Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all othe r cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein wi ll become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal in of appea l is perfected 21 or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal become final. It is this final judgment which is then correc tly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which executio n shall issue as a matter of right. 22 In other words, the fact that the Ombudsm an Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally car ry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, 2 execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however t hat with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodi es, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to qua si-judicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending appeal. The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately exec utory. Decisions rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission 24 and the C ivil Aeronautics Board, 25 for example, are not immediately executory and are st ayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code 26, an d the Office of the President under the Local Government Code 27, which responde nts cite, are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent la ws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the execution pending appeal o f their final orders or decisions. The Local Government Code, under Section 68 t hereof provides as follows: Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not prevent a decision from b ecoming final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been p laced under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal. Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the A

dministrative Code of 1987 provides: (4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being from being executory, and i n case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-jud icial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressl y so provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law dire cts otherwise. Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Loc al Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Offi ce of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local governm ent officials. Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 manda ting execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions o f the Civil Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administ rative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review sh ould be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. Cou rts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omissio n at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 28 And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in st atutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particula r case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over th e other. 29 In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have be en the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of t he President under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsm an under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged und er the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling against execution pending review of the Ombudsman s decision grants a one-sided protection to the offender found guilty of misconduct in office and nothing at a ll to the government as the aggrieved party. The offender, according to responde nts, can just let the case drag on until the expiration of his office or his ree lection as by then, the case against him shall become academic and his offense, obliterated. As such, respondents conclude, the government is left without furth er remedy and is left helpless in its own fight against graft and corruption. We find this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If it perceived that the fight against graft and corruption is hampered by the inad equacy of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Cou rt but by legislative amendment. As regards the contention of the Office of the Ombudsman that under Sec. 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law," suffice it to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisio ns of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equi valent to one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executo ry. Under these rules, which were admittedly promulgated by virtue of the rule-m aking power of the Office of the Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of o ne year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory. WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor

General and the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.1wphi 1.nt SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 173329 December 21, 2009 SUSAN G. PO and LILIA G. MUTIA, Petitioners, vs. OMERO DAMPAL,* Respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.:On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Manolo Fortich , Bukidnon which were covered by OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147, with an approx imate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged for P33,0 00.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of Tagoloan, Inc. For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at public auction on July 8, 1992 to petitioner Susan G. Po (Susan) who wa s the highest bidder. OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147 were subsequently cancelle d and TCT No. T-39280 and TCT No. 39281 were, in their stead, issued in Susans fa vor, following the spouses Causins failure to redeem the property. On September 13, 1993, Susan sold the lot covered by TCT No. 39281 to her herein co-petitioner Lilia G. Mutia (Lilia) who was issued TCT No. T-40193. On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein respondent Ome ro Dampal (Dampal) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich a compl aint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Sale, docket ed as Civil Case No. 94-280 (the civil case). While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, Dampal filed a complaint a gainst Susan and Lilia before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boa rd (DARAB) Region X, for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. X-05-361. By Decision1 of September 16, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator of DARAB Region X d isallowed the redemption prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit he dec lared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant; and that althou gh Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale, he was dee med to have knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence, th ere was substantial compliance with the rules. Dampals motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order2 dated October 28, 1997, he appealed to the DARAB Central Office where it was docketed as DARAB Ca se No. 7315. By Decision3 of October 19, 2004, the DARAB Central Office reversed the Adjudica tors ruling. It held that Dampal, as a tenant, had the right to redeem the mortga ge in the amount of P40,000.00 plus interest; and that the right had not prescri bed, owing to the lack of written notice to him and to the DAR of the sale. It a ccordingly ordered the cancellation of the title issued in favor of Susan and th at of Lilia and the issuance of new ones in Dampals favor, upon his payment of th e redemption amount. Susan and Lilias motion for reconsideration of the said Deci sion was denied by Resolution4 of July 7, 2005, hence, they appealed via certior ari to the Court of Appeals. By Resolution5 of October 19, 2005, the appellate court, holding that petitioner s should have appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43, instead of Rule 65, dismi ssed petitioners petition for certiorari. Petitioners thereupon filed before the appellate court a Motion for Leave to Ame nd Petition and for Admission of Amended Petition, which motion was denied by Re solution6 of March 28, 2006. In denying the motion, the appellate court held tha t dismissal due to error in the mode of appeal cannot be reconsidered by the mer e expediency of filing an amended petition. Moreover, it noted that it was filed out of time. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts March 28, 2006 Reso

lution, alleging that their error in the choice of remedy was excusable as they relied on Sec. 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, reading: Sec. 1. Appeal to the Board. An appeal may be taken to the Board from a resoluti on, decision or final order of the Adjudicator that completely disposes of the c ase by either or both of the parties within a period of fifteen (15) days from r eceipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed from or of the denial of the movants motion for reconsideration in accordance with section 12, Rule X by: 1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered the decision or final order appealed from; 1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties and the Board; and 1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to the DAR Cashier w here the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or through postal money order, pa yable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant. A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee. Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board an d payment of appeal fee shall be filed, within the reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of the case. Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (underscoring supplied) By Resolution7 of May 22, 2006, the appellate court denied the motion for recons ideration, holding that nothing in the above-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV states th at the remedy of an aggrieved party from an adverse decision of the DARAB is by certiorari, and that the applicable rule is Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Re vised Rules of Procedure. On petitioners attribution of the faux pas to their counsel, the appellate court held that they are bound thereby. Hence, this petition. Petitioners assert that the appellate court, in dismissing their petition due to technicality, denied them the opportunity to establish the merits of their case . They maintain that Dampals right of redemption has prescribed, he having admitt ed Susans acquisition of title to the property as early as 1993 but that it was o nly in 1997 that he filed the action for redemption before the DARAB. They thus conclude that the need for sending him notice in writing could be dispensed with ; and that Dampals inaction estopped him from asserting his right as a tenant. The petition is bereft of merit. The earlier-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure dw ells on how appeals to the DARAB Board from the decisions, resolutions or final orders of the Adjudicator are to be taken. How petitioners could have been misle d to file their appeal from the DARABs Decision to the Court of Appeals via certi orari escapes comprehension. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB sho uld be filed with the Court of Appeals by verified petition for review. Thus, Se c. 1 of Rule 43 provides: SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final order s of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolu tions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi -judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Cent ral Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of t he President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aer onautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunicat ions Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Gove rnment Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Bo ard of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.1avvphi1 SECTION 2. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appe al involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

SECTION 3. How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provides: Section 1. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - Any decision, order, resolution, aw ard or ruling of the Board on any agrarian dispute or any matter pertaining to t he application, implementation, enforcement, interpretation of agrarian reform l aws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought on appeal wi thin fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals i n accordance with the Rules of Court. (underscoring supplied) While a petition for certiorari, when availed of as a wrong remedy, is dismissib le, there are exceptions thereto, viz: (a) when public welfare and the advanceme nt of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requir es; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned orde r amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.8 None of these circum stances is present in the case at bar, however.lavvphil The denial9 by the appellate court of petitioners "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETI TION AND FOR ADMISSION OF AMENDED PETITION" filed on October 28, 2005 is thus in order. For the records show that petitioners filed the petition for certiorari on the last day of the 15-day period to appeal or on October 5, 2005. The belated filing of the Amended Petition is inexcusable. Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and t o disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensure s the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or compli cate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may b e heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parti es of the procedural rules.10 (emphasis supplied) Technicality aside, on the merits, petitioners failed to establish that in decid ing the case, the DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion. In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in view of S ec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which mand ates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon re gistration of the sale. Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, a s amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Refo rms of the Philippines, provides: Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have t he right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, T hat where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by h im. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundr ed eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the s ale. (emphasis supplied) The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the runnin g of the prescriptive period. Petitioners contention that Dampal must be consider ed to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of the express requ irement for notice to be in writing. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 183335 December 23, 2009 JUANITO TABIGUE, ALEX BIBAT, JECHRIS DASALLA, ANTONIO TANGON, ROLANDO PEDRIGAL, DANTE MAUL, ALFREDO IDUL, EDGAR RAMOS, RODERICK JAVIER, NOEL PONAYO, ROMEL ORAPA , REY JONE, ALMA PATAY, JERIC BANDIGAN, DANILO JAYME, ELENITA S. BELLEZA, JOSEPH INE COTANDA, RENE DEL MUNDO, PONCIANO ROBUCA, and MARLON MADICLUM, Petitioners, vs. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (INTERCO), Respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioner Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, all employees of responden t International Copra Export Corp-oration (INTERCO), filed a Notice of Preventiv e Mediation with the Department of Labor and Employment National Conciliation an d Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Branch No. XI, Davao City against respondent, for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on th e grievance conference/meeting.1 As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners request ed to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. The NCMB thus set a date for th e parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator. Before the parties could finally meet, respondent presented before the NCMB a le tter2 of Genaro Tan (Tan), president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union (the union) of which petitioners are members, addressed to respondents plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente (Tangente), stating that petitioners "are not duly aut horized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] . . . all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union." Respondent thus moved to dismi ss petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.3 Petitioners soon sent union president Tan and respondents plant manager Tangente a Notice to Arbitrate, citing the "Revised Guidelines" in the Conduct of Volunta ry Arbitration Procedure vis a vis Section 3, Article XII of the CBA, furnishing the NCMB with a copy4 thereof, which notice respondent opposed.5 The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement,6 NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and respondents plant manager Tangente of th e lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case thereto; and that under the CB A forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbi tration but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration. The NCMB Director thus concluded that "the demand of [petitioners] to submit the issues . . . to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED." He thus advised peti tioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights.7 On petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,8 the NCMB Director, by letter of April 11, 2007 to petitioners counsel, stated that the NCMB "has no rule-making power to decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the parties to . . . labor disputes." Petitioners thus assailed the NCMB Directors decision via Petition for Review bef ore the Court of Appeals9 which dismissed it by Resolution10 of October 24, 2007 in this wise: x x x x Considering that NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial f unctions but merely a conciliatory body for the purpose of facilitating settleme nt of disputes between parties, its decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under R ule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Further perusal of the petition reveals the following infirmities: 1. Payment of the docket fees and other legal fees is short by One Thousand Peso s (Php 1,000.00); 2. Copy of the assailed "Decision" of the Regional Director of the National Conc

iliation and Mediation Board has not been properly certified as the name and des ignation of the certifying officer thereto are not indicated; and 3. Not all of the petitioners named in the petition signed the verification and non-forum shopping.11 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Their Motion for Reconsideration12 having been denied,13 petitioners filed the p resent Petition for Review on Certiorari,14 raising the following arguments: THIS PARTICULAR CASE XXX FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 6, RULE IV , IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPH 3, SUB-PARAGRAPH 3.2, SECTION 4, RULE IV, ALL OF THE REVISED PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES IN THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDING S.15 THE NCMB, WHEN EXERCISING ADJUDICATIVE POWERS, ACTS AS A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.1 6 FINAL JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS, OR AWARDS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COU RTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BOARDS, LIKE THE NCMB, COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTA LITIES, ARE APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.17 (emphas is in the original) LABOR CASES, AS A GENERAL RULE, ARE NEVER RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF TECHNICALITY ESPECIALLY SO WHEN SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES ARE AFFECTED.18 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The petition fails. Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that [t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for cost s, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal ther eof. (underscoring and emphasis supplied) Petitioners claim that they had completed the payment of the appellate docket fe e and other legal fees when they filed their motion for reconsideration before t he Court of Appeals.19 While the Court has, in the interest of justice, given du e course to appeals despite the belated payment of those fees,20 petitioners hav e not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule. On this score alone, the dismissal by the appellate court of petitioners petition i s in order. But even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed, the appellate courts dismissal wo uld just the same be sustained. Under Section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganizat ion Act of 1980,21 the Court of Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdicti on over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regiona l Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commiss ions. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court under which petitioners filed their petition befor e the Court of Appeals22 applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutio ns of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-ju dicial functions.23 A[n agency] is said to be exercising judicial function where [it] has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and t hen undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of th e parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discre tion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to inve stigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw concl usions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.24 (underscoring supplied) Given NCMBs following functions, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order N o. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and Employment), viz: (a) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation an d guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor dispute s; (b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions; (c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and oth er government authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;

(d) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of opera tion and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and non-adversari al schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement; (e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of volu ntary arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and decisions; (f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the a dministration of collective agreements; (g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being imp lemented in the regional offices; and (h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Mi nister, it can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency. Respecting petitioners thesis that unsettled grievances should be referred to vol untary arbitration as called for in the CBA, the same does not lie. The pertinen t portion of the CBA reads: In case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement or any matter affecting the relations of Labor and Management, the UN ION and the COMPANY agree to exhaust all possibilities of conciliation through t he grievance machinery. The committee shall resolve all problems submitted to it within fifteen (15) days after the problems ha[ve] been discussed by the member s. If the dispute or grievance cannot be settled by the Committee, or if the com mittee failed to act on the matter within the period of fifteen (15) days herein stipulated, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit the issue to Voluntary Ar bitration. Selection of the arbitrator shall be made within seven (7) days from the date of notification by the aggrieved party. The Arbitrator shall be selecte d by lottery from four (4) qualified individuals nominated by in equal numbers b y both parties taken from the list of Arbitrators prepared by the National Conci liation and Mediation Board (NCMB). If the Company and the Union representatives within ten (10) days fail to agree on the Arbitrator, the NCMB shall name the A rbitrator. The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the pa rties. However, the Arbitrator shall not have the authority to change any provis ions of the Agreement. The cost of arbitration shall be borne equally by the par ties.25 (capitalization in the original, underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union. Apro pos is this Courts pronouncement in Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,26 viz: x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequent ly only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the gr ievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.27 (emphasis and underscoring supplie d) Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of th e Labor Code which states: Art. 255. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the e mployees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive rep resentative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaini ng. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right a t any time to present grievances to their employer. x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied) To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision "is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor organization/union."2 8 This Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to sub mit the same to voluntary arbitration. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 179674 July 28, 2009 PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES BUREAU DIRECTOR HORACIO C. RAMOS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR SAMUEL T. P ARAGAS, REGIONAL PANEL OF ARBITRATORS ATTY. CLARO E. RAMOLETE, JR., ATTY. JOSEPH ESTRELLA and ENGR. RENATO RIMANDO, and MONTAGUE RESOURCES PHILIPPINES CORPORATI ON, Respondents. D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1 997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to reverse the Resolutions dated 2 3 February 20071 and 6 September 20072 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. The appellate court, in its assailed Resolution dated 23 February 2007, dismissed the Petition for Review, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Ci vil Procedure, of herein petitioner Pyro Copper Mining Corporation, for failure of petitioner to attach pertinent and relevant documents thereto.3 The appellate court, in its other assailed Resolution dated 6 September 2007, denied the Moti on for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and for failure to show t he authority of Atty. Vicente R. Acsay (Atty. Acsay), one of the members of the Board of Directors of petitioner, to sign the Verification and Certification aga inst Forum Shopping accompanying the Petition. Petitioner additionally prays for the setting aside or reversal of the Decision4 dated 28 December 2006 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ( DENR)-Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB Case No. 0147-06, which affirmed the Orders dated 14 September 20055 and 27 December 20056 of the DENR-Panel of Arbi trators, Region 1, San Fernando City, La Union (Panel of Arbitrators), in Case N o. 2005-00012-I, dismissing the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent Montague Resources Phi lippines Corporation. Ultimately, petitioner seeks the denial of the mining clai m and the revocation/cancellation of the Exploration Permit, EXPA No. 21 dated 1 2 September 2003, of private respondent. The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws en gaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application for Mi neral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), identified as APSA-SF-000089, with th e Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, Regional Office No. 1, San Fe rnando City in La Union, for the exploration, development and commercial utiliza tion of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its fa vor. Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws o f the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. On 12 September 2003, p rivate respondent filed an Application for Exploration Permit7 with MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-18 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protes t/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent . It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators9 on 30 August 2005 and wa s received by the latter on 5 September 2005. The case was docketed as Case No. 2005-00012-I. Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the p rivate respondents Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-20 00-1 was cancelled per DENR Memorandum Order (DMO) No. 2005-0310 issued by the D ENR Secretary Michael Defensor on 1 February 2005. Petitioner moved for the reco nsideration of DMO No. 2005-03, which the DENR Secretary denied in its Decision1 1 dated 14 June 2005.12

On 1 September 2005,13 the MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. In an Order dated 14 September 2005, the Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu pro prio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner for the following reasons: (1 ) the instant pleading was filed out of time; (2) in view of the issuance of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was rendered moo t and academic; (3) the Panel of Arbitrators had no authority/jurisdiction to ca ncel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 of private respondent, the same being lod ged with the MGB, the issuing authority; and (4) petitioner failed to include a certification against forum shopping.14 Petitioner moved for its reconsideration , but the Panel of Arbitrators denied the same in its Order dated 27 December 20 05.15 Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB the Orders dated 14 September 2005 and 27 December 2005 of the Panel of Arbitrators, docketed as MAB Case No. 0147-06. Subsequently, in a Decision16 dated 28 December 2006 in MAB Case No. 0147-06, th e MAB dismissed the appeal of petitioner, on the following grounds: (a) the Veri fied Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed beyond the reglementary period; and (b) the Veri fied Protest/Opposition of petitioner did not include a certification against fo rum shopping.17 Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 o f the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No . 97663. In a Resolution dated 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said Petition, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Pro cedure,18 for failure of petitioner to attach thereto some pertinent and relevan t documents required under Section 6 of the same Rule.19 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 February 2007 Resolution , together with the required documents. Private respondent, however, in its Comm ent,20 still prayed for the dismissal of the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663 fo r failure of petitioner to submit Atty. Acsays authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. Petitioner was given an opportunity to submit Atty. Acsays written authority, but failed to do so. Consequently, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated 6 September 2007, denying for lack of merit the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. Hence, this Petition. The petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts Resolution: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] DEPARTED FROM THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION [A QUO] DESPITE FAITHFUL COMPLIANC E WITH THE RULES ON DISCLOSURE AS INCORPORATED IN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICA TION PORTION OF THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION [OF] TIME AND PETITION A QUO. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] DEPARTED FROM THE RULES AND ESTABLISHE D JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION A QUO DESPITE THE ATTACHMENT AND SUBMISSION OF THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY TO MAKE AND SIGN VERIFICATIONS AND SUBSEQU ENTLY REQUIRED PLEADINGS. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] REFUSED TO ADJUDICATE THE PETITION A QUO DESPITE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CLEARLY EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER AND PARAMOUNT PUBL IC INTEREST INVOLVED AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY FOR A RULING TO PUT AN END TO UNSC RUPULOUS ISSUANCE OF MINING CLAIMS. IV. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS IN THE DENR COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GR AVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT: (A) THE VERIFIED PROTEST/OPPOSITION W AS FILED OUT OF TIME; (B) THE ISSUANCE OF THE EXPLORATION PERMIT IN FAVOR OF [PR IVATE RESPONDENT] ON [1 SEPTEMBER 2005] AND THE UNILATERAL CANCELLATION OF THE M PSA BY THE DENR-SECRETARY RENDERED THE VERIFIED PROTEST/OPPOSITION MOOT AND ACAD EMIC; (C) THE [PANEL OF ARBITRATORS] HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CANCEL, DENY AND/OR REVOKE THE EXPLORATION PERMIT OF [PRIVATE RESPONDENT]; AND (D) THE VERIFIED PRO TEST/OPPOSITION DOES NOT CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.21 To resolve the foregoing issues, the Court must address the more specific issues below: I. Whether the subsequently attached Minutes of the Special Meeting dated 22 Jan

uary 2007 of the Board of Directors of petitioner sufficiently granted Atty. Acs ay authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping w hich accompanied the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. II. Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed out of time. III. Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner filed before the MAB needs to be accompanied by a Certification against Forum Shopping. IV. Whether the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 2005-03 on 1 February 2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the issuance by MGB o f EP No. 05-001 in favor of private respondent on 1 September 2005 rendered the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic. V. Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revo ke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent. The Court finds no merit in the present Petition. I Petitioner maintains that there are special circumstances and basic consideratio ns in support of Atty. Acsays authority to execute and sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping which accompanied its Petition in CA-G.R. S P No. 97663. Firstly, Atty. Acsay is an incorporator, stockholder, member of the board of directors, corporate secretary, and legal counsel of petitioner. Secon dly, he was the authorized representative of petitioner in the signing of MPSA N o. 153-2000-1. Therefore, Atty. Acsay is the best legally suitable person to mak e the required sworn disclosures in the Verification and Certification against F orum Shopping in the Petition of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. Petitioner also contends that the Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 January 2007 by the board of directors of petitioner, bestowing upon Atty. Acsay the authori ty to make and sign the Verification for the Motion for Extension of Time to Fil e Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure , must be construed in its entirety. According to the Minutes, Atty. Acsay was g ranted authority by the board to sign even verifications, which may be required in subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner. The reference in the Minutes to the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is not meant to be res trictive or qualifying, as to exclude other pleadings. With the foregoing, petitioner firmly argues that it has substantially complied with the requirements for the execution of the Verification and Certification ag ainst Forum Shopping, which accompanied its Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. Section 6(d), Rule 4322 in relation to Section 2, Rule 4223 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a petition for review shall contain a swo rn certification against forum shopping, in which the petitioner shall attest th at he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in this Court , the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or differ ent divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptl y inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five d ays therefrom.24 For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petiti oner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of t he docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petit ion shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The requirement that petitioner should sign the Certification against Forum Shop ping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction betw een natural and juridical persons.25 A corporation, however, exercises its power s through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific ac

t of the board of directors.26 The signatory, therefore, in the case of the corp oration should be "a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation" who has knowledge of the matter being certified.27 If the petitioner is a corporation, a board resolution authorizing a corporate o fficer to execute the Certification against Forum Shopping is necessary. A certi fication not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.28 To recall, the Court of Appeals initially dismissed, in its Resolution dated 23 February 2007, the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663, for failure of p etitioner to submit pertinent and relevant documents required under Section 6, R ule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner filed a Moti on for Reconsideration, attaching thereto the required documents, except the pro of of Atty. Acsays authority to sign the Verification and Certification against F orum Shopping for the Petition. Instead of immediately dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, however, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 8 June 2007, gave petitioner five days from receipt thereof to submit suc h proof. The petitioner then submitted the Minutes of the Special Meeting held o n 22 January 2007 by its board of directors, adopting a Resolution to the follow ing effect: RESOLVED, that [Atty. Acsay], Director and Corporate Secretary of [herein petiti oner] be, as he hereby is, authorized to make and sign the verification of the p leading filed by [petitioner] entitled "Motion for Extension of Time to File Pet ition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.29 It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Resolution of the board of directors of petitioner that the authority granted to Atty. Acsay was to make and sign the pl eading entitled "Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court," but not the Petition for Review itself. The word ings of the board Resolution are so explicit that they cannot be interpreted oth erwise. There is nothing to justify the argument of petitioner that the authorit y to sign granted to Atty. Acsay by the said board Resolution extended to all ot her pleadings subsequent to the Motion for Extension. Other than the Minutes of the Special Meeting held on 22 January 2007 by the boa rd of directors of petitioner, which the Court deemed unsatisfactory, no other p roof of Atty. Acsays purported authority to sign the Verification and Certificati on against Forum Shopping for the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663 wa s presented. Absent proof of such authority, then the reasonable conclusion is t hat there is actually none. Given that a certification not signed by a duly auth orized person renders the petition subject to dismissal,30 the Court of Appeals did not err in finally dismissing in its Resolution dated 6 September 2007 the P etition of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. Although the Court has previously relaxed the rules on verification and certific ation against forum shopping in some instances,31 it cannot do so here. From the very beginning, petitioner failed to attach to its Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals the relevant documents required by Section 6, Rule 4 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner had two opportunities to co mply with the requisites, i.e., when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 February 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and when it submitted it s compliance with the 8 June 2007 Resolution of the appellate court; yet, petiti oner still failed to do so. Petitioner never offered any satisfactory explanatio n for its stubborn non-compliance with or disregard for the rules of procedure. It is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice . However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and a t random, to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the iss ues and their just resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules shoul d not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have res ulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they are requi red to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.32 II Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Acsay did have the authority to sign the Verif

ication and Certification against Forum Shopping for the Petition for Review of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing said Petition, the Court still cannot grant the prayer of petitioner herein to reverse the actions undertaken by the DENR as regards the cancellation of its MP SA No. 153-2000-1 and the issuance of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. Petitioner insists that it filed its Verified Protest/Opposition to the Applicat ion for Exploration Permit of private respondent within the reglementary period. Based on the records of MGB, the Notice of Application for Exploration Permit o f private respondent was actually posted from 14 July 2005 to 28 July 2005. Appl ying the 30-day reglementary period, the last date on which to file any adverse claim, protest or opposition to the said application was 27 August 2005, a Satur day. Since 29 August 2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday, the next bus iness day was 30 August 2005, Tuesday. This very well explains why the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner was filed on 30 August 2005. Petitioner further avows that it paid the required legal fees through postal money order. The issu ance of the official receipt only after the filing, through registered mail, of its Verified Protest/Opposition, does not erase the fact that the docket fees we re paid to and received by the government. Section 21 of DAO No. 96-40 mandates: Section 21. Publication/Posting/Radio Announcement of an Exploration Permit Appl ication. - x x x Any adverse claim, protest or opposition shall be filed directl y, within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of publication/posting/ra dio announcement, with the concerned Regional Office or through any concerned PE NRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional Office for purposes of its res olution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of the Act and th ese implementing rules and regulations. x x x. Considering that the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB are bereft of any provision regarding the computation of time and the manner of filing, the Court may refer to Section 1, Rule 22 and Se ction 3, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,33 which state: Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or al lowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, th e day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in t he place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day . (Emphasis supplied.) Section 3. Manner of filing. - The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, no tices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the or iginal copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of cou rt or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, t he date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry rec eipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment or deposit in cou rt. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied .) In the present case, notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of privat e respondent were published in newspapers,34 announced on the radio,35 and poste d in public places. The posting was done the latest, so we reckon the last possi ble date petitioner could have validly filed its Verified Petition/Opposition wi th the Panel of Arbitrators therefrom. The notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent were posted on the bulletin boards of the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Dasol, Pa ngasinan on 16 to 31 March 2005; Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mabini, Pangas inan on 16 to 31 March 2005; Office of the Pangasinan Provincial Environment and Natural Resources on 17 March 2005 to 2 April 2005; Office of the DENR Provinci al Environment and Natural Resources-Pangasinan on 15 March 2005 to 6 April 2005 ; Office of the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources-Alaminos City o n 17 March 2005 to 5 April 2005; Offices of the Punong Barangays of Malimpin, Sa

n Pedro, Barlo, San Vicente, and Alilao on 16 to 31 March 2005; and MGB on 14 to 28 July 2005.36 Since the notice of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was last posted on 28 July 2005, the 30-day reglementary period for filing any adverse claim/protest/opposition thereto ended on 27 August 2005. As petitioner explained, however, 27 August 2005 was a Saturday; and 29 August 2005, Monday, w as declared a national holiday,37 so the next working day was 30 August 2005, Tu esday. Petitioner did send its Verified Protest/Opposition, through registered m ail, on 30 August 2005, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service38 of even date and Registry Receipts No. 10181; No. 10182; No. 10183; and No. 10184.39 Neverthe less, the Court still could not consider the Verified Protest/Opposition of peti tioner as having been filed within the reglementary period.lavvphil Section 21 of DAO No. 96-40, fixing the 30-day reglementary period for filing an y adverse claim/protest/opposition to an application for exploration permit, mus t be read in relation to Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40, which reads: Section 204. Substantial Requirements for Adverse Claims, Protest and Opposition s. No adverse claim, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be acce pted for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee and proof of services to the respondent(s), either personally or by registered mail : Provided, That the requirement for the payment of docket fees shall not be imp osed on pauper litigants[;] (Emphasis supplied.) and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB, which states that: Section 7. Form and Contents of Adverse Claims, Protest or Opposition. No advers e claim, petition, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be accept ed for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee and p roof of services to the respondent(s), either personally or by registered mail: Provided, That the requirement for the payment of docket fees shall not be impos ed on pauper litigants. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB explicitly requir e that the adverse claim/protest/opposition be accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee for the same to be accepted for filing. Upon a careful examination of the records of this case, it appears that the dock et fee was paid only on 6 September 2005, as evidenced by Official Receipt (O.R. ) No. 7478283 B.40 Although petitioner avers that it paid the docket fee through postal money order in which case, the date of mailing would be deemed the date of payment such averment is unsubstantiated. The Court finds no evidence to prov e that petitioner actually sent the purported postal money order for the payment of the docket fee. Petitioner submits the following evidence to prove payment o f the docket fee: (a) a Prudential Bank Check in the amount of P5,020.00 dated 1 September 2005;41 (b) O.R. No. 7478283 B dated 6 September 2005 issued by MGB R egion I, San Fernando City; and (c) several registry return receipts.42 But thes e pieces of evidence do not establish at all that the docket fee was paid by pos tal money order; or indicate the postal money order number and the date said pos tal money order was sent. Without any evidence to prove otherwise, the Court pre sumes that the docket fee was paid on the date the receipt for the same was issu ed, i.e., 6 September 2005. Based on the foregoing, the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the App lication for Exploration Permit of respondent is deemed filed with the Panel of Arbitrators only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee on 6 September 2005, clearly beyond the reglementary period, which ended on 30 August 2005. III The Panel of Arbitrators denied the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner in Case No. 2005-00012-I for another procedural lapse, the lack of a certification against forum shopping. Petitioner argues that a Verified Protest/Opposition does not require a certific ation against forum shopping. According to it, Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40 iden tifies the substantial requirements of a mining adverse claim/ protest/oppositio n, and a certification against forum shopping is not among them; the Panel of Ar

bitrators has no power and authority to impose additional requirements for the f iling and service of pleadings; the Panel of Arbitrators also does not have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations involving the practice, pleadings, litigation and disposition of cases before it, for the same only belongs to the MAB, pursuant to Section 207 of DAO No. 96-40. The arguments of petitioner have no merit. Petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition before the Panel of Arbitrators t o oppose the Application for Exploration Permit filed by private respondent with the MGB. The Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner constitutes an initiator y pleading before the Panel of Arbitrators, for which a certification against fo rum shopping may be required. Truly, DAO No. 96-40 is bereft of any provision re quiring that a certification against forum shopping be attached to the adverse c laim/protest/opposition. However, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules on Pleading, Pr actice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB allows the appl ication of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court by analogy or in a sup pletory manner, in the interest of expeditious justice and whenever practical an d convenient; and, according to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court: SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party s hall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneous ly filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or file d any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial a gency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendin g therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statem ent of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that th e same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid comp laint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere a mendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for th e dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motio n and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance w ith any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate f orum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctio ns. Hence, the requirement by the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB that a certificat ion against forum shopping be attached to initiatory pleadings filed before them , to ascertain that no similar actions have been filed before other courts, trib unals, or quasi-judicial bodies, is not arbitrary or baseless. The lack of such a certification is a ground for the dismissal of the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner. IV The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner for a third reason: that the same has become moot and academic, given that the DENR Secretary already issued DMO No. 2005-03 on 1 February 2005 canceling MPSA No. 153-2000-1 and MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent on 1 September 2005. However, petitioner asserts that MPSA No. 153-2000-1 has not been finally cancel led or revoked, considering the pendency of the legal remedies it availed itself of for DMO No. 2005-03. The issuance of DMO No. 2005-03 by the DENR Secretary, and of EP No. 05-001 by MGB pursuant thereto, should not render the Verified Pro test/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic. The position of petitioner is untenable. It must be stressed that the cancellation of MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner b y the DENR Secretary in DMO No. 2005-03 is already the subject of separate proce edings. The Court cannot touch upon it in the Petition at bar. Also worth stressing is that petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to t

he Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent. When the applicatio n was approved and the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petition er had nothing more to protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by MG B of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to seek th e cancellation thereof, over which, as subsequently discussed herein, the Panel of Arbitrators would have no jurisdiction. The Panel of Arbitrators cannot simpl y consider or convert the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Appli cation for Exploration Permit of private respondent as a petition for the cancel lation of EP No. 05-001. Since the Panel of Arbitrators can no longer grant peti tioner any actual substantial relief by reason of the foregoing circumstances, t hen the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner was appropriately dismissed fo r being moot and academic. V Finally, petitioner posits that Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Sections 202 to 203 of its Implementing Rules vest the Panel of Arbitrators with the jur isdiction to entertain and accept any claim, protest or opposition filed directl y with its office. In the discharge thereof, the office and function bestowed up on the Panel of Arbitrators include the power and authority to deny clearances, exclude exploration permits, and not to accept or entertain the same. The Court disagrees. Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclus ive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following: a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas; b. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits; c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires ; and d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effe ctivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) In Olympic Mines and Development Corporation v. Platinum Group Metals Corporatio n43 citing Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporat ion,44 this Court made the following pronouncements as regards paragraphs (a) an d (b) of Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942: In Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, et al., this Court speaking through Justice Velasco, specified the kind of disputes that fall under Section 77(a) of the Mining Act: The phrase "disputes involving rights to mining areas" refers to any adverse cla im, protest, or opposition to an application for a mineral agreement. x x x x [T]he power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, or protest rela tive to mining rights under Section 77 (a) of RA 7942 is confined only to advers e claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of m ineral rights. x x x. Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over "disputes involving rights to mining areas" has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agr eements. (Emphases supplied.) x x x x Parenthetically, the "permit" referred to in Section 77(b) of the Mining Act per tains to exploration permit, quarry permit, and other mining permits recognized in Chapters IV, VIII, and IX of the Mining Act. An operating agreement, not bein g among those listed, cannot be considered as a "mineral permit" under Section 7 7 (b). (Emphases supplied.) It is clear from the ruling of the Court in Olympic Mines and Celestial Nickel M ining that the Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, c onflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral righ ts, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing. As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides: Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. The Director/concerned Region

al Director may cancel the Exploration Permit for failure of the Permittee to co mply with any of the requirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditio ns under which the Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration Permits, the Secret ary upon the recommendation of the Director shall cause the cancellation of the same. According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, "Director" means the Director of the MG B Central Office, while "Regional Director" means the Regional Director of any M GB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, with draw or cancel the same.45 Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cance l EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not wi th the Panel of Arbitrators. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari of petitioner Pyro Copper Mining Corporation is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dat ed 23 February 2007 and 6 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP N o. 97663 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 158071 April 2, 2009 JOSE SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondents. D E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated J anuary 6, 2003, and Resolution2 dated April 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA ) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65163, entitled "Jose Santos v. Committee on Claims Settleme nt and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)." The facts are as follows: On August 16, 1986, petitioner Jose S. Santos retired from the Department of Agr arian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 16163 after rendering almost 21 years of service. On January 2, 1989, petitioner was re-employed in the Office of the Deputy Ombud sman for Luzon. In 1997, petitioner initiated moves to avail of early retirement under R.A. 660. 4 He requested and received from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Operating Unit a tentative computation of retirement benefits under R.A. 660 amo unting to P667,937.40. Petitioner formally applied for retirement under R.A. 660 in January 1998. However, in a Letter5 dated May 4, 1998, the GSIS Operating Unit informed petiti oner that he could no longer retire under R.A. 660 but he could do so under R.A. 8291,6 under which petitioner is entitled to a reduced benefit of P81,557.20. T his computation did not consider petitioners 20.91553 years of service with the D AR prior to his previous retirement. Petitioner appealed to respondent GSIS Committee on Claims. Unfortunately, respo ndent affirmed the GSIS Operating Units computation under R.A. 8291. On August 25, 1999, petitioner filed with the GSIS Board of Trustees a complaint against respondent docketed as GSIS Case No. 002-99. On February 15, 2000, the GSIS Board of Trustees rendered a decision7 denying pe titioners complaint, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered denying Petitioner Jose S. Santos Petition to be allowed to retire under the pension plan under RA 660, and modifying the Resolution of the Government Service Insurance Systems Committee on Claims Settle ment adopted in its Committee Meeting No. 158 held on September 23, 1996, insofa r as it limits Petitioners mode of retirement to that provided in RA 8291. The Op erating Unit concerned is ordered to process Petitioners retirement effective Mar

ch 21, 2000 under the gratuity retirement of RA 1616 or the pension retirement u nder RA 8291 after he formally indicates which mode he would like to avail of. SO ORDERED. In the meantime, on March 20, 2000, petitioner was compulsorily retired for reac hing the age of sixty-five. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 2000 decision of the Board of Trustees. He attached documentary evidence to his motion which s howed several retirees who were later on reemployed after their first retirement and were allowed to choose the law under which they can again retire. Thus, lik e them, he should also be allowed to retire under the law of his choice. The GSI S Board of Trustees denied his motion for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of t he 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 6, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision dismissing th e petition for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled as follows:8 This Court is of the belief, however, that the focal issue raised herein, i.e., whether or not the petitioner can choose to retire under either Republic Act 829 1 or Republic Act 660, is a pure question of law. As such, this Court is not ves ted with jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case since there is no dispute with respect to the fact that when an appeal raised only pure question of law, i t is only the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the same (Articl e VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), 1987 Constitution; Rule 45, Rules of Court; see also Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA [1987]). xx xxx xxx As can be seen from both parties[ ] arguments, the instant case calls for the de termination of what the law is on the particular situation of herein petitioner, i.e., whether RA 660 is applicable in his case or only that of RA 8291, or both . Such question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the e vidence presented by the parties because there is no dispute as to the truth or falsity of the facts obtaining in the case. Hence, the procedure adopted by the petitioner in this case is improper. The pro per procedure that should have been followed was to file a petition for review o n certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice of j udgment pointing out errors of law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. (e mphasis ours) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution dated April 22, 2003. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the following assignment of e rrors: 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that CA-G .R. SP No. 65163 entitled Jose S. Santos vs. Committee on Claims Settlement, GSI S raises only questions of law, hence the proper remedy for petitioner is a peti tion for review on certiorari under Rule 45; 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error in not giving due course to the petition as it raises questions of law only; a reading thereof shows that f actual issues are raised therein. The said dismissal left unresolved the questio ns of law and facts raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 65163; 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the GSI S of February 15, 2000, it being contrary to law. 4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 65163, alle gedly for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner avers that the CA erred in dismissing his petition which raised both questions of law and fact which are well within its jurisdiction pursuant to Rul e 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. According to petitioner the petition raised factual issues which necessitated the review of the records of the re-emp loyed retirees who were allowed by the GSIS to retire under the law of their cho ice. Petitioner further avers that even if CA-G.R. SP No. 65163 raises only ques

tions of law, the same is still within the jurisdiction of the CA pursuant to Se ction 31 of Republic Act No. 8291, which provides that appeals from any decision or award by the Board of Trustees shall be governed by Rules 43 and 45 of the 1 997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proper remedy of petitioner is to file a petition for review under Rule 45 and not under Rule 43, there being only pure questions of law involved in the case. Hence, the CA correctly dismiss ed the petition before it. We deal first with the procedural issue raised by petitioner. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states: Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final order s of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolu tions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi -judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Cent ral Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of t he President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aer onautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunicat ions Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Governme nt Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inv entions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbi trators authorized by law. x x x Section 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appe al involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (emph asis ours) In Posadas-Moya and Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. Greenfield Development Corporation, et al.,9 the Court distinguished a question of law from one of fact , thus: A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is o n a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or differ ence arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Explained the Court: "A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct app lication of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue do es not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibil ity of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circum stances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probab ility of the situation." Thus, the question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is u ndoubtedly a question of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that he has previously retired from the government under a particul ar statute and that he was re-employed by the government. These facts are admitt ed and there is no need for an examination of the probative value of the evidenc e presented. As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court si nce Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved."10 It should not be overlooked, however, that the same provisio n vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein is prefaced by the statement that it may "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on app eal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," the judgments o r final orders of lower courts in the cases therein enumerated.11 Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid general rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review sol

ely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this Court. Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the reglementary period to a ppeal whether the appeal involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As such, a question of fact or question of law alone or a mix ques tion of fact and law may be appealed to the CA via Rule 43. Thus, in Carpio v. S ulu Resources Development Corporation,12 we held: According to Section 3 of Rule 43, "[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and l aw." Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law m ay be brought to the CA. (emphasis ours) However, a remand of the case to the CA would serve no useful purpose, since the core issue in this case, i.e., under which law petitioner can retire, can alrea dy be resolved based on the records of the proceedings before the GSIS. A remand would unnecessarily impose on the parties the concomitant difficulties and expe nses of another proceeding where they would have to present the same evidence an d arguments again. This clearly runs counter to the Rules of Court, which mandat es liberal construction of the Rules to attain just, speedy and inexpensive disp osition of any action or proceeding.13 We now discuss petitioners arguments on the merits. It is well settled that the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entit led to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts.14 In the case at bar, this Court finds that the GSIS ruling as to which retirement law is applicable to petitioner deserves full faith and credit. Petitioner fails to co nvince us that there are justifiable reasons to depart from the GSIS decision in his case. As pertinently discussed by the GSIS Board of Trustees, the grant of the right t o choose a mode of retirement in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 is found in Section 13. It was reproduced in Section 11 (c), Rule IV of the Implementing Ru les and Regulations on the Revised GSIS Act of 1977, adopted by the Systems Board of Trustees pursuant to Board Resolution 223-78, stating that: (c) Employees who were in the government service at the time of the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1146 shall, at the time of their retirement, have the option to retire under said Decree or under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as previo usly amended. On August 28, 1980, the GSIS Board of Trustees, in Board Resolution No. 583-80, adopted the following amendment to Section 11 (c), Rule IV of the Implementing R ules for PD 1146, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Gray Areas: (c) Employees who were in the government service at the time of the effectivity of PD 1146 shall at the time of their retirement have the option to retire under said Decree or under CA 186 as previously amended Provided, that in the event t he member is reinstated in the service after having exercised the option to reti re under RA 1616 he shall subsequently be retireable under PD 1146 only. On July 19, 1985, P.D. No. 1981 was promulgated amending Section 13 of PD 1146 a s follows: Sec. 13. Retirement Option. Employees who are in the government service upon the effectivity of this Act shall, at the time of their retirement, have the option to retire under this Act or under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and the ir benefits and entitlement thereto shall be determined in accordance with the p rovisions of the law so opted: Provided, however, That in the event of re-employ ment, the employees subsequent retirement shall be governed by the provisions of this Act: Provided further, That the member may change the mode of his retiremen t within one year from the date of his retirement in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the System. x x x (emphasis ours) Clearly, the option to retire is preserved under PD 1146 for those who were in t he government service upon its effectivity in view of the rule on non-impairment of benefits. There is an apparent gray area when an employee who was in the gov ernment service upon the effectivity PD 1146 but opted to retire under one of th e previous retirement laws. Once reinstated, are they still entitled, upon reins

tatement, to exercise the option to again retire under the old law? The GSIS Board of Trustees, in agreement with the Committee on Claims Settlement concluded that Mr. Santos right to choose the law under which he would retire an d be covered by R.A. 660 is no longer available to him because he had already ex ercised said right when he availed of it during his previous retirement in 1986. In 1986, he chose to forego the benefits of R.A. 660 and retired under R.A. 161 6. When petitioner first retired in 1986, the applicable law to his situation was P .D. 1146 as amended by P.D. 1981. Section 13 of that law (upon which petitioner himself bases his right to choose the law to govern his retirement) expressly st ates that in the event of re-employment the subsequent retirement shall be gover ned by P.D. 1146. Even the Government Corporate Counsel supported such view through its Opinion No . 100, Series of 1981, stating that in the event the member is reinstated in the service after having exercised the option to retire under RA 1616, he shall sub sequently be retireable under PD 1146 only. All employees of the government are covered by PD 1146 upon its effectivity. Onl y employees who are in the government service upon the effectivity of the said l aw who shall have, at the time of retirement, the option to retire under the old law or CA 186 (otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter) are exempt from the coverage of PD 1146. The foregoing applies notwithstanding the rule in Section 44 on non-impairment o f benefits that have become vested under the old law. Pursuant to the rule on pr ospectivity of laws, employees who have previously retired under CA 186 and were reinstated after the effectivity of the new law are already covered by the new law, not because they are deemed new or original employees, but by mere prospect ive operation of the new law in force at the time they reentered the service.1av vphi1 The same view was shared by the Government Corporate Counsel, in its Opinion No. 154, Series of 1997, dated July 14, 1997, when it ruled that the legislature in tended to withhold the availability of retirement option from those who have bee n re-employed and are retiring for the second time. If the intent was otherwise, then the said proviso should have also expressly stated so and/or said proviso should not have been included at all. It stated, thus: One of the purposes for the passage of P.D. 1981 is to clarify the parties to wh om the retirement option in Section 13 of P.D. 1146 is available, thus: WHEREAS, there have been conflicting interpretations of certain provisions of Pr esidential Decree No. 1146, particularly as for whether or not elective public o fficials are covered by the GSIS for the duration of their term of office; wheth er or not a public officer or employee who is separated for cause or considered resigned automatically forfeits his retirement benefits; and whether or not publ ic officers and employees in the government service at the time Presidential Dec ree No. 1146 took effect have the option of retiring under the said Decree or Co mmonwealth Act No. 186, as amended: WHEREAS, conflicting claims for benefits have invariably been filed under the di fferent laws administered by the GSIS, which have oftentimes resulted in unneces sary litigation, delay and inconvenience on the part of the rightful claimants. x x x WHEREAS, it has thus become necessary to amend Presidential Decree No. 1146 to c larify some of its provisions to make it more responsive to the needs of the mem bers of the GSIS and to assure the actuarial solvency of the Funds administered by the GSIS during these times of grave economic crisis affecting the country. ( Underscoring ours) With this legislative purpose in mind, the amendment of Section 13 of P.D. 1981, to include a proviso that in the event of re-employment of a member his subsequ ent retirement shall be governed by P.D. 1146, shows the clear legislative inten t to withhold the availability of retirement option from those who have been reemployed and are retiring for the second time. If the intent was otherwise, then the said proviso should have also expressly stated so and/or said proviso shoul d not have been included at all.

Thus, the last proviso in Section 13 of P.D. 1146, as amended, granting the righ t to change the mode of retirement within one year, may not be considered as ref erring to the immediately preceding section, which is the proviso stating that s ubsequent retirements shall be governed by P.D. 1146. Such interpretation would only render both provisos inconsistent and conflicting with one another and effe ctively meaningless because even if the first proviso removes the option, the se cond proviso prescribes the period by which the option may be exercised. It has been held that statutes must be interpreted in such a way as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statutes and thus avoid non-sensical or absurd re sults (People vs. Duque, 212 SCRA 607; Automatic Parts and Equipment vs. Lingad, 30 SCRA 247, as cited in Agpalo, op. Cit., pp. 114-115). Thus, a better and mor e sensible interpretation of Section 13 of P.D. 1146 as amended is that the last proviso refers to the first part of the section which states to whom the option is given. In other words, government employees who are in the service at the ti me of the effectivity of P.D. 1146 have the option to retire under CA 186 or P.D . 1146 and if said option is exercised, they may change the mode of retirement c hosen or opted within one year from date of retirement. Once the retired employe es are however re-employed, they shall subsequently retire only under P.D. 1146. Further, this Court notes that when petitioner formally applied for retirement i n 1998 R.A. 8291 which amended P.D. 1146 was already in force and it was indubit ably the law applicable to his second retirement. In contrast, the examples of s ubsequent retirements of re-employed government employees cited by petitioner we re all prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8291. Significantly, Section 3 of R.A. 8291 provides: SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. - All laws and any other law or parts of law specifica lly inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That the rights under the existing laws, rules and regulations vested upon or a cquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of th is Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to t he effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously ret ired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the provi sions of this Act. (emphasis ours) In addition, Section 10 (b) of P.D. 1146, as amended by R.A. 8291, states: (b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which cor responding benefits have been awarded under this Act or other laws shall be excl uded in the computation of service in case of reinstatement in the service of an employer and subsequent retirement or separation which is compensable under thi s Act. As such, we find nothing objectionable in the following provisions of the GSIS th e Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 8291 which provides: Section 8.6. Effect of Re-employment. When a retiree is re-employed, his/her pre vious services credited at the time of his/her retirement shall be excluded in t he computation of future benefits. In effect, he/she shall be considered a new e ntrant. (emphasis ours) Additionally, Section 5.2 of the same implementing rules states that all service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which corresponding bene fits have been awarded shall be excluded in the computation of service in case o f re-employment. As a re-employed member of the government service who is retiring during the eff ectivity of RA 8291, petitioner cannot have his previous government service with the DAR credited in the computation of his retirement benefit. Neither can he c hoose a mode of retirement except that provided under R.A. 8291. All told, even if we find that the CA committed reversible error when it dismiss ed for lack of jurisdiction the petition filed before it, we see no reason to de viate from the findings of the GSIS. Hence, the instant petition must necessaril y fail. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 163101 February 13, 2008 BENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES -MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J. G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION, respondents. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: The instant petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the December 2, 2002 Decision1 and March 17, 2004 Resolution2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Mining Adjudication Board (DENR-MAB) in MAB Case No. 0124-01 (Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01) entitled Benguet C orporation (Benguet) v. J.G. Realty and Mining Corporation (J.G. Realty). The De cember 2, 2002 Decision upheld the March 19, 2001 Decision3 of the MAB Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which canceled the Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase ( RAWOP) dated June 1, 19874 between Benguet and J.G. Realty, and excluded Benguet from the joint Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application over fou r mining claims. The March 17, 2004 Resolution denied Benguets Motion for Reconsi deration. The Facts On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP, wherein J.G. Real ty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims respectively named as Bon ito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of 288.8656 hecta res, situated in Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose Pan ganiban, Camarines Norte. The parties also executed a Supplemental Agreement5 da ted June 1, 1987. The mining claims were covered by MPSA Application No. APSA-V0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claimowner and Benguet as operator. In the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claim s and/or otherwise acquire the mining rights to the mineral claims. Within 24 mo nths from the execution of the RAWOP, Benguet should also cause the examination of the mining claims for the purpose of determining whether or not they are wort h developing with reasonable probability of profitable production. Benguet under took also to furnish J.G. Realty with a report on the examination, within a reas onable time after the completion of the examination. Moreover, also within the e xamination period, Benguet shall conduct all necessary exploration in accordance with a prepared exploration program. If it chooses to do so and before the expi ration of the examination period, Benguet may undertake to develop the mining cl aims upon written notice to J.G. Realty. Benguet must then place the mining clai ms into commercial productive stage within 24 months from the written notice.6 I t is also provided in the RAWOP that if the mining claims were placed in commerc ial production by Benguet, J.G. Realty should be entitled to a royalty of five p ercent (5%) of net realizable value, and to royalty for any production done by B enguet whether during the examination or development periods. Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tac huling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mi ning claims. However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, J ohnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latte r that it was terminating the RAWOP on the following grounds: a. The fact that your company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake development works within 2 years from the executi on of the Agreement; b. Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our claim. c. No stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the RAWOP. d. Non-payment of the royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.7 In response, Benguets Manager for Legal Services, Reynaldo P. Mendoza, wrote J.G. Realty a letter dated March 8, 1999,8 therein alleging that Benguet complied wi th its obligations under the RAWOP by investing PhP 42.4 million to rehabilitate the mines, and that the commercial operation was hampered by the non-issuance o f a Mines Temporary Permit by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) which must

be considered as force majeure, entitling Benguet to an extension of time to pro secute such permit. Benguet further claimed that the high graders mentioned by J .G. Realty were already operating prior to Benguets taking over of the premises, and that J.G. Realty had the obligation of ejecting such small scale miners. Ben guet also alleged that the nature of the mining business made it difficult to sp ecify a time limit for the RAWOP. Benguet then argued that the royalties due to J.G. Realty were in fact in its office and ready to be picked up at any time. It appeared that, previously, the practice by J.G. Realty was to pick-up checks fr om Benguet representing such royalties. However, starting August 1994, J.G. Real ty allegedly refused to collect such checks from Benguet. Thus, Benguet posited that there was no valid ground for the termination of the RAWOP. It also reminde d J.G. Realty that it should submit the disagreement to arbitration rather than unilaterally terminating the RAWOP. On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancell ation of the RAWOP9 with the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case N o. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet. On March 19, 2001, the POA issued a Decision,10 dwelling upon the issues of (1) whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction over the case; and (2) whether Benguet violated the RAWOP justifying the unilateral cancellation of the RAWOP by J.G. R ealty. The dispositive portion stated: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 01, 1987 [RAWOP] and its Supplemental A greement is hereby declared cancelled and without effect. BENGUET is hereby excl uded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims denominated as "BON ITO-I", "BONITO-II", "BONITO-III" and "BONITO-IV". SO ORDERED. Therefrom, Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the MAB on April 23, 2001, do cketed as Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01. Thereafter, the MAB issued the assailed December 2, 2002 Decision. Benguet then filed a Motion for Reconsid eration of the assailed Decision which was denied in the March 17, 2004 Resoluti on of the MAB. Hence, Benguet filed the instant petition. The Issues 1. There was serious and palpable error when the Honorable Board failed to rule that the contractual obligation of the parties to arbitrate under the Royalty Ag reement is mandatory. 2. The Honorable Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it sustained the cancellat ion of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach of contract despite the absence of evidence. 3. The Questioned Decision of the Honorable Board in cancelling the RAWOP prejud ice[d] the substantial rights of Benguet under the contract to the unjust enrich ment of JG Realty.12 Restated, the issues are: (1) Should the controversy have first been submitted t o arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case?; (2) Was the cancellat ion of the RAWOP supported by evidence?; and (3) Did the cancellation of the RAW OP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G. Realty at the expense of Benguet? The Courts Ruling Before we dwell on the substantive issues, we find that the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper remedy. The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the "Philippin e Mining Act of 1995" states, "A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB]." However, this Court has already invalidated such provision in Carpio v. Sulu Res ources Development Corp.,13 ruling that a decision of the MAB must first be appe aled to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, before re course to this Court may be had. We held, thus: To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MA B Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that "[n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution wi thout its advice and consent." On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 prov

ides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a "petition for review by certiorari." This provision is obviously an expansion of the Courts app ellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented. Indiscr iminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Co urt would unnecessarily burden it. Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transf ers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys decision s, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substa ntive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is p reserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be mad e or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy. Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a unifor m rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from the ir judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a veri fied petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the right s of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circu lar No. 1-91"among these agencies are"indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies wh ich, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein. Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-j udicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fac t, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 e xplicitly expanded the list of such issues. According to Section 3 of Rule 43, "[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and l aw." Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law m ay be brought to the CA. Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that di rect resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribuna ls, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a re medy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.14 The above principle was reiterated in Asaphil Construction and Development Corpo ration v. Tuason, Jr. (Asaphil).15 However, the Carpio ruling was not applied to Asaphil as the petition in the latter case was filed in 1999 or three years bef ore the promulgation of Carpio in 2002. Here, the petition was filed on April 28 , 2004 when the Carpio decision was already applicable, thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA. Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decisio n of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant p etition must be denied. Even if we entertain the petition although Benguet skirted the appeal to the CA via Rule 43, still, the December 2, 2002 Decision and March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in MAB Case No. 0124-01 should be maintained. First Issue: The case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before the POA Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide: 11.01 Arbitration Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with re ference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amica bly settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in a ny court or administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the oth

er, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one t o be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to b e selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed. x x x x 11.02 Court Action No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabov e stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators.16 Thus, Benguet argues that the POA should have first referred the case to volunta ry arbitration before taking cognizance of the case, citing Sec. 2 of RA 876 on persons and matters subject to arbitration. On the other hand, in denying such argument, the POA ruled that: While the parties may establish such stipulations clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, the same must not be contrary to law and public pol icy. At a glance, there is nothing wrong with the terms and conditions of the ag reement. But to state that an aggrieved party cannot initiate an action without going to arbitration would be tying ones hand even if there is a law which allows him to do so.17 The MAB, meanwhile, denied Benguets contention on the ground of estoppel, stating : Besides, by its own act, Benguet is already estopped in questioning the jurisdic tion of the Panel of Arbitrators to hear and decide the case. As pointed out in the appealed Decision, Benguet initiated and filed an Adverse Claim docketed as MAC-R-M-2000-02 over the same mining claims without undergoing contractual arbit ration. In this particular case (MAC-R-M-2000-02) now subject of the appeal, Ben guet is likewise in estoppel from questioning the competence of the Panel of Arb itrators to hear and decide in the summary proceedings J.G. Realtys petition, whe n Benguet itself did not merely move for the dismissal of the case but also file d an Answer with counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs from the Panel of Arbi trators.18 Moreover, the MAB ruled that the contractual provision on arbitration merely pro vides for an additional forum or venue and does not divest the POA of the jurisd iction to hear the case.19 In its July 20, 2004 Comment,20 J.G. Realty reiterated the above rulings of the POA and MAB. It argued that RA 7942 or the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995" is a special law which should prevail over the stipulations of the parties and over a general law, such as RA 876. It also argued that the POA cannot be considered a s a "court" under the contemplation of RA 876 and that jurisprudence saying that there must be prior resort to arbitration before filing a case with the courts is inapplicable to the instant case as the POA is itself already engaged in arbi tration. On this issue, we rule for Benguet. Sec. 2 of RA 876 elucidates the scope of arbitration: Section 2. Persons and matters subject to arbitration.Two or more persons or parti es may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy exis ting between them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an action, or the parties to any contract may in such contract agree to settle b y arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract. Such submission or contract may include question[s] arising out of valuations, a ppraisals or other controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) In RA 9285 or the "Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004," the Congress rei terated the efficacy of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution by stating in Sec. 32 thereof that domestic arbitration shall still be governed by RA 876. Clearly, a contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to vol untary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal an d is in fact promoted by the State. Thus, petitioner correctly cites several cas es whereby arbitration clauses have been upheld by this Court.21 Moreover, the contention that RA 7942 prevails over RA 876 presupposes a conflic

t between the two laws. Such is not the case here. To reiterate, availment of vo luntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agenci es of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties. As stated in Secs. 6 and 7 of RA 876: Section 6. Hearing by court.A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under an agreement in writing providing for arbitration may p etition the court for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the ma nner provided for in such agreement. Five days notice in writing of the hearing of such application shall be served either personally or by registered mail upon the party in default. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfie d that the making of the agreement or such failure to comply therewith is not in issue, shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in a ccordance with the terms of the agreement. If the making of the agreement or def ault be in issue the court shall proceed to summarily hear such issue. If the fi nding be that no agreement in writing providing for arbitration was made, or tha t there is no default in the proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dism issed. If the finding be that a written provision for arbitration was made and t here is a default in proceeding thereunder, an order shall be made summarily dir ecting the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof. x x x x Section 7. Stay of civil action.If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue i nvolved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the a ction or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the ter ms of the agreement: Provided, That the applicant, for the stay is not in defaul t in proceeding with such arbitration. (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of volun tary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies , on motion of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enfo rcement of said provision. Besides, in BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we al ready ruled: In this connection, it bears stressing that the lower court has not lost its jur isdiction over the case. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 876 provides that proceed ings therein have only been stayed. After the special proceeding of arbitration has been pursued and completed, then the lower court may confirm the award made by the arbitrator.22 J.G. Realtys contention, that prior resort to arbitration is unavailing in the in stant case because the POAs mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving mineral ag reements, is misplaced. A distinction must be made between voluntary and compuls ory arbitration. In Ludo and Luym Corporation v. Saordino, the Court had the occ asion to distinguish between the two types of arbitrations: Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, compulsory arbit ration has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the part ies are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party." While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws.23 (Emphasis supplied.) There is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The a rbitration provided by the POA is compulsory, while the nature of the arbitratio n provision in the RAWOP is voluntary, not involving any government agency. Thus , J.G. Realtys argument on this matter must fail. As to J.G. Realtys contention that the provisions of RA 876 cannot apply to the i nstant case which involves an administrative agency, it must be pointed out that Section 11.01 of the RAWOP states that:

[Any controversy with regard to the contract] shall not be cause of any action o f any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but shall, upon noti ce of one party to the other, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting o f three (3) members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by th e OWNER and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbiters so appoi nted.24 (Emphasis supplied.) There can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an administrative agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered into by the parties, must be held binding against th em.25 In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntary a rbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law. However, we find that Benguet is already estopped from questioning the POAs juris diction. As it were, when J.G. Realty filed DENR Case No. 2000-01, Benguet filed its answer and participated in the proceedings before the POA, Region V. Second ly, when the adverse March 19, 2001 POA Decision was rendered, it filed an appea l with the MAB in Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01 and again participat ed in the MAB proceedings. When the adverse December 2, 2002 MAB Decision was pr omulgated, it filed a motion for reconsideration with the MAB. When the adverse March 17, 2004 MAB Resolution was issued, Benguet filed a petition with this Cou rt pursuant to Sec. 79 of RA 7942 impliedly recognizing MABs jurisdiction. In thi s factual milieu, the Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB c an no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguet should hav e done was to immediately challenge the POAs jurisdiction by a special civil acti on for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To r edo the proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seve n years from date of institution of the original action with the POA would be an athema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Second Issue: The cancellation of the RAWOP was supported by evidence The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds: (1) Benguets f ailure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining claims; and (2) Benguets failu re to seriously pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over the mining claims. As to the royalties, Benguet claims that the checks representing payments for th e royalties of J.G. Realty were available for pick-up in its office and it is th e latter which refused to claim them. Benguet then thus concludes that it did no t violate the RAWOP for nonpayment of royalties. Further, Benguet reasons that J .G. Realty has the burden of proving that the former did not pay such royalties following the principle that the complainants must prove their affirmative alleg ations. With regard to the failure to pursue the MPSA application, Benguet claims that t he lengthy time of approval of the application is due to the failure of the MGB to approve it. In other words, Benguet argues that the approval of the applicati on is solely in the hands of the MGB. Benguets arguments are bereft of merit. Sec. 14.05 of the RAWOP provides: 14.05 Bank Account OWNER shall maintain a bank account at ___________ or any other bank from time t o time selected by OWNER with notice in writing to BENGUET where BENGUET shall d eposit to the OWNERs credit any and all advances and payments which may become du e the OWNER under this Agreement as well as the purchase price herein agreed upo n in the event that BENGUET shall exercise the option to purchase provided for i n the Agreement. Any and all deposits so made by BENGUET shall be a full and com plete acquittance and release to [sic] BENGUET from any further liability to the OWNER of the amounts represented by such deposits. (Emphasis supplied.) Evidently, the RAWOP itself provides for the mode of royalty payment by Benguet. The fact that there was the previous practice whereby J.G. Realty picked-up the checks from Benguet is unavailing. The mode of payment is embodied in a contrac t between the parties. As such, the contract must be considered as the law betwe

en the parties and binding on both.26 Thus, after J.G. Realty informed Benguet o f the bank account where deposits of its royalties may be made, Benguet had the obligation to deposit the checks. J.G. Realty had no obligation to furnish Bengu et with a Board Resolution considering that the RAWOP itself provided for such p ayment scheme. Notably, Benguets claim that J.G. Realty must prove nonpayment of its royalties i s both illogical and unsupported by law and jurisprudence. The allegation of nonpayment is not a positive allegation as claimed by Benguet. Rather, such is a negative allegation that does not require proof and in fact t ransfers the burden of proof to Benguet. Thus, this Court ruled in Jimenez v. Na tional Labor Relations Commission: As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even whe re the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden re sts on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non -payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obl igation has been discharged by payment.27 (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, the obligation of Benguet to pay royalties to J.G. Realty h as been admitted and supported by the provisions of the RAWOP. Thus, the burden to prove such obligation rests on Benguet. It should also be borne in mind that MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 has been p ending with the MGB for a considerable length of time. Benguet, in the RAWOP, ob ligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims and/or otherwise acqui re the mining rights to the mineral claims but failed to present any evidence sh owing that it exerted efforts to speed up and have the application approved. In fact, Benguet never even alleged that it continuously followed-up the applicatio n with the MGB and that it was in constant communication with the government age ncy for the expeditious resolution of the application. Such allegations would sh ow that, indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application and clea rly failed to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP. Third Issue: There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case Based on the foregoing discussion, the cancellation of the RAWOP was based on va lid grounds and is, therefore, justified. The necessary implication of the cance llation is the cessation of Benguets right to prosecute MPSA Application No. APSA -V-0009 and to further develop such mining claims. In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, we de fined unjust enrichment, as follows: We have held that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of a nother against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience ." Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possessio n of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 req uires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or ju stification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.28 (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation o f the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in furthe r developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition, and AFFIRM the December 2, 2002 Decision and March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in MAB Case No. 0124-01 upholding the cancellation of the June 1, 1987 RAWOP. No costs. SO ORDERED.