De Leon v.

Esguerra Facts: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners who elected as councilmen of Barangay Dolores in the muncipality of Taytay, Rizal held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, or the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by the OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners then filed a case, praying that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over the said positions. They maintained that pursuant to Section 3 of BP Blg. 222, their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. They also asserted that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. Respondents contended that the terms of office of elective officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired. They said that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987. Ruling: No. It was held that the memoranda had no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x." Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives Facts: Following the dismissal of an complaint for the impeachment of Chief Justic Hilario Davide Jr. on October 22, 2003, a second one was filed on June 2, 2003. Thus arose the instant petitions (including that filed by Atty. Ernesto Francisco Jr.) against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings Held: To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court found the necessity of turning to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. The first of these is, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. No one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." However, it is noted that the doctrine of checks and balances insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of theHouse shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment

proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Gonzales vs. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner in the case prayed for the restraining of the COMELEC from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Issue: WON Constitutional Amendments may be Submitted for ratification in a General Election? Held: Nothing in the provision of Article XV of the Constitution indicates that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. Although an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution.

Imbong vs COMELEC Facts: In, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed several resolutions, which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. This was amended by a subsequent resolution which provided for the composition of the delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts. Congress then enacted R.A. No. 6132, implementing these resolutions. Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong who was interested in running as a candidate for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, impugned the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is constitutional. Held: The court sustained the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because the Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn

or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

Occena vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, asserted in this case that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The petitions were however dismissed by the Supreme Court at the outset, pursuant to the already decided case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, which made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. Issue: An issue was raised as to the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how it may be exercised. More specifically, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission. This was looked into the court as the petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality. Held: The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." 14 One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. Whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."

Tolentino vs. COMELEC Facts: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain COMELEC from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions. The petitioners then asserted that the said resolution have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscit, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. Issue: WON it is within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s. Held: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this

Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. Thus it was held that the plebiscite which was being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 was not authorized by the constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction were null and void.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. He later amended this in latter decrees which stated the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. It was recited in the "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced this case, seeking to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite and to declare without force and effect the said decrees. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country.

Santiago vs. COMELEC Facts: In 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative. The petition proposed several amendments to the Constitution (Sections 4 & 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X) which were concerned with the term limits of all elective government officials. He then asked the COMELEC for an order with regards the signature gathering and the publication of the petition. The petitioners filed this case raising the argument that the constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. They also argued that the people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. Issue:

Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. Held: The intention of the convention was to to leave the details of carrying out Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution to the legislature, making the system of initiative under such provision not selfexecutory. Without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. This mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action. However, in the last analysis it is still is dependent on congressional action. The court agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution but it was found wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, and failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. This deficiency cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then INVALID. Also, iscussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution was rendered unnecessary. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.

Lambino vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. The On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. Pursuant to the Santiago vs. COMELEC

ruling, the petition was not given due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. Issue: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative; Held: Th court ruled in the negative. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is thatthe entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Republic vs. Lim FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic was then ordered in the expropriation proceedings the payment of just compensation.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." For failure to pay the lots, Denzons successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed for recovery of possession with damages. The court held that they were the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation ("subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value") on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. Upon appeal, the court ruled that they were theregistered owners, however, they were not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value. Meanwhile, they mortgaged one of the lots to the respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name. Lim then filed a complaint for quieting of title against the petitioners, which was granted by the court. Petitioner, then filed a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation. HELD: The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not completed until payment of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete. While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. Also, just compensation is defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commisssion

Facts: To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Benigno Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the the commission from performing its functions. They argued among others, that the order violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause Held: The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Hence, the said order was struck down as unconstitutional.

Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing and the court directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Issue: WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held: As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Government of Hongkong vs. Hon. Olalia Facts: The Department of Justice received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of Juan Antonio Munoz. After an order of arrest was issued against him, he was detained. Munoz then filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent Judge Olalia, to whom the case was raffled off. The petitioner therafter moved to vacate the Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Held: No. In extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. So an extraditee cannot be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

Feeder International Line vs. CA Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, was carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga. The vessel anchored in Iloilo without notifying the customs authorities, who upon knowing this, discovered that it did not have the required ship and shipping documents. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The vessel was then found guilty of violating the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. This decision was affirmed both by the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of appeals. Issue: WON petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt Held: Proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, it was held that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Moreover, the petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

People vs Quitlong Facts: Two students, Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were involved in an argument with a fishball vendor, who allegedly short-changed them. During this incident, several men rushed towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito was cornered and stabbed. A witness who knew the victim, identified the appellants as the ones who assaulted Calpito. The three were then brought to the police station. Unfortunately, Calpito died from his injuries. The RTC found appellants guilty of murder. They moved fo reinvestigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial courtacted favorably on the motion. The information, as amended,included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. At their arraignment,the accused pleaded not guilty to the crimecharged. The accused were then declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Issue: The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be held guilty as co-principals by reason of conspiracy for, the death of the victim due to the solitary stab inflicted on him. Held: Where conspiracy exists, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. The information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. There being no conspiracy, the accomplices must be made to suffer a lower penalty.

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan Facts: Almost a year after the Maguindanao Massacre, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines, broadcasting networks, and the relatives of the victims, filed a petition before the Court, praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in the criminal cases be allowed, and that recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom. Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, contending that previous rulings regarding such matter, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative. Issue: WON lifting the absolute ban on live broadcasting of court proceedings in the case would infringe constitutional rights Held: Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Hence, the court allowed pro hac vice the live broadcasting.

Roco vs. Cervantes Facts: Five informations were filed by Cal's Corporation against Domingo Roco for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The cases were remanded by the RTC to the MTCC for the reception of petitioners evidence. During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court oand to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. However, the judge denied his request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases. Issue: WON the denial of the request for the issuance of the subpoenas is violative of the constitutional right of the accused as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution. Held: Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced. In order to entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. In the case at bar, the books and

documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.

Jackson vs. Macalino Facts: Am information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved. The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in one of the criminal cases. Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the respondents. In their return , the respondents alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and the hold departure order of the Makati RTC. Issue: WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, WON such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of deportation. Held: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered

prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

People vs. Gallarde Facts: Radel Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. He was accused of causing such harm to a ten year old Editha Talan, since according to witnesses, he was the last person seen talking to the child, the night before her death. Also, the when they were looking for her, Gallarde was seen several meters where Editha's slipper was found, with his hands and knees covered with soil. The child's body was later found in the same area. During trial, the court rejected photographs of Gallarde immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while was already under the mercy of the police." Still, based on circumstantial evidence, he was convictedof the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. Issue: WON Gallarde's constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated. Held: No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.

Philippine Savings Bank vs Bermoy Facts: Petitioner charged spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy with estafa through falsification of a public document. Upon arraignment, the spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge. Upon hearing, private prosecutor and defense counsel admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused. Initial hearing was set. During the hearings, the prosecution presented its witnesses and rested its case after the presentation of the testimonies. However, instead of presenting evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify the spouses as the accused. The case was dismissed and the spouses Bermoy were acquitted. Upon appeal to the CA, the ruling was affirmed. It held that even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Issue: WON double jeopardy has attached in the case. Held: For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal provedure requires the following elements in the first criminal case: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused

does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal. All the elements were present in the criminal case.Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.

Lejano vs. People of the Philippines Facts: On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant, Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses." Issue: WON a judgement of acquittal may be reconsidered. Held: As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. However, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. However, Vizconde had been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court's finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al's conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.