INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SECURITY
IN AN INSECURE WORLD
Proceedings of XXV Varna International
Philosophical School
June, 1 st_3rd 2008
IPhR-BAS
Sofia
2010
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publication in this volume is a result of the 25th Session of the Var-
na International Philosophical School discussions and would have been
impossible without the support and sponsorship of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation and and the co-organisational support of the Yarns
Municipality Council.
Profs. DSc. Vassil Prodanov
Chairman of the Organizing Committee
Varna International Philosophical Schools
Director of Institute for Philosophical Research
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD
Proceedings of XXV Varna International Philosophical School
June, 01'
1
- 03' d 2008
' Editor- Vesselin Petrov, 2010
IPhR-BAS, 2010
ISBN 978-954-92549-2-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 11
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
Vassil Prodanov ........................................................................... ............. 11
Chapter 1.
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, LEGAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECT OF SECURITY .... ...... 21
SECURITY IN COLD WAR EUROPE
Antony Kemp- Welch ................................................................................. 23
THE CHANCES OF REASON IN AN EPOCH
OF GLOBAL INFANTILE BEHAVIOUR
Alexander Stoychev .... .............. ............. .......... .. ..... ................... ...... ........ 30
DEMOCRACY IN THE INSECURE WORLD
Stilian Yotov .... .......... : ..... ... ... ..... .. ..... .. .. ..... ........... ... .. .... .. ....... ...... ... ... .. ... 35
PUBLIC POLICY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY
ANALYSIS
Larissa Nikovskaya ...................... .... ..... .. ......................... .... .. .. ....... ... ..... .... . 43
SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
RISKS AND CAVEATS- THE CASE OF ETHNIC PROFILING
INSERTING THE "EFFICIENCY" ELEMENT IN TO THE
"LIBERTY VS. SECURITY" DILEMMA
Andras L. Pap .. .. ...................... ... ..... .. .. ..... ... .. .. ......... ...... ........... ........... ..... 46
THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE "BIG BROTHER" AGE
Borislav Gradinarov ..... , ........................................................................... 52
THE RHETORIC OF SECURITY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL
ASPECTS
Evgeni Mitev ..... .. ........... .. .............. .. .. .. ...... .... ........ ... , .... ........................... 57
FREEDOM AND/OR SECURITY
Ivelina Ivanova, Todor Hristov ....................... ............ ....................... .. .. .. 63
4
OPEN-SOURCE PRINCIPLES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?
Ina Dimitrova ........................................................................................... 73
UNCERTANTY IS MY BUSINESSS. Precautionary principle
Stanka Hristova ........................................................................................ 78
PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION SAFETY
Anatoly Lazarevich ... ............................ .. ....... .............. ........... ......... ......... 84
A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO TERRORISM
Diana Danova .......... .... ....... ... ..... ........... ............. ...... .. .... ......... ...... ......... . 93
SECURITY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGES
Kamen Lozev ............................................................................................. 98
THE SELF ORGANIZING SOCIETY:
A SYNERGISTIC PARADIGM
Dimitar Dimitrov .. .......................................... .... .. .................................. 104
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION-MAKING
IN THE SECURITY
Ivan Tsanov ............ ............ ........ .................................................. .. .. ....... 113
KNOWLEDGE AS APT MENTAL STATE
Marina Bakalova ................. ..... .. .... .. ..... .................... .. ................. .. .. ...... 117
BRUTE FORCE: ON THE STRATEGIC ORIGINS
OF MEANING AND SPEECH ACTS
Mitchell Green .. .... ... .... ...... ..... .. ..... ... .. ... ... ........... .................. .. ....... ....... .. 125
NAMING AND UNCERTAINTY: THE HISTORICAL-CHAIN
THEORY REVISED
Zs6jia Zvolenszky .......... ...... .... ................................................................ 132
COMRADES AGAINST PEACOCKE
Nenad Miscevic ....................................................................................... 142
Chapter 2.
EPISTEMIC, ONTOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL
ASPECTS OF SECURITY ................................................................ l57
SECURE KNOWLEDGE IN AN INSECURE WORLD?
Anguel S. Stefanov, Nina Atanasova ................... .......... .......... ............. . 159
THE VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF TRUSTWORTHY
KNOWLEDGE: WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STRENGTH AND
THE SECURITY OF EVIDENCE CLAIMS?
Lilia Gurova ....... .... ................. .. ................. .................. ....... ............. .... ... 165
TRUTH WITHOUT CERTAINTY?
Lu DeVos ................................................................................................ 171
ON COGNITIVE INSECURITY
Aneta Karageorgieva, Dimitar Ivanov .................................................. 178
SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY AND SECURITY
Constantin Yanakiev ...... ................................ .................. .................. .... 185
CULTURES OF INSECURITY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF (RE)PRODUCTION
Ivaylo Dimitrov ....................................................................................... 190
ANTICIPATION AND DECISION-MAKING
Roberto Poli ............................................................................................. 199
RUDOLF RUMMEL AND JOHN SEARLE: TWO NOTIONS OF
INTENTIONAL ACTS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
FOR ONTOLOGY OF SECURITY
Tsena Zhelyazkova ................................................................................. 213
ANTICIPATION AND SECURITY: ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Vesselin Petrov ......................................................................................... 222
SECURITY AND RATIONALITY- INTER- SUBJECTIVE
MODES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFLICTS WITH CONNECTION
TO DEONTIC LOGIC AND THEORY OF DIAGNOSIS
Nikolay Obreshkov .......... ............... ......... ....................... ... .... ............. ..... 231
5
6
HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE
THE BOMB
Rosen Lutskanov ..................................................................................... 237
LOGICAL AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS OF INFORMATION
SECURED SYSTEMS
Doroteya Angelova ................................................................................. 242
MASS MEDIA MANIPULATIONS AS SOCIETY'S
DESTABILIZATION FACTOR
Valeri Lichev ............................................................................................ 251
CONSUMER CONFORMISM AS A MEANS
OF SOCIAL STABILITY
Veronika Ratseeva ........ .......... ........................................................... ... .. 260
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ANTROPOLOGICAL AREA.
THE MEDITERRANEAN
Polya Tarkoleva ....................................................................................... 265
SECURITY AND NON-PRIMARY QUALITIES.
PERCEPTUAL SECURITY
julia Vasseva ........................................................................................... 275
THE PLAIN EMPIRICISM AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -
RISKS AND TROUBLES
Engelsina Tasseva ................................ ....... ............. ....... ............... ......... 281
SCIENCE AND SECURE KNOWLEDGE
Daniela Ivanova ............................... ........ .. .. ... .............. ................... ....... 287
LOGIC, MANIPULATION, SECURITY
Martin Tabakov ............... ...... ...................... .............. ... .......... .... .... ........ 294
THE SECURITY OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Vasil Penchev .... ............ ... ...... ... .. ................................. .. .. ...... .................. 300
apter 3
ITHICAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
1JES OF SECURITY ..................................................................... 305
- ov ARD A VALUE SYSTEM OF THE MORAL INDIVIDUAL:
" HE ESCAPE TO A CERTAINITY
filan TASIC .......................................................................................... 307
: OWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF (IN)SECURITY:
E-It;SSERL, BLANCHOT AND DERRIDA
Peter Costello ........................................................................................... 321
- HE SECURITY OF HUMAN EXISTENCE FACING
THE NEW ANTHROPOTECHNIQUES
7.adimir Stoychev ................................................................................... 335
:::- A.RS IN LITERARY ANTI-UTOPIAS OF THE XX CENTURY:
. llli THEY BECOMING REALITY IN THE XXI?
Pra cia Spasova .......... ............. ..... ....... ...... ....... .. .................. ............. .... .. 341
RELIGIOUS CERTAINTY AND THE QUEST FOR SECURITY:
_ PHILOSOPHICAL/THEOLOGICAL VIEW
Oiristian Enchev .................. ................. ................................. ........ ........ 348
- LA.i\11- A SECURE OR AN INSECURE IMAGE
Or RELIGIOUS "OTHER" IN BULGARIA
3ogdana Todorova ...................... .................... ...................................... 355
INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AS A PRECONDITION
?OR THE FREEDOM OF BELIEF AND AS A PREREQUISITE
::-oR THE SECURITY IN THE BULGARIAN SOCIETY. THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX PRIESTS
1989.
Petar Kanev ...... ............................................... .. ..................................... . 363
ELIGION IN BULGARIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY
-THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
.-.;umen Mudrov ............................... ...... ......... ......................................... 374
7
RELIGION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Stoycho Yotov .................................................................................... ...... 380
TIME CONSCIOUSNESS; ITS UNITY AND CONTINUITY
Martin Jankovic ............................ ........... ...................................... ......... 385
FEAR OF THE OTHER (Problems and Challenges
before Human Identity)
Ivanka Stapova ... ................................................................................ .... 394
THE VISION OF DYNAMICS AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF SYNCHRONICITY IN EASTERN CULTURES
Antoaneta Nikolova .................................................................. .............. 399
VIDEOART - FEAR AND VIDEO FEAR
Anna Tzolovska ..................................................... .. ................................ 407
ONCE UPON A THEME
Rositsa Dikova .............................................................................. ..... ..... 415
Chapter4
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SECURITY:
RUSSIA AND THE REST OF WORLD .................. ................. .421
8
CHALLENGES FOR THE RUSSIXS SUSTAINABLE
AND SECURE DEVELOPMENT
Vladimir Yakimets ......... .......................... ... .... .. ............. ......................... 423
THE POLITICAL SECURITY IN MODERN RUSSIA:
THE REGIONAL ASPECT
Yury Golovin ........................ ..................... .............................................. 432
LABOUR CONFLICTOLOGY AS A THEORETICAL BASIS
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SAFETY OF MANUFACTURE
UNDER GLOBALIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY
Valentin Shalenko ........... ...... .. ... ... ... ................................ ....................... 441
CONFLICTOLOGY AS THE WAY OF CONNECTION THE
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF SOCIAL DIALECTICS WITH
PUBLIC PRACTICE IN RUSSIA AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE
Evgeny Stepanov ..................................................................................... 452
CONFLICTS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES:
DYNAMIC, FUNCTIONS, CONSEQUENCES
Boris Maximov .............. ..................................................................... ..... 463
-HE RUSSIAN SCIENCE- IN EMBRACES OF THE GLOBALISM
.-.natoly Samarin ................ ...................................................... ............... 468
9
THE SECURITY
OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Vasil Penchev
Quantum cryptography (or QKD) offers an automated procedure for
distributing secret keys utilizing generally used communication fibres. The
revolutionary characteristic of Q KD is that it is intrinsically secure: the key
cannot be acquired by an eavesdropper without the sender and addressee's
knowledge. Moreover, QKD permits the key to be changed often.
The philosophical meaning if quantum cryptography consists of
existing an absolute secure communication which guarantees on pri-
vate inviolability from Big Brother's infringement.
Cryptographers frequently depict code scenarios in terms of a trio of
characters called Alice, Bob and Eve. While Alice is endeavouring to send
a message to Bob, Eve is attempting to eavesdrop. To preserve her message
secret, Alice must encrypt it, and for this she employs a code known as a
"one-time pad': The one-time pad method should be logically uncrack-
able. The encryption wants for separating of three stages. ( 1) Alice changes
her message into a sequence of ls and Os. (2) Alice sets up a key- a ran-
dom series of ls and Os that is as large as the dispatch. (3) Alice affixes
each element of the clue to the corresponding component of the message,
to compose an encrypted text also built up of 1s and Os, at that 1 + 1 = 0.
This type of cipher is impracticable to solve because any element of Alice's
key is desultory. Bob possesses a duplicate of the key, and can decode the
string by simply subtracting the key from the encrypted text. After Alice
has manufactured a causal key, encrypted her message, and sent the en-
crypted text, she transmits the key to Bob so that he will be able to decrypt
the message. The key-distribution problem is usually solved by reliable
couriers to deliver the keys in safe hands.
In the early 1980s, Charles Bennett, a fellow from the IBM research,
and Gilles Brassard, a computer scientist at the University of Montreal,
300
proposed that Alice and Bob should use single photons polarised in dif-
ferent directions to represent 1 or 0 to interchange their key (Bennett,
Brassard, Breidbart, Wiesner 1983 ) .. If Eve }ried to intercept the key, she
would have to gauge the photons, which would virtually mean absorbing
them. To elude being identified, Eve would have to retransmit the pho-
ton to Bob. However Eve does not always measure the same polarization
that Alice sent. That in turn means that she cannot be certain that she is
forwarding the proper orientation. Thus Eve's interception will inevitably
affect the transmission of the key, and Alice and Bob should be able to
spot this, discard the key, and attempt again with a new one. The Bennett-
Brassard communications protocol (BB84) requires the use of four polar-
ising filters for Alice and four for Bob, but it was superseded in 1992 by a
simpler system that needs only two filters each:
Alice needs to send a key to Bob, which he can then use to decode
a future enciphered message (Bennett, Brassard, Mermin 1992). For do-
ing that, Alice begins with two polarising filters oriented at 0 degrees and
45, representing 0 and 1 respectively. Bob has two similar polarising filters
oriented at 90 and- 45. For the key, Alice dispatches Bob a string of ran-
domly polarised photons representing Is and Os. Bob then tries to measure
the polarisation of each photon by haphazardly switching between his two
filters. A photon striking a filter oriented in the same direction will always
pass through. Oppositely, a photon striking a filter adjusted perpendicularly
will never pass through. But a photon hitting a filter that is diagonal to its
own orientation is in a quantum uncertainty, with an equal chance both
of passing through and being blockaded. Suppose Bob picks his -45 filter
to measure a photon from Alice, and no photon passes through. He can-
not know whether Alice sent a +45 photon (meaning 1), which is always
barred, or if she sent a 0 photon (meaning 0), which is only sometimes
stopped. If a photon does pass through his filter, he can be sure that Alice
sent a 0 photon. This means that Bob knows that if a photon passes through
his -45 filter, Alice must be sending him a 0. Similarly, if he uses his 90 filter
and the photon passes through, then Alice must have sent a +45 photon.
So when Alice sends polarised photons to Bob, he will be able to ascertain
with assurance the bit value of a portion of them Alice could send a se-
quence of many photons, each one polarised at random, while Bob causally
switched between both of the filters. As a rule, three-quarters of them would
301
be stopped, however Bob would recognize the bit value for the minority
that got through. Bob could then call Alice anyway and recount her exactly
which 25 photons he received. These would form the key for enciphering a
subsequent message. Although Bob tells Alice which photons he correctly
measured, he does not say which filter he used to measure them. So even
if Eve overhears their conversation, she acquires no information about the
composition of the key. Also and crucially, if Eve attempts to mediate at an
earlier stage by intercepting the photons on their way to Bob, then her pres-
ence becomes evident. Imagine that Alice emits a oo photon, representing a
0 bit, and Eve measures it applying a -45 filter. If the photon is blockaded,
Eve does not know if this is because the photon was +45, and so stood no
chance of passing through, or because it was at 0. Eve might take a guess
that it was a +45 photon, and create and forward such a photon to Bob. If
Bob measured it using his 90 filter, the photon might pass through-and
if it did he would incorrectly interpret Alice's photon as representing a 1
bit. Bob's error can be used to expose Eve's interception. To see if Eve has
been listening, Alice and Bob check for misinterpretations. After sharing
a provisional key, they pick some of the bits at haphazard and declare their
values over their whatever open channel to see whether they agree. If there
is any inconsistency, they suppose that Eve has been eavesdropping and they
forsake the key and begin afresh. If there is no discrepancy, they assume that
it is trustworthy to utilize the key for encrypting an information. There is
always the probability that Eve intercepts a photon and guesses exactly when
she forwards it. If such a photon is used as part of the error-checking proce-
dure, then no mistake seems to appear, and Eve's presence is hidden. But by
Bob and Alice's checking more and more bits, her chances to elude revealing
become smaller and smalerl. Once the key has been delivered successfully,
Alice uses it for ciphering her information. She can then send the message
by whatever open channel. Safely encoded, it cannot be decrypted by any-
body but Bob, even if it's there for all to see. The critical technical problem is
the constant polarization of the photons. If this changes during transit, Alice
and Bob's error-checking procedure will locate inconsistency even if Eve has
not overheard, so no true key will produce.
In the original BB84 protocol, the sender (Alice) directs photons to
the recipient (Bob) in one not of two but of four different polarization
states: horizontal, vertical, diagonal ( 45) and anti-diagonal ( -45).
302
A better approach pioneered by Paul Townsend (1994) is to alter the
phase of the photon. In this method, weak laser pulses are injected into an
interferometer by Alice. By applying different voltages to a "phase modu-
lator" in one arm of the interferometer, Alice can encode bits as a phase
difference between the two emergent pulses sent to Bob - for example
with 0 representing "0" and 180 representing "1':
Furthermore, in 1991 Artur Ekert, while a PhD student at the Univer-
sity of Oxford, reported an alternative to the BB84 protocol that utilizes
another phenomenon of quantum mechanics and information: entangle-
ment. Pairs of entangled photons have quantum states that are correlated
more intensely than any coupled classical particles, such that measuring
one photon exert influence on the measurement of the other. If Alice and
Bob each have one of the pair, they can consequently exploit their meas-
urements for interchanging information.
Outcome:
1. The quantum states of individual subatomic particles (most fre-
quently photons) can be exploited to encipher messages, opening up ap-
plications in communication and computing.
2. The most experienced application of quantum mechanics to infor-
mation processing is quantum cryptography, with devices already on the
market.
3. Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), per-
mits transfering encrypted messages with security. Their secrecy can be
warranted by revealing of any eavesdropper.
4. Secure messages have been sent over distances longer than hun-
dreds kilometers using quantum cryptography with photons transmited
by optical fibres.
5. The next stage (Townsend 1997) would be to set up a "quantum
World-Wide Web" that would allow quantum cryptography to cover cit-
ies, regions, countries and perhaps the planet. '
"The Code Book'' by Simon Singh proposes that quantum cryptog-
raphy could be the end point of the evolution of cryptography with the
ultimate and final triumph of the cipher-makers. A different viewpoint is
also and maybe not less possible: quantum cryptography will complement
and aid conventional cryptography, rather than superseding it completely.
In order to be sure that a practical QKD system is secure and safe, it is all-
303
important to confirm that the postulates taken for granted in the security
proofs actually hold in its technical implementation. QKD really possesses
a primary advantage over classical cryptography due to the fact that, af-
ter a quantum transmission, unlike the standard procedure of encrypting,
there are no remains to be sent then.
In a philosophical plan, quantum cryptography means an absolute
security of communication between individuals keeping their private in-
violability.
Literature
1. Bennett, C., G. Brassard, S. Breidbart, S. Wiesner. (1983). "Quantum
cryptography, or unforgeable subway tokens': in D. Chaum, R.L. Rivest,
R. L., and A.T. Sherman (Eds.). Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of
Crypto '82. New York: Plenum, 267-275.
(http:/ I dsns. csie. nctu. edu. tw/research! crypto!HTML!PDFI C82/267.
PDF)
2. Bennett, C., G. Brassard, D. Mermin. (1992) "Quantum cryptogra-
phy without Bell's theorem:' Physical Review Letters, 68, 557-559.
3. Ekert, A. (1991). "Quantum cryptography based on Bell's theorem:'
Physical Review Letters, 67,661-663.
4. Townsend, P. (1994). "Secure key distribution system based on
quantum cryptographY:' Electronics Letters 30, 809-811.
5. Townsend, P. (1997). "Quantum cryptography on multiuser optical
fibre networks." Nature 385,47-49.
304