Canadian Journal of Philosophy

The Language-Game View of Religion and Religious Certainty Author(s): James Kellenberger Reviewed work(s): Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Dec., 1972), pp. 255-275 Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230391 . Accessed: 24/04/2012 13:11
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume II, Number 2, December 1972

The Language-Game View of Religion and Religious Certainty

JAMES KELLENBERGER, California State University, Northridge

I There is a certain view of religion, deriving from Wittgenstein's thought, that might be called the language-game view of religion. It has many parts, but in essence it holds - in its own terms-that religion is a language-game (or cluster of languagegames) in fact engaged in by men; or, what seems to be an alternative way of saying the same thing, or very nearly the same thing, religion is a form of life participated in by men. As such it is in order. Although one needs to enter into the form of lite and engage in the language-game to learn its grammar or logic and to see the order that it has. For its order has internal criteria: what count as, e.g., rational and meaningful within not by criteria appropriate to physics or religion are determined chess playing but by criteria appropriate to religion as it is lived by the religious. This view, it seems to me, captures something true and important about religion. It is impossible to understand what it is to have religious belief without appreciating how such beliefs are held, and gaining such an appreciation requires some familiarity with what goes on in religion. From the outside it looks like fantastic science without apparatus or metaphysics without the reasoned basis of argument. (Thus the great philosophical concern with the arguments for God's existence, a concern very different from Anselm's, who addressed his argument to God as a prayer, and from Aquinas' whose arguments came after his belief.) But the language-game view of religion says a lot more than that some familiarity with the religious life is required for an 255

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understanding of religious belief. Superadded to this core insight I would like to note are a number of far-reaching contentions. of this view in and comment briefly on five of the contentions its general form, and then go on to examine a special form of the view that relates to certainty. First there is the central contention that religion is a languageQuestions that arise game or many interrelated language-games. between the Wittgenhere are these: What is the relationship steinian notions of language-game and form of //Ye?1 Is a languageis part itself a form of life or is it that a language-game game of a form of life? Can one form of life involve several languageIs games, and in any case how do we count language-games? or ohe language-game involve one language-game), religion (or does it involve the language-game of prayer and the language game of belief as well as others? Or is it, as D. Z. Phillips lansuggests at one point, that religious beliefs are distinctive Some, at least, of these questions are important guage-games?2 this view maintains for this view, for, it should be remembered, that each language-game has its own internal criteria for meaning and rationality, as well as truth. Thus if there are several within religion, it will not be sufficient to learn language-games one set of internal criteria, one grammar; it will be necessary to learn the many grammars that govern the many language-games. I do not trace this implication because it clearly is a great difficulty, but to show the looseness of the view. There are analogous problems for the notion of a form of life. To support the claim that religion has its own grammar it has been compared to another culture, specifically that of the Azande.3 The thrust of the comparison (at least construed one way) is that, as what is rational, etc. for the Azande is determined by criteria internal to the Zande culture, so too what is rational, etc. for the religious is determined by criteria internal to religion. However, the question arises whether religion is on a par with another culture. Religion, after all, is found within a culture. And so, it has been suggested, while the Zande culture may be a form of life, religion can only be a mode of social life that goes on within a culture, and, further, that the thesis of internal
1 On this see Philosophical Investigations, 23 and p. 174; Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.j.: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 119-120; and J. F. M. Hunter, '"Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," American Philosophical Quarterly, v. 1968. 2 In his "Religious Beliefs and Language-Games," Ratio, XII, 1970. 3 By Peter Winch in His "Understanding a Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly, I, 1964; reprinted in Religion and Understanding, D. Z. Phillips, editor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967).

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criteria is only plausible for a form of life.4 It is only plausible for a form of life because, it is maintained, while it is possible to learn a language by participating in a form of life (a culture), it is not possible to learn the "mode of discourse" associated with a in it alone. mode of social life, like religion, by participating we cannot if there is a religious "mode of discourse/' Clearly, learn it first or by itself; given human life, this is a pedagogic impossibility. But this criticism is making more than a pedagogic point: its burden is that we cannot learn the religious "mode of discourse" from participating in the religious life alone because there is no internal logic to learn. Two reasons are cited to support this criticism. One is that "modes of discourse" include with other modes of social life: words that occur in connection while God is said to be merciful in the religious "mode of discontexts also. The course," "merciful" occurs in nonreligious second reason is that in regard to religion in particular even words like "grace," are which are limited to its "mode of discourse," supposed to have meaning in the whole of life. I am not sure that this criticism is all that good, for both of these reasons are open to question. Regarding the first, even if it is admitted that words that occur in the religious "mode of discourse" occur in other "modes of discourse" (which a holder of the languagegame view of religion might deny), it could equally well be said that words that occur in the language of one culture occur or might occur in the language of other cultures: cultures sometimes share languages (consider Latin). And if sharing words does not rule out learning a language from participating in a single culture, it should not rule out learning a "mode of discourse" by participating in a single mode of social life. Regarding the second reason, there seems to be a confusion between the source of meaning of a term and its application (or what it is used to refer to); if the former is a form of life or mode of social life, the latter could still be the whole of life.5 (Even if the source of meaning for {'created" in "God created the world" is the religious mode of social life, it could still be said that he created more than the religious mode of social life.) And finally - returning to the point that religion is not on a - even if religion is different from a culture par with a culture within a culture, religion does seem to be comin that it occurs parable to a culture in other important respects: as one cannot
4 See Vernon Pratt, Religion and Secularization (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 41-45. 5 Cf. D. Z. Phillips, "Religion and Epistemology: Some Contemporary Confusions," The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLIV,1966, p. 318.

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frequently change cultures so too one cannot frequently change and back again. religions or from being religious to nonreligious But at the very least this criticism points up that not all is clarity regarding what is and what is not a from of life. The point of the criticism just examined was that even if is a mode of social life, it is not a form of life and cannot religion be related to its "mode of discourse/' if it has one, as a form of life or culture is related to its language. But it seems to me that it is more misleading to speak of a religious "mode of discourse" than this criticism brings out. The second part of this view upon which I want to comment, then, is the contention that, as the religious have their own form of life, so too they have their own "mode of discourse," a "religious discourse." That is to say, they have their own "language" with its own, different concepts and meanings. Moreover, as we have seen, the terms understood to be part of religious discourse are .not just strictly religious terms like "God" and "grace" but also such terms as "rational,"* "belief,"' "mercy" and "love." There seems to me to be an overriding problem that attaches to this contention thus spelled out. It in part has to do with the problem of God predication, which obviously it. The problem is this: If when believers speak of, accompanies e.g., "God's mercy" they do not mean mercy but something else defined within "religious discourse," they should not be thankful for it as mercy (since it Js not mercy that is meant); and, for that matter, until it is defined, it is not clear that they should be thankful for it at all. But since "religious discourse" includes more than God predicates, the problem is wider. It extends to "belief," for instance, where it gives rise to the problem in this form: When one prays "Lord, strengthen my belief" it is not clear how to understand this if "belief" does not mean belief, and in any case it will not be a prayer for strengthened belief unless the term means belief. The third contention is that God does not exist, but is eternal; or, as it is sometimes put, God is not an existent. This is a much repeated theme, apparently drawn form Kierkegaard;8 at least
6 Again see Winch, op. cit. 7 Cf. Wittgenstein's Lectures and Conversations (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, " in 1966), pp. 52-64. Wittgenstein speaks of an "extraordinary use of the word 'believe' religion; it is (apparently) easy to go from a special religious use to a special religious concept or meaning. 8 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 2%. Also see Alastair Maclntyre, "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," Metaphysical Beliefs, A. Maclntyre, editor (1970 edition; London: SCM Press, 1970). p. 193; D. Z. Phillips. "Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding," Religion and Understanding, D. Z. Phillips, editor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 68-69; and R. F. Holland, "Religious Discourse and Theological Discourse," The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXIV, 1956, p. 161.

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with it. Now it is not altogether he is often quoted in connection clear what it comes to to say that God does not exist, he is eternal. who holds This is particularly so when we find one philosopher this view, D. Z. Phillips, saying, "Coming to see that there is a God is not like coming to see that an additional being exists."9 For this seems to say that one can come to see that there is a God, but this in turn is to say that one can come to see that God exists. However, despite such difficulties it seems to me that there is something right about this contention, or at least what lies behind it; and if we look in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript where Kierkegaard gives us the rather dark saying that God is eternal but does not exist, we can see what is right about it. In the is with the pages where it occurs Kierkegaard's root concern tendency of those outside religion, and those inside, or at least inside Christendom, to regard the question of the existence of God and its intellectual pursuit as of deep religious significance.10 Rather, Kierkegaard wanted to remind us, the religious concern is, or should be, maintaining a relationship to God, a passionate If this is the believer's relationship of faith and commitment. religious concern, there will be no question of God's existence in his mind any more than there is a question of the beloved's existence in the mind of the lover.11 It seems to me that this is Kierkegaard's burden, sorted out a bit; and it seems right. But this does not mean that God does not exist or cannot meaningfully be said to exist. It means that, so far as the believer whose of course he exists, for the faith remains strong is concerned, main thrust of life is to maintain his relationship of faith and love to God, which, if it is indeed a relationship to God, presupposes his existence. Yet, if I have got Kierkegaard's point right, one might wonder persist in maintaining that it is miswhy so many philosophers and wrong to say that God exists. One reason, I think, guided is that there :is thought to be an entailment between God's existbeing said to exist) and God's possibly ing (or his meaningfully not existing:12 if he exists (or can be said to), he might not. And so, it is argued, since God is not a being that might not exist, he It may well does not exist (but is eternal). But this is confused.
9 Phillips, "Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding," p. 68. 10 Kierkegaard, op. at., pp. 289ff. 11 This is Maclntyre's very apt analogy. Maclntyre, op. at., p. 193. 12 Or an entailment between it being a fact that God exists and it being the case that God might not exist. Cf. Phillips, "Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding," pp. 65-66.

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be that God in the Judaeo-Christian concept is not a being that not exist. But if God exists, it does not follow that he might might not. In fact if God exists and it is certain he exists, it follows that it is false that he might not exist. Similarly, to say that God exists is not to say or to establish that he might not too, and to say that God certainly exists is to deny that he might not. The point here is this: What is compatible with God's existing (or being said to exist) namely, its being certain that God exists entails that it is false that God might not exist. Consequently God's existing (or being said to exist) cannot by itself entail that he might not exist. It is true that philosophers say all existential statements are contingent, and this tenet might be taken to mean that anything that can be said to exist, ipso facto, might not exist. But strictly all that it can mean is that existential statements are not necessarily true as a matter of the meanings of their terms. That is, one can say of anything that it does not exist without contradicting himself. Or, as it is sometimes put, it is logically possible that should not exist. But this is only another quasiany given thing technical way of saying that the meanings of the terms in any statement we use to assert that a thing exists allow one to say that it does not without contradicting himself. Even is this is - it does not entail that all such right and it is questionable13 statements are doubtful. (Although it would in conjunction with the thesis that any statement that is not necessarily true is doubtbetween the ful, which is a further thesis about the connection contingency of statements and dubiety- one that is rather plainly wrong, I suggest.) In any case, though, it is being doubtful, not in this sense, per se, that rules out certainty. being contingent And, again, if it is certain that God exists, then it is not true that he might not exist. It may be, and I think it is, that even if God does certainly exist, doubters can raise the question whether he exists and meaningfully say that he does not. But, once more, this in itself does not mean that God's existence is dubious or that God might not exist. One man or many men doubting a certainty does not make it less a certainty. There is a second reason why some philosophers want to say that God does not exist, but is eternal. This reason takes the form of the following argument:14
13 On this and other points in this paragraph see J. Kellenberger, "The Ontological Principle and God's Existence," Philosophy, XLV,1970, pp. 281-86. 14 I have drawn this from R. F. Holland, "Religious Discourse and Theological Discourse," The argument Australasian journal of Philosophy, XXXIV, 1956, p. 161.

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1. Knowledge of God involves a cessation of faith. 2. Infinite faith, which is the faith of religion, requires that there not even be the possibility of a "cognitive encounter" with God, i.e., of coming to have knowledge of God. 3. If God were an existent, an existing thing or being, then such an encounter and hence knowledge would be possible. 4. So God cannot be an existent. What is sounded here is, I think, again a Kierkegaardian theme.15 Kierkegaard, of course, stressed the centrality of faith and commitment to the religious life. He also thought that faith and knowledge were mutually exclusive and that knowing that there is a God would rule out faith (first premiss). Faith requires there is no risk. There are risk, he said, and with knowledge problems with this apparently Kierkegaardian view of the nature of faith, and I have glossed over a number of difficulties in its formulation. But hopefully this statement of it and the preceding argument are sufficient to point up two things: First, one of the reasons that some philosophers want to say that God does not exist has to do with and presupposes of the way they conceive faith. Secondly, the way they conceive of faith is such that knowledge excludes it, and this way is Kierkegaardian. Now the Kierkegaardian conception of faith is one among several. Aquinas, for instance, thought that faith could be a source of knowledge (although not "scientific knowledge").16 And, while Aquinas thought that "scientific knowledge" regarding a matter ruled out faith regarding that matter, he did not think that it ruled out a will ready to believe, that is, commitment (which would then be different from faith). To be sure there are problems here, e.g.: Is the "knowledge" got from faith really knowledge? But the existence of Aquinas' view shows that there is some between and faith. question about the relationship knowledge Indeed, this is a deep and abiding issue for religion. And the tenet that God does not exist, but is eternal, presupposes a particular resolution of this issue, or does to the extent that it depends upon the cited argument. The fourth contention of the language-game view of religion I want to discuss is this: one must be inside religion, a believer, to understand what is believed?7 This is a much stronger claim
15 See The Concluding Unscientific Postcript. 16 Summa Theologies, ll-ll, q.2, a.4. Perhaps it is closer to Aquinas' intended view that revelation-assentedto-by-faith is a source of knowledge. 17 Cf. D. Z. Phillips, "Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding," pp. 76-79.

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that what seems to me to be insightful in this view, namely, that one must be familiar with religion and how religious beliefs are held to understand what it is to have religious belief. Accordabout criticisms and questions ing to this fourth contention, can always be dismissed, for religious beliefs by a nonbeliever the nonbeliever, it asserts, cannot understand the beliefs he is questioning. While this may seem a strong apologetic point, it is gained only at the cost of paradox and problems. Two are particularly significant, I think. First, sometimes those who are reared in religion, after years of leading a religious life, cease to be religious: their faith leaves them and they no longer believe. Sometimes this even happens to those who have taken vows. What should we say of such of what they bepast believers regarding their understanding lieved? Is it that once they cease to believe they no longer understand what they believed? But each has been steeped in religion. A good part of the problem here is that this fourth contention entails past believers either never did understand what they believed or ceased to understand just when they ceased to believe. If the first alternative were true, then we would have to say of a man of very great faith who nevertheless falls away from his faith, who is learned in the Bible and who was and remains more articulate than most believers regarding his past beliefs, that he does not and never did understand those beliefs. If the second alternative were true, then we would have to say of a past believer, who is similarly articulate regarding his past beliefs, that he did understand but does no longer - even though there has been absolutely no change in his ability to express and clarify those beliefs. Another part of this first problem has to do with believers who have only a wavering belief. Do they understand their belief or not? Those who hold the contention before us fail to see this problem because, following Kierkegaard perhaps, they tend to think of all religious belief as strong, committed belief. While such belief may be the ideal of religious faith, there nevertheless is the prayer for strengthened belief, offered sometimes by those who find belief hard precisely because they understand what it is they are being called upon to believe. This brings us to the second problem or paradox arising from this contention. It is this: Conversion to Christianity may be thought of as coming to believe in God and in Jesus of Nazareth as his Son and our Redeemer. That is, Jesus, the man who died on a cross, must be accepted as one with God the Father. Often this belief is hard to accept for converts. As St. Paul said, it is a 262

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Many if not all converts must struggle to accept stumbling-block. it. But how shall we understand this struggle to believe if it is not what must the effort to bridge the gulf between understanding and believing it? I could as be believed and finally accepting well have illustrated this problem in terms of belief in Cod, which involves the belief that there is a God, a belief not altogether easy for many to accept. I chose the example of Christian belief because Kierkegaard himself says something pertinent to this issue when it is put in terms of that example. As St. Paul talked about a stumbling-block, Kierkegaard talked about the "offense" Christianity offers to men.18 It offends their sense of of but chiefly the offense sense, dignity and their esthetic is against reason, and what offends reason, KierkeChristianity gaard says, is "that a definite individual man is God." But how unless could it offend reason as something utterly unreasonable it were understood? In fact it is because it is understood that the Now if one must overcome belief is deemed so unreasonable. this offense, and come to believe, to become a Christian, then clearly one must understand the belief before he believes (otherIn this way the implications wise there would be no offense). of what Kierkegaard says about offense, if he is right, require of the language-game of this fourth contention an abandonment view of religion. view that I want of the language-game The final contention to consider is that religious beliefs have no evidence. This contenin support tion is not that religious beliefs could have evidence of them but do not; it is that it is a mistake to think that religious beliefs are such that evidence can relate to them in any fashion, either for or against. That is, it is a mistake to think for religious beliefs. There that there can be external evidence can be internal evidence, though, it is maintained. What this distinction comes to is not completely clear. But apparently internal evidence is to be evidence such that: only believers know what and it is constitutes it, it is incapable of convincing nonbelievers to be internal not empirical.19 Examples of what are supposed evidence are supplied by D. Z. Phillips. If a believer were asked why he believed in God, Phillips says that he might reply with "God saved me while I was a sinner" or with "I just can't help believing,"20 He presents both as reasons that a believer might
18 Soren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 28. 19 See Thomas McPherson, "The Falsification Challenge: a Comment/' Religious Studies, V, 1969. 20 D. Z. Phillips, "Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding," p. 63.

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give for his believing in God. However, there seems to be a great difference between the status of the first and the status of the second. The second, if true, provides a reason in a sense, but it does not provide an evidential reason: while it explains why the believer believes, or what causes him to believe, it provides no reason for thinking what he believes is true.. The first reason, on the other hand, is an evidential reason; that is, it is if what the believer says is true. If God has saved him from his sins, then this is evidence that there is the God he believes in. Of course one might doubt that what the believer says is true, as is said to nonbelievers would. Perhaps this is why the evidence be internal, or part of the reason. But upon closer scrutiny this reason - God saving one while he is a sinner - does not seem to be internal evidence at all; not if internal evidence must meet the three conditions noted. The it. first condition is that only believers know what constitutes But nonbelievers know that God's saving one constitutes evidence for religious belief; it is just that there is no such thing, they say. And they know, or may know, what believers would point to as evidence of God's presence. The difference between the believer and the nonbeliever is not that the believer knows what to point to as evidence and the nonbeliever does not; it is rather that the believer sees what is pointed to as evidence (as, for instance, God's saving a sinner) an<^ the nonbeliever does not. The second condition is that internal evidence will not convince a nonbeliever. And, it is true, it will not, or, rather, it will not before it is seen as evidence. But this is a characteristic of all evidence: unless evidence is seen to be evidence it carries no evidential It could hardly be weight, that is, has no power to convince. otherwise. Must one be a believer to see God's saving a sinner I think described as such) to be evidence? (or the phenomenon not. Sometimes conversions occur just when one sees what he takes to be God's presence in his or another's life. That is to say, sometimes men come to believe in God after they have seen what they take to be overwhelming evidence of his presence. The third condition is that internal evidence not be empirical. Surely, one might think, whether God saved a sinner is not an empirical matter. If we take as our paradigm case of an empirical statement "It is raining," then "God saved me while I was a sinner" does not seem to be an empirical statement. But as long as we are working with that tradition-hardened between dichotomy logical statements and empirical statements we must be prepared to cram a lot into the empirical category. Not only "It is raining" 264

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but also "She harbors hate for her son though she shows no sign of it." And, I suggest, we ought not to dismiss out of hand the possibility that it may be easier to determine if something is a miracle than if, in certain tortured relationships, a mother unbeknownst to herself harbors hate for a son. I do not mean of course that the latter is not in principle open to discovery; but if it is, it is when we do not know what precisely to look for. So too the discovery that something is a miracle may in principle be possible, even if we do not know what to look for. Unforis loaded with meaning tunately, while this term "empirical" that those who use it most would have to concede is not emit is not altogether clear on the "cognitive" side. A couple pirical, of things are clear though. If "empirical" means, roughly, "the sort of thing the empirical sciences deal with," then whether Cod saved a sinner is not an empirical matter. But if "empirical" is to be equated with "matter of fact" or even "discoverable matter of fact" and it is true that a sinner is saved by God, then God's saving a sinner is an empirical matter, or, if an empirical matter must be discoverable (as opposed to just communicable), it may be. that there is no evidence for Yet, behind this contention it seems to me there is religious belief, or no external evidence, a rightheaded concern. That concern is that if we are not careful as religious beliefs in God and about God will be construed And hypotheses hypotheses. they (very often) are not. When a a believer says "I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth . . .," he is not offering a hypothesis; he is affirming his faith. Of course one could put forward "There is a God" as a hypothesis. But if he does he is not affirming his faith: one does not affirm his faith by putting forward a tentative view. But while those who hold the language-game view are clear that religious beliefs are not hypotheses, they go wrong, it seems to me, in thinking that if there were evidence for them, or at least "external" evidence, they would then be hypotheses.21 This is wrong, I think. What makes a hypothesis a hypothesis is not there being evidence that relates to it, but the way it is held or should be (tentatively), and the job it does (present a to be entertained or investigated). view, as yet unconfirmed,
21 Cf. Alastair Maclntyre, "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," pp. 191-92; and D. Z. Phillips, "Religious Beliefs and Language-Games," p. 33, where he allows that ("external") evidence is relevant to certain religious beliefs, e.g., the belief in relics and in the Last Judgment and then concludes that such a belief is taken to be a hypothesis. (It is because he wants to say such beliefs are different from other religious beliefs that he speaks of religious beliefs as languagg-games (plural) in this article.) For a discussion of religious belief in God as opposed to hypotheses and the sort of evidence that relates to each see J. Kellenberger, "We No Longer Have Need of that Hypothesis," Sophia, VIII, 1969.

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When one says to another "I love you" there could be evidence for it or against it, or both; but even so he clearly is not advancing a hypothesis. Nor is a believer when he says "There is a God." or "I believe in one God the Father Almighty . . ." Although, to be sure, the evidence that relates to religious beliefs, or the primary sort, might well be different from the sort that relates to hypotheses- but not as "internal" evidence is different from "external" evidence. Briefly put, while the evidence that relates to hypotheses clearly relates one way or the other once it is found, the evidence that relates to religious belief may be before us all the time but not seen in its significance as evidence. I have not raised these problems because I feel the languagegame view of religion is utterly misconceived. Earlier I noted what seems to me to be its central insight. That insight remains intact regardless of the difficulties of these five contentions. II There is another form of the language-game view of religion. It is a narrower version of the view and relates specifically to religious certainty. I am not sure that it has been formulated anywhere, but exists in embryo in Wittgenstein's On Certainty, which is to the narrower version what the Philosophical Investigations is to the general view. Wittgenstein's concern in the notes that comprise On Certainty is not primarily with certainty as it relates to religion, to be sure (although religious certainty seems to be in the back of his mind at times). Rather his concern is with certainty simpliciter. Furthermore, what Wittgenstein has to say about certainty does not emerge as a single, clear thesis; instead, we find in On Certainty, in the style of the Philosophical Investigations, a many-directioned investigation of certainty and knowledge. And this investigation at different points projects different pictures of the nature of certainty. One of these pictures - a dominant one, I think - has a religious application, as Wittgenstein himself obliquely points out. It is this application that yields the certainty version of the view before us. Wittgenstein's starting place in On Certainty is G. E. Moore's giving a list of things he says he knows with certainty, including that he has a body and that he was born, and saying that when he holds his hand up before himself and says "Here is one hand . . .," this is something he knows.22 Something about these
22 G. E. Moore, ':A Defense of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World," Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 32-33 and 145.

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examples, as examples of things Moore knows, does not seem right to Wittgenstein. What it is he gets at through the questions: Can it make sense to doubt these things? and What would it be like to discover mistakes here? Some things have to be bedrock, Wittgenstein suggests, and regarding them there will be no sensible doubts. For the same reason it will not be good sense for one to say he knows these things. The oddity about Moore's examples is that they belong to this bedrock category, Wittgenwhen Moore says he knows stein wants to say. Consequently that there is a hand before him or that he was born he is saying he knows things about which there could be no meaningful doubts; he is not, therefore, making a move in the certainty/ But he could still be meaningfully knowledge language-game. and describing the logic of the stating grammatical propositions That is, Moore could be enumerating propositions language-game. or part of that are part of the foundation of our language-game, as Wittgenstein our system of convictions, puts it (56-58, 116, 136,151).23 At this point a picture of certainty has emerged. Using the vocabulary of On Certainty, it can be expressed in more detail as follows: Doubt can meaningfully be expressed about things, some things. But for doubt to make sense some things must be certain (115). And about these things there can be no sensible doubts (2, 247, 248, 446, 450). They form our system of convicthere tions (100-103). Regarding these things, these propositions, is no question "Do you know that . . .?" nor any assertion "I know that . . ."; these are not moves in the language-game (10, 40, 58). The truth of these propositions is given in our frame lanof reference (83, 108), and the whole certainty/knowledge rests on their certainty (446, 558). guage-game There are two key notions here that we should particularly note: one is that of a system of convictions and the other is that A system of convictions consists of of a frame of reference. whose truth is given in a frame of reference. While propositions it is not altogether clear what a frame of reference is, apparently it is to be thought of as generated by what we are taught as with it Wittgenstein children; in connection speaks of our inherited background (94). Now fairly clearly this picture of certainty invites us to think that there could be a number of frames of each with its own system of convictions. reference, Certainly the religious in the picture rules this out. By extension, nothing
" Numbers in parentheses refer to sections of On Certainty, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell. 1969).

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frame of reference would be one possible frame of reference. Indeed, Wittgenstein seems to suggest this himself at one point (107). If there were a religious frame of reference, then presumthe ably we would find in the religious system of convictions propositions that there is a God and that he created the earth, among others; and their truth would be given in the religious frame of reference. What is more, the religious certainty/knowlwould be on all fours with the secular lanedge language-game guage-game. They would have different systems of convictions, of course; but regarding both it could be said "This languagethat this picture game is played." (I leave aside the complication seems to allow the possibility of several secular and several Here then we have what I take religious frames of reference.) On to be one of the main pictures of certainty in Wittgenstein's Certainty, and its religious application. However, there are problems attaching to this picture of certainty, and hence to its religious version. I shall first discuss these problems and then try to bring out quite a different picture of certainty, also found in On Certainty, which avoids these problems. Finally I shall try to relate these two pictures of certainty to Wittgenstein's comments on knowledge and to bring out the significance of what emerges for religious certainty and knowledge. The first problem interlocks with the others. It expresses itself in the question: Are the convictions of our system true? Or, in a broader variant: Which set of convictions, or which frame of would or may reference, is right, if any is? While Wittgenstein want to rule out these questions, they seem very pointed nevertheless. Clearly, to answer either question, we have to enumerate at least the convictions in our own system. But, while this was is aware what Moore was supposed to be doing, Wittgenstein that there is something odd about the business and that, finally, this cannot be done, at least not completely (102, 628). The source of the problem here is that this first picture of certainty suggests that we all have something akin to a geometrical system with internally unexamined, unexaminable axioms, which we have unconsciously adopted as part of our inherited And of course we want to stand back from the background. and ask: Are these axiomatically convictions system accepted true? We can do this with geometry; that is, we can ask if the axioms are true - although not while doing geometry, of course. We can stand back from Euclid's geometry and ask: Is it true that through a given point there can be but one line parallel to a given straight line? So why can we not do the same or 268

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the analogous thing with our system of convictions? We cannot, it turns out, for these reasons: First, as we have seen, it does in our system can (all) be not appear that the convictions specified. Secondly, even if they could be, it seems that nothing would count as standing back from the system and asking about the truth of its convictions. According to this picture of certainty that can call into question there is no move in the language-game As soon as one the propositions of one's system of convictions. does this, or tries to, he calls into question the entire languagenothing game, for if he is calling into question these propositions, could possibly be cited that is more certain (306, 307). To say that these propositions are dubious is to deny the very meanings the language-game - "know," of the terms used throughout "possible," "doubt," "certain," etc.; it is to reject the logic of the So runs the rationale of this picture of certainty. language-game. But if nothing counts as standing back from and asking about the system, why say there is a system? And if we cannot ask about the truth of the propositions that comprise our system of convictions, are these propositions certain or only inviolate? And are all the propositions of the different systems of convictions of the different frames of reference certain? Even if we accept this picture of certainty, or try to, and so allow that there can be no questions about at least the truth of For we cannot still there are problems. our basic convictions, But this, it seems, is help asking: Why have these convictions? or at least to express doubt about the truth of our convictions, would do as well. to raise the possibility that other convictions The problem is that as long as there is a posited system of cona number of questions that victions, comprised of propositions, relate to other basic propositions in other systems (like geometry) seem pertinent, even pressing; yet given the special status of these propositions many or all of these questions must be ruled out of court, and seemingly by fiat. Notice what happens if we try to explain or justify why we have the system of convictions that we do. It might be said that on trust. This is one sort of explana we accept our convictions theme tion, if not a justification. And it echoes the apologetic that religion and science are on a par because both must accept their basic principles on faith. No doubt this explanation would of this picture of certainty in its religious appeal to defenders application. However, this explanation has a cost. If these propositions are accepted on trust alone this is because they are doubtful; and this means that, like it or not, the questions of truth and

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certainty have been raised. On the other hand a pragmatic justification of our system of convictions might be given. Our convictions are "right" for us because they facilitate the sort of life that we lead. But pragmatic justifications do two things in addition to providing whatever justification they offer: (1) they raise the question of truth, and (2) they do not answer it. There is another picture of certainty in Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Or at any rate there are a number of reminders regarding certainty and doubt that point away from the first picture. If a picture is thought of as involving a metaphysical theory, perhaps it would be better not to call the alternative to the first consists simply of picture a picture at all. For its substance examples drawn from the familiar, and it can be bodied forth in terms of these examples with no reliance upon such notions as or their logical kin. For the sake of simsystem of convictions I shall call the alternative to the systems-ofplicity, however, a picture, even though if the first is metaconvictions-picture, physical the second is not, or at least involves no metaphysical theory on the order of the first. In On Certainty we find two classes of examples of things that are known or certain, or are said to be. One consists of Moore's Moore's have examples, and the other consists of Wittgenstein's. the hint of oddity about them (which provides the starting place for On Certainty, as was remarked). Wittgenstein's - many of them - are homely and clear, and it is through them and their reminders that we can discern the second picture of certainty. Wittgenstein brings out one example of something that is known in the is given the order "Bring me a following way: When someone book" he might wonder if the thing he sees across the room is in fact a book; if so he can look and make sure. Or he might not know what "book" means, if he is just learning English, and so not know if the thing in front of him is a book; if so he can look up the word in the appropriate dictionary (519). In this way, if he did not know that the thing he saw was a book when he saw it from across the room, he knows that it is upon closer and if he did not know that the thing in front of inspection; him was a book before he looked the word up, he does afterwards. If it is doubtful that what he sees from across the room is a book, it is certain that what he sees immediately before him is; and if it is doubtful that what is before him is a book before he knows the word "book," it is certain after he checks it. By reminding us of what we all sometimes have to do to carry out an order, for instance, Wittgenstein reminds us of how we in fact 270

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remove doubts and make certain by relying upon what is certain. Similar points are brought out in terms of another example: knowing that it's a tree one sees (349). It has point and is understandable to say "I know that that's a tree" just when there is an issue or a doubt over whether it is a tree one sees, Wittgento us all: stein reminds us. And such issues are recognizable thinking that what we see they involve, for instance, someone's is a shrub, not a tree, or a man through the mist or perhaps there does not spell it is a doubt about our eyes. While Wittgenstein out, just as and to the extent that the doubts are recognizable, what would remove them is clear. One other example: Wittgenstein reminds us that regarding some things the alternative to accepting a matter as certain is not a tentative, sane adoption of a view; it is madness. His friend N.N., he says, cannot be mistaken that he flew from America to England a few days ago (674). And, in fact, if N.N., seriously treated it as anything other than certain, would we not seek an explanation for his attitude, if not in terms of madness, at least in terms of his psychology or mental stress? In a different context, though, we could make perfectly good sense of N.N.'s doubting that he had flown from America to England. For in a different context it might not be certain at all. is Wittgenstein hints at such a context (671), in which someone packed up in a box (as in a kidnapping, say) and simply has no idea of where he is taken or how. Here, obviously, one could be mistaken about having flown from America to England, and here, too, it is not certain that he has at least not so far as he is concerned. Similarly a context could be introduced in which even someone's having a hand is doubtful. For instance, if someone had just undergone an operation in which it may have been necessary to amputate his hand, until the bandages are removed, or the surgeon tells him, he might be filled with quite understandable doubts about whether he (still) has his hand. Although, again, what would remove those doubts and make it certain whether he has a hand or not is as clear as the source of the doubt (23). As a rule, it seems, we cannot tell if a (nontautological) proposition is certain just by looking at the words that express it; we need to consider the context.24 For according to the context the matter might be certain or doubtful. (Although, to be sure, it strains the imagination to come up with a context in which
24 And of course we may need to consider the context to see if an utterance or sentence expresses a proposition at all, whether it be tautological or nontautalogical, as opposed to, for instance, giving an example of a declarative sentence in a grammar lesson.

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some of Moore's propositions would be doubtful, such as his proposition to the effect that the earth existed long before his birth; and his proposition that he was born presents special problems). One reason Moore's examples are so odd, as examples of things he knows, is that he did not supply any context for them, let alone a context to make doubts understandable and what would answer those doubts understandable. If he had made it clear what context he had in mind and what doubts there arose, he could have made it clear how those doubts would be answered and how his propositions would be seen to be certain. (Whether they would then be made pertinent to, e.g., the Materialist/Idealist issue is another matter.) In some contexts, then, according to the lesson of Wittgenstein's examples, propositions like "I have a hand" and "N.N. flew from America to England a few days ago" will be certain. No doubt someone at this point will want to observe that it is still logically possible that N.N. did not fly from America to England a few days ago. This is so, of course; that is one could say "N.N. did not fly from America to England a few days ago" without contradictiong himself. But (as a corollary to the point made about existential statements in Part I) such a feat does not establish that possibly N.N. did not just fly over to England, or even give us any reason to think that he did not. No doubts are raised simply by pointing out that the denial of what one says is inconsistent.25 Skeptics will not be happy with this, I ternally suppose, but in any case the concern here is not with refuting and cerskepticism. It is not with whether there are knowledge there are, with which of the two pictures tainty, but, assuming in On Certainty is correct or better. Setting skepticism aside, what Wittgenstein with is saying about certainty in connection the examples cited fairly clearly does not lead to the first picture. It is not part of our alleged system of convictions that N.N. just flew from America to England. Most of us do not even know N.N. Nor is it part of N.N.'s system of convictions. It could hardly be of his inherited And, anyway, it might be part background. uncertain in some contexts whether N.N. flew from America to England a few days ago, even for N.N. What Wittgenstein brings out in On Certainty vis-a-vis the second picture of certainty can be summed up, not altogether adequately, as follows, I think: When we place in their contexts propositions or matters like those in Wittgenstein's examples, they
25 Cases where it is being said that something is necessarily true are another matter, of course.

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can be seen to be certain. But they must be placed in their contexts. It is the situation or context that makes a matter certain and that establishes that, finally, there can be no doubt about those matters that are certain; for while a doubt can be raised because not all of the situation is appreciated, it can be answered in terms of the situation. And, indeed, even in those cases where such matters are uncertain, the situation makes clear what will answer doubts, at least it makes it as clear as the doubt itself is. The context and situation, then, are the determinants of certainty, according to this second picture, not a proposition's Of course this principle in its being in a system of convictions. abstract grandeur is little better than "Things make things certain/' But the principle can be filled in with examples, and it is the examples that are important, not the principle, which can be stated in various ways or abandoned entirely. If the principle can be abandoned with no loss, then in a sense there is no principle. And this, I think, accords with Wittgenstein's having no theses. Also, if there is no principle intrinsic to the second picture, then it, unlike the first, does not offer a picture of the essence of certainty. As Wittgenstein would say, I suppose, and as I tried to bring out earlier, it only reminds us of relevant, already familiar features of certainty.26 To sum things so far: The first picture of certainty in On up Certainty is misleading and gives rise to problems about systems of convictions that the second picture avoids, the second picture, then, seems preferable to the first. But it is the first that supports view of religion. Conthe certainty version of the language-game sequently, if .the first picture is rejected in favor of the second, view of religion, lacking any this version of the language-game other support, must go with it. If it is lost, though, what, one might wonder, is the status of religious certainty and religious A small part of their status can, I think, be got at knowledge. of Wittgenstein's On with the help of a further consideration Certainty. remarks on certainty are his comAncillary to Wittgenstein's wants to say that to meanments on Knowledge. Wittgenstein "I know that . . ." there must be sensible doubts ingfully say (10, 413,. 423, 622). If there are no sensible doubts, as there were not for, e.g., Moore's implicit "I know I have a hand," then what in is said can still have a meaning; but it must be understood some way other than as a claim to know. As for why sensible
* Cf. Philosophical Investigations, ss. 126-29.

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doubts regarding such a proposition are lacking, as we have seen, there are two sorts of suggestions in On Certainty: one is because the proposition is part of our system of convictions (first picture), and the other is because the context makes the certainty clear (second picture). If I have got Wittgenstein right, then he must oppose the view that, e.g., "I know I have a hand" is true or false and uttered, regardless of whether there are meaningful whenever sensible doubts, regardless of whether it has a point or is a And if he opposes this view, then he move in a language-game. comes down on one side of a knotty philosophical issue, namely: Is, e.g., "I know I have a hand" said by someone apropos of nothing neither a true assertion nor a false one, but meaningless as an assertion (as opposed to a joke, say), or is it an obviously made. true assertion (for one with a hand), but pointlessly Wittgenstein seems to say the former. As "Good morning" in the middle of a conversation is not a greeting, so too "I know I have a hand" apropos of nothing is not an assertion (464). But, on the other hand, if someone says as though to himself, "I know I have a hand," we feel an urge to say we understand him: he said that he knows he has a hand for some odd reason, or for no reason. Fortunately this issue can be avoided by reformusay lating Wittgenstein's point thus: If for one to meaningfully "I know that . . ." he must be able to say how he knows (if he has not forgotten) and answer "How do you know . . .?" questions, then there must be sensible doubts. And this, I think, is right because asking how one knows and saying how one knows in reply to such a question lock in with doubts. It is, a mark of this that when one is asked how he knows something, what will count as an adequate by the doubt that reply is determined gave rise to the question. If this is not immediately clear, consider the following two questions, where the different doubts behind each are made explicit: "How do you know that the tree in the backyard is a cherry tree (when you cannot tell one sort of tree from another)?" and "How do you know that the tree in the backyard is a cherry tree (when you have yet to see the backyard and you cannot trust what the owner says)?" The doubt behind the first question, but not the second, is answered by "The owner told me"; the doubt behind the second, but not the first, is answered by "I know because I saw it yesterday when I was shown the backyard." When Wittgenstein's in this way his point is reformulated seem to be right - except the first suggestions regarding knowledge 274

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picture explanation of why doubts are not sensible regarding a Rather, if we have to give a reason, the reason is proposition. as having to do with what is going on, the better understood context, and what doubts there arise (the second picture). When there are no sensible doubts about a matter it is not because is in our system of convictions; the corresponding proposition it is because, once the context is clear, all sensible doubt is ruled out. And if it goes this way, we get away from an oddity of the first picture that we do not know certainties and cannot even meaningfully say that we know certainties, or at least not the basic ones. For the second picture allows that there might be a claim in the face of others' doubts, and meaningful knowledge elements of the situation, to appreciate others, failing may sensibly doubt what one knows to be certain. In the light of these and earlier points I think that three things emerge for religious certainty and religious knowledge. down the They are hardly profound. But if we have journeyed wrong road, perhaps they at least bring us back to the signpost. (1) We cannot guarantee, or have guaranteed for us, that a is certain by somehow religious matter, like God's existence, setting up or by inheriting a system of unexaminable convictions. (2) It will be certain that there is a God, not if the proposition but if "There is a God" coincides with an accepted conviction, there is religious knowledge that there is a God; and such knowlclaim or that edge requires that which justifies a knowledge which brings one to know or by which one finds out, and one does not come to know simply by holding a conviction. (3) Furthermore, if it is certain that there is a God, and this is seen by some believers, it does not follow that it is nonsense for or other believers to at times doubt whether there nonbelievers is a God (as it would, for all believers at least, if this proposition Fools and those were part of a religious system of convictions). who are not fools have been known to doubt and to sensibly doubt certainties before they have seen them to be such.

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