1. CRUZ vs Sec.

of Environment and Natural Resources EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents. HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMOBEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAYLIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,

ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor. IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor. RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
i[1]

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition. On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted. Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; (2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples; (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.ii[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
iii[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
iv[4]

These provisions are:

(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; (2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates; (3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; (4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and (5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.v[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
vi[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:

(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other

related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; (2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules; (3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998; (4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and (5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.vii[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

ii

iii
iv

2. Carino vs Insular Government

March 25, 1907

G.R. No. 2869

MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee. Coudert Brothers for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. ARELLANO, C.J.: Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng. By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State. After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms: Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.) The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following: From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.) 1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned. 2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands. 3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law." 5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894. 7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded. 8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein. 9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws. By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err: 1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial; 2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.) Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Footnotes
1

Pub. Laws, 1056. II Pub. Laws, 311.

II Pub Laws, 288.

3. Legarda vs Saleeby
vi

October 2, 1915

G.R. No. L-8936 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. D.R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: From the record the following facts appear: First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall. Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the Torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.) While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law. For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of

land which has been registered in the name of two different persons. The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the Torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration. The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the torrens system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the Australian Torrens System, at page 823, says: The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.) Hogg adds however that, if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive. (See Hogg on the Australian torrens System, supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his Analysis of the Torrens System, page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title (p. 237). Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. It will be noted, from said section, that the decree of registration shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose,

may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a partydefendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an innocent purchaser. The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate. We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser. That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an innocent purchaser, by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an innocent purchaser, as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an innocent purchaser, would such purchaser be included in the phrase innocent purchaser, as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase innocent purchaser, in said sections. May the purchaser of land which has been included in a second original certificate ever be regarded as an innocent purchaser, as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]). When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.) Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which

the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record. In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an innocent purchaser, when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an innocent purchaser because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an innocent purchaser of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase innocent purchaser, used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an innocent purchaser of said strip? Would his vendee be an innocent purchaser of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The

purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence. The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected. In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued. Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

vii

4. Intestate Estate of Don mariano san pedro vs ca EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.

[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996]

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[1] on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south.[2] Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court,[3] in connection therewith. We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994][4] terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Courts, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the courts dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. [5] [Cited cases omitted]

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estates claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property. The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint[6] for recovery of
possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision[7] dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion[8] of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 1787417875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 [9] and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.[10] Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.[11] On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.[12] Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.[13] The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,[14] and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed[15] for being unmeritorious and the lower courts decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below; (2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership; (3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals; (4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;

(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void.[16] Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present petition[17] docketed as G. R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496 G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition[18] for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order[19] dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect. The dispositive portion[20] of the said Order reads: WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that: 1) 2) 3) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside. Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom. All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect. All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing

4) 5)

or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same. 6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession or knowledge under oath. This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.

7)

The consideration and approval of the administrators final accounting and inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors evidence as well as the consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m.

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively. On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition.[21] On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate.[22] On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).[23] On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General Philippine Constabulary Camp Crame, Quezon City The Solicitor General Manila The Government Corporate Counsel A. Mabini St., Manila The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

(j)

The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which properties of the estate are located; and

(k)

Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[24]

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof. On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar; 5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid; 6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription; 7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and 8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership.[25]

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings.[26] On February 16, 1977, the Republics Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the Opposition dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED. The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof.[27]

On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic.[28] On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City; (b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quitclaims, and/or exclusions; (c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof; (d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared. It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects. No Costs. SO ORDERED.[29]

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision:[30] On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez

denied the said petition.[31] After hearings were conducted on the Republics Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated Order[32] dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republics motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro.[33] On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.[34] In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republics claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings). The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[35] Hence, the herein petition,[36] docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992. After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15, 1994.[37] While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.

II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower courts null and void judgment.[38] In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a

question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners.[39] Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank.[40]

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final.[41]
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.[42] Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.[43]

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower courts resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an intestate court, [44] to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.[45] The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the States patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased.[46] A probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maingat v. Castillo,[47] that the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on

whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs. In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,[48] we stated, thus:
x x x questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons x x x

Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia[49]that:
x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.[50] [Underscoring Supplied]

In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a reviewing judge. By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a reviewing judge, proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.[51] There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The reviewing judge argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal. [52] In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and

setting aside Judge Bagasaos Decision dated April 25, 1978. Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby. It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act[53] within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976.[54] Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of their lands.[55] Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.[56] Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands. All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.

The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin; WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected; WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete; WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove

ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., [57] we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II. In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976.[58] Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. [59] Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered. In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos. Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. [60]

In the same light, it does not escape this Courts onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts holding in G.R. No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz. This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP)

to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as hypoteca (the Spanish term is `hipoteca) allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. C-9 to C-19). The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. - There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court; (b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"

xxx

xxx

xxx

Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:

SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. --- When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse partys custody. --- If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.

Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.[61] Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals,[62] we pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.[63]

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894. Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasaos April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified: xxx xxx
ATTY. BRINGAS: With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo propriedad 4136. COURT: Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili? ATTY. AGCAOILI: We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due existence of the titulo. ATTY. BRINGAS: We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136. ATTY. AGCAOILI:

xxx

We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic.[64] The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit `O-RP) concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows: a) On line 15 of p. 1, Title and on line 5 of p. 2, Title, the word Pinagcamaligan was written after Pulo; b) c) On line 16, p. 1, Title, un was converted to mil; On Line 18, p. 1, Title, mil was written at the end of tres in tres mil;

d) On line 19 of p. 1, Title, a semblance of mil was written after setentay tres;

e)

On line 6, p. 2, Title, un was formed to a semblance of uni; and

f)On line 8, p. 2, Title, un was formed to mil. The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the Titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings. The burnings were made on the very portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act.[65]

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.[66] Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial courts judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title x x x.

Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower courts analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit Q-RP) was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another. Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence. It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known. Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity. It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Parks whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if produced.[67]

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value.[68] At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.[69] is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity,[70] Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and

Quezon City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer. To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare. Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos Rejoinder to Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings. Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22). The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadecos Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land. But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124). Doubt on Piadecos title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law. Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its

rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadecos explanation -- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadecos treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496. The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadecos title.

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[71] we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulos validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulos nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[72] the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of

ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no net estate to speak of after the Titulos exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro. In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. 2, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. 2- De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. 2 - Dela Cruz). [73] Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. [74] More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity.[75] As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client.[76] The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,[77] we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing. It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system. All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344. In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.

In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, [78] denied Catalinos motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED. In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1)Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom; (2)All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban; (3)The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated. (4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., no part. Vitug, J., on official leave.