David Krajewski Epistemology- Term Paper In this paper I am going to examine the chain theory account of testimonial knowledge.

Testimonial knowledge is to be defined as knowledge that is explicitly gained by a hearer as a result of listening to a speakers statement. For knowledge to be testimonial, the knowledge gained by the hearer must be of the content of what is being testified by the speaker. Under the chain theory account of testimonial knowledge, there is a chain of testimony which includes every speaker of a particular case of testimony. The chain theory requires only that the first speaker across a chain of testimony has knowledge of what they are testifying in order for a hearer to gain testimonial knowledge from a speaker in this chain. Consider the case of Darwinian evolution. If a speaker across this chain of testimony articulates concepts of Darwinian evolution to a hearer, regardless of whether this speaker has knowledge of evolution, the hearer can come to have testimonial knowledge of evolution. It is presupposed that Darwin, the first speaker across this chain of testimony, has knowledge of his own concepts. As long as Darwin has knowledge of evolution, any speaker over this chain can transmit testimonial knowledge to a hearer. In defense of the chain theory, I will analyze Humes epistemology of miracles. In doing so, I will demonstrate that the original testifier of a miracle is not justified in believing that (p) hence no hearer or speaker over this chain of testimony can have knowledge that (p). For a refutation against the chain theory, I will consider Jennifer Lackeys claim that a hearer can have testimonial knowledge that (p) despite the first speaker across this particular chain not having knowledge of or even believing that (p). Finally, I will weigh the implications of Lackeys argument on Humes epistemology of miracles.

For Hume in Of Miracles, a miracle is to be defined as a transgression of a law of nature in which a supernatural deity interjects in the natural world and violates this law of nature. A miracle is also to be considered a single event based on Humes account, which throughout the course of history has been passed down from generation to generation through testimony. According to Hume, the first testifier of a miracle is not justified in believing that (p) hence no speaker across this chain can have testimonial knowledge (or any knowledge at all) that (p). To defend his claims, he first argues that it is human experience that one depends on in order to have beliefs about the world around us. Through continual observation, one can form beliefs about the world that fit their prior experiences. For example, when the sky gets dark at night, we expect the moon to come out. We are justified in believing the moon to come out, as in all of our prior experiences of the sky getting dark, the moon has come out. Suppose one was to assert that when the sky gets dark, the sun comes out. This assertion would contradict all prior human experience of the moon coming out when the sky darkens, and one would not be justified in their belief. Considering that our beliefs are grounded in experience, how is it that we can choose between belief in one event and belief in another? The case of the moon coming out at night is empirically (through experience) a global event, and there is very little if any dispute regarding that event. Hume argues that whenever one comes across a more difficult case, one begins to weigh the evidence of their prior experiences against the plausibility of some event. For Hume, one utilizes probability when determining whether to believe in one event over the other. Suppose a jury has to decide whether an individual is guilty or innocent; the jury must weigh the evidence of the legal testimony of witnesses, experts, lawyers etc. and make an informed decision. If it is the case that, after much deliberation, the jury has weighed the evidence and

deemed the individual guilty, then it is presumed that they have reasoned through experience to back up their claims. The jury has considered either the guilty or innocent scenario, and deemed the guilty scenario to be more probable. It is likely not the case that the jury made their decision to believe in the individuals guilt with as much as certainty as one who believes the moon to come out at night, but the fact remains that they considered the guilty scenario more probable. For Hume, we use this belief-forming process every day, whether it is to believe in the higher probability of the moon coming up or an individual being guilty in court. According to Hume, belief in miracles explicitly contradicts our beliefs in natural events such as the moon coming out at night. The laws of nature, like many other things that we experience, contribute to the large amount of beliefs that we have about the world. I believe that gravity exists because there has been thorough empirical investigation into the matter. I also should believe that gravity exists since when I jump off the ground, I end up back down on the ground instantly. In this case, I have discovered through personal experience that gravity acts in the way that it is said to by the scientific experts. If a miracle under Humes definition is a direct violation of the laws of nature (perhaps gravity), how is it that one can believe in a miracle? The laws of nature match up with our many experiences, and we turn to our experiences to have beliefs about the world. However, believing in a miracle implies that one has a belief about something that is contrary to all past experience and what we claim to believe about the natural world. With this in mind, it does not seem that one can be justified in believing in a miracle. Hume acknowledges that human experience is fallible and prone to inaccuracy. Perhaps it is so that in the case of the jury, they have chosen the wrong verdict. But most important to Hume, is that the jury formed their belief out of weighing the opposing scenarios and chose the scenario with the highest probability. He explains that belief in miracles does not conform to

past experiences and weighing probabilities; it instead relies on a suspect testimonial chain that opposes our past experiences. Generally for Hume, testimonial chains have credibility. Similarly as in the other cases of belief-forming, I look to my past experiences to find a consistency between my experiences and what is being testified. If what is being testified strongly correlates to my prior experiences, I have great reason to believe in the testimony. But, if the testimony strongly contradicts my past experiences, I should not believe in the testimony. Hume introduces the hypothetical of an Indian prince who does not believe in the first relations concerning the effects of frost or the ability of water to freeze. Considering that the Indian prince lives in a hot climate and has never experienced frost, he is justified in disbelieving it if it were testified to him. While the ability of water to freeze is a part of the laws of nature, the Indian princes past experiences were not familiarized with this particular law of nature. It is presupposed that, if the prince were acquainted with frost, he would be able to appeal to his past experiences and believe in the testimony. Since he is not however, he is still rational to disbelieve in the ability of water to freeze as frost does not conform to his prior experiences and observations. On Humes account, water freezing for the prince may be a remarkable experience, but it must be differentiated from a miraculous experience. A miraculous experience by Humes definition does not follow from the laws of nature and violates those laws, whereas frost does follow from the laws of nature. Suppose that the prince were to be shown numerous experiments of water freezing and not merely one instance. In this case, the prince would have great evidence that water does freeze and after he has witnessed many experiments, the experience itself gradually becomes trivial and less remarkable. If the prince in spite of all of these experiences were to assert that water still does not freeze, he would be forming a belief that violates the laws

of nature. On the Humean account, he would believe in a miracle and that would require the interference of a supernatural deity. While the prince is rational to disbelieve in the remarkable if he has not yet experienced it, he is irrational to believe in a miracle. For Hume, the laws of nature can be used as a proof against the possibility of any miracles. For example, if one believes in the miracle of Christs rebirth, they believe that one can be brought back from the dead despite all human experiences and evidence to the contrary. If I believe in this particular miracle, I must acknowledge that at no other point in human history has one come back from the dead. When forming this belief, I must turn to my past experiences and assess the validity of this miracle. To Hume, one cannot in rationality accept a miracle as true as our past experiences do not line up with its plausibility. When I put the laws of nature up against the possibility of a miracle and weigh the probabilities, I am always going to conclude the laws of nature as being more probable as they are in line with my past experiences. However, Hume considers what would have to be necessary in order for one to rationally believe in a miracle. To rationally believe in a miracle, it must be the case that when weighing the probabilities of a miracle as either true or false, a miracles falsehood must be more unlikely than the miracle that has been said to have occurred. As we do in our everyday belief-forming processes, we must balance the two scenarios of an event being a miracle or an event not being a miracle against each other. In other words, if it is the case that a miracles falsehood is more

improbable than the miracle itself, we can rationally believe in the miracle. Though Hume does not explicitly deny this possibility, he considers the laws of nature to be definitive proof against a miracle until shown otherwise. From analyzing Humes epistemology of miracles, we can say that it is irrational to believe in (p) based on the original testimony of the first speaker (or any speaker) in this

testimonial chain. Hume has argued that since we reason from prior experience, and miracles necessarily involve a transgression or violation of prior experience (the laws of nature) then no speaker across a testimonial chain can responsibly believe in (p). If no speaker can responsibly believe in (p), then no speaker can know that (p). According to the chain theory account of testimonial knowledge, if the first speaker across a chain knows (p), then any speaker can report (p) to a hearer in order for a hearer to know (p). Hume has not explicitly endorsed the chain theory account, but it is fundamental to his argument. If miracles rely on a testimonial chain to be communicated (Hume also notes that much of our knowledge about the world is dependent on testimony from others) we should be able to assert that the first speaker in the testimonial chain knows (p) if we are to believe (p) from that testimony. Hume has demonstrated that nobody can experience a miracle since (1) a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and (2) the laws of nature are a part of our past experiences. In other words, to claim I know a miracle happened is to also claim that I have experienced an event entirely in contrary to all of human past experiences. If I am the first speaker in a testimonial chain and I do not know (p), then no potential speaker or hearer in this chain can know (p) through my testimony. In Lackeys paper Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission, she argues that one can gain testimonial knowledge that (p) despite the first speaker in this testimonial chain not knowing or even believing that (p). In order to do this, she introduces the concept of doxastic defeaters. A doxastic defeater is to be defined as a believed proposition that defeats the justification of other beliefs. Suppose that I believe the Boston Red Sox won the World Series last year, but a friend tells me that he watched the World Series and the Texas Rangers won it last year. Any justification that I may have had for my belief that the Red Sox won the world series last year has been defeated by my belief that my friend watched the world series and saw

who won it. Lackey also introduces the concept of the defeater-defeater. Suppose that I find out that my friend was mistaken and he was only watching one of the World Series games where the Texas Rangers had won. I later go onto the internet and research who won the World Series, and many reputable sources state the San Francisco Giants. My new belief that the Giants won the World Series defeats my previous belief that the Rangers won the World Series; therefore it is a defeater-defeater for my initial belief that the Red Sox won the World Series. It is supposed that there can be a defeater-defeater-defeater for my initial belief, a defeater-defeaterdefeater-defeater and so forth. Lackey proposes a hypothetical case meant to show the plausibility that the first speaker in a testimonial chain can transmit testimonial knowledge to a hearer, despite the first speaker possessing an undefeated-defeater. An undefeated-defeater is a belief that, contingent on the individual, can prevent one from being able to justify any of their other more everyday beliefs. It is contingent in the sense that, while I as a first speaker may have an undefeated-defeater that undermines the rest of my beliefs, others across this chain do not necessarily have this same undefeated-defeater. An undefeated-defeater may defeat the justification that I have for my own beliefs, but unless others across the chain inherit my undefeated-defeater or believe in their own undefeated-defeater, they can plausibly gain testimonial knowledge from me. They are also conditional in that undefeated-defeaters can later be undermined themselves just as other defeaters can be refuted. If I come up with a strong argument against my undefeated-defeater, then I can once again justify the rest of my beliefs as I no longer believe in the undefeateddefeater. While undefeated-defeaters are not infallible, they remain a threat to our everyday beliefs and the ability to pass on testimonial knowledge. Through this hypothetical, Lackey will try to prove that a hearer can have testimonial knowledge that (p) in spite of the first speaker in a

testimonial chain having an undefeated-defeater which forces them to not know or even believe (p). First, Lackey notes that the first speaker in this hypothetical believes that there is an evil demon that is out to deceive her. The speakers belief in the evil demon is her undefeateddefeater or the belief that can contingently undermine the justification of any of her other beliefs. For example, imagine that you believe the sky is blue but you also believe in an evil demon that can alter the perception that you have of the skys color at any moment. If you maintain your belief in the evil demon, you have reason to think that at any moment you may be getting deceived. For that reason, you cannot justify any of your other more everyday beliefs as they may be distorted by the evil demon. Lackey then supposes that this first speaker who has this undefeated-defeater is asked by an individual where a caf is located on the street that they are both on. The first speaker tells the individual that the caf is right around the corner, but does not inform the individual that she believes that she is a victim to an evil demon. In other words, the hearer has no idea that the first speaker has an undefeated-defeater for all of her other beliefs, such as the caf being around the corner which is the belief being testified. Lackey also supposes that the hearer has never once considered belief in an evil demon deceiver or any extreme worry of that sort, and that the hearer does not have any other defeater for the belief that the caf is right around the corner. Since the hearer has no reason to doubt the validity of the first speakers testimony and does not have any defeater for the testimonial belief himself, he has formed a true belief as a result of the first speakers testimony. Though the first speaker testifies to the hearer that there is a caf around the corner, she does not herself believe that there is a caf around the corner because of her undefeated-defeater for that belief. Based on the chain theory account, the hearer cannot have testimonial knowledge

that (p) as the first speaker in this chain does not know or believe (p). But, Lackey argues that it is counter-intuitive to think that the hearer does not have testimonial knowledge that (p). For Lackey, the hearer has gained testimonial knowledge that the caf is around the corner directly as a result of the first speakers testimony. To show that it is counter-intuitive to claim that the hearer has not gained testimonial knowledge that (p) through this testimony, Lackey considers that this initially two-person chain extends to many others and becomes a longer testimonial chain. Lackey supposes that the hearer testifies (p) to another individual, who testifies (p) to another, and so on. It is also supposed that none of these new hearers have defeaters for the belief that is being testified, so they too can come to have testimonial knowledge that (p). It seems that, like the original hearer, these other hearers have formed a true belief out of the testimony that was initially given by the first speaker who had an undefeated-defeater for the testimony and did not believe in it herself. Keeping in mind that now many hearers have testimonial knowledge that (p) as a result of the first speakers testimony, it is more difficult to assert that none of these individuals know (p) through testimony. No matter what is argued; (p) can be followed all the way back to the first speaker in the chain who does not know or even believe (p). For Lackey, to deny that these hearers have testimonial knowledge is to deny that they have formed a true belief through testimony. It is the case that these hearers know (p) ultimately through the first testimonial link who does not know (p). Lackey argues that supporters of the chain theory account have been mistaken in thinking that doxastic defeaters are necessarily transmitted through testimony. While I may believe in an evil demon that is out to deceive me, I do not necessarily have to pass on my belief in the evil demon to another. Similarly as in the above hypothetical, I may tell a hearer that the San Francisco Giants won the World Series but I myself believe in the evil demon that deceived me

into believing that. It is not very sensible to claim in this scenario that the hearer also believes in the evil demon deceiver that I do, as I have only told him about the Giants winning the World Series. He may have a similar undefeated-defeater and that may prevent him from gaining testimonial knowledge from me. However, the point is that I do not have to pass on my personal undefeated-defeater to a hearer while testifying another belief to him. To strengthen her argument, Lackey supposes a case where a doxastic defeater is passed on through testimony. Consider that the first speaker in the original hypothetical tells the hearer about her belief in the evil demon. Since he now knows about the evil demon and is persuaded to believe in the evil demon, he also possesses the same undefeated-defeater that the first speaker has. For that reason, he does not believe that the caf is right around the corner, much like the first speaker does not. Lackey also supposes though, that at some point in the future, the hearer has a strong argument against the existence of the evil demon. In other words, he has a defeater-defeater for the belief in the evil demon. Since he longer has the undefeated-defeater, he can after all know the caf is right around the corner through the first speakers original testimony. In spite of the doxastic defeater of the evil demon being passed on through testimony, he can still come to know that the caf is around the corner at a later point through the first speakers report. In her paper, Lackey has shown that there can be various types of testimonial chains, where some may have defeaters for their beliefs and others may not. She has evidenced that a hearer can gain testimonial knowledge that (p) despite the first speaker across the chain not knowing or believing (p). She proposes a general thesis to sum up her views which is meant to successfully refute the chain theory. For Lackey, what is required for testimonial knowledge for a hearer is for the speakers statement that (p) to be appropriately connected with the fact that (p). In other words, if I report to you that the caf is around in the corner, you should have

good reason to think that I am telling the truth. You should think that I am a reliable testifier and also observe that in most situations, as Lackey points out, a hearer notices a consistency between testifiers telling the truth in this typical everyday context. If I do not report to you a defeater for my belief and if you do not already have a defeater against my belief yourself, you can gain testimonial knowledge from me that the caf is around the corner. If a hearer has no defeaters for the belief that is being testified (or has a defeater-defeater for the first speakers undefeateddefeater), and has good enough reason to think that the first speaker is telling the truth, then they can come to know (p) through the first speakers statement. Lackeys account has seemingly disproved the chain theory and explored different possibilities for testimonial chains that were restricted under the chain theory, where the first speaker need not know or believe (p) for hearers to know (p). It may be concluded that Lackey has refuted the chain theory, and also that undefeateddefeaters are not necessarily passed on through testimony. However, when evaluating Lackeys argument against Humes epistemology of miracles, these successes of Lackeys theory do not yet refute Humes claims against miraculous events. Hume considers the true experience of a miracle to be implausible, as we turn to our past experiences to know anything about the world. The experience of a miracle is in direct contradiction to all of our past experiences as it is a violation of the laws of nature (our past experiences of the world). Since this is the case, the first speaker across a testimonial chain of a miracle cannot know or even responsibly believe (p). We may grant that Lackey has refuted the chain theory, though we cannot also grant the plausibility that one across the testimonial chain of a miracle can know (p) despite the first speaker not knowing or believing (p). The reason for this is that based on Humes argument, there is an undefeated-defeater necessarily inherent to belief in miracles. If I grant that all of humanity

cannot experience a miracle as it is contrary to all of our past experiences, then I hold a belief that can undermine the justification of any belief in a miracle experienced by another or in a miracle that I experienced firsthand. If all of humanity believes in this undefeated-defeater, then nobody can know or responsibly believe (p). In order to use Lackeys argument to refute Humes claims against miracles, we must develop a defeater-defeater for Humes undefeateddefeater that miracles are a contradiction to all of our past experiences. According to Lackeys general thesis regarding testimonial knowledge, one can know (p) through testimony as long as the speakers statement can be appropriately connected to the fact that (p). Suppose it was the case that Hume loosened his definition of a miracle. While Hume defines a miracle to be a single event that cannot be repeated throughout the course of history, a miracle may also be construed as an event that can be subjectively affirmed for individuals on an ongoing basis. For example, many religious people believe in Christs rebirth. They may also claim to experience Christ and his divinity through prayer and song. It may be for these individuals that their experiences of these events appropriately connect them to the truth of the miracle of Christs rebirth; affirming in their view that the miracle occurred or else they would not be experiencing Christs divinity. Suppose also that these individuals have gone to church and were testified to before their divine experiences about Christs rebirth. As they consider their divine experiences, they are able to appropriately connect their experiences to the truth of the priests original statement. They have no undefeated-defeater or any other defeaters, and can feel that they know (p) irrespective of whether or not the priest knows (p). They likely think that the priest knows (p), but given Lackeys thesis, it is not necessary for the priest to know (p) for these individuals to know (p). In this case, Lackeys thesis allows these individuals to gain testimonial knowledge from the priest. They are able to link the priests original statement

regarding Christs rebirth to the truth. However, subjective affirmations of miracles do not serve as a defeater-defeater for Humes claims. Miracles for Hume, cannot be reproduced and especially not subjectively. Lackeys thesis against the chain theory has not provided a defeaterdefeater for Humes undefeated-defeater in this hypothetical. If a miracle is deemed a single event, how is it that we can provide a defeater-defeater for Humes undefeated-defeater? Hume concedes that one may, however implausibly, have a miraculous experience. For Hume, it must be the case that the falsehood of the miraculous experience is more miraculous than the experience itself. In order to provide a defeater-defeater to Humes undefeated-defeater, there must be a case in which this is demonstrated. Under what circumstances would the falsehood of a miracle be less likely than a violation of all of our past experiences (a miracle)? Suppose that, unlike in the evil demon case, the first speaker does not have an undefeateddefeater. She has never come across Humes undefeated-defeater, although she too considers a miracle to be a single event and not something that can be subjectively reproduced. The first speaker is under the impression that a miracle is a one time experience and that anybody who experiences such a rare event has a duty to testify it to others. While she does not personally acknowledge Humes undefeated-defeater, a violation of the laws of nature is to be considered as objectively implausible of an experience for her as much as it is for any other speaker in a particular miraculous testimonial chain. Although she has never come across Humes argument, it is presupposed that his undefeated-defeater is there for any testifier of a miracle. Contrary to the evil demon case, it seems that this is an undefeated-defeater that necessarily has to be present for any testifier of a miracle. Since Humes undefeated-defeater has to be confronted necessarily in testimonial chains of miracles, the first speaker in this case must attest that the falsehood of her miraculous

experience is less likely than the miraculous experience itself, and it will take a defeater-defeater to do that. Suppose that she claims to have a miraculous experience, keeping in mind that her claims must be held up to Humes undefeated-defeater irrespective of whether she believes in the undefeated-defeater. A hearer approaches her and asks for details about this miraculous experience. She begins to defend her claims, arguing that she experienced a supernatural force that manipulated the direction of a tornado in order to rescue lives. The hearer continues to ask her to elaborate, and she also claims that the direction of the tornado had to be manipulated because a natural explanation could not plausibly explain its movement. The hearer may also ask her to prove her apparent expertise on tornados, and she explains that she has been following them and studying them for years, understanding their natural movements well enough to make these assertions. The hearer has good enough reason to believe that she is a credible testifier about experiences of tornados. While he may have good reason to think that she is a believable testifier of natural tornado experiences, it is difficult to say why he should consider her a believable testifier of a miraculous experience. At this point, though the hearer is also unaware of Humes undefeated-defeater, he does not have a link to the truth of the miracle through her testimony and does not believe in the miracle. Suppose though, that at a later point, film is revealed of this tornado which had somehow been taken at a safe distance. The testifier of this miracle is able to further analyze the movements of this supernatural tornado and feels more confident in her assessment that it was a miraculous experience. In fact, she believes that the miracles falsehood would be less likely than the miraculous experience itself. She speaks to the hearer again, and after hearing more about the analysis of the tornado and acknowledging that she has had plenty of time to mull over the miraculous experience, he begins to believe it. As he now believes in the miracle, he too

begins to testify about the miraculous experience. This particular chain of testimony gets increasingly longer and soon many people believe that this miraculous experience of a tornado really happened. The hearers deliberate and after a while, appropriately connect the speakers statement to the truth. They appeal to the expert and are willing to believe that some supernatural force manipulated this tornado, though they did not experience the miracle firsthand. Humes undefeated-defeater may only need to respond to this case by arguing again that it is simply implausible to have a miraculous experience, no matter what the testifier of the miracle may argue themselves. Hume claims that we often have a tendency to want to believe in the miraculous; that there is a supernatural force guiding something if there is no initial natural explanation. A Humean response might indicate that, perhaps at an even later point, there may be a natural explanation for the tornado and we lack the scientific understanding for that right now. If there is no present scientific understanding of the tornado, that does not mean we must appeal to the miraculous. It seems unlikely that the testifier of this miracle, even in acknowledging Humes undefeated-defeater, would let that undefeated-defeater undermine her belief in this miracle. She feels subjectively passionate but also confident in objectively claiming that this tornado cannot be explained naturally. For her, she has experienced the miraculous as the falsehood of the miracle would be less likely than the miraculous experience itself. Unlike the individuals believing in Christs rebirth, she claims to have objective evidence regarding the miracle. With all of this in mind, Lackey can respond to Hume by saying that a hearer can know (p) through the first speakers testimony as they have positive objective reasons to believe in the testimony and in the credibility of the testifier. They also have the defeaterdefeater for Humes undefeated-defeater (supposing that they acknowledge it at a later time) that

in considering the objective evidence it seems too unlikely for this miracle not to have occurred. And if by some chance the first testifier of this miracle believes in Humes undefeated-defeater, the hearers across this testimonial chain can still know (p) as they have a defeater-defeater for that undefeated-defeater. In analyzing Lackeys general thesis regarding testimonial knowledge and implementing it into Humes epistemology of miracles, the chain theory appears to be much weaker. It seems that a hearer can come to know even a miracle without the first testifier of the miracle knowing or even believing in the miracle. Although, if one is a strong supporter of Humes argument and is not willing to do away with Humes undefeated-defeater, they too can still concede that one can have testimonial knowledge in a more everyday situation without the first speaker knowing or believing (p). A problem may arise when concluding this analysis; one may be tentative to call Lackeys cases instances of testimonial knowledge at all. If it is only necessary for a hearer to connect the statement of the first speaker to the truth, then it seems to make testimonial knowledge very accessible. One may claim that while the hearer is gaining knowledge; it is not testimonial knowledge. However for the purposes of this paper, it has been shown that while Humes argument may strengthen the chain theory account, Lackeys theory can seriously undermine the chain theory and potentially Humes epistemology of miracles.