BEGINNINGS: A MATTER OF ACTION?

Dragana Jelenic, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid

Geschrieben steht: >Im Anfang war das Wort!< Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort? Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmglich schtzen, Ich mub es anders berstzen, Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin. Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn. Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile, Dab deine Feder sich nicht bereile! Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft? Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft! Doch auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe, Schon warnt mich was, dab ich dabei nicht bleibe. Mir hilft der Geist! auf einmal seh ich Rat Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!(Goethe: Faust)

0. PRELIMINARY NOTES
The present paper approaches the problem of beginnings as a matter of action. The action is analysed in several of its configurations. In each of the configurations analysed the inherent component is a reflective attitude, i.e. reflection. The term reflection derives from the optical sphere. In a broader sense, it connotes an attitude of bending back. In this context, reflection amounts to the transitus ab actu ad potentiam, i.e. the action of stepping back from the realm of positivity into the realm of potentiality. In this sense, there is no reflexion without transition. Likewise, the action characterized by a transitive attitude connotates, apart from the former action of stepping back, the action of stepping out (ex-isting) from the positivity into the pursuit of ever-new beginnings. Both of these movements trigger the dynamics of the arch that put the original difference into motion. This results in the initial hiatus between the origin and the beginning, which offers space and time for experience. The origin referred to is the absence of origin, an origin without positivity, openness (Gelassenheit) that enables communication (Mitteilung) by means of its transpassability (transpassibilit) , i.e. mediation (Verteilung)1. The experience in question is the experience of non-identity, due to the mise en ouvre of the original difference that does not allow absolute identity. In this sense, two As are never the same because of the infinitesimal oscillation between them. Furthermore, the experience of never being identical to itself, nor to its concept is the only possibility for A to reach existence. Therefore, in this newly gained space for experience, the original difference is not expressed, but only ex-posed the way it is, with its original oscillation. It is split into the ex-sistance and thus, opened up to the experience of its proper finitude. In this sense, the action of stepping out, and the very freedom to do so, is nothing but a decision for ex-istance. Due to the fact that experience is intrinsically entangled with the movement, it cannot be but kinetic. Thus, what we are dealing with here is a kinetic experience and its intrinsic power to move in the direction of action. However, to begin implies two different types of action: action at a distance and action tout court. We suggest that the parallel between kinetics and kinematics be studied. Kinetics is a spacing and temporalizing movement in the realm of the positivity, i.e. effective reality that corresponds to action tout court, while kinematics is absolute movement in its permanent oscillation that corresponds to action at a distance. Moreover, kinetics as motion of bodies having mass, would be movement in the effective reality, while kinematics that refers to position, velocity, acceleration (but not forces, torques nor masses), would be placed off-stage, in the context of Schellings negative philosophy. In this sense, position, disposition and transposition of the movement of the Potenzen will be discussed.

Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly.[Pause]. Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. [Pause]. It will not be raised, nor lowered, whatever happens.[Pause]. S. Beckett, Ghost Trio

We suggest Beckett and Schelling have a similar approach to the problem of beginnings. The following are some of the points they may have in common.

1. The main issue for both, Schelling and Beckett, is the issueless predicament of existence.

2. According to Beckett, nothing is really accessible without performance, i.e. theatrical

ex-position, which corresponds to Schellings interpretation of the ex-istance in terms of the Greek existamenon, which literally means standing outside itself, i.e., ex-isting in effective reality (Wirklichkeit). In this sense, it is a matter of an act, a bringing-forth of something previously held back within the self, which corresponds to living by proxy, as Beckett called his performative art2.

3. Beckett suggested that mental space be attempted in the theatre. He wrote a series of
plays, which, while leaving virtually no possibility for mimetic reception, seemed to prove that mental space could be put on stage. When converted to theatrical space, it opens up new possibilities for immediacy and directness that can make the viewer dramatically aware of sharing an introvert space of mind3. This could perhaps be considered as a token for the possibility of staging Schellings Potencies.

4. Rather than representing something, a Beckett play stages the return of (1) a preconceptual experience which is beneath representation and (2) a post-conceptual experience which is beyond representation. In this sense, Becketts theatre is a theatre of difference4 that is always beneath or beyond representation and provides, in this way, the stage for the ever-new repetition that appears without a prescribed model, as a mime. Indeed, an utterance in Becketts plays is always what it says it is, despite the artist. This capacity of making the essence of something speak for itself in terms of itself deictically5 corresponds to the tautegorical mode of appearing of Potencies in Schellings Sptphilosophie.

5. Furthermore, Becketts aim to create the form in movement corresponds to Schellings

construction of the Figure of Being (die Figur des Seienden) whose ambiguous appearance defies notions of causality, referentiality of space and time, and is capable of circumventing corporeality. In this sense, it is a matter of an appearance that has more to do with music than theatre, except for Becketts theatre that attests to an auditory memory6 that is spatial and rhythmic rather than visual.

6. Yet, Beckett advocated also turning to a vision, only conveyed in a complexity of

rhythm, colour, gesture, and united not by the plot and character, but by lyric expression7, which corresponds to the poetic condensation (Dichtung) of being, acting and thinking in the Figure of Being and their tautegoric ex-position.

7. For both Schellings Potenzenlehre and Becketts performative art, in which the visual
or figurative components of movement and stasis are conveyed by the spatial and musical quality, action at a distance is the indispensable component that incites and increases the heuristic aspect of the off-stage action.

8. Moreover, both suggest a movement ab actu ad potentiam. The mimetic space is often a
pretext for negation of the solidity of the events within the positive reality, which opens up possibilities for new horizons. Moreover, the mental drama of creation8, the experience of re-creating this final account of a life-long quest for meaning is a process that does not end within the playing time, nor within effective reality.

9.

All this could be transcribed in a formula for the theatrum philosophicum of their own: minimal theatre-space + maximal openness, communication and transpassability.

I hope that these remarks will lead to a tentative analysis of the work of Beckett and Schelling (how can indeed such an analysis be anything but tentative) in view of the theatrum philosophicum of their own in which the on-stage and off-stage action are simultaneously transpassable. Moreover, the aforementioned formula ventures us on to the No-Mans Land between performance and meaning where a glimpse of the Figure of Being can be caught in the very course of its production.

THE OFF-STAGE ACTION

The problem of origin and an introduction to Beckets phantasm
Footfalls echo in the memory Down the passage which we did not take Toward the door we never opened Into the rose-garden. My words echo Thus, in your mind. T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton Thirty thousand nights of ghosts beyond. Beyond that black beyond. Ghost nights. Ghost rooms. Ghost graves. Ghost ... he all but said ghost loved ones. S. Beckett, A Piece of Monologue

Now the question rises as to how to embark on the adventure of thinking, acting and existing? From where to take a departure? From where to begin? Any systematic thinking is preceded by a stage of the original confusion at which reason notices only the signs by which organisms are differentiated. These signs, marks and indications are differentials that enable cognition to distinguish one thing from another. Also, they are that by which the organisms break loose from the general continuity of being as such, separate themselves from others and are explicitly for themselves. However, these signs are unmediated and unspiritual differentials, les Wesen sauvages, according to Richir, that are necessary but not sufficient to escape from this system of absolute differentiation. We shall take this relentless system of in/difference as a terminus a quo in an attempt to approach the problem of origin. In this state of original confusion nothing can be discerned and everything is far away from any shape or definition. This is le trou noir whose negative gravity dramatically and theatrically sucks everything in; far away from any origin, but nevertheless able to originate an origin. It corresponds to the ultra-cerebral obscurity of Becketts plays 9 that is also referred to as a state of transcendental psychosis in terms of Richirs interpretation of Schelling10. However, precisely this condition of radical differentiation allows a certain freedom with regard to the assignment of meaning (Meinen) that offers on all sides the beginnings of laws, traces of necessity, allusions to order and system, witty and plausible connections. However, none of these beginnings is plausible if the state of the original confusion were not transcended. To approach the problem of origin, Schelling postulates an actuality (the act of existence) that precedes all possibility. This throws some light on the problem of beginnings. This actuality that precedes possibility is also an actuality that precedes thought and precisely for that reason is unthinkable (unvordenklich), thus the first genuine object of thought (quod se

objicit). In this sense, it is the beginning of all real thought for the beginning of thought is not yet thought itself.11 Similarly, an actuality that precedes possibility is also an actuality that precedes action and for that reason it is the first genuine object of action. As such this actuality is not actualised and precisely on that ground it is the beginning of all real action for the beginning of action is not yet action itself. However, this actuality as the act of existence is not completely devoid of the condition of action, so that it ultimately might perform an action, i.e. an action at a distance. It is a matter of a kinematics action that consists of absolute movement in permanent oscillation and is able to suspend concrete, symbolic possibilities for existing as possibilities. Only by the means of this action, the original actuality (the act of existance, the pure act) escapes from the transcendental psychosis and the negative gravity of the black hole. Of course, there is something of an agent to this action. It is pure Potency that is contained in the act of existence. It has an existence but not of its own, it acts, but only at a distance. It is also designated as the necessary existent natura sua, that that can be (das Knnensein), or a mere Potency (die blosse Potenz), which corresponds to the unmediated differential above mentioned. It is situated in the original actuality (the pure act) and ought to be a contingency regarding itself. In this unprethinkable being, it does not have a willingness of its own. For this reason, its doing (Tun) is free in respect of this being. However, due to the condition of being free in the act of existence, pure Potency is always below or above itself, but never itself. To escape from this unwanted condition of groundless freedom (grundlose Freiheit), the necessary existent must become other than that which is in this unprethinkable being. In this sense, it must transcend the necessary existent purely in act, transgress it, and be more than it. Nevertheless, it cannot remain the Being, because it has transgressed the prescribed condition of being a mere possibility. Thus, pure Potency ceases to be potentia actus (a potency of an act) and becomes potencia potentiae12. Briefly put, pure Potency does act in the act of existence, but only at a distance. However, it is precisely action at a distance that offers Beginnings on all sides. In this sense, we shall attempt to outline briefly the phenomenology of pure Potency in its condition of being a beginning of everything that exists by means of its three main characteristics that are the following: a) TRANSPASABILITY. The simple potency (die blosse Potenz) or that that can be precedes all beginnings. In this sense, it is the beginning of everything that exists. It is constituted by the transpassability of the condensed concept of the act of existence (the original actuality) and is transpossible because it does not actualise itself immediately, which ensures its quality of being transpassible. However, the beginning of everything that exists in itself is a

simple subject for the being, yet without being an entity. Accordingly, that that can be is the simple subject for (zum) the being, that has no being of its own, hence, a simple potency.13 b) ATTRACTION. The next important characteristic of pure potency is attraction. Simple potency is the internal beginning of everything that exists the initial capture (seizure) (der An-fang) because of its infinite not being. The attractive potency of the equally infinite being also exists, but only in second place. To begin and to attract are already in view of the terms (anfangen and anziehen) equivalent concepts. Beginning lies in attraction. Thus, to attract is to begin.14 c) THE SUBLIME. Simple potency is the original, unprethinkable mystery, but also for that reason, the primum cogitabile whose being consists of winking, oscillation, and vibration and by no means of a concrete action or donation. The initiation of meaning is produced by the process of condensation by the means of magic (Magie), charm (Zauber), hypnosis due to the fact that the pure act elevates itself to the pure superabundant being (berschwenglich) and appears as sublime in the infinitive symbolic condensation (Dichtung, poetry) of the phenomenological mass of the language (that has ceased to be le tour noir). In this way, the divinely sublime does not exert its horrible power to act, but fascinates, i.e. exists transcendentally and hypnotises, which is nothing but an action at a distance. Briefly put, the absence of a fixed origin is replaced by an origin that situates itself in the stepping outside (transition) of the original state of confusion. The condition of being open permits the action of transposition that is made effective by transpassability. In the very course of transpassability an origin without positivity is being effectuated. Thus, the origin is nothing but the site in which the transcendental psychosis of the apperception and the continence of the Stimmung, cease to be continent, impermeable and hermetically closed, and open to transposition.15 Now, the question is how it decides for itself and assigns itself its proper origin in the absence of origin. We shall try to outline a possible solution according to Schelling in the next section, but before we embark on this task, we would like to consider some possible parallels in the treatment of the problem of origin in the work of Schelling and Beckett. We suggest the phenomenological status of pure Potency (das Knnensein or die blosse Potenz) be compared with the phenomenological status of Becketts phantasm of his later plays. The ability to set a distance, to separate itself and split into its own double, is a matter of the absolute, yet the groundless freedom (die grundlose Freiheit) of pure Potency that introduces contingency and opens up the space of the Double, i.e., of phantasm. This contingency produces the interior distance that discloses the enigma of the same: A is never identical to another A (AA), because of the infinitesimal distance between them (AA) which produces the

infinitesimal difference constituted by the trans- of their transpassability, i.e. of their porosity; transpassability being an indispensable constituent in the process of meaning production. This space, in which the distance and the proximity of the Same is at stake, inaugurates the phantasm of Becketts later plays that is embodied by a protagonist that is always present in the quality of being absent, that is always on stage without being of the stage, a disembodied voice that hovers over our heads, yet, in its full fleshy weight. In this sense, this newly opened space generates the figure that is an icon, a bodily frame to signal human presence, the external forma, not a person sustained in drama but an emblem of an assumed person behind, the Beckettian persona, the figure of identity, of the missing I conspicuously absent by contrast to the corporal figure of the actor16. In this sense, we suggest both authors share the same attempt to materialise the immaterial and repotentialise the positivity of the world by means of the performative action, to which some refer in Becketts case as ghosting17. According to our interpretation, it is a matter of putting a phantasm on stage, or of staging the dance of Schellings Potencies. The parallel can be illustrated by the paradigm of the forms of reflexivity that enable action at a distance, which both, pure Potency (das Knnensein) and Becketts phantasm, have in common. Accordingly, the phantasm and pure Potency are nothing but porous, attractive, and sublime, offering Beginnings on all sides.

THE ON-STAGE ACTION

the phenomenology of inner reality
There are three conditions which often look alike Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow: Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment From self and from things and from persons; and, growing between them, indifference Which resembles the others as death resembles life, Being between two lives... T.S. Eliot, Burt Norton

Now, the question is how Being, as pure Potency or a phantasm, has come into being, i.e. how the existence outside of the pure world of ideas could possibly have originated. Schelling maintains that the eternally perfect ideas could never by themselves have generated an extra-ideal, corruptible reality. Consequently, the only explanation for the existence of this material universe must be to postulate an utterly contingent, yet primordial, leap (Sprung) out of ideality into corporeal finitude.18 This issue provides the driving force for Schellings final philosophy and can be accounted for by the theory of Potencies (Potenzenlehre)19.

Potencies are mediators between the necessary laws of the rational and the creative forces of the suprarational, as well as the irrational. They are endowed with concrete individualities that enable them to assume innumerable relations. They constitute the figure of being (die Figur des Seienden) that is an indispensable constituent of reality, but not yet real. It lacks the specificity of material presence and individuality, because neither particularity nor freedom can be produced by essences alone. Schelling maintains that these essences are lacking in full actality. Indeed, as Beach argues, even the very concepts of space and time, of particular and freedom are still only hypothetical thought-determinations.20 How, then, is to be understood the transition a potencia ad actum, from ideal being to actual existence, from the formal to the concrete? In their original condition of rest, the Potencies have a being as ideal possibilities, without possessing concrete actuality in real space and time. Hence, for the Potency to effect a transition from potential-being to actual-being (a potentia ad actum) would involve stepping outside the prescribed limits, and taking upon itself a mode of being that would, at least in the beginning, be quite foreign to it. In other words, the Potency must cease to relate itself to the other Potencies, because they are mere universals and as such possess no particularity of their own. However, it is not enough. Due to the fact that no mere concept by itself is able to confer actuality, the Potency must utterly transcend the system of ideas in order to acquire the particularity. How is this to be managed? Schelling embarks on the following argument. Ideally the Potency should accept the imposed limitations. Nevertheless, being the source of all possibilities, it also possesses the ability not to subordinate itself to the principle of order. As a pure possibility, a being entirely in itself, it is free to assume a decision to turn inside out, i.e., to ex-ist (the word exist being derived from the Greek existamenon that literally means standing outside itself)21. In case it exercises that option, the Potency will undergo a profound alteration that endows it involve a dislocation of its former character that previously sustained an ideal system of harmony and order. Moreover, it will be endowed with a condition of radical disorder: not only must the Potency actualise itself and be passively resistant to the orders, but also become an active power that works in opposition to the principles of rationality. In this way, it will transform into a positive force for disorder. This new Potency will in effect be an inversion (Umkehrung), or a perversion (Verkehrung), of the Potency as it was in the original state of rest. Thus, this transformation involves much more than just a radical break from the ideal world of essences. This new Potency negates the forces of order, resists formal determinations of any kind in order to ex-sist.22 Moreover, this is the way in which the individuality emerges. Briefly put, the possible pushes toward the act, and freedom (the decision of the Potency in favour of existence) is the force that actualises the possible. This being so, the particular in Schellings work would be nothing but a matter of actualisation of the Potency, i.e. of its (re)potentialisation.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

For most of us, there is only the unattended Moment, the moment in and out of time, The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply That it is not heard at all, but you are the music While the music lasts. These are only hints and guesses, Hints followed by guesses; and the rest Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action. The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is incarnation. Here the impossible union Of spheres of existence is actual, Here the past and future Are conquered and reconciled, ... T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets

Till now, we have considered the possibility of movement of the transcendental facticity. Now, it is time to tackle the issue of its dynamic transformation. When Potency abandons its condition of being a mere Potency, it enters into the realm of effective reality, i.e. of impossibility, in which it ceases to be possible and becomes effectively real. The dynamic transfer of the kinetic experience puts the transcendental facticity into motion by exposing its mode of presentation (Darstellung) and its differences, that are the differences in clarity and non-clarity, immediacy and mediation, the modes of symbolic consciousness insofar as the symbolic consciousness of image (bildlich) or non-image, modes of direct intuition of phantasia, and indirect intuition of image, etc. However, transcendental facticity is not figurable (darstellbar), although it does contribute to the figurability (Darstellbarkeit)23 of the Figure of Being. In this regard, transcendental facticity does not express, but ex-poses itself as it is. For this reason, it is necessary to account for the mode of appearing (Art der Aufweisung) of this kinetic ex-position of the Figure of Being as a dancing consort of being, acting and thinking. Accordingly, our task is to grasp the phenomenality of the Figure of Being in the exact mode of appearing, not the mere fact of it. In this way, the appearing of the Figure of Being will be approached not only in its physicality, but also in its phenomenality as the indispensable constituent of the entire experience, and ultimately, of the aesthetic experience. In this sense, Czanne attempted to paint the sensation, Bacon to register the fact and Pollock to perform action painting. We suggest that Schellings Potenzenlehre and Becketts stage rather consist of the same attempt. All of them offer different modes of the ex-position of being, acting and thinking that have in common a tautegoric approach24 according to which neither content nor form are to be discerned separately. Thus, the ex-posed is not first embodied in a form and then it appears, but it appears in this form and is (means) this form. Only in this way, being, acting and thinking do exist effectively and are not different, nor mean anything different from what they are but the very fact that they are.

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THE KINETIC SCULPTURE

The end is where we start from. And every phrase And sentence that is right (where every word is at home Taking its place to support the others, The word neither diffident nor ostentatious, An easy commerce of the old and the new, The common word exact without vulgarity, The formal word precise but not pedantic. The complete consort dancing together every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning. T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding

The kinetic experience of the Figure of Being can be accounted for only by the dynamic transfer of transcendental facticity. The dynamic transfer puts the Figure of Being into locomotion, so that it turns into kinetic sculpture. In this section we shall deal with the athletics of kinetic sculpture. A kinetic experience is produced by a movement that works out the meaning and makes a complete consort of Potencies dance together. This movement results in a kinetic sculpture that is both, an object and an event, or happening. In fact, this is a mobile that depends for its aesthetic effect on constantly changing patterns of relationships between Potencies taking place through space and time. The movement of the kinetic sculpture goes simultaneously in two directions: ab actu ad potenciam and a potencia ad actum, i.e. a) from the pure act (or the state of original indetermination) to the potency free to obey or to act on its own and b) from the positivity of the unmediated and unspiritual selves to the realm of possibilities. This can be illustrated by the athletics of the Figure of Being that consists of three different motions: translation (or motion along a path from one place to another), rotation about an axis, vibration, or any combination of motions. The coexistence of all motions in the Figure of Being is the rhythm that sets a distance in regard to the condition of original indetermination. Indeed, every movement is a movement, vertigo-like, to somewhere not previous reckoned on a matter of submission in order to release. In this sense, the rhythm must be rightly timed and cannot be imitated. Thus, learning to wait for the Figure of Being to discover its rhythm, waiting without knowing and the waiting itself mean a submission to the inimitability of the rightly timed rhythm. Only this rhythm is able to set the levels of sensation, i.e., to produce affectation, alteration, difference, movement, change. In fact, sensation is nothing but vibration that turns into resonance. This movement corresponds to the kinematics of the dynamic transfer of the Figure of Being, or perhaps, in Becketts terms, to the static image of the egg stirring with lifenever-to-become-hatched25. However, there should be also a third term to explain how something becomes affected and how the force becomes affectation. Thus, we come to the triptych Deleuze uses in the Logic of Sensation that is: vibration resonance time.

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The dance of the kinetic sculpture is also performed by means of four different movements which basic element is always action (Wirkung). These are: traction, abstraction, attraction, and distraction. The basic activity is traction; that is a particular form of power that makes something move in the direction of the action. Furthermore, the kinetic sculpture relies on the movement of ab-straction; that is the activity of getting something out of something else (=extraction) by which Potencies are enabled to step out of the original state of indetermination. It is a matter of an abs-traction (ab-ziehen) from the absence of origin that makes the possibility possible. Also, the abstraction works simultaneously in two directions: a) ab actu ad potenciam, by inciting the potency to use its possibility of acting on its own in case of particularisation or individualisation and b) a potencia ad actum, by breaking the positivity of the unmediated and unspiritual selves into a plurality in potentiam in case of repotentialisation. In fact, in both cases, it is a matter of repotentialisation that repotentialises simultaneously i) the pure act and, ii) the positivity of unmediated and unspiritual selves. This process is enabled either by the activity of dis-traction or attr-action. Dis-traction, as a means of repotentialisation, makes something free from its positivity and ready to succumb to up until now an unknown attr-action. And thus, the end is where we start from: in the movement of the attraction, as a particular feature that offers beginnings on all sides. Be as it may, basically, it is always a matter of action (regardless of the type: tr-action, abstr-action, distr-action or attr-action). By these means, the dance of the Figure of Being turns into a spectacle of hearing and seeing, measured by a sequence of visual and aural signals that interact, join and split, mirror each other, showing agreement and conflict. And, the stage is always where the figure appears, recorded or live, and where it is posed against another figure, embodied or not, and set against the setting where there is a human body which can obey or challenge the voice and where the possible movements of the body and sound of speech or music are set against changes and modulations of lighting.

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REPOTENTIALISATION REVISITED
dead calm, then a murmur, a name, a murmured name, in doubt, in fear, in love, in fear, in doubt, wind of winter in the black boughs, cold calm sea whitening whispering to the shore, stealing, hastening, swelling, passing, dying, from naught come, to naught gone. S. Beckett, Addenda to Watt

These are some moments of the phenomenological insight of the kinetic sculpture in the theatrum philosophicum of Schelling and Beckett in which one listens to the rising and subsiding rhythm of vivid and exuberant life20. Indeed this sort of listening to where a rhythm changes, begins and ends, and becomes sound, and eventually a word that is also an act (Tat) listening to the roots of things and sources is where everything begins and ends. This implies authenticity of radical listening to the inward frequences of merely being alive26, which is not static but kinetic experience that allows us to consider action as a matter of openness (Gelassenheit), and, thus, beginnings as a matter of action (Wirkung).

NOTES
Richir, M., LExprience du penser. Phnomnologie, philosophie, mythologie, Editions Jrme Millon, Grenoble, 1996 (henceforth cited as Exp.); Courtine, J.-F., La subjectivit: Fondation et extase de la raison in Extase de la Raison. Essais sur Schelling, Galile, Paris, 1990, pp. 151-167. 2 Knottenbelt, E.M., Samuel Beckett: Poetry as performative act Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 32. 3 Kedzierski, M., Texts for performance: Becketts late works and the question of dramatism, performability and genre in Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 305-311. 4 Cousineau, Beneath Representation: On Staging Becketts Plays in Stewart, B., ed. Beckett and Beyond, The Princess Grace Irish Library, Monaco, 1999, pp. 62-63. 5 Knottenbelt, E.M., op. cit., p. 32-33. 6 Ibid., p. 35. 7 Kedzierski, M., op. cit., pp. 305-311. 8 Duckworth, C., Becketts theatre: beyond the stage space in Stewart, B., ed. Beckett and Beyond, The Princess Grace Irish Library, Monaco, 1999, p. 96. 9 Beckett, S., Dream of Fair to Middling Women, The Black Cat Press, Dublin, 1992. 10 Richir, M., Quest-ce quun Dieu? Mythologie et question de la pense, preface to Schelling F.W.J, Philosophie de la mythologie, Editions Jrme Millon, Grenoble, 1994, pp. 8-85; Richir, M., Exp., p. 103. 11 Schelling, F.W.J., Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begrndung der positiven Philosophie, 1891. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings smmtliche Werke, K.F.A. Schelling (ed.), Vol. XIII, Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cottascher Verlag, 1856-61, 162; Beach, E.A., The potencies of God(s): Schellings philosophy of mythology, State University of New York Press, New York, 1994, 106 (henceforth cited as The Potencies). 12 Schelling, F.W.J., Philosophische Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie oder Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophie, Vol. XI, 337-338, 346-347. 13 Ibid., 355. 14 Ibid., 355. 15 Richir, M., Exp., pp. 100-106, 139-279. 16 Kedzierski, M., op. cit., pp. 305-311. 17 Cohn, R., Ghosting throught Beckett in Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 1-11. 18 Schelling, Philosophie und Religion, 1804. Vol. VI, 36; Beach, E.A., The Potencies, p. 97. 19 Schelling, XI.

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Beach, E.A., The Potencies, pp. 129-136. Schelling, XI, 388; XII, 38. 21 Schelling, XIII. This is also the way in which Richir accounts for the action of les Wesen sauvages, i.e. les Wesen de language phnomnologique, Exp., p. 270. 22 Schelling, XII, 195-196, 237-238. 23 Beckett, S., Breath and other shorts, Faber and Faber, London, 1971. 24 Knottenbelt, E.M., op. cit., p. 35.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beach, E.A., The potencies of God(s): Schellings philosophy of mythology, State University of New York Press, New York, 1994. Brater, E., Beyond Minimalism: Becketts Late Style in the Theatre. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Beckett, S., The Complete Dramatic Works, Faber and Faber, London, 1986. Beckett, S., Whoroscope, Hours Press, Paris, 1930. Beckett, S., Dream of Fair to Middling Women, The Black Cat Press, Dublin, 1992. Beckett, S., Breath and other shorts, Faber and Faber, London, 1971. Beckett, S., Collected Poems in English and French, John Calder, London, 1977. Cohn, R., Ghosting throught Beckett in Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 1-11. Cousineau, Beneath Representation: On Staging Becketts Plays in Stewart, B., ed. Beckett and Beyond, The Princess Grace Irish Library, Monaco, 1999, pp. 62-69. Courtine, J.-F., La subjectivit: Fondation et extase de la raison in Extase de la Raison. Essais sur Schelling, Galile, Paris, 1990, pp. 151-167. Deleuze, G., Francis Bacon, logique de la sensation, ditions de la Diffrence, Paris, 2 vol., 1981. Duckworth, C., Becketts theatre: beyond the stage space in Stewart, B., ed. Beckett and Beyond, The Princess Grace Irish Library, Monaco, 1999, pp. 93-101. Kedzierski, M., Texts for performance: Becketts late works and the question of dramatism, performability and genre in Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 305-311. Knottenbelt, E.M., Samuel Beckett: Poetry as performative act Buning, M. And Oppenheim, L. (eds.) Beckett in the 1990s. Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atlanta, GA 1993, pp. 31-40. Richir, M., LExprience du penser. Phnomnologie, philosophie, mythologie, Editions Jrme Millon, Grenoble, 1996. Richir, M., Quest-ce quun dieu? Mythologie et question de la pense, preface to: J.W.F. Schelling, Philosophie de la mythologie, Editions Jrme Millon, Grenoble, 1994, 8-85. Schelling, F.W.J., Philosophie und Religion, 1804. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings smmtliche Werke, K.F.A. Schelling (ed.), Vol. VI, Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cottascher Verlag, 1856-61. Schelling, F.W.J., Philosophische Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie oder Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophie, 1847. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings smmtliche Werke, K.F.A. Schelling (ed.), Vol. XI, Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cottascher Verlag, 1856-61. Schelling, F.W.J., Philosophie der Mythologie, 1842. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings smmtliche Werke, K.F.A. Schelling (ed.), Vol. XII, Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cottascher Verlag, 1856-61. Schelling, F.W.J., Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begrndung der positiven Philosophie, 1841. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings smmtliche Werke, K.F.A. Schelling (ed.), Vol. XIII, Stuttgart/Augsburg: J.G. Cottascher Verlag, 1856-61.

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