The United Nations During the Cold War (1946-1988)

The great expectations which availed on the foundation of the world organisation were quickly disappointed. The East-West Conflict, which manifested by 1947 at the latest, made constructive work in the UN committees during the first decades very difficult. "The concord between the Allied major powers during the Second World War broke down as soon as the spoils of war were to be distributed - and with it the hopes for the 'one world' that the UNO institutionally embodied, and which it was supposed to protect. Whereas the United Nations succeeded in pegging up a series of successes in 1947, including the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Iran, the regulation of the issue concerning Trieste and the retreat of the Anglo-French troops from the Lebanon and Syria, the former brotherhood in arms between the world powers and the Soviet Union had turned into a conflict by 1947 at the latest, which was to characterise international relations and the work of the United Nations for 40 years. The power-political and ideological confrontation between both Blocs ... dominated the debates and negotiations in all UN committees fro this point onwards, and most significantly of course, in the Security Council. The function of the organisation to secure peace practically came to a standstill. What is more, the 'peace-loving major powers', who, according to the statutes, carried the main responsibility for peace, soon became the catalyst for the most dangerous breakdown in peace in their fight to achieve influence in the Third World."
[taken from: Gnther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 37]

However, the blockade of the Security Council due to the Cold War should not lead us to the conclusion that the first four decades meant lost time for the UNO, whose history really first began with the epoch-making revolutionary changes in 1989/90. Such an estimation would fail to take into account the achievements of the world organisation, such as those in the area of human rights preservation or the continued development of international law and decolonisation. Although it was impossible to apply Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a core element of the collective security system, the organisation identified other core areas for work. Despite - or perhaps because of - the blockade, success was achieved in making important course settings, which frequently characterise the image of the UNO today as a forum for global problems. "During the initial phase, the field of activity of the UNO was limited to those areas in which the direct interests of the major powers were not affected. The First Secretary-General, Trygve Lie of Norway, was, during the major part of his term of office (1946-1952), busy expanding the Secretariat and promoting the United Nations to a position of being able to carry out its work at the headquarters in New York. Over and above this, ... a series of specialist and ancillary organisations were called into life to simplify the rebuilding of devastated areas, particularly in Europe. The climax of this year was ultimately to be the General Declaration of Human Rights, drafted by the UN Commission on Human Rights - a specialist organ of the Economic and Social Council - and unanimously accepted by the General Assembly on 10th December 1948." [...more information of the topic of human rights and all the important

documents relating to this can be found under the Main Subject Group of Human Rights on D@dalos]
[taken from: Gnther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 41]

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the somewhat more relaxed atmosphere between the Blocs ("peaceful co-existence") and in the United Nations catered for improved working conditions. Following the year-long stop on admissions, 16 new member states were able to join the UNO in 1955. The Eastern Bloc countries now started getting involved in several voluntarily financed UN aid programmes and specialist organisations which they had boycotted during the first years. Besides this, Dag Hammarskjld of the Sweden was elected to the office of Secretary-General in 1953, and he is still considered to have been the most outstanding holder until today. "Dag Hammarskjld considered himself to be a 'mere' representative and administrative head of the United Nations. With a firm aim in mind and great aptitude, he used the loopholes in the UN Charter during the following years to continuously extend the duties and flexibility of the SecretaryGeneral. Without any particularly request or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly, he attempted to mediate in the sense of 'preventative diplomacy' as soon as a conflict arose and before the dispute reached a critical state. On the basis of the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' of 1950 ... the United Nations developed a completely new instrument - what are referred to as Peacekeeping Missions on the instigation of the Secretary-General in the mid-50s, which were not planned for in the Charter. In contrast to the measures to 'force peace' stipulated in Chapter VII, operations of this nature are not based on the use of force, but serve to avoid it by installing a 'buffer zone' between the conflicting parties. Since peace-preserving missions of this nature by the United Nations are only possible if the conflicting parties involved agree to them, and UN soldiers are not permitted to use weapons except in self-defence, operations of this kind are subject to the consent of the majority rather than being pure UN military actions."
[taken from: Gnther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 45]

The first occasion on which the "Blue Helmets" went into action was during the Suez Crisis of 1956, where they functioned as a buffer between the conflicting parties. Further operations followed in which the range of duties was continually expanded. An overview of peace missions to-date, whose number increased significantly after the end of the Cold War [see the section following in this basic course], can be found in the section on History. Since the 50s, issues concerning decolonisation have developed into a core area of work. After the road to independence for the colonies had first been marked by bloody wars (of liberation), success was achieved - thanks not least to the United Nations - in steering the process towards orderly and peaceful channels.

"The process of decolonisation had grave impact on the United Nations itself: The states who had recently achieved independence all joined the UNO, meaning that the organisation had 50 new members added between 1955 and 1962. 118 states already belonged to the United Nations in 1965, and the geographic distribution changing fundamentally as well. Whereas the UNO consisted of North and South American and European states alone in 1945, mainly Asiatic and African countries, and later Oceanic and Caribbean countries, joined as a result of the wave of decolonisation. As a consequence, the UNO developed from a committee, which earlier had consisted primarily of the Allies from the Second World War, into a real world organisation."
[taken from: Gnther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 51-53]

This changed the face of the United Nations completely. Out of the three task fields [see Basic Course 1], the original main set of tasks - securing peace - faded into the background, principally because the Security Council was only capable of functioning to a limited degree anyway due to the veto power wielded by the opponents during the Cold War, and the set of tasks dealing with "economic and social development" took centre-stage. Nearly all the former colonies to join the UNO were developing countries. The 'Third World' countries now had a majority vote in the General Assembly. Development policy took up a central role in the work of the United Nations from this point onwards. In 1961, Sithu U Thant of Burma was elected SecretaryGeneral and the General Assembly announced the "first decade of development". In 1963, two changes to the UN Charter led to the number of non-permanent members in the Security Council being increased from six to ten, and the number of members in the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 (and to 54 in 1971). Geographical distribution of the 127 UN members (1970) Africa Asia Europe America Oceanic Total 42 29 27 26 3 127

With a majority in the General Assembly, the developing countries occasioned the foundation of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) as a counterweight to the Bretton Woods organisations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in which the number of votes is measured in terms of investment income, and which failed to provide the poor states with any potential for shaping it as a result. In 1966, two institutions - the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance EPTA and the Special Fund SF founded in 1959 - were placed under the single banner of the UN Development Programme UNDP. Although the East-West Conflict persevered and continued to make the work of the UNO difficult, it was now overshadowed by the North-South Conflict. "The western states rejected the automatic two-thirds majority of the Third World states with increasing intensity. The developing countries complained about the 'ignorance of the

minority' concerning the problems of the large majority of humanity. The industrial nations, headed by the USA - as the payer of the largest subscriptions by far -, lamented the 'tyranny of the majority' of the Third World in the UN organs ... Since the developing countries contributed less than three percent of the budget, the Americans were less and less prepared to accept their recommendations and resolutions on important questions, including the UN budget."
[taken from: Gnther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 67-69]

Helmut Volger summarises the development of this phase: "In the United Nations, the Seventies was the decade of great hope for the countries of the Third World. Many countries of the Third World felt bolstered in their position, particularly following the resolution by the General Assembly in October 1971 to replace the Republic of China (Taiwan) with the Peoples Republic of China, because the Peoples Republic of China would appear as an agent and representative of the interests of the Third World as a permanent UN Security Council member. Efforts towards a reform of the world economy stood at the centre of the work of the United Nations during this period (...). As a consequence, a "Declaration to Establish a New International Economic Order" was accepted by the UN Special General Assembly on Resources in 1974 in the consensus procedure. It was supplemented by the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" which the UN General Assembly passed as a resolution in December 1974. The programme for the "New International Economic Order" ... included fair price relations for the Third World, the step-by-step removal or tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, in order to make it easier for the countries of the Third World to access the industrial nations' markets, and increased development aid services (...). Because the declaration on the reform of the international economic order needed to be accepted by all member states - including the industrial nations of the west - the Third World states were optimistic that rapid implementation of the individual steps in the reform would succeed. In actual fact during the following years, they failed, beyond a tiny level of approval, to succeed in achieving decisive structural changes in the international trade system at the UNCTAD world trade conferences, during negotiations at the World Bank, at the International Monetary Fund, or in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because of the diplomatically clever and stalwart resistance of the industrial nations to the issue at hand. The UNCTAD conferences in 1983 in Belgrade finally signalised what ... devastating consequences the failure of the efforts by the Third World towards a 'new international economic order' would have for the quality of life of the majority of the peoples of most of the countries of the Third World."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 7-8]

[Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary-General 1972-1981]

These problems of international distribution and the consequent unjustness have still not been solved today. Due to processes summarised under 'Globalisation', they have become

even worse over the last few decades [further information on this topic can be found within the framework of the Main Subject Group of Globalisation on D@dalos]. The Balance in Securing Peace The balance concerning the principal task of the United Nations of securing peace and international security proved ambivalent during the first few decades. Whereas during the Berlin, Suez and Cuba crises, it can be said that world organisation succeeded, the UNO was clearly overtaxed during the Congo mission, and this anticipated the future problems of the peace missions [an historical summary of all peace missions can be found in the section on History]. The Berlin Crisis: The United Nations as a Negotiation Forum "In the case of the Berlin Blockade, which appeared daily on the General Assemblys agenda at the end of September 1948 at the request of the western powers, the USSR may have prevented the Council's resolution being passed, but diplomatic activities did occur at the United Nations during the period following. In October 1948, Secretary-General Lie mediated discussion contacts with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Wyschinskij through his employees Sobolew (USSR) and Feller (USA) at the request of the American UN delegate Jessup. The attempt at negotiations remained unsuccessful however. Following US President Truman's decision on 31. January 1949 to reply to an indirect proposal for negotiation made by Stalin in an interview with a US press agency by giving a signal demonstrating his readiness to talk, the USA consciously chose the United Nations for the secret discussions. The American UN delegate Jessup repeatedly met with the Soviet UN delegate Malik and negotiated the end of the blockade with him. Despite the Security Council being blocked by the veto, the United Nations proved its worth in the Berlin Conflict as an instrument for settling conflicts."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 4]

Collective Security System: The Basic Concept and Problem The Berlin Crisis demonstrates that important functions of the United nations appear well below the threshold of "spectacular" peace missions. It also provides a forum for discussions, particularly in times of crisis, where absent channels of communication may lead to an escalation in conflict. This certainly fails to live up to the demands of a functioning, collective security system, the simple fundamental idea of which consists of a potential aggressor being confronted by a closed front made up of all members, which is why he would avoid an attack from the very beginning (in the ideal case). If he attacks nevertheless, the state which is attacked would be defended by all the states in the system. A system of this type has not worked (up until now), and critics state that it is not capable of working for structural reasons, which the history of the United Nations to-date confirms. This is because it would not be required (if the important members are in accord), or it would not function (if they are not). Despite this, action which was expressly authorised by the Security Council took place under the leadership of the USA in 1950 following the attack on South Korea by North Korea. However, this represents a special case, since it was only possible to pass the resolution in the Security Council, because the Soviet Union had stayed away from sessions at the time

(in protest against the Peoples Republic of China not being accepted into the United Nations in place of Taiwan). The Suez Crisis: The Peace Troops Come into Being "The Suez Conflict of 1956 represents an important test period for the United Nations' peacekeeping system: on the one hand, the United Nations failed to conduct business successfully, despite the direct participation of two permanent Security Council members Great Britain and France -, because the USA had placed strong political pressure on both to agree to a mediation solution, and because - following Great Britain and France blocking the Security Council with their veto right - the Council had resolved to call an emergency meeting of the General Assembly with the votes of the USA and USSR according to the Uniting for Peace Resolution procedure. On the suggestion of Secretary-General Hammarskjld, the General Assembly resolved to send in UN troops to monitor the maintenance of the previously agreed cease-fire: this involved the first UN peace troops and signalised a further development of the Charter in which UN troops of this type were not planned for, and who were not meant to impose sanctions according to Chapter VII following a breakdown in peace, but were merely meant to secure a cease-fire with the agreement of the conflicting parties. Today, they are most certainly the most important instrument that the United Nations has."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6]

The Congo Conflict: The Peace Troops are Overtaxed The peace mission to the Congo between 1960 and 1964 demonstrated the limits of the new instrument and dampened the optimism linked to the peace troops. Sven Gareis and Johannes Varwick sum up the failure of the mission: "The temporary success of the UNEF Mission had resulted in highly optimistic expectations for securing peace by the United Nations at the beginning of the 1960s. This stance found expression amongst other things in the ambitious operation in the Congo ... (ONUC), which partially ignored the principles set up by Hammarskjld. Beginning with Resolution 143 of July 1960, the Security Council's mandate was extended by a total of four further resolutions. Hammarskjld's Fundamental Principles for Blue Helmet Operations: All conflicting parties must agree to the mission. The United Nations is responsible for the operation, i.e. observation missions and peace troops function as ancillary organs of the Security Council. The Blue Helmets are unbiased. The Blue Helmets are only allowed to use weapons in self-defence.

The ONUC mission, which involved nearly 20,000 servicemen at its peak, was originally instigated to support the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo Republic, but was enlarged to ensure its territorial integrity, prevent the outbreak of a civil war, or at least limit it, and support the government in setting up offices. With Security Council resolution 161 of February 1961, the peace troops were permitted to use weapons beyond self-defence for the first time in order to carry out their orders. As a

result, they increasingly became a party to the conflict in contrast to the original concept. Following initial successes, ONUC became the first 'major peacekeeping failure' (Jett). The United Nations became increasingly entangled in the unsolved interior problems of the Congo Republic (...). The lessons learnt from the Congo mission, which William Durch referred to exaggeratedly as 'The UNO's Vietnam', were lasting. No mission of comparable complexity or size was to take place for another three decades. The peace-keeping aims of the UNO became more moderate after this point. The United Nations reflected upon the principles formulated by Hammarskjld, and sought the agreement of the conflicting parties before starting a mission."
[taken from: Sven Gareis/Johannes Varwick, Die Vereinten Nationen. Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen; Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Schriftenreihe Band 403, Bonn 2003, P. 122-123]

The Cuba Crisis: Successful Mediation "In the Cuba Crisis of 1962, which brought about the acute danger of a nuclear war between the USA and the USSR, the United Nations achieved one of its most monumental achievements. At the high point of the confrontation, just as Soviet ships were on their way to Cuba, whose waters US President Kennedy had declared as a quarantine zone for Soviet ships, UN Secretary-General U Thant succeeded in halting escalations by sending similarly penned letters to Khrushchev and Kennedy on 24th October, in which he requested a period of standstill, and where he urged both sides to avoid further confrontations in two further letters of 25th October (...). Quotation from the letter written by U Thant to Khrushchev and Kennedy: "I believe that a voluntary postponement for a period of two or three weeks would take considerable pressure off the situation and give the parties involved a chance to meet and discuss with the aim of finding a peaceful solution to the problem. In this relation, I would be glad to place myself at the disposal of all parties for any services that I may be in the position to provide."
[quoted from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6, Anm. 17]

The United Nations played a decisive role in managing the Cuba Crisis: U Thant's initiative contributed to avoiding a direct confrontation, gave both sides the chance to search for alternative solutions, and allowed them to withdraw from positions clung to until that time without losing face, so as to arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6-7]

Gareis/Varwick Account for the Ambivalence "If one balances up the experience of the first four decades of UN peace-keeping in summary, a mixed image results. First, it needs to be stated that each mission is a special case, and does not take place according to a fixed course and the same plan in every detail. The idealistic notions from the UN Charter (and, in particular, the wide-ranging rulings in Chapter VII) hardly proved to be applicable in practice, which is why an innovative instrument was created in the 'Blue Helmets', who had not been planned for in the Charter. The missions aimed mainly at aiding the parties involved in a conflict to find a solution, or 'bringing the violent part of the conflict to a end' (Khne) ... Missions by the Blue Helmets functioned as a method of quietening down the dispute, but did provide a solution to

conflicts, not out of moderation or failing trust in the ability of the United Nations to find a solution, but out of conceptual reserve, strategic prudence and limitation to the doable. The aim of quietening down the conflict was achieved in the majority of cases. Frequently however, - as in the case of Cyprus this only took place at the cost of a massive permanent presence. If - as in the case of the Congo - this restraint were to be given up, the results would probably be negative."
[taken from: Sven Gareis/Johannes Varwick, Die Vereinten Nationen. Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen; Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Schriftenreihe Band 403, Bonn 2003, P. 124]

The United Nations Crisis The already limited potential for securing peace continued to thin out during the course of the 70s and 80s. A United Nations crisis was spoken of in general, and this took on existential proportions for the world organisation in the mid-80s as the following text excerpt demonstrates: "In terms of securing peace, the United Nations found itself in a deep crisis in the Seventies and Eighties: although it continued to maintain a presence in the Near East and Cyprus through a series of peace-keeping missions, it failed to prevent repeated military confrontations taking place in both conflict zones. It was equally wanting in making a contribution to the settlement of newly burgeoning warring conflicts in Nicaragua, West Sahara, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and the growing war between Iran and Iraq. During this phase of international politics, the main problem lay in the fact that the suggestions for solutions made by the United Nations were paid little attention to. In his annual report to the General Assembly of 1983, Prez de Cullar spoke of a "process of disintegration in multilateralism and internationalism' which is seriously detrimental to the work of the United Nations. He lamented the tendency of the major powers to get involved in regional disputes using weapons: 'This went so far in several cases, that regional conflicts degenerated into replacement wars for the more powerful nations. In situations like this, there is a tendency to circumnavigate or snuff out the United Nations or ... to use it as exclusively a platform for exchanging polemic blows.' (...) The crises in securing peace developed into a general existential crisis for the United Nations due to the policy of withdrawal of the USA and its refusal to pay subscriptions under the Presidency of Reagan during the Eighties. This policy was triggered by the USA's anger at its defeat during voting in the General Assembly and the resolutions of the Security Council, where it saw itself forced to make use of its veto in order to prevent sanctionary measures against South Africa and South Rhodesia, and criticism of the policies of Israel against its neighbouring states and the Palestinians.

[Prez de Cullar, UN Secretary-General 1982-1991]

In addition to this, accusations surfaced within the USA concerning the administrative apparatus of the United Nations: it was accused of working inefficiently and wasting cash resources (...) [see Basic Course 5 for more information on the problems concerning the United Nations]. Far graver were the consequences of the USA refusing to pay its

subscriptions to the full extent in 1986."

[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung Bonn, P. 8]

The United Nations' financial crisis could have been prevented by a compromise, but instead, the world organisation began leading a nebulous existence in international politics. This suddenly changed with the end of the East-West Conflict...