Scientific Methodology PH3080/PH3580

Luca Moretti Department of Philosophy Aberdeen University l.moretti@abdn.ac.uk http://lucamoretti.org

Lecture 1 Scientific Rationality and basic notions

Requested readings: J. Ladyman, Understanding philosophy of science (Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-18. B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance (Dickenson Pub. Co., 1966), Ch. 1.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.1 Why investigating the scientific method is important

In modern western societies we generally believe (at least most of us do) that science provides us with genuine knowledge. In this, science would be superior to other alleged forms of knowledge for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, commonsense, and so on. In our societies, we tend to trust the words of a scientist much more than the words of a novelist, a politician or a journalist. Since the content of science tends to change in time (often radically), the reason why science would be superior to other disciplines or activities cannot depend on its content. It must rather depend on its method. A widespread idea is that science provides us with genuine knowledge because it is based on the right method to achieve knowledge. This method would be constitutive of the often celebrated scientific rationality.

Is this true? Is there something like a definite set of rules that constitutes the scientific method? And if there is a scientific method, is it actually able to provide us with knowledge?
We will investigate these issues.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.2 Many different ways to investigate science

Science can be investigated by using science itself. For example, by:

sociology of science (possible questions: What is the structure of a scientific community?, Is the behaviour of a scientific community independent of the political context?); psychology of science (What is the typical personality of a physicist?); history of science (How did the American scientific community receive the innovative ideas of Einstein before the Second World War?); ...
Science can also be investigated by using philosophy.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.3 How philosophy investigates science

In analytic philosophy, science is principally investigated by philosophy of science. Philosophy of science can analyse the content of science or the method of science. When philosophy of science analyses the content of science, it does metaphysics of science. Typical questions are: what is a cause? What is space? What is a scientific law? When philosophy of science investigates the method of science, it does epistemology of science (or scientific methodology). Typical questions are: in which cases a theory can be accepted or rejected? Can we really falsify a theory? When a hypothesis should be considered ad hoc?

We will do scientific methodology.

1.4 Distinguishing normative questions from factual questions

One issue is to investigate what the scientists actually do, another issue is to investigate what the scientists should do.

Scientific methodology is interested in both issues:

It is important that the image of the scientific method provided by philosophers be as realistic as possible. Yet it is also important that the scientific method be correct for example, if the goal of the science is to track the truth, the rules of scientific method should lead scientists to accept true (or probably true) theories!

1.4 Distinguishing normative questions from factual questions

One issue is to investigate what the scientists actually do, another issue is to investigate what the scientists should do.

Scientific methodology is interested in both issues:

It is important that the image of the scientific method provided by philosophers be as realistic as possible. Yet it is also important that the scientific method be correct for example, if the goal of the science is to track the truth, the rules of scientific method should lead scientists to accept true (or probably true) theories!

1.4 Distinguishing normative questions from factual questions

One issue is to investigate what the scientists actually do, another issue is to investigate what the scientists should do.

Scientific methodology is interested in both issues:

It is important that the image of the scientific method provided by philosophers be as realistic as possible. Yet it is also important that the scientific method be correct for example, if the goal of the science is to track the truth, the rules of scientific method should lead scientists to accept true (or probably true) theories!

1.4 Distinguishing normative questions from factual questions

One issue is to investigate what the scientists actually do, another issue is to investigate what the scientists should do.

Scientific methodology is interested in both issues:

It is important that the image of the scientific method provided by philosophers be as realistic as possible so, it has to reflect what scientists do. Yet it is also important that the scientific method be correct for example, if the goal of the science is to track the truth, the rules of scientific method should lead scientists to accept true (or probably true) theories!

1.4 Distinguishing normative questions from factual questions

One issue is to investigate what the scientists actually do, another issue is to investigate what the scientists should do.

Scientific methodology is interested in both issues:

It is important that the image of the scientific method provided by philosophers be as realistic as possible so, it has to reflect what scientists do. But it is also important that the image of the scientific method be internally coherent for example, if the goal of science is to track the truth, the rules of the scientific method should lead the scientists to accept true (or probably true) theories. Thus, scientific methodology also tells the scientists what they should do.

1.5 Is there a scientific method?

Sceptics, social constructivists, cultural relativists, methodological anarchists (and others) would seem to argue that there exists no scientific method there is no rule that allows us to select the true or the probably true theories (or at least to eliminate the false theories). A consequence of this would be that the scientists do not really attain knowledge scientific decisions radically depend on social and political or even personal factors. Science is not more rational than, for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, or commonsense.

If this is true, the Copernican image of the world is not closer to the truth (or more rational) than the Ptolemaic.
Can we really accept this thesis?

1.5 Is there a scientific method?

Sceptics, social constructivists, cultural relativists, methodological anarchists (and others) would seem to argue that there exists no scientific method there is no rule that allows us to select the true or the probably true theories (or at least to eliminate the false theories). A consequence of this would be that the scientists do not really attain knowledge scientific decisions radically depend on social and political or even personal factors. Science is not more rational than, for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, or commonsense.

If this is true, the Copernican image of the world is not closer to the truth (or more rational) than the Ptolemaic.
Can we really accept this thesis?

1.5 Is there a scientific method?

Sceptics, social constructivists, cultural relativists, methodological anarchists (and others) would seem to argue that there exists no scientific method there is no rule that allows us to select the true or the probably true theories (or at least to eliminate the false theories). A consequence of this would be that the scientists do not really attain knowledge scientific decisions radically depend on social and political or even personal factors. Science is not more rational than, for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, or commonsense.

If this is true, the Copernican image of the world is not closer to the truth (or more rational) than the Ptolemaic.
Can we really accept this thesis?

1.5 Is there a scientific method?

Sceptics, social constructivists, cultural relativists, methodological anarchists (and others) would seem to argue that there exists no scientific method there is no rule that allows us to select the true or the probably true theories (or at least to eliminate the false theories). A consequence of this would be that the scientists do not really attain knowledge scientific decisions radically depend on social and political or even personal factors. Science is not more rational than, for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, or commonsense.

If this is true, for instance, the Copernican image of the world may not be closer to the truth (or more rational) than the Ptolemaic.
Can we really accept this thesis?

1.5 Is there a scientific method?

Sceptics, social constructivists, cultural relativists, methodological anarchists (and others) would seem to argue that there exists no scientific method there is no rule that allows us to select the true or the probably true theories (or at least to eliminate the false theories). A consequence of this would be that the scientists do not really attain knowledge scientific decisions radically depend on social and political or even personal factors. Science is not more rational than, for instance, alchemy, myth, witchcraft, religion, or commonsense.

If this is true, for instance, the Copernican image of the world may not be closer to the truth (or more rational) than the Ptolemaic.
Can we really accept this thesis?

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others, closer to us, are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others, closer to us, are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others, closer to us, are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others, closer to us, are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others, closer to us, are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.6 Some prominent methodologists

Aristotle (384BC-322BC) He invented syllogistic logic (the ancestor of a branch of modern predicate logic) and formulated the first version of the principle of induction by enumeration).

Francis Bacon (1561-1628) He formulated a primitive version of what we can call the experimental method (a set of practical rules for deciding among rival hypotheses on the grounds of experimental evidence).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) He formulated a more modern version of the experimental method for the specific purpose of deciding among rival hypotheses that postulate causal relations between phenomena. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) He defined a formal system of inductive logic based on an interpretation of the notion of mathematical probability. Others closer to us are: Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn (?) and Paul Feyerabend (?)

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has thus become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice (an incredible effort, in this sense, has been made by Lakatos).
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, the discipline of scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has thus become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice (an incredible effort, in this sense, has been made by Lakatos).
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, the discipline of scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice.
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, the discipline of scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice.
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice.
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.7 The state of play in scientific methodology

The methodological analysis of science has not proceeded randomly or incoherently. Each of the above methodologist has taken into account the achievements of his predecessors.

The image of the scientific method has become in time more and more complex and sophisticated. Many problems have been resolved. Furthermore, philosophers have attempted to make their models closer and closer to the real scientific practice.
Yet, as a result of criticism by Kuhn and above all Feyerabend, scientific methodology faces today serious difficulties. The idea that there exists a scientific method that constraints the decisions of the scientists and allows them to choose rationally the best theories and to discard the defective has become dubious.

The claim that our best scientific theories actually track the truth has become uncertain.
Some of these difficulties will be discussed in these lectures.

1.8 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will first introduce a case study: the Copernican revolution, which roughly coincides with the replacement of the Ptolemaic heliocentric theory of heavens by the Copernican geocentric theory of heavens in the 16th and 17th centuries

The Copernican revolution gave birth to modern science. If anything is rational in science, its very beginning must have been so.
If scientific rationality depends essentially on the scientific method, the Copernican revolution must have been a paradigmatic example of the application of the scientific method. If so, what scientific methodology, exactly, can explain or justify the Copernican revolution? Is there any set of rules that can certify that the theory switch during the Copernican revolution was rational?

1.8 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will first introduce a case study: the Copernican revolution, which coincides with the replacement of the Ptolemaic heliocentric theory of heavens by the Copernican geocentric theory of heavens between, roughly, the second half of the 16th century and first half of the 17th century. The Copernican revolution gave birth to modern science. If anything is rational in science, its very beginning must have been so. If scientific rationality depends essentially on the scientific method, the Copernican revolution must have been a paradigmatic example of the application of the scientific method. If so, what scientific methodology, exactly, can explain or justify the Copernican revolution? Is there any set of rules that can certify that the theory shift during the Copernican revolution was rational?

1.8 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will first introduce a case study: the Copernican revolution, which coincides with the replacement of the Ptolemaic heliocentric theory of heavens by the Copernican geocentric theory of heavens between, roughly, the second half of the 16th century and first half of the 17th century. The Copernican revolution gave birth to modern science. If anything is rational in science, its very beginning must have been so. If scientific rationality depends essentially on the scientific method, the Copernican revolution must have been a paradigmatic example of the application of the scientific method. If so, what scientific methodology, exactly, can explain or justify the Copernican revolution? Is there any set of rules that can certify that the theory shift during the Copernican revolution was rational?

1.8 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will first introduce a case study: the Copernican revolution, which coincides with the replacement of the Ptolemaic heliocentric theory of heavens by the Copernican geocentric theory of heavens between, roughly, the second half of the 16th century and first half of the 17th century. The Copernican revolution gave birth to modern science. If anything is rational in science, its very beginning must have been so. If scientific rationality depends essentially on the scientific method, the Copernican revolution must have been a paradigmatic example of the application of the scientific method. If so, what scientific methodology, exactly, can explain or justify the Copernican revolution? Is there any set of rules that can certify that the theory shift during the Copernican revolution was rational?

1.8 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will first introduce a case study: the Copernican revolution, which coincides with the replacement of the Ptolemaic heliocentric theory of heavens by the Copernican geocentric theory of heavens between, roughly, the second half of the 16th century and first half of the 17th century. The Copernican revolution gave birth to modern science. If anything is rational in science, its very beginning must have been so. If scientific rationality depends essentially on the scientific method, the Copernican revolution must have been a paradigmatic example of the application of the scientific method. If so, what scientific methodology, exactly, can explain or justify the Copernican revolution? Is there any set of rules that can certify that the theory shift during the Copernican revolution was rational?

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will start with the ingenuous inductive methodology advocated by Bacon. We will see that it is defective in too many respects and that it can cast no light on the problems of the Copernican revolution. We will move to the more recent and mature conception of the scientific method defended by Popper, called Falsificationism. We will see that it fares much better that Bacons conception. Yet Poppers methodology in its crudest version cannot explain why it was rational to prefer the Copernican view of the universe to the Ptolemaic view. Some clarification will eventually come from Lakatos methodology of scientific programs. We will see, however, that as Feyerabend has argued Lakatos methodology cannot in general provide definitive or conclusive reasons to prefer a theory to its rivals.

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will start with the ingenuous inductive methodology advocated by Bacon. We will see that it is defective in too many respects and that it can cast no light on the problems of the Copernican revolution. We will move to the more recent and mature conception of the scientific method defended by Popper, called falsificationism. We will see that it fares much better than Bacons conception. Yet Poppers methodology in its crudest version cannot explain why it was rational to prefer the Copernican view of the universe to the Ptolemaic view. Some clarification will eventually come from Lakatos methodology of scientific programs. We will see, however, that as Feyerabend has argued Lakatos methodology cannot in general provide definitive or conclusive reasons to prefer a theory to its rivals.

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will start with the ingenuous inductive methodology advocated by Bacon. We will see that it is defective in too many respects and that it can cast no light on the problems of the Copernican revolution. We will move to the more recent and mature conception of the scientific method defended by Popper, called falsificationism. We will see that it fares much better than Bacons conception. Yet Poppers methodology in its crudest version cannot really explain why it was rational to prefer the Copernican view of the universe to the Ptolemaic view. Some clarification will eventually come from Lakatos methodology of scientific programs. We will see, however, that as Feyerabend has argued Lakatos methodology cannot in general provide definitive or conclusive reasons to prefer a theory to its rivals.

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will start with the ingenuous inductive methodology advocated by Bacon. We will see that it is defective in too many respects and that it can cast no light on the problems of the Copernican revolution. We will move to the more recent and mature conception of the scientific method defended by Popper, called falsificationism. We will see that it fares much better than Bacons conception. Yet Poppers methodology in its crudest version cannot really explain why it was rational to prefer the Copernican view of the universe to the Ptolemaic view. Some clarification will eventually come from Lakatos methodology of scientific programs. We will see, however, that as Feyerabend has argued Lakatos methodology cannot in general provide definitive or conclusive reasons to prefer a theory to its rivals.

1.9 What we are going to do in these lectures

We will start with the ingenuous inductive methodology advocated by Bacon. We will see that it is defective in too many respects and that it can cast no light on the problems of the Copernican revolution. We will move to the more recent and mature conception of the scientific method defended by Popper, called falsificationism. We will see that it fares much better than Bacons conception. Yet Poppers methodology in its crudest version cannot really explain why it was rational to prefer the Copernican view of the universe to the Ptolemaic view. Some clarification will eventually come from Lakatos methodology of scientific programs. We will see, however, that as Feyerabend has argued Lakatos methodology cannot in general provide definitive or conclusive reasons to prefer a theory to its rivals.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies, (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aims to provide very precises rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies enrich it by adding the language of the probability calculus. The aim of the formal methodologies is providing a set of formal rules for the epistemic assessment of hypotheses. (As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions). Formal methodologies can be thought of as idealizations of (fragments) of the real methodologies of scientists. (But also as providing epistemic rules and principles that could be used by machines there are many overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aims to provide very precises rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies enrich it by adding the language of the probability calculus. The aim of the formal methodologies is providing a set of formal rules for the epistemic assessment of hypotheses. (As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions). Formal methodologies can be thought of as idealizations of (fragments) of the real methodologies of scientists. (But also as providing epistemic rules and principles that could be used by machines there are many overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aim to provide very precise rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies enrich it by adding the language of the probability calculus. The aim of the formal methodologies is providing a set of formal rules for the epistemic assessment of hypotheses. (As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions). Formal methodologies can be thought of as idealizations of (fragments) of the real methodologies of scientists. (But also as providing epistemic rules and principles that could be used by machines there are many overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aim to provide very precise rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies expand it by adding the language of the probability calculus. The aim of the formal methodologies is providing a set of formal rules for the epistemic assessment of hypotheses. (As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions). Formal methodologies can be thought of as idealizations of (fragments) of the real methodologies of scientists. (But also as providing epistemic rules and principles that could be used by machines there are many overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aim to provide very precise rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies expand it by adding the language of the probability calculus. Formal methodologies provides formal rules for the epistemic evaluation of hypotheses. As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions. Formal methodologies can be thought of as idealizations of (fragments) of the real methodologies of scientists. (But also as providing epistemic rules and principles that could be used by machines there are many overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aim to provide very precise rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies expand it by adding the language of the probability calculus. Formal methodologies provides formal rules for the epistemic evaluation of hypotheses. As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions. Formal methodologies can be thought of as dealing with idealizations of fragments of real scientific reasoning. They provide epistemic rules that could be used by machines. (There are indeed overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover its points of strength and weakness.

1.10 What we are going to do in these lectures

In the second part of the course we will examine some formal methodologies (also called inductive logics or confirmation theories). Formal methodologies aim to provide very precise rules to establish whether to believe or disbelieve a given hypothesis on the ground of evidence. Typically, hypotheses and evidence are expressed in the language of first order logic. Some methodologies expand it by adding the language of the probability calculus. Formal methodologies provides formal rules for the epistemic evaluation of hypotheses. As formal, these rules do not depend on the contents of hypotheses in the same way as first order logical rules do not depend on the content of propositions. Formal methodologies can be thought of as dealing with idealizations of fragments of real scientific reasoning. They provide epistemic rules that could be used by machines. (There are indeed overlaps between this branch of philosophy and artificial intelligence). We will mostly focus on Hempels confirmation theory, Hypothetico-Deductivism and modern Bayesianism. We will try to uncover their points of strength and weakness.

1.11 Inductive arguments

Inductive arguments are used very often in everyday life and in science:
Example 1. I go to Norway. One day, I talk to 20 people and I find out that they all speak a very good English. I thus infer that the next person I will meet in Norway will probably speak a very good English.

Example 2. The general theory of relativity entails that: (a) gravity will bend the path of a light ray if the ray passes close to a massive body, (b) Mercurys orbit has certain (anomalous) features (precession of Mercurys perihelion).
Scientists have verified instances of (a) and (b). From this, the have inferred that the general theory of relativity is plausible or probably true. Both these inferences are inductive arguments.

1.11 Inductive arguments

Inductive arguments are used very often in everyday life and in science:
Example 1. I go to Norway. One day, I talk to 20 people and I find out that they all speak a very good English. I thus infer that the next person I will meet in Norway will probably speak a very good English.

Example 2. The general theory of relativity entails that: (a) gravity will bend the path of a light ray if the ray passes close to a massive body, (b) Mercurys orbit has certain (anomalous) features (precession of Mercurys perihelion).
Scientists have verified instances of (a) and (b). From this, the have inferred that the general theory of relativity is plausible or probably true. Both these inferences are inductive arguments.

1.11 Inductive arguments

Inductive arguments are used very often in everyday life and in science:
Example 1. I go to Norway. One day, I talk to 20 people and I find out that they all speak a very good English. I thus infer that the next person I will meet in Norway will probably speak a very good English.

Example 2. The general theory of relativity entails that: (a) gravity will bend the path of a light ray if the ray passes close to a massive body, (b) Mercurys orbit has certain (anomalous) features (precession of Mercurys perihelion).
Scientists have verified instances of (a) and (b). From this, the have inferred that the general theory of relativity is plausible or probably true. Both these inferences are inductive arguments.

1.11 Inductive arguments

Inductive arguments are used very often in everyday life and in science:
Example 1. I go to Norway. One day, I talk to 20 people and I find out that they all speak a very good English. I thus infer that the next person I will meet in Norway will probably speak a very good English.

Example 2. The general theory of relativity entails that: (a) gravity will bend the path of a light ray if the ray passes close to a massive body, (b) Mercurys orbit has certain (anomalous) features (precession of Mercurys perihelion).
Scientists have verified instances of (a) and (b). From this, the have inferred that the general theory of relativity is plausible or probably true. Both these inferences are inductive arguments.

1.11 Inductive arguments

Inductive arguments are used very often in everyday life and in science:
Example 1. I go to Norway. One day, I talk to 20 people and I find out that they all speak a very good English. I thus infer that the next person I will meet in Norway will probably speak a very good English.

Example 2. The general theory of relativity entails that: (a) gravity will bend the path of a light ray if the ray passes close to a massive body, (b) Mercurys orbit has certain (anomalous) features (precession of Mercurys perihelion).
Scientists have verified instances of (a) and (b). From this, they have inferred that the general theory of relativity is plausible or probably true. Both these inferences are inductive arguments.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact and that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that the conclusion is strongly supported by the premises i.e. such that if the premises are true, it is highly plausible or highly probable (but not logically necessary) that the conclusion is true is said inductively strong.

All inductive arguments strong or week deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are true or false has no bearing at all on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true, is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true, is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true, is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.12 Inductive arguments versus deductive arguments

An argument is a list of declarative sentences (or statements or propositions) of which one is called conclusion and the others premises, and where the premises state reasons to support the conclusion. A declarative sentence is any one that aims to represent a fact, so that can be true or false. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion is true is said deductively valid. Deductive validity is the highest possible level of evidential support. Any argument such that if the premises are true, it is just highly plausible or highly probable that the conclusion is true, is said inductively strong. Inductively weak arguments are defined in the obvious way.

All inductive arguments strong or week are deductively invalid.

Whether the premises of an argument are actually true or not has no bearing on whether the argument is deductively valid or inductively strong or weak.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 10000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 10001 cannot fly.

1.13 Types of inductive arguments

A widespread misconception says that deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific and that inductively strong arguments proceed from the specific to the general. This is false. Consider these counterexamples:
A deductively valid argument from general to general: All men are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal or British.
A deductively valid argument from particular to particular: John Smith is Australian and Hegel was a philosopher. Therefore, Hegel was a philosopher. An inductively strong argument from general to general: All bodies on the earth obey Newtons laws. All planets obey Newtons laws. Therefore, all bodies obey in general Newtons laws. An inductively strong argument from general to particular: All African emeralds are green. All Asian emeralds are green. All Australian emeralds are green. Therefore, the first American emerald I will see will be green. An inductively strong argument from particular to particular: Pig no. 1 cannot fly, pig no. 2 cannot fly, pig no. 1000 cannot fly. Therefore, pig no. 1001 cannot fly.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with fresh knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with fresh knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with fresh knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with fresh knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with new knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with new knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with new knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with new knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

1.14 Deduction, induction and information

An essential feature of any deductively valid argument is this: All information conveyed by the conclusion is already included in its premises.

This explains why any deductively valid argument is such that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why no deductively valid argument can - strictly speaking provide us with new knowledge. An essential feature of any inductive argument is the following:
At least part of the information conveyed by the conclusion of any such argument is not included in its premises. This is why the truth of the premises of any inductive strong argument cannot guarantee the truth of its conclusion. This also explains why all inductively strong arguments seem capable to provide us with fresh knowledge.

End Lecture 1