KANTIAN ETHICS

There are two different approaches in moral philosophy:

the moral value of our actions depends on their purpose (utilitarian ethic)

teleological approach

deontological approach

the moral value of our actions depends on their conformity with the moral duty (Kantian ethic)

A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS: KANT'S ETHICS OF DUTY How do we know that people have rights? This question can be answered in a straightforward way when it is asked about legal rights: A person has certain legal rights because the person lives within a legal system that guarantees those rights. However, what is the basis of moral rights?

1724-1804

UTILITARIANS

People have moral rights because the possession of moral rights maximizes utility.

It is doubtful, however, that utilitarianism can serve as an adequate basis for moral rights. To say that someone has a moral right to do something is to say that person is entitled to do it regardless of the utilitarian benefits it provides for others. Utilitarianism cannot easily support such a nonutilitarian concept.

A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS: KANT'S ETHICS OF DUTY

A more satisfactory foundation for moral rights is provided by the ethical theory developed by

IMMANUEL KANT

There are certain moral rights and duties that all human beings possess regardless of any utilitarian benefits that the exercise of those rights and duties may provide for others.

Kant's theory is based on a moral principle that he called the

categorical imperative

Everyone should be treated as a free person equal to everyone else.

Kant provides at least two ways of formulating this basic moral principle. Each formulation serves as an explanation of the meaning of this basic moral right and correlative duty.

The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F1]

Act only at that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
maxim = the reason a person in a certain situation has for doing what he or she plans to do.

A maxim would become a universal law if every person in a similar situation chose to do the same thing for the same reason. An action is morally right for a person in a certain situation if, and only if, the persons reason for carrying out the action is a reason that he or she would be willing to have every person act on, in any similar situation.

The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F1]

Sometimes it is not even possible to conceive of having everyone act on a certain reason, much less be willing to have everyone act on that reason.
Suppose that I am considering breaking a contract because it has committed me to do something I do not want to do. Then I must ask whether I would be willing to have everyone break any contract that they did not want to keep. But it is impossible to even conceive of everyone making and then breaking contracts in this way because if everyone knew that any contract could be broken, then people would cease making contracts altogether (what possible purpose would they serve?) and contracts would no longer exist.

Consequently, because it is impossible to conceive of everyone making and breaking contracts in this way, it is also impossible for me to be willing to have everyone act like this (how can I want something I cannot even conceive?). It would be wrong, therefore, for me to break a contract simply because I do not want to keep it.

The first formulation of Kants categorical imperative [F1]

Suppose that I am trying to decide whether to fire a female secretary because she's got married. I must ask myself whether I would be willing to have an employer fire any secretary whenever she gets married (including my mother, wife, sister, daughter, niece, etc.) In particular, I must ask myself whether I would be willing to be fired myself should my employer not like that I'm not single.

If I am not willing to have everyone act in this way, even toward me, then it is morally wrong for me to act in this way toward others.
A person's reasons for acting, then, must be 'reversible': One must be willing to have all others use those reasons even against oneself. There is an obvious similarity, then, between the categorical imperative and the so-called GOLDEN RULE: 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you'.

F1 incorporates two criteria for determining moral right and wrong: UNIVERSALIZABILITY The person's reasons for acting must be reasons that everyone could act on at least in principle. REVERSIBILITY The person's reasons for acting must be reasons that he or she would be willing to have all others use, even as a basis of how they treat him or her.
Unlike the principle of utilitarianism, Kant's F1 focuses on a person's interior motivations and not on the consequences of external actions. Moral right and wrong are distinguished not by what a person accomplishes, but by the reasons the person has for the action. To the extent that a person performs an action merely because it will advance the person's own future interests or merely because the person finds the action pleasurable, the action 'has no moral worth'. A person's action has 'moral worth' only to the degree that it is also motivated by a sense of 'duty', that is, a belief that it is the right way for all people to behave.

The second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F2]

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
'Treating humanity as an end' = everyone should treat each human being as a being whose existence as a free rational person should be respected and promoted.

An action is morally right for a person if, and only if, in performing the action, the person does not use others merely as a means for advancing his or her own interests, but also both respects and develops their capacity to choose freely for themselves. F2 implies that human beings have an equal dignity that sets them apart from things such as tools or machines and that is incompatible with their being manipulated, deceived, or otherwise unwillingly exploited to satisfy the self-interests of another.

The second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F2]

The principle in effect says that people should not be treated as objects incapable of free choice.
By deceiving a person into making a contract that that person would not otherwise freely choose to make, I fail to respect that person's freedom to choose and merely use the person to advance my own interests. By failing to lend needed and easily extended help to another person, I limit what that person is free to choose to do.

Both F1 and F2 come down to the same thing: People are to treat each other as free and equal in the pursuit of their interests.

PROBLEMS WITH KANT Kant's moral philosophy is providing us with probably the strongest arguments supporting the idea that human beings do have moral rights. The categorical imperative, however, cannot by itself tell us what particular moral rights human beings have. Insofar as free speech is critically important, humans must leave each other equally free to speak as they choose: everyone has a moral right to freedom of speech. However, insofar as free speech conflicts with another human interest that can be shown to be of equal or greater importance (such as our interest in not being libeled or defamed), the right to freedom of speech must be limited.

There is substantial disagreement concerning what the limits of each of these rights are and concerning how each of these rights should be balanced against other conflicting rights. Kant's theory does not help us resolve these disagreements.

PROBLEMS WITH KANT

There are cases where the requirements of the categorical imperative are unclear.

One difficulty lies in trying to determine whether one would (as F1 requires) 'be willing to have everyone follow' a certain policy. Suppose I am a thief. Would I then be willing to have everyone follow the policy that all thieves should be punished? In a sense I would be willing to because I would want to be protected from other thieves, but in another sense I would not be willing because I do not want to be punished myself.

PROBLEMS WITH KANT

It is also sometimes difficult to determine whether (as F2 states) one person is using another 'merely as a means'. Suppose that Mr. Jones, an employer, only pays minimum wages to his employees and refuses to install the safety equipment they want, yet he says he is 'respecting their capacity to freely choose for themselves' because he is willing to let them work elsewhere if they choose. Is he then treating them merely as means or also as ends?