Natural experiments can provide useful source of exogenous variation in problematic regressors. Not all policy differences / changes are exogenous Political factors and past realizations of the response variable can affect existing policies or policy changes. Some natural experiments of criminological interest.
Natural experiments can provide useful source of exogenous variation in problematic regressors. Not all policy differences / changes are exogenous Political factors and past realizations of the response variable can affect existing policies or policy changes. Some natural experiments of criminological interest.
Natural experiments can provide useful source of exogenous variation in problematic regressors. Not all policy differences / changes are exogenous Political factors and past realizations of the response variable can affect existing policies or policy changes. Some natural experiments of criminological interest.
(1) Natural experiments as interesting sources of instrumental variables (2) The consequences of weak instruments for causal inference (3) Some useful IV diagnostics (4) Walk through an empirical application Goal = provide concrete examples of instrumental variables methods Instrumental Variables and Natural Experiments What is a natural experiment? situations where the forces of nature or government policy have conspired to produce an environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment Angrist and Krueger (2001, p. 73) Natural experiments can provide a useful source of exogenous variation in problematic regressors But they require detailed institutional knowledge Instrumental Variables and Natural Experiments Some natural experiments in economics Existing policy differences, or changes that affect some jurisdictions (or groups) but not others Minimum wage rate Excise taxes on consumer goods Unemployment insurance, workers compensation Unexpected shocks to the local economy Coal prices and the Middle East oil embargo (1973) Agricultural production and adverse weather events Instrumental Variables and Natural Experiments Some potential pitfalls Not all policy differences/changes are exogenous Political factors and past realizations of the response variable can affect existing policies or policy changes Generalizability of causal effect estimates Results may not generalize beyond the units under study Heterogeneity in causal effects Results may be sensitive to the natural experiment chosen in a specific study (L.A.T.E.) Instrumental Variables and Natural Experiments Some natural experiments of criminological interest Levitt (1996) = prison population crime rate Levitt (1997) = police hiring crime rate Apel et al. (2008) = youth employment delinquency Some natural experiments not of criminological interest, but interesting nonetheless Angrist and Evans (1998) = fertility labor supply Levitt (1996), Q.J .E. Large decline in crime did not accompany the large increase in prison population (1971-1993) Prima fascia evidence of prison ineffectiveness But...increased prison use could mask what would have been a greater increase in crime Underlying determinants of crime probably worsened And...prison population probably responded to crime increase Levitt (1996), Q.J .E. Prison overcrowding legislation Population caps, prohibition of double celling In 12 states, the entire prison system came under court control AL, AK, AR, DE, FL, MS, NM, OK, RI, SC, TN, TX Relationship between legislation and prisons Prior to filing, prison growth outpaced national average by 2.3 percent After filing, prison growth was 5.1 percent slower Levitt (1996), Q.J .E. Prisons Under Court Control Prison Population Growth
Crime Rate Growth Logic of the instrumental variable in this study Court rulings concerning prison capacity cannot be correlated with the unobserved determinants of crime rate changes Or...the only reason court rulings are related to crime is because they limit prison population growth Levitt (1996), Q.J .E. 2SLS model yields a prison effect on crime at least four times as high as the LS model Violent crime rate b LS = .099 (s.e. = .033) b IV = .424 (s.e. = .201) Property crime rate b LS = .071 (s.e. = .019) b IV = .321 (s.e. = .138) A 10% increase in prison size produces a 4.2% decrease in violent crime and a 3.2% decrease in property crime Levitt (1996), Q.J .E. L.A.T.E. = effect of prison growth on crime among states under court order to slow growth Some relevant observations Generalizability = predominately Southern states Large prison populations, unusually fast prison growth T.E. heterogeneity = (slowed) prison growth due to court-ordered prison reductions may be differentially related to crime rates Other IVs could lead to different causal effect estimates Levitt (1997), A.E.R. Breaking the simultaneity in the police-crime connection When more police are hired, crime should decline But...more police may be hired during crime waves Election cycles and police hiring Increases in size of police force disproportionately concentrated in election years Growth is 2.1% in mayoral election years, 2.0% in gubernatorial election years, and 0.0% in non- election years Levitt (1997), A.E.R. However...can election cycles affect crime rates through other spending channels? Ex., education, welfare, unemployment benefits If so, all of these other indirect channels must be netted out
Growth in Police Manpower + Growth in Crime Rate Election Year Levitt (1997), A.E.R. First-stage coefficients Reduced-form coefficients Levitt (1997), A.E.R. Comparative estimates of the effect of police manpower on city crime rates Violent crime rate Levels: b LS = +.28 (s.e. = .05) Changes: b LS = .27 (s.e. = .06) Changes: b IV = 1.39 (s.e. = .55) Property crime rate Levels: b LS = +.21 (s.e. = .05) Changes: b LS = .23 (s.e. = .09) Changes: b IV = .38 (s.e. = .83) Levitt (1997), A.E.R. Follow-up instrumental variables studies of the police-crime relationship in the U.S. Levitt (2002) = Number of firefighters Klick and Tabarrok (2005) = Washington, DC, terrorism alert levels post-9/11 Evans and Owens (2007) = Grants from the federal Office of C.O.P.S. These findings basically replicated those from Levitts (1997) original study Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. What effect does working have on adolescent behavior? Prior research suggests the consequences of work are uniformly negative Focus on work intensity rather than work per se Youth Worker Protection Act Problem of non-random selection into youth labor market Especially pronounced for high-intensity workers Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. Something interesting happens at age 16 Youth work is no longer governed by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.) Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. F.L.S.A. governs employment of all 15 year olds during the school year No work past 7:00 pm Maximum 3 hours/day and 18 hours/week But, F.L.S.A. expires for 16 year olds And...every state has its own law governing 16- year-old employment Thus, youth age into less restrictive regimes that vary across jurisdictions Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. Change in work intensity at 15-16 transition among 15-year-old non-workers Magnitude of change is an increasing function of the number of hours allowed at age 16 State Child Labor Law Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hours per Week 0.32 (.05)*** No Limit 11.43 (1.6)*** Hours per Weekday 1.19 (.19)*** No Limit 9.37 (1.3)*** Work Curfew 2.19 (.27)*** No Limit 23.83 (2.7)*** R-square .400 .401 .409 R-square with IVs .014 .015 .023 Partial R-square for IVs .023 .025 .037 F-test for IVs 26.2 28.3 41.9 Approx. relative bias .000 .000 .000 Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. Apel et al. (2008), J .Q.C. A 20-hour increase in the number of hours worked per week reduces the variety of delinquent behavior by 0.47 (.023320) Angrist and Krueger (1991), J .L.E. Returns to education (Y = wages) Problem of omitted ability bias Years of schooling vary by quarter of birth Compulsory schooling laws, age-at-entry rules Someone born in Q1 is a little older and will be able to drop out sooner than someone born in Q4 Q.O.B. can be treated as a useful source of exogeneity in schooling Angrist and Krueger (1991), J .L.E. People born in Q1 do obtain less schooling But pay close attention to the scale of the y-axis Mean difference between Q1 and Q4 is only 0.124, or 1.5 months So...need large N since R 2 X,Z will be very small A&K had over 300k for the 1930-39 cohort Source: Angrist and Krueger (1991), Figure I Angrist and Krueger (1991), J .L.E. Final 2SLS model interacted QOB with year of birth (30), state of birth (150) OLS: b = .0628 (s.e. = .0003) 2SLS: b = .0811 (s.e. = .0109) Least squares estimate does not appear to be badly biased by omitted variables But...replication effort identified some pitfalls in this analysis that are instructive Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), J .A.S.A. Potential problems with QOB as an IV Correlation between QOB and schooling is weak Small Cov(X,Z) introduces finite-sample bias, which will be exacerbated with the inclusion of many IVs QOB may not be completely exogenous Even small Cov(Z,e) will cause inconsistency, and this will be exacerbated when Cov(X,Z) is small QOB qualifies as a weak instrument that may be correlated with unobserved determinants of wages (e.g., family income) Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), J .A.S.A. Even if the instrument is good, matters can be made far worse with IV as opposed to LS Weak correlation between IV and endogenous regressor can pose severe finite-sample bias Andreally large samples wont help, especially if there is even weak endogeneity between IV and error First-stage diagnostics provide a sense of how good an IV is in a given setting F-test and partial-R 2 on IVs Useful Diagnostic Tools for IV Models Tests of instrument relevance Weak IVs Large variance of b IV as well as potentially severe finite-sample bias Tests of instrument exogeneity Endogenous IVs Inconsistency of b IV that makes it no better (and probably worse) than b LS
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test Endogeneity of the problem regressor(s) Tests of Instrument Relevance Diagnostics based on the F-test for the joint significance of the IVs Nelson and Startz (1990); Staiger and Stock (1997) Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) Partial R-square for the IVs Shea (1997) There is a growing econometric literature on the weak instrument problem Tests of Instrument Exogeneity Model must be overidentified, i.e., more IVs than endogenous Xs H 0 : All IVs uncorrelated with structural error Overidentification test: 1. Estimate structural model 2. Regress IV residuals on all exogenous variables 3. Compute NR 2 and compare to chi-square df = # IVs # endogenous Xs Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test Balances the consistency of IV against the efficiency of LS H 0 : IV and LS both consistent, but LS is efficient H 1 : Only IV is consistent DWH test for a single endogenous regressor: DWH = (b IV b LS ) / (s 2 b IV s 2 b LS ) ~ N(0,1) If |DWH| > 1.96, then X is endogenous and IV is the preferred estimator despite its inefficiency Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test A roughly equivalent procedure for DWH: 1. Estimate the first-stage model 2. Include the first-stage residual in the structural model along with the endogenous X 3. Test for significance of the coefficient on residual Note: Coefficient on endogenous X in this model is b IV (standard error is smaller, though) First-stage residual is a generated regressor Software Considerations I have a strong preference for Stata Classic routine (-ivreg-) as well as a user-written one with a lot more diagnostic capability (-ivreg2-) Non-linear models: -ivprobit- and -ivtobit- Panel models: -xtivreg- and -xtivreg2- Useful post-estimation routines Overidentification: -overid- Endogeneity of X in LS model: -ivendog- Heteroscedasticity: -ivhettest- Software Considerations Basic model specification in Stata ivreg y (x = z) w [weight = wtvar], options y = dependent variable x = endogenous variable z = instrumental variable w = control variable(s) Useful options: first, ffirst, robust, cluster(varname) Software Considerations For SAS users: Proc Syslin (SAS/ETS) Basic command: proc syslin data=dataset 2sls options1; endogenous x; instruments z w; model y = x w / options2; weight wtvar; run; Useful options1: first Useful options2: overid Software Considerations For SPSS users: 2SLS Basic command: 2sls y with x w / instruments z w / constant. For point-and-click aficionados Analyze Regression Two-Stage Least Squares DEPENDENT, EXPLANATORY, and INSTRUMENTAL Software Considerations For Limdep users: 2SLS Basic command: 2SLS ; Lhs = y ; Rhs = one, x, w ; Inst = one, z, w ; Wts = wtvar ; Dfc $
Application: Adolescent Work and Delinquent Behavior Prior research shows a positive correlation between teenage work and delinquency Reasons to suspect serious endogeneity bias 2nd wave of the NLSY97 (N = 8,368) Y = 1 if committed delinquent act (31.9%) X = 1 if worked in a formal job (52.6%) Z 1 = 1 if child labor law allows 40+ hours (14.2%) Z 2 = 1 if no child labor restriction in place (39.6%) Regression Model Ignoring Endogeneity . reg pcrime work if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 1, 8366) = 6.33 Model | 1.37395379 1 1.37395379 Prob > F = 0.0119 Residual | 1815.97786 8366 .217066443 R-squared = 0.0008 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.0006 Total | 1817.35182 8367 .217204711 Root MSE = .4659
Teenage workers significantly more delinquent Modest effect but consistent with prior research First-Stage Model . reg work law40 nolaw if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 2, 8365) = 626.64 Model | 271.829722 2 135.914861 Prob > F = 0.0000 Residual | 1814.33364 8365 .216895832 R-squared = 0.1303 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.1301 Total | 2086.16336 8367 .249332301 Root MSE = .46572
State child labor laws affect probability of work This is a really strong first stage (F, R 2 ) Two-Stage Least Squares Model . ivreg pcrime (work = law40 nolaw) if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 1, 8366) = 6.86 Model | -19.5287923 1 -19.5287923 Prob > F = 0.0088 Residual | 1836.88061 8366 .219564978 R-squared = . -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = . Total | 1817.35182 8367 .217204711 Root MSE = .46858
What Do the Models Suggest Thus Far? Completely different conclusions! OLS = Teenage work is criminogenic (b = +.026) Delinquency risk increases by 8.5 percent (base = .305) 2SLS = Teenage work is prophylactic (b = .074) Delinquency risk decreases by 20.7 percent (base = .358) Which model should we believe? We still have some additional diagnostic work to do to evaluate the 2SLS model Overidentification test, Hausman test Regression- Based Overidentification Test . reg IVresid law40 nolaw if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 2, 8365) = 0.25 Model | .111648085 2 .055824043 Prob > F = 0.7755 Residual | 1836.76895 8365 .219577878 R-squared = 0.0001 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = -0.0002 Total | 1836.8806 8367 .219538735 Root MSE = .46859
Overidentification test = 8,368 .0001 = .8368 ~ 2 (1) Overidentification Test from the Software . overid
Tests of overidentifying restrictions: Sargan N*R-sq test 0.509 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.4757 Basmann test 0.508 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.4758
IVs jointly pass the exogeneity requirement Notice that -overid- provides a global test, whereas the regression-based approach allows you to test the IVs jointly as well as individually Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test Estimated by Hand Summary coefficients OLS model: b = +.026, s.e. = .010 2SLS model: b = .074, s.e. = .028 Notice the size of the 2SLS standard error DWH = (.074 .026) / (.028 2 .010 2 ) 3.82 CONCLUSION: Least squares estimate of the work effect is biased and inconsistent The 2SLS estimate is preferred Regression-Based DWH Test . reg pcrime work FSresid if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 2, 8365) = 10.40 Model | 4.50567523 2 2.25283761 Prob > F = 0.0000 Residual | 1812.84614 8365 .216718009 R-squared = 0.0025 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.0022 Total | 1817.35182 8367 .217204711 Root MSE = .46553
Coeff. on work is b IV , while t-test on FSresid is DWH Standard error for work is underestimated, though Or Just Let the Software Give You the DWH Test . ivendog
Tests of endogeneity of: work H0: Regressor is exogenous Wu-Hausman F test: 14.45067 F(1,8365) P-value = 0.00014 Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 14.43093 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.00015
Notice that -ivendog- provides a chi-square test for DWH, but the z-test that we computed by hand is easily recovered ( 2 ) = z (14.43) = 3.80 Alternative Specifications for the Work-Delinquency Association IV probit model Without IVs: b = +.072 (s.e. = .029) With IVs: b = .207 (s.e. = .078) Continuous work hours Without IVs: b = +.0015 (s.e. = .0003) With IVs: b = .0024 (s.e. = .0009) Indicator for intensive work (>20 hours) Without IVs: b = +.043 (s.e. = .012) With IVs: b = .095 (s.e. = .036) Alternative Specifications for the Work-Delinquency Association Control variables = gender, race, child, dropout, family structure, family size, urbanicity, dwelling, school suspension, unemployment rate, mobility Binary work status Without IVs: b = +.013 (s.e. = .010) With IVs: b = .061 (s.e. = .029) Continuous work hours Without IVs: b = +.0007 (s.e. = .0003) With IVs: b = .0023 (s.e. = .0010) Intensive work indicator Without IVs: b = +.020 (s.e. = .012) With IVs: b = .085 (s.e. = .040) So Where Do We Stand with the Work-Delinquency Question? Are child labor laws correlated with work? YES = first-stage F is large Are child labor laws good IVs? YES = overidentification test is not rejected Is teenage work endogenous? YES = Hausman test is rejected Prior research findings that teenage work is criminogenic are selection artifacts Stata Commands for the Foregoing Example Regression model ignoring endogeneity: reg y x w First-stage regression model: reg x z1 z2 w With controls and multiple IVs, test relevance: test z1 z2 2SLS regression model: ivreg y (x = z1 z2) w Stata Commands for the Foregoing Example Manual post hoc commands Get residuals for regression-based overid. test: After 2SLS model: predict IVresid if e(sample), resid Then: reg IVresid z1 z2 Get residuals for regression-based DWH test: After first-stage model: predict FSresid if e(sample), resid Then: reg y x w FSresid Canned post hoc commands After 2SLS model: overid and ivendog NowWhat Happens if I Throw in a Potentially Bogus Instrument? Now there are three instrumental variables Z 1 = 1 if child labor law allows 40+ hours (14.2%) Z 2 = 1 if no child labor restriction in place (39.6%) Z 3 = 1 if high unemployment rate in county (20.1%) A little more difficult to tell a convincing story that the unemployment rate is only related to delinquency through work experience But lets see what happens First-Stage Model . reg work law40 nolaw highun if nomiss==1 & wave==2
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 3, 8364) = 427.28 Model | 277.229696 3 92.4098987 Prob > F = 0.0000 Residual | 1808.93366 8364 .216276144 R-squared = 0.1329 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.1326 Total | 2086.16336 8367 .249332301 Root MSE = .46505
Tests of overidentifying restrictions: Sargan N*R-sq test 5.301 Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.0706 Basmann test 5.301 Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.0706
. ivendog
Tests of endogeneity of: work H0: Regressor is exogenous Wu-Hausman F test: 12.32811 F(1,8365) P-value = 0.00045 Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 12.31438 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.00045
Overidentification gives cause for concern The p-value shouldnt be anywhere near 0.05 Follow-Up Overidentification Test . reg IVresid law40 nolaw highun
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 8368 -------------+------------------------------ F( 3, 8364) = 1.77 Model | 1.1613555 3 .387118499 Prob > F = 0.1511 Residual | 1832.25406 8364 .21906433 R-squared = 0.0006 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.0003 Total | 1833.41541 8367 .219124586 Root MSE = .46804
Okayunemployment rate is problematic as IV Conclusion from Diagnostic Tests 2SLS work effect is similar Without unemployment, b = .074 (s.e. = .028) With unemployment, b = .066 (s.e. = .028) Butthe second model is invalidated because the unemployment rate is not exogenous If affects criminality through other channels We need to control for all other indirect pathways, or It should not be used as an IV at all Closing Comments about Instrumental Variables Studies In general, a lagged value of the endogenous regressor is not a good instrument Traditional structural equation model uses lagged values of X and Y as instruments to break the simultaneity between the current values of X and Y X 1 X 2 Y 1 Y 2 These models impose the awfully strong assumption that lagged values of X and Y only affect the outcomes through current values Closing Comments about Instrumental Variables Studies Good IV models are generally interesting in their own right, and should not be treated as tack on analyses Practice varies widely across disciplines Some researchers write papers about their discovery and application of a clever IV for some problem Other researchers tack on IV models at the end of their analysis, often poorly, as a way to convince readers that their results are robust Rules for Good Practice with Instrumental Variables Models IV models can be very informative, but its your job to convince your audience Show the first-stage model diagnostics Even the most clever IV might not be sufficiently strongly related to X to be a useful source of identification Report test(s) of overidentifying restrictions An invalid IV is often worse than no IV at all Report LS endogeneity (DWH) test Rules for Good Practice with Instrumental Variables Models Most importantly, TELL A STORY about why a particular IV is a good instrument Something to consider when thinking about whether a particular IV is good Does the IV, for all intents and purposes, randomize the endogenous regressor? Other Interesting IV Topics I Just Dont Have Time to Cover 2SLS with a continuous treatment Instrumental variables for sample selectivity Generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) Non-linear two-stage least squares (N2SLS) Two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV) Fixed-effects instrumental variables (FEIV) Dynamic panel data estimators References Angrist. (2006). Instrumental variables methods in experimental criminology research: What, why and how. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2, 23-44. Angrist & Evans. (1998). Children and their parents labor supply: Evidence from exogenous variation in family size. American Economic Review, 88, 450-477. Angrist & Krueger. (1991). Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 979-1014. Angrist & Krueger. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 69-85. Apel, Bushway, Paternoster, Brame & Sweeten. (2008). Using state child labor laws to identify the causal effect of youth employment on deviant behavior and academic achievement. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 24, 337-362. References Bound, Jaeger & Baker. (1995). Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variables is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 443-450. Evans & Owens. (2007). COPS and crime. Journal of Public Economics, 91, 181-201. Imbens & Angrist. (1994). Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects. Econometrica, 62, 467-475. Kelejian. (1971). Two-stage least squares and econometric systems linear in parameters but nonlinear in the endogenous variable. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66, 373-374. Klick & Tabarrok. (2005). Using terror alert levels to estimate the effect of police on crime. Journal of Law & Economics, 48, 267-279. Levitt. (1996). The effect of prison population size on crime rates: Evidence from prison overcrowding litigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 319-351. Levitt. (1997). Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime. American Economic Review, 87, 270-290. References Levitt. (2002). Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime: Reply. American Economic Review, 92, 1244-1250. Nelson and Startz. (1990). The distribution of the instrumental variables estimator and its t-ratio when the instrument is a poor one. Journal of Business, 63, S125-S140. Permutt & Hebel. (1989). Simultaneous-equation estimation in a clinical trial of the effect of smoking on birth weight. Biometrics, 45, 619-622. Sexton & Hebel. (1984). A clinical trial of change in maternal smoking and its effect on birth weight. Journal of the American Medical Association, 251, 911-915. Shea. (1997). Instrument relevance in multivariate linear models: A simple measure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 348-352. Sherman & Berk. (1984). The specific deterrent effect of arrest for domestic assault. American Sociological Review, 49, 261-272. Staiger and Stock. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica, 65, 557-586.