PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.

1152

PHILIPPINE
ENVIRONMENT CODE

THE PHILIPPINE ENVIRONMENTAL CODE

It is a body of laws settling forth management
policies and prescribing quality standards for the
environment in its totality. It has declared two-fold
policies relative to our natural resources:
a. To manage these natural resources in order to obtain
maximum benefits there from; and
b. To conserve these natural resources for the future
generations.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
a) Ambient Air Quality means the average atmospheric purity as
distinguished from discharge measurements taken at the source of
pollution. It is the general amount of pollution present in a broad area.
b) Emission means the act of passing into the atmosphere an air
contaminant, pollutant, gas stream and unwanted sound from a known
source.
c) Water Quality means the characteristics of water which define its
use in terms of physical, chemical and biological contents; hence the
quality of water for domestic use is different from industrial use.
d) Water Quality Surveillance means a close and continuous
supervision of the water quality to detect developments, movements or
changes in the characteristics of the water.
e) Water Quality Standard means a plan that is established by
governmental authority as a program for water pollution prevention and
abatement. Such a standard may include water use classification and the
criteria to support the uses of the water.
f) Effluent Standards means restrictions established to limit levels of
concentration of physical, chemical and biological constituents which are
discharged from point sources.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
g) Clean-up Operations refers to activities conducted in removing the
pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h) Accidental Spills refers to spills of oil or other hazardous substances
in water that result from accidents involving the carriers of such substance
such as collisions and grounding.
i) Areas of Critical Environmental Concern are areas where
uncontrolled development could result in irreparable damage to important
historic, cultural, or aesthetic values or natural systems or processes of
national significance.
j) Hazardous Substances means elements or compounds which when
discharged in any quantity present imminent or substantial danger to
public health and welfare.
k) Areas Impacted by Public Facilities refers to areas where the
introduction of public facilities may tend to induce development and
urbanization of more than local significance or impact.
l) Environmental Impact is the alteration, to any degree, of
environmental conditions or the creation of a new set of environmental
conditions, adverse or beneficial, to be induced or caused by a proposed
project.
m) Government Agencies refers to national, local and regional
agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

PHILIPPINE ENVIRONMENT CODE

(Enacted on June 6, 1977)

AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT

NATURAL
RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT AND
CONSERVATION

WATER QUALITY
MANAGEMENT

WASTE
MANAGEMENT

LAND USE
MANAGEMENT

MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS

MINORS VS DENR et. al

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1.Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2.Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2.The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

MINORS VS DENR et. al

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development,
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

MUSTANG VS. CA
Facts
1 April 1990 the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) conducted
a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard based on information that a huge pile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang
Lumber.
The team (SAID) saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber coming
out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices
and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at DENR compound.
3 April 1990 - RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same day, the team
seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber,
and various species of lumber and shorts.
4 April 1990 - team returned to lumberyard and placed under administrative
seizure (owner retains physical possession of seized articles, only an inventory
is taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce
required documents upon demand. Robles then submitted a memorandum
report to Factoran, recommending the suspension and subsequent cancellation
of petitioners Dealers Permit, filing of criminal charges, and confiscation of the
trucks and lumbers. Mustang Lumber filed for a restraining order against
Factoran and Robles, questioning the validity of the seizure and the lack of

MUSTANG VS. CA
Upon reports of violation of P.D. No. 705 (Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines),
DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner and caught that
petitioner is still in operation although its permit had already been suspended. The
team then effected a constructive seizure by issuing a receipt therefor.
As a consequence, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. (2nd Civil Case)
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation
of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.
The prosecutor handed down a resolution recommending the filing of an
information against Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.
Po filed a Motion to Quash based on the grounds that the information does not
charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 and that there was an illegal seizure.
1st and 2nd civil cases - RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Judge
Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case. Hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed.

MUSTANG VS. CA
Issues
Whether or not a lumber can be considered timber and that petitioner
should be held liable under Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the respondents was
valid.
Ruling
ISSUE 1
Yes. SC says that lumber is included in timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of timber or lumber. While
Timber is included in definition of forestry products par (q) Sec.3. Lumber is
mentioned same section (par aa) in the definition of processing plants.
Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass,
shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber,
veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
forest raw material. The Code uses lumber in ordinary common usage. In 1993
ed. of Websters International Dictionary, lumber is defined as timber or logs
after being prepared for the market. Therefore, lumber is a processed log or
timber. Sec 68 of PD 705 makes no distinction between raw & processed

MUSTANG VS. CA
Ruling
ISSUE 2
Yes. The search and seizures made were all valid.
(1) April 1 search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
(2) The search on April 4 was a continuation of the search on April 3 done under
and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio.
Under ROC Rule 126 Sec 9, a search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. Hence, it
could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose
cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day or
days until completed, provided it is still within the 10-day period.
What are acts punished under section 68 of PD 705? the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; and possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.

PAAT VS. CA
FACTS:
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce
the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and
required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan
sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the
truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending
appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against
petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved
to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

PAAT VS. CA
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part
of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.

CARIO VS INSURANCE
GOVERNMENT
FACTS:
In February 1904,Mateo Cario filed a claim before the Court of Land
Registration praying that he be granted title over a 40 hectare land in the then
town of Baguio, Province of Benguet.
The government filed its opposition as it averred thatCario or his
predecessors in interest did not continuously, exclusively, and adversely
possessed the said parcel of land. Cario interposed that he and his ancestors
had been in possession over said parcel of land since time immemorial. And
that in 1901,Cario filed a claim under the mortgage law over said parcel of
land.
The government maintained that whatever rightCario and his predecessors
had over the said parcel of land, the same had already prescribed by reason of
their failure to register their title during the Spanish Era. Under Spanish Law
(specifically, a decree issued in 1880), a land privately held, if not registered,
shall revert back to the public (regalian doctrine).
ISSUE:Whether or notCarios claim must be granted.

CARIO VS INSURANCE
GOVERNMENT
HELD:
No.Cario was not able to support his claim. As a rule,a parcel of land, being
of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty,
and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private
persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the
State.
The parcel of land being contested here was not part of the lands disposed off
during the Spanish Era. The last disposition made by the Spanish government
was in 1894. The lands disposed in 1894 did not include the land being
claimed byCario hence, said land is presumed to belong to the State.
It is true that the American Government (which was then ruling the Philippines
at the time of this case) provided that prescription may favor a land claimant
but only in instances where the Spanish Government has allowed the claimant
to cultivate an unappropriated land. There was no showing thatCario or his
predecessors in interest were allowed to cultivate said land (title of egresion or
title of composicion). In short,Cario or his predecessors in interest failed to
show that they were able to comply with the legal requisites for them to
acquire title.
His claim of title under the mortgage law is only possessory. He must wait for
twenty years to lapse before such can ripen to ownership.

END
OF
PRESENTATION