Application of Voting Paradox

SJNSOM Academic Fee

Name Roll No
Boopathi Raja P R 159278021
Yanamadala Rohith 159278110
Kumar
Sathish Kumar R 159278115

Game Theory 1
Game Theory 2
Types of Voters

Nave Voter: He always casts his ballot honestly, even

when it is not in his best interest to do so.

Strategic Voter: This voter supports another candidate

more strongly than his or her sincere preference in order
to prevent an undesirable outcome.

Game Theory 3
Scenario

SJNSOM is one of the premier B schools in India which attracts

Crme De Crme of CAT aspirants. Its affordable fee along
with the better RoI among the colleges of its league is one of
the crucial factors for choosing SJNSOM over others. Now the
institute is planning to revise its academic fee to be at par
with its competing institutes (IIN A, B, C)
But there exists a contrasting opinions among the different
stakeholders,
Students : Doesnt want fee hike (Low, L)
Faculties : Average fee hike (Medium, M)
HoD : Higher than IINs (High, H)
Game Theory 4
 Voter Preferences

HoD of SOM, has been given the

voter preferences decision making authority
Students L > M >H
HoD H > L >M
Faculties M > H >L Thus HoD carries the power to
cast a tie-breaking vote. It is more
likely that his/her preferred
outcome will be chosen. This
institution is confirmed by the
nave model.

Game Theory 5
The Nave Voting Model

If all three members of the committee vote naively, then

the outcome of vote is straightforward and intuitive:

Students L H is chosen by the

Faculties M committee and
HoD H academic fees is
revised at par with
its Competitors.

Game Theory 6
 Consider HoDs best response to every possible pair of votes by
Students and Faculties.

If Students and Faculties vote for the same candidate, then HoDs
vote is irrelevant and all three of HoDs strategies are equally good.

If Faculties and Students split their vote, then Ms. HoDs vote
determines the outcome. Hence HoD has a weakly dominant
strategy of voting for H. we would predict, and so presumably
would Faculty and Students, that he will vote for H.

Game Theory 7
Payoff Matrix assuming HoD votes for H

Studentss vote
H M L
(middle, worst, (Middle, worst (Middle,
Fac H
best) best,) worst, best)
ultie
s (middle, worst, (best, middle, (Middle,
M
vote best) worst) worst, best)
(middle, Worst, (Middle, Worst, (Middle, best,
L
best) best) worst)

Payoffs: Faculties, Students and

HoD Game Theory 8
Payoff Matrix assuming HoD votes for H and
Students does not vote for H

Students vote
M L
(Middle, worst,
H (Middle, worst, best)
best)
Faculties
vote (best, middle,
M (Middle, worst, best)
worst)
(Middle, Worst,
L (Middle, best, worst)
best)
Payoffs: Faculties, Students and
HoD
Game Theory 9
Game Theory 10