After

the
Cold
War
4 Post-Cold War periods
 First Period,1991-2000
Triumph of global capitalism

Russias transition crisis

The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak

The eastward expansion of NATO and EU

Formation of the global neoliberal regime

 Second Period, 2001-2008
The Islamist challenge and the Bush response

Rise of new power centers

Russias resurgence

Relative decline of US hegemony

 Third Period, 2008-12
The Great Recession in the global economy

The US attempt to shore up hegemony by liberal

means
The crisis of European integration

The rise of China as a global power

Reset in Russias relations with the West

 Fourth Period, 2013-
Russias pushback vs. Western containment
Ukraine: the most serious geopolitical conflict between
Russia and the West since the early 1980s
a sense of zero-sum game
deadlocked political dialog

Information war

economic war

winding down of Russia-West security cooperation

heightened military preparations on both sides

Destabilization in the Middle East, and Russias return to

the region in a more
Progress in Eurasian integration (EAU, SCO)
US-led containment of China
 Russias transition crisis:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MhStxLABfMs
Russias Great Depression
1991-96:
GDP - fell by 45%

Industrial output fell by 49%

Agricultural output fell by 32%

1991-1999:
Textile, leather and fur, and footwear industries:
Output fell by nearly 10 times,

Garment industry - by 5 times,

Meat and dairy industries - by 3 times.
The share of high-tech products in GDP fell
from 45.3 to 25 percent of the GDP.

In 2000, labour productivity in Russia was 5 times lower than in the

United States
---------------------------------------
Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor: Jim Yong Kim,
Joyce V. Millen, Alec Irwin and John Gershman (Eds.), Common Courage
Press, Monroe, 2000
Facts and Figures: Raw Materials Exporter. - Ekonomika i zhizn, No. 43, 2000
The social impact:
A double blow to the livelihoods of most Russians:

a decline in their incomes and savings

a drastic reduction of social services for which they depended
on the state.
 In 1999, the incomes of over 40% of the population (60
million people) were below the official subsistence level of
1,138 roubles a month, which was the equivalent of about
US$40.[i]
The official (government-determined) minimum wage in
2000 was 132 roubles (US$ 4,74) a month.[ii]
The average monthly salary was 2,403 roubles (US$86).[iii]
About half of all families with one child lived below the
subsistence level.
In 75% of families with three children, each family member
had less than a dollar a day to live on.[iv]
[i] Izvestia, 4.07.2000.
[ii] Moscow Times, 18.10.2000
[iii] AFP, 31.10.2000
[iv] Moscow Times, 18.10.2000
[v] VCIOM, Press-vypusk 3.03. 2000
Social inequality
In the last years of the Soviet Union, the gap between the

rich and poor was estimated to be 4:1.

It is usually assumed that if the gap grows beyond 10:1,

society becomes unstable.

In 1999, the gap in Russia was 15:1, according to official

statistics.
According to the estimates of the Institute of

Socioeconomic Problems of the Population of the Russian

Academy of Sciences, the actual gap was much wider:
Total income of the 10% richest households was 44 times

higher than that of the poorest 10%.[ii]

[i] Izvestia, 4.07.2000

[ii] Moscow Times, 18.10.2000.

 The worlds billionaires, 2011, Forbes Magazine:
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/
Total 1,210
US 412
Russia 101
China 95
India 55
Germany 52
Brazil 40
Turkey 38
Hong Kong 36
UK 33
The Wealth Report, 2012:
http://www.thewealthreport.net/The-Wealth-Report-2012.pd
f
Former Russian billionaire No.1 Mikhail Khodorkovsky
 Khodorkovsky letter from jail, 2004:
Russian liberalism has suffered a defeat because it
ignored two things: first, some key elements of Russias
historical experience, second, vital interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Russian people. And it was
mortally afraid of telling the truth.
I do not want to say that Russias liberal leaders set it as
their goal to deceive the people. Many of the liberals who
came to power with Yeltsin were convinced that liberalism
offered the only right solution for Russia, and that a liberal
revolution was needed in this exhausted country which had
historically tasted so little freedom. But they understood this
revolution in a very peculiar, elitist way. They cared about
the conditions of life and work of those 10% of Russians
who were ready to embrace decisive social change and to
abandon government paternalism. But they forgot about the
90%. And they covered up their failures with lies.
 They deceived most Russians about privatization. They
gave everyone a privatization voucher, promising that at
some point, one would be able to buy two cars with it. Well,
if you were an enterprising financial dealer with access to
insider information and the brains to analyze it, you would
probably be able to buy ten cars with your voucher. But the
promise was given to everyone. They closed their eyes to
the social realities of Russia, as they carried out
privatization. Ignoring the social costs of it, they called it
painless, honest and fair. But we do know what the people
think of this privatization.
No fundamental reformation of society is possible without
social stability and social peace. But the Russian liberals
chose to disregard it and created a chasm between
themselves and the people. And they used the information-
bureaucratic pump of PR technologies to fill the chasm with
liberal myths
Vedomosti, March 29, 2004
Contraction of Russian power
NATO enlargement, 1949-2004
Main changes in Russias international role following the end
of the Cold War:
1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russias power
Territorial losses
Economic depression (loss of 50% of the GDP)
The military crisis
Ideological neutralization
after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20 th
century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right
2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces
with minimal regulation by the state
3. Political affiliation with the West
4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony
 Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in
the Cold War sense:
Russias abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key

enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal

regime
RUSSIA AS A NORMAL COUNTRY: capitalist, cautious,

status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking

friends everywhere, wary of making enemies
RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR
The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:

The nuclear risks

Possibility of a totalitarian backlash

Potential for civil war

Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a

sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space
Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US

(not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other
states) or:
Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US

hegemony (a problem for the US)

 The economy*
GDP, PPP - $3.56 trln. (No.7 in the world)
Worlds 10th biggest exporter
GDP per capita - $24,800
Real growth rate 5.6% in 2008, -7.9% in 2009, 4,5% in
2010, 4.3% in 2011, 3.4% in 2012, 1.3% in 2013, 0.6% in
2014, -3.7% in 2015
Public debt (2013 est.) 13.4% of GDP
Unemployment rate 5.1%
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rs.html
 Under Yeltsin, Russia became a capitalist country, but its
state was in disarray, and its economy in deep depression
Under Putin, Russian capitalism was consolidated through
rebuilding of state authority
Russia achieved relative stability and recovered the status
of a Great Power
The costs:
Stymied democratic development
Rise of bureaucratic (or state) capitalism
 Russia continues to need major changes
Troubles in the global economy have exposed Russias
economic fragility
The Russian economy needs major modernization to
compete successfully
The post-Soviet Russian state has many flaws and needs
major reforms to help meet the challenges faced by Russia
The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality
Social inequality, OECD data, Dec. 2011
 The challenges
Modernization of the economy from hydrocarbons to

hi-tech
Rebuilding infrastructure

Social investments: health, education, other social

programs to improve quality of life

 Since Putins coming to power in 2000, Russia has been in
a conservative phase
The new ruling class is determined to maintain its

wealth and power

A soft authoritarian regime with elements of democracy

Rising influence of the Russian Orthodox Church

Rejection of some elements of Western liberalism

 The bureaucracy is bigger, more powerful, more corrupt,
and less accountable
Among the bureaucrats, security and military elites have
gained commanding positions
Competition between them and other elites
Rule of law remains very weak
Levada Center opinion poll, November 2012:
57% - Russia needs reforms

20% - need for decisive change in the system of

government
10% - ready to live under existing stability

19% - the rulers are doing enough to reform the state

Geopolitics of Eurasia, according to Nicholas Spykman
From Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard
http://urbandemographics.blogspot.ca/2012/08/the-worlds-shifting-centre
-of-gravity.html
Russias foreign policy compass
The Western vector - US, EU, NATO

The Eastern vector Asia-Pacific

The Southern vector - the Muslim world, India

The Northern vector - the Arctic

Pew Research global
polls, March-May
2013 and Spring 2015
Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009: http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/
 The main elements of Russian foreign policy thinking
Primacy of national interests

Attempts to increase the degree of national sovereignty

Wariness of Western support of opposition forces in

Russia
A drive for re-integration of Eurasia

Multivector foreign policy active engagement with

other international actors

The Eastward drift

Primacy of trade and investment issues

Growing security concerns and major investments in

military power
Readiness for international cooperation to work out joint

solutions to problems
Russias military budget
Mid-1980s defence spending accounted for 15-17% of

Soviet GDP
Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991

Steady rise since 2000 by 15-25% a year

2007-2015: a new state armaments program

Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion).

63% allocated for the procurement of modern weapons and

equipment
27% towards defense research and development.

2014 defence spending accounted for 3.5% of Russias

GDP (CIA est.)

 NATO Russia
Tanks 12,332 22,950
APCs 31,420 25,080
Submarines 84 66
Principal surface 194 57
combatants
Bomber/fighter 1,905 1,648
ground attack
Deployable 3,579 mln. 1,200 mln. (+
military personnel active reserve of
0.75 mln.)
Military spending, $1,085 trln. $56 bln.
2010

http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/5084/4/zPr
oject%20finished%2026.01.pdf
 Russias place on the Global
Firepower Index:
http://www.globalfirepower.com/co
untries-listing.asp
Russian elite interests
The oligarchy the upper crust of the new capitalist class,
product of the post-communist transformation
Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms

Dependent on the West, primarily the US

Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it

Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR

Assertive in the political sphere

Seeks economic opportunities worldwide

Intertwined with state bureaucracy

 The bureaucrats
The enforcers (siloviki) military and security elites

Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get

their property
Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West

Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more

authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis
Federal civilian bureaucracy

Interested in whatever protects and increases their

power
Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests
 The national bourgeoisie
Well below the ranks of the oligarchy

Gets little from the West

Feels dominated by the oligarchs

Is nationalist and protectionist

The politicians
1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, United

Russia the ruling party under Putin

The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide and synthesis
 Which countries should Russia develop cooperation with
in the first place? Levada poll, Jan. 2013

Jan. 2001 Jan. 2013

USA 31 18
Germany, France, UK, 49 48
other West European
countries
Japan 27 22
India, China 22 30
Ukraine, Belarus, 53 46
Kazakhstan, other CIS
countries
Cuba, Venezuela, 11 10
Iran, North Korea
Hard to say 10 16
http://www.levada.ru/30-01-2013/rossiyane-otmechayut-
okhlazhdenie-v-otnosheniyakh-mezhdu-rossiei-i-ssha
Which of these countries should Russia build good relations
with for the long term? Levada poll, Dec. 2014

May April April Decemb

2004 2008 2013 er 2014
China 9 12 21 47
CIS countries, such 34 35 28 12
as Ukraine and
Belarus
West European 25 28 20 8
countries, such as
France and Germany

USA 13 7 9 4
Moslem countries 1 2 3 1
Others 3 2 1 2
Hard to say 14 13 19 27

http://www.levada.ru/13-01-2015/vneshnyaya-
politika-rossii-orientiry-i-kritika