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S.

52 Transfer of property pending suit


relating thereto.
During the pendency in any Court
having authority within the limits of India excluding the
state of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond
such limits by the Central Government
of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive
and in which any right to immovable property is
directly and specifically in question,
of the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt
with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to
affect the rights of any other party thereto under any
decree or order which may be made therein,
except under the authority of the Court and on such
terms as it may impose.
Explanation
For the purpose of this section,
the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be
deemed to commence from the date of the
presentation of the plaint or the institution of the
proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction;
and to continue until the suit or proceeding has
been disposed of by a final decree or order
and complete satisfaction or discharge of such
decree or order has been obtained,
Or has become unobtainable by reason of the
expiration of any period of limitation prescribed
for the execution thereof by any law for the time
being in force.
Doctrine of lis pendes
The basis of this doctrine is expressed in the
maxim ut lite pendente nihil innovetur
translated into English means nothing new is
introduced in pending litigation.
The foundation of this section is a matter of
public policy.
Main ingredients of the section are

(A) A civil suit or proceeding is pending between


the parties or their representatives.
(B) The suit is pending in a Court having
authority to decide the matter.
(C) The suit about any right relating immovable
property between the parties.
(D) The suit is not collusive between the parties.
Legal effect of the section : If the above
conditions are present , neither of the parties,
as a principle of law, can transfer the property
involved in the suit so as affect the right of
other party when a decree is passed.
The transfer is not void but voidable
A suit is deemed to be pending as soon as a
plaint is filed or proceedings are commenced
in a Court having competent jurisdiction.
In case the plaint is filed in a wrong
Court, then that is said to be not
pending.
Competent jurisdiction means both
territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.
The suit is deemed to be continuing
and pending until all the legal issues
are decided by passing a final decree
or order.
But passing final decree is not the end of the suit.
Until the decree is completely satisfied by
judgement-debtor, the suit is deemed to be

pending or
Satisfaction of decree cannot be obtained by
decree holder because of expiry of period of
limitation for execution of the decree.
For the execution the limitation period is
generally 3 years from the date of decree or
order.
Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami
AIR 1973 SC 569 : (1972) 2 SCC 200
Brief Facts: The Plaintiff-Respondent impleaded
the appellant and one Muniswamy ayyar
commenced by a pauper application on dated
June 23, 1958 in a partition suit so that the suit
must be deemed to have been filed on that date.
The appellant J is the son-in-law of the M.
The appellant purchased some lease-hold land
from the M on dated July 7, 1958 and others
under a sale deed of July 15, 1960 at a public
auction of immovable property held to realize the
dues in respect of loans taken by the M under
the Land improvement Loans Act, 1883.
On the facts stated above, the appellant J claims
that both kinds of sales were outside the purview
of the doctrine of lis pendense as both the sales
were for the discharge of pre-existing liabilities of
the Hindu Joint family of which M was the karta.
Whenever these liabilities existing they are
supposed to be disposed first by the whole family
after that whatever is remaining would be
available for partition.
In the case of 2nd sale it was contended that they
obtained priority over other claims.
For this additional reason it fell outside the scope
of the principle of lis pendens.
The M and the appellant J both pleaded that
the properties in suit were acquired by M with
his own funds obtained by separate business in
partnership with a stranger.
And the plaintiff A had no share in these
properties.
The Plaintiff-Respondents case was that although
the properties were joint, the liabilities sought to
be created and alienated by M were fraudulent
and not for any legal necessity and therefore not
binding on the family.
Issues: Whether the two alienations made by
the M will fall under the ambit of the
doctrine of lis pendens or not?
Observations: The appellant J claims that
both kinds of sales were outside the purview
of the doctrine of lispendens as both the
sales were for the discharge of pre-existing
liabilities of the HJF of which M was the
karta.
The liabilities incurred by M had to be met
out of the properties which were the subject
matter of the partition suit.
It was urged that, where properties are liable to
be sold for payment of such debts as have to be
discharged by the whole family, only those
properties would be available for partition in the
pending suit which are left after taking away the
properties sold for meeting the pre-existing
liabilities of the joint family.
They further pleaded that the properties in suit
were acquired by M with his own funds
obtained by separate business in partnership with
a stranger and the Plaintiff had no share in these
properties.
The Plaintiffs contention was that the alienations
made by M were fraudulent and not for any
legal necessity, and, therefore, not binding on the
family.
The T.C. observed that A karta is only authorized
to make alienations on behalf of the whole family
where these are supported by legal necessity.
The commissioner who was to divide the
properties by metes and bounds implied that
both the sale deeds made by the M were
treated as the separate liabilities of the M and
not those of the joint family.
The appellant relied upon certain authorities
laying down that the S.52 is not to be
extended to cover involuntary sales in
execution of a decree in mortgage suit where
the mortgage prior to the institution of the
suit in which the plea of lis pendens is taken,
because the rights of the purchaser in
execution of a mortgage decree dated back to
the mortgage itself.
The language of S.52 has been held to be
applicable not only to private transfers but also to
Court sales held in execution decrees.
But, as we have no actual sale in execution of
mortgage decree, this question need not be
decided here.
It was observed that as regards the satisfaction of
the mortgage decree in his favor, which was part
of the consideration for the sale of July 7, 1958,
the appellant-purchaser decree-holder could get
the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act and still
executes his decree, if it remains unsatisfied due
to failure of consideration.
It is no doubt mentions the names of the sons of
M but not the plaintiff A among the sellers.
At the most, it could be a sale binding on the
shares of the sellers.
Therefore we hold that the sale was not binding
on the whole family hence it attracts the
doctrine.
On the second contest the High Court committed
a small mistake by interpreting the law.
The HC had given effect to S.7(1)(c) of the Land
Improvement Loans Act of 1883 but had
overlooked S.7(1)(a).
S.7. Recovery of loans: (1) All loans granted under
this Act when they become due shall be
recoverable by the collector in all or any of the
following modes, namely :
(a) from the borrower as if they were arrears of
land revenue due by him;
(c) out of the land for the benefit of which the
loan has been granted as if they were arrears of
land revenue due in respect of that land;
In the case before us, the borrower had himself
taken up the case that the loan was taken by him
individually for the purpose of purchasing a
pumping set installed on the land.
It follows that this liability was not incurred on
behalf of the joint family unless it amounted to
an improvement of the joint land.
In our opinion the properties sold for the
purpose of clearing the debts under this sale
deed should be allotted to the share of
Muniswami.
In the Corpus Juris Secundum we find the
following definition Lis Pendens literally means a
pending suit;
and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined
as the jurisdiction, power, or control which a
court acquires over property involved in a suit
pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment therein.
The purpose of S.52 is not to defeat any just and
equitable claim but only to subject them to the
authority of the court which is dealing with the
property to which claims are put forward.
Conclusion: In the case before us, the courts
had given directions to safeguard such just
and equitable claims as the purchaser-
appellant may have obtained without
trespassing on the rights of the Plaintiff-
respondent in the joint property involved in
the partition suit before the court.
Hence, the doctrine of lis pendens was
correctly applied,
For the reasons given above, there is no force
in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.
Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.v.
H.H.Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo
AIR 1975 SC 1810 : (1975) 2 SCC 530
Brief Facts: There was a Sunder Vilas Theatre (now
known as Plaza Talkies) owned by its former owners,
Jiwan Das Bhatia and his sons.
The borrowers had taken Rs.2,50,000 from the
Plaintiff-respondent, a Maharaja, against the security
of bales of cotton.
On December 29, 1951, they executed a registered
mortgage deed in respect of the Plaza theatre in favor
of the plaintiff as the price of pledged goods was
insufficient to satisfy the dues.
The plaintiff, unable to recover the amount due,
had bought a civil suit No. 15A of 1954 in which a
compromise decree was passed on May 7, 1960,
in terms of an agreement between the parties
that amount due will be realized by the sale of
Plaza theatre.
The Central Bank of India, another creditor of
Bhatias, had brought Civil Suit No. 3B of 1952 and
obtained a decree for Rs.1,24,000 on April 29,
1952. Rights under the decree were assigned in
favor of the plaintiff-respondent.
The Plaza theatre, together with other properties
of Bhatias was attached on May 4, 1955 in the
course of execution of that decree.
The appellant company claimed to be a lessee in
occupation of the theatre where it had carried on
the business of running a cinema under an
unregistered lease obtained on Feb 27, 1940
which had expired on April 10, 1946.
The company continued as a tenant holding over
until the impugned lease deed of March 30, 1956
was executed.
If this was a valid lease, it would have conferred
upon the company the right to be a tenant of the
property under the lease for 8 years from 1956 to
1964 with an option for a renewal until 1970.
This lease was executed after the company filed a
suit (No.16A of 1954) on November 20, 1954 for
the specific performance of an agreement to
lease contained in a letter dated July 19, 1948.
A compromise decree was passed on March 24,
1956 in this suit also.
The lease deed of March 30, 1956 purported to
carry out the terms of that compromise decree
passed in a suit in which the plaintiff was not
impleaded at all.
Issue: Whether the lease of March 30, 1956 was
void as it was stuck by statutory provision,
namely, Section 52 of the TPA of lis pendens or
not as the Plaintiffs suit is already pending in the
Court on that date?.
Observations: The contention that the case fell outside
the purview of S.52 of the TPA as the lease was
executed in purported satisfaction of an antecedent
claim rests upon the terms of an agreement of 1948,
embodied in a letter on the strength of which the
defendant had filed his suit for specific performance.
We find that the terms of compromise decree in that
suit and lease deed of 1956 purported to confer upon
the defendant-appellant new rights.
Indeed, there are good grounds for suspecting that the
compromise in the suit for specific performance was
adopted as a device to get round legal difficulties in the
execution of the lease of 1956 in favor of the
defendant company.
We are unable to accept the argument.
We think that it purported to create entirely new
rights pendent lite.
An alternative argument of the appellant was
that a case falling within S.65A(2)(e) of the TPA,
confining the duration of a lease by a mortgagor
to 3 years, being a special provision, displaces the
provisions of S.52 of TPA.
This argument overlooks the special objects of
the doctrine of lis pendens which applies to a
case in which litigation, relating to property in
which rights are sought to be created pendent
lite by act of parties, is pending.
Moreover, for the purposes of this argument,
even if the provisions of S. 65A(2)(e) applies, even
that would make no substantial difference to the
rights of the defendant as the Plaintiffs suit was
existing on that date.
The reason being the act of the parties were after
the Plaintiffs suit was initiated.
Conclusion: We think that as the special doctrine
of lis pendens is applicable here, the purported
lease of 1956 was invalid from the outset.
In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to
consider the applicability of S.65A(2)(e) to the
facts of this case.
For the reasons given above, we dismiss this
appeal with costs.
Govinda Pillai Gopala Pillai v.
Aiyyappan Krishnan (AIR 1957 Ker 10)
Brief Facts: In execution of the decree in the suit the
appellant applied for delivery of one acre of property
together with the building thereon.
The contentions of the respondent (102nd defendant) as
summarized by the court below are:
That the 35th D, his father, had no rights over the property
even on the date of the suit that the 35th D has gifted this
property u/Ext.I to himself and his mother on 3-6-1895, long
before the suit, that the mother in turn gifted her rights over
the property to him u/Ext.II in 1901, that ever since that date,
he is in possession of the property in his own independent
title, that neither he nor his mother was a party to this
decree, that the decree is not binding on him and his property
and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to get
possession of the property.
The plaint was returned for want of pecuniary
jurisdiction for presentation to proper court
was filed in the District Court of Kottayam only
on 29-11-1895.
Issue: Whether the gift deed dated 3-6-1895 is
affected by the rule of lis pendens as on that
date the suit was not active in a competent
Court or not?
Observations: S.52 of the TPA states that
During the active prosecution in any Court
having authority of a continuous suit or
proceeding in which any right to immovable
property is directly and specifically in question,
the property cannot be transferred or otherwise
dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding
so as to affect the right of any other party
thereto under any decree or order which may be
made therein, except under the authority of the
Court and on such terms as it may impose.
The section was amended in 1929 by substituting the
word pendency for the words active prosecution
and the words any suit or proceeding which is not
collusive for the words a contentious suit or
proceeding.
There was no TPA in force in the Travancore State at
the relevant time and so what we are concerned with
in this case is not so much the application of a specific
statutory provision as of the general principle
governing such matters.
Lis means an action or a suit, pendens is the
present participle of pendo meaning continuing or
pending, and the doctrine of Lis Pendens may be
defined as the jurisdiction, power, or control that
courts have, during the pendency of an action over the
property involved therein
The basis of the doctrine is given as follows in the said
volume:
a pending suit must be regarded as notice to all the
world, any person who deals with property involved
therein must have acted in bad faith and is therefore,
properly bound by the judgment rendered.
As a matter of public policy preventing litigants from
disposing of the property in controversy in such manner
as to interfere with execution of the courts decree.
All suits for specific property might be rendered abortive
by successive alienations of the property in the suit, so
that at the end of the suit another would have to be
commenced, and after that , another, making it almost
impracticable for a man ever to make his rights available
by a resort to the courts of justice.
The foundation for the doctrine of lis pendens
does not rest upon notice, actual or constructive;
it rests solely upon necessity- the necessity, that
neither party to the litigation should alienate the
property in dispute so as to affect his opponent.
In Mullas commentary to S.52 stated that:
If the plaintiffs valuation is disputed and the plaint
returned after inquiry for presentation to a Court of
higher grade, an alienation effected in the interval is
affected by the doctrine of lis pendens.
if this proposition embodies the correct principle
then Ex.I is affected by the said doctrine and the
appeal has to be allowed.
Case Ma Than v. Maung Bagyan (AIR 1927 Rang 145).
In this case a suit was instituted in the Court where it
could deal only with suits up to Rs.500 in value. The D
filed a W.S. he pleaded that on a correct valuation the suit
is of value Rs.750 which is beyond the pecuniary
jurisdiction of that Court.
Hence the plaint returned.
And the plaint was presented in the proper Court on 21st
May 1920 and on 20th May 1920 the D sold the property
in dispute.
The Court held that the sale was void as it prohibited by
the S.52 of the TPA.
Subsequently held in a case Gouri Dutt v. Shanker (AIR
1933 Sind 117) held that this is not the good law.
Conclusion: We take the view that S.52 of the
TPA, as it stands today embodies a correct version
of the rule of lis pendens and that it is that rule
that should be applied in this case.
If the said rule is applied here there can be no
doubt that there was no suit pending in a court of
competent jurisdiction prior to 29-11-1895 and
that Ext-I dated 3-6-1895 should hence be held as
not vitiated by the rule of lis pendens.
Accordingly the appeal falls and is hereby
dismissed with costs.
Sri Jagannath Mahaprabhu v. Pravat
Chandra Chatterjee (AIR 1992 Ori 47)
Brief Facts: The petitioner instituted the suit for a
decree for eviction of the defendant, recovery of
possession and damages for illegal occupation.
Opposite party No.1 denied the assertions of the
petitioner and his title.
By registered sale deed dated 27-2-84, a portion
of the property involved in the suit was sold by
opposite party No.1 in favor of opposite parties 2
and 3 who filed an application on 1-10-85 u/O I
R10 of the CPC to be impleaded as parties.
Despite objection of the petitioner, by the
impugned order the learned munsif allowed
their prayer holding that though no doubt the
transfer was hit by the rule of lis pendens, in
as much as the Defendant-opposite party No.1
might not be interested after sale and for
properly conducting the suit and that might
cause prejudice to the lis pendens purchasers,
they should be arrayed as parties u/O 22, R 10
of the CPC.
Issue: Whether the rule that in a suit for declaration of
title a transferee from the defendant pendente lite is
either a necessary or a proper party and is also entitled
to be impleaded in as much as he would be bound by
the decree in the suit, having regard to the principles
contained in S.52 of the TPA or not?
Observations: The intervenors could not have been
added as parties to the suit in the beginning.
A person is not to be added as a defendant merely
because he would be affected by the judgment.
The main consideration is whether or not the presence
of such person is necessary to enable the Court to
adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in
the suit.
O I R10 cannot be read as requiring all persons
who have or claim to have or likely to have any
sort of right, title or interest in respect of the
subject-matter of a suit to be made parties.
The effect of S.52 is to render void as against the
decree-holder in a suit in which any right to
immovable property was in dispute and entitle
him to ignore all transfers or other dealings with
it by the judgment debtor from the time of the
institution of the suit till the complete satisfaction
or discharge of the decree which would affect the
decree holders rights under the decree or any
order made in the suit.
A transferee from a party to a suit gets interest in
the suit property and has a right to be substituted
in the place of transferor in the suit itself under
the provisions of O 22 R 10 CPC.
It enables the transferee to continue the
proceeding with the leave of the Court.
It does not bar the transferor continuing the suit
for the benefit of his Successor.
A person who had entered into an agreement for
sale of property from a defendant who had been
restrained by an order of injunction not to sell
the same, a stranger should not be added as a
party merely because he or she would be
incidentally affected by the judgment.
If alienations pendent lite were permitted then the
plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by
the defendants alienating before the judgment or
decree, and would be driven to commence his
proceedings de novo, subject again to be decided by
the same course of proceeding.
Lord Craneworth Said:
It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a
purchaser through the doctrine of notice. It affects him
not because it amounts to notice, but because the law
does not allow litigant parties to give to others,
pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute,
so as to prejudice the opposite party.
The rule is based not on the doctrine of notice but on
principle of expediency and public policy. Hence, no
question of good faith or bonafide arises.
The effect of S.52, therefore, is that a lis pendens
transferee is bound by the decree whether on
contest, ex parte or on compromise.
The plaintiff is under no obligation to implead a
lis pendens transferee.
This Court relied in the case Nagubhai Ammal v.
B.Shama Rao(AIR 1956 SC 593) that:
The contention that the words the property
cannot be transferred answered as following:
we are unable to accede to the contention of the
appellants that transferor pendent lite must, for
purposes of S.52, be treated as still retaining title
to the properties.
Conclusion: U/O 22, R 10 an alienee pendent
lite may be joined as party, but the plaintiff is
not bound to make him a party.
But the Court has discretion in the matter
which must be judicially exercised and an
alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party
to enable him to protect his interest (Mulla)
and also to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Accordingly we dismiss this revision petition.
Dalip Kaur v. Jeewan Ram
AIR 1996 P & H 158
Brief Facts: Lachhman respondent No.24 filed a
suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the
land measuring 9 kanals 9 Marlas which had been
sold to Respondents 1 to 5 to 6 to 21
The suit for possession by pre-emption was
decreed by the trial court on August 22, 1983
pursuance of which land possessed by him on Oct
6, 1983.
The appeal was filed by the respondents which
was dismissed by the District Judge on March,
1985.
The second appeal to this court was dismissed
on Sep 26, 1985.
Thereafter the Respondents 1 to 5 filed a special
leave petition u/A 136 of the Constitution of
India.
Leave was granted.
Accordingly, the suit filed by Lachhman was
dismissed.
Thereafter the original vendees and Respondents
6 to 21 filed an application u/S.144 of the CPC for
the restitution of possession.
Issue: Are the proceedings in a civil appeal
before the Supreme Court in pursuance to the
grant of special leave U/A 136 of the
Constitution of India not a continuation of the
proceedings in the original suit and is the
principle of lis pendens not applicable to such
proceedings? This is the short question that
arises in this second appeal.
Observations: Firstly, it deserves to notice that
the SC is at the head of the pyramid of the
judicial system in the country.
It exercises original and appellate jurisdiction.
It has the power to pass such decree or make
such order as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter-and any decree so
passed or order so made shall be enforceable
throughout the territory of India.
The law declared by the SC is binding on all
Courts within the territory of India.
U/A.136 SC has the discretion to grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or
matter passed or made by any court or Tribunal.
Their Lordships can even interfere with an
interlocutory order.
The powers conferred on the Court under the
Constitution are very wide.
This power has been invoked and exercised not
only in case where substantial questions of law
are involved but even in those where the HC has
come to a wrong conclusion from the evidence.
In the present case, there appears to be no
warrant for the view that the proceedings are not
a continuation of the original suit.
The mere fact that the leave to appeal has to be
obtained under the constitution does not mean
that the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply
or that the decree holder shall not be entitled to
the restoration of possession.
Conclusion: The principle that the transferee
during the pendency of the proceedings in
bound by the result was recognised.
It is held that proceedings before the Supreme
Court are a continuation of those in the
original suit and that the principle of lis
pendens as well as restitution shall apply to
the proceedings.
Accordingly, it is held that there is no merit in
this appeal.
It is dismissed.
S.53 Fraudulent transfer
Every transfer of immovable property
made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors
of the transferor
shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so
defeated or delayed.
Nothing in this section shall impair the rights of a
transferee in good faith and for consideration.
Nothing in this sub-section shall affect any law for
the time being in force relating to insolvency.
A suit instituted by a creditor ( which term
includes a decree-holder whether he has or
has not applied for execution of his decree)
to avoid a transfer on the ground that it has
been made with intent to defeat or delay the
creditors of the transferor
shall be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit
of, all the creditors.
(2) Every transfer of immovable property
made without consideration with intent to
defraud a subsequent transferee
shall be voidable at the option of such
transferee.
For the purposes of this sub-section,
no transfer made without consideration
shall be deemed to have been made
with intent to defraud by reason only.
Doctrine of Part performance-S.53A
Where any person contracts to transfer
for consideration any immovable property
by writing signed by him or on his behalf
from which the terms necessary to constitute
the transfer can be ascertained
with reasonable certainty,
and the transferee has,
in part performance of the contract,
possession of the property or any part thereof,
or the transferee,
being already in possession,
continues in possession
in part performance of the contract and
has done some act in furtherance of the
contract,
and the transferee has performed or is willing
to perform his part of the contract,
then, notwithstanding that where there is an
instrument of transfer,
that the transfer has not been completed in the
manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time
being in force,
the transferor or any person claiming under him any
right in respect of the property of which the
transferee has taken or continued in possession,
other than a right expressly provided by the terms
of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect
the rights of a transferee for consideration who has
no notice of the contract or of the part
performance thereof.
Doctrine of Part performance-S.53A
1. There is a contract for transfer of
immovable property in writing signed by the
transferor to the transferee.
2. The transfer is for consideration but not
gratuitous.
3. The terms of transfer can be gathered with
reasonable certainty. They are not vague or
uncertain or ambiguous.
4. The transfer has taken possession of
property from the transferor in partial
performance of the contract. The
performance was not fully completed.
5. If transferee is already in possession of
property and continues with possession in
partial performance of the contract.
6. The transferee has performed some act in
furtherance of the contract.
7. The transferee is always ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract or in other
words, ready to complete the contract.
If the above ingredients are satisfied, the
transferor or any person claiming under him
shall be debarred from taking back possession
from the transferee.
This section gives legal protection to the
transferee from being disturbed with his
possession
Exception: But in case if the same property is
transferred to another person, he will get the
property provided the transfer is:
A) for consideration
B) he has no notice of the earlier contract or
about part performance of the earlier
contract.
It must be noted that under s. 53 A the parties
enter into a contract of sale (popularly known
as (agreement of sale) but not sale as
explained in 1 para. Of sec. 54 of the Act.

For instance, A signs an agreement of sale


with B and B takes possession of property in
part performance of the agreement.
It must be carefully noted that s. 53A does not
confer title on the transferee.
This section only gives protection to his
uninterrupted right to possession of the
property and transferor is permanently
debarred from interfering with that right.
Therefore the transferee can protect his
possession of the property either as plaintiff
or defendant.
In other words when transferor files suit for
regaining possession the transferee as
defendant can protect his right or the
transferee can pray to the Court to
permanently debar the transferor from
interfering with his right.
Distinction between English law and Indian
law
In UK even an oral agreement is sufficient to
protect the transferees but in India it must be
in writing and also in view of recent
Amendment to Registration Act is that every
part performance of the contract needs to be
mandatorily registered.
The transferee who is having possession of the
property under the agreement can obtain
perfect title from the Court by fling a suit for
specific performance of the contract under
the Specific relief Act, 1963.
Until then he cannot claim to be the owner of
the property.

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