INVESTIGATION REPORT

MARINE ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to present the result of the

investigation into the marine accident nordlys on 11 september
2017 in Alesund, Norway
BACKGROUND
 The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) has carried out a safety
investigation in connection with the fire on board Nordlys 11 September 2011.
Two crew members died and two suffered serious injuries during the fire that
commenced in the engine room when Nordlys approached Ålesund, Norway. In
addition seven crew members suffered minor injuries. Nordlys had 207 passengers
on board. They were all evacuated without any physical injuries.
METHOD

 Investigation team from Accident Investigation Board Norway

(AIBN). The investigated before the accident until that accident
happended.
FINDING
During the investigation, the following evidence was discovered:
 the fire probably started when a diesel leakage was ignited coming into contact with an
un-insulated indicator valve on starboard main engine.
 AIBN is of the opinion that insufficient job specification in the shipping company’s
maintenance system had contributed to the fuel injection pump not being sufficiently
fastened and to the indicator valve not being sufficiently insulated.
 The water-based local application fire-extinguishing system was not immediately released
because it was set to the manual mode, and the CO2-based main fire-extinguishing
system was not released as the master did not have an overview of where all members of
the engine crew were located.
 Due to limited options of evacuating from the workshop in the engine room, three crew
members had to evacuate passing through the area of the fire. They received no
protection from the local application fire-extinguishing system as this had not been
activated at that time.
CONCLUSION

The investigation concludes that the stabillizer fins were not

retracted before Nordlys was berthed, and in the impact with the
quay the starboard fin was pressed through the hull. Initially, this
led to water ingress in cargo hold no 2. Because a watertight
sliding door either leaked or was left open, cargo hold no 1 was
also flooded. As Nordlys was designed to withstand damages
between the main transverse bulkheads only, the flooding
became critical and Nordlys came close to capsizing alongside
the quay.
RECOMMENDATIONS
 The AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority increase its focus
on insulation of hot surfaces in connection with inspections of passenger ships.
 The AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority propose a
requirement for all ships to have prepared an overview of surfaces that must be
insulated and to keep such documentation on board at all times.
 The AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority propose
requirements for automatic release of local application fire-extinguishing systems
in engine rooms, regardless of whether or not the engine room is manned
 The AIBN recommends that Hurtigruten ASA revise its maintenance system so
that the job specifications provide the crew with sufficient support for correct
execution of the work.