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A → B : { D} K encr ,C , (
MAC K mac , C { D} K encr ,C )
SNEP with Strong Freshness
A → B : N A , RA
B → A : { RB } K encr ,C
(
, MAC K mac , N A C { RB } K encr ,C
)
µTESLA
TESLA authenticates initial packet with a
digital signature. µTESLA uses only
symmetric mechanisms.
Instead of disclosing a key in each packet,
a key is disclosed once per epoch.
µTESLA restricts number of authenticated
senders.
Broadcast from Base Station vs. Broadcast
from a node
Cryptography
Implementation
Block Cipher
RC5 – small code size and high efficiency
Variable block size (32, 64, or 128 bits)
Key Size (0 to 255)
# of Rounds (0 to 255)
RAM Requirements
Evaluation
Energy Costs
MAC Transmission
20%
1% Encryption Computation
1%
Encryption
1% Transmission
7% Computation
2% Freshness Transmission
71% MAC Computation
Data Transmission
Related Work
Carman, Kruus, and Matt analyze a variety
of approaches for key agreement and
distribution in sensor networks.
TEA by Wheeler and Needham or TREYFER
by Yuval are smaller alternatives as
symmetric ciphers.
Karlof and Wagner investigate security
goals for routing in sensor networks.
Deng et al. analyze attacks against the
base station.
Limitations/Future Work
µTESLA requires loose time
synchronization between nodes
Counter must be updated at sender and
receiver
Information leakage through covert
channels
Only ensure that a compromised sensor
does not reveal the keys of all the sensors
in the network
Limitations/Future Work
Does not consider DoS
Does not achieve non-repudiation
Relies on the base station being trusted,
and therefore does not consider attacks on
the base station itself.
Questions/Comment
s